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Terrorism Review



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13 December 1984

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GI TR 84-026
13 December 1984

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Terrorism Review [Redacted]

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This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor

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Terrorism Review

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13 December 1984

Focus**The Kuwaiti Aircraft Hijacking**

On 4 December at 0235 hours,¹ Kuwaiti Airlines Flight 221 from Kuwait via Dubayy to Karachi was hijacked and forced to fly to Mehrabad Airport, Tehran. Approximately 166 people were on board: 150 passengers (including three USAID employees, and a US businessman), 11 crewmembers, and four hijackers.

The hijackers boarded the flight in Dubayy. Released passengers said the hijackers were either Lebanese or Lebanese Palestinians. Reportedly, they were armed with small automatic handguns and grenades.

The hijackers shot a Kuwaiti aircraft guard in the leg when they took the plane over. Soon after the plane landed, the hijackers shot and killed USAID employee Charles Hegna and threw his body from the plane. Iranian airport officials had obstacles placed around the plane to prevent its departure. The hijackers demanded that the plane be refueled, that food be brought on board, and that Kuwait release the prisoners convicted for the 12 December 1983 bombings in Kuwait.”²

Following is a chronology of the significant events of the next six days before the incident was resolved:

4 December

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1530 | The hijackers first contacted the Kuwaiti charge in Tehran, telling him they would blow up the plane if their demands were not met. |
| 1740 | The hijackers released 19 passengers after the aircraft was refueled. The passengers said that the hijackers did not have any explosive material other than one or two grenades. |
| 2000 | According to a press report, the “17 September Organization” in Beirut claimed responsibility for the hijacking. This group, which purports to defend the Palestinian people, was first heard from when it claimed credit for bombing the Kuwaiti Embassy in Beirut on 16 November 1984. |
| 2025 | Twenty-four passengers and crewmembers were released. All women and children were now off the aircraft. |

¹ All times mentioned are approximate Tehran local times, unless otherwise indicated.

² These prisoners have been identified as members of the Iranian-backed Dawa Party, composed of Iraqi and Kuwaiti dissidents and extremist Lebanese Shias.

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Secret**5 December**

Morning

AFP in Beirut received a message from an anonymous spokesman for the Islamic Jihad Organization that professed solidarity with the hijackers but asked them to move the plane to Damascus, Cairo, or Baghdad so as to absolve the Iranian Government of any responsibility in the incident.

0630

The wounded aircraft guard was released.

Before 1930

The hijackers released 23 more passengers. Swiss Embassy officials in Tehran viewed the body of the dead passenger for the first time. Their description, however, did not match that of any US officials on board.

2030

The hijackers allowed a doctor to come on board to treat a Kuwaiti passenger suffering from a heart problem. Two other passengers also reportedly suffered heart ailments, and the hijackers offered to exchange them for the Kuwaiti charge in Tehran.

6 December

Morning

The hijackers broadcast to the control tower the screams of a passenger being tortured.

Before 0740

The hijackers reported they had killed two more passengers, William Stanford of USAID, and a Kuwaiti. Only the report about Stanford turned out later to be true. A Pakistani passenger who had been taken outside the plane escaped death by running away from the aircraft as the hijackers prepared to gun him down.

0740

The hijackers first spoke with the Kuwaiti negotiating team. The discussions lasted only 10 minutes. The hijackers threatened to kill the remaining US citizens unless the prisoners in Kuwait were released.

0915

A photographer was allowed to approach the door of the aircraft and photograph bodies of passengers allegedly killed earlier in the day. It subsequently transpired that the hijackers had forced two Kuwaitis to lie down and play dead and had sprinkled their bodies with ketchup.

Before 1045

The hijackers demanded that a new crew be supplied for the aircraft.

1045

Kuwaiti officials refused to provide a new crew for the aircraft.

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1110	An Iranian cleaning crew was allowed on the aircraft. Afterward, the cleaners reported that the passengers had been tied to their seats and that two bodies were covered on the floor.
Before 1444	The Kuwaiti flight engineer, who was reportedly suffering from a heart ailment, was released by the hijackers.
1730	A special Iran Air flight arrived in Karachi with most of the passengers who had been released the two previous days.
1840	Four more passengers were released.
Later	Twenty more passengers, all Pakistanis, were released.
Midnight	The first deadline set by the hijackers for Kuwait to meet their demands.
 <i>7 December</i>	
0700	The second deadline set by the hijackers after first deadline passed without Kuwaiti compliance.
1906	Iran radio broadcast a statement by the hijackers that condemned Kuwait and justified the killing of Hegna and Stanford on the grounds they were CIA agents. They also claimed they had killed two other persons and said the next ones to be killed would be the remaining AID official and three Kuwaiti diplomats.
2300	Eight more passengers were released: six Pakistanis and two Iranians described as students, bringing the number of persons released to 107. Those in the latest group said only two Americans had been killed.
 <i>8 December</i>	
1130	Sixteen more persons were released, bringing the total released to 123.
1330	After a hiatus of 36 hours, Kuwait announced it had renewed contact with the hijackers.
1407	The hijackers told the airport tower that the Americans would now be tried for unspecified crimes.
1730	The hijackers told the airport tower they would release all those "not connected with this matter."

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1800 Tehran media carried a second statement by the hijackers. It repeated the above offer and reasserted their intent toward the remaining captives.

2015 The hijackers released 23 more hostages, all Pakistanis, bringing the total released to 146 and leaving only 19 on board the plane.

2030 The time, announced by Islamic Jihad in a telephone call to AFP in Beirut, after which the hijackers would begin killing the three Kuwaiti diplomats unless Kuwait released the prisoners it was holding. The IJO caller reiterated the organization's assertion that the hijackers were not members of Islamic Jihad but enjoyed its full support.

Night The Iranian Foreign Minister returned to Tehran from Hungary.

9 December
Morning The Kuwaiti negotiating team left for Istanbul, saying that negotiations would be handled by diplomatic personnel on the scene.

0903 The hijackers threatened to kill the remaining American hostages unless a reporter and a video camera were provided. Iranian reporters were allowed on board. They later reported that two Kuwaitis and the two Americans had been beaten, the Americans less severely than the Kuwaitis.

1100 Tehran radio reported that only 10 hostages were still on board the aircraft.

1140 The hijackers, declaring they wanted to leave Tehran, demanded a new aircraft.

1300 The hijackers beat a Kuwaiti hostage on the steps of the aircraft and threatened again to blow it up.

1349 AFP reported that two unscheduled Syrian aircraft had arrived from Damascus.

1400 The airport was closed because of the threat to blow up the plane.

1500 The airport was reopened.

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- 1520 The hijackers broadcast their "last will and testament" to the control tower, rejected offers of food, and broke communications.
- 1630 The Iranians told Kuwaiti and Pakistani officials that they would "shortly use force" to overcome the hijackers.
- 1635 The hijackers renewed communications with the tower. They reported they had said their final prayers and had planted explosives around the plane. They renewed their threat to blow up the aircraft and again demanded another one.
- 1710 Food was delivered to the aircraft.
- 2145 Seven more hostages were released, said to be six crew-members and a flight engineer.
- 2345 The Iranian news agency IRNA reported that Iranian security forces had "stormed" the plane. The hijackers came out with their hands up and the remaining hostages walked out. According to the IRNA report, the troops had hidden close to the plane and entered when the hijackers requested a cleanup crew. Gunfire was reported, but no casualties announced. Two Kuwaitis whom the hijackers had claimed to have killed were among the nine hostages released, confirming that Hegna and Stanford were the only passengers killed during the ordeal.

It is questionable how much force the Iranians needed to use to subdue the hijackers and rescue the remaining hostages. Although there is no evidence that the Iranian Government was involved in planning the hijacking, Tehran's behavior throughout the six-day ordeal indicated strong sympathy for the hijackers' aims and a willingness to exploit the opportunity that had arisen to gain the release of the Iranian sympathizers imprisoned in Kuwait.

