



Directorate of  
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**Terrorism Review**



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15 November 1984

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*This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor*

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**Terrorism Review** 

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**Focus****Iranian Terrorist Threat Remains High** 

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Although Iranian-backed terrorists did not attempt any attacks in the days preceding the 6 November US elections, the threat they pose to US interests in the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon, remains high. The terrorists may have been forced to postpone their attacks because of increased security at US facilities. Iran and its surrogates, however, remain committed to eliminating US influence in the Middle East. We therefore believe that Shia extremists will continue to target US facilities in Lebanon and possibly other parts of the Middle East.

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Several threats issued by persons claiming to represent the Islamic Jihad early this month indicated that Iranian-backed terrorists were planning attacks on US and Allied interests in the near future:

- On 4 November, a Lebanese radiobroadcast claimed the Islamic Jihad had threatened to conduct a surprise attack against the United States and its allies before 6 November.
- Also on 4 November, an anonymous caller to a foreign news agency claimed the Islamic Jihad would strike a "hard blow" against US interests in the Middle East very soon. The caller added that the Islamic Jihad would attack the US Navy and specifically warned that, "if we cannot prevent the reelection of Mr. Reagan, we shall inevitably prevent him from completing his second term of office."
- On 5 November, a caller claiming to represent the Islamic Jihad indicated the group would attack any Lebanese officials who participate in the troop withdrawal talks with Israel.
- Also on 5 November, spokesmen for the Hizballah—elements of which we believe use Islamic Jihad as a covername—published an article that labeled the negotiations with Israel "sacrilege" and called for a "holy struggle" to eliminate Israel.

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As the September bombing of the US Embassy Annex indicated, attacks by the radical Shias can occur with little or no warning. The Hizballah in Lebanon and Iranian-backed groups in the Persian Gulf and possibly elsewhere may believe that new US targets of opportunity will emerge as heightened security measures taken prior to the US elections are gradually relaxed. Local security services responsible for protecting US facilities beyond the limited area controlled by American personnel may be unable or unwilling to devote special attention to US needs indefinitely. The terrorists' primary target in Lebanon probably is still the US

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Ambassador's residence in Yarze. The original Hizballah plan for a suicide vehicle bombing against the residence could be replaced by other types of operations, such as suicide attacks with explosives-laden aircraft, or a commando-style raid. We have not, however, seen much credible evidence of Hizballah capabilities to conduct such attacks at present.

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If continued high security in Lebanon denies the terrorists any attractive targets there, Iranian-backed terrorists may target other US facilities and personnel in the Middle East. The "surprise" referred to in the 4 November Islamic Jihad threat suggests that attacks outside Lebanon may be planned. In addition, an Iranian radio commentary marking the fifth anniversary of the takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran encouraged similar attacks on US Embassies elsewhere.

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We believe the most likely alternative targets for attacks would be US in Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, or Cyprus. Iran could use either local Shia collaborators or its other operatives in these countries to conduct such attacks. While the terrorists undoubtedly would like to conduct spectacular bombings against official US facilities as they have in the past, smaller scale armed attacks or kidnappings of vulnerable US officials also are a serious possibility. Nonofficial US interests, such as corporate facilities or unprotected private citizens, may offer softer targets that would nevertheless allow the terrorists to maintain their pressure on the United States.

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**Highlights****Alert Items****Sudan****Correction: Libya Not Targeting US Ambassador**

We have learned that the information concerning an alleged Libyan plot to kill the US Ambassador to Sudan, described in this space in our last issue, was entirely fabricated. The story is groundless.

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**Key Indicators****West Germany****Red Army Faction Buildup Continues?**

A number of recent events indicate that the RAF may be planning a terrorist attack in the near future. Several persons on the federal police watchlist of suspected and potential terrorists have disappeared in recent months, suggesting they may have joined the hardcore underground. Imprisoned RAF members are preparing to stage a hunger strike. Two cars were recently stolen from a rental agency in Mannheim by a woman associated with the RAF. At least one of the cars was used by the two men who robbed 22 handguns from a gunshop in Maxdorf, near Mannheim, on 5 November. They also took a large quantity of ammunition.

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Documents discovered at the time of the arrests of six RAF terrorists in Frankfurt last summer indicated that the group had advanced plans for terrorist attacks. Among the documents was a strategy paper calling for a hunger strike of RAF prisoners to take place as a political action in parallel with attacks against US military and NATO installations. The RAF has a history of stubbornly adhering to its plans even when it knows the authorities have discovered them.

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**Turkey****Arrests Interrupt Urban Terrorist Comeback**

A monthlong counterterrorist operation by Turkish security forces in Istanbul netted several dozen members of two urban terrorist groups, the Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU) and the Revolutionary Left (Dev Sol). After three years of low activity, the two groups were believed responsible for a number of bomb attacks in Istanbul during August and September against private businesses, government buildings, and several branch offices of Turkey's ruling party. In addition, Turkish security forces were concerned that the virulently anti-American MLAPU might have been preparing an attack against US personnel and property in reprisal for the mid-October sentencing of 22 of the group's members to death.

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The arrests demonstrate that Turkish security forces, although unable to exterminate these urban terrorist groups, are nevertheless capable of neutralizing terrorist efforts to regain lost momentum. The operation against MLAPU uncovered material for making explosives, but Tayfun Bilgin—the group's explosives expert and one of its top leaders, who had been thought to be outside the country—evaded capture.

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**Significant Developments**

**Saudi Arabia**

**Civil Airliner Hijacked to Iran**

On 6 November a Saudia Airlines jet en route from London to Riyadh with 131 passengers and crewpersons was hijacked after a stopover in Jiddah. The two male hijackers, believed to be North Yemenis, diverted the plane to Tehran. While on the ground there, they were overpowered by the crew and passengers and arrested by Iranian authorities.

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The hijackers had demanded a ransom of \$500,000, the payment of an equal sum to North Yemen, assurance that Saudi Arabia would leave North Yemen alone, and political asylum for themselves in Iran. Their fate is not known, but the crew and passengers, including 12 Americans and 40 Britons, were returned safely to Saudi Arabia.

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**Costa Rica**

**Court Approves Extradition of ETA Member to Spain**

In Alajuela, the Superior Penal Court of Appeals authorized the extradition of accused ETA operative Gregorio Jimenez to Spain, overturning a lower court ruling that asserted the charges Jimenez faced in Spain were political.

