DAMO-IAO   19 July 1972

MEMORANDUM THRU: -CHIEF,-SECURITY OPERATIONS DIVISION ~~~~~~~~~ 2'0 JUL 1972

FOR: DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Urban Insurgency

1. Introduction.

    a. In your 10 Jul 72 memorandum to me, subject: "Project for Active
Duty Training," you directed me:

    (1) To determine what changes, if any, are necessary in US Army
doctrine respecting urban insurgency, and

    (2) To outline a study effort to effect appropriate changes.

    b. I have conferred with the individuals listed in your memorandum,
have reviewed the selected references and study work similarly recommended,
and have held informal discussions with knowledgeable CIA associates.

    c. The short answers to the two tasks listed above are:

    (1) Existing US Army doctrine respecting insurgency is sound; it needs
to be supplemented by detailed doctrinal statements particularized for the
urban situation, and by tactical principles to provide guidance for the
conduct of operations to identify, prevent and counter urban insurgency.

    (2) The above task can best be performed by the creation, in the FM
31-series, of an authoritative text. This effort can be successfully
undertaken by in-house Army assets pursuing allocated sub-tasks as suggested
hereinafter.

2. Discussion.

    a. Basic US Army doctrine pertinent to urban insurgency is contained
in © FM 100-20, "Field Service Regulations: Internal Defense and
Development (IDAD)," May 1967. Although dated in some respects (revisions
needed are mainly those to update changes over the past five years in US
organization - Chapter 5 - and in national policy - the Nixon Doctrine),
FM 100-20 remains entirely valid in its general statements of overall
policy and broad doctrine, viz:

(1) "Strengthening of police agencies, the first line of defense, and reorientation or increased emphasis on certain basic police control techniques to diminish the insurgent threat, are prerequisite to the conduct of successful government operations...." (3-7b)

(2) "The police should be expanded and reorganized as required to support . the increased populace and resources control effort, the intelligence effort, and restoration of law and order to planned priority areas. Paramilitary forces may be organized or expanded to supplement the police or regular military forces." (3-8b)

(3) "CIA is responsible for other activities as directed." (5-2b)

(4) "AID...plans and implements programs...to maximize the capability of civil police." (5-4b)

(5) "DOD develops friendly paramilitary or police forces...or strengthens existing organizations." (5-6)

(6) "DOD...develops military doctrine for stability operations." (5-6c)

(7) "Specific responsibility of the Army in stability operations: develop...the doctrine, tactics, procedures, techniques, and equipment to be used...." (6-2b)

(8) "The Army...supports AID through direct liaison at national and field level. Army personnel support AID operations by administering the aspects of the MAP program that bear on...military and paramilitary, police activity." (6-3g)

(9) "US support of civil police forces normally will be accomplished through AID. Paramilitary police forces may be supported through MAP." (6-7c)

(10) "AID has primary responsibility for coordinating US support to civil and some paramilitary police. DOD also provides training, when appropriate, for paramilitary and military forces which support police operations." (6-11c)

(11) "Local and regional police are used to assist in establishing and maintaining order in urban areas." (7-6e)

b. Necessarily broad, these and similar doctrines set forth in FM 100-20 do not particularize the urban situation, the only specific allusion to which is contained in the passage quoted in (11) above. Nevertheless, FM 100-20 constitutes a sufficient broad framework for development of detailed doctrine, and indeed invites such development in the passages quoted in (6) and (7) above.

c. There have been at least two abortive attempts in recent years to produce authoritative doctrine on urban insurgency. One, described in your memorandum, attempted the external research route, which was deemed inappropriate. The other, launched in 1968, attempted to have USACDC develop a single FM on the subject. This latter effort has had a pathetically inconclusive history. A year was first consumed in approving a USACDC counter-proposal that specified existing FM's be revised, rather than treating urban insurgency in a separate FM. Three more years have now elapsed and none of the proposed revisions have yet been published. A June 72 "Final Draft Manuscript" of FM 31-23, incorporating some agreed changes does exist, but "does not reflect final approval of DA." Nor does it cover much of the material outlined in the original CDC proposal.

d. It is my firm opinion that the initial DCSOPS concept of a single FM devoted to urban insurgency was sound. I feel ODCSOPS erred in its 4 Jun 69 acceptance of USACDC's alternative, and specifically that the following ODCSOPS comment was in error:

"Due to the relevancy of urban warfare doctrine for counterguerrilla and stability operations, and for combat in fortified and built-up areas, it is felt that the multiple manual approach would provide a broader exposure of the desired doctrine and facilitate its availability to users."

This formula assumes two errors. It accepts the notion that the single FM and the multiple approach are mutually exclusive, which they of course are not. It also adopts the phrase urban warfare, as substituted by USACDC for the initial charge to get on with urban insurgency, and thus sets the tone for all which followed, in which process the problem became diffused into the whole field of combat in towns.

e. It is now time to return to the original 1968 proposition. If, meanwhile, USACDC ever does get around to inserting urban insurgency matters into other related FMs, all to the good. But a separate integral manual on urban insurgency is every bit as needed now as it ever has been, and should be produced forthwith.

f. There is no lack of pertinent material. In fact the problem is rather one of culling the available literature to extract the best. A good start in this direction has been made:

(1) "Current Urban Guerrilla Tactics: A Bibliography," Francis M. Watson, Jr. (CRESS/CINFAC), Sep 1970.

(2) "Army Doctrine on Urban Counterinsurgency," a May 72 Active Duty Training Project by MOBDES MAJ Sellers, with Anx A, "Collected References and Comments as to Relevance to Urban Counterinsurgency Doctrine."

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(3) "A Selected Annotated Bibliography on Urban Low-Intensity Conflict," Battelle, 12 Jan 72 (C).

These three annotated bibliographies, and the better of the works they list, should provide all that is needed to describe urban insurgency and its causative factors.

g. What is more difficult to come by is source material on the Army's role in countering urban insurgency. Available reports on the Vietnam urban aspects of TET 68 and "MINI-TET" (May 68) should be reviewed. Army contributions to PHOENIX, with special reference to PHOENIX in the major Vietnam cities, should also be culled. The POI's worked up at USARSA for the Seminar on Urban Warfare (0-7) and the old Irregular Warfare Orientation Course (06-A) offer leads to preventive measures.

h. What is most difficult of all is to achieve AID and CIA input designed to flesh out the generalized statements in FM 100-20 such as those quotes in 2a (3) and (4) above. Here it would seem desirable to seek drafting assistance from those two agencies, perhaps best done after all other sections of the new FM have been drafted and are available.

i. A word should be said at this point about the real, or at least alledged sensitivity of this subject. Concern that the Army's interest therein would be misconstrued as a domestic concern seems to have conditioned the 1970 turn-down of the proposal to contract out a study of the problem and is probably still a factor. Whether or not such concern is justified, the decision was all to the good, for yet another "study" would probably not have filled the bill. The production of an FM would, even if it were classified "Confidential," and if meaningful input from CIA is to be obtained, it will probably be necessary to resort to classification anyway. So for both purposes, protection from domestic outcry and inclusion of somewhat sensitive information, it is prudent to think in terms of a classified FM, in order to get on with a meaningful production.

j. Another word is in order on nomenclature. It has been noted above that the phrase-turn from "urban insurgency" to "urban warfare" badly side tracked the first FM proposal. Now that "IDAD" has become a term of art, it might be well to think of the new FMs title as a take-off from FM 31-22, "Internal Defense/Development Operations, US Army Doctrine." Perhaps what we are striving for could be entitled: (C) FM 31-22A, "Internal Defense/Development Operations - Urban Areas" (U). On the other hand if FM 31-23, "Stability Operations - US Army Doctrine" even achieves DA approval, it would supersede FM 31-22, 12 Nov 63 and (S) FM 31-22A, 22 Nov 63. Alternatively, a supplement to FM 31-16, "Counterguerrilla Operations," could be produced as (C) FM 31-16A, "Counterguerrilla Operations - Urban Areas."

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3. <u>Study Effort and Allocation of Sub-Tasks</u>.

   a. On-going Efforts.

   (1) ARPA is grinding out a study of "Military Operations in Built up Areas," originated 1 Oct 71. This title euphemistically covers some material on urban insurgency, and hence the effort should be kept under review for whatever use can be made of the relevant materials it generates. But it will be long in gestation, will be somewhat broad brush and theoretical in content, and (most importantly) will lack the authenticity implicit in an approved FM. It should not therefore, be viewed as an answer to the problem.

   (2) AIR has produced some police studies (typical is a May 72 pamphlet on the police of India, Guatamala, Bolivia and Thailand).which should be reviewed for possible relevance to the required FM. AIR also made a presentation to the recent MORS Symposium's panel on urban insurgency. The results of that panel's effort should shortly be available to JCS J3 DOCSA (COL Norman or COL Birch), and should be reviewed.

   (3) Carlisle's Strategic Studies Institute will be assigning a 2/4 man team to a project "Service Roles in Providing Assistance to Allies Under the Nixon Doctrine" in December. This effort may be a vehicle for additional broad-brush treatment of urban insurgency.

   (4) Individual authors continue to produce works bearing on the problem. One such, better than most, is "Urban Guerrillas, the New Face of Political Violence," by Robert Moss (London: Temple Smith, 1972). Such productions should be reviewed while the FM is in process to assure inclusion of up-to-date information and examples.

   b. Proposed Study Effort.

   Since none of the above ongoing efforts bids fair to solve the need an in-house DA effort is proposed, with allocation of sub-tasks as follows:

   (1) ODCSOPS MOBDES. A forthcoming MOBDES to IA should be assigned a project for Active Duty training which would require him to:

   (a) Pull together in one location the full texts of the better works listed in the bibliographies above.

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(b) Research available DA histories and accounts bearing upon MACV activities in Vietnam urban areas 1965 to date, with special emphasis on TET and MINI-TET 68.

(2) FM Drafting Team. Realizing that T/O manpower available to IA is so sufficiently engaged in current business as to prevent undertaking the task of drafting the required FM, it is suggested that a two-man team, consisting of a junior active duty officer at Ft Bragg and a senior retired officer be formed. The model would be the comparable group which created the FARSEA "Guerrilla Handbook." The materials collected as a result of (1) above should be gathered at Bragg, where the junior member of the team could commence drafting. The contract retiree, available for up to 90 days, could review drafts and improve them on the basis of his experience.

(3) When a semi-finished draft is at hand, IA SO UW could make it available to AID/PSD and CIA [ ] for addition of material pertinent to those two agencies.   25X1

(4) The final IA draft could then be vetted through ODCSOPS for forwarding to CDC with an updated version of the initial 1968 request for the prompt completion of a finished FM on urban insurgency.

4. Recommendation. That the above be approved as a method of proceeding to produce an Army Field Manual on Urban Insurgency.

R. D. DRAIN
COL, AR-USAR

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THE PROBLEM OF URBAN INSURGENCY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SECTION I: INTRODUCTION

1. <u>Purpose of Study</u>. The study of urban insurgency was undertaken for the following purposes:

a. To identify the characteristics of urban insurgency and the military aspects of its containment.

b. To determine whether or not revolutionary conflict is shifting from rural guerrilla warfare to urban insurgency.

c. To determine whether or not current US Army doctrine will be adequate for coping with urban insurgency.

2. <u>Assumptions and Restraints</u>. The study does not examine the containment of urban insurgency within the US. Nor does it consider the possible conduct of urban insurgency operations by US forces within the context of an unconventional warfare mission.

3. <u>Methodology</u>. The study is based on the examination of revolutionary texts, the analysis of current revolutionary doctrine and a case-study survey of 43 recent examples of urban insurgency, such as Algiers (1956-59), Montevideo (1963-70) and Belfast (1967-73). Approximately 100 books, articles and films are cited in the bibliography.

4. <u>Organization of Study Results</u>. The study is organized into three sections of three chapters each. Section I deals with revolutionary theory, modern urbanization and current revolutionary doctrine. Section II outlines the organizational and operational characteristics of an urban underground. Section III examines US defense policy, identifies the tactical principles necessary for success in urban counterinsurgency operations, and provides solutions to the problems associated with the conduct of such operations. A detailed table of contents is provided at Tab A.

SECTION II: MAJOR CONCLUSIONS

1. <u>The Nature of the Problem</u>. The study yields six major conclusions with regard to the problem of urban insurgency:

a. Because of the rapid urbanization of the modern world and because of the political unrest associated with such urbanization, insurgency within metropolitan areas is likely to increase. Subversive literature currently being circulated throughout the world emphasizes the vulnerability of the urban area.

b. Urban insurgency differs from rural insurgency in its emphasis upon techniques of provocation. It concentrates on tactics which will provoke overreaction by the government and arouse public opinion against the government. Emphasizing terrorism, it does not rely upon the development and maintenance of large guerrilla bands to achieve revolution.

c. The impact of media television will have a crucial effect on US public opinion regarding Army involvement in urban counterinsurgency operations. Because of this impact, and because of the traditions which govern its role in national defense, the Army will be vulnerable to a loss of public support and the consequent erosion of its own stability when it becomes involved in urban counterinsurgency operations.

d. The cities of the US can be seriously affected by urban insurgency occurring within selected foreign cities. Because the major cities of the world are netted technologically in terms of such functions as trade, finance, communications and transportation, the stability of the US is dependent on the stability of these functions within many cities external to its own boundaries, and hence the US itself may be affected indirectly by interference with these functions.

e. Because of this technological extension, and because US armed forces are vulnerable to the erosion described above, if drawn into counterinsurgency operations, urban insurgency lends itself to strategic employment against the US, carried out by a third power sponsoring conflict within selected foreign cities under the guise of revolutionary insurgency.

f. US Army tactical doctrine is generally inadequate for urban counterinsurgency operations and could result in an escalation of conflict if employed in such operations. Because it is oriented toward rural guerrilla warfare, this doctrine fails to emphasize the techniques of non-provocation essential for an urban environment. ·

2. <u>Responses to the Problem.</u> The study also yields five conclusions with regard to how the Army may respond to the problem of urban insurgency.

a. A separate urban counterinsurgency manual should be prepared. This manual would indicate how provocation may be avoided in urban counter-insurgency warfare by the incorporation of certain basic principles (the principles of patience, discrimination and restraint) in tactical doctrine.

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b. A training program should be developed for utilization by US Army personnel prior to engagement in urban counterinsurgency operations as either advisors or unit members. This training would clarify the way in which urban insurgency differs from rural insurgency and would emphasize practical exercises which stress the principles cited above.

c. An urban counterinsurgency CPX format should be developed. This CPX would train personnel in the techniques of integrating military action with civic action in an urban environment, and would stress reliance on non-military agencies in the containment and elimination of urban insurgency.

d. The Army should avoid involvement in the containment of sporadic urban terrorism. Since the containment of such terrorism does not appear to be a proper military mission, other Federal agencies should be employed for this purpose and should be utilized in an advisory assistance role to strengthen foreign police agencies as necessary.

e. Although not directly confronted with domestic problems concerning urban insurgency, the active Army should develop more effective ways of assisting the National Guard in executing two essentially conflicting missions, i.e., domestic disturbance and mobilization readiness.

SECTION III: OUTLINE OF STUDY

1. Background Considerations. Section I of the study provides a definition of urban insurgency, an examination of the way in which the urban environment is susceptible to insurgency, and a survey of how current revolutionary techniques seek to exploit this vulnerability.

a. Urban insurgency is defined as systematic low-intensity aggression against the technological, economic and political structure of an urbanized nation, occurring within its own boundaries or within those metropolitan areas to which it is linked via this structure, undertaken for either revolutionary purposes or for purposes of diverting its military strength.

b. The urban environment is shown to be extremely vulnerable to subversion because of its technological complexity and because of the political unrest associated with modern urbanization. It is also shown to be compatible with the sustained conduct of insurgency operations.

c. Revolutionary doctrine currently available is shown to advocate terrorism, hijacking, assassination and "propaganda by violence" in the conduct of urban insurgency. Carlos Marighella's Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla is examined in detail, and is shown to advocate tactics which are adaptable to both revolutionary urban insurgency and strategically-motivated urban insurgency.

2. <u>The Characteristics of Urban Insurgency</u>. Based on case-studies, Section II shows that:

   a. The urban underground is usually organized in small, highly compartmentalized cells which operate on a sustained basis without their members departing from normal civilian routine. These cells are readily adapted to the exploitation of larger elements, such as mass protest movements.

   b. The recruiting, training and logistical procedures employed by an urban insurgency apparatus are extremely efficient within the metropolitan environment. The techniques of ambush, raid and terrorism employed by such an apparatus are all based on the exploitation of the environment's physical and social characteristics.

   d. The Battle for Algiers and other case-studies indicate that the principal military problem in coping with urban insurgency is the danger of over-reaction, the use of excessive military force and the consequent escalation of violence. As a result, military action often succeeds in the momentary containment of an insurgency while provoking a mass reaction which will cause resumption of revolt.

3. <u>National Defense Against Urban Insurgency</u>. In Section III, the examination of national defense policy and national tradition indicates that:

   a. The Army's role in national defense requires the maintenance of public support and the accomodation of public opinion. In the execution of the FID program, its involvement in urban counterinsurgency operations calls therefore for the recognition of three traditions which underlie public opinion: the respect for efficiency, the tendency to reduce complex foreign problems to moral issues, and the non-glorification of war.

   b. In order to accomodate these attitudes, in order to guard against the revolutionary principle that conventional forces are best destroyed piece-meal by erosion of public support, and in order to guard against the escalation of an insurgent situation, the Army must incorporate in its counterinsurgency tactical doctrine three princples via which all this may be accomplished:

   (1) Patience in the containment and elimination of an insurgent movement, in order to prevent escalation and involvement of US forces beyond the advisory role envisioned in the FID program.

   (2) Discrimination in target selection within the urban environment, so that public opinion is not aggravated by counterinsurgency operations.

   (3) Extreme restraint in the use of firepower and explosives, so that provocation and escalation of the insurgent situation are avoided to the maximum extent possible.

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c. To maintain preparedness to cope with urban insurgency as it might occur within a foreign environment, and to maintain a capability of executing those roles it might play within the framework of the FID program, the Army does not need to establish and maintain specially trained units. A more reasonable response would be those measures indicated in Par 2, Sect II above.

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THE PROBLEM OF URBAN INSURGENCY

APRIL 1973

PREPARED BY

INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

PREFACE

The study which follows was initially undertaken as an effort to determine the nature of urban insurgency, with its primary objective being the identification of current trends in revolutionary warfare.

In the beginning, its specific orientation was based on two questions: Is revolutionary conflict shifting from rural guerrilla warfare to a new and different kind of insurgency within the confines of the metropolitan area? And if so, what are the characteristics of this new form of revolutionary action? As the study indicates, the attempt to answer these questions led to the discovery that a far more complicated threat lies hidden in the nature of urban insurgency. This threat is essentially strategic, and not revolutionary.

What this means is that for the United States, the perils of urban insurgency are to be identified in two forms: the diversion and erosion of its armed forces, and the crippling of its technology. These themes are addressed throughout the study.

The study recognizes that domestic disturbances are not the proper concern of the US Army. Indeed, in Chapter Seven this restraint and the national traditions which underlie it are examined in detail, for they have indirect impact upon the way in which the Army may prepare for missions outside the national boundaries.

The study is divided into three sections. In Section I, it examines the nature of revolutionary warfare, the growth of urbanization and the characteristics of modern revolutionary doctrine. In Section II, it summarizes the organizational and operational techniques of an illegal urban underground, and also identifies certain recent incidents -- particularly the struggles within Algiers, Belfast and Montevideo, as well as the activities of the Black September movement -- as being most indicative of what urban insurgency may amount

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to. Section III is devoted to an examination of current US defense policy, the ways in which the Army may cope with the problems which underlie urban insurgency, and the specific actions it may take to prepare itself for an urban counterinsurgency role outside the United States.

One of the primary conclusions set forth in the final section is that successful urban counterinsurgency operations require unusual political aware-ness on the part of the personnel involved. Exactly how such awareness may be integrated with tactical doctrine is set forth in Chapter Eight. A second major conclusion is that the Army may best prepare for such operations by de-veloping a separate field manual, by creating special instructional packages, and by employing CPX's designed to orient its personnel to the complexities of urban counterinsurgency warfare. A third and perhaps more surprising con-clusion is that in order to guard against its own over-commitment (as well as the threat of erosion) the Army would be well advised to encourage the develop-ment of non-military police forces capable of bearing the burden of the urban insurgency threat. These matters are examined in Chapter Nine.

Source materials are set forth in the bibliography at the end of the study. The study was completed in April 1973, and was done by COL Seale R. Doss (USAR) and CPT Ronald Hiett (USAR), under the direction of the Security Operations Division, International and Civil Affairs Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

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SECTION I: BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS

SECTION III: NATIONAL DEFENSE AGAINST URBAN INSURGENCY

SECTION I

BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS

All warfare is based on deception.
Hence, when able to attack, we must
seem unable; when using our forces,
we must seem inactive; when we are
near, we must make the enemy believe
that we are away; when far away, we
must make him believe we are near.
Hold out baits to entice the enemy.
Feign disorder, and crush him.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War

CHAPTER ONE

URBAN INSURGENCY AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

1. The Analysis of Urban Insurgency

Violence in the streets is not a strictly modern phenomenon. Almost all the major cities of the world have been subjected at one time or another to crippling outbursts of rebellion or agitation, usually in the wake of economic or social disorder. In the 20th Century, however, such disorder has been accompanied by the announced determination of various revolutionary movements to bring about political upheaval through urban violence. It is not surprising, therefore, that urban violence is now the subject of increasing attention on the part of political and military analysts. The term "urban insurgency" has thus crept into the vocabulary of those concerned with violence in the modern city.

Certain fundamental questions dominate this concern:

(1) What are the distinguishing characteristics of urban insurgency, as opposed to random violence in the city?

(2) What is the relationship between urban insurgency and other forms of revolutionary activity, such as a rural-based guerrilla movement?

(3) What are the countermeasures which have proven successful in preventing, controlling or combatting urban insurgency in actual instances of its occurrence?

In short, the effort to analyse urban insurgency revolves around an attempt to define it first, and then determine its characteristics. This attempt requires an examination of the various forms of revolutionary activity, the purpose of this examination being the development of distinctions by means of which urban insurgency may be identified and studied. This process of analysis permits the isolation of urban insurgency as a phenomenon

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separate from (although, on occasion, related to) other forms of violence and subversion. Additionally, it permits the dissection of identified instances of urban insurgency on a case-study basis. This case-study procedure facilitates the determination of the causes, as well as the stages, of urban insurgency.

Finally, the case-study identification of the causes of urban insurgency permits examination of the role of political doctrine and political agitation in the creation of urban unrest and the transformation of such unrest into actual insurgency. The widespread use of political propaganda in the 20th Century has frequently resulted in the misidentification of random violence as true insurgency, with this confusion sometimes even encouraged for the sake of political provocation. Therefore the exact determination of the relationship between agitation and insurgency is of central importance in understanding the latter.

There is no shortage of insurgent doctrine as such. Set forth in the works of revolutionary writers ranging from Lenin to Carlos Marighella, blueprints for insurgency are readily available. Nor is there a shortage of historical instances of urban violence, although many such instances prove upon closer scrutiny to be considerably less than actual insurgency. The systematic analysis of urban insurgency thus permits concentration upon a selection of representative revolutionary works and their relationship to specific instances of such insurgency.

Despite the availability of both doctrine and examples, the analysis of their relationship reveals a general unawareness that detailed blueprints for urban insurgency have existed since the turn of the century. More modern revolutionary writing has largely concentrated on the central role played by

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rural guerrilla warfare, with only peripheral attention to the details of
urban warfare. However, the recent increase in urban terrorism suggests a
shift back to the metropolitan area as the center of insurgency, and thus
suggests the resurrection of the earlier, urban-oriented revolutionary
doctrine. This doctrine is elaborated upon in Chapter Three following the
analysis, in Chapter Two, of the social and cultural forces which underlie
this renewed emphasis upon urban revolution.

2. Definitional Problems in the Analysis of Urban Insurgency

The definition of key words and phrases is of considerable importance
in the study of urban insurgency. Since the shift from guerrilla warfare
to urban insurgency reflects a shift in revolutionary thought -- as outlined
in Chapter Three -- it is not surprising that the key terms employed in dis-
cussing, describing and analysing this process are also subject to change.
A case in point is the meaning of the word "guerrilla". In the language of
the rural-oriented discussion of revolutionary conflict, the word owes its
meaning to a concept of unconventional warfare within which armed revolution-
aries operate as militarily-organized units engaged in raids, ambushes and
similar assaults upon conventional military forces. In the more recent
shift within revolutionary doctrine, "guerrilla" takes on a different mean-
ing, as is reflected in Marighella's Minimanual For the Urban Guerrilla.
Committed to terrorism and "propaganda by violence", Marighella's urban
rebel becomes a guerrilla only as the word itself undergoes a change in usage.

