

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
Security Committee

31 MAY 1979

SUBJECT: Outline of Briefing for DDA on Security Committee  
and Community Security Group

TIME: 1330 Hours Thursday, 31 May 1979

PLACE: DDA Conference Room

BY: Robert W. Gambino, Chairman, Security Committee  
[REDACTED] Chief, Community Security Group

DURATION: 30 Minute Presentation. Open ended question period.

Introduction -

Background - History of Security Committee  
1956 to 1979

Mission and DCID 1/11-Security Committee  
Functions -

Establish security policies and procedures for  
protection of intelligence from unauthorized  
disclosures.

Formulate policies governing release to foreign  
governments and release to public.

Ensure that investigations are conducted of  
unauthorized disclosures.

Prevention of technical surveillance.

Develop proposals for protection of compartmented intelligence.

Ensure procedures for computer security.

Establish and direct security research program.

Composition - Members and Observers  
Subcommittees and Working Groups; Staff

Relationships - NFIB, Information Handling Committee,  
SIGINT Committee, COMIREX, DCI SA/CI, SCOCE

Location - Administration  
DCI - D/DCI/Community Support

Current Issues and Problems:

Leaks

APEX


Personnel Security

Security Education

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

Physical Security

Services of common concern



Strengths and Weakness

Strengths - Single security focal point for DCI

Rapid communications

Capability for uniform action

Capacity for locating and coordinating security resource commitments.

Weaknesses - Diverse goals of member agencies  
Diverse levels of influence in member agencies  
Lack of dollar and personnel resources

Projections and Priorities

Short Range - Leak investigations  
APEX Implementation  
Foreign Disclosure Policy development  
Moscow Security

Long Range - Community Unification of Security  
policies and procedures  
Greater uniformity in Community security  
practices  
More services of common concern  
Impact on Community Security elements of  
E.O. 12036, legislation  
Communication/Computer security  
Technical Surveillance Countermeasures

DCI

D/DCI/RM

D/DCI/Support

D/DCI/CT

Security Committee

Subcommittees:

Computer Security  
Technical Surveillance Counter-  
measures  
Research and Development  
Compartmentation  
(Unauthorized Disclosure  
Investigative)

Working Groups:

Security Awareness  
SCI Denials  
Investigative Standards  
Security Advisory (USSR)  
Physical Security Standards

Services of Common Concern:



Staff - Community Security Group

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SECURITY COMMITTEE

Chairman - Robert W. Gambino

Executive Secretary -

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STATINTL Members

Air Force - Col. H. Kamm

Army - Merrill T. Kelly

STATINTL DOE - George Weisz

FBI - David Ryan

Navy - Richard Welch

STATINTL State - Karl Ackerman

Treasury - Dennis Southern

Observers


State INR - Donald Stigers

DEA - Cyril Frank

Commerce - William Randolph

Sec Def - Maynard Anderson

Community Security Group



31 MAR 1978

**\* OS REGISTRY**  
**\* FILE** *Committee 14*  
*also Security 5*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: DCI Security Committee

1. At the 14 March 1978 meeting of the Board, I announced the reassignment and subordination of the DCI Security Committee under the Deputy to the DCI for Support.

2. The Community Security Group (CSG) is hereby established in the office of the D/DCI for Support to serve as the focal point for Community Security affairs and to provide staff support to the DCI Security Committee.  is appointed Chief, Community Security Group. He will concurrently function as Executive Secretary of the DCI Security Committee.

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3. The Security Committee supported by the CSG will be responsible for advising me on all matters of Community concern with respect to security policy and management. The Security Committee will continue to function under the charter provisions of DCID No. 1/11 (effective 18 May 1976). The Community Security Group will subsume the compartmentation security policy responsibilities heretofore exercised by the Special Security Center, CIA.

4. The nucleus of the Community Security Group is being formed by the transfer of the positions until now associated with the Security Committee staff from the Intelligence Community Staff. The positions associated with compartmentation security policy functions in the Special Security Center, CIA are also being transferred to the Community Security Group. In addition, I am making other positions available from the CIA to complete the organization. Nominations will be invited in the near future from the NFIB agencies to fill some of the positions in the Group on a rotational, reimbursable basis.

5. Effective immediately Mr. Robert W. Gambino, Director of Security, CIA is appointed Chairman of the DCI Security Committee.

