



Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM

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November 16, 1983

TO: INR/EC/CDC - Mr. Frederick Shoup
FROM: AF/S - Peggy Blackford
SUBJECT: Mineral Supply Availability: Botswana
REF: Lindstrom Memo dated November 9, 1983

A. Botswana is a pro-Western democracy which would probably favor the U.S. in an East-West conflict and would in any case come under strong pressure from South Africa to provide strategic materials to the United States.

B. Botswana's production of cobalt could be easily disrupted in time of war. The Botswana Defense Force numbers only about 3000 men who attempt to patrol an area the size of Texas. Guerilla forces could easily infiltrate the border.

C. Botswana's nickel matte which contains cobalt is exported via South Africa which could be expected to vigorously defend its rail lines and port facilities. Nevertheless sabotage is a real possibility.

[Signature]
Drafted by: AF/S: PBlackford: sra
11/16/83 X20916

Clearance: AF/S: RNorland
AF/S: DPassage
[Signature]

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DECL: OADR



Washington, D.C. 20520

November 15, 1983

SECRETMEMORANDUM

TO: INR/EC - Mr. Lindstrom
FROM: AF/C - Deborah M. Odell
SUBJECT: Mineral Supply Availability: Gabon

A. The Government of Gabon, which is pro-West and capitalist, is unlikely to withhold manganese from the United States in the event of war. Gabon, as an oil producer, is, at present, financially secure.

B. Gabon is a stable, one-party state, held together by the personality of one man, President Bongo, who maintains power by a careful balancing of the country's varied ethnic interests. Although we do not anticipate civil unrest in the event of a war, the assassination of President Bongo or deliberate attempts at destabilization by outside forces could change the picture. In addition, Gabon's economy and government bureaucracy are run by French technicians; the removal of these technicians, for whatever reason, would cause the disruption of government in Gabon, and would certainly seriously inhibit production and exports.

C. Manganese is exported from Gabon by sea; land routes will not be available for several years to come. The disruption of North Atlantic shipping would certainly have an adverse effect on Gabon's export of manganese to the United States. Of Gabon's neighbors, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea are pro-West. Congo is non-aligned but has close ties to the Soviet Union and other east bloc countries.

Drafted: AF/C:DMOdell:jeh/mc
11/14/83. 632-0996
VYDEC #14. B-9

Cleared: AF/C:GAMunro

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Washington, D.C. 20520

November 15, 1983

SECRETMEMORANDUM

To: INR/EC - Ralph E. Lindstrom

From: AF/S - Daniel H. Simpson *DHS*

Subject: Your Memorandum of November 9 on Reliability of Supply of key Minerals from Namibia

For the purposes of the study described in your memorandum, a distinction would have to be made between the status quo in Namibia (South African control) and the character of any elected government if the current international negotiations result in Namibian independence.

In the first instance, one would have to assume that there would be no likely disruption of the supply of diamonds or other minerals produced in Namibia (uranium, copper, lead, tin, or zinc).

Were a crisis to unfold after Namibian independence, it is conceivable that an elected Namibian government, particularly one involving SWAPO, might seek to withhold critical or strategic materials or prove susceptible to Soviet pressure to do so. More likely, given the virtual certainty, under any conditions, of Namibia's continued heavy economic dependence on South Africa and the great extent of Western involvement in the Namibian minerals sector, there would be little chance of an effective embargo directed at the Western market. Moreover, the complete dependence on South Africa as a transit channel for Namibian exports eliminates the possibility that land routes through other neighboring countries would have any bearing on questions of supply.

Similarly, we discount the possibility that civil unrest, sabotage, insurgency, or other military action, whether or not Soviet-inspired, would have any effect on mineral production or exports. Under current circumstances, of course, Namibia faces just those conditions, with no effect on production. Given Namibia's topography, the vast distances involved, and the relatively sparse population, any threat to production appears minimal, even in the context of actions directed against a Namibian government friendly to the West.