Definitions are nevertheless important, for they provide the theoretical
framework necessary for an examination of the problem of urban insurgency.
Within the present study, seven key terms require definition before urban

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insurgency itself can be defined and examined. They are:

Subversion: Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength of a regime.

Insurrection: An abrupt, armed uprising against the military and security forces of a constituted government.

Revolution: The effort to seize power via the violent overthrow of the prevailing political authority.

Civil War: A military struggle which takes place when revolutionary forces adopt the organization and tactics of conventional military forces.

Internal War: A form of conflict within which the prevailing government is challenged by a process of subversion and insurgency.

Urban Society: An environment whose technological, economic and political characteristics are predominantly those of a modern metropolitan area.

Insurgency: Systematic, low-intensity aggression against the political structure of a nation, falling short of civil war.

Of these seven, the first definition is provided by AR 310-25 and JCS Pub 1. The next five are definitions derived from common usage. The definition of insurgency is, however, a departure from the usage specified by AR 310-25, which defines insurgency as follows: "A condition-resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the present context, subversive insurgency is primarily Communist inspired, supported or exploited." This departure is predicated on three factors. First, since insurgency falls short of civil war, it actually amounts to low-intensity aggression, in contrast to the relatively high-intensity conflict which would characterize combat between conventionally organized forces. Second, insurgency may be undertaken by forces whose

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ideological persuasion is not necessarily Communist. Third, while insurgency
may well result from revolt or insurrection, it may also result merely from
the deliberate intensification of internal aggression undertaken for purposes
other than the actual overthrow of a government. Even then it would be
systematic, of course, since insurgency is not merely random violence but is
violence undertaken for some specific purpose.

Certain points follow immediately from these definitions. Internal
war may be seen as something distinguishable from revolutionary war; as
shown in Chapter Three, this distinction is of primary importance because
it permits awareness of the possible strategic utilization of urban in-
surgency, as when such insurgency is fomented not so much for the sake of
revolution as for the sake of diversion. Additionally, the other definit-
ions permit the recognition that insurgency may grow out of subversion with
or without being initiated by or resulting in insurrection. This enhances
understanding of the current disagreement among revolutionary theorists
themselves. Finally, the definitions permit suspension of those revolution-
ary theories which focus upon subversion, insurgency and insurrection as
distinct phases in revolutionary warfare, thus forcing their analysis to
obey models and theories which may prove misleading with regard to urban
insurgency.

The definition of urban insurgency, as developed in the pages which
follow, is set forth at the end of this chapter.

3. Revolution and the Dual-Warfare Nature of Modern Conflict

While definitions are important in the study of urban insurgency,
equal importance must be accorded to the way in which the US Army is drawn

into a concern for insurgency in the first place. Indeed, one of the most important characteristics of urban insurgency will turn out to be its potential impact on the Army's concept of itself, and thus one of the most important obstacles to understanding the deeper threat of urban insurgency is the recognition of what this concept amounts to.

Traditionally, the Army's role in national defense has been envisioned in terms of conventional conflict -- that is, defense of the US against a foreign power whose armed forces threaten the security of the nation. The various public attitudes which underlie this tradition are examined in Chapter Seven, where their impact on the problem of urban insurgency is developed in detail. Most important, however, is the concept of conventional war which results from this heritage. In response to the American political tradition and its own role in national defense, the Army's concept of itself is one which calls for conflict against a foreign force organized and operated along lines similar to its own, with the conflict ideally initiated by an abrupt outbreak of hostilities and a declaration of war. In this sense, World War II provides a model which governs the Army's modern organization. Because World War II was accompanied by internal conflict behind the boundaries of the Axis powers, the Army's modern organization also includes a capacity to exploit such conflict in the event of any future war -- in effect, a capacity to bring about insurgency behind the lines of the enemy in conjunction with and in support of conventional operations. Thus, even with its capacity to support insurgency in conjunction with orthodox operations, the Army's concept of itself -- and hence its concept of how war should be waged -- remains essentially conventional.

The emergence of an alternative concept of war results, therefore, in a

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serious threat to the Army's concept of itself and its concept of how war is to be waged. But it is just such an alternative which underlies modern revolutionary theory. The scenario is Lenin's: a gradual increase in unrest, protest and dissatisfaction within a given country, leading to subversion and violence, culminating in insurgency or insurrection, resulting only then in civil war and the emergence of relatively conventional conflict between opposing military forces. Successful in Russia, China and Cuba, the scenario lends itself to continuation elsewhere. In those areas where its own interests would be threatened by revolution, the US must therefore protect its interests accordingly. / In effect, it must respond to this alternative form of war while maintaining its preparedness for conventional war.

Thus the Army is confronted with what amounts to a dual-warfare mission: given the task of maintaining readiness for land warfare on its own terms, it is simultaneously confronted with preventing war on opposing terms and, consequently, with interdicting the process envisioned by Lenin. This interdiction effort was undertaken with varied success in Lebanon, in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnam. Refined now in the Foreign Internal Defense program (whose implications are examined in Chapter Seven) the interdiction effort leads to a concern for how insurgency may be contained and eliminated -- and hence leads to special consideration for the interdiction of urban insurgency within a friendly foreign nation. The strategic merit of the interdiction effort is, of course, its capacity to abort the process envisioned by Lenin. Its strategic danger, however, is the risk of diversion, for the strategy of interdiction invites its own counterstrategy: the fomenting of subversion and insurgency for the more sake of provoking interdiction and thereby diverting the military strength of the US. The most crucial discovery to be made about urban insurgency is its adaptability

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to such strategic utilization.

Revolution is easily understood: its ultimate goal is the overthrow of a government. But since strategic diversion would be most effective if disguised as revolution, and since the dual-warfare mission invites such diversion, the recognition of how urban insurgency lends itself to this threat will require reconsideration of how subversion, insurgency and revolution are interrelated.

4. The Nature of Subversion

In the sense in which it is defined here, revolution requires the erosion of incumbent political authority. Unless this condition is met, and unless those powers in authority can be effectively challenged as a result of this erosion, the attempt to seize power cannot be significant enough to merit the status of revolution.

The classic example of erosion of authority is provided by Czarist Russia in the period preceding the revolution of 1917. With the gradual decline of the Czar's capacity to control events, the opportunity to seize power became a real possibility for the Czar's opponents and revolution resulted. In turn, German history of the same period provides the classic example of a relatively stable government being subjected to an uprising which failed to materialize as revolution. Hitler's unsuccessful putsch of 1923 failed primarily because the government in power had not, at this point, lost its capacity to sustain itself. Quickly aborted, the Munich putsch was not even an unsuccessful revolution.

The erosion of governmental authority follows certain general patterns. Initially it involves the development of opposition elements inspired by some basic inadequacy on the part of the government. Such opposition groups may

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remain dormant for a prolonged period -- or they may, as in Czarist Russia, engage in acts of violence designed to aggravate the government's position. Assassination and sabotage are typical efforts to subvert the government.

The deliberate and systematic undermining of political authority is thus a stage in the revolutionary process, and its objective is to establish those conditions under which power may be seized from the government. This undermining process may consume years of effort, culminating in an abrupt collapse of the government, as in the case of the Czar's abdication in 1917. Or it may involve an accelerated effort to subvert the government, followed by insurgency, or insurrection, or even civil war. The transition from unrest and disaffection to subversion and rebellion is thus varied and is always quite complicated. But its end result, if it is to accomodate revolution, is the crippling of governmental power.

Subversion in its earliest stages may involve relatively uncoordinated acts of rebellion on the part of groups which differ radically in their own goals. Such was the case in Germany during the 1920's, when both Fascist and Communist elements sought the collapse of the Weimar government. In turn, subversion may involve only a single, highly coordinated organization determined to bring about the collapse and overthrow of the ruling powers, as in the Algerian insurgency of the 1950's. What is crucial about the process of subversion is not so much a unity of ultimate goals as a unity of immediate purpose -- which is the weakening of the government in power.

Organized in increasingly complicated structures, modern governments are vulnerable to more and more diverse forms of such subversion. Given its many responsibilities for maintaining law and order, insuring economic stability, managing its own agencies and retaining the consent of the pop-

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ulace, the typical government presents an array of targets against which subversion may be directed. Its failure to execute any of these responsibilities will weaken its own status and provide momentum to a revolutionary movement.

In the economic sphere, subversion may involve the instigation of strikes, acts of industrial sabotage, efforts at production slow-down, interference with methods of distribution, and similar activities directed at reducing the efficiency of the economic system, and hence at reducing the acceptability of the government in power. In the strictly political sphere, the dissemination of propaganda and the development of anti-government protests and demonstrations also serve to undermine authority. The infiltration of various governmental agencies, particularly its police and military forces, can be a significant form of subversion if it succeeds in undermining the allegiance of these agencies. Additionally, acts of overt violence and terror -- particularly in the form of kidnapping and assassination of key officials -- may succeed in reducing the government's strength. When such acts of terror cause the government to over-react in a repressive way, thus alienating previously sympathetic elements of the population, the subversive's cause is strengthened even further.

What is most significant about these forms of subversion is that they are often a prelude to, and then a complement of, armed insurgency against the government. They may even culminate in insurrection. In the earliest stages of subversion, however, insurrection would be premature since the government's position has not been sufficiently weakened. Being premature in this sense, it is doomed to failure, as was the case with the 1905 revolution in Russia and the 1923 uprisings in Germany. When insurrection is

delayed until the government's position has been sufficiently weakened by
subversion, it stands a greatly improved chance of success. Again, the
classic example is provided by the Russian revolution of 1917; when the
Provisional Government established after the Czar's overthrow had reached
the point it could no longer resist Bolshevist subversion, the Bolshevist
insurrection proved both swift and insurmountable.

5. From Subversion to Insurgency

Because it is ideally launched only after subversion has weakened
the government, insurrection is described by Lenin and others as a phase
in the revolutionary process. But if insurrection leads to civil war,
as was the case in Spain in 1935, it will normally be accompanied by a
continuation and even acceleration of those subversive acts of sabotage,
terror and propaganda which preceded it. To identify subversion and in-
surrection as mutually exclusive phases in a revolution would therefore be
mistaken.

Insurrection has not only led to the overthrow of the government or
the commencement of protracted civil war. In other cases, when it has
failed to achieve either of these results, its failure has brought about
the complete collapse of the revolutionary movement (as with Budapest in
1956), or has resulted in the revolutionary movement reverting to subversion
(as with the St. Petersburg uprisings of 1905), or has led to protracted in-
surgency along the lines of guerrilla war (as with the Chinese Communists
following the Canton and Shanghai uprisings of the 1920's). Moreover, not
all instances of insurgency have been initiated by insurrection. As in
Vietnam, in which the gradual escalation of subversion led finally to in-
surgency, guerrilla warfare can emerge through raids and ambushes which grow

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in frequency and intensity until a state of insurgency exists without an
abrupt armed uprising ever having occurred. In turn, insurgency in the
rural environment can lead to urban insurrection, as was the design of the
1968 Tet offensive upon the part of the Vietcong. But this outcome is not
itself a necessary condition for revolutionary success, since Castro's Cuban
insurgency triumphed without significant urban insurrection. Obviously,
then, the variations on the revolutionary theme are great, and these var-
iations have led to doctrinal disagreements among revolutionaries them-
selves, as described in Chapter Three. They have also led to disagreement
about the meaning of the terms involved in describing revolution.

In general, however, insurgency has been described as a relatively
open attack upon governmental agencies and installations by organized groups
of revolutionary forces. These forces have been distinguished from the
earlier agents of subversion by three factors: (1) unlike the subversive
underground, they are generally organized into military or para-military
structures which continue to exist through the duration of the insurgency,
(2) they are committed to direct and systematic assault upon the government
not so much for the sake of weakening the government as for the sake of
forcing its collapse, and (3) they require, for the continuation of their
own operations, logistical resources similar to those available to convent-
ional military forces.

Modern history has seen the popularization of a distinct and flamboyant
label for such forces: they are not rebels but guerrillas. The use of such
terminology permits distinction between the military forces of the government
in power and the military or para-military forces of the revolutionary move-
ment -- or, in the international sense, between those conventional forces of

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a foreign power which may constitute an external threat and those forces of a revolutionary movement which constitute an internal threat. This distinction between conventional forces and guerrilla forces has generated a vast amount of guerrilla warfare literature in the post-World War II era, with particular emphasis upon the operations of guerrilla forces as "a new form of warfare".

The tendency to identify guerrilla insurgency as a significantly different form of war is due largely to the objectives of insurgency and the operation of the insurgent forces amid the continuation of subversion. Conventional warfare ordinarily involves the battlefield confrontation of opposing military forces -- accompanied, since the advent of military aviation, by the bombardment of the various industrial and urban bases which support those forces. Traditionally, such warfare has been dedicated to the destruction of opposing military forces and the removal of their capacity to threaten the nation opposed by them; only rarely (as in World War II) has it been accompanied by the objective of overthrowing the government of the opposing nation. Insofar as guerrilla warfare is an aspect of revolution, and is thus dedicated to the overthrow of the government, it differs from conventional warfare in its final objectives. Insofar as it is combined with subversion against the political apparatus of the state, it also differs in its overall methods.

What is crucial about guerrilla war is this dependence upon the continued impact of subversion. Guerrilla operations may or may not be accompanied by conventional warfare: in Jugoslavia, the World War II partisan campaign was an adjunct of the total war against Nazi Germany -- but in Castro's Cuban insurgency, the government was not confronted simultaneously with an

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external military threat. In either case, sustained guerrilla activity must be accompanied by a significant degree of subversion, for it is subversion which weakens and diverts the government, making it vulnerable to guerrilla war.

The various forms of subversion -- such as propaganda, terrorism, infiltration, assassination and sabotage -- are thus activities which prepare the way for insurgency (or insurrection) and then complement it in the more advanced stages of revolution. In this sense, insurgency involves a broad spectrum of opposition to the government. In a formula sense, insurgency is a combination of subversion plus armed resistance, and the emergence of open warfare as a product of this combination marks the revolutionary shift from mere subversion to actual insurgency.

6. Rural Guerrilla Warfare as an Aspect of Insurgency

Once the momentum of the revolutionary effort has reached a level of violence sufficient to inspire armed resistance against the government, the shift from subversion to insurgency may result in either an abrupt collapse of the government or a long and sustained struggle between the insurgent forces and those of the government. Those short-run cases which have produced relatively swift revolutionary success have most often involved urban insurrection: the overthrow of the Provisional Government of Russia was largely a matter of warfare in the streets, as was the case with the revolution which had earlier toppled the French monarchy. As a result, urban insurrection has been characterized by brevity. It has not always been successful, of course, and in those instances when it has failed it has usually been described as an uprising -- as with the Shanghai uprising of 1927 and the Budapest uprising of 1956. Nor has insurrection always been revolutionary

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in intent; the Warsaw uprising of 1944 was essentially dedicated to resistance against German occupation forces.

When such urban insurrection does fail, and when it is an aspect of revolution, the revolution itself may collapse in defeat or, if sufficient forces survive, result in protracted insurgency within the countryside external to the urban environment. In the 20th Century, this shift to rural insurgency in the wake of urban defeat has been largely due to the fact that it is only in a rural environment that insurgent forces have been able to manage the security and mobility necessary for their own survival. Thus it is in the rural context that the modern guerrilla has flourished, as with Mao's campaign in China and the Vietcong insurgency in South Vietnam. When rural insurgency has not been accompanied by urban subversion it has generally failed, however, as with Gueverra's abortive Bolivian expedition. In such cases, freedom from distraction by subversion permits a government to concentrate its security forces upon the elimination of the guerrilla.

The relationship between rural guerrilla warfare and urban subversion has therefore been a complementary one in the history of 20th Century revolution. While the rural environment provides the security necessary for the sustained existence of an insurgent force, the rural operations of such a force have rarely been sufficient to topple a government, however. In the case of Mao's 20-year campaign against the Nationalist Chinese, the combined impact of Japanese invasion and Communist insurgency were necessary to bring the revolution to a successful end; in Castro's case, substantial urban subversion was a necessary complement to the operations conducted in the Sierra Maestras.

The balance between rural guerrilla warfare and urban subversion has been

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influenced by such variables as the physical strength of the guerrilla element, the extent of external support provided by foreign interests and the capacity of the government to endure a prolonged revolutionary challenge. Despite these variables, the patterns of modern revolutionary warfare reveal the necessity for such a balance. They also indicate that revolutionary success requires an increase in the intensity of rural guerrilla operations to balance any decrease in the impact of urban subversion (as in South Vietnam prior to the Tet uprisings), as well as requiring an increase in urban violence to balance any decrease in the impact of rural operations (as in South Vietnam during the Tet uprisings). Given this necessity, and given the increasing vulnerability of the modern city, any decrease in the potential effectiveness of rural guerrilla warfare is thus likely to produce a renewed concern for urban insurgency as a primary vehicle of revolution. This is, in fact, the thrust of the revolutionary doctrine examined in Chapter Three.

7. A Definition of Urban Insurgency

A tentative definition of urban insurgency would begin with emphasis upon the revolutionary seizure of political power and the dissolution of the prevailing system of government. In terms of the relationship between subversion and insurgency, and in view of the modern emphasis upon rural guerrilla warfare, a more refined definition might characterize urban insurgency as highly intensified subversion carried out in support of rural insurgency. However, the analysis of those current military, social, political and technological trends which will inevitably influence the nature of revolutionary warfare suggest that urban insurgency may well be emerging as far more than an auxiliary form of such war. Urban insurgency may well be destined to become

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the primary form of revolutionary struggle.

Several factors provide a hint of this possibility. In terms of military technology, the advent of the helicopter provides the governmental security force with a mobility so great that the rural guerrilla's earlier advantage of refuge and security is seriously diminished. In terms of social structure, one may note the accelerating urbanization of those areas of the world which are most susceptible to revolutionary unrest to begin with; this urbanization is generally accompanied by a decrease in the rural population base from which the guerrilla movement might otherwise draw its strength. Moreover, the rapidly changing relationship between the city and the countryside, essentially a product of modern industrial technology, makes the city less dependent upon the political stability of the rural area, and hence reduces the rural guerrilla's chance of toppling the government from a rural stronghold. At the same time, however, the complexity of the modern city, with its intricate technological structure, makes it extremely vulnerable to subversion by sabotage. And, perhaps most important, the process of urbanization has meant, in many of the major cities of the world, a concentration of masses of dissatisfied people readily subject to revolutionary temptation. In effect, then, the modern city grows more vulnerable to subversion as it grows more powerful in political and technological significance.

Whether or not the modern city provides conditions which would permit sustained insurgency remains to be examined. As indicated earlier, the occurrence of insurrection within the confines of the city has generally resulted in either swift revolutionary triumph (or defeat), or a transfer of the revolution's focal point to a rural environment. But it is entirely possible that the changing nature of the city may result in conditions which would permit pro-

tracted urban guerrilla war instead. Such war would be properly described as urban insurgency. If it is to encompass this possibility, and thereby permit an understanding of the increasing potential for such warfare, the definition of urban insurgency must allow for these conditions.

In this sense, then, the definition must incorporate the following major points, as developed in the preceding pages:

(1) Urban insurgency is a form of violence against the prevailing government, ordinarily undertaken for revolutionary purposes by armed and organized enemies of the government.

(2) As a revolutionary activity, urban insurgency has as its objectives the seizure of political power and the dissolution and replacement of the prevailing political system.

(3) Urban insurgency is preceded by subversive acts, such as sabotage, terror and propaganda, which weaken the government in power and which are continued during the insurgency itself.

(4) Urban insurgency may be initiated by armed uprising of an insurrectionist nature, or may be the result of subversion which has been intensified until it has flared into open insurgency.

(5) Amounting to guerrilla warfare within the city, urban insurgency may or may not be accompanied by rural guerrilla warfare.

In capsule form, then, urban insurgency is low-intensity aggression within the environment of the city. Its historical characteristics suggest its categorization as a form of revolutionary war. But the examination of its potential will result, in Chapters Two and Three, in the recognition that urban insurgency may be provoked for other purposes than actual revolution, insofar as revolution involves the overthrow of a political system. In terms of modern

revolutionary doctrine, international strategy and the accelerating importance of its cities for an industrialized nation, it is conceivable that urban insurgency may be fomented for strategic purposes, rather than strictly revolutionary purposes. To permit the analysis of these possibilities, the following definition is employed in the pages which follow:

Urban Insurgency is systematic low-intensity aggression against the technological, economic and political structure of an urbanized nation, occurring within its own boundaries or within those metropolitan areas to which it is linked via this structure, undertaken for either revolutionary purposes or for purposes of diverting its military strength.

combining all available journal violence short of military action.

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THE URBAN COMPLEX AS AN INSURGENT ENVIRONMENT

1. The City in History

To understand the environment within which urban insurgency may occur, it is necessary to understand the complex nature of the modern city and its relationship to the rural countryside. Ordinarily the distinction between the two is conceived in terms of population density, with the city being thought of as an area in which that density is extremely great while the rural countryside is an area in which it is relatively low. In fact, the crucial difference is an agricultural matter: traditionally, the city has consisted of people who do not grow their own food and who can therefore be assembled for the sake of carrying out other functions, while the rural countryside consists of people who grow food for all.

As a result, the history of the city is parallel to the history of agriculture and technology. Thus the advent of iron not only permitted the development of the plow and the hoe which made agriculture more efficient; it also, as a result, permitted the growth of great cities like Rome and the development of the weapons via which these cities could dominate the countryside. In the modern world, the advent of machine technology has resulted in tractors and reapers which have further increased agricultural efficiency, thereby accelerating the growth of cities; at the same time, this technology has resulted in a factory system via which the city could achieve even greater domination over the countryside. What is most remarkable about the modern world is that its technology has not only brought unprecedented agricultural efficiency; it has also virtually erased the qualitative differences which have long distinguished the city from the countryside.

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Historically, life within the city has differed from that of the country-
side not only in regard to the types of labor performed, but also with regard
to its intellectual and political atmosphere. It is the city where ideas
have flourished and books have been written, where intellectual and political
unrest have been centered, where styles have been determined. Isolated from
all this, the rural countryside has been characterized by moral and relig-
ious traditions far less subject to change. It is true, of course, that
revolution has sometimes erupted in the countryside, often in response to
a sense of exploitation -- just as rebellion has often erupted within the
cities in response to poverty or tyranny. But throughout the world, the
pace of life within the rural area has been essentially different from
that of the city -- until the advent of modern technology. With the ad-
vent of the truck and the automobile, the gap between the two has disappeared;
with the advent of radio and television, differences in thought and attitude
have diminished; with the introduction of machine technology, the farm itself
has become a factory. Indeed, the most striking characteristic of modern
civilization -- North America, Japan, Western Europe -- is that the country-
side itself has been urbanized in the qualitative sense. Except for pop-
ulation density, the difference between the city and the rural area has
vanished in these urbanized regions.

Meanwhile, technology has accelerated the process of change. Most
important, psychological changes have been brought about by the mass communi-
cations techniques made possible by modern technology; bombarded daily by
books, newspapers, magazines, television programs, all competing for its
attention, the population of an urbanized area is now subject to what amounts
to urban stress. Within this climate of unrest, propaganda feeds on confusion

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and political agitation is commonplace.

Of all those forces, the television camera is most powerful. Its presence has not only influenced the nature of urban civilizatin; it has literally altered the nature and meaning of revolutionary warfare. For, as the French Army found in Algeria, the most important consequence of military action against an insurgent force may not be its impact on that force but its impact on a population far removed from the scene of the insurgency. If that population is able to monitor such action through the medium of television, and if the violence of the counterinsurgency effort provokes negative reaction on its part, the populace may well withdraw its support of this effort. The remark that "we won the battle in Algiers, but we lost the war in Paris" is merely one index of this phenomenon; guarding against it may well be the most critical aspect of counterinsurgency operations within an urban environment.

Success in such operations therefore requires recognition that the urban environment/yields a new kind of battlefield. The historical distinction between the city and the rural countryside having been erased wherever modern technology has been introduced, solving the problem of urban insurgency is thus dependent on understanding this new environment.

2. The Process of Modern Urbanization

With more workers needed in factories and fewer workers needed on farms, the urbanization process has been accelerated with each new technological step along the path of modern industrialization. Only 2.4 per cent of the world's population resided in cities of 20,000 or more at the beginning

of the 19th Century. By 1950 that figure had increased almost ten-fold. The rapid urbanization of man continues, and has been described as "perhaps the most spectacular social phenomenon of modern times". In turn, the development of radically new means of communication and transportation has resulted in something equally spectacular: the cities themselves have become netted with each other.

As complex as this growth process has been, it is nevertheless characterized by certain basic features which prove relevant in the analysis of urban insurgency:

* The industrialization of North America and Western Europe is now being followed by the effort to bring about industrialization in other major regions of the world. Japan and Russia have become industrialized in the past two generations, and much of Asia and Latin America are now moving rapidly in this direction.