6. Effective 10 April 1978 the Community Security Group will be temporarily located in Room 3E 05, CIA Headquarters Building, telephone

S

/s/ Frank C. Carlucci

STANSFIELD TURNER  
Chairman

DD/A Registry

78-1034

Executive Registry

78-4425

10 MAR 1978

*Pres*

**\* OS REGISTRY  
FILE**

*Committees 14  
Security 5*

REFERENCE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: John F. Blake  
Deputy Director for Administration  
SUBJECT: Security Committee Organization and Staffing. (C)

Sir:

1. (C) In anticipation of your 14 March 1978 appearance before NFIB, let me present an outline of tentative planning regarding the DCI Security Committee which you have already determined will operate in the future under the cognizance of the "Deputy to the DCI for Support." The preliminary thinking has been heavily influenced by two underlying convictions: (1) with the dedication of adequate resources together with proper commitment and application, much more can be accomplished in security on a Community level than in the past; and (2) while the Agency's Office of Security will contribute heavily, in manpower and expertise, to the effort, the staff support to the Security Committee should be concentrated in a discretely separate entity reporting to the D/DCI/Support side of my Office.

*yes*

2. (C) It is proposed that such a unit be organized as the "Community Security Group" (CSG) and be headed by an Office of Security supergrade who will also act as the Executive Secretary of the Security Committee. It is further proposed that CSG feature (as shown in attached chart) a three-branch breakdown with functions as indicated. A total staffing complement of nine professional officers is anticipated, seven to be drawn from the Office of Security and two coming from elsewhere in the Community to serve as Branch Chiefs, i.e., C/Facilities Security Branch and C/Personnel and Industrial Security Branch. (The two Branch Chiefs from the Community should be at least GS-15 level officers or O-6.) It is assumed these two posts would be filled by calling for nominations from the other Community agencies.

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
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3. (C) The role of the Director of Security, CIA, is recognized as vital in the overall plan. He would act as Chairman of the Security Committee. In his absence, the SECOM meetings would be run by a Vice Chairman - the senior ranking officer on the Committee. The Director of Security will draw his staff support from the CSG to which he in turn will provide technical guidance and professional advice. Under this concept of a revitalized Security Committee, the participating agencies will be expected to name their most senior security officers their members. These officers will be expected to actively participate in SECOM meetings and activities.

4. (C) The planning projects, perhaps for the first time, a truly concerted attack on policy and implementation discrepancies between the agencies in all the major security dimensions. At the same time, the plan allows for the continuance, at least for a time, of the current subcommittee structure of SECOM. This is predicated on the belief that the Community Security Group can prod these subcommittees to significantly greater accomplishments.

5. (C) Finally, establishment of the CSG will not require any new positions. It will involve transfer of the four positions (GS-17, GS-16, GS-14, GS-09) currently constituting the Security Committee Staff under the IC Staff from John Koehler's T/O to mine. To these I will add eight positions from the current DDA ceiling.



John F. Blake

Att

Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - ER

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Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85-00821R000100040015-6

Deputy Director for Administration CIA	Deputy to DCI for Support
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Director of Security CIA	Chairman, Security Committee
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Chief, Community Security Gp. (Executive Secretary, SECOM)	
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C/Compartmented Security Branch	
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C/Facilities Security Branch	
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C/Personnel & Industrial Security Branch	
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°Compartmentation Policy and Standards

°CIB - Oversight

°Unauthorized Disclosures

°Compartmentation Subcommittee/SECOM - Liaison

°Physical Security Policy and Standards

°Technical Security Policy and Standards

°Security R&D - Oversight

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°Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee/SECOM - Liaison

°Computer Security Subcommittee/SECOM - Liaison

°Personnel Security Policy and Standards

°Industrial Security Policy and Standards

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
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DCID No. 1/11

~~OS~~ - REGISTRY  
\* FILE Committees 14  
Also Security 5

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/1  
SECURITY COMMITTEE

(Effective 18 May 1976)

Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 11905 and National Security Council Intelligence Directives, a Security Committee is hereby established as a standing Director of Central Intelligence Committee with the following mission and functions.