Drafted: AF/S: PReams
11/15/83 x8252

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Washington, D.C. 20520

November 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

TO: INR/EC- Mr. Lindstrom

FROM: AF/S- David Passage

SUBJECT: Mineral Supply Availability- South Africa

This memorandum contains the responses pertaining to South Africa in answer to your questionnaire dated November 9 concerning supply reliability of critical and strategic minerals:

- A. It is unlikely that the South African Government would withhold its important supplies of platinum, chrome and vanadium from the U.S. in time of war. South Africa considers itself a bulwark against communism and Soviet expansion, and would probably want to assist the United States in the event of a war along the lines assumed in the questionnaire. In addition, U.S. policy--by trying to promote peaceful change away from apartheid and toward a system of government in South Africa which involves the country's black majority--is aimed at ensuring that we stay on friendly terms with any government that should succeed the present South African Government.
- B. Civil unrest, sabotage or insurgency could indeed disrupt South Africa's production or exports of the above-named minerals in wartime, but such activity would have to be of greater magnitude than at the present time. Groups which are seeking--principally with Soviet assistance--to overthrow the government of South Africa have not at this point demonstrated an ability to project force which could result in such disruptions. There is nothing to preclude a change in tactics, however, which might result in greater damage being inflicted on South Africa's infrastructure, particularly in a war-time situation.
- C. The above contingencies could well cause land routes through neighboring countries, such as Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Namibia, to be interrupted in time of war.

Drafted: AF/S-RNorland



Washington, D.C. 20520

November 15, 1983

SECRET
MEMORANDUM

TO: INR/EC - Ralph Lindstrom

FROM: AF/E - Richard W. Bogosian *MB*

SUBJECT: Mineral Supply Availability: Cobalt
from Uganda

REF: Your Memo of November 9, 1983

The following addresses the questions posed in your memo regarding the supply reliability of cobalt from Uganda.

A. Barring a radical change in its foreign policy, Uganda is unlikely to withhold sales of cobalt to the United States under the wartime scenario described in your memo. Instead, Uganda would probably attempt to maximize the economic benefits of commercial trade in its strategic materials. In any case, Uganda's borders are so permeable that any official interdiction of mineral exports would be very difficult to enforce.

B. Unless Uganda itself were directly involved in the hostilities, the chances of war-inspired disturbances disrupting production or exports are minimal. Since Uganda experiences more or less chronic domestic instability, there is a chance that during a prolonged war, local production could be disturbed by random civil unrest.

C. Uganda would depend on both land and sea routes for the export of cobalt to the U.S. Under the contingencies described in the memo, the principal port handling Ugandan exports (Mombasa, Kenya) could be damaged or otherwise unavailable for trade with the West. Also, closing of the Red Sea and Suez Canal would disrupt, but not necessarily impede, seaborne trade between Uganda and the U.S. More likely, the interruption of normal sea trade routes would cause a break in regular supply until alternative routes were

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established. That assumes that Ugandan cobalt remains economically competitive and essential enough to justify continuing our importation.

SJP
Drafted By: AF/E: SEP *panizza*: vbh
11-15-83: 632-8852

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S Zaire CG
United States Department of State EMIN
Washington, D.C. 20520 COMPRE

November 16, 1983

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MEMORANDUM

TO: INR/EC - Mr. Lindstrom
FROM: AF/C - Glenn A. Munro
SUBJECT: Request for Information--Mineral Supply Availability:
Zaire

A. It is highly unlikely that Zaire under President Mobutu Sese Seko would withhold supplies of copper and cobalt from the U.S. in time of war. President Mobutu has made close ties with the West a cornerstone of his 18 year leadership of Zaire. His government and country depend upon mineral sales to the West to stay afloat economically. Western countries, the U.S. included, have twice acted to save his regime when it was invaded by East Bloc backed guerillas in the late 1970's. Mobutu clearly sees his political and economic fortunes as inextricably linked to the West and especially the United States. We see no evidence to support the idea that the Mobutu regime would willingly deny us access to its mineral supplies in time of war.

B. However, mineral production in Zaire is vulnerable to actions designed to disrupt it. The main cobalt and copper producing areas are found in Shaba province, near the Zambian and Angolan borders. These are notoriously unstable areas, as witnessed by the Shaba I and II invasions. Dissident Zairian movements are active just across the borders, and a full scale civil war is taking place in Angola. Security within Shaba province is poor, with ill-equipped and often unpaid Zairian troops more concerned about shaking down civilians than preparing for the region's defense. If the war were to reach Central Africa or if the USSR or its clients were to incite the Zairian opposition groups to disrupt minerals production, this could probably be done fairly easily.