* This process of industrialization is resulting in the rapid growth of urban complexes in regions of the world which had remained predominantly rural up to the very recent past. In certain Latin American countries -- particularly Brazil, Columbia, Ecuador and Venezuela -- the current urban population is now almost four times what it was in 1950.

* Inevitably causing change in social values, the industrialization/urbanization process has been accompanied by rising expectations of prosperity, resulting in concentrated masses of people vulnerable to political agitation and revolutionary provocation when these expectations become frustrated.

* Because of the intricate relationship between the urban complexes of the world, instability in one major city will have impact in those other cities with which it is economically related. The interruption of the shipping facilities of a large port through which petroleum is processed can, for example,

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paralyze the industry of another city dependent on petroleum energy.

* Despite the unprecedented status of the urban complex as the nerve-center of industrialized civilization, those factors which make it powerful -- its size, its organization and its function -- are also factors which make it increasingly vulnerable to political unrest and revolutionary agitation.

These factors apply in different degrees to the various major cities of the world. They indicate why otbursts of urban unrest are of paramount concern half-way around the globe. If the world is shifting rapidly to an urbanized status, and if the control of the major cities of a region will result in political and military domination of that region, then the revolutionary instinct will inevitably direct itself to such control, seeking to convert unrest into the subversion which would make the seizure of such control possible.

3. The Vulnerability of the Urban Complex

The political and military importance of a particular city is more a matter of the given city's function than it is a matter of mere size. Recent population figures indicate Shanghai is the world's largest city, totalling 10,000,000 people. In terms of its potential for revolutionary significance Shanghai may be, however, far less important than other, smaller cities which serve as centers of communication, transportation and political influence. What is most important is the way in which each such center of power is vulnerable to subversion.

All cities are vulnerable in one way or another, in that the interruption of electrical power, water supply or food transportation can disturb the precarious balance of goods and services upon which urban life is based. The typical city is, of course, dependent upon the countryside and the world be-

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yond for a steady flow of foodstuffs; it is estimated that New York City, re-
quiring a daily input of some 5000 tons of food, has in its warehouses and
on its store shelves only enough food at any given time for some 14 days.
Depending on the complexity of the city, it is also dependent upon the
effectiveness of its internal services; interference with a city's water-
works, followed by the collapse of its fire-fighting agencies, can lead
swiftly to a city's devastation. As a rule, the more elaborate the city's
organizational structure, the more fragile is its stability.

With regard to subversion, the important vulnerabilities of a given
urban area are a function of two factors: the specific character of the
city and the particular objectives of the subversive movement. A given
city may be a gigantic industrial complex whose paralysis would undermine
the stability of the national government; for the purposes of revolutionary
subversion, the city's most important vulnerability might therefore be the
hydroelectric plants upon which its factories are dependent. But for the
purposes of strategically-oriented, externally-inspired subversion, the same
city's most important vulnerability might be its shipping facilities instead --
especially if the collapse of these facilities would subvert a nation's
capacity to transport troops and supplies to some distant force.

Since the estimate of any given city's vulnerability to subversion
would require attention to the subversive motives involved, defense against
urban subversion -- and, ultimately, against urban insurgency -- might appear
to demand unorthodox principles of intelligence. Whether or not these prin-
ciples would be applicable to military intelligence is examined in Chapter
Eight, at which point the more general question of a US military role in
urban insurgency is dealt with. It is obvious, however, that whatever security

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agency is involved in defense against subversion and insurgency, the execut-
of its role will demand attention to motives, since these motives will dictate
target selection within the urban environment.

Not all the targets involved will bear directly on the stability of a
city. The robbery of a bank for the sake of obtaining funds and the looting
of an arms depot for the sake of obtaining weapons are acts stressed by both
Lenin and Marighella, but these acts will not be directly subversive unless
accompanied by propaganda. The more direct acts of subversion are those
which create unrest, arouse popular opinion against the government, inter-
fere with the city's various functions, or otherwise undermine the prevail-
ing political structure and its military/security forces. The more import-
ant a city is to the stability of a nation, the more decisive this subvers-
ion will be; if it is permitted to flare into open insurgency, the stability
of the entire nation may be threatened. The most striking hint of this possi-
bility was provided by the 1968 Paris disorders which momentarily arrested
the economy of France and threatened the overthrow of the French government.
As with Paris, the typical modern urban complex is made fragile by the vulner-
ability of the industrial system upon which it is based and from which it de-
rives its importance.

4. Strategic Subversion and the World-City Urban Complex

Since a projection of current world strategies is outside the scope of
this study, it is not possible to classify any given urban complex as being
more strategically significant than some other complex. That characterization
would be a function of a particular strategy. It is nevertheless possible to
identify a number of modern urban configurations which have attained "world-
city" status of such magnitude that their potential strategic significance

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casts light upon the strategic possibilities for urban insurgency.

By definition, a world-city is an urban complex which has attained political and economic influence of such scope that its stability has direct impact upon the stability of the rest of the world. In contrast, a region-ally important city may be extremely important to the political and economic stability of a given geographic area without having direct influence upon the rest of the world. This contrast would result in the categorization of London as a world-city, leaving Shanghai to be classified as a city of only regional significance even though its population is roughly equal to that of London.

The world-cities are characteristically centers of trade and government. They are great ports which distribute imported goods to all parts of their own nations and receive goods for export to other nations; within the nations within which they are located, roads and railways focus upon them, and they are the sites of the great international airports, such as Heathrow, Kennedy, Orly, Schiphol and Sheremetyevo. They are also the banking and financial centers of the world, housing the trading banks and insurance organizations upon which world-wide trade and industry are dependent. They are not always identified by a single city-name; in several cases, they are actually inter-connected complexes of previously distinct cities now merged into one gigantic configuration through the impact of transportation and communication. One such product of this growth process is the so-called Rhine-Ruhr world-city, actually an agglomeration of ten cities of over 200,000 people apiece and an-other ten cities of between 100,000 and 200,000 apiece, all located in a 40-mile radius. Included in it are Bonn, Cologne, Dusseldorf and an autobahn net which link more than 10,000,000 residents of this world-city complex. A similar ring of cities -- actually referred to by the Dutch themselves as Randstand Holland -- is the complex containing Rotterdam, Amsterdam,

Utrecht and The Hague. Although it contains only 4,000,000 people, its influence upon world cause the Randstand to be identified as one of the seven true world-cities. The others, besides Randstand and Rhine-Ruhr, are New York, London, Paris, Moscow and Tokyo-Yokohama. Not only are these seven the dominant metropolitan centers within their own geographic areas; they are linked together throughout the world as a result of modern communication, transportation and the industrial-economic system which has made them dependent upon one another.

It is this international influence which makes the world-city a potentially important target of strategic subversion. Subversion intense enough to paralyze the industrial activities of the Tokyo-Yokohama complex would have severe consequences throughout that part of the world which has grown dependent upon Japanese technology. Interference with the factories of the Rhine-Ruhr complex would effect industry thousands of miles away. This sudden ripple-effect is both subtle and substantial; it is illustrated by the way in which a late 1960's snowstorm which caused serious delays in air traffic in and out of New York also caused, as a direct consequence, unprecedented surface traffic snarls in cities as far away as Los Angeles. In a world dominated by a few/gigantic metropolitan complexes, a serious disturbance in one can have grave (and possibly predictable) impact elsewhere. Hence their strategic potential: a foreign power seeking to strike at the economic heart of another power might well elect to do so indirectly, by subverting within a given world-city those particular functions upon which the attacked power is dependent, with the targeted world-city not even being inside the national boundaries of the nation being attacked.

Similarly, a nation may be attacked indirectly via the subversion of certain functions within the network of its own cities: the hijacking of

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commercial aircraft within the United States has had economic and political
effects which hint at the range of possibilities open for strategic exploit-
ation.

What is perhaps most important about these possibilities is their
subtlety. Given the way in which the cities of an industrialized nation
are netted internally, just as the world-cities are netted internationally,
subversion against a nation could involve selected acts so widespread through-
out this net that their local frequency is slight and their interconnection
is unnoticed. The technological process which has transformed their cities
into such a net of urban/complexes is only vaguely recognized by the indust-
rialized nations of the world, to begin with. Conditioned to think of their
cities as distinct entities because of their geographic separation, and pre-
pared to recognize insurgency only when a sustained outburst of violence is
concentrated in particular places, industrialized nations may be most vulner-
able where they are most easily blinded. Indeed, it is not inconceivable
that subversion of high-level intensity, so great that it is actually in-
surgency, could be undertaken throughout a network of cities, with its acts
of violence so generally widespread that their intensity is not locally not-
iceable and their cumulative force is not nationally recognized. By analogy,
one might imagine a battleship whose commander has been trained to think an
attack means enemy bombs and torpedoes, but whose ship is about to go under
without warning because its hull has been rusted away by some chemical intro-
duced into the ocean within which it floats. If surprise is a principle of
war, unconventional war lends itself to new forms of surprise through the in-
creased potential for urban insurgency.

It is in this sense that the functional interconnection of the great
world-cities casts light upon the strategic aspects of urban insurgency: to

the extent that its own cities are similarly interconnected, and to the extent that its major cities are connected to the world cities, an industrialized nation is to that extent vulnerable to attack by strategically-motivated subversion -- with the attack being undertaken at a selected level of intensity, against selected functions, at selected points within the national and international network of cities.

5. Strategic Principles Bearing Upon Urban Insurgency

The external sponsorship of subversion, insurgency and even revolution is a well-recognized phenomenon. It is exemplified in the Vietnam War. Subversion need not be externally sponsored, of course, for it may grow out of local unrest amid the failure of the prevailing government to satisfy some given element of the population. Such subversion may be motivated by Communist ideology, or motivated by different ideologies and merely influenced by Communist techniques which are copied. It may or may not involve a clarity of objectives; much violence against the modern state is prompted by a spirit of vengeance and rebellion resulting in deliberate, sustained sabotage of the prevailing political system for the mere sake of destruction. Regardless of its origin, a foreign power interested in diverting the strength of another nation may well fan the flames of such subversion for the sake of achieving its own strategic ends. Insurgent flames do not feed on mere propaganda, however; their intensity is finally dependent upon the availability of arms and munitions, and a foreign power hoping to profit from the subversion of another nation can be expected to follow the principles of economy in fanning these flames. Presumably, then, it will provide support only to the extent that (and the places where) its own objectives can be satisfied. Even within the context of Communist ideology, and the worldwide sponsorship of revolution to

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which that ideology fed, the economic limitations upon such sponsorship have been pronounced.

Besides this principle of economic constraint, certain other general principles emerge from the distinction between revolutionary insurgency and strategically sponsored insurgency, the distinction between urban insurgency and rural insurgency, and the distinction between low-intensity subversion and outright insurgency. Considered within the context of modern industrial urbanization, these principles indicate that:

* The strategic significance of a given urban complex is not dependent upon its population total or even its geographic location but is largely a matter of its economic and political functions and their relationship to, as well as their influence upon, similar functions in other areas.

* The strategic significance of urban subversion (or, possibly, urban insurgency) in any given metropolitan area will depend on the extent to which such subversion assists a given power in the pursuit of its own objectives.

* The extent to which support of subversion is provided by a foreign power will be dependent upon the strategic objectives of that power, and will fall short of extensive material assistance unless high-intensity subversion and insurgency are in the interests of the foreign power.

* In the absence of external support and the limitation of a revolutionary movement to its own resources, the selection of targets for subversion will be dictated by local political objectives and may result in events which have no international or strategic significance.

* The relationship between urban and rural activities on the part of a given subversive movement will be determined by the overall environment within which the movement occurs, by the particular objectives of the movement,

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and by the extent to which the movement is influenced by a foreign power.

* Successful resistance to subversion of either a low-intensity or high-intensity nature will depend largely upon the capacity of the prevailing government to identify the movement, to ascertain its objectives, and to anticipate its selection of targets.

Although abstract, these principles permit the further analysis of the relationship between sponsored subversion and locally inspired revolution. This is undertaken in Chapter Three. Additionally, they bring into focus certain basic questions which arise in the attempt to understand urban insurgency within the context of modern industrial technology and its impact upon urbanization. Precipitated by the emergence of the world-cities and other enormously influential metropolitan centers, as well as by the increasing frequency of politically-motivated violence within these centers, these questions are arrived at in the attempt to accomodate the future with the past. For the recent past reveals a sequence of revolutionary movements which were nurtured through insurgency that was essentially rural, and not urban. Thus:

(1) Are urban subversion and insurgency likely to be engaged in only as a complement of rural insurgency, so that significant urban insurgency is not possible except in support of or in conjunction with rural insurgency?

(2) When and if urban insurgency could be undertaken as the primary vehicle of revolution -- or strategic insurgency disguised as revolution -- are its characteristics likely to differ from those of an essentially rural insurgency?

Both questions require attention to revolutionary thought, which is the subject of Chapter Three. However, the impact of modern urbanization upon such thought indicates that the answers to both questions are a def-

inite, though complex, no.

6. The Impact of Urbanization Upon Insurgent Warfare

Contemporary theories about revolutionary warfare most often stress the crucial role of rural insurgency, elevating it to a position of central importance in the revolutionary process. In this assessment and in the various forms of training doctrine which follow from it, the rural guerrilla is characterized in terms of his ability to strike decisive blows against a conventional military force while relying on the countryside and its populace for support and security. In the oft-quoted vision of Mao, the peasant countryside is an ocean within which the guerrilla fish swim. And in the extension of this metaphor, it is tempting to think of the city as a mere spawning ground for such fish.

This emphasis upon the rural insurgent is due to a series of relatively recent events in revolutionary warfare. Foremost among these events is the success of the Chinese Communist revolution, which survived through rural insurgency after a series of abortive urban uprisings in such cities as Shanghai and Canton. The success of the Cuban revolution, in which Castro's rural insurgency echoed and reinforced Mao's conclusions about guerrilla warfare, has been almost equally influential. Indeed, the propagandization of Che's role in that revolution has served -- despite his subsequent defeat in Bolivia -- to popularize the image of the rural guerrilla as the ultimate agent of revolution. And the rural operations of the Vietcong, carried out in the wake of Ho's victory over the French, have had a similar effect despite the ambiguous nature of the Indochinese-Vietnamese wars. In short, the net impact of these insurgencies has been to magnify the role of rural insurgency in modern revolution, even to the extent of equating revolution

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with rural guerrilla warfare.

The theoretical justification for this emphasis rests upon three principles drawn from the success of such revolutions. First, it is generally maintained that the city provides a sanctuary for governmental security forces; within this sanctuary they cannot be challenged successfully, and so it is the countryside, and not the city, which is the appropriate choice of battlefields for the guerrilla. Second, it is maintained that the urban complex does not provide the environment necessary for organizing, training, maneuvering and securing a guerrilla organization, while the countryside does. Finally, it is maintained that the employment of a guerrilla force over a sustained period is a virtual prerequisite for revolutionary triumph, since it is only through a process of erosion that the government's security forces may be brought to their knees. This final conclusion no doubt reflects the failure of literally thousands of urban insurrections and uprisings which ended in abrupt suffocation. Step-by-step, the three principles lead to the current identification of revolution with rural insurgency: since guerrilla war is necessary, and since the guerrilla can neither flourish in the city nor triumph in the city, revolution must anchor itself in the countryside. Hence the conventional revolutionary scenario: political unrest, then urban and rural subversion, then rural guerrilla warfare, and finally the collapse of the government's security forces and the overthrow of the government itself.

However relevant in terms of recent revolutionary events, this scenario may prove inappropriate for a world within which the modern city is changing rapidly, and within which the relationship of the city to the countryside is changing as a result. The revolutions which most influenced the modern vision

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of guerrilla war were waged in areas which were relatively undeveloped from the standpoint of industrial growth and industrial urbanization. For those parts of the world which have achieved a high level of industrialization, the conclusions drawn from these recent revolutions -- and the rural guerrilla scenario based on these conclusions -- would appear to be inappropriate already. As the rest of the world moves toward industrialization, the scenario may prove to be essentially anachronistic. Mao's ocean may, indeed, be drying up.

7. Insurgency in a Technological Environment

Since the three principles supporting the rural guerrilla concept are based on insurgency which succeeded in industrially undeveloped areas (or in an environment within which the complex nature of modern urbanization had not yet emerged) the impact of industrialization upon revolutionary methods of operation will depend upon the extent to which the three principles remain valid or prove invalid for an industrialized environment. While the projection of this impact is necessarily speculative, the radical transformation of certain national or regional areas by modern industrialization already undermines these principles. Specifically, the major portion of Japan, most of Western Europe, and the northeastern part of the Western Hemisphere have been so altered by industrial growth that the combined effects of population density and technological change have produced an urban/rural form of civilization to which the principles now appear inapplicable.

This form of civilization reflects the most advanced features of the industrial growth process described earlier in Sections 2-3 of this chapter. Among them are certain features which weigh heavily against the rural guer-

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rilla:

* Highly efficient forms of air and surface transportation which make possible the rapid deployment of security forces. The helicopter is of particular significance in this regard, since its availability increases the challenge to the guerrilla's rural sanctuary. In turn, the advent of mass automotive transportation has resulted in ever-expanding highway nets which slice the countryside into smaller and smaller pieces.

* Highly effective forms of communication, surveillance and intelligence collection which marry the rural countryside to the urban complex in a way previously unknown. Modern telephonic and television nets virtually erase the urban/rural information gap and, among other things, make possible the almost instant awareness of guerrilla activities.

* The introduction of agricultural technology which accelerates the decreasing need for agricultural workers and thus reduces the rural population within which the rural guerrilla might otherwise flourish -- so that, in the sense alluded to earlier, Mao's ocean hardly exists in the industrialized world.

* The development of agricultural specialization, which changes the countryside in qualitative ways virtually eliminating the rural area as a support base for guerrilla warfare. Wed more and more to modern processing and manufacturing techniques, the rural farmer is not only less capable of providing staple support to a guerrilla movement but is himself more dependent on and more a captive of the urban complex.

While such developments spell a vanishing frontier for the rural guerrilla, they are accompanied by other, equally significant, implications for insurgent warfare. For there are certain features in the process of modern urbanization which weigh heavily on the side of urban insurgency as an al-

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ternative to rural warfare. They are:

* The increased availability of automatic weapons and sophisticated explosive devices which increase the rebel's capacity to confront and challenge security forces in an urban complex -- as exemplified by recent incidents in which a handful of insurgents have been able to hold at bay the security forces massed against them.

* The availability of telephonic systems which give an urban underground the communications necessary to permit rapid assembly as an insurgent force, and which permit coordination of insurgent actions within the midst of the urban complex.

* The availability of automotive transportation, which permits both rapid assembly of and increased mobility for an urban revolutionary organization, thus permitting it to strike and disperse with ease.

* The emergence, within the growth pattern of large metropolitan complexes, of urban areas which are virtually inaccessable to governmental security forces and which provide resulting sanctuary for an insurgent force.

Taken as a whole, these factors indicate that the modern city's industrializztion has produced technological and demographic consequences which weigh against the rural guerrilla but which, ironically, increase the potential for urban guerrilla war. In effect, then, the three principles upon which guerrilla warfare has been based may well be replaced by newly emerging principles of insurgent warfare.

INSURGENT DOCTRINE AND REVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT

1. Revolutionary Doctrine and Urban Insurgency

The examination of the urban complex as an insurgent environment leads to three conclusions:

(1) The emphasis upon rural guerrilla operations in recent revolutionary doctrine is largely a result of insurgent success in underdeveloped areas.

(2) In the more industrialized urban regions of the world, technological growth is creating an environment which lends itself to urban insurgency as the preferred alternative to rural guerrilla warfare.

(3) Urban insurgency conducted within certain world-city complexes and metropolitan areas could have strategic significance sufficient to justify its sponsorship and support by a foreign power.

The three conclusions lead quickly to a concern for the doctrine in terms of which revolutionary action is carried out, with particular attention to the way in which revolutionary doctrine may be adapted to a changing urban environment. If some sort of blueprint is necessary to provide direction and guidance to a subversive movement, the emergence of serious urban insurgency would evidently require both the development and dissemination of an urban-oriented revolutionary doctrine. The question is: does such a doctrine even exist?

The role which printed material plays in such matters can hardly be exaggerated. Revolutionary teachings serve not only to influence the potential rebel in propagandistic ways; they also provide instruction in how to achieve revolution. Such teachings range from instruction in the manufacture of ex-

plosives to the outline of techniques for organizing mass protests; on the more theoretical level, as in Lenin's work, they provide the revolutionary with an understanding of how the various stages of a revolution are to be put together. The extent to which the printing press has made possible the mass dissemination of such instruction is a central factor in modern revolutionary action. It is estimated that more than ten million copies of Mao's teachings have appeared in English alone.

This reliance upon printed doctrine is not surprising, considering the role which printed material plays in modern civilization. Ranging from cookbooks to medical journals, a never-ending list of publications provides the flow of ideas which make expertise possible. Revolutionary literature follows much the same pattern as that of any other activity: the test of an idea begins with its widespread dissemination among those interested in its subject matter. The exchange of ideas among revolutionary thinkers is therefore much like the exchange of ideas among engineers or botanists; it involves conferences, letters, critiques, seminars, conventions and publications. In turn, while revolution itself may be a matter requiring the utmost secrecy, the spread of revolutionary ideas and techniques cannot be kept secret, for just as the poet seeks an audience, the revolutionary seeks a following. The history of the Communist movement and its various insurgencies is paralleled by the publications of Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Mao, Ho and other, lesser-known, Communist thinkers.

Given this necessity for the open distribution of subversive doctrine, it is not surprising that such publications are equally available to those who are merely curious about -- or even opposed to -- the revolutionary's announced goals. Thus the possession and study of subversive literature is

hardly evidence of a revolutionary tendency. On the other hand, since the

existence of even a moderately sophisticated subversive movement is depend-

ent upon the availability of skills and techniques of a fairly high order,

the absence of revolutionary literature will have the effect of limiting

the tactical and technical expertise of a subversive organization.

The ends to which a subversive movement may put such expertise are

not necessarily the ends envisioned by the authors of any given revolution-

ary text. Mao's teachings may influence the thought and action of a rev-

olutionary movement whose goals are so nationalistic as to entail ultimate

opposition to Chinese interests. It is even conceivable that anti-Communist

subversion against an established Communist government could be inspired by

and executed along tactical lines laid down originally by Communist rev-

olutionary theory and doctrine. What is important is whether the modern

potential for significant urban insurgency is accompanied by both the theor-

etical and technical literature necessary to generate such insurgency --

independent of any question as to whether such insurgency would satisfy the

motives originally underlying the literature.

The remarkable fact is that the literature not only exists, but has ex-

isted throughout most of the 20th Century.

2. The History of Revolutionary Doctrine

Certain major works of revolutionary writing reveal the history of

insurgent thought. They also reflect the changing tides of such thought,

indicating how this thought has proceeded from an essentially urban orient-

ation at the beginning of the century to a rural orientation which may now

be shifting back to the original emphasis upon revolution in the city. If

such a shift does transpire in the wake of the urban tendencies described

in Chapter Two, the earlier literature can only regain the significance

which it had lost in the intervening period, for it had stressed the key

role of urban insurgency in the revolutionary process.

Foremost among the early works of revolutionary writing which stressed

urban insurgency were those of Lenin, as exemplified in Partisan Warfare.

Written in 1906, it was produced against the background of a decade of

strikes and uprisings which had failed to unseat the Czarist government.

In it, Lenin restates the goals of Marxism, reviews the historical process

of revolution and emphasizes the central role of armed terror as a prelude

to insurrection. Lenin did not restrict insurrection to urban warfare --

indeed, "Marxism does not tie the movement to any particular combat method",

he wrote -- but he did foresee the crucial function of the city as the ulti-

mate revolutionary battlefield. Like almost all early Marxists, Lenin in-

itially saw the highly industrialized Western European countries as more

vulnerable to Marxist revolution than less developed nations such as Czarist

Russia. His outline for the pursuit of revolution nevertheless influenced

the outcome of the Russian revolution, and proves relevant again as set

forth in the pages which follow.

Equally revealing is Trotsky's subsequent thought, widely circulated in

the History of The Russian Revolution. In the examination of that revolution,

Trotsky observes that "only mass insurrection has ever brought the victory

of one social regime over another" and then argues that such insurrection

can only succeed when it is organized carefully and coordinated with a con-

spiratorial movement which prepares for its emergence. In a brief chapter

entitled "The Art of Insurrection", Trotsky provides an outline for this

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process of subversion and insurrection which, as an outline, bears remarkable relevance to the current potential for urban warfare. The tactics it advocates are readily adaptable to urban insurgency in the modern world.