1. *Mission*

The mission of the committee is to provide the means by which the Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice of National Foreign Intelligence Board principals, can:

a. Ensure establishment of security policies and procedures including recommendations for legislation for the protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods<sup>2</sup> from unauthorized disclosure.

b. Review and formulate personnel, physical and document security policies, standards and practices and dissemination procedures applicable to all organizations of the Executive Branch as such policies, standards, practices and procedures relate to the protection of intelligence sources and methods in consideration of the effectiveness, risks and cost factors involved.

c. Review and formulate policies and procedures governing the release of intelligence to foreign governments and international organizations and the review of classified intelligence proposed for release to the public through declassification or other action. With respect to foreign disclosure, ensure that releases are in consonance with US security policy, should result in net advantage to the United States, and that the intelligence itself is accorded a degree of protection equal to that afforded by the United States. With respect to public release, ensure that disclosure or declassification actions are taken pursuant to proper authority and that they are accomplished so as to minimize the risk to intelligence sources and methods.

d. Ensure that appropriate lawful investigations are made of any unauthorized disclosure or compromise of intelligence or of intelligence sources and methods and that the results of such investigations, along with appropriate recommendations, are provided to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>1</sup>This directive supersedes DCID No. 1/11 effective 23 August 1974.

<sup>2</sup>The term intelligence as used in this document applies only to information covered by statute, Executive Order, or other authority consonant with the statutory responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence for foreign intelligence and for the protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.



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4. *Composition, organization and rules of procedure*

a. The composition, organization and rules of procedure of the Security Committee are those stated in DCID 1/3.

b. The committee will be supported by permanent subcommittees for technical surveillance countermeasures, computer security, special security compartmentation and security research and development. The chairmen of these subcommittees will be designated by the committee chairman with the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence.

George Bush  
Director of Central Intelligence

Attachments (4)

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DCID 1/11  
Attachment 1

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/11  
(Attachment 1)

**OS REGISTRY**

**\*FILE** *Committees 14*  
*also Security 5*

**TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES**

The functions of the Security Committee include:

I. With respect to general technical surveillance countermeasures:

a. To facilitate the formulation, development and application of effective countermeasures equipment and techniques based on assessments by the Central Intelligence Agency and other knowledgeable organizations of the Intelligence Community of (1) the state of the art of audio surveillance equipment, and (2) the known and estimated technical surveillance capabilities of foreign governments.

b. To formulate and recommend to the Director of Central Intelligence resource programming objectives for Intelligence Community organizations in the field of technical surveillance countermeasures in consideration of current and foreseen threats and with regard for the effective and efficient use of resources.


c. To coordinate all aspects of the US Government effort in defense against technical surveillance penetration and to resolve conflicts that may arise in connection therewith.

d. To facilitate the interchange of information in the field of technical surveillance countermeasures among Intelligence Community organizations and others as appropriate, particularly by the preparation, publication and dissemination of appropriate reports, notices and guides.

e. To recommend policies governing disclosures concerning technical surveillance devices (except as otherwise provided for under NSCID No. 5), or countermeasures thereto, to be made to foreign governments or international organizations in which the US Government participates.

f. To advise Intelligence Community organizations of technical surveillance countermeasures objectives and standards to be considered in connection with existing or new facilities abroad.

g. To prepare damage assessments by furnishing reports of known or suspected hostile audio surveillance penetrations of US facilities and recommending remedial or other actions as appropriate.

h. To evaluate the curriculum and operations of and to provide policy guidance to,  conducted by CIA as a service of common concern for training Intelligence Community and other US Government personnel in technical surveillance countermeasures.

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/11  
(Attachment 2)


COMPUTER SECURITY

**OS REGISTRY**  
**\*FILE** Committees 14  
Also Security 5

The Security Committee with respect to computer security shall:

1. Review, formulate and recommend to the Director of Central Intelligence policies, standards and procedures to protect intelligence data stored or processed by computer.
2. Advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence, Intelligence Community organizations, DCI committees and other intelligence users with respect to all computer security issues; and to resolve conflicts that may arise in connection therewith.
3. Formulate and recommend to the Director of Central Intelligence resource programming objectives for Intelligence Community organizations in the field of computer security in consideration of current and foreseen vulnerabilities and threats and with regard for the effective and efficient use of resources; to foster and to monitor an aggressive program of computer security research and development in the Intelligence Community in order to avoid unwarranted duplication and to assure the pursuit of an effective effort at resolving technical problems associated with the protection of computer operations.
4. Coordinate all aspects of Intelligence Community efforts in defense against hostile penetration of Community computer systems and as feasible to support other governmental efforts aimed at improving computer security technology; to foster a coordinated program of Intelligence Community computer security training and indoctrination.
5. Facilitate within the Intelligence Community the exchange of information relating to computer security threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures by providing a focal point for:
  - a. The evaluation of foreign intentions and capabilities to exploit Community computer operations;
  - b. Central notification of hostile exploitation attempts;
  - c. The preparation of damage assessments of incidents of foreign exploitation of intelligence computer operations; and
  - d. The development of policy recommendations to the Director of Central Intelligence on the release of computer security information to foreign governments and international organizations.
6. Review, formulate and recommend minimum computer security standards, procedures and criteria as guidance for system design, evaluation and certification of acceptable levels of security for computer systems.