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The Appeals Court decision may be evidence of a stronger Costa Rican Government posture against terrorism. On the other hand, since Jimenez is suspected of involvement in a plot to assassinate Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) leader Eden Pastora in 1983, the decision may also reflect a desire to avoid trying Jimenez in Costa Rica. Either way, retaliatory attacks by ETA members or supporters are likely.

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**Chile**

**Terrorist Threat Used To Justify State of Siege**

President Pinochet declared a 90-day state of siege on 6 November, claiming it was needed to combat the recent wave of terrorism. The terrorist attacks included a large number of bombings and resulted in some deaths. According to press reports, the declaration was followed two days later by the arrest at the University of Chile of at least 35 students protesting the declaration, and secret police raids in Santiago and the southern city of Temuco that netted at least 25 labor and political activists.

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Pinochet's actions, although keyed to the need to respond to the recent surge of terrorist attacks, also allow him to restrict the activities of the democratic opposition. The state of siege and several other measures, including the closure of opposition publications and the banning of unauthorized meetings in the capital, constitute the most sweeping political crackdown since Pinochet seized power in his September 1973 coup. Although the measures initially may allow the government to stop the escalating terrorist activity, their draconian nature will further antagonize political moderates and might increase the support enjoyed by the radicals.

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**Peru****Shining Path Conducting Antielection Campaign**

The Sendero Luminoso apparently has begun a campaign to disrupt voter registration for the 1985 presidential election. On 26 and 27 October, two offices of the National Elections Board (JNE) in Lima were attacked and the voting rolls were burned. Eight persons were injured by bombs the terrorists threw as they were leaving. In early November Sendero Luminoso terrorists killed 12 government officials at election registration centers in the central Peruvian towns of Jivia and Jesus. Security forces arrested 11 suspects. The government has now augmented police protection for JNE offices.

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We believe the recent attacks could be the opening salvo of a sustained effort to derail the electoral process. Past police successes in penetrating the organization's infrastructure in Lima, however, may indicate that the Sendero Luminoso will find it difficult to sustain such a campaign in the capital.

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**India****The Gandhi Assassination**

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was shot to death on 31 October by two Sikh members of her security force. One of the two attackers was killed and the other seriously wounded by other guards. Although it is widely believed that Mrs. Gandhi's assassination was the result of a Sikh conspiracy, and rumors of the involvement of a Sikh army general are rife, there is as yet no evidence to suggest that the shooting was anything more than an act of vengeance by the actors concerned. The surviving assailant is still being questioned and may implicate others.

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The immediate consequence of Mrs. Gandhi's death was a week of Hindu violence against Sikhs, an event that may lead to a Sikh backlash and a cycle of terror such as occurred in Punjab in 1982 and 1983. Communal frictions also surfaced between Muslims and Hindus in Bombay earlier this year, and the Tamils of the south have recently been restive. Mrs. Gandhi was willing to use the Army to suppress outbreaks of communal violence, but it remains to be seen whether the new Prime Minister, her son Rajiv, will be as firm.

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Finally, there is some concern that further assassination attempts may be made, perhaps against Rajiv or President Zail Singh, if some of the more radical Sikhs feel emboldened by the attack on Mrs. Gandhi. But it may be that Sikh outrage has played itself out in the murder of the leader who authorized the storming of the Sikhs' Golden Temple last June.

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Indonesia

**Group Implicated in Bombings Poses Threat to Americans**

In the wake of an apparently spontaneous outbreak of communal violence in Jakarta last September and October, disturbing information has come to light suggesting that a hitherto unknown terrorist group may have been behind the riots and bombings. Of more direct import to the United States is a series of incidents that indicates that this group may be targeting American personnel and facilities.

[redacted]

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After rioting in the Tanjung Priok section of Jakarta on 12 September—which, [redacted] claimed as many as 150 lives—and a trio of anti-Chinese bombings on 4 October that killed two and wounded 16, Indonesian police rounded up hundreds of suspects. [redacted] some of the detainees claim to belong to "Solidaritas Islam," a recently established group that seeks to overthrow the Indonesian Government by exploiting Muslim frustrations over societal inequities. They admitted Solidaritas had planned to instigate mob violence on 20 September, but instead took advantage of Muslim indignation to help fuel the events of 12 September and then set off bombs in Chinese-owned banks and businesses on 4 October. The group reportedly intends to set off more bombs. [redacted]

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Subsequent to these events, several threats to US personnel and facilities from Muslim fundamentalist extremists have surfaced. In mid-October, Indonesian employees of the American Employees' Recreation Association Club were observed with posters praising Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, which they claimed to have obtained from the Iranian Embassy. On 5 November the US Embassy received a letter signed by Solidaritas Islam threatening the Embassy with the same sort of bombings experienced by the Chinese establishments. The same day, an identical threat was telephoned to an apartment building housing several US officials by a person who also pledged to bring an "Islamic Jihad" down on the occupants. These were the first threats from extremist Islamic groups in Jakarta since last March. [redacted]

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## French Policy Toward Extradition of Terrorists

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*The following has been adapted from an evaluation recently furnished by the US Embassy in Paris.*

Some observers in both the Socialist and opposition camps believed that the French Government's 23 September decision to extradite three Basques to Spain would be a wedge leading to a major breakthrough for future terrorism-related extradition cases. A month after the decision, however, the government's reluctance to generalize about extradition or any other aspect of the terrorism problem remains strong, and it is questionable whether the government will be as forthcoming in extraditing other accused terrorists in the coming months.

It appears that the government made its late September Basque extradition decision primarily because it was backed into a corner by circumstances. Judging from past practice, the French would have preferred to support Spanish democracy and Spain's battle against Basque terrorism in less forceful and controversial ways. These extraditions caused severe repercussions against French commercial interests in Spain and significantly heightened the security problem in French Basque country just prior to a presidential trip.

A 1982 government policy statement on extradition sets forth the basis for rejection of extradition on political grounds while reaffirming French cooperation on extradition for criminal cases. With the Basque decision, the government has indeed shown its willingness to extradite terrorists who carry out political crimes of extreme violence. However, the government has long avoided defining clear and consistent principles for dealing with accused foreign terrorists. For several reasons, the government especially resists pronouncing anathemas on foreign nationalist groups or lumping them together in policy statements. Coldblooded calculators in the government see no reason to court trouble by

confronting groups that have not focused on French targets. Some also believe that the shifting tides of international politics may eventually create conditions where these groups will be useful to France. In addition, some officials, while opposing terrorists' methods, sympathize with particular grievances—or at least recognize them as political problems that should be resolved through negotiation.