Lenin and Trotsky are not the only Communist thinkers to influence the patterns of insurgency, of course. During the period immediately following the Russian revolution, a series of lesser-known theorists developed in detail the lessons of that revolution, adapting them to the urban environment of the as yet unsubverted West European complex of nations. Much of their work was directed by the Soviet Union's various agencies, and some of it -- as set forth in Section 5 -- is virtually anonymous. But it reveals how the initial revolutionary vision of urban warfare could be worked out in the detail necessary to make such warfare a widespread phenomenon.

The gradual submergence of these early writings in the flow of revolutionary literature is due, at least in part, to what may prove to be historical accident. Between the Russian Revolution and the present were certain upheavals which served, at least momentarily, to redirect the energies of revolutionary thought from urban insurgency to rural insurgency. One of these upheavals was the momentary triumph of Fascism in certain regions, accompanied by the ruthless extermination of West European revolutionaries; another was the occurrence of World War Two, which forced the Soviet Union to direct its attention to self defense while relenting in the effort to foment foreign revolution; still another was the success of the Chinese Communist struggle which, in the aftermath of World War Two, finally succeeded in the seizure of China and the popularization of a rural guerrilla blueprint. And, finally, the varied success of Ho, Castro and other revolutionaries working in an industrially undeveloped environment has not only

served to reinforce the momentum of the rural guerrilla doctrine but has served to obliterate the earlier emphasis upon the urban complex as the actual revolutionary battlefield.

Recently published works indicate, however, that revolutionary theory -- kept, as always, in line with revolutionary opportunity -- is once again shifting to the context of the city. Most typical of this work is the so-called Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, authored by Carlos Marighella, an Uruguan terrorist killed in 1969. As outlined in Section 5, his emphasis upon terrorism and the techniques of urban violence involves what amounts to a recipe for insurrection within the city. Coupled with the earlier, more theoretical views of Lenin and Trotsky, the writings of Marighella thus provide a blueprint for insurgency quite unlike that outlined by such rural-oriented advocates as Mao and Che. The Minimanual has found, in turn, a widespread audience and has been published in several languages.

The extracts which follow are not meant to characterize these writings as the key documents of revolutionary theory. Such documents do not exist, in the sense that no single text can be identified as, say, the history of Europe or the key to French cooking. In such things there are no Bibles. But these documents do indicate that the doctrine and techniques necessary for urban insurgency do exist -- and their widespread dissemination indicates that the opportunity for revolution in an urbanized environment need not await the arrival of such teachings.

3. Lenin's Concept of Partisan Warfare

Much of Lenin's early commentary is devoted to justifying the use of violence and insurrection as a necessary part of the revolutionary process.

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This justification is provided as argument against the position maintained by many turn-of-the-century critics, who held that the employment of violence was neither compatible with the aims of a social revolutionary nor feasible in the face of a powerful governmental force. Confronted with these claims, Lenin provided counter-claims which amounted to the insistence that violence was inevitable. Thus Partisan Warfare attempted to answer what was then, for the revolutionary, an urgent question: what is armed struggle? In answering that question Lenin set forth a series of observations which bear relevance to the study of modern insurgency:

(1) The revolutionary must reject abstract principles and undertake a careful study of the mass struggle actually taking place. In this sense, it is necessary to accept and employ "ever new and different methods of defense and attack". Moreover, it must be concluded that "due to changes in social conditions, new forms of battle will arise inevitably", although no one can see what the character of these future encounters will be.

(2) Given that a revolutionary technique must reflect historical conditions, the failure of one tactic must be followed by the introduction of alternate tactics. The general strike is only one means of forcing the overthrow of the government, just as the erection of barricades and their employment as focal points of resistance may be another. Just as the revolutionary must be committed to actions, he must be flexible in the choice of tactics.

(3) Armed struggle in the process of revolution is waged by small groups which have two goals requiring sharp distinction. "The first objective is to kill individuals such as high officials and lower-ranking members of the police and the army. The second objective is to confiscate money from the government as well as from private persons." Lenin estab-

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lished the importance of this latter objective by arguing for the need to obtain funds in order to purchase arms, bribe officials, and carry out the revolution.

(4) The failure of such actions will generally reflect not so much the failure of a revolutionary tactic as the failure of revolutionary organization. "Our complaints about partisan warfare", Lenin wrote, "are nothing but complaints about the weakness of our party...which is incapable... of organizing the uprising". To key to successful revolution is organization, a point Lenin stresses repeatedly.

(5) Since partisan warfare -- that is, revolutionary insurrection -- is merely a "form of civil war", it is best fought by what Lenin called a "combat party", prepared to agitate, demonstrate or terrorize as the need arises. As Lenin puts it such revolutionary elements "must learn how to wage war. That is all there is to it."

(6) Such action must be executed in strict accordance with the revolution's ultimate goals. They must not be allowed to develop spontaneously, in such a way that they degenerate into inconclusive violence. And, most important, they must be executed in such a way that they widen the gap between the government and the people, so as to sustain the revolution.

(7) The battles of the revolution must be conceived of in terms of a protracted war, "a series of a few big battles, separated by comparatively long intervals, and a large number of small engagements which take place during these interim periods". As Lenin puts it, "the uprising cannot assume the traditional form of a single blow".

These major points, reiterated elsewhere in Lenin's other work, do not preclude the development of a rural guerrilla war, of course -- for to do so

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would violate Lenin's emphasis upon flexibility in the choice of techniques and tactics. But they do reflect his awareness that successful revolution requires concentration upon urban violence. "Organize fighting brigades among students, and particularly among workers", Lenin wrote. "Let the squads begin to train....some can undertake to assassinate a spy or blow up a police station, others can attack a bank to expropriate funds for an insurrection. Let every squad learn, if only by beating up police".

In the revolution of 1917 which thrust Lenin into power, it was the force of such urban violence that proved decisive.

4. Revolutionary Insurgency and the Principle of Erosion

What is most striking about revolutionary doctrine is not merely the way in which it is adaptable to modern urban insurgency; what is equally significant is the underlying concept of how an opposing military force is to be dealt with, for this concept -- which amounts to the concept of erosion -- is what makes the revolutionary threat so serious in the context of modern urbanization.

In his study of the Russian Revolution, Trotsky identified the essential condition for revolutionary success as being the elimination of military opposition by indirect means. "The first task of every insurrection is to bring the troops over to its side", he wrote, "and the chief means of accomplishing are the general strike, mass processions, street encounters, battles at the barricades". Trotsky's interpretation of the Russian Revolution can be reduced to the recognition that successful revolution must be predicated not on the physical defeat of the government's security forces -- for that is, after all, a most difficult undertaking -- but on the erosion of those

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forces through propaganda, confusion, creation of disorder and a gradual elimination of their will to resist insurgency. The tactics of the barricade are essential psychological: to create in the context of the urban environment and on the part of the government's security forces a widespread distaste for the kind of conflict which characterizes revolution. If that distaste can be cultivated, the army's will to resist can be eroded -- and only if that happens can a revolution succeed. It is this insight which underlies the real threat of urban insurgency, for as it is carried over into the modern urban environment it feeds on conditions of stress which make erosion an even greater danger than it was in 1917.

It is true, of course, that in the aftermath of the Russian experience revolutionary thought has been entangled in disagreement over both goals and tactics. Lenin's emphasis upon the city as the focal point of revolution led to the development of tactical blueprints for the conduct of urban warfare, as exemplified in the remarkably detailed Road to Victory (1927) and its successor, Armed Insurrection (1928). Based on the scrutiny of specific urban uprisings -- particularly those in Hamburg (1923), Shanghai (1926) and Canton (1927) -- these Communist works were circulated throughout Europe and Asia, and even today bear relevance to the conduct of urban insurrection; indeed, they have been revived and republished in several languages during the past decade. But their significance has been overshadowed by the emergence of a revolutionary doctrine which did not focus upon the city as the focal point of revolution. As Mao's thought superseded Lenin's, as the goals of the Russian Revolution shifted, as Communist success in the rural areas of China led to a different attitude about revolution, revolutionary thought has concentrated on the tactics of rural insurgency amid deep disagreements over the nature of revolution itself.

Hence the difference between Mao's emphasis upon the peasant as the vehicle of revolution, in contrast to Lenin's emphasis upon the factory worker. Hence, also, the deeper disagreement among Communists as to the relative virtue of urban insurgency as opposed to rural insurgency, resulting in ideological disagreement over the identification of targets appropriate for revolution. It can be no coincidence that the most significant revolutionary events in recent history -- the Cuban revolution and the Indochinese wars -- were thus carried out along lines dictated by Mao's thought, since these were revolutions which occurred within underdeveloped areas that lent themselves to rural guerrilla warfare. Nor is it any coincidence that as the world becomes more urbanized, and as revolution is directed more steadily against these urbanized regions, Lenin's thought -- along with the insights of Trotsky and other early adherents of urban warfare -- receives renewed attention. But the differences in ideology, in goals, in tactics and in techniques are nevertheless accompanied by agreement in terms of fundamental principles. And in both Lenin's and Mao's thought, the fundamental principle remains the same. It is the principle identified by Trotsky: revolution succeeds only with the erosion of the opposing armed forces.

The erosion of armed resistance is essentially a matter of morale: once the will to resist has disappeared, revolution may succeed. Since Lenin and Mao are in accordance on this principle, differences in tactical emphasis with regard to urban insurgency versus rural insurgency is really only a secondary matter. The crucial question for a revolutionary must be: where may this erosion process be exploited most effectively? In the modern world, the answer is that it is most effective within an urban complex -- for it is there that the various influences of technology, mass communications, political unrest and ideological stress result in a condition ideally suited for rev-

olutionary action. As outlined in Chapter Two, it is this condition which makes the urban environment most vulnerable, and it is this vulnerability which guarantees increasing revolutionary attention to urban insurgency. In Chapters Seven and Eight the details of the erosion process are further examined. What is immediately obvious is that since revolutionary thought is opportunistic, since revolution feeds on the psychological erosion of opposition, and since urbanization means increasing vulnerability to psychological erosion, urban insurgency is undoubtedly destined to play a central role in future revolutionary thinking.

Perhaps most important is the inevitable recognition that this principle of erosion may be exploited for strategic purposes, as well: if an urban environment lends itself to revolutionary action because it is vulnerable to erosion, it also lends itself to strategic action carried out merely to erode a nation's military strength. Given the dual-warfare mission described in Chapter One, and given the impact which urban insurgency can have on the morale of an army, the US Army provides an ideal target for strategically-inspired urban insurgency -- that is, insurgency whose objectives are not revolutionary, but diversionary. Moreover, urban insurgency may have strategic impact beyond even the erosion and diversion of an army: given the technical vulnerability of an industrialized nation, such insurgency provides a readily available weapon for eroding a nation's ability to function effectively in an industrially competitive world. Few of these implications are likely to be overlooked.

5. The Popularization of Revolutionary Doctrine

The complex events of the post World War Two era may be understood in terms of shifting strategies and alliances, the gradual revision of certain Communist beliefs and the emergence of so-called "third world" nationalistic

movements which have adopted the techniques of the early Communist revolution-
aries without necessarily identifying themselves as Communists. In the un-
developed areas of the world, the application of these techniques has re-
sulted in rural guerrilla warfare, along the lines exploited by Mao, Ho and
Castro. In more developed areas, the result has been urban violence. And
amid that violence, a modernized revolutionary literature has been circulated,
with emphasis upon the techniques of urban terror. Almost all of it rein-
forces the earlier doctrine, which called for terrorism as a prelude to urb-
an insurrection.

Marighella's Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla is typical of this recent
literature. In it, Marighella identifies the task of the urban subversive:
"to distract, to wear out, to demoralize" through kidnapping, assassination,
sabotage and the propagandization of violence. What is most striking about
the Minimanual is its detailed adaptation of the earlier revolutionary con-
cepts to the modern urban environment: in it occur specific instructions on
such things as the hijacking of commercial aircraft for propaganda purposes,
the "kidnapping of a political personality....to exchange or liberate im-
prisoned revolutionary comrades", the use of the telephone and postal system
to spread false information on the planting of bombs, and the employment of
the automobile in ambushes against local police. Recent events reveal how
effective this adaptation has been, not only in Latin American but in those
urban areas linked together through the growth of modern technology. Mari-
ghella himself stresses the impact which subversion in one city can have
upon the political climate in another city a hemisphere away. Throughout
the Minimanual, he proclaims the effect which terrorism at a distance can
have upon the United States in particular.

Marighella's political motivation remains unclear, and the Minimanual confines itself to scorn for "Yankee imperialism and fascist capitalism", revealing no political objectives beyond the destruction of the existing system. Even so, the Minimanual echoes the insurgency doctrine of the early Communist theorists. With its emphasis upon the robbery of banks for the sake of obtaining revolutionary funds, its stress upon proper timing and careful organization, and its concern for the infiltration and neutralization of governmental security forces, the Minimanual is clearly influenced by the writings of Lenin and Trotsky. Its primary effect, however, has been not only the resurrection of Lenin's emphasis upon urban insurgency, but the popularization of such insurgency as the focal point of revolution.

The Minimanual does not address itself to the relationship between the terrorist movement and the development of a clandestine governmental apparatus which would assume power once it is ready to be seized; in this sense, Marighella's published thought is typical of many contemporary pamphlets which emphasize revolution for its own sake. Nor does the Minimanual theorize about the phases of the revolutionary process; instead, it provides a scenario for intensifying organized terrorism to such a point that the government in power finally collapses. Marighella, unlike Lenin, makes no distinction between subversion and insurrection. In the absence of this distinction, the subject of mass uprising goes untreated, and what is left is a formula via which increased violence may become incipient, urban insurgency.

What is important in such work is therefore not only its popularization of urban insurgency, but its advocacy of a form of violence and terrorism almost perfectly suited to the purposes of strategic insurgency. As with

similar revolutionary treatises which have appeared in the past decade, it
is this adaptability which makes the urban insurgency proclamations of the
Minimanual most important.

6. Urban Insurgency and Its Strategic Implementation

Not all revolution is Communist inspired, nor is all revolutionary in-
surgency devoted to the establishment of a Communist government. Oppression
by the government in power may provoke opposition from dissident groups
who disagree with each other as to alternative forms of government, who
nevertheless join together in revolution, and who then struggle among
themselves for power -- as in the period following the Czar's abdication
in 1917. Amid such struggle, the superior organization of a Communist
minority may well result in its triumph, of course -- and, presumably, in
its swift profession of alliance with other Communist powers. But in the
sense in which it was conceived by Lenin and advocated by Trotsky, world-
wide Communist revolution as a single, coherent thrust for power may be de-
scribed as an abandoned goal. Internal conflict among the major Communist
powers, plus the continued survival of the Soviet Union without such world-
wide revolution, have been the principle factors in this revision of Commun-
ist theory. In its place may be emerging the reliance upon revolution not
for ideological purposes but for strategic purposes.

Several major factors underlie this possibility. The advent of nuclear
weapons having compromised their willingness to risk total war in the settling
of conflict, the major powers of the world have sought alternative strategies
and techniques; the US doctrine of limited war was initially for just this
purpose. Whether or not the success of this alternative strategy in the
Korean War served to inspire a deliberate counter-strategy is a matter of

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speculation. Perhaps more important is the way in which urban insurgency reflects the availability of such a counter-strategy.

This counter-strategy is made available by the emergence of three factors. First, the advent of technology has resulted in an unprecedented concentration of economic and political power in the metropolitan areas of those nations which have become modernized. The stability of such a nation is thus dependent on the stability of its major cities. Second, the source of its economic and political strength has ironically become the greatest vulnerability of the modern industrialized state, since its cities offer such concentrated targets. Third, the widespread dissemination of a thoroughly tested and highly effective blueprint for urban insurgency, available to dissident elements of varied political persuasion, has resulted in a volatile mixture of revolutionary technique and revolutionary motivation. This mixture has already resulted in thousands of urban explosions, of varying force and varying impact. The manipulation of this mixture being possible, the cities being vulnerable, and the strength of an industrialized nation being dependent on its cities, such a nation may be readily attacked by the fomenting of urban insurgency within its cities -- or, indeed, by the fomenting of urban insurgency within cities upon which its own economy is dependent although the cities themselves are thousands of miles away. The strategic variations available are enormous.

The actual seizure of power need not be the objective of such a counter-strategy. Rather, its objective could be to divert the energies and resources of the attacked nation, forcing it to concentrate upon its own internal problems at the expense of external matters. Moreover, the attacking nation need not expose itself in the process. Relying on clan-

destine means to manipulate unrest it could, theoretically, orchestrate that unrest in such a way it is maintained at whatever level desired. As with limited war, limited insurgent war is also possible. And for the purposes of strategic diversion, limited insurgency may be more suitable than insurgency brought to a fever pitch. For the latter runs the risk of culminating in insurrection, with the consequent risk of an abrupt extinction of the insurgent movement -- while limited insurgency, marked by extreme terrorism but not accompanied by serious plans for the revolutionary seizure of power, offers itself to continuation over a sustained period and hence offers the greatest prospect of diverting the strength of a nation. Since it is in this sense that urban insurgency involves strategic potential, it is also in this sense that the absence of any serious comment about revolutionary objectives is most striking in Marighella's treatise and similar works of modern revolutionary advocates.

Nor must insurgency be confined to the cities within an attacked nation. Given the interrelationship of the modern industrial cities as described in Chapter Two, a nation may find its economic system interrupted, its internal stability undermined and its foreign alliances challenged by the impact of urban insurgency executed in cities which are well outside its own geographic boundaries. If the attacked nation can be drawn into diverting its energies to the solution of urban insurgency in some such third-country target, the compound effect of this strategy would be even greater.

Because of these possibilities, the response to urban insurgency requires careful assessment of not only the motives but also the objectives of an insurgent movement. In the sense set forth in Chapter Two, it also requires recognition that insurgency may be widespread, concentrated on a

particular urban function and yet not even apparent to the attacked nation because of its relative dispersion throughout a network of internal and external cities. The variations on such insurgency are therefore endless, as the case studies of Section II illustrate. Exactly what role the US Army might play in the resistance of such insurgency is the subject of Section III.

SECTION II

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN INSURGENCY

> The secret for the success of any
> operation, simple or complicated,
> easy or difficult, is to rely on
> determined men. Strictly speaking,
> there are no easy operations. All
> must be carried out with the same
> care exercised in the case of the
> most difficult, beginning with the
> choice of the human element, which
> means relying on leadership and
> capacity for decision in every test.
>
> Carlos Marighella, Minimanual of
> The Urban
> Guerrilla

CHAPTER FOUR

ORGANIZATION OF THE URBAN UNDERGROUND

1. The Persistence of the Underground

Zealot resistance to the Roman occupation of Palestine. Spartans working within the Democratic institutions of Athens to develop dissension and distrust of the government. Assassins employing selective murder in order to influence politics in the Near East during the crusades. Committees of Correspondance transmitting information and propaganda among the British colonies of North America. Resistance to the German and Japanese occupation forces. Political murders of athletes in Munich and U.S. officials in Montevido and Khartoum. Rioting demonstrators attacking British troops in in the streets of Belfast. Abductions of American and British businessmen in Argentina. Lingering low-intensity political conflicts and disputes throughout the world which are increasingly evident in metropolitan areas in the form of aircraft hijackings letter bombs, kidnappings, political murders, bank robberies, demonstrations and riots......

Whether local or international in impact, all these activities were, or are, based upon the existence of an underground organization. This organization may be sophisticated or simple, large or small, but regardless of these aspects it will be generally organized along the traditional lines of the illegal underground apparatus which has existed throughout the history of mankind.

The illegal underground apparatus and most of its techniques have been exposed because of its increasing employment during the last three decades, as well as a vast body of literature which exists describing it. As a result

this aspect of revolutionary warfare is now in use throughout the world by numerous minority groups seeking to implement their own particular social or political changes. Employment of illegal underground techniques by these groups will continue as long as they hold promise of imposing the will of a minority upon a majority in a short period of time. Most of their success has been due to the misunderstanding of, and improper reaction to these techniques by governments and security forces throughout the world.

The illegal underground apparatus, often a creation of some secret society, has formed the basis for resistance or revolt throughout history, and this type of organization is neither new nor rare. This type of organization has also often existed as the "other side of the coin" for many organizations which appear, or have appeared to participate legally, and openly in the affairs of society.

The illegal underground apparatus is not the product of any one group or of any particular period in history. However, it can be said that during the latter half of the 19th century and most of the 20th century, the Communist Party developed and used this form of organization and its operational techniques more successfully than any other group in the history of the world.

The increased appearance of revolutionary warfare in the mid and late 20th century, particularly the use of the illegal underground apparatus and its operational techniques, is clearly a response to, and consistant with the three major strategic and tactical considerations which characterize the conduct of modern warfare. The first is the rise of total war -- a process which has evolved from mass conscription of mass armies, to the complete involvement of all members of a population in a situation where two opposing forces are attempting to organize and control the same population. The

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second is the desire of participants to escape the effects of ever-increasing fire-power. The third is the wish of participants to keep the conflict at a level of intensity low enough to preclude the introduction of nuclear weapons.

Today it may be possible to add a fourth general consideration: the desire of participants, whether one or all are engaged in clandestine operations, to keep the conflict at a level of intensity low enough to preclude any participant from having to introduce conventional main force units and/or weapons systems.

Detection of the illegal underground apparatus is usually difficult, especially in more open societies, and especially during its formative period. This often holds true until the time that the underground initiates enough overt actions to produce a pattern which may reveal its existence. This is due to the fact that most metropolitan security forces i.e. police, customs, federal investigative agencies, in the more open societies spend the majority of their time, and focus most of their activities upon crime and criminals. Obviously, many of the early activities of the illegal underground apparatus such as expropriations, theft of arms, and even murder, will be confused with non-political criminal behavior and activities. It may be only after the "crime wave" ceases to abate that security forces come to realize that they have a politically motivated illegal element to deal with.

Today, in certain societies, involvement in the formation and development of an illegal underground apparatus may easily fall within the bounds of what has been described as "discretionary behavior". Discretionary behavior is that behavior which the majority of the population does not really believe threatens the status quo — even though it may be quite violent or anti-social

as in the context of urban insurgency. Obviously, if one could keep the number of illegal underground organizations in a particular country or region limited in number, and their operations at such a low level of intensity as to permit them to be viewed as "discretionary" by most of the populace, one could then engage in a systematic attack upon a government, system, or group for a considerable period of time without eliciting a vigorous response from security forces.

2. The Objectives of the Underground

Offensive operations of the illegal underground apparatus are usually short in duration and executed by small teams using offensive tactics and following carefully made plans which emphasize: detailed intelligence collection and reconnassiance, surprise, violence, and mobility. "Keep in mind that in the conduct of its operations the underground must obey the principles of war PLUS the principle of Deliberate Delay." Deliberate delay has been described as the "prevention of disclosure and defeat in premature hostile contacts". In other words: "pick your fight", and "if the fight looks fair, bug out".

Many of these operations will be carried out during the hours of darkness; however, due to the ease of evading direct fire of small arms in an urban environment, as by merely turning a corner, daylight operations are quite feasible. The objectives of these operations are the lowering of the morale of the underground, capturing arms, material, funds, or hostages, while proving the ineffectiveness of the government. All will provide training for members of the underground apparatus. These operations are

unlikely to produce any stunning defeats of the security forces and even
less likely to result in the total overthrow of a government; however, they
do support the complete spectrum of actions and techniques used by the
illegal underground apparatus to function in an urban environment.

Unfortunately, due to their nature, these offensive operations are often
the most obvious portion of the actions of an illegal underground apparatus
and as such attract the bulk of publicity and government attention. Far more
important and far more dangerous in the long run is the actual underground
apparatus itself and the political causes that drive it.

The actual operation of an underground apparatus is much more dangerous
and complicated in an urban environment than in a rural environment. The
urban environment offers far greater temptations and comforts to members of
the organization than does the rural environment. Many opportunities will
be available for members of the underground apparatus to take dangerous short-
cuts and short-circuit the more tedious but essential security measures required
to reduce the risk to personnel, equipment, and operations in the city. The
density of the urban population may offer more potential recruits to the
urban insurgents, but it also harbors more potential informers. As a conse-
quence, it is vital that the organization be made up of dedicated personnel
and that it conducts constant detailed training for all members, whether their
positions are administrative or operational. In addition, a very high level
of discipline must be maintained in order to insure a satisfactory level of
participation and performance by its members.

All of these conditions and factors are recognized in the traditional
techniques of the illegal underground apparatus and a great deal of attention
is paid to them. Some modern underground organizations have tended to skim

over these realities as time consuming and unecessary, focusing instead

upon offensive operations in hopes of short-run results. Usually they have

paid heavily for these attempted short cuts. The Tupamaros, operating in and

around Montevideo, Uruguay, came close to destruction pursuing a course consist-

ing of spontaneous, uncoordinated, decentralized armed actions, and have been

in the process of attempting to rebuild their organization along the lines

of the traditional illegal underground apparatus.