C. Active guerrilla movements, politically volatile relations between countries in the region, poorly developed and maintained transportation facilities and a chronic lack of spare parts all combine to render it conceivable that supplies of minerals from Shaba province would be interdicted in time of war. The Benquela railway now functions at only a fraction of its capacity because of sabotage caused by UNITA guerrillas in Angola. The Lubumbashi to Durban railway, which currently carries two-thirds of Shaba's mineral production, passes through Zambia and Zimbabwe, and it is likely that in the case of a conventional war the Zimbabwean-South African border would be

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closed. The internal transportation system from Lubumbashi to Matadi via Ilebo is least likely to be interdicted, but this too is vulnerable to sabotage and in its present poor condition can only carry part of the region's mineral production. A fourth possible route exists via Zambia and the Tazara Railway, to Dar Es Salaam, but it is not presently used and suffers from many of the problems cited above.

5/11/83
Drafted: AF/C: ERMcmahon:mc
11/15/83 632-1637
Cleared: AF/C: RBresler
AF/C: GAMunro

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM

November 16, 1983

TO: INR/EC/CDC - Mr. Fred Shoup
(Room 8448)

FROM: AF/S - Daniel H. Simpson *DHS*

SUBJECT: Request for Information on Mineral Supply
Availability - Zambia

REF: Lindstrom Memorandum of November 9, 1983

Following are replies to questions posed in the referenced memorandum.

- A. Because of the likely enormous political and economic costs of such a decision, the Government of Zambia is unlikely to withhold cobalt and copper from the United States in time of war.

The importance of mining to Zambia's overall GDP has declined in recent years, but the sector remains the primary determinant of Zambia's economic and financial performance. The U.S. is a major market for Zambian copper which alone has traditionally accounted for 95% of the country's export revenues. Although the U.S. has not been the primary market for Zambia's generally low-quality cobalt, the Zambian mining sector recently has devoted considerable effort to producing a higher grade of cobalt which would increase its attractiveness in the U.S. market.

The country's recession plagued economy weakened further in the past two years owing to recurring droughts which necessitated costly food imports and further expenditures of foreign exchange. The government is undertaking a program of IMF-World Bank mandated reforms, moving to reschedule debts, and according greater emphasis to agriculture and industrialization, but Zambia's economic health and prospects will remain tied to its ability to earn foreign exchange from copper and cobalt exports for the foreseeable future.

- B. Civil unrest, sabotage, insurgency or military action from forces in neighboring countries, whether or not Soviet-inspired, could disrupt Zambia's production and/or export of cobalt and copper in war time. Land-locked Zambia's mining industry would be vulnerable to actions from hostile neighbors or insurgencies. Its production in part is dependent upon

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foreign sources of spare parts and machinery. Zambia's exports and imports must transit through neighboring countries. Disruption of maritime services and sea routes between Zambia and the U.S. also could disrupt the country's production and export of these minerals.

Additionally, expatriate expertise continues to play an important role in Zambia's copper and cobalt mining sectors, although a program of Zambianization is underway. Zambia's ability to retain the services of its expatriate personnel could affect the production and export capability. The attitude and actions of Zambia's politically important, independent trade unions which are strong in the mining sector would also be an important factor.

- C. Civil unrest, sabotage, insurgency, or other military action, whether or not Soviet-inspired, could cause land routes through non-producer countries -- routes important in the import of Zambia's cobalt and copper to the United States -- to be interrupted in war time. Zambia's exports travel by surface through neighboring countries. Consequently, political and economic conditions in Tanzania, for example, would affect Zambia's ability to continue exports to the U.S.