Tehran assisted the terrorists in several ways, including granting them access to the media and twice refueling the aircraft without obtaining any concessions. Moreover, initially Tehran refused to allow Kuwaiti officials to make contact with released hostages or to allow Kuwaiti planes to participate in relief efforts. Some Pakistani passengers later accused the Iranians of providing the hijackers with handcuffs, rope, and additional firearms, but this has not been confirmed.

Only after additional killings were reported on the third day of the hijacking did Tehran appear to become more concerned about its image. Only then did it condemn the death of the first US official and—after pleas from Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, among others—the hijacking itself. The ease with which Iranian forces took the aircraft and the lack of casualties among either hijackers or hostages also suggest a degree of collusion between the Tehran authorities and the terrorists.

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Many questions remain to be answered, including the exact identities, nationalities, and affiliations of the hijackers, the degree of culpability of the Iranian Government—or elements thereof—and the role of Damascus, which some press reports have credited with persuading Tehran finally to take action to bring the episode to an end.



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Highlights

Alert Items

Lebanon


New Threat to US Embassy

On 28 November a Lebanese guard at the US Embassy Annex in Awkar overheard an alleged member of the Hizballah say that a boobytrapped vehicle is being prepared at an Iranian-Hizballah training facility in the Bekaa Valley and that this vehicle is to be used to attack the US Embassy in Beirut very soon. The Hizballah member claimed that this vehicle bomb would be much larger than the ones previously used against the US Embassy and Embassy Annex. [redacted]

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It is not clear whether the speaker meant the next target would be the US Embassy in West Beirut, the Annex in Awkar, or the Ambassador's residence in Yarze. The most attractive target for the terrorists would be the Ambassador's residence, because most of the US personnel are currently living and working there. [redacted]

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Japan

USS Vinson May Be Greeted by Terrorists

Japanese radicals plan extensive demonstrations in mid-December to mark the upcoming visit of the USS Vinson to the port of Yokosuka. US installations in Japan have been placed on heightened alert in view not only of the demonstrations but also of the possibility of terrorist attacks during that period. The radical leftist group Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction), which opposes both the US military presence and the US-Japan security treaty, has conducted several incendiary attacks against US military installations in the past two years. [redacted]

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Key Indicators

Sri Lanka

Terrorist Atrocities Provoke Communal Violence

Terrorist attacks by Tamil separatists against members of the Sinhalese majority have increased dramatically in number and ferocity since the beginning of November. Among recent incidents:

- On 30 November members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam attacked two Sinhalese farms in the Tamil-dominated Jaffna region, killing 65 to 80 men, women, and children. Some of the victims were intentionally burned alive.
- That same night unidentified Tamils murdered 11 fishermen in a northern village.
- On 3 December separatist guerrillas of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA) seized nine hostages at a cement plant on the Jaffna Peninsula and demanded that the government pay a \$400,000 ransom and free certain imprisoned Tamil leaders. Apparently, the government refused to meet the demands, for on 5 December TELA reportedly killed the hostages.
- On 4 December Tamil terrorist landmines in Mannar killed one soldier and injured six.

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The Tamil attacks appear intended to provoke a Sinhalese backlash similar to the bloody anti-Tamil riots that took place in the summer of 1983. Apparently, at least two major reprisals have already occurred:

- On 3 December 20 Tamil terrorist suspects were reportedly killed while in government custody in the town of Vavuniya in north-central Sri Lanka.
- On 4 December after the landmine explosions in Mannar, government forces there went on a rampage, killing more than 100 Tamils, many in cold blood. Reportedly, two buses were waylaid and their passengers killed; six postal employees were lined up and shot to death; and about 40 Tamils were gunned down while working in the fields. Some 2,000 Mannar residents took refuge in the jungle and in schools and shrines.

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The Tamils as a whole would not gain from a Sinhalese backlash unless that provoked Indian intervention on their side. The fact that the latest outbreak of Tamil violence occurred after the assassination of Indira Gandhi on 31 October is probably no coincidence; it implies that the Tamil terrorists are hoping to force the hand of a new Indian Government that has not yet figured out what its policy toward the Sri Lankan problem should be.

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Colombia

Narcoterrorist Threats Continue

On 26 November in Bogota, a car bomb exploded near the US Embassy, killing one Colombian. Antidrug leaflets strewn about the car suggest that the bombing probably was the work of narcoterrorists protesting the pending extradition of their colleagues to the United States. Since then, no more such attacks have occurred, but terrorist threats continue to be issued—including some against the Spanish Ambassador. Four Colombian narcotics traffickers are currently in Spanish custody, awaiting possible extradition to the United States.

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
Switzerland and Italy

Arrested Lebanese Terrorists Were Planning Anti-US Attacks

On 18 November in Zurich, Swiss police arrested an Arab male in whose possession they found a kilogram of explosives and four blasting caps as well as documents indicating he was headed for Italy. On 24 November in a town near Rome, Italian police checking out addresses provided by the Swiss arrested seven Lebanese men. Judging by confiscated material and information developed subsequently, the group was planning to attack the US Embassy and possibly to mount other anti-US operations, including kidnappings of US officials. Not all of the persons in the group have necessarily been arrested, and Italian officials indicate a threat to US installations and personnel may persist.

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Significant Developments

Italy

Preventive Detention Reform Postponed

On 27 November the Italian Cabinet approved a temporary law permitting the authorities to keep persons identified as dangerous criminals in preventive detention even after the new preventive detention reform law goes into full effect in February. The temporary legislation gives the authorities until next November to finish processing the trials and appeals of especially dangerous terrorists and gangsters who otherwise would have been eligible for release in February.

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Greece-Romania

Jordanian Diplomats Attacked by Terrorists

On 29 November in Athens, an unidentified gunman tried to assassinate a top Jordanian diplomat, but his gun jammed. No group claimed responsibility, but Greek police later arrested an Arab male suspect as he was trying to leave the country. On 4 December the deputy chief of the Jordanian Mission in Bucharest was shot dead in front of his hotel. Romanian police immediately arrested the gunman, a 27-year-old Palestinian student from the Israeli-occupied West Bank. An anonymous spokesman later claimed that the Black September Organization had been responsible for the assassination and was resuming "revolutionary activities."

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The Black September Organization, as the covert terrorist wing of Fatah was known, has been inactive since the early 1970s. Considering that Fatah has been improving its relations with Jordan recently, we consider it extremely unlikely that mainline Fatah operatives would now be conducting attacks on Jordanian diplomats. Moreover, the PLO representative in Bucharest, an Arafat loyalist, denounced the attack. It is conceivable that the Fatah dissidents have decided to resurrect the Black September Organization, but no specific evidence links them to these attacks. Instead, the modus operandi of the attackers resembles that of the Abu Nidal Group, which has attacked Jordanian diplomats repeatedly in the past and threatened to resume doing so as recently as last October.

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Jordan

PNC Meeting Punctuated by Terrorism

As Yasir Arafat presided over the meeting of the Palestine National Council (PNC) in Amman from 22 to 29 November, Jordanian security forces had their hands full fending off Palestinian terrorists bent on discrediting and overshadowing the moderates.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] On 24 November and 2 December, time bombs planted at US-affiliated offices in Amman were found and defused. The Jordanians say the two bombs were similar to devices previously used by the Abu Nidal Group. On 27 November a bomb exploded near the PLO headquarters in Amman. Jordanian authorities arrested a member of the Syrian-backed Popular Struggle Front (PSF) in connection with that bombing and reported that two other suspects escaped into Syria. [Redacted]

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Although each of these groups has its own reasons for wanting to sabotage the PNC meeting, it is also a fact that they are all supported by Syria, which is determined to prevent King Hussein from opening negotiations with Israel on behalf of the Palestinians. Few of these operations could have taken place without Syrian acquiescence, although hard evidence proving Syrian complicity is lacking. [Redacted]

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India

UK Diplomat Murdered

On 27 November in Bombay, the deputy British high commissioner was shot to death by two male attackers as he was being driven to work. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims (ROSM) claimed credit. [Redacted]