The experiences of both our allies and ourselves during the last two

decades should have proved to us that the design and implementation of effec-

tive countermeasures to insurgency, whether rural or urban, must be predicated

upon a much more thorough understaning of the illegal underground apparatus

and its operations coupled with increased political awareness on the part

of our represenatives closest to the situation.

It follows that there is a definate need for developing the ability of

selected officers, whether serving as advisors, staff officers, or comman-

ders, to recognize the involvement and manipulation of various social and

political activities in foreign areas by underground organizations and tech-

niques. To accomplish this, it must be insured that these personnel under-

stand more than just the basic terms and components describing revolutionary

war. They must appreciate the political significance of these activities

and their very sensitive nature in an urban environment, where each act of

the participants is rapidly transmitted through the population and readily

amplified. They must understand not only the traditional illegal underground

apparatus but also some of the modern variations of these organizations, op-

erations, and techniques. What follows is a combination outline and thumb-

nail sketch of the traditional illegal underground apparatus which forms the

base for any activity in any phase of revolutionary war.

3. The Cellular Principle of Underground Organization

The traditional underground apparatus operating in an urban environment is organized hierarchially, and rises from a base of cells, through buildings, neighborhoods, and districts to the urban or metropolitan headquarters. However, some of the current illegal underground organizations, particularly those which are operating internationally, have a much smaller structure than the traditional organization, and their cells may be organized more along functional lines for a specific period of time, or for a specific mission.

The goals of the underground apparatus are illegal and the primary means used to reach these goals are illegal. For these reasons the underground will always try to conceal the identity of its membership and the structure of its organization.

The illegal underground apparatus can be spread throughout the metropolitan environment. Its members come from all over the urban area and may well hold a wide variety of social and economic positions within the area; consequently a well organized underground has access almost everywhere. It performs the normal tasks of any organization in addition to those specialized tasks required to keep it in business and to accomplish its own particular ends. It may be that the illegal underground apparatus, traditionally organized, may perform more functions itself than any other single organization known to man -- except a government, which, of course, it is designed to replace.

Membership may be divided into leaders, members, auxiliaries and sympathizers. The leadership is composed of the dedicated full-time personnel

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who are devoting all their time and effort to the underground and to its objectives. The regular members normally maintain their normal role in the urban area while performing organizational duties and attending underground meetings and receiving training. Auxiliaries are part-time workers available to the underground only for particular periods of time, utilized for the performance of certain tasks or special assignments. Sympathizers are non-members who are not apt to assist the government and who are generally well-disposed toward the underground and its aims. They may involve themselves in demonstrations and occasionally provide other aid to the apparatus.

The primary cell is the basic building block of the illegal underground apparatus and is usually composed of a leader and two members. This composition may vary greatly and will be dealt with later. The leader will supervise the activities of the members and he will be the only one to receive and transmit orders, information, and material vertically or horizontally as required by the role of his cell in the underground apparatus. The ways in which the primary cells may be arranged in order to build an underground apparatus are limited only by imagination after careful evaluation of the overall situation and your own objectives. Obviously the density of the population will have an influence upon the number of cell that are, or can be formed.

The cells in an underground organization may or may not be highly compartmentalized -- usually this will depend upon government actions toward the underground. Compartmentation limits or prevents contact and knowledge of one member by another and of one cell by another, so on through the apparatus. If the apparatus is compartmentized apprehension of one man, or even one cell, will not normally either harm the apparatus or permit security

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forces to "roll-up" any more personnel or cells, simply because of lack
of information about other members and other cells on the part of those
in government hands."

A further feature of the cell would be whether it was organized
functionally or geographically. It might be the explosives manufacturing
cell for the entire underground or simply a cell in a neighborhood that
may have to perform a wide variety of functions. Often the two are combined
and the cell will perform as the intelligence cell for a neighborhood or,
let us say, the reconnaissance cell for targets in Western Europe."

The types of cells are broadly divided into administrative cells and
operational cells. Specific examples of administrative cells would be; re-
cruiting, training, finance, transport, manufacturing, liaison, etc. Ex-
amples of operational cells would be; intelligence, sabotage, psychological
operations, assassination, armed teams, etc. During times of mass recruit-
ing and mass organizing, auxiliary cells are sometimes formed as an aid
in handling large numbers of personnel and in order to provide a vehicle for
testing and evaluating prospective members for the underground apparatus.
itself.

Arrangement of the cells in the organization will be based upon con-
ditions in the operational area and upon the imagination, training, and
experience of the leaders. However the general overall arrangement will
usually be either in parallel or in series.

In a parallel arrangement of cells, communications and command and
control run vertically and there is little, if any, contact among the
members or cells horizontally. This arrangement is particularly useful
in times of danger to the apparatus and in the conduct of intelligence

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collection operations where the need to double check information and to

maintain a back-up source of information are important tasks.

4. Communications and Security Within the Urban Underground

Cells arranged in series run horizontally and are most useful in
activities requiring a division of labor such as manufacturing (material
moves from cell to cell, each cell performing its task upon it in order
to produce a finished item much like an assembly line in a factory).
Production of an underground newspaper would be another example of cells
in series (one cell collects information, one cell edits it, one cell
publishes it, and another makes the distribution).

Communication among the cells may be either technical or non-technical,
formal or informal. In a metropolitan area it is possible that the abundant
technical communications facilities available to the urban insurgent-
may greatly influence his operations by improving his communications -- e.g.,
telephones, small commercial two-way radios, and radio and T.V. sets to
receive his appeals and messages to the population. The urban environment
also offers easy procurement of chemicals for production of invisible
inks and for the components required to build a variety of communications
equipment. If, however, the underground makes use of technical communi-
cations available to it in the city it runs the risk of compromise by
government security forces using wire-tapping and other forms of electronic
surviellance.

For this reason most underground organizations will rely upon tra-
ditional non-technical communication methods. These non-technical means

of communication may range from visual signals (lamps hung in a bell tower) to use of both live and dead "drops". A drop is simply a place or person where messages or materials are left for another to pick up — thus preventing both members of the underground from being in one location at the same time and even from knowing one another. It could be a clerk in a shop (a live drop) or beneath a rock in a park (a dead drop). The formality for communication within the organization depends largely upon the size of the cells — if they are large, informal communication with few written messages or records will be prevelant. If cells are small the reverse is true — more writing and records will be necessary. In underground communications messages are normally sent by two routes to insure delivery and great emphasis placed upon acknowledgement of message receipt — otherwise compromise must be assumed.

In general, most illegal undergrounds solve their problems of means and methods used to coordinate over long periods of time (command and control) by centralizing their administrative functions and decentralizing their operational functions. Too much centralization requires too much coordination. Too much coordination requires too much communication. Too much communication in terms of frequent meetings, production of documents, and written messages helps the security forces attacking the apparatus. In order to prevent this condition the traditional apparatus will issue as many mission type orders as possible and leave the details to the lower echelons.

Security is clearly a vital factor in every aspect of every activity of the illegal underground apparatus. Basically the member of an illegal underground apparatus is safest when he apoears to be most like every

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other member of the populace and does nothing to arouse suspicion. This will require training and self-discipline and care will have to be taken to prevent accidental divulgence of information or boasting. Marighella's Minimanual stresses that the urban insurgent must take care to blend with the populace in the area of the city that he is operating in.

Documents must often be stolen, forged, or purchased in order for members to exist or conduct operations. This is a bigger problem for the urban insurgent because he is apt to face more paperwork and control measures based upon paperwork than for the rural insurgent. International operations of an illegal underground apparatus will require even more in the way of sophisticated documentation.

Close attention is paid to the security of meeting and rendezvous sites. These sites are changed frequently and the times of arrival and departure of underground members is varied. In public, signals and passwords are used to insure that the area is clear and that both members recognize each other.

Other security measures include investigation of backgrounds of recruits; loyalty oaths to impress members with security, limiting personal contact among members of the underground, strict regulation of liaison, minimization of records, and use of codes and cover identities and stories.

In case of capture of a member of the illegal underground apparatus, most organizations will exfiltrate all members the captured individual could identify. If possible, all features and activities of the organization that the captured member could reveal are immediately altered. Because of this, the French Army in Algiers often collected Arabs at random, knowing a given group would probably contain some cell members, whose cells would thereby be exfiltrated from Algiers.

5. The Organization of Demonstrations

The demonstration is one of the most useful, and most used, techniques of insurgency. In the urban setting the demonstration takes on added significance because it serves the functions of attracting publicity, involving numbers of the population in a common activity, providing a training vehicle for members of the underground organization. And it may produce a situation where over-reaction on the part of the government will alienate members of the population.

The underground organization will carefully examine the groups involved in a particular demonstration in order to insure that there is really a chance for them to control the demonstration and turn its use to their own ends. Large, planned demonstrations almost always, possess the potential for transformation into mass violence of such size and duration that the government may be forced into committing errors and into acting in a fashion which may further aggravate the situation.

In some cases the underground organization may plan and execute small demonstrations which appear to be spontaneous. Because they use a limited number of participants and depend a great deal upon surprise, these types of demonstrations require detailed planning and a high degree of discipline. If violent, this type of demonstration reduces the number of unnecessary casualities while providing training and experience for members of the underground apparatus. It may also provide an outlet for more violent members of the organization short of out and out terroist actions.

The general techniques used to organize and control a demonstration do not vary significantly with the methods used to take over or "stiffen"

an on going demonstration which the urban insurgents have determined
will serve their purposes. In the majority of cases these techniques are
simple and depend more upon discipline and training than upon sheer
numbers of underground participants. Even quite large masses of people
can be controlled by a small number of personnel using the following
techniques.

The senior members of the underground responsible for the control
of the demonstration will generally keep themselves some distance from the
demonstration and any action occurring as a result of the demonstration.
These leaders constitute what is known as the exterior command and they
transmit their orders to other members of the underground apparatus
inside the demonstration via hand and arm signals, messengers, and today,
with the advent of small, inexpensive two-way radio sets, even use of radio.

The second level of leadership is usually located inside the demon-
stration and has the mission of transmitting and supervising the orders
of the exterior command. Due to the cellular form of the underground
apparatus these may be the only underground members who know the identity
of the exterior command. It is possible that the operation might be "cut-
out" thru use of messengers and/or pre-arranged signals so elaborately
that very few of the underground cells or individual members participating
would actually know how many members of the underground apparatus were
actually participating. The second level of leadership will usually
remain close to any significant actions that the demonstration becomes in-
volved in and as a result will usually require some physical protection
in the form of bodyguards to permit them to devote their attention to
supervision of the demonstration. The body guards will also usually have

a secondary mission of insuring the escape of this interior leadership, even at their own expense, from government security forces or from other elements within the demonstration itself."

Another element of the underground within the demonstration are the "standard bearers" who may be carrying signs, banners, etc. Initially the standards may reflect popular issues or demands, but as the demonstration intensifies the leaders may direct that these standards be changed for standards which are more aggressive in nature, thus contributing to a change in the tone of the demonstration. Many times important members of the underground apparatus involved in the demonstration may locate themselves in the vicinity of specific standards in order that they can be easily located by messengers and other underground participants during the course of the demonstration.

Some operational cells may have highly specialized missions. One of these would be that of "cheerleaders" who have carefully rehearsed a variety of slogans, again varying in content and aggressiveness in order to alter mood and actions of the masses. These slogans will be changed upon direction of the leaders thru the use of prearranged signals e.g., change in standards, etc. As in the case of the standards the slogans may become more aggressive as the demonstrations become more intense. Other cells may serve to "herd" the front, flank, rear, or seperate section of the demonstration in order to give it shape and physical direction and, as a result, better control by the underground.

Some cells may serve as attack groups who take offensive action against government representatives, other groups in or near the demonstration, or facilities which may be targets. These operational cells are normally

armed in some fashion (clubs, rocks, molotov cocktails -- and in some cases knives, grenades, and even firearms.) These cells also provide an organized violent response if the demonstration is attacked, thus intensifying the demonstration.'

CHAPTER FIVE

ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF THE URBAN UNDERGROUND

1. Recruiting Procedures Within the Underground

In order to develop an effective organization, the illegal underground apparatus must perform certain basic administrative acts such as recruiting, training, obtaining funds, and procuring supplies. The underground in a metropolitan area does not have as great a need for material and equipment as does the illegal apparatus supporting a rural insurgency with its large military units. However, the need for recruiting and training is just as vital to its continued existence as are these functions for the continued existence of the rural apparatus. The urban apparatus will usually use the simplest and easiest techniques to accomplish these essential housekeeping activities. Without continuous recruiting, the underground, like all organizations, would cease to grow and perhaps cease to exist. However, the illegal underground apparatus does not normally need really great numbers to accomplish its aims. A large organization makes some operations easier, but in the metropolitan area personnel are not necessarily as important as technical skills, dedication, and tight organization.

The techniques used in recruiting will vary with the organization's stage of development and with the needs of the organization. Initially, emphasis will be upon selective recruiting, and then later, when the leaders are trained, emphasis is shifted to mass recruiting efforts if the general situation in the metropolitan area permits it. During and after recruitment the prospective member of the apparatus is usually subjected to a

variety of tests to insure that he is not a penetration agent or an informer. In some cases a process of gradual committment is used to recruit a member or a group of members. The target is led into helping the organization and as a result either compromises himself in the process, or the recruiter leads him to believe that he is compromised as far as the government is concerned. He will be led to believe there is no way out of becoming a member of the organization. In some cases, coercion will be used to deliberately compromise a specific individual who would be very valuable to the underground. He will be led into some act that will make it impossible for him to betray the apparatus without incriminating himself.

Recruiters generally seek people with the type of grievances and vulnerabilities which are most likely to cause them to agree with the ends and means of the organization. At times recruiters have been instructed to specifically seek those who have tasted failure or poverty at some times in their lives, or simply to look for unhappy and ugly persons — all those being characteristics which breed generalized discontent or hostility toward society and which may be channeled by the underground toward its own ends. Thus the recruiter for the urban underground offers to many persons living in our modern urban complexes an opportunity for comradeship in a common cause, like that of a secret society or group in danger. Indeed, comradeship is one of the things which appeals most to many socially alienated persons in urban areas. Social pressure and fashions within a sub-culture may lead many into seeking, or accepting membership in the urban underground. Whatever the individual reasons for joining, the recruiter must insure that his appeals coincide with the

value system of his target.'

Selective recruitment focuses upon persons who would be useful
to the apparatus because of their social or occupational situation and
who could be transformed into dedicated members of the apparatus. These
are the type of persons who are sought to fill leadership, intelligence,
and other special positions within the apparatus. Selective recruitment
makes maximem use of the fail-safe principle of maximum compartmentation
in its operations because it exposes members of the apparatus to the danger
of identification and betrayal. A spotter identifies a prospective recruit
who would be useful to the underground and who appears to be approachable.
The spotter then drops from the picture and his information is passed to a
recruiter who makes his approach.' If he sees fit he will make a direct
offer; if not, he will attempt to gradually lead the individual into the
organization. The recruit is then tested by having him perform some task
which is unimportant to the underground to see if he will carry it out
faithfully without supervision.' The recruit may then take a loyalty oath
and receive training necessary for him to perform his duties in the appara-
tus. Throughout this entire period he is kept under observation and
continuously tested.'

When recruiting leaders, the illegal underground apparatus will seek
persons with an ability to deal with people. Since most operations are
decentralized the underground must depend upon leaders at the lowest level
to give directions, enforce discipline, and to sustain morale.' Persons
from the local community with leadership experience are prime targets.

Intelligence gathering is one of the major activities of the apparatus
so persons are sought for recruitment into intelligence duties who have

access to information which may be useful to the apparatus. An example
of this was a member of the FLN in Algeria who served as vice-mayor of
Algiers. Often someone without current access to information is recruited
and assisted by the organization to advance to a position where he will
have access to important information.

Recruiting for personnel with special skills will be of concern to
the underground. There will always be a need for doctors, nurses, carpenters, locksmiths, chemists, radio operators, gunsmiths, etc. in the
operations of an illegal underground apparatus.

In traditional underground methods, mass recruitment usually takes
place only after a solid organization has been formed. In some cases this
may take years. Recruiters in this type of activity can take advantage of
past organizational assisstance to the needy and to groups oppressed or
ignored by the government. Often these groups are most willing to assist the
underground after they have been made aware of their neglected status in
relation to the society as a whole. Coercion in mass recruitment occurs
by "armed invitation": by luring a group into a building, or to a neighborhood rally or meeting against their wishes, in order to compromise them
with the government. The setting for this act must be viewed as illegal by
the government (violation of curfew, etc.) so that the participants can
be made to feel that they have compromised themselves with the government;
gradual involvement and the threat of exposure are also used on the
masses. Sometimes quotas for membership are given to local leaders and are
backed up by threats against individuals or the community. The youth are
usually easily persuaded to join organizations of this type, mainly because
of their sense of adventure, and because they most often make decisions

based on emotion rather than on reason.

Mass recruitment relies upon the use of key men who know their own area and people thoroughly. These men use specific appeals geared to local grievances and issues with social pressure in order to recruit the masses. They are usually natural leaders. They have the respect of the community that they reside in and usually are susceptible to recruitment into the apparatus. Having been recruited and trained himself, he will initially recruit among his friends and then use the bandwagon effect to bring in many more supporters and member for the apparatus. This key man is important in mass recruiting because more often than not people will accept guidance from a member of their own group than they will from an outsider. Such men perform as a channel of communication from the apparatus to a large segment of the population; they normally do not exercise any control functions themselves.

2. Training Within the Urban Underground

Training is an extremely important activity for the underground apparatus because a well trained membership means that the organization will be able to survive and conduct operations in pursuit of their aims even under adverse conditions. Although literature is widely available on underground organizations and their techniques, only those deeply interested in these matters, will be likely to trouble themselves to locate and study it. Most of the populace in any given metropolitan area will have little knowledge of the techniques necessary to conduct these activities. Training in matters of organizational techniques may be especially necessary in

those metropolitan areas of the world where mass organizations have yet to come into existence. Many undergrounds have placed great emphasis upon practical "OJT" type training of members in what amounts to "trial by fire" during participation in action-operations after only a minimum of training. This technique is favored by many of today's illegal underground organizations.

Literature, as discussed earlier, is readily available on all aspects of underground operations to those who are interested. Study and gradual application of this literature makes it feasible for a small extremist minority group to educate itself well enough to establish and operate an illegal underground apparatus.

Very formal activities for training in underground operations such as schools are usually located in quite secure areas either outside the metropolitan area, or more often outside the country. Often leaders of underground organizations have been graduates of various Communist Party schools, either Russian, Chinese, Cuban, or North Korean. These leaders upon returning to their homes do not necessarily form Communist undergrounds nor do they necessarily pursue Communist goals. It is conceivable that something like "night schools" might be set up in urban areas for certain types of training for the general membership.

Most of the training conducted by the underground is informal in nature and given to small groups. Use of smaller groups offers fewer security problems and permits a wide variety of locations for the conduct of training. For example, several members could receive training each day by having lunch with an instructor in a park. Technical training would be easier to give in an urban environment due to the abundance of shops,

plants, and hospitals, etc."

Political indoctrination will be of utmost importance to the underground, especially indoctrination of the leaders, intelligence operatives, and certain specialists. The membership of the organization must develop sufficient dedication to insure that they will function in situations where the underground does not have direct control over them.

Weapons and explosive training in urban areas poses greater problems than in rural areas. However, this can be overcome by teaching fundamentals and conducting dry-runs in an urban setting and them spending weekends in live exercises in remote rural areas. If this is impractical, air rifles can be used for firearms training and to improve marksmenship in basements, garages, attics, and even hallways and alleys. In some cases the members will first use weapons and explosives during actual operations — this is possible if there has been a great deal of practice and "dry-firing". As in any type of training program, whether for conventional warfare or for underground action operations there is no substitute for intelligence and imagination on the part of the training officer or instructor.

The underground apparatus always needs funds for purchase of food and supplies, medicine, component parts of equipment, weapons, and explosives. Funds will also be necessary for the full-time leaders and workers. Financial aid may also have to be provided to families of members who have been captured, killed, or exfiltrated. Funds will also be needed _ for intelligence purposes and bribery.

Internal sources of funds can be developed from the population and from all forms of economic activity in the metropolitan area. These sources range from individuals, to businesses, to, possibly, the treasury of the

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government itself. Methods of collecting these funds will have an impact upon the attitude of the population toward the apparatus and may reflect the attitude of the apparatus toward the population.

Non-coercive methods of acquiring funds will bring in monies in the form of gifts, loans, and receipt of sales. Often embezzlement of funds from businesses of from the government will be possible. Few undergrounds have been able to survive by depending solely upon non-coercive methods of funding unless they were large and had almost total support from the population.

More often than not, especially in the case of smaller, short-range organizations, funds had to also come from use of coercive methods.

Coercive methods such as robberies or expropriations from banks, forced contributions from businesses or other organizations, and taxation of the populace, will be used if popular support is insufficient to produce funds by non-coercive methods.

External sources of funds may be from foreign governments who are either interested in the aims of the illegal underground apparatus, or who desire to "capture" the apparatus for their own ends, or who interested in creating problems in a metropolitan area at the expense of another nation and/or its allies. Sometimes this external financial support will come from a similar ethnic or political group abroad who want to support the common "cause". Funds from external sources can be easily channeled from one urban area to another through borders by the use of dummy corporations, dummy bank accounts, and the use of highly valuable, easily marketable, and hard to trace items such as: gems, gold, and drugs.

Funds may be transmitted and used in many different forms. Cash in

the local currency is most usable but dangerous to the underground if stored or transmitted in large amounts. Cash in "hard" currencies such as the British Pound or the US Dollar -- and currently the Japanese Yen -- are all usable internationally and serve as a better substitute for local currency than gems, gold, or drugs. Usually the use of counterfeit money is avoided because it requires a complex operation to manufacture it and its use may adversly effect the creditability of the underground apparatus.

3. Logistical Considerations Within the Urban Underground

Logistics in these types of activities involves the procurement, storage, and transfer or materials necessary for the operations of the apparatus, ranging from ink to ammunition. Unlike the rural insurgent, most members of the urban apparatus provide their own food, clothing, and shelter, which they procure in the course of their activities as normal members of the urban population.

The local blackmarket, if one exists, may provide a source of supply for specific goods unavailable on the open market because of scarcity, government control, or illegality such as medicines, certain chemicals and explosives. Purchases from the open market will provide components which the underground can assemble into finished items such as batteries, clocks, and wire for bombs. The Polish underground during WW II purchased large quantities of fertilizer openly from the Germans and then used it to manufacture explosives.

Weapons and explosives may be captured or purchased. In several cases arms have been acquired directly from members of the security forces

(police and military) by purchase. This was true of IRA operations
during the period 1916 - 1923. The regular British soldiers were often
cooperative with the underground in these matters because they would be
returned to England for this offense. The Black and Tans, a temporary
paramilitary force introduced later in the conflict, provided no supplies
to the IRA in this fashion.

Theft by members of the apparatus from their place of work will
supply many items as will robberies of shops and businesses. These
underground supply activities may attract little attention from the security
forces because they are easily confused with normal criminal activities.
Because the needs of the urban insurgent organization is small, "snap"
inventories, etc., may reflect only normal shrinkage and not always be a
sound indicator of early procurement measures by an underground. Raids
upon storage areas and upon government forces can produce numerous types
of material and weapons. In this fashion a small extremist minority
group could develop a large arsenal in a short period of time.

Manufacturing is less significant in urban insurgent logistics act-
ivities because more components and more finished items which they can
use are readily available in an urban environment than they are in a rural
environment. If manufacturing is necessary it can be done in a variety
of places in the urban area where the activity would be camoflagued, e.g.,
flamethrowers could be produced in a fire extinquisher factory. The
smaller apparatus will find it easier to procure most items through purchase
or theft than to bother to try te make them. Manufacturing always presents
security problems in terms of space and noise.

International commerce makes it easy for a small group to receive

small amounts of material from abroad hidden in shipments of legal goods
or in the vehicles crossing the fronteirs.

Transfer of material is less of a problem in the urban area than in
the rural area because of the variety and quantity of transport available,
and because of the patterns of constant vehicular movement which charact-
erizes the modern metropolitan complex. Certain types of movement are so
regular that routes may be set up, and a steady flow of items thus esta
blished. Examples of this would be people going to and from work, public
transport systems, and commercial vehicles making their rounds. Items
can be hidden in the load or disguised as part of the legal load. Illegal
organizations operating internationally face more sophisticated problems
in their attempts to move weapons and explosives across borders by air or
ground transport. Activities of this nature will generally call for reduc-
tion in size and clever disguise of those items they need to accomplish
their missions. Pistols hidden in hair dryers and explosives in aerosol
cans are examples of solutions to these problems.