Drafted: AF/S: SStanfield:mj
11/16/83 632-8851

Clearances: AF/S: DPassage

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM

November 16, 1983

TO: INR/EC - Mr. Ralph E. Lindstrom
FROM: AF/S - Simeon L. Moats *SM*
SUBJECT: Zimbabwe: Mineral Supply Availability
REF: Your Request for Information dated 11/9/83

Following is our best and briefest response the questions you posed:

A. Would Zimbabwe withhold chromite and asbestos from the U.S. in wartime?

-- Zimbabwe's most likely reaction to a conventional war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would be to attempt to remain neutral. That would include honoring previous commitments for supplying strategic minerals and basing future supply decisions on economic (including deliverability), not political factors.

B. Would Zimbabwe's production or exports be cut off?

-- Zimbabwe's production of chromite and asbestos would probably not be cut off voluntarily, but could be disrupted by Soviet-inspired unrest. Zimbabwe is landlocked and exports would depend on the ability of Mozambique and South Africa to insure transit of such shipments.

C. Would trans-shipment be blocked?

-- Barring major Soviet intervention, complete cutoff is unlikely, since several alternate transport routes exist.

Drafted by: AF/S:SMoats:sra
11/16/83 X28434

Clearances: AF/S:DPassage (*draft*) *SM*

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- A. Given Australia's history of close alliance and cooperation with the US in peace and war, we assume that in a future conflict it would be no less supportive of the US than any other of our very closest allies. Such support would likely include as much of the minerals listed in the question as Australian industry could spare. Australia is a partner with the US and New Zealand in the ANZUS security treaty.

- B. If public support of Australia's support role in the hypothetical conflict is high, such disruption is extremely unlikely.

- C. It is possible that increased Soviet activity in the Pacific could disrupt US-Australia sea lanes of communication (Australia does not share a land border with any other country).

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Concurrence: *P*
EA/ANZ - Mr. Baas



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM

TO: INR/EC - Ralph E. Lindstrom
FROM: EA/C - Richard H. Howarth *RHH*
SUBJECT: Mineral Supply Availability

The following information is provided in response to your memo of November 9.

A. The government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) consistently emphasizes its independence from both the Soviet Union and the United States, and can therefore be expected to act strictly in its own national interest in time of war. In its self-perceived role as a Third World leader, the PRC could be expected to hew to a non-aligned and an aggressively independent course of action.

Although the PRC perceives the Soviet Union as a greater security threat than the United States, that motivation alone should not be construed as sufficient to ensure the continued shipment of strategic materials during war time. In addition, PRC actions in a conventional war including action in Korea would be directly affected by long-standing ties between China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). If, for example, the US was perceived as an aggressor in the DPRK, the PRC would be likely to take a hostile attitude towards the US. Alternatively, China would not shrink from making a profit and establishing a greater market presence by continuing sales to the US, if the alignment of third countries and the battle situation permitted.

B. Because of the significant Soviet military force deployed on China's long land border with the Soviet Union, one could expect significant disruption of Chinese economic production during a time of global hostilities, and US access to strategic materials from China could not be assured. This is necessarily dependent upon the precise location and extent of hostilities, but the PRC cannot be considered a reliable source of supply under the scenario provided.

C. The scenario provides that the Pacific would be free from all but slight interdiction therefore China's primary trade routes would remain intact.

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DECL. OADR

Mineral Supply Availability
Memo To INR/EC

Drafted: EA/C - JKeith ^{JK}
w0999E. November 17, 1983

Clearances: EA/C - DKeyser ^{JK}
EA/RA - PGardner ^{JK}
EA/EP - LMoriarty ^{JK}

Mineral Supply Availability -- Indonesia

NOTE: Indonesia is a major supplier of petroleum to the U.S. (currently supplies about 8% of our imports). If Middle East supplies were disrupted, we would undoubtedly seek to increase our purchases from Indonesia.

A. As a formally non-aligned nation with very modest defense capabilities, Indonesia would seek to avoid any action which might draw it directly into a big power war. At the same time, its political sympathies would be strongly with the U.S. For that reason and because of the substantial economic benefits it could reap, Indonesia would seek to continue and even increase its export of strategic materials to the U.S. as long as it judged that such action would not put it in jeopardy of direct Soviet retaliation (it probably would be willing to run the risk of Soviet interdiction of shipping, especially since it has only a small ocean-going merchant fleet and the great bulk of its exports are transported on U.S. or third country vessels).