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No arrests have been made in the case, and an initial search for two men appearing to be Europeans, which suggested that Northern Irish terrorists might have been responsible, has given way to the pursuit of two men who look like Arabs, which lends some support to the claim by ROSM. That mysterious group previously claimed responsibility for the similar murder of a British diplomat in Athens last March, as well as for the kidnaping of a British journalist in Lebanon a couple of months ago. ROSM's credibility is dubious, however, since it also claimed responsibility for the recent bombing of the British Conservative Party Conference in Brighton, which UK authorities are certain was conducted by the Provisional IRA. [Redacted]

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Chile

Terrorists Undaunted by State of Siege

[Redacted] the number of terrorist incidents in November was roughly the same as in the two preceding months—before the state of siege was imposed. In addition, since the first successful car bombing on 26 October, five more have occurred, and a sixth car bomb was discovered and deactivated before it could explode. Thus, although the government's crackdown has stifled the moderate opposition, it has had little apparent effect on the terrorists who were its ostensible target. [Redacted]

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Somalia**Airliner Hijacked to Ethiopia**

On 27 November three Somalis wounded a security guard and hijacked to Addis Ababa a Somali Airlines flight scheduled to fly from Mogadishu to Jiddah carrying 130 passengers and crew. The hijackers initially demanded the release of 14 Somali political prisoners and a commitment not to execute seven Somali youths they believed were under sentence of death. The Somali Government refused to release any prisoners, but Italian mediators, believing they had received certain ambiguous assurances regarding the seven youths, guaranteed the safety of the youths. The skyjackers eventually released all 130 hostages in exchange for a promise of asylum by the Ethiopian Government. [redacted]

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The conduct of Ethiopian officials on the scene was clearly improper. One eyewitness described them as having a relaxed rapport with the hijackers; another alleged that the Ethiopians could have ended the episode at any time. Although we do not believe the Ethiopian Government instigated the hijacking, it obviously tried to manipulate the episode for political purposes. Somalia has condemned the actions of the Ethiopians. [redacted]

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Zimbabwe**ZANU-ZAPU Strife Leads to Political Assassinations**

The assassination on 9 November of a senator from Beitbridge, representing the majority Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), has set off a wave of political terrorism and violence. ZANU supporters, blaming the incident on the rival Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), looted and burned ZAPU homes and businesses. The police reportedly stood by during the rioting, in which one person died. As the violence spread, a ZANU central committee member publicly stated that for every ZANU supporter killed, three ZAPU supporters would die. On 25 November a ZAPU member of parliament was assassinated. Further acts of violence between ZANU and ZAPU are likely, especially as the campaigning for the mid-1985 election intensifies. [redacted]

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Uganda**NRM Terrorists Strike in Capital**

During the last 10 days of November, at least 16 terrorist attacks took place in and around Kampala. Grenades, bombs, and gunfire exploded all around the capital, often in market areas, resulting in numerous civilian and military casualties. Insurgent forces of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) were probably responsible for most of the attacks, although it is suspected that security forces perpetrated some of them in order to loot the markets. By the end of the month, security forces in Kampala had arrested several NRM terrorist suspects and succeeded in bringing the violence there largely to an end. [redacted]

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The insurgents probably brought their conflict to Kampala for two reasons: to demonstrate the government's inability to keep the capital secure and to divert government soldiers away from the current NRM offensive in the Luwero Triangle. They are capable of renewing their terrorist attacks in Kampala at any time. [redacted]

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Terrorism in International Law

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Jose Manuel Martinez-Balestegui was accused of murdering a Spanish industrialist in 1978. Francisco Javier Lujambio Galdeanu was wanted for a bombing that killed two members of the Spanish Civil Guard in 1980. Jose Carlos Garcia Ramirez was charged with killing four members of the Spanish Civil Guard in 1980. All three men were members of the Spanish Basque terrorist organization Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA). Earlier this year, like many other ETA members wanted by the Spanish authorities, they were living in France, where, because of a long tradition of hospitality toward foreign political exiles, they felt safe from extradition.

for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism. Again, however, agreement proved impossible to reach.

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Late last summer their safehaven evaporated. Reversing its policy of tolerating the presence of ETA members as long as they did not operate in France, the French Government arrested the three men (along with a number of other *Etarras* accused of lesser crimes) in response to official Spanish requests for their extradition. When brought into French court, they demanded political asylum, arguing that their acts were political, rather than criminal. The French court had to address a fundamental question that challenges the contemporary international legal system: is terrorism a legally protected form of political activity, or is it crime?

One reason it is so difficult to achieve universal acceptance of a single conception of terrorism is that the various legal systems of the world hold contrasting views of "political crime." Systems based on the common law, found chiefly in the English-speaking countries, tend to view terrorism as common criminality. Civil law systems, found in continental Europe and Latin America, have tended to recognize a political offense exception to the criminal law. Under the idiosyncratic legal systems of many Third World countries, appropriate political ends may be deemed to justify almost any means. Thus, most Third World countries have consistently resisted all efforts by Western countries to establish limits to the political offense exception.

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There is no international law even defining, much less prohibiting, terrorism. Only piracy, the slave trade, war crimes, genocide, and skyjacking are widely regarded as international crimes. Twice in this century there have been attempts to gain international consensus on what behavior constitutes terrorism. In 1937 the League of Nations tried to get its membership to agree on a definition of the term, but only 13 nations concurred with the proposal. In 1972, following the terrorist tragedy at the Munich Olympics, the United States submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations a Draft Convention

In Anglo-American law, activities that involve, in other than a combat context, the willful taking of human life, the purposeful commission of bodily harm, the deliberate destruction of state or private property, or the intentional infliction of mental distress through the use or threatened use of force are criminal acts. There are a number of defenses to prosecution for criminal acts, such as mistake, necessity, provocation, duress, and insanity, but political motivation is not one of them. Thus, the political offense exception finds little application in Anglo-American courts.

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The British Extradition Act denies extradition of a fugitive offender if the request is made for the purpose of punishing him for an offense of a "political character." But, for an offense to be characterized as

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political, two criteria must be met: (1) the act must have occurred during a political revolt or disturbance and (2) the act must have been either ancillary to, or formed a part of, the same revolt or disturbance. The narrowness of this definition is the basis of the government's consistent refusal to grant "political prisoner" status to convicted Provisional IRA terrorists. It also explains why Britain is not as popular as other European states among those seeking political asylum. [redacted]

Canada takes an even more rigorous line. Murder, or the indiscriminate perpetration of serious bodily harm, even if committed for political motives, are deemed common crimes, and urban terrorists, whatever their causes, are considered criminals. In keeping with this position, Canada returned to the United States the man charged with four counts of arson and murder relating to the bombing of the Army Mathematics Research Center at the University of Wisconsin. [redacted]

The United States recognizes political offense exceptions to an extradition request only if there is in force a specific bilateral extradition treaty or convention allowing for such exceptions. In his 1972 speech before the UN General Assembly, US Secretary of State William P. Rogers stated that "Political passion, however deeply held, cannot be a justification for criminal violence against innocent persons . . . [which] must be universally condemned, whether we consider the cause the terrorists invoke noble or ignoble, legitimate or illegitimate." [redacted]

By contrast, in the countries of continental Europe and Latin America, a tradition of granting asylum to fugitives accused of political crimes dates from the late 18th century. The civil law systems of these countries have long permitted the political offense exception to be used widely as a defense. But the growing problem of terrorism in the region is leading some West European governments to modify their positions on this question, at least on a selective basis. In the cases of the three accused Spanish Basque terrorists cited above, the French court made an unprecedented decision to grant extradition to Spain. [redacted]

The primary issue, according to the French court, was the fact that the three were accused of "blood crimes." In explaining its decision, the court acknowledged that the acts the accused were charged with were committed "because they are members of ETA . . . however, these are common law offenses that cannot be viewed as having a political character or being related to a political offense for any reason whatsoever. The murder of a civil servant is therefore not a political act. . . unacceptable acts of violence cannot be construed as the expression of a political purpose." Instead, the crimes were "common law offenses committed on the territory of a state which respects freedom and rights." The court therefore concluded that the Basques were not true refugees and did not qualify for political asylum. [redacted]