Storage of material in an urban area is not the problem that it would
seem because large amounts of supplies are not required for illegal opera-
tions of a small group. Storage will become a problem if the aims of the
underground include developing a large organization and eventually arming
the masses for an uprising. In that event, dumps and caches of some size
must be located or prepared. False walls, sewers, and portions of legal ware-
houses have all been used for these purposes. Normally, nothing should
be stored by individual members -- it is better to centralize material
in small amounts in non-incriminating locations so that few persons will
be apprehended if the cache is found.

4. Intelligence Collection Within the Urban Underground

Intelligence collection by the illegal apparatus is an operational function which is continuous and spread over the entire urban area. Certain members of the underground may have professions or jobs that offer direct access to valuable information, but all members of the apparatus are encouraged to collect information about the government and its security forces. This feedback allows the organization to feel the pulse of the urban populace in order to plan other operations.

A wealth of information is available from local open sources such as newspapers, radio, and television pertaining to the government and its reactions to activities of the apparatus. Infiltration of the military, police, and government bureaucracy is of prime importance to the urban insurgent and this network of cells will be organized with tightly compartmented small cells arranged in parallel fashion. Counter-infiltration or penetration by government security forces is one the biggest dangers the illegal underground apparatus faces, so great attention is paid to attempts to infiltrate those agencies who might have information concerning government informants.

Collection of information for action operations is often very easy in the city because of the density and flow patterns of the population. Prevention of reconnaissance of a bank by an illegal apparatus would be almost impossible and it is even possible that a small armed team might be able to rehearse an operation by walking around and through the objective or objective area. Both of these actions would be screened by normal daily presence of the population.

Other items and places providing information important to the urban

apparatus would be maps(street, sewer, utilities, power, transport, etc.),
telephone books, and libraries. Female members of the organization can
often get positions which offer them access to information needed by the
apparatus without arousing much suspicion. They can also be employed to
divert or seduce individuals who have access to information useful to the
apparatus or control over activities which can endanger or help the apparatus.

Currently in Northern Ireland one sub-structure apparently associated
with the IRA is composed completely of women who have collected information
in a variety of ways in addition to engaging in armed operations. In
Uruguay, female membership in the Tupamaros rose from an estimated 39%
in 1969 to an estimated 77% in 1972 while the male membership dropped from
61% to 23% -- an indicator of the awesome potential for intelligence
collection this apparatus may now possess.

Children play everywhere in the city and little attention is given to
their activities, so they have the opportunity to collect a great deal of
information that adults could not. Likewise, the elderly person is
rarely suspected of collection activities, but often they produce excellent
intelligence because of the wealth of experience they bring to this
activity.

Both children and the elderly also generally have a great deal of
free time and may move, play, or lounge at will. Both make excellant
couriers because little attention is paid to children and generally
the elderly are treated with respect. Collection of information will
pose little problem for a broad-based apparatus, although a number
of persons will have to be found who have the talent, and can be
trained for the work of collating it.

5. Raids, Ambushes, and Terrorism in the Urban Environment

Most of the armed actions of the combat or operational cells are either ambushes or raids. All the elements normally present in the planning and conduct of such actions are present in the urban underground. The primary difference is that in urban ambushes and raids fewer personnel will be involved, the action will be shorter in duration and scope, and more imagination will be used in their planning and execution. The latter is due to the fact that urban terrain offers far more diversity than does the rural.

The ambush will be used to harass security forces, block areas off where a raid is taking place, and as a tactic to deny areas of the city to all but large formations of the security forces. Urban ambushes will occur at close quarters and be characterized by a high volume of fire from automatic weapons and/or shotguns and command mines. Ambushes can consist of only a sniper or two, or one or two firebombers operating from rooftops. Withdrawal of these small groups through urban terrain is easy.

Raids in the urban environment will also be limited in scope and duration for the reasons we have mentioned. Intelligence collection, reconnaissance, and planning will be quite detailed. These armed operations will be conducted against banks for funds, against security forces for weapons and equipment, and in order to kidnap or assassinate selected personnel. Raids also demonstrate the strength of the apparatus, attract attention, and help to put the government and the security forces on the defensive. In many urban areas vehicles will be a necessity for the conduct of these operations and a great number of them must be acquired for use by the apparatus. This can be done by stealing them in small numbers

over a long period of time, altering their appearance, and then storing them in a junkyard, used car lot, or around a filling station or garage.

Kidnapping may be carried out by normal raiding parties. These occur primarily either to raise funds or to attract publicity. Assass- inations, on the other hand, are usually specialized operations using select personnel. The underground in Palestine used only one individual to carry out the mission; he would be provided with the target's name and address and the rest would be left up to him.

Hijacking of aircraft began during the days of Castro's insurgency against Cuba. Since then it has been used for a variety of reasons and accomplished in a variety of ways. It seems unlikely that it can be prevented, as long as some sort of safe haven is available for the imagi- native and determined hijacked. Short of this, urban insurgents in a metropolitan area always have the opportunity to halt or impede national and international air traffic by threats and by attacks on the facilities of the airport itself. This is also true of other forms of transport systems.

Sabotage can be both active or passive. Passive sabotage consists of small deeds which gradually make their impact upon the urban area and the government. Strikes, boycotts, false tips to security forces, and work slowdowns fall into this category. Active sabotage in the urban area is planned and violent. Usually it is directed against facilities, vehi- cles, and equipment of the government and the security forces. It may be directed against the physical plant of the urban area itself, (water, power, transport, etc.) which is what most persons will think of when they consider urban sabotage; however, this would constitute an attack upon the

population because it causes them hardships and may lose the apparatus popular support.

If the population must be aggravated and further allienated from the government, the underground may set out to interdict food supplies to the metropolitan area. This action could occur further from the urban area and be accomplished in such a manner that it would appear to be a result of government inefficiency rather than an act of the underground apparatus.

In general, such psychological operations by an urban apparatus go far beyond the mere pasting of slogans on walls and the printing of leaflets and underground newspapers. Indeed, a well run organization will consider the psychological impact of all of its methods and operations before taking any action. Each act in the urban area can influence large numbers of people in a short period of time. This becomes more significant with the advent of on the spot news coverage which may have international distribution.

Hence the apparatus will try to make the government over-react and appear to be brutal in every possible instance. Use of women and children as "troop-baiters" to "set-up" security forces for this type of effect is common in urban conflicts in addition to development of situations where large numbers of the populace will become innocent victims of indiscriminate use of force by the government. Terrorism is crucially important in this effort to create over-reaction.

Terrorism exists as both an operational function of an illegal apparatus and also, in some cases, a form of illegal underground activity itself.

The effects of terroristic actions upon both the targets and the users are quite complex and have been examined in numerous works. However,

a single comprehensive study has yet to appear. Its main products seem to be fear and immobilization in the individuals and groups against which it is directed, inabling them to be controlled more easily. As an operational aspect of an illegal apparatus, it may be discriminate or indiscriminate, and it may be used to eliminate or control both friendly, neutral, and hostile elements in the urban area.

In some organizations terrorism is such a predominate feature of their operations that almost all other administrative and operational functions will be neglected. This will either lose them what popular support they have or prevent them from developing any popular support.

CHAPTER SIX

RECENT TRENDS IN URBAN INSURGENCY

1. The Battle For Algiers: Its Background and Development'

After World War II Algeria, although legally part of France, was
made up of two seperate communities: approximately eight million Moslems
and one million European Colonists. The latter not only controlled most
of the land, businesses, and other sources of wealth in the country, but
also determined the internal and external politics of Algeria.

Moslem nationalistic organizations had existed for years but had
seldom been significant in the affairs of the country. At the end of the
war French authorities ignored the aspirations of the Moslems and the few
promises of reform that were made, failed to satisfy the Moslem political
leaders, consequently tension mounted.

In the city of Setif in May of 1945 a peaceful World War II victory
parade turned into a riot as French authorities attempted to stop the
display of Moslem nationalistic banners. Former Moslem soldiers went on
a rampage and killed over 100 Europeans in the towns of Setif, Kerrata,
and Guelma.

The uprising was put down by the French, using brutal methods which
imprisoned most of the Moslem leaders in the area and resulted in the
killing of between fifteen thousand to thirty thousand Moslem natives.
French reaction clearly exceeded anything that the Moslems had done in
scope or degree. As a result, when the Algerian revolt for independance
began in 1954 almost all the leaders of the FLN had experienced some
form of reprisal due to French reaction after the rioting at Setif in

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1945 .

In preventing the French forces from winning any big engagements,
the FLN sapped the strength of the army and the French treasury, while
also wearing down the will to fight on the part of the French government
and the French people. By skillful use of propaganda, terror, and illegal
organizational techniques the FLN was able to gain the support of the great
majority of Algeria's Moslems.

Illegal undergrounds were established in all the key cities and in
1956 - 1957 the most important network was organized in Algiers. Opera-
tions in the autonomous zone of Algiers were conducted by a council con-
sisting of a political - military chief and three deputies for political,
military, and supply and liaison activities. Each deputy had under him
three men responsible for carrying out his respective activity in each of
three regions into which Algiers was divided. Each of these men, in turn,
had subordinates in each of three sectors into which the regions were divided,
and each sector chief had subordinates in each of the three districts into
which the sector was subdivided. In theory, a council composed of the
heads of each of the three activities was to be formed, but in practice one man
often performed two or perhaps all three activities.

The armed operational cells of each region consisted of three groups,
each of which included 11 men: a leader, his assistant, and three cells
of three men each. Including the regional chief and his deputy, there were
thus 35 armed men per region, 105 in all of the city of Algiers. In
addition to these "military" personnel, there were between 50 to 150
hard-core terrorists charged with protecting the members of the FLN and
their activities. These men, in turn, often used known gangsters or the

unemployed in terrorist operations." Although the French almost destroyed this underground apparatus in late 1957, it was later reconstituted along similar lines, but on a much larger scale.

Communications among cities and between rural and urban areas depended mostly upon couriers. Communication in the cities was easy due to the fact that the Moslems were always concentrated in one area and the large families and dense population made word of mouth communication particularly effective in informing large numbers of people in a short period of time.

Recruiting took place not only in the cities of Algeria, but also among Algerian Moslems living abroad in French cities. These urban organizations emphasized training for acts of terrorism and propaganda, while people were organized in Algiers for work in intelligence, propaganda, and supply activities. In the early stages of recruiting and organizing, known gangsters whose word was obeyed by the Moslems were used to help insure that FLN orders would be obeyed. The organization of the Moslems in the Casbah was important not only for establishment and operation of the underground, but also for the psychological weapon that it gave the FLN when it wished to show that it spoke for the Algerian people. The FLN was able, by the use of mass organizational techniques, to organize a mass demonstration of any nature at any time it desired. These same techniques of population control permitted the FLN leadership to prevent any sort of demonstration by the Moslems in Algiers during 1961 - 1962 in response to indiscriminate terror attacks by the OAS, who sought to incite the Moslems to riot, attack Europeans, and cause the French government and army to intervene and "keep Algeria French".

2. FLN Operations In the Battle for Algiers

An all Algerian labor union was formed, which drew workers away from the Communist labor union. Within France, numerous auxiliary groups were formed to assist in collection of funds and intelligence. In the major cities of Algeria the FLN underground collected taxes and assessments from the people, often aided by force or the threat of force. Funds came from urban areas in France, Belgium, and Tunisia and Morocco.

Security was enforced rigidly in all of the urban underground networks. Traitors were punished by death. If any member of a three man cell was captured, the other two members of his cell were sent to the guerrilla units in the rural areas so that they could not be interrogated by the French.

Propaganda literature was printed in Cairo and Tunis for worldwide distribution and the FLN actually opened information offices in important cities throughout the world. Members of the underground working in these offices developed and exploited contacts with the local press and government officials. Within Algiers itself, each unit had a typewriter and a mimeograph machine so that they could print propaganda. Newspapers and tracts printed by the FLN were distributed in all the large cities of France and these were supplemented by radio broadcasts.

The FLN conducted a number of bombings in the urban areas, primarily for the purpose of creating general disorder and to show the inability of the French to keep order. Bombs were stolen from the French, but more often manufactured by the underground. Active and passive sabotage was committed in the urban areas of both Algeria and France, especially in those areas or industries that contained a high density of Algerian

Moslems. The mere threat of violence produced psychological advantages for the FLN. In 1957 the FLN threatened to explode bombs on tourist ships and airplanes leaving France, and warned foreign tourists to boycott French carriers. Although the acts of violence were not carried out, the fear produced by the threat caused a loss to France of a great deal of tourist trade.

Intelligence was collected in the urban areas of Algeria by instucting the people to report on the daily activities of the French security forces and by "turning around" agents used by the French against the FLN. Information could be gathered from any place in Algiers that employed Algerian Moslems.

Initial French reaction to the FLN was inadequate because they did not recognize that this might be a well-planned revolt led by people determined to win national independence. This underestimation of the actual and potential strength of the FLN was further complicated by the French refusal to conduct any sort of negotiations with the illegal apparatus. As the insurgency grew the French finally employed a variety of civil-affairs, pacification, and military programs, which generally proved ineffective against the apparatus in the long run.

In urban areas the French attempted to organize the people to insure that they obeyed the laws and did not cooperate with the FLN. The French carried out large propaganda campaigns and in addition attempted to counter-organize the population. The best example of military operations against the illegal underground apparatus in an urban environment occurred during the "Battle of Algiers" which took place in 1957. The FLN had extended its operations throughout the entire city and the existing French security forces were completely ineffective against the underground. As a result

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the French assigned the military the mission of regaining control of the city and   French military units then entered Algiers not to reinforce the civilian security forces, but to replace them.

In general, the French military units committed to regain control of the city of Algiers in 1957 were assigned sectors for which they were responsible for population and resources control, intelligence collection, and counter-organization of the population. The two latter missions perhaps contributed most to the destruction of the FLN underground apparatus, however they were also the two activities which proved to be the most counter-productive in the long run.

Population and resources measures employed in this were, for the most part, conventional in nature -- involving the usual methods of checkpoints, control points, personnel and vehicle searches, "snap checks", and occasional raids based upon intelligence produced in intelligence collection and population counter-organization activities.

3. French Army Operations Against the FLN

Although the regular French military units committed against the FLN were to employ a rather wide range of collection techniques (to include use of informers and penetration agents) one method of collecting information concerning membership and activities of the FLN underground was the apprehension of a mass of persons at random from the streets of Algiers, and then subjecting them to a screening interrogation.

A typical mass apprehension might be of, say, 100 males from ages of 15 to 25 from one unit's sector. Interrogation of this group would usually result in a number of suspects who would be detained for intensive

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interrogation while the other personnel were released. The initial
interrogation which served to screen this mass of people was often carried
out by company level officers and NCOs who might not have use of an in-
terpreter and who were untrained in the techniques of interrogation.
It must be noted that these same men, to varying degrees, had as a rule
had some form of contact with, or knowledge of, both underground resistance
operations in various parts of the world during WW II and experience
against the Viet Minh in Indochina. Obviously this system was ready-made
for occasional abuses.

If a member of any type of underground cell were found and made to
talk, usually only two or three other members of the underground would be
discovered. If action was taken rapidly enough, a few more members might
be taken; however the returns were normally small, because in short order
a cut-out would be encountered and the lead, whether horizontal or vertical
into the underground organization, would be broken. Even if reaction was
slow and the other members of the cell were able to escape, the FLN
underground made it a practice to exfiltrate "blown" cell members to the
guerrilla units outside the city. Consequently, even though only one member
of a cell might be in custody, the cell would be a loss to the underground,
thus further diminishing their strength and overtaxing other cells within
the organization, forcing them to risk additional exposure. This had the
effect of reducing the membership of the underground apparatus in Algiers
even though the other members of the cell were not in custody.

Unfortunately, the apprehension and generally rough treatment of, say,
the 90 men who were not detained for further intensive interrogation,
served only to alienate them from the French cause and to make them more
readily available for recruitment by the FLN underground when the French

military units had finished their mission and returned control of the city to the civilian authorities. The underground members who had been compromised and exfiltrated from the city of Algiers were also once again available for underground operations when the military was withdrawn.

The counter-organization of the population was the French military effort to structure the population so that they could control it and thus force the FLN underground organization to reveal itself and its members. This counter-organization followed classic totalitarian methods of population control, for example identification block leaders, street wardens, building wardens, and heads of households and making them responsible for the members of the population under and around them. Failure to report recent arrivals and departures, suspicious activities, and known underground members or activities was punishable by detention and in some cases by death. Although this did have the effect of slowing down many activities of the FLN underground it also proved to be counter-productive in the long run because it systematically alienated the Moslem population of the city of Algiers, and when the French military units were withdrawn from the city more people were willing to assist the FLN underground.

Thus it appears clear that the French military had to resort to techniques and methods that are not traditionally military in order to destroy an illegal underground apparatus, and that this had far-reaching effects upon the army and the French people. The substitution of the military for the police and other internal security organizations may have destroyed the underground apparatus in one urban area in the short-run but this action contributed far more to the loss of the conflict in the long-run. Ultimately the world-wide reaction to the French Army's tactics was so great that despite the momentary defeat of the FLN in the streets of Algiers, the war was lost.

4. The IRA and the Battle For Dublin

In contrast to the Algerian situation, the religious and political differences which divide the population of Ireland are far more complex and more deeply rooted in that population. These differences have surfaced in an urban setting again and again with mounting intensity in the forms of demonstrations, rioting, murder, and rebellion. These actions have involved a variety of illegal underground organizations whose operations have reinforced intolerance and communal segregation.

The most well known of these Irish organizations is the IRA which has existed for over fifty years as an illigal apparatus. The IRA conducted its first operations during the period 1916 - 1923, in what has been referred to as the "Irish Revolt". Of particular interest is the urban uprising in Dublin on Easter Sunday in 1916. Although this particular action was won by the British it insured the continued existence of what came to be called the IRA, and established conditions that eventually caused the British to negotiate for peace in 1923.

On Easter morning of 1916, between 500 - 1000 members of the IRA seized the major public buildings in Dublin without resistence. Although these armed units had existed for some time, they were equipped only with rifles and grenades as opposed to th regular British formations equipped with automatic weapons and artillery. They expected little support from the local urban population and few of the citizens of Dublin paid much attention to the initial actions of the insurgents. A reflection of the fact that most of the population in Ireland were generally ready to accept Home Rule. The reaction of the British military was swift, violent, and finally quite savage.

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During their initial operations against the urban insurgents, the British lost a great number of infantrymen and cavalrymen because they did not adapt their tactics to the terrain. Finally they brought in artillery and coupled with the tactics of house-to-house fighting they eventually put an end to the uprising in five days. Sections of Dublin had been destroyed by artillery and fire, and many civilians mistreated by troops who did not take the time to distinquish between them and members of the IRA. During the course of the action some of the populace of Dublin began to praise the IRA for the fight they were putting up against such heavy odds.

Shortly after the end of hostilities the British began to courts-martial members of the uprising, always in private and without public record. Most of the leaders were executed as soon as their death sentences were confirmed. As knowledge of these executions spread, so did popular support for the Easter Uprising and the IRA. It has been said that the British made the mistake of assuming that they were fighting the whole population. By the time a month had passed, IRA and nationalistic Irish literature and tracts had become so popular in Dublin that they were hard to find. The members of the apparatus executed by the British had become martyrs and the population was ready to assist the IRA. In one detention camp holding 2000 people not originally IRA sympathizers, a handful of actual IRA members were able to convert almost all others to their side.

During the ensuing struggle the Irish were identified with the struggles of small nations all over the world and the Irish were encouraged by Wilson's 14 Points at the end of WWI. The Catholic church finally came out against many of the practices of the British and many of its priests

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actively aided the underground."

The British regular units on duty in Ireland apparently disliked the duty and many attempted to remain as neutral as possible. "Often the IRA was able to obtain weapons and supplies from these units. The British organized a number of paramilitary units during the course of the conflict but had difficulty in coordianting their intelligence and action operations directed against the IRA."

In addition the activities of these units were characterized by brutality and lack of discrimination which further antagonized the population of the cities.

The end result was the strenghtening of the legal Irish nationalistic political organization to the point it could win an election and the influencing of world opinion against the British, because of their methods of repression, thus forcing them to finally negotiate.

It appears, now, that the British have learned from their mistakes and that their current operations in Belfast and other cities of Northern Ireland are characterized by patience, restraint, and discriminating use of force. Careful attention is being paid to community relations between the troops and the populace as well as the collection of intelligence. It is evident that systems have been worked out to coordinate and control both intelligence and operations at each civil-military level and that all personnel involved in security operations are aware that the solutions are political, rather than military.

5. The Tupamaros and the Battle For Montevideo

In Uruguay, a struggle similar to that in Belfast reveals similar

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patterns. The Tupamaros have existed in Uruguay for at least 10 years and have become the principle security problem for that nation. Their most renowned leader has been, of course, Carlos Marighella.

After an election defeat in 1962, leftist elements began to pursue their ends by establishing an illegal underground apparatus. In 1963 armed actions such as raiding for funds and arms began to occur. These operations continued until 1966 when the first deaths occured in the course of a Tupamaro robbery. The police saw the Tupamaros as a danger but the government did not take the organization seriously or consider it a potential threat. In 1968 after more robberies and sabotage the Tupamaros conducted the first of many kidnappings. Police actions produced few results and the Tupamaros appeared to be able to operate at will.

Violence continued through 1969 and in 1970 the Tupamaros raided a military facility for arms and ammunition. This incident involved the Uruguayan military for the first time and although they continued in support of the police, results were meager. The government still had taken no action in the fields of intelligence and psychological operations. The Tupamaros became bolder and initiated kidnappings of national and international personalities in order to demonstrate their power and to embarrass the government. Although the police did capture a number of leaders of the apparatus, the apparatus continued to function because these leaders were able to run it from prison and some were later to escape. Shortly after this, the murder of a USAID employee by the Tupamaros caused a shift in popular sentiment away from the Tupamaros.

In 1971 the government assigned the military the mission of fighting the underground. Even though the underground activities increased in 1971

and 1972 the apparatus's use of terror and lack of public support were
operating against them. The military was able to take advantage of the fact
that they had been working with the police on intelligence since 1969 and
that troop units had had some experience in urban operations in support of
the police since 1970. They were able to capitalize on these factors by
creating a type of coordinating committee at each administrative level
whose responsibility was to coordinate all intelligence and operations
against the Tupamaros. They were supported in these operations by legisla-
tion giving exceptional or emergency powers to the security forces. These
combined operations were successful enough to cause the Tupamaros to
attempt to shift their activities to the rural environment. They failed in
this and lost more strength to the security forces.

Operations against the remnants of the Tupamaros continue; however
it appears that the coordination of intelligence and coordination of
operations against the underground have been able to make significant
inroads upon the apparatus and to exploit the Tupamaro's failure to develop
popular support while relying upon terrorist actions to achieve their ends.

All of this has no doubt been enhanced by the attention that the mil-
itary has paid to educating its personnel for these type of operations.
About the military response to the Tupamaros, it has been written that
"... the theoretical and cultural development of the individual officer
proved important. His understanding of the real national situation and
his knowledge of applicable legislation made it easy to prevent excesses
in that type of urban operations which is so delicate because of the re-
quired contact with the civilian population." As indicated in Chapters
Eight and Nine, the lessons to be drawn from Montevideo are readily trans-
latable into U.S. Army training doctrine.

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6. The Operations of the Black September Organization

Perhaps most sinister in recent trends is the action of the so-called Black September Movement. From what little information is available it appears that the Black September organization is the terror arm of the Al Fatah, the Palestine Liberation movement, rather than an independant apparatus operating on its own.

Generally, Black September operations have been sensational in nature and intended to draw attention to the Palestinian political demands, free captured members of the organization, or provide a display of organizational power. Operations have been carried out internationally and have been characterized by excellant intelligence, good planning, and ruthlessness on the part of the participants. It is interesting to note that these operations have never extended into Israel itself, perhaps due to problems of collection of intelligence,and of infiltration.

The philosophy of this apparatus is still unclear. It seems to emphasize revenge against both Israel and Jordan; however there also appears to be an interest in influencing the structure of Arab political alignment, as demonstrated by its recent operation in Khartoum. Still, its international terrorism is less well associated with its goals than were the terror operations of the Stern Gang nearly 30 years ago, or the current operations of the undergrounds in Uruguay and Turkey today.

So far there has been no headquarters located for this organization, nor has there been any sort of membership list captured. It appears that only a top level planning leadership exists, along with a number of cadre scattered around the Mid-East. These cadre cells contain between 5 to 10 members each and are highly compartmented. Estimates are that the entire

apparatus totals between 50 and 100 personnel.' The cadre are carefully screened and thoroughly investigated before being extensively trained in underground techniques.' These cadre are the team leaders who' command the actual operations. Most of these leaders have appeared to be well educated and possess some technical skills.'

Once the top leadership has prepared plans for an operation one of the cadre takes the mission and recruits his team from established groups of Palestinian guerrillas. Usually these team members are men who have survived the fighting in Jordan in 1970, which was their "trial by fire". The groups then train in Syria or Iraq and usually the team members learn only at the last minute that they are conducting a Black September operation. Once in the objective area support may come from either the Al Fatah or the PLO.