B. The Government of Indonesia at all times places a high priority on maintaining domestic stability, keeping a tight lid on the expression of dissident views. In times of international unrest, it would keep the lid on even tighter. There is little likelihood of domestic unrest of sufficient magnitude to significantly disrupt production or export of strategic materials, in the absence of a severe breakdown of the Indonesian economy.

C. N/A.

Drafted: EA/IMBS:AMLehn:ecs
11/14/83:632-3276

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Mineral Supply Availability -- Malaysia

A. Provided Southeast Asian and Pacific sealanes remain open in wartime and Malaysia itself is not occupied or invaded militarily, the flow of strategic materials, including rubber, tin and exotic metals, to the United States would likely be maintained. On the political side, the Malaysian Government is staunchly anti-communist and could be counted upon to assist in maintaining the flow of critical materials to the United States and other Western nations. Although technically non-aligned (as are Malaysia's ASEAN partners Indonesia and Singapore), the Malaysian Government supports a U.S. strategic presence in Asia as a bulwark against communism, whether the threat might emanate from the USSR, China or Vietnam. In time of threat or international tension, Malaysia would largely be guided by the common outlook and/or policies of ASEAN, but these are expected to be fundamentally pro-Western and supportive of Western anti-communist efforts.

B. There is no significant subversive or terrorist threat to the Malaysian Government, whether Soviet-inspired or not. The GOM has effective military, police and security forces to maintain domestic order, although acts of sabotage provoked by Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) factions or the few pro-communist guerillas remaining in the Sarawak-West Kalimantan border area would not be out of the question. Also, while Malaysia's communal problem revolving around deep-seated mistrust between the Malays and Chinese remains a constant in the political life of the country, inter-ethnic tension is not likely to affect the viability of the government, Malaysia's national integrity or defense and security capabilities in wartime or other periods of international tension. Indeed, a "national emergency" in the face of an external threat or a major internal subversive threat would result in measures to forestall communal unrest. In this situation, it is not likely that the flow of strategic materials from Malaysia would be adversely affected.

C. Since natural commodities flow out of Malaysia by sea, the question of land routes to or through neighboring countries does not arise.

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Drafted: EA/IMBS:AFLA Porta:ecs
11/16/83:632-3276

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DECL: OADR



Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

November 17, 1983

TO: INR/EC - Mr. Ralph Lindstrom
FROM: EA/PIA - Steven R. Pruett
SUBJECT: Request for Information-Mineral Supply
Availability

A. The actions of the territorial administration in New Caledonia in wartime would depend primarily on decisions of the French Government. If France were occupied, Australia, the major regional power, might feel compelled to intervene as it did in World War II.

B. Given New Caledonia's geographic location, it is not likely that Soviet action, short of a military move on Australia, would disrupt New Caledonia's nickel production.

C. Not applicable. New Caledonia is an island.

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Washington, D.C. 20520

November 16, 1983

UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM

TO: INR/EC - Ralph E. Lindstrom
FROM: EA/PHL - Ulrich A. Straus *UAS*
SUBJECT: Request for Information--Mineral Supply Availability

With regard to the questions raised in your memorandum of November 9, the following can be said regarding the availability of critical and strategic materials from the Philippines in wartime:

A. Under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1952, each party is committed to self-help and mutual aid to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack" and to "act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes." In view of these obligations and the close and friendly relationship prevailing between the two countries, we fully anticipate that the Philippines would continue to make chromite, cobalt, and nickel available to the U.S., unless its own involvement in the hostilities should make continued shipment of these commodities physically impossible.

B. Since U.S. military facilities on Philippines soil would inevitably be engaged in the war posited by the interagency review group and hostile Soviet military action against those facilities would be equally likely, the possibility of disruption of Philippine production of critical minerals during wartime must be considered by U.S. planners for stockpiling purposes. It is of course conceivable that, even if our military facilities there were damaged or destroyed, the Philippines could nevertheless stay out of the war, but alliance obligations and other considerations make this unlikely. On the other hand, civil unrest, sabotage, and insurgency are not likely to affect Philippine mineral production unless the country is actually invaded.