These developments in the French courts, however, should not be viewed as establishing new, binding legal precedents regarding extradition in French civil law. Despite its ostensible legal justification, there is considerable evidence that this decision to agree to extradition was political rather than judicial, and specific rather than universal, and that Paris currently has no intention of applying the stated reasoning to fugitives other than Basque terrorists. Other foreigners accused of committing blood crimes for political reasons have not been arrested, much less extradited. [redacted]

A generation ago, the International Court of Justice observed that extradition "practice has been so much influenced by considerations of political expediency in the various cases, that it is not possible to discern . . . any consistent and uniform usage accepted as law." The historical record shows that national policy considerations take precedence over penalties for criminal acts, when governments decide that this is in their best interests. There is no reason to believe this practice will change in the near future. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Turkey: The Threat of Resurgent Terrorism [redacted]

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Despite a drastic reduction in the incidence of violence and the decimation of a number of clandestine terrorist groups under the three years of military rule that ended last November, we do not believe that Turkey's effort to put an end to terrorism has succeeded:

- Turkish security forces continue to find and confiscate significant quantities of weapons and make arrests.
- In the last several months, there has been a recurrence of small-scale violence.
- Raids by Kurdish dissidents in August resulted in several deaths and demonstrated that this problem remains alive. [redacted]

Foreign support for Turkish terrorism continues. The Turks see Damascus—an ideological and historical rival—as their main antagonist. There is also limited evidence that the Soviets have in the past lent support to Kurdish dissidents. The Bulgarians have sold arms to both leftwing and rightwing extremists. In addition, Arab and Iranian terrorist groups have begun targeting each other and Western targets in Turkey. [redacted]

Eliminating foreign support would not halt terrorism in Turkey. In our judgment, Turkish terrorism has its roots in the sweeping demographic, economic, and sociological changes that have occurred over the last three decades. Until significant improvements can be achieved in dealing with the resulting problems—unemployment, inequitable land and income distribution, overtaxed urban facilities, and festering religious and ethnic tensions—terrorism will remain a threat. [redacted]

We expect a gradual resurgence of violence, but we do not expect it to take on dimensions serious enough to threaten political stability over the next year or two. Despite the return to civilian rule in November 1983, martial law remains in force throughout most of the

country. Moreover, Turkish security forces have been strengthened by improved training and financial resources. [redacted]

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The strength of the resurgence will also depend on the willingness of civilian and military authorities—now represented by Prime Minister Ozal and President Evren—to work together. We believe the competing political and institutional interests of these two men will complicate their relationship and perhaps weaken the government's ability to contain terrorism. [redacted]

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Even a moderate upsurge in terrorism could threaten US facilities and personnel in the country. The United States is seen as the principal patron of the Turkish Government, and US servicemen might again become the targets of terrorists. [redacted]

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The Roots of Terrorism

A wave of violence that began in Turkey in the late 1950s was punctuated by military interventions in 1960, 1971, and September 1980. The violence had its roots in the sweeping demographic, economic, and sociological changes that have occurred over the last three decades. Although the strains resulting from economic change, population growth, internal migration, urbanization, and ethnic/religious changes are common in the Third World, they have been acute in Turkey:

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- Turkey's population of 50 million is nearly double that of 30 years ago. It grew at an average annual rate of 2.7 percent between 1950 and 1975—one of the highest rates in the world.
- The urban population has grown even more rapidly than the population as a whole. In 1960, 25 percent of the population lived in cities; by 1980 the portion

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had risen to 50 percent. This has thrown together diverse and sometimes antagonistic ethnic and religious groups in unfamiliar city neighborhoods with sometimes violent consequences. For example, the southeastern city of Kahramanmaras, the scene of large-scale rioting in December 1978, had perhaps the highest rate of growth in Turkey during the 1970s.

- The current official unemployment rate of about 20 percent has dropped only slightly from levels in the 1970s. Underemployment has been variously estimated as high as 70 percent of the working population in the sprawling shantytowns surrounding cities such as Ankara and Izmir.
- Rural workers account for half the working population but only 28 percent of the national income, and much of this is concentrated among a few individuals. In general, income distribution is badly skewed. Land distribution also has become less equitable over time. [redacted]

Turkey's serious minority problems have also contributed to the strains. Most troublesome are the Kurds in the southeastern provinces, who are second only to ethnic Turks in supplying recruits to radical leftist groups. The estrangement of this community, which makes up at least 10 percent of the population, is due in large part to Turkish laws that prohibit Kurdish language, literature, and ethnic organizational activity; indeed, Turkish officials deny the existence of a Kurdish minority. The Alevi community, concentrated in eastern Turkey and comprising perhaps 15 percent of the population, is another significant minority. Alevis—ethnic Turks who practice a version of Islam that draws from both Sunni and Shia doctrine, as well as elements of shamanism and Christianity—are viewed with suspicion, intolerance, and open hostility by the Sunni majority. Violence has flared frequently between these groups. [redacted]

The complexity of the causes of violence is matched by the diversity of terrorist groups that have sprung up in Turkey. More than 50 leftist groups were in existence before the 1980 coup, and there was no trace of a common organization. The fragmentation

of these groups reflects their highly personalized leadership and undeveloped ideologies. Beyond fuzzy Marxist notions, they appear to have only a vague concept of the type of state they wish to establish, and an anarchistic bent that has prevented the development of a widespread base of support. Their fragmentation, small size, and tight cell structure, however, do afford some protection against police operations. [redacted]

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Weak Governments. Parliamentary governments in Turkey have not measured up well to the challenges posed by political violence. When terrorist violence first emerged as a serious problem in the late 1950s, the political institutions left by Ataturk had already been discredited by corrupt and arbitrary rule. A succession of weak and internally divided coalition governments proved unable to agree on the causes of or solutions to Turkey's problems. [redacted]

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Terrorism first took on significant dimensions under the conservative and authoritarian Menderes government, whose misrule led to a military coup by a cabal of reformist Army colonels in May 1960. Their temporary government produced a highly liberal Constitution that opened the way to previously repressed political and social forces. Radical political parties and interest groups began to organize openly. Trade unions were granted the right to strike, and labor unrest began to grow. In this atmosphere of ferment, political radicalism took hold in the student community. The major political parties—the social democratic Republican People's Party and the conservative Justice Party—were preoccupied with internal power struggles and unwilling to cooperate to reduce the influence of these dangerous new forces. [redacted]

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The politicization of the universities and factories led to street demonstrations and violence during the late 1960s and early 1970s as well as to the emergence of clandestine radical groups. In 1971 the military hierarchy intervened again, bloodlessly deposing the conservative Demirel government. The government of technocrats that followed, as well as subsequent

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elected cabinets, proved weak and equally incapable of containing the unrest. Between the 1971 and 1980 military interventions, governments were debilitated by the switching of party allegiances by deputies and even Cabinet ministers, the need to seek coalition partners among extremist groups, rampant corruption, and the lack of consistent economic and political decision making. Foreign developments, such as the 1973/74 oil price hikes and the 1974 Cyprus conflict, produced new economic difficulties and anti-Western emotions that contributed to the growth of radicalism. Dissatisfaction with the United States, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the Middle East, and the rise of formidable leftist groups prompted the emergence in turn of Islamic and neofascist groups.¹ [redacted]

The first large-scale violence occurred in Kahramanmaras in December 1978 between Sunnis and Alevis. The killing of more than 100 people there led the left-of-center Ecevit government to impose martial law in 13 provinces, including the major urban areas. Nevertheless, the situation deteriorated rapidly, partly because the major political parties were themselves riddled with extremists and unwilling to cooperate against terrorism. By 1980, up to 20 Turks were dying every day in terrorist attacks. The victims included a former premier, a deputy party chief, a trade union leader, the country's foremost journalist, and senior security officials. The military, concerned that the situation was fast approaching civil war, finally intervened on 12 September 1980 and imposed military rule. [redacted]