In addition to these general considerations, the extradition issue exerts specific pressures on the government. Many a committed Socialist militant can recite by rote a number of instances where violent nationalist groups fighting against governments claiming to be democratic won their struggles, assumed power, and came to be regarded as legitimate members of the world community. The recent extradition of the three Basques went down hard in many Socialist circles where the right of asylum is a sacred principle. The government, in view of the declining morale within the Socialist Party on other issues, is reluctant to force-feed the faithful a steady diet of such extraditions.

In the wake of the Basque extraditions, the French press reported that Spain was submitting additional extradition requests to France. These requests thus far have generated only a faint grinding of teeth in Paris. We cannot predict with certainty that the government will maneuver to avoid further extraditions, but official behavior recently appears aimed at discouraging any ideas about automaticity. We suspect that expulsions may remain a prime tool for dealing with alleged Basque terrorists. The prospects of extraditions to Italy appear particularly discouraging. French officials have characterized Italian extradition requests as poorly prepared and

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unrealistic. By this they apparently mean that the Italians sometimes present membership in a terrorist group as a sufficient reason for extradition, whereas the French want to play down these "political" aspects of the cases and concentrate on criminal actions. We suspect, however, that even an Italian dossier which demonstrated convincingly the commission of a violent crime might run into trouble with the French. Although government officials are reluctant to say so specifically, some are uneasy as a result of criticism in the French press of the Italian judicial system.

In sum, we see the government as keeping open its options on extradition. Justice and Interior Ministry sources have said that future cases involving "political criminals" might not evoke the same response as did the Basque cases last September. We believe, the French Government will strive to avoid placing itself in a position of automatic approval on extradition cases.



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**Death in Guatemala City** 

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A recent spate of assassinations in Guatemala City, at least some of them politically related, reveals the fragility of the process through which the country is gradually returning to constitutional government.

Some of these killings may have been terrorist acts, depending on the identities and motivations of the murderers, which in most cases have yet to be determined. This possibility is of some importance to those of use who chronicle terrorist events; indeed, it is the reason the murders are described in this publication. In the context in which the killings occurred, however, the question of whether or not they were terrorist acts can be seen to be of little relevance.

**Businessman Murdered**

On 25 October prominent Guatemalan businessman Freddy Sedri Calderon was found murdered, together with his bodyguard. They had been kidnaped around 8 October by six armed men originally identified in the press as police investigators. It now appears likely that the two were killed after ransom negotiations broke down between the Sedri family and the kidnapers. Two persons have been arrested in connection with the case.

**Party Leader Attacked**

The Secretary General of the National Unity Front (FUN), Gabriel Giron Ortiz, reported that, during the early morning hours of 26 October, unknown persons fired several shots at his house. Although no one was hurt, Giron requested protection from government security forces.

**National Assemblyman Assassinated**

On 26 October Santos Hernandez, an Indian deputy in the National Constituent Assembly representing Quiche Department, was shot to death as he was walking along a Guatemala City street. The assailants, several men who arrived in two vehicles, also killed his two bodyguards. Hernandez had been

elected to the assembly in July as a member of the FUN but angered his party by subsequently announcing that he was planning to switch to the extreme rightwing National Liberation Movement (MLN).<sup>1</sup> Speculation over the identity of his killers has been wide ranging:

- The FUN may have killed him because of his intended defection.
- The MLN, which was planning a formal ceremony to accept Hernandez into the party, may have killed him to prevent him from reconsidering his defection, as he was rumored to be doing.
- Business rivals may have killed him to break his reported monopoly on transport in his home region.
- Extreme leftwing elements may have killed him to embarrass the government.

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**Two Communist Professors Murdered**

On 26 October National University of San Carlos economics professor Carlos de Leon Guidel was shot to death by unknown assailants as he drove home from the university. The following day, the dean of the economics faculty, Vitalino Giron Corado, was shot to death as he stopped at a gas station while driving to the funeral of de Leon. The assassins arrived in two cars; those from one car pulled Mrs. Giron away from her husband, while those from the second car shot him.

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A government statement about the murders implied the two professors had been murdered by common criminals, but it seems more likely they were either killed by government security forces—de Leon had previously been kidnaped and then released by security personnel—or that they died as a

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<sup>1</sup> FUN leader Giron then revealed that Hernandez was illiterate and tried to take his place in the assembly, but the assembly voted instead to let Hernandez keep his seat, saying he could serve as the representative of the country's 4 million illiterates.

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consequence of an internecine struggle in the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party (PGT). Both were rumored to be members of the PGT Orthodox Faction, and the university is currently in the throes of a PGT-fomented labor dispute.

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The US Embassy fears that the deaths of the two Communist professors indicate that the rector of the university, Dr. Eduardo Meyer, is in extreme jeopardy. Meyer, who refuses to use bodyguards, is sometimes mentioned as a likely presidential candidate. An attack against him would, in the Embassy's view, be a major setback to the process of returning Guatemala to constitutional government. Moreover, according to the Embassy, in the past when its members have been murdered, the PGT has retaliated in kind. Thus the ground has been prepared for a cycle of retaliatory assassinations.

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**US Peace Corps Volunteer Slain**

On 28 October in Guatemala City, a US Peace Corps volunteer was found shot to death. With help from the US Embassy, which had received a tip, a few days later police identified and arrested the apparent killer, a young Guatemalan. According to him, the killing was basically an accident. Although there are some holes in his story, there were apparently no political overtones to the incident.

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## Terrorism in Colombia and Prospects for Peace

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Political violence has ebbed and flowed in Colombia for more than three decades but has never really disappeared. At present, there are four major terrorist organizations operating in the cities and countryside conducting kidnappings, extortion, bombings, bank robberies, murder, takeovers of towns, and other forms of violence. Although these groups have never seriously threatened Colombia's political stability, their activities have hurt Colombia's economy and have undermined public faith in the government's ability to protect its citizens. They all have an anti-US attitude and have in the past victimized US citizens.

Given the intensity and longevity of Colombian terrorism, there is little hope that a lasting cessation of violence will result from President Betancur's peace plan, which includes cease-fire agreements with the major terrorist groups. Adding to the difficulties in achieving peace is the growing violence of the narcotics traffickers, who have developed close ties with the terrorists.