Because the Black September is not an underground apparatus in itself, but is rather a special/operational arm of a larger Palestinian underground organization, it does use many of the techniques of the traditional underground apparatus -- particularly those that pertain to personal and organizational security -- but it evidently performs no administrative functions of its own. Therefore Black September operations are largely confined to what is best described as armed action operations, with other operational functions probably being performed by other elements of the larger organization.

Obviously, no single national security agency or military force can eliminate an apparatus of this nature. Black September, Al Fatah, and the PLO may well be a sophisticated model of an internationally dispersed underground apparatus which lends itself to strategically inspired urban insurgency, in the sense that such dispersed operations were described in Chapter Two.

SECTION III

NATIONAL DEFENSE AGAINST URBAN INSURGENCY

> Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards. So in war, the way to avoid what is strong is to strike what is weak. Water shapes its course according to the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.
>
> Sun Tzu, <u>The Art of War</u>

CHAPTER SEVEN

US DEFENSE POLICY AND THE NATIONAL TRADITION

1. National Policy and Dual-Warfare Preparedness

As set forth in Chapter One, the Army is confronted by a dual-warfare mission which requires it to maintain preparedness for both conventional warfare and interdictory warfare. In both cases, its mission is essentially deterrent: its capability of waging land warfare would theoretically deter conventional aggression against the US, and its capacity to interdict the early stages of unconventional conflict would abort that process before it could result in war. This interdictory effort was undertaken with varied success in Lebanon, the Dominican Republic and Vietnam. Its obvious strategic risk is the danger of diversion, since the strategy of interdiction invites a counterstrategy of sponsoring subversion for the mere sake of provoking interdiction. Within the context of modern American life, this risk is magnified by the emergence of what has been labelled urban insurgency. If it is to maintain a realistic counter-insurgency capability, US Army doctrine must be adaptable to this risk.

The counterinsurgency mission is governed by three considerations, of which two are matters of national policy and the third is national tradition:

(1) In support of its allies and in pursuit of its own strategic objectives, the US is prepared to offer varied forms of assistance to foreign nations confronted by subversion and insurgency.

(2) In providing this foreign assistance, the US will rely on a combination of governmental agencies, with maximum emphasis upon advisory assistance and minimal involvement of US armed forces.

(3) Resistance against internal subversion and domestic insurgency is the responsibility of security agencies other than the active Army, which by

tradition involves itself only with external threats to national security.

Within the context of these general principles, the Army's role in specific cases of subversion or insurgency will be dictated by current national policy and the assessment of current events by those governmental agencies responsible for determining policy. Its own responsibilities are therefore threefold: to maintain advisory assistance capabilities, to train itself for various levels of involvement, and to develop techniques and tactics appropriate not only for its own elements but also for those units which it may be called upon to advise. In terms of the dual-warfare distinction set forth earlier, these responsibilities must be executed within the context of other tasks, and hence must be engaged in with optimal resources only. Such restraint governs all military planning, of course, but its impact on counterinsurgency preparedness is unusually significant -- for it is within this context of limited resources and multiple missions that the Army is confronted with unprecedented problems concerning the training and morale of its own personnel. Analysis indicates these problems are at the very heart of the urban insurgency issue.

While national policy commits the Army to multiple tasks, the strategy of revolutionary warfare is predicated on the erosion of a nation's armed forces. To envision this erosion as a process dependent on combat attrition is to miss the point of revolutionary theory, however. The erosion prescribed by Lenin being only superficially dependent on battle casualties, its real sources are overextension, psychological confusion and loss of direction. This erosion may be accelerated by ambush and terrorism, of course -- but its origins lie in the mind and the soul, and not in wounds to the body. In those modern revolutionary campaigns which succeeded, this erosion has been largely overlooked amid the analysis of battles, tactics and operations. The

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psychological turmoil suffered by the French Army in Algeria is also easily
overlooked, but it provides a most striking example of this erosion process
at work. Despite the heroism of certain "elite" units, despite the determin-
ation of its most celebrated generals, despite the stakes involved in pre-
serving Algdria's status as a part of France itself, and despite the fact
its 800,000-man force actually suffered only incidental casualties, the
French Army was wasted away in the seven years of the Algerian War, its de-
termination eroded by nothing less than psychological and political confusion.
The war was lost. But exactly where it was lost is the issue, and the issue
is most decisive in confronting the challenge of urban insurgency. Faced with
those preparedness responsibilities which national policy entails, the US
Army cannot avoid the implications of this issue without risking the erosion
threat so central to insurgent warfare theory.

This is, no doubt, a deeply sensitive matter. Within the context of
its own traditions and its own orientation, the US Army is not surprisingly
tempted to address the problem of urban insurgency in terms of organization,
tactics and equipment, while avoiding the psychological implications of rev-
olutionary warfare theory. As shown earlier, this theory -- first promulgated
by Lenin and thereafter circulated throughout the world -- stresses defeat of
governmental forces via erosion as a prelude to direct confrontation. The
success of the latter is dependent upon the impact of the former. And the
former is to be achieved, in Lenin's terms, via overextension of the armed
forces, via psychological confusion in its ranks, and via loss of direction
and loss of a sense of purpose on the part of its leadership element. This
combination was examined in Chapter Three. The remarkable point about it is
that it can succeed, that it is adaptable to strategic insurgency and that
the US Army's historical traditions, as well as its modern missions, make it

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particularly vulnerable to this combination.

There is no special cause for alarm in this vulnerability, however, since its recognition is largely the condition for its solution. In terms of the present study, this recognition requires careful examination of the interplay between urban technology, revolutionary theory and national defense policy. For it is this interplay which makes the problem of urban insurgency what it is, and it is this interplay which indicates why the problem is far more than an isolated matter of organization, tactics and equipment. However sensitive the subject, the problem of urban insurgency is actually a simple matter of matching national strategy against the specific challenge of force erosion.

Once the problem is addressed in these terms, certain fundamental requirements emerge in the face of the urban insurgency threat. They are set forth in the pages which follow -- but their intelligibility is dependent on unremitting attention to the strategic significance of urban insurgency in the dual-warfare scheme of things.

2. The Army's role and the National Tradition

As with all armies, the US Army is a product of its own history; as in all democracies, it is what the people make it; as with all human enterprise, its activities are governed by concepts and ideas whose scrutiny is often left unattended. The impact of these forces on the study of urban insurgency is best illustrated by a problem which bears only indirectly on the subject at hand: the problem of counter-maintenance. Equipped with weapons, vehicles and an array of devices which reflect the technological style upon which American life is based, the Army is consequently faced with an endless maintenance task. Being a product of the civilization which produced this technology, it

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approaches this task in terms of schooling, inspection reports and a careful matching of the IQ's of prospective soldiers with the complex demands of its own equipment. Influenced by the tradition of leadership, it relies on command emphasis to do the rest. But no one who has struggled with the maintenance problem at the small-unit level is likely to claim the challenge has been met as effectively as, say, the challenge of feeding a million men three million meals daily -- although the magnitude of the maintenance problem is certainly no greater than that of the messing problem. The explanation may lie no further away than the disposal dumps of any modern American city. One finds there an assortment of junked refrigerators, radios, electric stoves, trucks and automobiles -- all mute testimony to the counter-maintenance spirit of American life. The spirit is an inescapable byproduct of the technology, industry and marketing systems which define American life, and within that context it is in itself neither a vice nor a virtue. The Army context is another thing. If its personnel come to it with a counter-maintenance attitude already established, it is no wonder that the Army faces a sustained maintenance problem, nor any wonder that IQ tests, technical schools and report forms do not solve the problem. The mess problem is met with relative ease because American society encourages attention to food; the maintenance problem may well persist simply because American society cultivates a counter-maintenance attitude. One may conclude that the urban insurgency problem will be met successfully only if the Army considers its mission within the context of similar American traditions and attitudes.

Three such attitudes bear directly on this problem: the traditional public view of the American Army's role in national defense, the public view toward the National Guard, and the public attitude -- however transitory that attitude may be at any given time -- about the relationship of the US to the rest of the

world. Were urban insurgency an insignificant matter, the Army might safely neglect these attitudes. Given the threat potential, it is unlikely that it can safely afford such neglect. What is required is recognition of the impact these attitudes have upon the Army's ability to carry out its mission.

Of these attitudes, the first is most persistent. It may be traced to its very origins in the Revolutionary Warfare period, and it is first suggested in the Federalist Papers which influenced the thought of that era. Angered by their experiences with King George's soldiers, fearful of the internal police role often played by European armies, and seeking refuge from foreign conflict, a generation of colonists-turned-Americans debated fiercely over the perils of maintaining an army of their own. The question persists into the present, echoed in talk about "a standing army". The Federalist Papers encouraged a practical compromise: maintenance of a minimal standing Army, civilian control of its activities, constitutional restraint upon its support, and public readiness to fill its ranks in the event of genuine threat. However challenged by the turn of events, that formula has been endorsed to the present, through nine wars and profound changes in American civilization. It is anchored in the Constitution itself, and it is echoed in a public attitude which runs, like a thread, through two centuries of American life: while the Army is an instrument to be used in the event of need, it is to be resharpened only as the need arises -- with that need to be defined and identified by the populace and its representatives, not by the Army. This tradition is well known, of course. What is most important in its reconsideration is what it means with regard to the Army's dual-warfare preparedness mission, and hence what impact it will have upon the Army's capacity to cope with the urban insurgency threat.

This attitude is spelled out in four forms, each verifiable within current public life and governmental policy:

(1) The US Army is not to concern itself with political matters, either domestic or foreign. This exclusion being necessary if civilian control of the military is to be possible, the Army must confine its mission preparedness activities to matters of tactics and weapons only.

(2) The US Army is to be maintained at minimal operational strength. This restraint being necessary, its contingency planning is to reflect reliance upon its civilian-soldier reserve components, whose strength will match its own, and for whose training it is responsible.

(3) US military strategy is to be determined and guided by civilian authorities, with the military responsible for maintaining the level of preparedness necessary to execute whatever roles this strategy may dictate.

(4) The US Armed forces are to continue to accomodate the values reflected in American life. While it may well remain indifferent to matters of style, the military must respect and incorporate into its own practices those concepts of law, human rights and individual freedom which are derived from the Constitution.

While recognizable as byproducts of the general, traditional attitude of the American people toward its armed forces, these four requirements create special hazards for the Army in its effort to execute the dual-warfare preparedness mission. And these hazards are virtually imperceptible, unless seen within the context of the low-intensity warfare threat. For the threat is dependent on an exploitation of political unrest, and by tradition the US Army is not to concern itself with political matters; it is dependent on a vulnerability to over-extension, and by tradition the US Army must remain at minimal strength; it is dependent on a loss of direction, and by tradition the Army does not determine the strategies it may pursue; finally, it is dependent on psychological confusion, and by tradition the Army must not tamper

with national values, even though these values invite confusion. In short, the unique traditions of the American Army make it specially vulnerable to erosion by sustained, strategically-directed, low-intensity warfare. And since it is this form of warfare which defines the potential hazards of urban insurgency, the Army's obvious challenge is to guard against these hazards without violating either the requirements of national tradition or the demands of dual-warfare preparedness. As with the problem of counter-maintenance alluded to earlier, the challenge is rooted deeply in the American military tradition.

The challenge is therefore essentially one of translating theoretical awareness into practical doctrine. In what follows, this translation effort is directed at three distinct points: the role of the National Guard, the military assistance advisory program, and the political aspects of counter-insurgency tactics.

3. The National Guard and the Strategic Problem

As with the active Army, the National Guard owes its special character to its place in American history. And, just as the role of the Army is influenced by public opinion, so too is the Guard a reflection of tradition and popular attitudes. In the case of the Guard, these attitudes have direct bearing on the problem of urban insurgency since it is the Guard, and not the active Army, which faces involvement in domestic insurgency.

Current national defense planning is predicated upon swift mobilization and deployment of Guard units. With almost half of the one-Army's list of tactical units being in the Guard, and with little prospect of a long post-mobilization training period prior to any future deployment, the Guard is faced with an unprecedented readiness task. It is no secret that the Guard,

faced with this challenge, is seriously compromised in pursuing this readiness mission because of its civil disturbance role -- a role which follows, quite naturally, from the American military traditions outlined earlier.

Historically, the Guard is an outgrowth of the militia units which flourished in the post-Revolutionary period. With the active Army restricted to cadre strength and a frontier-defense role, and with the various states assuming responsibility for the maintenance of internal order, the militia -- and, later, the Guard -- came naturally to serve two distinct masters: the state governors, who utilized it for internal matters, and the commander-in-chief, who might integrate it into the active Army in time of national crisis. In three of the four 20th Century wars fought by the US, this integration proved crucial in filling out the ranks of the active Army. Meanwhile, the role of the Guard in domestic matters has grown increasingly complex: as industrialization and urbanization worked their changes on the national environment, the Guard has come to face an assortment of domestic missions -- ranging from riot control in a metropolitan area to postal service in the midst of carrier strikes, from flood relief to fire fighting, from traffic management to school integration. Since 1945, National Guard units have been called out in more than 2000 recorded instances of domestic need. Its recruiting slogans emphasize the reliance which the states have placed on it: one may sleep well because the Guard is there. Unfortunately, when the dual mission of the Guard is matched against the strategic demands of modern warfare, one may be ill-advised to sleep at all. For there is evidence that the Guard cannot simultaneously continue in its civil disturbance role and in its strategic back-up role without the national defense posture being seriously jeopardized.

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Three factors underlie this danger:

(1) Modern warfare having become more sophisticated, the Guard is faced with an increasingly complex training mission while, simultaneously, its post-mobilization training time is being decreased in strategic deployment plans.

(2) Modern civilization having become more complex, the utilization of the Guard in domestic matters has become more frequent, and more distracting, at just the time its national defense role has become more crucial and more demanding.

(3) As the population shifts more to an urban base, the Guard must rely more on a metropolitan populace to fill its ranks, while it is this very populace which is the focal point of the unrest and disorder underlying the Guard's increasing role in civil disturbance.

Current events hint at the collision course spelled out by these factors: Guard readiness tests reflect a serious difficulty in achieving battalion-level training objectives; Guard performance in civil disturbance missions reflect a need for more, not less, allocation of time for civil disturbance training if this mission is to continue; and, in the midst of all this, Guard recruiting in the metropolitan areas indicates an increasing reluctance to join, "an organization which may at any time be directed against one's own neighbors". As with the counter-maintenance problem alluded to earlier, the Guard faces an inescapable problem with regard to psychological confusion in its own ranks -- for these ranks are being filled more and more with an urban population, at just the time when urban unrest is increasing and its own role in quelling urban disorder is accelerating.

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Dependent on the Guard in the event of national mobilization, the active Army is responsible for both training doctrine and training assistance to the Guard. Its current regulations permit a minimal amount of time for training in civil disturbance subjects -- not enough to prepare the Guard, but still enough to deter from the Guard's mobilization mission. Its Military Police school provides in the SEADOC program a civil disturbance orientation course which outlines, for the Guard, a set of techniques to be employed in riot control, crowd dispersal, urban disorder and civil disturbance. Its FM's and training doctrine for stability operations are reflected in Guard operations. Its relationship with the Guard, in terms of funding, equipment utilization, Federal status, and training priorities, is set forth in a tangled web of public laws and military directives -- and thus, even though the active Army must avoid involvement in domestic matters in order to accomodate its own traditions, it is at least indirectly drawn into domestic matters via its identification with and responsibility for the Guard. Indeed, the "US Army" identification tape has been worn on the breast of every Guardsman involved in every recent instance of civil disturbance. More important, it is drawn directly into the domestic issue once the strategic implications of urban insurgency are addressed.

If the most important consequence of strategic insurgency is its eroding effect, and if erosion involves over-extension, psychological confusion and lack of direction, then the traditional missions of the Guard, vis a vis the Guard's accelerating importance in national defense, result in an increasingly perilous US Army vulnerability to strategic insurgency. The dual mission of the Guard, the Guard's difficulty in urban recruiting, and the Guard's increasing uncertainty about its primary mission are a three-fold index of this

erosion vulnerability. To guard against erosion, then, only three avenues appear open for the active US Army:

(1) It must rely far less on the Guard than its current mobilization plans dictate, or

(2) It must seek to extract the Guard from a domestic disturbance role of any sort, or

(3) It must develop more effective ways of assisting the Guard in executing two essentially conflicting missions.

Of these three alternatives, none is truly satisfactory. Given the national traditions involved, however, it is the third alternative which appears most favorable, and which is developed further in Chapter Nine.

4. The Military Assistance Program and the FID Problem

While tradition and policy govern the Army's role in national defense, and while tradition and public attitudes influence the Guard's relationship with the active army, the influence of public opinion is, ironically, most pronounced and most unpredictable in the one area of the urban insurgency problem in which the US Army's role is most specific and most immediate: the Foreign Internal Defense program.

FID is a direct outgrowth of the dual-warfare mission: it is the framework within which interdiction would take place since it involves, by definition, those military, paramilitary and non-military activities in which the US government would engage, with its allies, to prevent or defeat subversive insurgency in a given foreign country. In terms of the basic national policies outlined earlier, FID involvement on the part of the US Army must be essentially advisory, with US Army elements directly committed in only the most extreme

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instances of a threat to US interests. The doctrine which would govern this involvement is relatively clear; it is the impact of public opinion on the execution of this doctrine which remains unclear. Given the challenge of erosion this impact must be evaluated, however, since it is this impact which makes strategically-directed insurgency a potential threat.

In outline form, FID involvement is envisioned in three phases of ascending commitment:

Phase I: the implementation of a security assistance program, via which US personnel assess the subversive situation within the foreign country and, to the extent dictated by US interests and host country needs, provide advisory assistance in coping with subversion.

Phase II: the expansion of US assistance amid escalated insurgency, with assistance provided in terms of equipment, instructor personnel and, if necessary, unit-level advisors trained in the tactics and techniques of counter-insurgency operations.

Phase III: The commitment of selected US general purpose forces if requested by the host country and if absolutely required by US interests, with the host country still providing maximum possible manpower as the insurgent conflict becomes a war of movement.

Designed to provide maximum flexibility, current doctrine would permit the Phase I/II employment of mobile training teams and other "forces trained specifically for FID activities", with these US forces confined to an advisory/assistance role and, by implication, precluded from direct engagement in counter-insurgency operations. The most crucial tasks are therefore the Phase I assessment of the threat and the host country's ability to meet it, followed by the Phase II assistance necessary to improve that ability. In both phases, the role of the US advisor is central; his success in assessment

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and advisory assistance is clearly the key to success in the interdictory effort, since mistakes in Phase I or failure in Phase II could contribute to the emergence of Phase III and, conceivably, to US involvement beyond its own best interests. Given the dual-warfare peril of over-commitment, and given the possibility that a strategic opponent might well sponsor subversion for the mere sake of eroding US military strength, the stakes involved in FID are obviously great. The Army's tasks are therefore identifiable in terms of the phases themselves:

(1) The development of advisory personnel capable of assessing both the threat to US interests and the ability of the foreign country to cope with this threat.

(2) The development of effective counterinsurgency techniques and the training of advisory personnel to transmit these techniques when such advisory assistance is required.

(3) The development of tactical doctrine applicable to host-country forces and to US general purpose forces when and if such US forces are in fact committed.

In theory, the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program (FAOP) would satisfy the first requirement; its counterinsurgency doctrine, when matched with its capacity to train advisors, would satisfy the second requirement; and its stability operations doctrine, already applicable to its own forces, would satisfy the third. In fact, however, the three responses are not fully adequate, for they are predicated on an essentially misleading assumption: that the problems of insurgency, like the problems of conventional war, are mechanically soluble in terms of tactical doctrine, equipment development and military organization. The assumption is no doubt deeply rooted in the

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American way of thinking, and is perhaps reinforced by the Army's carefully guarded isolation from political matters -- but the overwhelming evidence of modern history is that it is false. Since insurgency feeds' on political unrest, effective counterinsurgency requires constant awareness of the political implications involved in every action, at every level. The failure of the French Army in Algeria bears witness to this restraint, and the advent of battlefield TV virtually guarantees it in any future American operations. Since successful interdiction will require profound attention to the political nature of insurgent warfare, the Army's task is to incorporate political awareness into all three of the preceding activities, without violating the essential meaning of its traditional isolation from things political.

The task is by no means self-contradictory. It does require recognition of three distinct factors:

(1) The execution of the Phase I military assessment effort requires detailed awareness of the political objectives of the United States.

(2) The effectiveness of the advisory assistance effort in Phase II depends on detailed awareness of the political environment of the host country, plus awareness of the political impact which advisory activities (as well as the activities of advised units) can have upon the US public.

(3) The successful utilization of US general purpose forces in Phase III will require the political orientation of all US personnel involved, with careful attention to both the host country political environment and US political objectives, plus attention to the political characteristics inherent in US stability operations doctrine, plus attention to the impact these operations can have upon the US public.

However tedious they may be, these requirements are an inevitable

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consequence of the political character of insurgent warfare. National trad-
ition may well encourage their denial, but to deny them is to avoid the
lessons of the Algerian War. Their achievement is therefore dependent on a
realistic reappraisal of this tradition and its relationship to the Army's
FID mission.

5. Political Awareness and National Tradition

Six factors must dominate the reappraisal of national tradition and its
impact upon the FID mission:

(1) The Army's exclusion from political matters is essentially the pro-
duct of a national tradition meant to prevent it from interfering in either
the domestic political process or the civilian determination of US foreign
policy.

(2) To the extent that its morale, its recruiting and its access to
material resources will be influenced by public opinion, the Army's ability
to execute its national defense role will depend on public attitude about
this role.

(3) Since specific FID activities will revolve around current foreign
policy, and since foreign policy is a political matter, the Army cannot
attempt to influence public opinion about specific FID activities without
interfering in political matters.

(4) US Army counterinsurgency activities of whatever degree will be
matched by a corresponding degree of media attention to these activities, and
will very likely be accompanied by a corresponding degree of public debate
over the justification of these activities.

(5) Because of the intellectual stress which accompanies urbanization,

public debate over FID activities will very likely focus on moral issues and will very likely generate moral confusion from which the Army cannot insulate itself.

(6) Revolutionary theory and insurgent practice indicate the key to success in insurgent warfare is the psychological erosion of the opposing armed forces and the withdrawal of public support from the activities of these forces.

These six factors are by no means simple, nor is the resolution of their conflicting nature a simple challenge. It is true, of course, that the ideal separation of the military from the political is not possible at the highest level of government, where strategic decisions must reflect military capabilities, and where the ensuing dialogue between governmental and military leaders is one which blurs the theoretical separation of the two. It is not within this high-level arena of decision-making that the problem of erosion occurs, however. It is within the context of public opinion that it occurs, for it is there that the Army's role in counterinsurgency warfare is least likely to be understood and most likely to engender public reaction. To the extent that such reaction will compromise its ability to carry out this mission, the Army's task is thus obvious: it must develop methods of executing the FID mission in such a way that public reaction is minimized. It cannot set out to reconstruct public opinion; to do this would be to violate the national tradition. It cannot conceal its activities, because low-intensity warfare precludes those secrecy measures which characterize total war. Logically, then, its only course of action is to develop counterinsurgency techniques which will satisfy the interdiction role and also satisfy public opinion, thus preventing the erosion of its own status within a democratic society. As the problem of urban insurgency increases, this course of action will require

constant awareness of the political impact inherent in every level of FID activity.

As outlined in the following chapter, the principle techniques involved in achieving this goal are tactical, since it is at the tactical level that the political impact of counterinsurgency operations is greatest. It is there that the cultivation of political awareness is most likely to prove decisive in satisfying public opinion, and it is also there that this goal may be pursued without violation of the national tradition. Thus the introduction of political restraint in counterinsurgency tactics, is one key to solving the problem of force erosion within the context of urban insurgency warfare. A second key is the training of advisory personnel capable of adapting these tactical principles to a foreign environment, since this adaptability is a prerequisite to success in the FID program. A third key, not to be forgotten in the overall strategic meaning of force erosion, is the Army's management of its relationship with the National Guard. These last two aspects of the urban insurgency problem are dealt with in Chapter Nine.

POLITICAL AWARENESS AND TACTICAL DOCTRINE

1. The Need for a Separate Doctrine

Combat in cities is amply treated in US Army operational doctrine. Influenced by the lessons of World War Two, this doctrine calls for the by-passing and isolation of urban areas whenever possible, largely for the sake of guarding against a dissipation of forces in street-to-street fighting. This peril is best illustrated by the German Army's disaster at Stalingrad, and its implications for the Soviet Army are reflected in that Army's emphasis upon luring a land warfare opponent into urban battle. Aware of such peril, the US Army's most recent attention to urban warfare has resulted in an exhaustive study matching Soviet tactical doctrine against the detailed characteristics of the modern city -- with one result being an extensive reconsideration of US Army tactics, equipment and organization for urban combat.