C. Only sea routes are involved. Maintaining those routes would have to be entirely a U.S. responsibility.

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Washington, D.C. 20520

November 18, 1983

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MEMORANDUM

TO: INR/EC/CDC - Frederick Shoup

FROM: ARA/AND - Lee M. Peters *LP*

SUBJECT: Mineral Supply Availability Review

A. Bolivia maintains diplomatic relations with the USSR and, under the Siles Administration, has sought closer economic and commercial relations with Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies. Nevertheless, under present and foreseeable circumstances neither the Siles Government nor any likely successor regime would withhold supplies of tin and tungsten from the US. Under a civilian government, leftist elements could try to obstruct such transactions, but centrist influences and economic considerations would almost certainly outweigh their efforts. A military government would undoubtedly continue to supply the US in the event of a major East-West conflict.

One factor that could color Bolivian attitudes -- at least under a left-to-center civilian government -- would be the position of other Latin American governments toward a US-Soviet conflict in a Third World context in which the US was seen as the aggressor. Bolivia could join a boycott by other Latin producers if the boycott involved a substantial share of OAS member states. Overcoming Bolivian solidarity with other Latin nations in such circumstances could be difficult and costly.

B. Labor action and sabotage could disrupt Bolivian mineral production and exports, at least temporarily, during a US-Soviet conflict.

The National Labor Federation (COB) is well organized and frequently critical of the US and the Government. Within the COB the miners are the most cohesively organized group. Labor leadership is likely to be critical of the US in any conflict with the Warsaw Pact, especially if Third World proxies or Third World locales are involved. Whether labor militancy would seriously interrupt production would depend on economic factors and on the willingness of the Government to intervene. High prices and high wages would make labor more tractable. Present or foreseeable governments, even if critical of the US, would probably respond to US economic incentives and political pressure to end major labor actions.

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Sabotage, both spontaneous and Soviet-inspired, is possible. As with labor unrest, the Government would be responsive to US pressure and incentives to halt sabotage, although its traditional weakness could limit its ability to halt determined saboteurs.

C. Bolivia ships its mineral exports through Chilean ports. By a treaty of 1904, Chile granted Bolivia free use of its ports, and later clarifications have made those rights essentially inviolable. Under present or foreseeable circumstances Chile is unlikely to deny passage to Bolivian minerals. Labor stoppages and/or sabotage could obstruct transit and loading, but under the current or foreseeable Chilean governments such interruptions would probably not be prolonged or serious.

Bolivian mineral shipments do not normally move through Peruvian ports, but if Chilean ports were unavailable they could be used. Under present and foreseeable circumstances Peru would permit such movement. Labor unrest and/or sabotage are unlikely to have a serious or long-term effect.

Shipment through Argentina by rail is also possible, but simply uneconomical.

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Washington, D.C. 20520

November 17, 1983

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MEMORANDUM

TO: INR/EC - Ralph E. Lindstrom
FROM: ARA/BR - Irving Williamson, Jr. *IW*
SUBJECT: Request for Information - Mineral Supply Availability

Below are the answers for Brazil to the questions posed in your memo of November 9, 1983, a copy of which is attached.

A. Given Brazil's pro-western orientation, and its need to maintain a trade surplus to finance its foreign debt, Brazil would not be expected to withhold in time of war any of the strategic materials listed.

B. Under the scenario specified in the request, civil unrest, etc. are unlikely to disrupt Brazil's production of exports of the strategic materials listed given the ability of the Brazilian Government, and ultimately the Brazilian military, to maintain order.

C. Given Brazil's location, and its extensive port facilities, the strategic materials in question would not come to the United States by land and therefore question C is not applicable.

Attachment:

Your memo of November 9, 1983

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Washington, D.C. 20520

November 15, 1983

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MEMORANDUM

TO: INR/EC - Ralph E. Lindstrom
FROM: AF/W - Nancy E. Morgan *NEM*
SUBJECT: Mineral Supply Availability - Guinea
REF: Your memo dated November 9, 1983

In response to your memo about availability of Guinean bauxite, AF/W offers the following responses:

A. Would the Government of Guinea, considering both its financial needs and its political orientation in war time, withhold bauxite from the United States?

Response: No.

B. Would civil unrest, sabotage, insurgency, or other military action, whether or not Soviet-inspired, disrupt Guinea's production or exports of bauxite in war time?

