

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000200150008-9

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

CIS Registry
83-111

25 FEB 1983

83-0446/1
-----------

Mr. Steven Garfinkel  
Director, Information Security  
Oversight Office  
General Services Administration (AT)  
18th & F Streets, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20405

Dear Mr. Garfinkel:

Enclosed are the "Guidelines for Identifying and Handling CIA Information During Declassification Review of Records from the Period 1946-54," as required by Section 3.3(a) of Executive Order 12356, 47 F.R. 14879, April 6, 1952, and Section 2001.31(c)(3)(i) of Information Security Oversight Office Directive Number 1, 47 F.R. 27839, June 25, 1982. The guidelines were coordinated in draft with Mr. Edwin A. Thompson, Director of the Declassification Review Division, National Archives and Records Service.

The policy at CIA is that our officers must review information for which we are responsible before it can be declassified and released to the public. In the attached guidelines we have attempted to explain the reasoning behind that policy. In addition, we have described our activities as an intelligence agency as they relate to the creation and protection of records, and we have tried to anticipate, at least in a broad sense, where such records might be encountered in the files of other U.S. Government agencies. Finally, we have provided a three-page listing of the various types of intelligence reports that CIA produced during the period with descriptions and comments about where they may be held in governmental records.

The enclosed guidelines supersede the "Central Intelligence Agency Systematic Review Guidelines" which were issued pursuant to Executive Order 12065, signed by Director Stansfield Turner, and forwarded under a letter dated 5 June 1979.

Previously issued guidelines currently in use at the National Archives and Records Service covering the records of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), material of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), and the Foreign Documents Division (FDD) remain in effect but will be reviewed and considered for revision as necessary.

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN  
SEPARATED FROM  
ENCLOSURE

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000200150008-9

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1 If you have any questions or comments concerning these guidelines, please contact [redacted], Director of Information Services, Directorate of Administration, CIA, Washington, D.C. 20505, [redacted]

Sincerely,

[redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
Harry E. Fitzwater  
Deputy Director  
for  
Administration

Enclosure

Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee w/encl and atts
- 1 - DDA Subject w/encl and atts
- 1 - DDA Chrono
- 1 - D/OIS Subject w/encl and atts
- 1 - D/OIS Chrono
- ✓ 1 - CRD Liaison w/ISOO w/encl and atts
- 1 - CRD Chrono

25X1 [redacted] (22 February 1983)

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**GUIDELINES FOR IDENTIFYING AND HANDLING CIA INFORMATION  
DURING DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF RECORDS FROM THE PERIOD 1946-54INTRODUCTION

This guideline will serve as the basis for identifying and handling information which was originated between 1946 and 1954 by the CIA or one of its predecessor organizations, or is information from that period which falls under CIA jurisdiction. This guideline provides no authority to declassify information. Its purpose is to provide background and general descriptions intended to aid declassification review personnel to identify CIA material that may be found in the records of other agencies. When such material is found it must be reviewed for declassification by CIA personnel. This is necessary because an intelligence agency has special security problems. All components of an intelligence agency are either directly involved in clandestine work, provide support to elements that are engaged in clandestine work, or are involved in processing clandestinely acquired information into a finished intelligence product. Whatever their role, there is an interrelationship among these elements which makes them all sensitive to one degree or another and an exposure in one can lead to an exposure in another. It requires a thorough understanding of these components and their interrelationships to assess the degree of sensitivity of information relating to intelligence matters and pass credible judgment on its classification status. (U)

The inherent sensitivity of intelligence organizations is attested to by the fact that no other nation allows, let alone requires, its intelligence organization to make its records public except after a minimum of 30 years and then sources and methods are still completely protected. This point is important from another aspect: the intelligence services of nations friendly to the U.S. are keenly aware of the situation created by the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, mandatory review, and systematic declassification review, and are very sensitive to the possibility that information that they pass to the U.S. government may be exposed. For this reason, we do not declassify or even downgrade information from other intelligence services without their concurrence. (C)

BACKGROUND

During the years 1946 to 1954, U.S. intelligence was passing through a transitional period. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which played the major U.S. intelligence role during WWII, was disbanded on 1 October 1945. It was succeeded by the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) which existed for one year. The records of the OSS and the SSU reflect a wartime context, being staffed with military personnel and putting emphasis on "hot war" activities related to the achievement of military objectives. On 22 January 1946 the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) was created and began to take in more civilians while it succeeded in absorbing the SSU by the end of October 1946. The CIG in turn was replaced by the CIA on 18 September 1947. The CIA was created as a civilian organization and remains one today. (U)

25X1

WARNING NOTICE  
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
OR METHODS INVOLVED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