### The Terrorist Groups

The major Colombian guerrilla groups trace their origins to the bitter civil war known as "la violencia" that lasted from 1948 to 1957. During this period, members of the Conservative and Liberal parties fought each other in a bloody confrontation that cost the lives of at least 200,000 people. Members of both parties formed guerrilla bands either for group protection or in order to harass the enemy. When "la violencia" was finally brought to an end, many guerrilla groups refused to lay down their arms; rural banditry had become a way of life.

The largest insurgent-terrorist group, the *Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)*, has about 25 guerrilla "fronts" with some 2,500 armed combatants and a support organization of approximately 10,000 sympathizers. The FARC was established in 1966 as the armed wing of the Moscow-

line Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), but generally has operated independently of the PCC. The FARC is primarily a rural organization and seldom operates in the cities. It obtains its funds mostly through kidnaping, extortion of wealthy ranchers, and, since 1980, from the narcotics trade.

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The best known terrorist group in Colombia is the *19th of April Movement (M-19)*, which emerged in January 1974 when it stole the sword of Simon Bolivar from a Bogota museum. Since then, M-19—which took its name from the date of the election defeat in 1970 of former dictator/president Gen. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla—has demonstrated an ability to conduct daring and spectacular incidents. On New Year's Eve in 1978, M-19 members raided an Army arms depot by tunneling into it and making off with more than 500 weapons. In February 1980, 16 heavily armed members seized the Dominican Republic Embassy in Bogota during a diplomatic reception and took 80 hostages, including the US Ambassador, triggering a siege that lasted for more than two months.

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M-19 has suffered several setbacks since the Dominican Republic Embassy incident. Its reputation was tarnished in early 1981 when an M-19 splinter group kidnaped and later killed a US citizen affiliated with the Summer Institute of Linguistics, a US religious organization. In March 1981, M-19 attempted to launch a coordinated rural attack on various coastal towns. Several hundred recruits, newly trained in Cuba, landed in several boats and were quickly confronted by Colombian security forces who killed more than 25 attackers and captured 800. Because M-19 had often claimed it was a purely Colombian group, its image was further tarnished by its now-obvious association with Cuba.

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The worst blow to M-19 was the death of its charismatic leader, Jaime Bateman, in a plane crash in Panama in the spring of 1983. Since then, the movement, which is currently believed to number about 900 activists, has not mounted a large-scale operation and is rumored to be divided. It obtains most of its funds from bank robberies, kidnappings, and drug trafficking.

The *National Army of Liberation (ELN)*, is a pro-Cuban urban/rural organization with approximately 500 combatants. Founded in 1963, the ELN carried out terrorist attacks until 1973 when Colombian military raids crippled the movement. Cuba subsequently withdrew its support. The group remained relatively weak until 1982 when it began to increase its urban and rural activities, especially kidnappings. In November 1983, ELN terrorists kidnaped President Betancur's brother, but released him in the face of nationwide revulsion. In January 1984, the ELN suffered a serious setback when police raided an ELN safehouse in Bogota.

The *Popular Liberation Army (EPL)* was founded in 1967 by the pro-Beijing Colombian Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist (PCC/ML). It has about 600 members, of which about 350 belong to its urban branch, the Pedro Leon Arboleda group (PLA), which often operates independently of the EPL. Both the EPL and PLA have attacked US interests. The EPL attacked the US Embassy and the US Marine Security Guard residence in Bogota in the late 1970s.

The Trotskyite *Workers Auto Defense Movement (ADO)* is an obscure but violent group that was almost completely destroyed in 1982 with the arrests of several of its leaders. The ADO has recently resurfaced and reportedly was cooperating with the ELN in a plot to attack US Embassy officials last spring. Another shadowy group is the *People's Revolutionary Organization (ORP)*, which carried out two major kidnappings in 1983 but then disappeared. It is possible that the name ORP was used by M-19 or another terrorist group.

Unlike some other Latin American countries, Colombia has not had a serious problem with rightwing terrorism, but in the last two years the "*Death to Kidnapers*" (*MAS*) and other rightist movements have appeared. *MAS*, which assassinates suspected terrorists and other leftist extremists, is believed to be made up of elements of the security and military forces; possibly it is financed by drug traffickers. Shortly after he assumed office in August 1982, Betancur launched an investigation of *MAS*, which publicly implicated several military officers. The armed forces were outraged by the government's findings, but attacks by *MAS* and other extralegal counterterrorism declined after this adverse publicity.

#### Counterinsurgency Efforts

The Colombian military has waged a campaign against rural and urban terrorists for the last 30 years, committing 10,000 to 15,000 field troops to counterinsurgency operations. Over the years, the armed forces have also assumed a major part in shaping national policy toward the insurgents. For instance, state-of-siege decrees codified in the security statute of 1978 gave the military the responsibility for trying insurgents in military courts (a reaction to a slow, corrupt, and lenient civilian court system). Betancur has attempted to reduce the role of the military in internal affairs—against the wishes of the armed forces command—while at the same time he has recognized the necessity of maintaining a strong military counterterrorist capability.

At the behest of Betancur, who came into office committed to achieving peace with the guerrillas, on 20 November 1982 a general amnesty was approved by the Congress. The amnesty was designed to entice guerrillas to lay down their arms and enter the mainstream of Colombian politics. Under the generous terms of the decree, all those accused of politically motivated crimes except murder were pardoned, and the amnestied guerrillas were promised economic benefits as an incentive for adopting legitimate livelihoods. A civic action program was designed to redress the social and economic inadequacies in the countryside, a long-professed goal of the insurgents. As an adjunct to the amnesty

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project, Betancur formed a peace commission to study ways and means to solve the social, economic, and political inequities that had fed the insurgency. [ ]

M-19 and the FARC initially indicated their support for the amnesty. After the bill became law, however, M-19 rejected the pardon and demanded a six-month truce. M-19 blamed the Army for the failure, claiming that in one area the Army was blocking M-19 members from turning themselves in by conducting offensive operations, ambushes, and blockades of guerrillas in regions they controlled. FARC soon followed M-19 in rejecting the program, while the ELN and EPL never accepted the concept of amnesty. After a few months, terrorism returned to its previously high levels. Only a small number of guerrillas turned themselves in to the authorities. [ ]