Response: Given Guinea's remote location in West Africa, it is highly unlikely that any local disturbances would disrupt production or export of bauxite from the country.

C. Would the above contingencies cause land routes through non-producer countries--routes important in the import of Guinea's bauxite to the United States--be interrupted in war time?

Response: No. Guinea is located on the coast of West Africa; shipment of bauxite is by sea, not through any other country.

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Washington, D.C. 20520

November 16, 1983

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TO: INR/EC - Mr. Ralph E. Lindstrom
FROM: ARA/CAR - Richard H. Morefield *R*
SUBJECT: Bauxite Supply Availability from Guyana
REF: Your Memorandum of November 9, 1983

Please find below our response to your questions raised in the referenced memorandum regarding Guyana.

1. Would the Government of Guyana withhold bauxite and alumina shipments in wartime?

The current Government of Guyana, professedly socialist, nationalized the former American and Canadian holdings of Guyanese bauxite shortly after independence. Guyana is the United States' principal source of calcined bauxite, used for the manufacture of heat resistant materials of furnace linings for the production of steel. While the current Guyanese Government maintains friendly relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union and its East European allies, and while relations with the United States have fluctuated and are now at a low point, we would expect the current government to adopt a pragmatic approach, especially as the United States could interdict Guyana's major non-bauxite exports (sugar, rice, and wood products). In addition, wartime conditions would be likely to preclude continued importation of necessary products from non-Western Hemisphere suppliers, a consideration which would not be lost on any Guyanese government. We would therefore anticipate the current Guyanese Government's continued cooperation in the export of bauxite to the United States in wartime, although we would expect that government to use whatever leverage it possessed to assure high prices and the supply of vital import needs. The principal opposition parties in Guyana are ideologically to the left of the current government and one, the Peoples' Progressive Party (PPP), has openly admitted its close ties with the Soviet Union. Were the PPP to be in power during a war situation such as that hypothesized, it is possible that it would attempt to embargo the export of strategic materials to the United States. It would quickly confront serious economic difficulties, however, and it would be unlikely to be able to retain power for any significant period while obstructing traditional export and import patterns.

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2. Would civil unrest, sabotage, etc. disrupt production of exports during wartime?

Guyana's bauxite production and export facilities are relatively isolated and access to them subject to fairly easily imposed controls. Sabotage by groups with ideological and party ties to the Soviet Union and Cuba would be a possibility, but probably could not be mounted on a scale sufficient to seriously impair production or export, particularly as wartime production would be likely to create prosperity for the producing communities and sabotage would thus face popular opposition. Production, of course, would continue to be dependent upon supplies of fuel, spare parts, and equipment from abroad.

3. Interruption of routes through third countries?

Because of the shifting sand/mud bars of the Guyana current off the northeast coast of South America, the tonnage of ships serving Guyana is severely limited, and, as a consequence, some Guyanese production is transhipped through a Trinidad port. We would expect the Government of Trinidad and Tobago to cooperate fully in wartime conditions with the continued shipment of Guyanese bauxite to the United States.


Draft:ARA/CAR:RD:yer:eb
11/16/83 632-3210
W-5386E

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Washington, D.C. 20520

November 16, 1983

SECRET

TO: INR/EC - Mr. Ralph E. Lindstrom
FROM: ARA/CAR - Richard H. Morefield
SUBJECT: Bauxite Supply Availability from Jamaica
REF: Your Memorandum of November 9, 1983

Please find below our responses to your questions raised in the referenced memorandum regarding Jamaica.

1. Would the Government of Jamaica withhold bauxite and alumina shipments in wartime?

We would expect the current Jamaican Government to cooperate closely with the United States in a wartime situation. The current opposition, were it to be in power during a war, would also be likely to continue the export of bauxite to the United States, although it might be somewhat less cooperative than the current government. As the important Jamaican tourist industry could be expected to all but disappear during wartime, the importance of bauxite exports would be significantly enhanced.

2. Would civil unrest, sabotage, etc. disrupt production of exports during wartime?

Isolated attempts at sabotage could occur, but would be unlikely to seriously curtail production and export. Production and export would depend on the supply of fuel, spare parts, and equipment from abroad.

