

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
and the
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

- PROJECT TITLE: Declassification Review of 1950-54 Department of State Records.
- SCOPE: This project will consist of a review for declassification of the most historically significant portions of the 1950-54 central decimal files of the Department of State (R.G. 59) and of the 1950-54 records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State (R.G. 84) appraised as having continuing value. The declassification reviewers will use the 1950-54 systematic review guidelines developed by the Department of State for use by the Archivist of the United States. The reviewers will also use applicable guidelines issued by the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Justice and by the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council. The project will require careful page-by-page review using all guidelines currently available and coordination for final declassification determination with responsible agency experts.
- OBJECTIVES: The purpose of this project is to declassify and prepare for release to the public the historically significant portions of the 1950-54 Department of State records. This objective should be accomplished on or before January 1, 1986.
- PRODUCTS:
1. Declassified 1950-54 Department of State records arranged, reboxed, and labeled.
 2. 1950-54 Department of State records identified as requiring further national security protection segregated, arranged, reboxed, and labeled.
 3. A listing of the record items requiring continued national security protection.
 4. 1950-54 Department of State records accessioned into the National Archives.
- ORGANIZATION: The project will involve National Archives and Records Service (NARS) and Department of State personnel. The project will be organized as follows:
1. NARS: The Project Director will be:
Edwin A. Thompson
Director, Records Declassification Division
Office of the National Archives, NARS
- The NARS project team will consist of a supervisory archivist/project coordinator and at least two archivists/team leaders and approximately 22 archives technicians/reviewers.

State Dept. review
completed

NLC Review
Completed.

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2. Department of State: The Project Liaison Officer will be:

John R. Burke
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Classification/Declassification
Department of State

The Department of State will assign one or more staff members to work with the NARS project team on an as needed basis.

NARS

RESPONSIBILITIES: The National Archives and Records Service agrees to:

1. review the most significant portions of the 1950-54 State Department Records (R.G.s 59 and 84) using all current applicable guidelines for declassification,
2. coordinate with agency experts the review of record items not declassifiable under those guidelines,
3. participate with Department of State personnel in revising the systematic review guidelines provided by the Department of State,
4. prepare for researcher use the record items which have been declassified,
5. segregate, arrange, and rebox the record items determined by competent agency authority to require continued national security protection,
6. prepare and submit to the Department of State a listing of the segregated items,
7. provide professional archival direction, supervision, and space necessary to accomplish the review,
8. employ, train, and maintain a staff of approximately 25 qualified persons to conduct the review, and
9. accession the 1950-54 records of the Department of State into the National Archives upon completion of this project.

DEPT. OF STATE

RESPONSIBILITIES: The Department of State agrees to:

1. maintain high level management support for the project,
2. provide the project liaison officer with sufficient resources to complete the project,
3. issue, maintain and keep current the Department of State guidelines necessary to accomplish the objective, and

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4. respond to Freedom of Information Act and mandatory review requests on the 1950-54 records of the Department of State until completion of this project.

SCHEDULE: This project will begin on or about March 1, 1982, and should be completed by March 1, 1986.

TERMINATION: Either party may terminate this agreement upon 90 days notice in writing. Outstanding financial or other obligations incurred by either party will be settled to the extent of the commitment at the time of termination.

COST: The Department of State agrees to reimburse the National Archives and Records Service in the amount of \$162,000 in F.Y. 1982. At the commencement of each fiscal year, beginning in F.Y. 1983 and thereafter through F.Y. 1986, both parties will agree to a funding limitation for the project.

BILLING: The Department of State will furnish NARS with required fiscal citations, the correct billing address, and one signed copy of this Memorandum of Agreement.

NARS will bill the Department of State quarterly based on the funding limitation. Standard Form 1080, Transfer of Funds, will be used for billing purposes.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

By _____
James W. Moore

By _____

Title: Assistant Archivist
for the National Archives

Title: _____

Date: _____

Date: _____

Please provide the following when Agreement is approved:

Funds Citation: _____

Agency Billing Address: _____

AUTHORITY: This Agreement is made under the authority of the Economy Act, approved June 30, 1932, as amended (31 U.S.C. 686).

