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OS REGISTRY
FILE *Committee 4*

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-M-232

8 April 1980

Minutes
Two Hundred and Twenty-ninth Meeting
Wednesday, 2 April 1980, 1000-1200 Hours
Room 7E62, Langley Headquarters Building

25X1A [REDACTED]
Chairman
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

25X1A Mr. Karl Ackerman, Department of State
Mr. Lloyd E. Dean, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Col. Herbert Kamm, Department of the Air Force
Mr. Merrill T. Kelly, Department of the Army
Mr. [REDACTED], National Security Agency
Mr. D. Jerry Rubino, Department of Justice
Mr. Richard L. Welch, Department of the Navy

ALTERNATES PRESENT

25X1A Mr. Gerald Berkin, Department of the Navy
Mr. [REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Martin Dowd, Department of Energy
25X1A Mr. James W. Gerblich, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mr. [REDACTED], National Security Agency
25X1A Mr. Verne St. Mars, Department of State
Lt. [REDACTED] Defense Intelligence Agency
Mr. [REDACTED] Defense Intelligence Agency

ALSO PRESENT

25X1A Mr. Maynard C. Anderson, Office of Secretary of Defense
Mr. [REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency

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25X1A Mr. Cyril F. Frank, Justice/Drug Enforcement Agency
Mr. [REDACTED] tional Security Agency
Mr. [REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency
25X1A Mr. Robert A. O'Brien, Department of Energy
Mr. [REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. William H. Randolph, Department of Commerce
25X1A Mr. Donald Stigers, Department of State
Mr. [REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. [REDACTED], Executive Secretary, Security Committee
25X1A Messrs [REDACTED]
25X1A [REDACTED] Community Security Group

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PRELIMINARY COMMENTS

25X1A 1. [REDACTED] noting his formal appointment on 21 March as Director of Security, CIA, said he viewed his Security Committee duties as being equally important as his Agency ones. He advised that the DCI had also stressed the significance of the Community responsibilities involved. 25X1A [REDACTED] said he would welcome ideas and suggestions from members to aid him in dealing with Community concerns. (U)

2. The Chairman recognized and welcomed Mr. Lloyd E. Dean as the new FBI member of the Committee. (U)

3. The Chairman next asked Col. Kamm and [REDACTED] to brief members on APEX implementation. (U) 25X1A

a. Col. Kamm, chairman of the working group on APEX implementation in Government, said they had agreed that Washington area civilian and military managers for handling SCI material should be invited to an orientation seminar on APEX. These people would then be tasked to provide similar orientation briefings to others, and so on, until all involved U.S. officials worldwide had been provided an understanding of the APEX system. Col. Kamm distributed and discussed a proposed agenda for the seminar, scheduled for 5-6 May 1980. (U)

25X1A b. [REDACTED] chairman of the working group on industry implementation, said they were developing a series of tapes/films on the background, purpose and scope of the APEX implementation and conversion process. A small number of contractor representatives is being asked to comment on the draft series to ensure that it covers the subject clearly and adequately for subsequent distribution to the field and use by contractors there. (U)

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25X1A 4. The Chairman advised that the security orientation for senior officials, as edited, had been shown to the DCI on 1 April. [REDACTED] said the DCI's reaction was enthusiastic and that he had volunteered to sign letters to Cabinet officers encouraging them and their senior assistants to see the presentation. [REDACTED] advised that a copy of the package (slides, tape and script) would be provided to members of the Security Awareness Working Group at their next meeting for use by senior security officers within departments and agencies. The Chairman commended [REDACTED] and his working group for their work in developing such a useful presentation. A suggestion was made that the presentation, when possible, should accompany personal briefings by a security officer. It was noted that the presentation was classified Secret. (U)

25X1A 5. The Chairman advised that efforts to develop a common nondisclosure agreement for use with APEX were proceeding on schedule. [REDACTED] noted that CIA and NSA General Counsels were currently consulting on a specific form. (U)

25X1A 6. The Chairman referred to discussions at the 22 February 1980 special SECOM meeting, and asked members what had been done in their agencies with regard to the SECOM majority position suggesting changes in S.2284, the proposed National Intelligence Act of 1980. Representatives from seven member agencies said they had referred the majority position to their Counsels or policy staffs without known result to date. [REDACTED] asked that efforts be continued to obtain policy review of this matter. Mr. Anderson advised that his office viewed the SECOM recommended changes as administrative ones. He said they had discussed them with Mr. Miller, Staff Director, SSCI. (U)

25X1A 7. The Chairman advised that he had participated in a closed briefing of the House Government Operations Subcommittee on security at U.S. facilities overseas. He commended the quality of State's presentation there and expressed his pleasure with the attitude of mutual support evidenced by representatives of various departments and agencies. [REDACTED] noted that Subcommittee members

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seemed quite interested in the extent of field holdings of sensitive documents and in emergency destruction capabilities. Mr. Ackerman said he believed the Congress would pursue these subjects more vigorously after the hostages in Tehran and Bogota are released. [REDACTED] suggested the need to consider the security of sensitive documents under major fire conditions as well as when embassies are seized by mobs. He suggested that U.S. documents reproduced in [REDACTED] could have been compromised during the serious fire in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in 1979. (C)