Results of Military Rule. Three years of military rule produced significant gains in the battle against terrorism. According to official claims and press reports, political killings dropped from 5,000 during

¹ Although the emergence of the rightwing terrorist group, the *Grey Wolves* of Alpaslan Turkes, was a major destabilizing factor before the coup, Islamic-oriented extremist groups have not been potent compared with other Turkish militants or even Islamic fundamentalist organizations in neighboring countries. Most Turks—leftist and rightist extremists, as well as mainstream politicians—support the idea of a secular state despite otherwise intense political differences and interpretations of Kemalism. Turkey is an overwhelmingly Sunni nation, and the only significant religious minority, the Alevis, does not have the dynamic clergy associated with the Shias. The government historically has kept religious leaders of all persuasions under fairly tight rein. [redacted]

Political Violence in Turkey Before and After the Military Takeover

	26 Dec 1978– 12 Sep 1980	13 Sep 1980– 11 Sep 1982
Armed assaults	9,090	737
Explosions	6,365	370
Riots	1,163	68
Robberies	3,014	1,491
Student demonstrations	2,532	60
Other demonstrations	3,836	860
Wounded	10,427	850
Security officials killed	164	72
Terrorists killed	146	215

Source: Turkish Government figures.

[redacted]

the nine months before the coup in 1980 to 442 in the following year. Incidents of political violence were down from 33,000 to 5,673 during the same period. Security forces confiscated more than a half million pistols and rifles, about 2.2 million rounds of ammunition, nearly 10,000 explosive devices, 21 rocket launchers, and one mortar during the first year of military rule alone. [redacted]

The number of suspect terrorists arrested reached into the tens of thousands. Some Turkish newspapers have alleged that as many as 125,000 suspected terrorists and sympathizers may have been arrested since the initial imposition of martial law in 1978, although many of these were subsequently released or acquitted. A senior official of Ozal's party told the press last spring that there are still 100,000 people in jail, including 20,000 people in military prisons. The government has described most of the prisoners as leftists from urban areas. [redacted]

In handing over power last year, the military tried to ensure it would retain the means to deal with any resurgence of terrorism. It kept the presidency in its

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own hands, in the person of Gen. Kenan Evren, the former Chairman of the National Security Council. The new Constitution enhances the powers of the president, who now has wide authority to act in emergencies and can control the selection and discipline of civil servants. The military also imposed new laws restricting party and electoral activity, banning former party leaders from participation in politics for 10 years, imposing sanctions for references to past political quarrels, and setting stiff penalties for violations of limits on labor and religious activity.

[redacted]

A cornerstone of the military's program to strengthen the hand of the government is the State of Emergency Law. Passed by the NSC last October, it offers a mechanism for the government to deal with disorder without implementing martial law. It gives the government power to issue laws by decree, detain suspects for extended periods, impose curfews, and ban public meetings or publications for a period of up to six months in the event of a disruption of public order or natural disaster. Parliament has the responsibility of approving the decision and of extending the emergency in four-month increments. The NSC also established new state security courts to deal with offenses against the "integrity" of the country. These courts are staffed by civilians but have military judges and prosecutors. They can try cases falling under the anti-Communist provisions of the civil code, as well as violations related to labor laws, illegal demonstrations and associations, and smuggling.

In practice, the new law has served as a vehicle for shifting administrative responsibility from military to civilian authorities. Of the 26 provinces without military rule, 11 have been placed under a state of emergency. Martial law was extended in June in the remaining 41 provinces.

Terrorism Not Eliminated

Despite the military's continuing crackdown on radical groups, and the current relative calm, practically all observers agree that terrorist violence has not been permanently eliminated.

Domestic Groups. The government claimed in 1983 that nearly half of the illegal groups active at the time of the coup were still in operation. Last August, in an unusual announcement regarding the status of clandestine organizations, the martial law command in Ankara said that 25 groups had been practically eliminated but that three groups were still engaged in violence, while 17 others had increased their activities. The command also announced that almost 6,000 suspects were still at large. A scattering of violent incidents in Istanbul and around the country supported contentions that the terrorists are down, but not out.

The most active and dangerous organizations appear to be the same ones that were notorious before the 1980 coup. According to their own manifestos, all these groups aim to overthrow the constitutional order through violent means and to force the removal of US facilities from Turkey. Their main tactics are armed assaults and bombings, and their main targets are government officials and facilities, as well as rightist opponents and leftist rivals.

The Foreign Dimension. In addition to the continuing domestic terrorist threat, foreign terrorist activities on Turkish soil add to the challenges facing the new government. The war between Iran and Iraq and the upheaval in Lebanon have produced a spate of terrorism throughout the Middle East that occasionally spills over into Turkey.

[redacted]

Armenian terrorism, although it has garnered more headlines abroad, is a much less serious threat. Armenian-sponsored terrorism for the most part takes place outside Turkey and has not contributed significantly to political instability. In fact, we believe Armenian terrorism tends to unite Turks and reinforce government efforts to portray the problem of

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terrorism simply as a result of foreign subversion. Even so, attacks by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) have unnerved the Turkish foreign service, generated unfavorable publicity about Turkey, and further burdened the security services. [redacted]

Although there is limited information about Soviet activities in Turkey, Turkish officials are convinced that Moscow plays a substantial role in fostering leftist extremism. We believe Soviet influence over Turkish militants is limited. Despite their avowed link to Lenin, most Turkish groups appear to have more in common ideologically with Mao and Marcuse. Turkish terrorist groups feature rapidly shifting and charismatic leaderships and a predilection toward action instead of the establishment of a broad basis of support within the labor movement. These factors help explain why the pro-Soviet Turkish Communist Party remains a marginal factor in the country's politics. Throughout its 60 years of existence as an illegal party, the TKP has focused its efforts on unifying divergent leftist parties as a cover for its own activities. The latest version of this approach is an attempt to unite Turkish workers in West Germany. The strategy has failed to produce any significant electoral support or control over antisystem movements. [redacted]

The Kurdish problem is the one most susceptible to foreign manipulation, given the predominance of ethnic Kurds in southeastern Turkey and their cross-border ties with compatriots in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. [redacted] Kurdish organizations had become more active. Army officers reportedly also have become more concerned of late about the Kurdish problem, especially because of Baghdad's decision earlier this year to grant limited autonomy for Iraq's Kurdish tribes along Turkey's southern frontier. Turkish concerns appear to have been well founded. According to press reports and government announcements, in mid-August Kurdish guerrillas launched raids in several towns in eastern Turkey. Several Gendarme officers were killed or wounded. [redacted]

Police Capabilities

The ability of the security forces, and particularly the police, to cope with the threat posed by terrorism will be crucial to the Ozal government. The Turkish National Police (TNP), which has primary responsibility for internal security, was discredited by its failure to put down extremist violence in the 1970s. As part of its efforts to improve the capabilities and performance of the TNP, the NSC has appointed Army officers to administer police training programs. Although substantial progress has been made to rebuild the TNP since 1980, it is still hindered by material and personnel shortcomings. [redacted]

In our view, it is questionable whether the police can gain the upper hand over terrorism, both because of their own shortcomings and because of the inherent advantages of extremist groups in this kind of struggle. The lack of cohesiveness and homogeneity among Turkish terrorist groups—their small size, highly personalized organization, and tight cell structure—makes them extremely resilient. The fragmentation of leftist extremists forces the police to scatter their resources. In addition, Turkish terrorists are highly motivated and by and large appear to have a higher level of education than their TNP opponents. The militants' access to sophisticated Western weapons also puts the police at a disadvantage on occasion. [redacted] 25X1

There are indications, too, that radical officers still exist within TNP and military ranks. The US Consul in Izmir reported in February that a large-scale police sweep through several Aegean provinces was conducted entirely by the Izmir police because of concerns that local forces had been penetrated. About 500 military officers reportedly have been tried in military courts since 1980 for political activity, and retired and active-duty military officers have been arrested for membership in Marxist groups. [redacted]