3. Interruption of routes through third countries?

Jamaican production is shipped directly by sea to the United States.

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11/16/83 632-3210
W-5389E

SECRET
DECL: OADR



Washington, D.C. 20520

November 17, 1983

SECRET

TO: INR/EC - Mr. Lindstrom
FROM: ARA/MEX - George High *GOH/A*
SUBJECT: Request for Information--Mineral Supply Availability

Your memorandum of November 9 requested information on the amount of certain critical and strategic materials which could be expected to come from Mexico during wartime.

In our view, it is unlikely that Mexico would withhold fluor-spar and zinc from the U.S. in a wartime situation. It is highly probable that Mexico would be allied to the U.S. - or at least sympathetic with U.S. objectives - in such a war and would, therefore, not wish to undercut U.S. capabilities. We do not believe Mexico's production or export of zinc or fluor-spar would be disrupted in wartime, though it is conceivable that internal groups sympathetic to the Soviets could cause some dislocation. As Mexico borders the U.S., transport lines are direct and would not be influenced by the position of non-producer countries.

[Signature]
ARA:MEX:JGHuff:mph
11/17/83 Ext. 21881
WANG 6751S

SECRET



Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

November 16, 1983

TO: .. INR/EC/CDC - Frederick Shoup
FROM: ARA/AND/P - William Lofstrom
SUBJECT: Mineral Supply Availability Review

A. Although Peru has normal diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, enjoys a favorable balance of trade, and has a close military supply relationship with the USSR, under present and foreseeable circumstances Peru is not likely to withhold supplies of lead, molybdenum and zinc from the United States in time of war. The present Belaunde government is openly pro-US and any likely constitutional successor would probably also identify with the US and with other hemisphere nations in any east-west conflict. Although the Peruvian army and airforce have a significant Soviet component in their inventories, problems related to supply, parts and training have caused the Peruvians to question the utility of the relationship. For political reasons also, the Belaunde government has begun to seek alternative sources for parts and service for existing equipment, and for new acquisitions. In a situation of real or potential east-west conflict, this tendency would probably be reinforced, and alternate sources would probably be more readily available.

B. Peru's leftist political parties and its militant, leftist oriented labor union confederations would be critical of the US in any east-west conflict, especially if Third World proxies or a third world locale were involved. Labor stoppages affecting mines, processing plants and transport systems could result in temporary interruption of the flow of minerals to the US market, but it is unlikely that this would have a serious or long term effect.

C. Not applicable

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November 14, 1983

SECRET

TO: INR/EC/CDC - Fred Shoup
FROM: ARA/CAR - Richard Morefield
SUBJECT: Request for Information - Mineral Supply Availability

The following responds to your memo of November 9 which requested information concerning the reliability of Suriname as a supplier of bauxite.

Although remotely possible, we do not believe it likely that the Government of Suriname would withhold bauxite from the United States in time of war. Bauxite provides the major source of government revenue to the Government of Suriname and the United States is Suriname's largest consumer of Suriname's bauxite exports. Suriname could consider withholding bauxite from the United States only in the event it is able to find an alternative buyer, which is not likely given the currently soft international market for bauxite. Even during 1982/83 when U.S. - Surinamese bilateral relations were strained as a result of political problems, the Government of Suriname made no effort to interfere with bauxite exports or with U.S. - owned firms involved in the extraction of bauxite. Civil unrest, insurgency or sabotage which could cause mechanical problems, such as loss of power, and/or an exodus of managerial staff involved in bauxite extraction, could disrupt Suriname's production or export of bauxite during war time. Bauxite exports are sent by ship from Suriname and need not transmit non-producer countries.

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DECL:OADR



Washington, D.C. 20520

November 14, 1983

SECRET

TO: INR/EC/CDC - Mr. Shoup
FROM: EUR/CAN - James C. Nelson *JN*
SUBJECT: Request for Information -- Mineral
Supply Availability

The following answers with respect to Canada
are keyed to the questions in your memo of
November 9, 1983:

- A. No.
- B. No.
- C. No.

Cleared: EUR - JM Medas *JM*

SECRET
DECL: OADR