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/INT	YH	12/15/81
2	C/SIT	783	12-15-81
3	AC/ADM	TY-	12-16
4			
5			
6	JOAN - FILE <u>LIAISON W/ NARS</u> <u>LIAISON W/ STATE</u>		
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
Remarks:			
<p>FYI. IF NARS CAN CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE THEIR HALF OF THE BUDGET & GET THE \$162K FROM STATE, THEY PLAN TO GO AHEAD WITH THIS IN SPITE OF PROJECTED CUTS. ALAN THOMPSON'S ESTIMATE IS FOR OUR SUPPORT QMNT. IS PERHAPS 2-3 PEOPLE FULL TIME, IF NARS CAN KEEP CA. 20 PEOPLE AT THIS REVIEW. NARS HAS SIGNED THIS CONTRACT, BUT STATE HAS NOT, SO PLEASE CONSIDER THIS STILL A SENSITIVE MATTER AT THIS TIME. *(A.T ESTIMATES THAT 10-20% OF THE PAGES WILL CONTAIN INFO OF INTEREST TO US.)</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
C/CRD			15 Dec 81
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67

(40)

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

30 Nov 81

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. C/CRD	<i>[Handwritten Initials]</i>	30 Nov 81
2.		
3.		
4. <i>Joan - file Liaison/State</i>		
5.		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

After our discussion, I called Richard Long at A/CDC/Systematic Review to inform him that we had no objection or comments on the latest version of this guideline which substantively is unchanged from the earlier version. As you will recall, we coordinated the earlier version throughout the Agency. I also mentioned that the reference to us as the Classification Review Group should be changed to the Classification Review Division. Mr. Long will make the change.

In other discussion, Mr. Long mentioned a document from a Consulate in Northern France forwarding a report received officially from the French Secret Service. After some general discussion on the implications I suggested he send it to us for review. He will do so.

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
CRD/OPS	Phone No.

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
 Prescribed by GSA
 FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

(UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of attachment) Date 11/2/81
ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. CIA - [Redacted]	AK	27 Nov 81
2.		
3. C/CRD	[Signature]	27 Nov 81
4.		
5.		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

The attached guidelines on State Department intelligence information for 1950-1954 for use by the National Archives are a revision of the guidelines which were sent to you earlier and which I understand were approved by CIA. There has been no change in the content--only the format was changed and a brief historical paragraph was added.

1-3; other than as noted above there is no substantive change from the earlier edition (copy also attached), since the earlier version was coordinated + approved should we notify State that this version is OK

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions *YES?*

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
Richard G. Long A/CDC/SR <i>RL</i>	B-234
	Phone No.
	632-9400 9291

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10/30/81

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Subject Guidelines for the Review of
Department of State Intelligence Information, 1950-1954

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of these subject guidelines is to aid in the identification of indicators and categories of information on intelligence activities, sources and methods which should be referred to the Department of State for further review; however, these guidelines provide no authority to declassify any information. The guidelines cover all intelligence information of whatever origin found in records of the Department of State for the period 1950-1954 as well as intelligence information generated by the Department of State which may be found in the records of other government agencies or departments. If there is any question as to whether a document contains information falling within these guidelines, the document should be referred to the Department of State for review. (U)

These guidelines are to be applied in the context of the "Guidelines for Systematic Review of Department of State Records Dated 1950-54" and of any other pertinent country or subject guideline for that period. An intelligence-related document usually needs to be reviewed also in the light of other subject or country guidelines. (U)

During World War II the United States built up a large foreign intelligence program, of which the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) handled most of the overall coordination and analysis. With the end of the war two important branches of the OSS were transferred to the Department of State by Executive Order effective October 1, 1945 with the aim of making State the chief intelligence coordinator of the U.S. Government. In January, 1946 however, State lost its interdepartmental intelligence coordinating role, and a much smaller departmental organization was established under a Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (its symbol was SA-MC: SA for Special Assistant, and MC for Alfred McCormack who held the position). In 1947 the intelligence unit was strengthened again, and in 1948 W. Park Armstrong, Jr., was named Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence with the organizational symbol of "R". From 1950 through 1956 the organization of the unit was as follows:

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Office of the Special Assistant - Intelligence (R)
W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

Office of Intelligence Research (OIR)
(Broken down into geographic and functional
Divisions which produced analytical
intelligence and reports)

Office of Libraries and Intelligence-Acquisition (OLI)
Division of Acquisition and Distribution (IAD)
(Included CIA and Military Liaison Branches)

Division of Biographic Information
(With Geographic branches)

Division of Library and Reference Services (LR)
(U)

INDICATORS OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

The following terms, symbols, or characteristics usually indicate the presence of intelligence information in a document. A document with one or more of the following indicators (except for the first item) should be referred to the Department of State for review; documents produced by INR's predecessor should be reviewed in the light of the categories of intelligence information listed below. (U)

1. Documents produced by INR's predecessor: Special Assistant - Intelligence (R), and its subsidiary offices and divisions. (U)
2. Documents or information which are clearly labeled "intelligence" or which refer specifically to covert, clandestine, or intelligence activities, sources, or methods. (U)
3. Documents or information generated by intelligence organizations of the U.S. or foreign governments. (U).
4. ROGER CHANNEL telgrams, airgrams, or other correspondence. These messages were initially marked "FOR ROGER" or "FROM ROGER"; "ROGER CHANNEL" began to be used about 1955. (U)


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5. Communications addressed primarily to U.S. Intelligence Community agencies or to foreign government intelligence agencies. (U)
6. Documents marked with four or five letter code words in addition to the normal security classification, or which have special markings such as "Handle Via _____ Channels Only". Such markings generally indicate the presence of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), which is defined as information and material requiring restricted handling within compartmented intelligence systems. (U)
7. The initials "CAS" (Controlled American Source), "CAS Reports", "CAS Station", "Station Chief", or "Station". (C)

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10. Documents carrying one or more markings intended to control its use and dissemination. The appearance of one or more of the following controls on a document indicates that intelligence information is included therein (these controls were used prior to 1962 in conjunction with a classification marking): (U)

INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS ONLY (i.e. CIA, State, Defense FBI, AEC, and military intelligence units)
LIMITED (same as INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS ONLY, but limited to full-time employees excluding consultants and contractors)
NSC PARTICIPATING AGENCIES ONLY
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS (U)

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11. Documents which carry any of the following Department of State file numbers (usually in the right-hand margin):

101.21
102.31
103.1102
121.**3
122.***3
123
700.52
711.5200 (E)
711.5200 (FAMILY)

Note that these files are sometimes followed by additional numbers to indicate further filing divisions. (U)

CATEGORIES OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

A. Intelligence Activities

1. Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Classified information which identifies, describes or comments on any aspect of the past present or proposed foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities, including the participation of any U.S. Government or foreign government agency or personnel. This includes, but is not limited to, "special activities" which are defined in Section 4-212 of E.O. 12036 as:

"activities conducted abroad in support of national foreign policy objectives which are designed to further official United States programs and policies abroad and which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but not including diplomatic activity or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions". (U)

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
2. Intelligence Organizations and Programs. Classified information on the organizational structure, number and assignments of personnel, size and composition of budget, security (procedures, techniques and activities), training and personnel (policies, methods, sites, techniques and materials), and communications (policies, methods and security) of any intelligence agency, as well as any other classified data which could reveal the nature, objectives, requirements, priorities, degree of success, scope or thrust of any intelligence agency activity, including the missions, functions and locations of such agency components or installations which are under any form of cover. Information pertaining to contractual relationships with private individuals, commercial concerns, or non-governmental institutions or entities when such a relationship involves a specific intelligence interest, or reveals the extent of knowledge of technical expertise possessed by an intelligence agency or when disclosure of the relationship could jeopardize the contractor's willingness or ability to provide services to such an agency. (U)
3. Cooperation with foreign government intelligence agencies regarding intelligence activities, sources and methods. This includes the confirmation of the fact of such cooperation. (U)
4. Defector Program. All aspects of the scope, policies, operations, and personnel of the U.S. Defector Program, which is now an Intelligence Community program. (C)