Ozal and Evren

The Ozal-Evren relationship, which has never been entirely cordial, will be a critical factor in

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Turkish Police and Intelligence

The Turkish National Police (TNP) has the primary responsibility for law enforcement in urban areas of Turkey. The TNP has 90,000 to 100,000 personnel. It conducts antiterrorist sweeps, antismuggling operations, security investigations, and operations to penetrate extremist groups and is responsible for surveillance of foreigners in collaboration with the intelligence service. The TNP is subordinate to the Interior Ministry, and its key officials are appointed by the Prime Minister with the approval of the President. [redacted]

The 125,000-member Gendarme is responsible for maintaining order in rural areas and villages, guarding prisons and major industrial installations, and protecting the country's frontiers. Unlike the TNP, the Gendarme's involvement in intelligence and investigative activities is limited. Although the Gendarme falls under the responsibility of the Interior Ministry in peacetime, the Turkish General Staff would take control in wartime. New laws also make the General Staff responsible for training and educating Gendarme personnel. [redacted]

The Turkish National Intelligence Organization (TNIO) is supervised by the office of the Prime Minister. Its responsibilities include both domestic and foreign intelligence. The internal directorate conducts counterintelligence operations and surveillance of foreigners, and gathers information on illegal Communist, Kurdish, rightist, and religious groups. [redacted]

[redacted] *We believe that the TNIO's primary purpose is to provide information on the status of illegal groups, and it appears to cooperate closely with the TNP despite an overlap in responsibilities.* [redacted]

TNIO activities are crucial to the success of the counterterrorism program, but the TNIO's contribution is far less apparent than the role played by the TNP and the Gendarme. We believe politicization has been a much less serious problem within the TNIO than in the TNP, and it has maintained a higher degree of professionalism. [redacted]

determining the ability of the government to deal with internal security problems. At present, there are no apparent problems. Ozal has a solid majority in Parliament and an established working relationship with Evren. The two men have similar philosophical outlooks, and they appear to have an informal arrangement whereby Evren takes a greater degree of responsibility for foreign and security affairs, while Ozal concentrates on economic policy. According to press reports, Evren chairs monthly meetings of the new National Security Council, which consists of Ozal; the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs; the chief of the General Staff; force commanders; and the commander of the Gendarme.

[redacted]

We expect the formulation of internal security policy to become progressively more difficult as Ozal's political imperatives come into conflict with Evren's interest in security and in maintaining the authority of the military. Ozal probably will want to gain a greater degree of control over the national and local bureaucracy as a means of strengthening his hold on power and ensuring that his controversial economic policies are carried out. Evren, on the other hand, will probably oppose any such effort, especially if it involves the removal of former military officers serving, for example, as provincial governors. [redacted]

Outlook

In our judgment, the most likely outlook for Turkey is a gradual resurgence of terrorism and violence. Under the best of circumstances, the government will be unable to eliminate the deep-seated roots of violence. Strains are likely to emerge in the Ozal-Evren relationship, creating uncertainty within the bureaucracy and sapping the dynamism of the antiterrorist effort. Both are strong-willed men, and Ozal clearly is intent on asserting his own authority.

[redacted]

Although we expect a gradual worsening of the terrorist problem, we do not expect it to become so severe over the next one to two years as to threaten political stability in Turkey. Martial law remains in effect throughout most of the country, and the

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government and security forces have ample authority to take action under new laws. The powers and authority of the president are, in our judgment, the best assurance of a strong government approach to the problem, and Evren's mandate runs until 1989. [redacted]

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Even a modest revival of terrorism, however, would pose fresh risks for US personnel in Turkey. In the year or so before the military takeover, several US servicemen were killed by Marxist terrorists. We have no direct evidence of current anti-US planning, but it is unlikely that there would be any advance warning of an attack [redacted]

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[redacted] Because the United States was perceived as a staunch supporter of the former military government, we believe Turkish militants might try to exact revenge by seeking out US personnel. There is also a continuing threat from non-Turkish terrorists, especially those entering Turkey from neighboring Arab countries. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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The Shia Urge Toward Martyrdom

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The willingness of radical Shias to launch suicide attacks, such as the Islamic Jihad bombing of the US Embassy Annex in Beirut, in our view, evolves from a complex relationship involving theology, faith, superstition, and instigation.

Theological Underpinnings

The Islamic Jihad suicide bombers believe that they are martyrs for Islam who will receive special rewards in heaven. Martyrdom is only obliquely alluded to in the Koran: "If ye be slain or die on the path of God, then pardon from God and mercy is better than ye have amassed." (*Sura* iii. 156.) The *Hadith* (sayings and deeds of the Prophet), however, spells out promises for those who die for Islam:

- The martyr will not have to answer for his sins before ascending into heaven.
- The martyr does not have to pass through the Islamic version of purgatory.
- The martyr can return to Earth up to 10 times if he wishes to suffer martyrdom again.

Martyrdom is particularly important in Shia theology. The Shias attach special political and religious significance to the martyrdom in 680 A.D. of their Third Imam, Husayn, who was the son of Ali (the first of the 12 Shia Imams, as the Shia political and religious leaders are called) and the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. Husayn was murdered for refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of Yazid, the Sunni Umayyad Caliph. The special religious significance of his martyrdom is derived from his standing as a direct descendant of the Prophet, his betrayal by erstwhile followers who joined the Caliph's forces just days before he was killed, and the barbarous treatment to which he was subjected before his death and to which his corpse was subjected afterward. Shia traditions say that Husayn was killed gradually, that his corpse was trampled, dismembered, and left unburied for three days, and that his severed head was carried to the Caliph in Damascus.

Each year the Shias celebrate the martyrdom of Husayn on the 10th of Muharram (corresponding to 5 October this year). Some make pilgrimages to Karbala in Iraq, the site of his death and now one of Shiism's holiest places; and many perform rituals including self-flagellation to symbolize Husayn's torture and death.

Faith and Superstition

Iranian efforts to export the revolution have stimulated a transformation from "quietism" to activism among economically disadvantaged and politically disenfranchised Shias in many parts of the Muslim world. The faith of the new activists, which has been exploited to advance the objectives of Khomeini and the other Iranian leaders, has often been fatal to the individuals concerned. Self-flagellation is one thing; martyrdom is a much bigger leap even for true believers to make. To help them make this leap, their cynical leaders and commanders have encouraged them to believe things that might appear nonsensical from a secular standpoint. Some of Khomeini's followers, for example, have attributed to him the righteousness and supernatural powers of the Prophet Muhammad and of Husayn, even claiming that he is the 12th, or Hidden, Imam—the last of the true Imams, who, according to Shia tradition, went into "occultation" in the ninth century A.D.

The same syndrome is illustrated by the recent use of "magical keys" by captured Iranian soldiers. According to Arab press reports, the soldiers were told that if they drank water into which the keys had been dipped they would be invisible to their Iraqi captors. Iraqi military officers reported that captured Iranians were dumbfounded when Iraqi soldiers could still see them even after they had swallowed key-infused water. (The fact that the soldiers were told

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this story suggests that their leaders were less than confident that their religious beliefs alone were strong enough to motivate them.)

The Expressway to Heaven

By referring to the United States as the "Great Satan" and terming it a primary enemy of Islam, Khomeini and the other Iranian fundamentalists suggest to Shias that suicidal acts against the United States parallel the courage of Husayn, the martyred Third Imam. In the minds of the most impassioned Shia believers, killing Americans is a way of demonstrating the strength of their faith. According to a number of reports, this belief is carefully inculcated and reinforced in those who are tapped for terrorist missions.



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The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta: Gone But Not Forgotten

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In some ways a terrorist group can be likened to a living organism—it is born, it matures, it gets old, it dies. Unlike a cow or a fish, however, which shortly after its demise begins giving increasingly pungent evidence of it, a terrorist group often just fades away without our noticing. There are some well-known exceptions: the West German 2nd of June Movement and the Italian Prima Linea publicly announced their own disbandment; and the West German and British police put an end to the Kexel-Hepp Group through the simple expedient of arresting all but one of its members. Yet it is likely that a good number of the terrorist groups found on most lists of such groups really do not belong there any longer. Following is a description of how one such group has maintained a ghostly presence in the files of counterterrorism organizations of several governments.