The world environment also was in transition: from wartime, to peacetime, then very quickly into a "cold war," followed after a few years with hostilities in Korea, 1950-54. Intelligence activities during the period 1946-54 were not of wartime nature but they continued to have a strong paramilitary cast. Considerable resources were devoted to special activities aimed at strengthening the West and weakening the East through various kinds of direct action operations. Measures were undertaken to prepare for a "hot war" situation. Refugee and especially defector debriefings were an important source of intelligence information although classical intelligence collection operations were not ignored. Throughout this period the "iron curtain" between the West and East proved very difficult for our relatively young intelligence agencies to penetrate, and it restricted the flow of even overt information to the West. That forced collection efforts into many unlikely areas which normally would be considered overt. (U)

During this period, CIA and the other U.S. national security agencies were learning to coordinate their intelligence activities and were developing channels among themselves and with other U.S. government agencies to get administrative and operational support. Because intelligence agencies must establish themselves and operate abroad under some legitimate form, i.e. cover, they require a broad spectrum of support from agencies that function overtly. The latter will provide transportation, housing, offices, equipment, medical facilities, etc., the provision of which must be done covertly to provide cover for intelligence personnel. The arrangements for and actual providing of this support will leave a "paper trail" some of which will be classified, and some of which will not. This "paper trail" may be found among any type of administrative or operational records of the agencies and units which are involved in providing the cover. Many of these records may appear routine and normal for the unit. If all is done properly, it may be difficult from administrative records to identify the intelligence connection. But care must be exercised when reviewing all the unit's records that no document is declassified which could compromise the intelligence connection, even inferentially, and thus "blow" the cover. (See also the CIA Guideline to Aid NARS Identify Unclassified Information Concerning Intelligence Sources and Methods). (C)

The identification of intelligence related documents and information can be very difficult, and one purpose of this guideline is to assist the records reviewer in identifying records that relate to intelligence and, more specifically, to CIA. When files are encountered that relate to CIA, or relate to intelligence matters, but the specific organization cannot be determined, they should be given to CIA for declassification review. (U)

#### GENERAL GUIDELINE

For the purpose of identifying information relating to CIA we may break down its activities into four major areas: Plans and Policies; Collection; Processing and Analysis; and Production and Dissemination. Following is a brief general description of each of these areas intended to serve as a framework within which to identify CIA intelligence related information. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000200150008-9

Plans and Policies - Overall guidance to the intelligence community comes from the National Security Council (NSC). Many intelligence activities, particularly special activities, are initiated by the NSC or by presidential commissions such as the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) or the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). Several agencies may be involved in discussing and eventually adopting and formulating such guidance and the record of such collective activities may be held by all the participating agencies. The implementation of such plans must be coordinated at all levels and with the many types of units. This broad involvement will be documented and that record will be found somewhere in the files of the participating agencies. At the NSC level planning papers often do not indicate the source of the specific information used. In such a document if an intelligence matter is involved and it is not possible to identify the specific agency or department responsible for the information, CIA would like to have the opportunity to review that material. Classified planning and policy records relating to intelligence activities normally will require protection for long periods of time because (1) they officially confirm U.S. involvement and preclude the use of plausible denial and, (2) might provide details which could compromise intelligence sources and methods. (C)

Collection - The acquisition of intelligence information by all methods both human and technical. This involves the development, placement, and exploitation of sources that can obtain the intelligence information that our government needs. The protection of these intelligence sources is paramount to preserve the flow of intelligence information, to prevent disruption in our foreign relations, to protect those persons and organizations who risk themselves on our behalf, to protect our national investment in costly projects and technical devices, and to prevent the targeted persons and countries from becoming aware of our intelligence efforts and degree of success so they will not take actions to nullify the results obtained or take aggressive countermeasures detrimental to our national security. (U)

It appears somewhat contradictory, but to establish a clandestine foreign intelligence collection capability requires extensive support from overt agencies or entities. The support required includes transportation, housing, ostensible employment, funding, and medical care; in short, all the things a large organization must have to place and maintain personnel all around the world. This support also must be rendered in such a way that the cover it provides to intelligence personnel and their activities is not compromised. Much of this support comes from other U.S. government agencies. This is "official" cover and of course, like any element of the government, the units involved must keep a record of their activities. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000200150008-9

# CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000200150008-9

While it is generally known, and therefore unclassified, that CIA conducts intelligence operations around the world, the details and specifics remain classified. The CIA's covert presence abroad is made possible by the use of cover, and to maintain that cover the U.S. government cannot acknowledge that a specific CIA presence exists abroad. It is also important to protect friends and allies and to avoid frictions in our foreign relations by not disclosing details of our presence in specific countries or of our liaison relationships with foreign intelligence and security services. Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) Security Classification Guidance on Liaison Relationships With Foreign Intelligence Organizations and Foreign Security Services, effective 18 January 1982, (Attachment A), states that the fact of intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and a specific governmental component in an allied country, or general description of the nature of intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and one of these components is classified CONFIDENTIAL unless a higher classification or no classification has been specified by mutual agreement with the government or organization concerned. Finally, intelligence agency elements are stationed abroad to obtain and report information. Collections of their raw field reports can reveal a great deal about the organization that produced them. Therefore, all raw, unevaluated, field intelligence reports dated 1 January 1946 or later are withheld from automatic declassification under the authority of a letter from the DCI to the Archivist of the U.S. dated 16 October 1978 which was approved by the Archivist. (U)

Technical Collection - CIA is responsible for the clandestine technical collection for the intelligence community - as distinct from overt technical collection, which is the responsibility of the Department of Defense. Technical collection encompasses sensors and methods of their use including platforms, transmitters and receivers for relaying the data collected, and all related equipment. Sensors are designed for various types of technical intelligence collection: ACOUSTINT, RADINT, SIGINT (ELINT and COMINT), PHOTINT, etc. Platforms can range from the very small in the case of the microminiature, to vans, ships, aircraft, and satellites. Generally, anything having to do with the research and development, procurement, transportation, storage, location, and use of this equipment by the Agency, and its success or lack of it in collecting the required data, is classified. Certain codeword controls often apply to such information and could also serve as a key to identifying intelligence collected in a technical manner. (C)

Processing and Analysis - Processing is the conversion of technical data into information useful to the intelligence analyst. An example would be the development of film from overhead reconnaissance, and its examination and reporting by photo interpreters. Since most of this conversion falls under the heading of "intelligence methods", the process and technical parameters are always classified, with the most highly classified information

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000200150008-9

# CONFIDENTIAL

being about the degree of success of the system and data which, if divulged, would aid in the development of countermeasures to negate collection. (U)

Much of the processing of technical data (such as in the field of overhead photography) is a joint effort by CIA and other U.S. government agencies, particularly elements of the Department of Defense. The research and development of advanced methods of technical collection is often a joint effort, with CIA sharing contracting, appropriations, testing, etc. with other agencies. Consequently, many documents concerning such joint efforts will be found in the files of all participating agencies. The review of classified documents arising from such joint activities must be coordinated with all the agencies involved. (C)

Analysis is generally known and understood as the collation and processing of raw data from many different sources to find the solution to some question confronting our policy makers. There are many specific techniques that will be classified. The weighing and establishing of priorities for collection data and its use in estimating foreign capabilities and intentions is an intellectual process used by all analysts. But the fact that the Agency employs unique intelligence methodologies, for example, to estimate the costs of foreign defense activities, is classified. So are analytical techniques used in assessing the impact of natural resources, science and technology development, and food and population factors on foreign military, political, and economic responses to the U.S. The substantive intelligence produced by such analysis is often unavailable any other way. (C)

As in the case of processing, CIA has often shared analysis duties with other government agencies, with many of the private "think tanks," and with analytical institutions sponsored by various American universities. CIA often has shared in contracts other U.S. government agencies have had with such institutions. Once again, this will result in documents of interest to CIA being found in many files within and outside the intelligence community, and review of these classified records from joint activities must be coordinated with all the agencies involved. (C)

Production and Dissemination - The basic informational end product of an intelligence service is the finished intelligence report. It results from the collation, analysis, and evaluation of information available on a particular subject from all sources both overt and covert. (Attachment B is a list of many of the finished intelligence products that were published and disseminated by CIA during the period 1946-54.) Most finished intelligence reports are classified. Many of them include information from other U.S. government agencies or from foreign governments. This means that classification review must be coordinated with other interested elements before the information can be downgraded or

# CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000200150008-9

declassified. In some cases the titles of intelligence reports may be sensitive and require careful handling. Also, these publications receive very wide distribution throughout the U.S. government and therefore will be found in considerable numbers and in a variety of files not only in the records of intelligence and national security agencies but other U.S. government agencies as well. (U)