The main cause of the program's failure was the guerrillas' insistence on several conditions before accepting amnesty that the government could or would not meet. Their main demands were initiation of a "national dialogue," imposition of a truce, and withdrawal of the military from guerrilla strongholds. Some were extreme, such as the one requiring that all multinational corporations leave Colombia. The demand for a national dialogue was partially met by Betancur's encouragement of the peace commission to meet with the guerrillas and hear their views. It was this commission's work which eventually led to cease-fire agreements with the FARC and M-19. [ ]


**Impact on US Interests in Colombia**

Although the large majority of the victims of violence in Colombia are Colombians, foreigners—especially US citizens—also have been targeted by Colombian terrorist groups. In 1977 a Peace Corps volunteer was kidnaped by the FARC and released only three years later after the payment of a large ransom. US Ambassador Diego Asencio was held hostage for two months in 1980 during M-19's seizure of the Dominican Republic Embassy. In 1981 a US citizen working for the Summer Institute of Linguistics was kidnaped by an M-19 faction and later murdered. [ ]

Three Americans were kidnaped in 1983. The most spectacular attack was ORP's kidnaping of a Texaco executive, Kenneth Bishop, in a bloody shootout in downtown Bogota. He was released five weeks later

after the payment of a large ransom. In May the FARC kidnaped Catherine Woods Kirby, a rancher, and in June the FARC abducted Russel Martin Stendal, also a rancher. Both were released following the payment of ransoms. [ ]

US Government installations also have been targeted. In July 1978 a bomb placed on the grounds of the US Embassy knocked down one of the security walls. In 1980 a bomb intended for the US Consulate in Cali exploded prematurely, killing two M-19 terrorists. In 1983, USIS-sponsored binational centers in Barranquilla and Bucaramanga were damaged by bombs, and a guard at the Medellin binational center was killed in a terrorist bombing. On 22 May 1984 two bombs exploded near the US Embassy. [ ]



In the last seven years the threat to US officials and US businessmen has steadily increased. Following the Bishop kidnaping and M-19 threats to target multinational organizations in 1983, several major US firms with operations in Colombia decided to pull out their US personnel. Other US firms have been discouraged from investing or expanding their operations in Colombia. [ ]

Broader US interests also are affected by the corrosive effects of Colombian terrorist activity. The United States has an interest in assuring that Colombia has a stable democracy and a workable economy. Kidnapings and extortion have led numerous Colombian businessmen to flee the country and transfer assets abroad, resulting in increased unemployment and slowed economic growth. Although democratic traditions are strong, because of the state of siege that has existed for almost three decades, the military has acquired an informally institutionalized role in political affairs. Although the


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military strongly supports Colombia's democratic principles and there is little threat of a military takeover, the possibility of a coup is sometimes rumored during periods of heightened terrorist activity. [ ]

**Foreign Connections**

Colombian terrorist groups maintain contacts with foreign governments and terrorist groups. FARC, M-19, and ELN terrorists, for example, have been trained by Cuba. At the time of its formation, the ELN had particularly close ties with Cuba, receiving training, advice, and possibly funds. In the 1970s, Cuba-ELN relations were weak, but a renewal of ties was reported in 1980. [ ]

Although M-19 originally asserted it was not supported by foreign governments, the 1981 Cuban-sponsored invasion on Colombia's Pacific Coast disproved its claim. To protest Cuba's role in this invasion, Colombia broke diplomatic relations. Further evidence of M-19 ties with Cuba surfaced in 1980-81 when Castro began using Colombia's narcotics ring to funnel arms and funds to M-19, using as intermediary Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian drug trafficker now in custody in Mexico. [ ]



The M-19 also has close ties to the Nicaraguan Government and contacts with terrorist movements throughout Latin America, including Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and two insurgent Venezuelan groups. [ ]

There is little information on the FARC's foreign connections. A US citizen held captive by the FARC for four months reported in January 1984 that some of its leaders told him they had trained in Vietnam, Libya, and Cuba. The Cuban influence on the FARC

is strong, according to this source. He also noted that 20 to 30 percent of the FARC guerrillas he saw in captivity were not Colombian. His captors told him that Colombian guerrillas had served in Nicaragua and that some were currently fighting in El Salvador. A portion of all guerrilla revenues from bank robbery, kidnaping, drug trafficking, and so on is sent to Salvadoran insurgents, according to this same source. [ ]

Cuban support to Colombian terrorist groups has diminished since Betancur became President. Castro would like to reestablish diplomatic relations with Colombia, and he realizes that any large-scale assistance to Colombian terrorist groups would be counterproductive. Nevertheless, Castro probably will maintain contact with Colombia's insurgent movements and continue to provide training and other types of support. [ ]

**Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking**

Colombian guerrilla groups initially shunned all contact with narcotics growers and traffickers in order to avoid any corrupting influence on the moral principles of their revolution. After 1977, however, the FARC became attracted to the drug business as a way of supplementing its original reliance on extortion, kidnaping, and robbery for funds. [ ]

The narcotics/terrorist relationship provides benefits to both groups. The FARC lets the coca growers go about their business and often warns them of patrols by the antinarcotics police or military units. In the FARC-dominated region, with the FARC in control of strategic points along various rivers, the police can no longer move about with impunity. The basic benefit to the guerrillas is financial, and the basic benefit to the growers is protection. [ ]

The ELN and the EPL are involved with the traffickers to a much lesser degree. M-19 used the drug-smuggling apparatus of Jaime Guillot Lara to bring a large shipment of weapons into Colombia in 1980-81. After Guillot's arrest in Mexico City in November 1981, evidence surfaced of Cuban involvement in a narcotics-terrorism-gunrunning operation. Cuban officials and Colombian drug

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traffickers were clearly associated in facilitating narcotics shipments to the United States. The extent to which Cuba has continued to facilitate drug trafficking, either for money or arms, is not known.