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3. To furnish technical guidance and assistance to the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation, to the SIGINT Committee, and to the Executive Agents of other compartmented information in connection with their sanitization, downgrading, declassification and decontrol responsibilities.

4. To review and survey, when appropriate, with the cooperation and assistance of the National Foreign Intelligence Board principal concerned, the security standards, practices and procedures employed by Intelligence Community organizations and their contractors in relation to approved compartmentation policies, procedures and controls; and to make recommendations for practical improvements to the National Foreign Intelligence Board principals concerned through the Director of Central Intelligence.

5. To provide advice and guidance to foreign governments participating in US compartmented intelligence activities.

6. To recommend security policies, in coordination with appropriate Director of Central Intelligence committees, governing the release or disclosure of compartmented intelligence to the public, foreign governments or international organizations in which the US Government participates.

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DCID 1/11  
Attachment 3

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/11  
(Attachment 3)

COMPARTMENTATION<sup>1</sup>

**OS REGISTRY**  
**\* FILE** *Committee 14*  
*Security 5*

The functions of the Security Committee as they relate to compartmentation controls are:<sup>2</sup>

1. To develop and recommend to the Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice of the National Foreign Intelligence Board, technical guidance for the establishment, maintenance and improvement of coordinated compartmentation systems which will:

a. Provide special protection to sensitive intelligence, intelligence information and intelligence sources and methods under the authority of Section 9 of Executive Order 11652.

b. Ensure the establishment and disestablishment of compartmentation of intelligence and intelligence information on the instructions of the Director of Central Intelligence.

c. Ensure coherent control by the Director of Central Intelligence of the processes for access approvals to compartmented intelligence and intelligence information and of the processes for dissemination, sanitization or release of such intelligence information.

d. Ensure the establishment and promulgation of appropriate criteria for security and need-to-know access approvals.

2. To formulate, coordinate, maintain and promulgate technical guidance for use in the administration of compartmentation controls at all echelons of Intelligence Community organizations, both domestic and overseas, including consultants and contractor support activity concerning:

a. Access approval criteria and employment in hazardous duty areas


b. Physical security

c. Document identification, handling, accountability and destruction

d. Automatic data processing and associated materials.

<sup>1</sup>The term "compartmentation" as used in this directive refers to the system whereby special Intelligence Community controls indicating restricted handling within collection programs and their end products are applied to certain types of intelligence information and material. The term does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section II, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

<sup>2</sup>In the conduct of these functions, the committee will recognize the special requirements of individual compartmented collection programs operated on an Executive Agent basis, particularly those which involve hazardous activities.



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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/11  
(Attachment 4)

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

**US REGISTRY**  
**\*FILE** *Committees 14*  
*Also: Security 5*

The functions of the Security Committee as they relate to security research and development include:

1. With respect to general technical surveillance countermeasures research and development:

a. To establish and direct an aggressive and imaginative program of research and development leading to improved technical surveillance countermeasures equipment and techniques.

b. To coordinate research and development programs in the technical countermeasures field, particularly to ensure an effective exchange of information and to avoid unwanted duplication.

c. To promote joint development and procurement of appropriate specialized items of technical surveillance countermeasures equipment where cost savings or increased security can be achieved through interagency exchange of prototype equipment for evaluation purposes and through joint procurement activities.

d. To establish and coordinate research and development programs in such related areas as physical security devices and computer security systems.

2. With respect to physical security, computer security and other technical aspects of security:

To initiate and coordinate appropriate research and development programs required to support the other missions of the Security Committee.

3. With respect to foreign technical threats:

To identify and consider any new foreign technical threats in the field of security resulting from advances in US or foreign technology.