The processing and analysis of raw intelligence information serves to some degree to protect the source of the information. Nevertheless, the source may be identifiable through the content, subject matter, nature of the information, peculiar details, and timing. In a few cases of exceptional importance to U.S. policymakers the identity of the source may be given to aid in assessing the value of the intelligence. Information from a foreign liaison service may be distinguished through its style, content, subject matter, the conclusions drawn or comments added, and sometimes by outright identification. Intelligence methods might also be inferable, particularly where technical means are used to acquire information because of the nature, content, and quality of the data provided. Also, some sensitivity might accrue to information which concerns the handling and distribution of intelligence reporting, such as dissemination blocks, cover sheets, buck slips, and even handwritten margin notes. Such informational tidbits could indicate what information has been made available to certain organizations, thus revealing the division of effort in the intelligence community. It could reveal the names of covert personnel, identify components whose existence is classified, or reveal the existence and details of collaboration with a specific foreign liaison service. (C)

As noted above, information that CIA is responsible for may appear in documents which are not clearly discernible as CIA-originated, or in documents originated by other agencies. This makes the identification of CIA involvement very difficult. As a bottom line, we request reviewers to coordinate with CIA any information in any document bearing on, or suspected of bearing on, any of the topics discussed in this paper. Queries should be directed to the Classification Review Division, Office of Information Services, Directorate of Administration, CIA, Washington, D.C. 20505, or . (U)

25X1

#### Attachments:

- A. DCID
- B. CIA INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS PRODUCED DURING THE PERIOD 1946-54

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000200150008-9

CONFIDENTIAL



Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000200150008-9

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE <sup>1</sup>SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE ON LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS  
WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS AND FOREIGN  
SECURITY SERVICES

(Effective 18 January 1982)

Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 12333, and Executive Order 12065, the following is established as security classification guidance to representatives of U.S. departments, agencies and military commands who conduct, supervise or coordinate intelligence liaison with foreign intelligence and security services and international organization.

1. The fact of broad, general intelligence cooperation with a country or group of countries with which the United States maintains formal military alliances or agreements (e.g., NATO) is unclassified.

2. The fact of intelligence cooperation between the United States and a specific governmental component in an allied country (see 1 above), or general description of the nature of intelligence cooperation between the United States and one of the foregoing parties is classified Confidential unless a higher classification or no classification is specified by mutual agreement with the government or organization concerned.

3. The fact of intelligence cooperation between the United States and specifically named foreign countries and governmental components thereof with which the United States is not allied is classified Secret unless a different classification is mutually agreed upon.

4. Details of or specifics concerning any intelligence liaison or exchange agreement will be classified according to content.

5. The identities (including name or title) of foreign governmental or military personnel who provide intelligence pursuant to such agreements or liaison relationships will be protected at the same level of classification which applies to the fact of the intelligence cooperation, or at such different level as may be mutually agreed upon.

6. Information classified in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 above shall not be released to any component of either a foreign government or an international organization without the mutual agreement of the originating parties.

7. Information classified in accordance with this guidance shall be protected as specified in applicable Executive Orders and may be declassified only in accordance with the mutual desires of the United States and the foreign government or international organization whose interests are involved.

8. This directive does not apply to any liaison relationship that is concerned with U.S. internal security functions, or with criminal or disciplinary matters that are not directly related to foreign intelligence.

<sup>1</sup> This directive supersedes DCID 1/10 effective 18 May 1976. Nothing in this directive shall supersede the guidance provided in DCID 6/3.

William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence

UNCLASSIFIED

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000200150008-9

CIA INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS PRODUCED  
DURING THE PERIOD 1946-54

ALL CLASSIFIED SSU, CIG, AND CIA INTELLIGENCE REPORTS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO CIA.

ALL UNIDENTIFIED CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO CIA.

The following is a list of CIA finished intelligence publications that were produced and disseminated throughout the government during the period 1946-54. Copies may be found in the records holdings of any government agency that had need of, or use for, foreign intelligence. The titles of the publications often changed through the years, as did the designations of many of the CIA components which produced them. Most of these items had cover sheets with a CIA letterhead, logo, and document number. In certain cases, however, a plain cover containing only the document title was substituted, or the CIA cover sheet was removed, for security or other reasons. This listing is as complete as current institutional memory can make it but there may be other series found in government files. As experience reveals additional publications that are, or could be attributable to CIA, they should be forwarded to the Classification Review Division, Office of Information Services, Directorate of Administration, CIA, Washington, D.C. 20505.

National Intelligence Surveys (NIS) - Encyclopedic compendium of facts about a specific country, published by section, with contributions from all members of the intelligence community; e.g., USSR: Agriculture, Bolivia: Naval Forces, etc. The sections were published as completed, and some sections were updated several times before the program ended. The NIS's succeeded the JANIS reports, a similar series published during World War II by a Joint Army-Navy team.

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) - Produced and coordinated during this period by the Office of National Estimates, CIA, on behalf of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) (later the United States Intelligence Board (USIB)), with contributions from all members of the intelligence community. NIE's cover long term problems or situations, and project policy analysis into the future.

Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE) - originally called SE's, later called SNIE's. Originated the same way as the NIE's, except that they are spot reports covering immediate problems or crises.

Current Intelligence Bulletin (CIB) - Brief reports alerting the intelligence community and senior policy officials to world events of particular interest. Published daily by the Office of Current Intelligence and given wide distribution.

Current Intelligence Digest (CID) - a briefer, less formal version of the CIB.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000200150008-9

Current Intelligence Summary (CIS), and its codeword version, the Current Intelligence Weekly Review (CIWR) - longer, more complete documents and articles on current problem areas - published weekly. Often had one or more annexes which gave a fuller treatment to one specific problem. The annexes were sometimes published separately.

Current Support Memos and Current Support Briefs - low level monographs on economic subjects of current interest. Published periodically by the Current Support Staff of the Office of Research and Reports. Some items were codeword.

ESAU Papers, CAESAR Papers, and POLO Papers - were Staff Studies produced by the Senior Research Staff on International Communism. SRS studies were detailed, scholarly reports on various aspects of international communism; e.g., the Sino-Soviet dispute on Party doctrine. These studies were published in series, by subject matter. Sometimes they were called projects.

Studies in Intelligence - articles and book reviews of lasting interest in intelligence history, published (during this period) by the CIA, Office of Training, on a quarterly basis. Classified, but sometimes appeared with an unclassified annex attached.

Foreign Document Division (FDD) - Translations of foreign language articles from books, magazines, and periodicals of intelligence interest. These were classified to protect the method of acquisition and/or the intelligence interest. During most of this period, the Foreign Document Division was part of the CIA, Office of Operations. Hence, many FDD translations appeared as Office of Operations (OO) reports.

Consolidated Translation Survey - Longer reports by FDD which exploited numerous foreign language articles of intelligence interest for the latest information (often scientific, technical, or economic) on a single subject, e.g., Soviet electronics, Chinese Medicine, etc. These were all classified.

Foreign Broadcast Information Division Daily Report (FBID) - published in five volumes daily (except Saturday and Sunday) by area of the world, in both classified and unclassified versions. At that time, FBID was subordinated to the Office of Operations.

Radio Propaganda Reports - produced by FBID's Radio Propaganda Branch. These reports analyzed Communist policies, and especially policy changes, as evidence by their radio propaganda broadcasts. These were classified.

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000200150008-9

Vulnerability Series, Spot Reports, Radio Reaction Series, Current Development Series - Other FBID reporting of information obtained from the exploitation of foreign radio broadcasts. For example, because of the popularity of radio stations as a primary target for coup plotters, first word of upheavals in foreign countries often came from these reports. Published as necessary. These were classified.

Biographic Intelligence Bulletin - a short biography of a foreign personality appearing in the news. If the person was in the field of science, technology, or economics the bulletin would be produced by the Biographic Register in the CIA. At this time biographies of political personalities were produced by the Biographic Information Division/INR/State Department. However, this responsibility was transferred to CIA in 1961. Therefore political biographies, even those with a BID/State cover sheet, must be sent to CIA for classification review. Biographies of strictly military personalities were produced by the individual U.S. services and are now the responsibility of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Biographic Reference Aids - biographies of foreign personalities grouped by a common interest, e.g. Soviet doctors attending a conference in Italy, Chinese aircraft designers, etc. All these were classified.

OCR Reference Aids - The Graphics Register, Industrial Register, and Special Register of the Office of Central Reference also produced reference aids in the fields of film and still photography, plant intelligence, and other non-biographic fields.

Intelligence Publications Index (IPI) - a bibliographic aid which indexed classified articles of intelligence interest from all U.S. government sources (including contractors) and was disseminated throughout the intelligence community. These were classified. Published monthly and cumulated semi-annually.

Domestic Contact Reports - sometimes informally called OOB's from the first three characters of their document number series. Intelligence reports on all subjects gleaned from interviews with Americans returned from overseas. These were classified. Published by the Domestic Contacts Division of the Office of Operations, CIA.

Intelligence Reports - title usually preceded by the subject matter, hence, Economic Intelligence Reports, Scientific Intelligence Reports, Geographic Intelligence Reports, Photographic Intelligence Reports, [redacted], etc. - monographs produced by the Intelligence Directorate, CIA, or one of its constituent offices periodically. Classified and disseminated according to subject matter, but usually single subjects.

Intelligence Memoranda - also preceded by the subject in the title, as Scientific Intelligence Memorandum - shorter than reports, and usually with less research and coordination. Classified and published as the occasion warranted.