[redacted]

**Prospects for Peace**

On 28 May 1984, a cease-fire agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC went into effect. Under the terms of the agreement, FARC will condemn and forbid kidnappings, extortion, and terrorism in return for pledges of political, social, and economic reform. The FARC will be allowed to reorganize itself politically, while the Betancur administration will urge the Congress to institute political and agrarian reforms, facilitate the establishment and functioning of communal and peasant organizations, workers cooperatives, and the like. Two provisions not included in the agreement are the laying down of arms by the guerrillas and the withdrawal of armed forces from guerrilla-dominated areas. Thus, the potential for renewed activity by either side is high. [redacted]

After the cease-fire agreement with the FARC, the Colombian Government concentrated on reaching accords with the other insurgent groups. By late summer it had reached agreements with the EPL, a column of the ADO, and M-19. The ELN refused to enter into peace talks with the government. M-19 leaders were reported to be dissatisfied with the terms of the FARC cease-fire agreement because it was not coordinated with other insurgent terrorist groups and did not include enough "social reforms." [redacted]

At one point, M-19 demanded that the Colombian Government lift the state of siege (reinstated after the 30 April assassination of Justice Minister Lara Bonilla) and replace the military defense minister with a civilian as conditions for signing an accord. M-19 also insisted that the peace process be broadened into a national dialogue. Betancur responded to the last demand by the creation in late July of another national commission of "negotiations and dialogue" to conduct official negotiations with M-19 and the EPL. M-19 was also said to have demanded extensive agrarian reforms, elimination or prosecution of the MAS organization, and wage hikes. [redacted]

Nevertheless, the insurgent groups stand to benefit in several ways from the cease-fire agreements. The most obvious advantage to them is that they will gain time to rest and reorganize, without government harassment. The guerrillas may also need to regain a more positive public image. By rejecting the 1982 amnesty, the insurgents cast themselves in the roles of bad guys, with the government appearing to be the good guy. [redacted]

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Few Colombians believe that the insurgent organizations actually intend to lay down their arms and convert themselves into political parties. Many FARC guerrillas are not ideologically committed; rather, they pursue the guerrilla way of life as a profession and a livelihood—they are classic Latin American *bandidos*. Furthermore, the FARC-narcotics connection has become so close that the government's crackdown on narcotics traffickers could lead to confrontations with FARC guerrillas and spark military confrontations in violation of the cease-fire. [redacted]

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The cease-fire agreement is also threatened by dissidents within the FARC and M-19 who have rejected the peace proposals. The "Ricardo Franco Front" of the FARC announced its rejection of the cease-fire with a series of bombings in Bogota on 22 May, including two near the US Embassy, one at the US-sponsored binational center, and several at US-affiliated businesses. A split in the M-19 hierarchy over the issue of a peace accord has been reported. On 8 June a Colombian newspaper announced that the Ricardo Franco Front and a breakaway M-19 faction called M-19 South had merged and signed a pact vowing to step up fighting in the cities and countryside. [redacted]

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Although cease-fire violations began to be reported almost as soon as the agreement with the FARC was signed, the peace commission refused to attribute these acts to the FARC. In fact, the Betancur administration made every effort to avoid antagonizing the FARC. In early August, in one of the few instances where Betancur has interfered directly in military affairs, he issued direct orders to Army units to pull back after they had surrounded a

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large FARC contingent. In the future, elements of Colombian security forces not in agreement with the cease-fire agreements might provoke confrontations with the guerrillas, which could endanger the peace process.

M-19 and EPL members as well as government forces continued to conduct operations during the cease-fire negotiations, which delayed and almost torpedoed the signing of the accords. In July, a wave of kidnappings occurred in various regions, and an EPL leader was reported to have told the media that the group used and would continue to use kidnappings as "political activity" fundamental to the support of the guerrilla group. Bombings continued as well, and M-19 claimed responsibility for an explosion at the Honduran Consulate in Barranquilla on 20 July. Another bombing at the Chilean Consulate in Medellin on 23 July may have been the work of the ELN. It is not clear if these bombings and other acts were condoned by the leadership of the terrorist groups or were the work of dissidents operating on their own initiative.

Just as the talks were reaching the final stages, M-19 leader Carlos Toledo Plata was killed by unknown individuals. One day later, M-19 and members of the Ricardo Franco Front invaded and temporarily occupied the industrial city of Yumbo, killing nearly 40 persons. Just before the scheduled ceremony to sign the cease-fire, an elite unit of Colombian police attacked a convoy carrying M-19 leader Carlos Picarro Leon, wounding him and several other M-19 members. Evidently, both sides meant to demonstrate that it was not through any lack of will or means to fight that they had agreed to the cease-fire.

Perhaps one of the greatest dangers to the cease-fire is the narcotics/terrorist connection. Although terrorists and narcotics traffickers have not conducted joint operations in the past, this could change. The terrorists could soon find themselves in need of money—they have promised to stop such fund-raising operations as kidnappings—and could be tempted to conduct operations for or with the narcotics traffickers. The traffickers, for their part, probably will become even more dangerous and anti-US owing to Betancur's decision to extradite narcotics traffickers to the United States, a decision prompted

by the April 1984 assassination of Justice Minister Lara. They have little to gain from the cease-fire and much to gain from closer cooperation with the terrorists.

The record for achieving peace through amnesties and cease-fire agreements in Latin America has been mixed. In Venezuela a "pacification program" in 1968 offering amnesty for guerrillas who chose to surrender proved to be the final blow to an eight-year-old insurgent movement, already weakened by guerrilla factionalization and government military successes. On the other hand, after Argentine President Juan Peron released political prisoners in 1973, terrorist activity increased and soon almost paralyzed the country.

The tradition of democracy in Colombia simply may not be as strong as the tradition of violence. The political and economic reforms demanded by the guerrillas in the cease-fire agreements could take years to implement, and the guerrillas could tire of waiting. Also, if the guerrillas do not gain a significant political following in a short term, they will probably be discouraged from following a peaceful path. The implementation of the plan was largely due to the President's personal popularity and credibility, and its endurance will depend on the ability of his successors to maintain his plan.

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**Chilean Terrorists**  
**Up the Ante**

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On 6 November, citing increasing terrorism, the military government of Augusto Pinochet suspended civil rights and declared Chile to be in a state of siege. Among the stimulants of this move was a recent bombing campaign by the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), which was launched in conjunction with the 11th major antigovernment protest carried out by political opposition and labor groups since mid-1983.

The FPMR claims to be an independent revolutionary organization. The Chilean Government and US Embassy believe that the FPMR is the military arm of the Communist-dominated Popular Democratic Movement.