The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) was formed in 1974 by several like-minded South American terrorist groups in an effort to facilitate international cooperation.¹ Initially, this group seemed to pose a formidable threat to several governments in the region. It did in fact carry out—or was anyway implicated in—a number of terrorist incidents. The last known event that may have involved the JCR was recorded in 1977. Since then, no confirmed reporting of any activity of the group has been received.

Recently, inconsistencies in the file prompted a thorough review of available information concerning the JCR. One thing uncovered was a 1979 study of the JCR that concluded the group was “moribund at best” and should no longer be considered a terrorist threat. Similarly, current issues of CIA publications that list terrorist and insurgent groups no longer

¹ The founders of the JCR were:
• The People’s Revolutionary Movement (ERP) of Argentina.
• The National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros) of Uruguay.
• The Army of National Liberation (ELN) of Bolivia.
• The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) of Chile.

contain references to the JCR; and a recent DIA compendium that contains a useful historical treatment of the group notes a dearth of current information concerning the group’s leadership, strength, weapons, equipment, and funding. At the same time, however, a number of fairly recent reports

appeared in the aggregate to provide confirmed information that the JCR was still functioning.

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A closer examination, however, revealed a pattern of circular reporting that tended to provide false verification because of time delays and variances in details.

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It is not unlikely, moreover, that some creative writing crept into these reports. Where details were present, they were of the sort that anyone who knew something about terrorism and read current newspapers could easily invent. The motivation is understandable: it is often convenient for a security service to have a

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scapegoat that cannot respond to or refute accusations, one that can be accused of exerting external influence on a country's internal problems, one which poses such a threat as to justify an increase in the service's budget.

Earlier this year, an unsourced report carried in a South American newspaper prompted a series of intergovernmental queries, the responses to which nearly "confirmed" the existence of a nonexistent terrorist group. Under the pressure of short deadlines,

[redacted] information of dubious accuracy and relevancy as if it were pertinent fact. An assumption that the group existed caused certain information to be interpreted as evidence the group existed, when in fact the contrary interpretation was more appropriate and should have led the assumption to be challenged.

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These cases suggest that it may not be uncommon for terrorist groups to be perpetuated in reporting long after they cease in actuality.

[redacted]

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Chronology of Terrorism—1984

Below are described noteworthy foreign and international terrorist events and counterterrorism developments that have occurred or come to light since our last issue. Events and developments that have already been described in previous issues are not included unless new information has surfaced. Asterisks denote events covered elsewhere in this issue in greater detail. []

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2 November***Chile: FPMR Attacks Police Bus**

A police bus carrying 16 members of a special forces unit was hit near Valparaiso by a remote-controlled claymore-type device. The blast killed four carabineros and injured the other 12. The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) claimed responsibility. []

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4 November***Chile: FPMR Attacks Police Station**

In Santiago, three FPMR terrorists aboard a stolen truck assaulted the 10th Precinct Station of the National Police using automatic weapons and grenades. Two carabineros died and four were wounded. Subsequently, the attackers took refuge in the Swedish Embassy, where they demanded asylum. []

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8 November**Sudan: Libyan-Backed Dissidents Arrested**

In Khartoum, [] four Sudanese dissidents arrested in Chad and expelled to Sudan claimed to have been sent on a terrorist mission against high-level Sudanese officials and American diplomatic and business targets. []

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14 November**Zaire: Canadian Clergyman Killed**

A Canadian Methodist minister-pilot was shot after landing in Moba during a rebel attack. US Embassy officials suggest the guerrillas were probably unaware of his identity, because in his dress and appearance he resembled a mercenary and he carried two army officers as passengers. []

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19 November**Colombia: Police Seize ELN Hideout**

In Bogota, five former students were arrested when police raided a safehouse of the National Liberation Army (ELN). Ammunition and powerful explosives were confiscated. []

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20 November**Bolivia: Home of Former President Bombed**

A powerful blast shook the home of former President (1971-78) Hugo Banzer Suarez without causing any damage. No group has claimed responsibility. []

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Peru: Binational Center, Government Buildings Bombed

Among the buildings damaged in a bombing attack in the northern city of Piura were the US-affiliated Peruvian-American Cultural Institute and local offices of the Ministry of Labor and Agriculture. There were no reported casualties. [redacted]

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Philippines: American and German Held by MNLF

In the Sulu Archipelago, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) claimed to be holding an American and a German as "trespassers" and demanded a 500,000-peso ransom. [redacted] this "kidnaping" was a publicity stunt and [redacted] the two, along with seven other foreigners, would be freed in mid-December. [redacted]

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21 November

Italy: Seven Suspected Terrorists Arrested

In Naples, Italian police arrested seven suspected terrorists accused of belonging to the "Communist Guerrilla Nucleus" (CGN). Two other suspects remain at large.

[redacted]

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22 November

Greece: 21 November Announces Its Arrival With Bombs

In Athens, bomb explosions at four sites including the offices of the bar association and an opposition party news service caused extensive damage and injured four people. A telephone caller claimed the attacks were conducted by the "21 November Organization," a previously unheard-of group of unknown political leanings. [redacted]

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Turkey: Hizbullah Extremists Arrested

In Istanbul, police arrested 15 members of "Hizbullah," a Turkish Islamic extremist organization that advocates converting Turkey into an Islamic republic. The police also confiscated five weapons and 1,000 rounds of ammunition that had been buried on the grounds of a mosque. Police believe Hizbullah members have been responsible for more than 20 robberies of banks and jewelry stores in Istanbul. [redacted]

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Bolivia: Attempted Kidnaping of Bolivian Congresswoman

In La Paz, three unidentified men tried but failed to kidnap Nora Matienzo de Lopez outside her residence. She is a member of the Chamber of Deputies and Vice President of the Congressional Mixed Commission investigating links between the Bolivian Government and narcotics traffickers. [redacted]

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***Chile: Naval Guard Attacked**


Near Talcahuano, south of Santiago, unidentified terrorists attacked a naval patrol guarding a high-tension tower. One of the guards was wounded and subsequently died. [redacted]

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22-24 November




22-27 November

24 November

***Jordan: Bomb Found at US Research Center**

In Amman, police defused a bomb found in a flower box at the US-affiliated American Center for Oriental Research (ACOR). [redacted]

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Jordan: Abu Nidal Operatives Arrested

In Amman, Jordanian [redacted] arrested two Palestine National Council observers identified as members of the Abu Nidal Group. The two had been present while King Hussein and Yasir Arafat gave their speeches. [redacted]

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25 November

Greece: 21 November Continues Bombing Campaign

The new group 21 November claimed credit for three more bombs. One heavily damaged a truck in the port city of Pireaus. The second, housed in a flashlight, injured a man when it exploded in his hands. The third was found and removed from an Athens hotel after a phone caller tipped off its location to Greek security forces. [redacted]

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26 November

***Chile: Car Bomb Explodes Near Municipal Building**

In Santiago, a car bomb containing about 25 kilograms of ammonia gelatin exploded near a municipal building. Two vehicles were completely destroyed, two were damaged, and the windows of the municipal building and nearby houses were shattered. [redacted]

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Colombia: Explosion at US Embassy

In Bogota, a car bomb exploded near the US Embassy compound, killing a Colombian citizen. The bombing was believed to be the work of Colombian narcotics traffickers angered at the government's decision to extradite several of their compatriots to the United States. [redacted]

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El Salvador: D'Aubuisson's Vehicle Attacked

The personal armored vehicle belonging to Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, leader of the National Republican Alliance, was riddled by automatic weapons fire as it patrolled streets near his home. D'Aubuisson was not in the vehicle at the time. No group has claimed responsibility. [redacted]

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Mexico: Congressman Murdered