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B. Intelligence Sources

Information which could reveal or identify intelligence sources, whether a person, organization, group, technical system, mechanism, device or any other means or instrument. This includes references to specific governments as the source of intelligence information. (U)

C. Intelligence Methods and Techniques

1. Classified information which could reveal or identify the existence, nature, scope, target, and degree of success of (a) techniques, procedures, and equipment employed for clandestine and covert operations or communications; (b) human and technical surveillance and counter-surveillance devices, strategies, and operations; (c) the recruitment, training, compensation, and method of operation of intelligence agents; (d) escape and evasion techniques; and (e) handling of sensitive defector cases. (U)

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3. Classified information on intelligence support activities, including the assignments, travel, and activities of covert American intelligence personnel. However, information on overt intelligence activities -- such as travel expense vouchers of military attaches -- does not require protection beyond 20 years. The identification of individuals whose connection with covert organizations has been officially acknowledged by the U.S. Intelligence Community needs no continued protection.

4. Signals Intelligence, Photographic Intelligence, Cryptography and Related Activities. Information concerning or revealing the process, techniques, technical material or equipment, sites, facilities, particular operations, and overall scope of signals intelligence, photographic intelligence, and cryptographic security, including documents which came from the collection or exploitation of foreign signals and thus reveal the direction and success of such efforts. Some of this material may be SCI-see item 6 in the Indicators of Intelligence Information. (U)

Attachment:

Special Guidelines for Declassification Review of
Special Program Materials.

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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

3 Aug 81

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. Lou DO/IRO	<i>[Signature]</i>	3 Aug 81
2.		
3. CRD/OIS		
4. 		
5.		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

This is the final version of the intelligence part of the State guideline written for NARS and covering State records accessioned to NARS for the period 1950-54. It is essentially the same as the draft we sent to you earlier (in three parts, one part of which covered intelligence activities, sources and methods).

As before, we would appreciate any comments you have.

1 to 3: I routed this thru all of our branches. No one has any problem with it. Thanks.

sent to OK, FBI, ARS, etc.

Lu.

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
	Phone No.
 CRD/OIS	

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
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 FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

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Special Guidelines for Systematic Review of 1950-1954
Department of State Records Dealing With:
Intelligence Activities, Sources and Methods

This guideline lists categories of information on intelligence activities, sources and methods which should not be declassified or released without specific review by the Department of State, no matter what the date of the document. It covers intelligence information produced by foreign governments as well as by the U.S. Government. If there is any question as to whether a document contains information falling within this guideline, the document should be referred to the Department of State for review.

The following likely indicators of intelligence information provide a quick checklist of the types of documents or information which may be covered by this guideline.

1. Reports produced by INR's predecessor: Special Assistant - Intelligence (R) and its subsidiary offices.
2. Documents clearly labeled "intelligence" or which refer specifically to intelligence activities, sources, or methods.
3. Documents generated by intelligence organizations of the U.S. or foreign governments.
4. ROGER CHANNEL telegrams, airgrams, or other correspondence. These messages were initially marked "FOR ROGER" or "FROM ROGER"; "ROGER CHANNEL" began to be used about 1955.
Do not release any messages in this channel.
5. Communications addressed primarily to U.S. Intelligence Community or foreign government intelligence agencies.
6. Documents marked with four - or five- letter code words in addition to the normal security classification, or which have special markings such as "Handle Via _____ Channels Only" Such markings generally indicate the presence of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), which is defined as information and material requiring restricted handling within compartmented intelligence systems.
7. Certain words, abbreviations, and other indicators (such as "CAS" or "Station") which are usually connected with classified intelligence sources and methods—see Attachment A for a full list.

CATEGORIES OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

A. Intelligence Activities

1. Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Classified information which identifies, describes, or comments on any aspect of past,

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
- 2 -

present, or proposed foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities, including the participation of any U.S. Government or foreign government agency or personnel. This includes, but is not limited to, "special activities" which are defined in Section 4-212 of E.O. 12036 as:

"activities conducted abroad in support of national foreign policy objectives which are designed to further official United States programs and policies abroad and which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but not including diplomatic activity or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions."