Between 21 and 29 October, the FPMR is suspected of bombing at least 15 sites throughout Chile (see the table). Most of the attacks occurred in Santiago, Talcahuano, and Concepcion. Targets included the Tobalaba Airport, railroad tracks, factories, transportation facilities, and municipal buildings. In Curico a bomb severely damaged a bridge and cut rail traffic to southern Chile. Two Chileans were injured by an explosion at the US-owned Anaconda firm in Santiago.

The most serious attack for which the FPMR has claimed credit occurred on 25 October, when the FPMR detonated an estimated 35 kilograms of explosives inside a taxi that had been parked near the Diego Portales Building, which houses the headquarters of the military junta. The blast injured five persons in an adjacent apartment and destroyed six cars. It was the first successful car bombing in Chile and the first major FPMR attack against a government building.

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**FPMR Attacks Against US Targets**

*15 May 1984 In Santiago a 5-kilogram bomb exploded in front of an Exxon subsidiary, damaging 80 percent of the windows.*

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*29 May Armed FPMR members forced the editors of the Associated Press office to broadcast an anti-government proclamation.*

*6 August In Valparaiso an explosion caused minor damage to the Binational Cultural Center.*

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*The Coca-Cola plant in Santiago was the site of three bomb explosions that caused \$2 million worth of property damage.*

*21 August A bomb caused minor damage to the windows of the Morgan Bank in Vina Del Mar.*

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*16 October In Rancagua an explosion caused extensive damage to the North American Cultural Institute.*

*25 October An explosion caused minor damage and injured two Chileans at the offices of the Anaconda mining firm in Santiago.*

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**FPMR Attacks in Chile,  
21-29 October 1984**

		Target	Type of Attack	Damage
21 October	Santiago	Tabalaba Airport	Explosive	Slight
23 October	Santiago	Factory	Explosive	Slight
	Santiago	Employment office	Explosive	Slight
	Santiago	Nursing home	Explosive	Slight
	Santiago	Grocery store	Arson	Extensive
	Santiago	Street	Explosive	Slight
24 October	Talcahuano	Railway tracks	Explosive	Extensive
	Concepcion	Railway tracks	Explosive	Extensive
	Santiago	Lamp post	Explosive	Slight
	Santiago	Taxicab stop	Explosive	Unknown
25 October	Santiago	Anaconda office	Explosive	Slight
26 October	Santiago	Headquarters of military junta	Explosive	Extensive
	Santiago	Buses	Arson	Extensive
28 October	Curico	Bridge	Explosive	Extensive
29 October	Santiago	Railway tracks	Explosive	Unknown

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**Chronology of Terrorism—1984**

*Below are described noteworthy foreign and international terrorist events and counterterrorism developments that have occurred or come to light since our last issue. Events and developments that have already been described in previous issues are not included unless new information has surfaced. Asterisks denote events covered elsewhere in this issue in greater detail.*

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**4 October****\*Indonesia: Solidaritas Islam Responsible for Bombings**

In Jakarta, Indonesian police arrested 40 persons in connection with an anti-Chinese bombing campaign originally thought to be spontaneous communal violence provoked by a serious riot in September. Some of the suspects claimed to be members of "Solidaritas Islam," a hitherto unknown group. They said the group carried out the bombings of three Chinese-owned banks and businesses, in which two persons died and 16 others were wounded, after one of its members had been killed by police in the September disturbance.

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**7 October****West Bank: Bomb Defused**

Border police safely defused a bomb found near the Israeli settlement of Ma'ale Efrayim. No group claimed responsibility for placing the bomb.

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**20 October****Lebanon: PFLP-GC-PC Operation Foiled by Israeli Navy**

An Israeli naval patrol exchanged fire with persons on board a small dinghy off the coast of West Beirut, killing two persons who turned out to be members of a pro-Arafat splinter of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) that calls itself the PFLP-GC-Provisional Command.

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**24 October****Corsica: Court Decision Against FNLC Spurs Riots**

In Bastia, Corsican nationalists rioted after the local French court of appeals upheld prison sentences handed down last June to two members of the Corsican National Liberation Front. Molotov cocktails were thrown during the riots, which left 12 people injured and the homes of two magistrates damaged by explosions.

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**24-27 October****Argentina: Human Rights Activists Bombed**

On 24 October in Buenos Aires, a bomb caused minor damage to a church while members of the Relatives and Friends of Persons Killed by Subversion (FAMUS) were attending mass. There were no injuries. On 27 October the offices of a former member of the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) were firebombed. Files and equipment were destroyed, but again there were no injuries. No group has claimed credit for the attacks.

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**Chronology of Terrorism—1984****25 October****Yugoslavia: Two Bombings in Croatian Capital**

In Zagreb, bombs exploded in Republic Square and Tomislav Square but caused no injuries or damage. A Yugoslav citizen has been arrested in connection with the bombings, but it has not yet been established whether he was acting alone or on behalf of a nationalist group.

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**26 October****El Salvador: FPL Murders Salvadoran Guard**

In San Salvador, the supervisor of the Salvadoran guards at the US Embassy was killed by three self-proclaimed members of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL).

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**Peru: More Common Graves Found**

Near Huanta four graves containing a total of 19 bodies were uncovered, bringing to more than 70 the number of such bodies found during the week. No group has claimed credit.

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**\*Guatemala: National Legislator Murdered**

In Guatemala City, National Constituent Assembly Deputy Santos Hernandez and two of his bodyguards were shot and killed by unknown persons.

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**26-27 October****\*Guatemala: Two Communist Professors Murdered**

On 26 October in Guatemala City, Carlos de Leon Gudiel, a professor of economics at the University of San Carlos, was shot to death by unknown assailants as he drove home. On 27 October, Vitalino Giron Corado, the dean of the economics faculty at the university, was shot to death by unidentified attackers when he stopped at a gas station on his way to the funeral of de Leon. Both of the dead men were believed to be members of the Orthodox faction of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party.

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**28 October****Israel: Soldier Arrested for Attack on Arab Bus**

A rocket attack on a bus filled with Arabs killed one Arab and wounded 10 others. A previously unknown group called the Avengers claimed responsibility for the attack, saying it was in retaliation for the shooting deaths of two Israelis near Bethlehem in September. Several days later, however, police arrested an Israeli soldier who admitted he had been the attacker and also claimed responsibility for a grenade attack on an Arab cafe in Jerusalem in September. Police are now trying to determine if the bus attack was the work of a lone individual or a terrorist group.