Unidentified gunmen ambushed and killed Mexican congressman Roque Spinoza Faglia of the ruling Revolutionary Institutional Party and two of his cousins as they rode in two cars along an isolated stretch of road in the state of Veracruz. Spinoza was a former leader of the National Union of Sugarcane Growers. The reason for the attack is not known, and no one claimed responsibility. [redacted]

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27 November

***Jordan: PSF Bomb Explodes Near PLO Headquarters**

In Amman, a bomb consisting of 2 kilograms of TNT exploded in a vacant lot adjoining the PLO headquarters building. The bomb caused no casualties and only slight damage to the building. [redacted]

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Guatemala: Gunmen Kill Official

Gunmen in an automobile and a motorcycle fatally shot Beatriz Charnoud, the head of Guatemala's waterworks, along with her bodyguard, as they were driving to work. No one has claimed responsibility for the murders. [redacted]

25X1

Colombia: Spanish Ambassador Threatened With Death

The Spanish Ambassador to Colombia received death threats from Colombian narcotics traffickers in response to the arrest in Madrid on 15 November of eight Colombian narcotics traffickers. The Spanish Government is now considering whether to extradite two of the detainees to the United States. [redacted]

25X1

India: UK Diplomat Assassinated

In Bombay, Britain's deputy high commissioner was killed by two unidentified gunmen as he was being driven to work. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims (ROSM) claimed credit for the act. [redacted]

25X1

28 November

Argentina: Bomb Blasts Office of Military Lobbying Group

In Buenos Aires, the office of the Center of Argentine Officers for Democracy, a recently formed group of retired military officers, was bombed. No group has claimed responsibility. [redacted]

25X1

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Peru: Peruvian-American Cultural Center Bombed

Two bombs exploded adjacent to the auditorium of the Peruvian-American Cultural Institute in Lima, but caused no injuries. Police believe members of Sendero Luminoso were responsible. This was the second attack on a binational center in a week.

25X1

Ethiopia: Three Hostages Released

In Kassala, Ethiopian guerrillas released to the Sudanese two Britons and one Australian who had been held since 19 October when the rebels seized the town of Lalibela. Three other captives (two Americans and one Briton) had earlier been released inside Ethiopia.

25X1

29 November

Lebanon: Bombing of British Airways Office

In Beirut, a bomb heavily damaged the British Airways office, but caused no injuries. An anonymous caller to AFP claimed that the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims (ROSM) was responsible.

25X1

El Salvador: FCER Strafes US Embassy

The Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front (FCER), a dissident faction of the FPL, machinegunned the US Embassy. No injuries were reported.

25X1

Peru: General Strike Punctuated by Bombs

Five bombs exploded during a general strike protesting the national government's human rights record and austerity policies. Bomb blasts ripped through an English-language school and two banks in Lima, as well as government buildings in the Andean city of Huanuco.

25X1

***Greece: Jordanian Diplomat Attacked**

In Athens, an unidentified gunman attempted to assassinate the deputy chief of the Jordanian Mission, but his gun jammed. The gunman escaped on a motorcycle that had been rented by a man with a Moroccan passport. The next day police arrested a suspect at the Greek-Yugoslav border carrying an apparently forged Moroccan passport.

25X1

***Sri Lanka: Tamil Tigers Massacre Settlers**

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam claimed responsibility for two separate massacres of Sinhalese. In the first incident 65-80 men, women, and children, mostly from a former prisoner rehabilitation program, reportedly were herded into houses and barns and killed by gunfire or grenades, or incinerated when the buildings were deliberately set ablaze. In another incident the same night, 11 Sinhalese fisherman were apparently killed by unidentified Tamils on the northeast coast.

25X1

Secret


1 December

Greece: Conservative Leader Target of Bombs

In Athens, two bombs were found and removed from under a platform where opposition leader Constantine Mitsotakis was scheduled to speak. No group claimed credit for the attempted bombing.

25X1

2 December



25X6

Corsica: Violence Erupts at Nationalist Rally

One policeman was killed and two were wounded by bombs in a night of violence spurred by a rally held in support of imprisoned Corsican nationalists. Press reports indicate several other small bombs exploded throughout the island during the night.

25X1

3 December

Greece: Bombs Planted Under Iraqi Embassy Vehicles

In Athens, a Greek explosives expert was killed while attempting to disarm one of four bombs planted under Iraqi Embassy vehicles. The other three bombs were safely detonated by police. In a phone call to AFP in Paris, the Islamic Action in Iraq Organization, an Iranian-backed group of Iraqi dissidents affiliated with the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, claimed credit for the bombings.

25X1

***Jordan: Bomb Found Near Citibank Offices**

In Amman, Jordanian police defused a bomb found near Citibank executive offices in the American Life Insurance Company building. This device was very similar to the bomb defused on 24 November at the ACOR building in Amman. No group claimed credit for placing either bomb, but the US Embassy believes the Abu Nidal Group was responsible.

25X1

Mozambique: Second Italian Technician Found Dead

Near a Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) camp in Maputo Province, the Mozambican Army discovered the body of the second Italian technician who had been abducted by RENAMO on 12 September. Earlier, the body of his compatriot had been found nearby.

25X1

4 December

***Romania: Jordanian Diplomat Assassinated**

In Bucharest, the deputy chief of the Jordanian Mission was shot dead in front of his hotel. Police arrested the gunman, a Palestinian student, at the scene. An anonymous caller claimed credit for the attack in the name of the Black September Organization, an unlikely story. The modus operandi of the attack was similar to that of the Abu Nidal Group, which has attacked Jordanian diplomats in the past.

25X1

***Philippines: LAFM Leaders Condemned**

In Manila, four leaders of the outlawed "Light-a-Fire Movement" (LAFM) were convicted of a 1979 arson campaign and sentenced to death. They were also found guilty of conspiring to commit rebellion and plotting to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos.

25X1

4-10 December

***Kuwait-Iran: Hijackers Kill Passengers**

In Tehran, the four hijackers of a Kuwaiti airliner were overpowered by Iranian security forces and their remaining hostages were released unharmed. During the six-day ordeal, the hijackers killed two Americans and injured at least six others of various nationalities, while demanding that Kuwait free those Iraqis and Lebanese convicted in the 12 December 1983 Dawa Party bombing of the US and French Embassies in Kuwait. The hijackers are therefore believed to be associated with the Iranian-supported Dawa Party.

25X1

5 December

***Greece: British Council Escapes Bombing**

In Athens, Greek explosives experts disarmed a bomb discovered in a bag outside the garage of the British Council.

25X1

***Sri Lanka: Tamils Kill Nine Hostages**

In the Jaffna Peninsula, separatists of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA) were reported to have killed nine Sinhalese hostages they had seized at a cement plant on 3 December.

25X1

6 December

***Chile: Police Station Attacked**

In the working-class district of Santa Adriana in Santiago, numerous assailants in three vehicles attacked the police station with handgrenades and automatic weapons, killing a police officer and wounding another officer and a passer-by.

25X1

7 December

***Spain: ETA Bomb Kills Three Soldiers**

In Mungui, members of ETA claimed responsibility for a bombing attack on a military convoy that killed three soldiers and wounded 11 others.

25X1

Secret

8 December

***Chile: Bomb Explodes on Subway Tracks**

In Santiago, a bomb exploded on the subway tracks during rush hour, halting service in the entire western sector of the city. At least one person was injured in the explosion, which also damaged the tracks, electric installations, and a ticket booth.

25X1

9 December

Portugal: Grenade Attack on NATO Headquarters

In Oeiras, members of the leftist group, Popular Forces of 15 April (FP-25) claimed responsibility for a grenade attack on NATO's Iberian headquarters. In their claim they stated that the four grenades fired into the facility were part of a struggle against NATO, against US "imperialism," and for national independence.

25X1

Pakistan: Bus Bombed

In the Northwest Frontier Province, a bomb exploded on a bus, wounding 14 people. Pakistani officials say they suspect the explosion was an act of sabotage by "Afghan terrorists," whose activities they claim have lately been increasing.

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