2. Intelligence Organizations and Programs. Classified information on the organizational structure, number and assignments of personnel, size and composition of budget, security (procedures, techniques and activities), training and personnel (policies, methods, sites, techniques and materials), and communications (policies, methods and security) of any intelligence agency, as well as any other classified data which could reveal the nature, objectives, requirements, priorities, degree of success, scope or thrust of any intelligence agency activity, including the missions, functions and locations of such agency components or installations which are under any form of cover. Information pertaining to contractual relationships with private individuals, commercial concerns, or nongovernmental institutions and entities when such a relationship involves a specific intelligence interest, or reveals the extent of knowledge or technical expertise possessed by an intelligence agency or when disclosure of the relationship could jeopardize the contractor's willingness or ability to provide services to such an agency.
3. Cooperation with foreign government intelligence agencies regarding intelligence activities, sources and methods. This includes the confirmation of the fact of such cooperation.
4. Defector Program. All aspects of the scope, policies, operations, and personnel of the U.S. Defector Program, which is now an Intelligence Community program.

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B. Intelligence Sources

Information which could reveal or identify intelligence sources, whether a person, organization, group, technical system, mechanism, device or any other means on instrument. This includes references to specific governments as the source of intelligence information.

C. Intelligence Methods and Techniques

1. Classified information which could reveal or identify the existence, nature, scope; target, and degree of success of (a) techniques, procedures, and equipment employed for clandestine and covert operations or communications; (b) human and technical surveillance and counter-surveillance devices, strategies, and operations; (c) the recruitment, training, compensation, and method of operation of intelligence agents; (d) escape and evasion techniques; and (e) handling of sensitive defector cases.
2. Information which reveals the names of organizations and the fact that they provided cover for intelligence operations. Those organizations whose intelligence connection has been officially acknowledged by the U.S. Intelligence Community need no continued protection.
3. Classified information on intelligence support activities, including the assignments, travel, and activities of covert American intelligence personnel. However, information on overt intelligence activities—such as travel expense vouchers of military attaches—does not in and of itself qualify as a sensitive method and normally does not require protection beyond 20 years. The identification of individuals whose connection with covert organizations has been officially acknowledged by the U.S. Intelligence Community needs no continued protection.
4. Signals Intelligence, Photographic Intelligence, Cryptography, and Related Activities. Information concerning or revealing the process, techniques, technical material and equipment, sites, facilities, particular operations, and overall scope of signals intelligence, photographic intelligence, and cryptographic security, including documents which came from the collection or exploitation of foreign signals and thus reveal the direction and success of such efforts. Some of this material may be SCI—see the introductory paragraph, item 6.

Attachments:

- A. Words, Abbreviations and Other Indicators Usually Connected with Classified Intelligence Sources and Methods.
- B. Special Guidelines for Declassification Review of Special Program Materials

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Words, Abbreviations and Other Indicators
Usually Connected with Classified
Intelligence Sources and Methods
(For Materials Originated Prior to 1962)

1. The following indicators or key phrases may appear as references or in the body of documents such as incoming or outgoing telegrams, dispatches, and airgrams, internal memoranda, inter-agency correspondence, memoranda of conversation, and other official communications:

- a. The initials "CAS" (Controlled American Source), "CAS reports", "CAS Station", "Station Chief", or "Station".

NOTE: These categories or phrases require continuing protection and should be deleted in all cases when the rest of the material is being released.

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b.

NOTE: These indicators are subject to CIA guidance concerning declassification.

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c.

d.

2. Intelligence information may carry one or more markings intended to control its use and dissemination. Since Foreign Service reporting does not usually carry intelligence markings, the appearance of one or more of the following controls on a document indicates that intelligence information is included therein (controls in use prior to 1962 and used with a classification marking):

INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS ONLY (i.e., CIA, State, Defense, FBI, ABC,
and military intelligence units)
LIMITED (same as INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS ONLY, but limited to full-time
employees and excluding consultants & contractors)
NSC PARTICIPATING AGENCIES ONLY
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

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