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8. Mr. Dowd introduced Mr. Robert O'Brien of the Department of Energy, who will be their administrative point of contact for SECOM matters. (U)

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ITEM 1: Approval of Minutes

The minutes of the special meeting on 22 February 1980 were approved with a corrected page already distributed, and the minutes of the regular meeting of 27 February were approved as written. (U)

ITEM 2: Subcommittee and Working Group Reports

a. Compartmentation - Col. Kamm said they planned to meet on 10 April to review the appendix to DCID 1/20. (U)

b. R&D - [redacted] distributed a paper on anticompromise emergency destruction, and asked members to review it and come to the next meeting prepared to discuss it. [redacted] said some members of Congress had been troubled to learn during a recent hearing that the U.S. was not holding realistic fire drills overseas. (C)

c. Security Awareness - [redacted] advised that the Defense Industrial Security Institute has applied for membership on the working group. (U)

d. Investigative Standards - [redacted] said the DCI approved adjudication guidelines were being printed. The working group has tentatively approved the personnel security investigations survey report and galley proofs are being prepared for review by SECOM members at the next meeting. [redacted] plans to present highlights of the report and will be available for questions at the 7 May meeting. [redacted] asked [redacted] to take the lead in finishing work on the survey and in other WG matters pending selection of a new chairman to replace [redacted]. (U)

e. TSCS - [redacted] advised that they had addressed without resolution the security implications of advertising and export by manufacturers of countermeasures equipment. The issue of nongovernmental requests for data on countermeasures capabilities is also of concern to the TSCS. (U)

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f. Unauthorized Disclosures - Mr. Moore said the FBI was investigating leaks of sensitive information bearing on the Afghanistan crisis, but noted that broad dissemination made resolution doubtful. He advised that the Air Force had found it could not court martial [redacted] (enlisted man charged with compromise of SCI material) because he had been permitted to re-enlist; Federal prosecution is still a possibility. Mr. Moore said a third man had been arrested in a case of hijacking of sensitive U.S. data overseas, and a fourth was being sought. The classified material has not been recovered. In response to a question from [redacted] Mr. Rubino said Justice seemed to be still holding to its position that journalists were immune from prosecution regardless of their connection in any case of unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Mr. Rubino distributed for information the text of a recent public speech by the Attorney General on intelligence and the law. Mr. Kelly asked if anyone had addressed the legal implications of journalists suborning government employees to violate the Espionage Statutes. Mr. Rubino said he knew of no action to that end in Justice. [redacted] advised that NSA was re-examining its dissemination lists with a view to limiting them in the interest of better protection for sensitive data. (C)

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[REDACTED]

h. Physical Security Standards [REDACTED] distributed copies of the first draft of the proposed revision of the 1973 USIB Physical Security Standards; commended the work of group members in developing them; and asked SECOM members to convey any comments they had to their working group representatives. A number of members asked that consideration be given to classifying the standards to preclude their availability to hostile elements contemplating penetration of U.S. facilities. (U)

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ITEM 3: DCID 1/7

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The Chairman summarized actions to develop a new draft of this directive, and asked for member comments on the current version distributed to members on 13 March. Mr. Welch said the Navy was concerned about potential problems arising from section 5.a(1) of the draft on release of classified information to foreign nationals officially integrated into a U.S. agency. He withdrew his reservation when assured by Mr. Anderson that since national policy specifies that disclosure be made to governments and not to foreign individuals, foreign integreees would be considered as representing their governments and hence be eligible to receive classified material their governments were entitled to. [REDACTED] said CIA coordination of the draft developed a view that the NOFORN control should be authorized on an exemplary as opposed to an exclusionary basis. It was agreed that the CIA reservation would be provided the staff for referral to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for their comments in view of past OSD (PR) objections to the exemplary approach. All other members concurred in the draft DCID as presented. (U)

ITEM 4: Old Business

a. The Chairman, referring to the DIA member's memorandum dated 28 January 1980, advised that the occasionally found marking "sensitive" was not sanctioned,

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and said that the staff was developing a proposal for SECOM consideration. (U)

25X1A b. [REDACTED] reminded members who had not yet done so to provide responses to SECOM-D-136, dated 14 March, asking for current data on contact points for the exchange of SCI denials information. (U)

ITEM 5: New Business

25X1A a. [REDACTED] proposed consideration of training courses for persons who adjudicate personnel security cases for SCI access. He said there was a need for DCI guidance in this area and he recommended that the Investigative Standards Working Group take the lead. All members supported this recommendation and the matter was assigned to the working group for study and report. (U)

25X1A b. [REDACTED] suggested the need for security consideration of persons applying for sensitive access positions who are active adherents of groups such as the [REDACTED] which has been involved in the compromise of official secrets. Mr. Rubino advised that the Department of Justice might be able to develop questions which could be put to applicants to address this concern but which would avoid improper interference with First Amendment privileges. (U)

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ITEM 6: Next Meeting

The Chairman scheduled the next regular meeting of the Committee for Wednesday, 7 May 1980, at CIA Headquarters. (U)

[REDACTED]
Executive Secretary

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