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**Chronology of Terrorism—1984**

**29 October**

**West Germany: Arms Cache Discovered**

Near Dortmund, police discovered an arsenal of weapons, 20 pounds of explosives, and various Nazi memorabilia during a raid. Arrest warrants have been issued for five West Germans who are suspected of being members of an extreme rightwing paramilitary group.

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**Northern Ireland: PIRA Attacks Continue**

In Derry, snipers shot at but missed members of a British Army patrol as they moved through the Bogside District. In Newry, a bomb exploded outside a car showroom, causing extensive damage but no injuries. The police blamed the Provisional IRA for both attacks.


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**30 October**

**France: Iparretarrak Bombs French Industrialist**

In Saint-Pee-Sur-Nivelle, the French Basque group Iparretarrak bombed and destroyed the villa of an industrialist whose company, which employed many Basques, had recently suffered financial reverses. Another bomb damaged his office in Mauleon Island.

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**31 October**

**Northern Ireland: Catholic Taxi Driver Murdered**

Masked gunmen shot and killed a freelance taxicab driver, apparently just because he was Catholic. Police speculate that the murderers were Protestant Loyalists and fear that the attack may signal the beginning of a new wave of sectarian violence, since the Provisional IRA usually retaliates in kind.

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**\*India: Gandhi Assassinated by Sikh Bodyguards**

In New Delhi, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by two Sikh members of her security detail, who shot her as she walked across the grounds of her residence. In an ensuing struggle, one of her assailants was killed and the other was seriously wounded. A third member of the security force was also reported to have been wounded.

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**Chronology of Terrorism—1984****Ethiopia: Kidnaped Americans Released**

In Addis Ababa, two American citizens, who were among several foreigners held by the Tigrean People's Liberation Front since its forces overran the town of Lalibela on 19 October, were released unharmed. The release was arranged by the International Red Cross.

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**Chile: Bomb Explodes Near Pinochet**

In Santiago, a bomb exploded 200 meters from President Pinochet as he attended the inauguration of the International Industrial Fair. There were no injuries and no group claimed credit.

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**West Bank Violence Among Palestinian Factions**

In Bethlehem, four attacks on Palestinian property in three days appear to be the result of increasing tensions among radical and moderate Palestinian factions. On the night of 31 October, a car belonging to a relative of the man convicted of trying to assassinate Bethlehem's Mayor Freij was destroyed by arson. The following evening the offices of the Bethlehem Press Service were severely damaged by firebombs. Rivalry between Communist and Muslim Brotherhood Factions of the Village Leagues caused these incidents, according to press reports. Mayor Freij's store was the target of arson attempts on both 1 and 2 November, with the second attack causing about \$50,000 damage. The mayor had met with visiting US Secretary of Defense Weinberger in October.

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**Late October—Early  
November**

**\*Peru: Sendero Luminoso Torch Electoral Offices**

On 26 and 27 October in Lima, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) terrorists attacked two offices of the National Elections Board (JNE) and burned the voting rolls in an effort to disrupt the June 1985 presidential elections. Eight persons were injured. In early November, Sendero Luminoso terrorists killed 12 government officials at election registration centers in the central Peruvian towns of Jivia and Jesus. Security forces arrested 11 suspects. As a result of the attacks, the government has augmented police protection for JNE offices.

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**2 November**

**Chile: Bomb Kills Four**

In Valparaiso, a bus was destroyed, four policemen were killed, and 11 persons were injured by a remotely detonated bomb. No group claimed credit.

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**3 November**

**Spain: ETA Bombs Civil Guard Barracks**

In Araya, members of the Basque terrorist groups ETA/M claimed credit for a grenade and machinegun attack on a Civil Guard barracks. A guard's wife was injured.

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**Chronology of Terrorism—1984****4 November****West Bank: Katyusha Rockets Fired From Jordan**

According to press reports, two Kaytusha rockets were fired from Jordanian territory into the Bet She'an valley area, probably by Palestinian *fedayeen*. Israeli authorities are becoming concerned that Jordan is not preventing the infiltration of Palestinian terrorist teams into the Israeli border area.

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**5 November****Chile: Police Post Attacked**

In Santiago, unidentified individuals attacked a police post with grenades and machineguns, killing two policemen and wounding four.

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**Belgium: FCC Tries To Bomb Police Van**

In Brussels, police defused a bomb that had been placed under a van outside the police station. Apparently, the device had malfunctioned. Security officials suspect the Fighting Communist Cells were responsible because the device was similar to one used in a previous FCC attack.

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**Italy: Red Brigades Trial Begins**

In Genoa, 21 accused members of the Red Brigades went on trial, accused of having murdered six people in the Genoa area between 1978 and 1980. Among the defendants are Mario Moretti, reputedly involved in the kidnaping and execution of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro, and Patrizio Peci, one of the most important of the Red Brigades *pentiti*, as those who have turned states evidence are known.

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**Costa Rica: Assassination Attempt Against Anti-Sandinista Leader**

In San Jose, "Contra" leader Alfonso Robelo Callejas escaped injury from a grenade thrown into his vehicle, although a young Costa Rican woman riding with him was seriously wounded. No group has claimed credit.

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**6 November****Venezuela: Grenade Damages Italian Embassy and Portuguese Consulate**

In Caracas a German-made M-81 grenade caused minor damage to the building that houses the Italian Embassy, Portuguese Consulate, and the Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. There were no casualties.

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**\*Saudi Arabia: Civil Airliner Hijacked to Iran**

Two North Yemeni men hijacked a Saudi Airlines jet bound from London to Riyadh with 131 persons aboard, after it made a stopover in Jiddah. The plane was diverted to Iran, where the skyjackers were attacked and overcome by crew and passengers. The passengers were returned unharmed to Saudi Arabia.

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**Chronology of Terrorism—1984**

**Pakistan: Al-Zulfikar Skyjacking Accomplices Sentenced**

In Karachi, four accomplices in the March 1981 hijacking of a Pakistani airliner by Al-Zulfikar terrorists were sentenced to death and a fifth received a life sentence. They were convicted of obtaining the tickets, arms, and ammunition used in the hijacking.

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**8 November**

**United Kingdom: Iranian Airline Office Occupied**

In London, seven anti-Khomeini Iranian students were arrested after briefly occupying the offices of Iran Air. No one was hurt and damage was slight.

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**Spain: Shooting of Electrician**

In San Sebastian, members of ETA shot and killed an electrician, allegedly because his father was a police informer.

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