Inevitably, such reconsideration must include the adaptability of given tactical methods to given types of urban conflict, since land warfare between conventional forces -- the form of conflict envisioned in NATO planning -- would involve only a part of the urban warfare spectrum. This spectrum ranges across an array of possibilities, each a special variation on the distinctions involved: conventional forces versus unconventional forces, defensive operations versus offensive (or counteroffensive) operations, friendly city versus enemy city. The scenario which portrays conventional US forces counterattacking conventional enemy forces through the streets of a friendly city is one which reflects only a special combination of these variables; at the other end of the urban warfare spectrum, one may envision US forces coping with insurgent terrorism in the midst of an occupied

and hostile enemy city. The spectrum must also reflect the varied intensity of these engagements, exemplified in the contrast between the day-to-day terrorism faced by French Army personnel in Algiers and the unparalleled attrition of the house-to-house, room-to-room combat of Stalingrad. Because of these variations, no single set of tactics, nor single method of operations, is likely to accomodate such a vast range of possible situations.

When political factors are added, the perils of relying on a single method are compounded. The Russian Army's assault against Berlin, undertaken in a style which had proven successful at Smolensk and Stalingrad, nevertheless caused urban damage which long afterwards interfered with the Soviet Union's political and economic hold on East Germany. Similarly, the French Army's counter-terror tactics, prompted by lessons learned in Indochina, contributed to political defeat in the Algerian War despite tactical victory in the streets of Algiers. With its emphasis upon firepower, rapid destruction of opposing forces and the clearance of a built-up area, the tactical doctrine appropriate for urban combat between two opposing conventional forces is thus not likely to provide lasting success in urban conflict which involves political undertones. This is, however, the essential character of urban insurgency, however much it may approach the violence of street-to-street fighting between conventional forces.

Faced with the dual-warfare mission, the Army might hope to simplify its tasks by applying the tactics of conventional warfare to interdictory operations. To do this, however, would be to risk confusing Algiers with Stalingrad, as if urban counterinsurgency operations were little more than a special instance of combat in built-up areas. Given that these types of urban conflict are fundamentally different despite certain superficial similarities, the task is to develop tactical doctrine for each. In the case of

conventional urban combat, the resulting doctrine must undoubtedly emphasize firepower and rapid clearance of an urban area -- but in the case of urban counterinsurgency, tactical doctrine must reflect the political character of such operations. It is in this sense that political awareness must be integrated into tactical doctrine and cultivated in the training of those personnel who would employ this doctrine.

2. Factors Influencing Political Awareness

Two factors define the nature of the political awareness necessary in counterinsurgency operations:

First, the Army must guard against internal erosion. Thus it must accommodate US public opinion, lest its counterinsurgency activities provoke public reaction and endanger its own effectiveness. In this sense, political awareness is sustained recognition of the interplay between tactical behaviour and US public opinion.

Second, the Army must develop tactics which will meet the specific requirements of interdiction. These must accommodate the foreign political environment within which they are employed, lest they accelerate the political unrest which underlies insurgency. In this sense, political awareness is detailed recognition of the political forces at work within a foreign area.

Presumably, the tactics employed in counterinsurgency operations would be those advocated by the Army itself, for even though its FID activities are designed to preclude involvement of its own forces, its FID advisory effort would inevitably reflect its own tactical doctrine. Thus, to the extent its FID activities receive public attention, public opinion is likely to hold the Army responsible for the tactical behaviour of whatever units are involved, be they foreign or American. If this behaviour is thought to be

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reprehensible, the Army will at best suffer guilt by association. Moreover, it is actual human behaviour which is likely to receive public attention, for in the televized dramatization of conflict it is individual behaviour which captures public attention, and in the intellectual stress of urbanized life it is visible action, and not complex policy, which is most readily subjected to public scrutiny. These are environmental factors central to the problem of urban insurgency. Thus, since it is specific behaviour which provokes public opinion, and since it is tactical doctrine which governs this behaviour, incorporation of political awareness in tactical doctrine would depend on careful assessment of how specific kinds of tactical behaviour will effect public opinion. It would also depend on certain general observations about the foreign political environment within which this behaviour would occur.

The most disastrous response to these separate requirements would be tactical behaviour which alienates US public opinion and aggravates the insurgent situation -- resulting in a need to increase US Army involvement amid decreased public support. The most effective response would be tactical behaviour which simultaneously satisfies public opinion and resolves the insurgent situation, so that increased US involvement would not be required.

The attempt to incorporate political awareness in tactical doctrine need not degenerate into an assessment of day-to-day political trends within the US. Certain very general principles underlie these trends, providing a basis for the realistic understanding of US public opinion and the likely impact of specific tactical behaviour on that opinion. At the same time, certain general principles characterize these foreign environments within which the FID program might be undertaken. These, too, provide insight into the tactical doctrine necessary to achieve political success in counter-

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insurgency warfare.

The three tendencies most pertinent to US public opinion about counter-insurgency operations will turn out to be these:

(1) The US public respects efficiency in whatever one undertakes. It is this principle which underlies its attitude toward commerce and industry.

(2) The US public is not patient with complex political issues. Its values encourage a "good guy versus bad guy" simplification of such issues.

(3) The US public does not glorify war in itself. Its political history leads it to characterize war as a necessary evil at best.

These are, of course, generalizations -- but they reflect the technological and political traditions of American life. One may identify these principles at work in various attitudes toward the Vietnamese War, attitudes which were initially independent of any disagreement about the virtue of that war. In terms of counterinsurgency doctrine, they generate three quite simple conclusions: if public opinion is to be reconciled, counterinsurgency tactics must be demonstrably efficient; they must be precise in target selection, with zero impact on innocent bystanders; and they must be restrained in terms of violence and use of weaponry. The full impact of these conclusions is developed in the sections which follow.

In turn, the three factors which generally characterize these foreign environments within which FID activities might occur are these:

(1) The political unrest which would precede US involvement is very likely to be nationalistic in tone.

(2) The foreigner is likely to have far more respect for his own traditions than he has for those of an outsider.

(3) Specific traditions will vary from one foreign environment to another,

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with associated differences in values and morals.

As with the principles which underlie US public opinion, these factors yield specific conditions which must be met if the Army's counterinsurgency activities are to be successful: the Army's presence must be low-profile, it must be accompanied by systematic respect for local values, and it must be adaptable to extreme variations in tradition and custom. Surprisingly, these conditions will be met best by the tactical measures already cited, for efficiency, precise target selection and restraint in the use of violence will prove to be the key to satisfying these conditions.

To insure tactical behaviour which would satisfy US public opinion and also insure FID success, it is thus necessary to incorporate these factors in the details of tactical doctrine. Once this is done, and once the FID personnel who would execute this doctrine are led to understand these factors, the necessary level of political awareness would be attained.

3. Tactical Efficiency and the Principle of Patience

Ideally, the FID program would be executed without the involvement of any US forces and without the provocation of the US public. Thus the most acceptable implementation of this program would be an advisory assistance effort in which effective counterinsurgency techniques are made available to the security forces of the foreign country faced with subversion or insurgency. Because specially selected US forces might be involved in even the early phases of the FID effort, and because general purpose US forces could conceivably become involved if the insurgent movement is not contained, the tactical techniques appropriate for advisory dissemination must also be

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appropriate for utilization by US forces. In any event, the validity of these techniques will be measurable in terms of their impact on the insurgent movement and their acceptability to the US public. Within the framework of the urban insurgency threat, tactical efficiency must be measured in the same way.

In general, counterinsurgency operations must have two goals: first the containment of the insurgent threat, and then the elimination of the insurgent movement. In turn, revolutionary practice is dedicated toward expansion of the insurgent threat, and thus insurgent tactics are most efficient when they produce a response which inadvertently brings about this expansion. Indeed, the principle objective of urban terror is to provoke a governmental response which will cause public reaction, create sympathy for the revolutionary movement and erode public support of the government. The self-defeating futility of the Algiers counterinsurgency effort illustrates this danger. One must assume that revolutionary or strategic urban insurgency directed against US interests will also be predicated upon this possibility, and will therefore involve efforts to force a military response which provokes the US public in such a way that its tolerance of the counterinsurgency effort and its support of the military enterprise are strongly effected. Given the special characteristics of the urban environment, and given the impact of television and other mass media, the unrest which underlies urban life creates a condition within which this insurgent tactical principle may flourish. A politically successful counterinsurgency effort is therefore dependent on constant attention to this peril. In effect, then, efficient urban counterinsurgency tactics will be those tactical pro-

cedures which contain the insurgency threat without provoking reactionary support for the insurgent movement.

Containment without provocation is only one index of tactical efficiency in urban counterinsurgency operations. A second index is the effectiveness of these operations in eliminating the insurgent movement itself. While successful containment would prevent the expansion of the insurgement movement, the elimination of such a movement would require the dissolution of its structure and the resolution of its causes. Although this latter requirement cannot be met by strictly military action -- because the causes which underlie insurgency are generally political, economic and social in nature -- the successful elimination of an urban insurgent movement will require sustained coordination of military and civic action. Unlike rural guerrilla warfare, which permits the battlefield separation of insurgent combat from the causes of insurgency, the causes of urban insurgency are likely to be present within the battlefield itself. Therefore the synthesis of the military and civic efforts will require constant coordination at the very lowest levels of urban activity. From a tactical standpoint, this means a recognition that tactics alone cannot eliminate urban insurgency.

Of course, the penetration of an insurgent structure and the capture or death of its leaders can result in temporary suspension of the movement, but this is not likely to guarantee its elimination; the French Army's destruction of the FLN's cellular apparatus did not bring victory in Algiers. Therefore the second major index of tactical efficiency in urban counterinsurgency operations will be the effectiveness of these tactics in reinforcing and complementing the civic action via which an insurgency movement is actually eliminated.

From all this, one may conclude that the containment and elimination of urban insurgency will require extreme patience. Because the attempt to seek

out and destroy an insurgent apparatus is even more frustrating in an urban environment than in a rural countryside, patience is easily spent and military over-reaction is most natural. But provocation follows readily from the mass detention of suspect persons, the armed entry into private dwellings, the indiscriminate use of firepower and explosives, the establishment of blockades, the interruption of traffic and business, and the use of overt torture, and when these measures are undertaken in the urban environment their impact on an otherwise neutral populace can prove self-defeating. Of course, the response required in any given counterinsurgency operation will be influenced by the techniques of terrorism, ambush, propaganda, sabotage and interference employed by the insurgent movement itself, but this response need not be dictated by these techniques. Since containment and elimination are dependent on non-provocation and the coordination of military action with civic action, patience must remain the fundamental principle of tactical efficiency in urban counterinsurgency operations.

In considering this principle, it is to be noted that efficiency in an FID undertaking does not necessarily mean the swift resolution of an insurgent threat; rather, it means the containment and elimination of this threat in such a way that the threat is not escalated and US forces are not needed. Given the provocative impact of military over-reaction, tactical patience is thus the key to non-provocation and non-escalation, and hence the key to FID efficiency. Because it would be a guard against the involvement of US forces, it is also the key to maintaining a low-profile American presence in the insurgent environment, and hence the key to satisfying those nationalistic tendencies likely to characterize any environment within which FID assistance would be undertaken.

4. Target Selection and the Principle of Discrimination

While tactical efficiency and the principle of patience are byproducts of one American tradition, a second attitude weighing heavily on the tactics of counterinsurgency is the traditional American interpretation of war as a conflict between good and evil. Even though the US interests threatened by foreign insurgency may well be economic only, and even though this threat may be clouded in terms of complex foreign policy, the traditional tendency to characterize war in less complicated moral terms is not likely to vanish. The FID program is an example of the actual complexity of the world, but the public, moral justification of this program is not, of course, an Army concern. It cannot be, because the Army is traditionally excluded from the public political process. The Army is responsible for guarding against its own erosion, however, and is therefore responsible for assuring that its activities do not provoke a moral reaction which could lead to public repudiation of the Army. In terms of urban counterinsurgency, this means it must guard against the indiscriminate use of force amid an urban populace. In a tactical sense, this means the principle of discrimination must govern target selection.

The principle of discrimination is dictated by the "good guy" versus bad guy" distinction which dominates public opinion about complex matters of conflict and violence. In terms of urban insurgency, the "bad guys" will inevitably be those insurgent personalities who engage in terrorism, ambush, sabotage and similar acts; applying the principle of discrimination in urban counterinsurgency operations would therefore mean careful restriction of tactical measures to those insurgent personnel who are clearly identifiable as "bad guys". With the omnipresent television camera likely to record every

instance of counterinsurgency action, indiscriminate public arrest, mass de-
tention, house raids and return fire are likely to produce an image of brutal-
ity, and hence likely to blur the public's vision of the counterinsurgency
process. This is especially true where women and children are involved --
but women and children are everywhere present in the urban environment, and
insurgent leaders seeking to capitalize on public sentiment have successfully
pushed women and children into the forefront of many urban struggles, such as
Algiers and Belfast. In guarding against these tactics and in responding to
the human features of the urban environment, the security forces engaged
against an insurgent movement must exercise great care in identifying the
actual enemy, lest these security forces themselves become portrayed as
agents of oppression and evil. In practical terms, this means the utmost
care in avoiding violence against women and children, in preventing accidental
harm to non-involved portions of the populace, and in guarding against damage
to public property. In short, it means precise target selection.

Precise target selection is not only the key to guarding against reaction
on the part of the American public. It is also the key to preventing reaction
within the foreign environment. Because it is likely to respect its own customs
and traditions far more than those of an outside power, a foreign populace is
not likely to sympathize with violence which can be traced to or identified
with a foreign power; if this violence is identifiable with a foreign power,
even to the extent that the foreign power is involved only in an advisory
role, it is the foreign power which is likely to be blamed when the counter-
insurgency effort disrupts local life. This disruption is far more implicit
within an urban environment than within a rural environment, simply because
the separation of the insurgent movement from its popular base is far more

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tedious within an urban situation. In Algiers, the French Army sought to isolate the FLN by blocking off large areas of the city, but this isolation (and the search and destroy operations undertaken when it failed) so disrupted local life that the French Army, and not the FLN, suffered blame for the increase in unrest which followed. If this increase is to be avoided, counterinsurgency tactics must be governed by the principle of discrimination -- and this, again, means utmost care in the selection of targets against which the counterinsurgency effort will be directed.

Violations of this principle are measurable in terms of their impact on both the local environment and US public opinion. But tactical discrimination is by no means simple: it is primarily influenced by the population mix within which urban insurgency would occur, but it is also influenced by the way in which urban counterinsurgency operations are likely to be pictured on television, as well as the way in which the language used in describing these operations is likely to influence the public response to this pictorial content. The language of the Vietnam War is particularly suspect in this regard: terms such as "free-fire zone" and "body count", when accompanied by pictures of destroyed villages and stacks of dead (and obviously young) Vietcong, can only impact negatively on a populace which seeks to understand insurgent warfare in morally simple terms. "We had to destroy the village in order to save it" may be a remark intelligible to those engaged in counterinsurgency operations, but the public's misunderstanding of such language -- and its consequent revulsion for the tactics employed, not to mention its consequent revulsion for the war itself -- cannot be overlooked if lessons are to be learned from the Vietnam war. One obvious lesson is that the prevention of public reaction to urban counterinsurgency operations will require constant

awareness of the political implications inherent in every incident and every
remark, with a consequent need for discretion on the part of every individual
involved in the counterinsurgency effort. In the strictly tactical sense,
this means the utmost care in target selection if such violations are to be
avoided.

5. Tactical Violence and the Principle of Restraint

Besides patience and discrimination, restraint in the use of violence
is also necessary if urban counterinsurgency tactics are to accomodate US
public opinion and the characteristics of the foreign environment.

The very nature of counterinsurgency warfare runs against American
tradition, of course, because that tradition results in a view of war not
readily compatible with insurgency, in that it is not readily compatible
with a gradual emergence in conflict, with vagueness in the identification
of an enemy, and with prolonged, low-intensity violence. Instead, the US
tradition is most comfortable with a war which begins in abrupt attack
against the US, carried out by readily identifiable enemies who thereby
deserve the violence necessary to vanquish such aggression. Even then, war
is not glorious: World War II was merely a necessary evil. Interdictory
operations can also be only a necessary evil, and while they will make great
demands on the American tradition because of their unconventional nature,
it is apparent that a high level of violence in the midst of these operations
can only further aggravate public opinion.

From the tactical standpoint, this means restraint in the use of fire-
power and explosives in the effort to contain and eliminate insurgency. Only

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if violence is restrained will this effort be likely to satisfy US public opinion. Moreover, only if it is restrained will it be likely to accomodate the special characteristics of any given foreign environment within which counterinsurgency operations are undertaken. Because values and customs vary so much from one foreign locale to another, tactics which are predicated upon the use of a high degree of violence are likely to be a guarantee for disaster -- especially since the tactics, once refined, are not likely to be adaptable to variations in culture. The use of a bayonet in the streets of Budapest means something altogether different from its usage in the streets of, say, Montevideo -- and the same is true of the sub-machine gun, the hand grenade and the police dog. What is required is a tactical doctrine which is highly flexible and highly adaptable to local custom, and hence highly free of dependence on the use of unrestrained violence.

Within an urban environment, this restraint becomes doubly important. The French experience in Algiers indicates, for example, that the promiscuous use of the sub-machine gun in urban search-and-destroy operations is self-defeating. Accompanied by the use of explosives in the effort to root out the FLN, the violence of the sub-machine gun merely dramatized the conflict of the Algerian War, causing considerable damage to bystanders caught in firefights between the French and the FLN, causing escalation in public sentiment, causing increased sympathy for the revolutionary movement itself -- but causing, in its wake, little real damage to the FLN apparatus itself. Moreover, the use of physical violence -- particularly the use of torture designed to extract information from FLN captives -- proved self-defeating. For inevitably such violence made its way into French television and French journalism, and again its impact was more on the French people and the rest

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of the world rather than the FLN itself.

Restraint is far more critical within an urban environment than within the context of rural guerrilla warfare, primarily because of the population mix and the presence of television. As with the principle of discrimination, the principle of restraint is dictated by the presence of women and children; violence which impacts on them will certainly be recorded in detail, and can only undermine the public's moral interpretation of the counterinsurgency effort. To prevent this accidental victimization of a surrounding population, precision in the use of weapons is one requirement. This means, from a tactical standpoint, the reliance on smaller, more controllable fire teams highly trained in counter-sniping techniques. It means extreme care in the distribution of ammunition in crowd-control operations. It means reliance upon passive measures in blocking off crowds, with the careful avoidance of even a hint of brutality, and hence the utmost restraint in the use of the bayonet, clubs and other weapons. In terms of non-lethal weaponry, it means a renewed emphasis upon incapicitating gases and other devices which would permit the containment of an insurgency without undue violence. Perhaps most important, it means the realization that the tactics appropriate for combat within a built-up area -- those tactics · to be   utilized by conventional forces in clearing out an urban area -- are wholly unsatisfactory for urban counterinsurgency operations. The one set of tactics is predicated on the need to bring maximum violence to bear against an opponent; within counterinsurgency operations, particularly in the urban environment, it is precisely the opposite which is needed.

The principle of restraint is closely related to the principles of patience and discrimination, in that the three principles reinforce each other. Thus the successful containment of hostile fire -- for example, the containment of

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sniper fire which has been directed against a security force from the roof-tops of a heavily populated residential area -- would require patience in the application of counter-fire, extreme discrimination in the targets against which that fire is directed, and recognition that what is required in counter-fire is not volume, but precision. Unless such principles are obeyed, the impact on by-standers can only result in further deterioration of the insurgent situation, leading to an escalation in violence amid an inevitable decrease in public support for the counterinsurgency effort.

6. Urban Counterinsurgency Tactics and the Principles of War

The need for patience, discrimination and restraint is deeply rooted in the political nature of counterinsurgency operations. In carrying out such operations, the security forces involved are confronted with demands wholly unlike those encountered in conventional warfare: they must guard against the provocation of a surrounding populace, against the aggravation of foreign opinion, against an image of brutality. They must carry out operations within an environment which is qualitatively different from that of the open battle-field. In short, they must assume a role more like that of a police force than that of a military force. To the extent it is identified with urban counter-insurgency operations in either an advisory capacity or a participating role, the US Army must accomodate all these factors and even more: it must acknowledge US tradition with regard to efficiency, moral simplicity and the nature of war itself. Moreover, it must do all this within the context of its own theory of war, and hence it is not surprising that the need for patience, discrimination and restraint makes grave demands upon the Army's adaptability to the urban counterinsurgency mission. For the tactical principles inherent in urban counter-

insurgency operations would appear to violate the principles of war upon which
the Army's concept of action is based and from which its conventional tactical
doctrine is derived.

Of the nine principles of war, no less than three appear to be incompati-
ble with the demands of urban insurgency. The three are the principles of
mass, offensive and simplicity. For the principle of mass calls for the
concentration of superior fire power at the decisive point in a battle, while
urban counterinsurgency operations must be marked by a careful restraint in
the use of firepower. The principle of the offensive calls for swift and de-
cisive action, while the containment of insurgency calls for patience and
great deliberation. And the need for careful discrimination in the selection
of targets appears to conflict with both the principles of mass and offensive,
since the careful choice of targets in urban counterinsurgency operation would
mean avoidance of massed fire and avoidance of the shock-action dictated by
the principle of the offensive. Moreover, underlying these considerations is
the fact that an urban counterinsurgency program can succeed in eliminating
the insurgent threat only if military action is carefully coordinated with
civic action at every level -- but this coordination results in operational
complexity far beyond those limits ordinarily permitted by the principle of
simplicity. To the extent that the principles of mass, offensive and simplicity
are inconsistent with the demands of urban insurgency, execution of the urban
counterinsurgency mission thus requires the deliberate suspension of these
principles in the name of patience, discretion and restraint. It is therefore
not surprising that the tactics appropriate for combat in a built-up area are
inappropriate for urban counterinsurgency operations.

It is in this sense that a separate tactical doctrine is required. It
would necessarily be adaptable to both US Army utilization as well as utili-

zation by a foreign army receiving advisory assistance. It would acknowledge
the specific principles of patience, discretion and restraint necessary for
counterinsurgency success. It would provide detailed recognition of the
political character of insurgent warfare, and would thereby incorporate
political sensitivity into the tactical procedures to be employed in urban
counterinsurgency operations. In short, it would permit attainment of the
political awareness without which such operations cannot hope to succeed.

CHAPTER NINE

PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

1. The Development of a Separate Urban Counterinsurgency Manual

Tactical doctrine pertinent to unconventional warfare is presently available in a number of US Army Field Manuals. These manuals are primarily addressed to rural guerrilla operations. As a result, they emphasize the organization and tactics appropriate for rural insurgency and rural counterinsurgency operations, with only passing attention to the characteristics of insurgency within a city. In the sense that insurgency within a city is only an adjunct to rural guerrilla warfare, this doctrine is adequate for both the rural and urban aspects of guerrilla warfare. But in the sense in which urban insurgency is something quite distinct, this doctrine is not adequate. From the standpoint of offensive insurgency -- that is, insurgency to be undertaken by US Army elements in support of an all-out war -- it reflects a commitment to rural operations, and thus concentrates upon the development, training, support and coordination of rural forces. From a counterinsurgency standpoint -- that is, operations to be undertaken against an insurgent threat -- it also concentrates upon rural warfare. In both cases, its thrust is in the direction of organization, techniques of control, and methods of coordination. The tactical doctrine contained within these manuals is essentially irrelevant to urban insurgency.

Equally unsatisfactory is the doctrine governing stability operations. Although their scope differs from that of the manuals which deal with unconventional warfare, those manuals devoted to stability operations nevertheless concentrate upon problems in organization and control, with little attention to the political factors inherent in urban insurgency. It is not

so much that the stability operations doctrine is irrelevant; it is merely inadequate. Because it does not address itself to the problem of political awareness, this doctrine is virtually silent with regard to the principles of patience, discrimination and restraint which must characterize a successful urban counterinsurgency effort. As with the doctrine which governs unconventional warfare, the stability operations doctrine reflects a preoccupation with rural guerrilla warfare, and therefore what is required is the development of a separate, distinct urban counterinsurgency manual which does stress the integration of political awareness with tactical doctrine.

A separate manual would enhance the recognition that urban insurgency is, in fact, a form of unconventional warfare essentially distinct from either rural-oriented guerrilla warfare or guerrilla warfare which is accompanied by a city-based underground. Moreover, it would permit the assembly of those tactical techniques appropriate for urban insurgency, and would thereby permit the recognition that these techniques are fundamentally unlike those appropriate for conventional combat in a built-up area. At present, the absence of a single manual has resulted in the fragmentation of the subject, with bits and pieces of tactical insight scattered through the various manuals which deal with unconventional warfare and stability operations. Their significance is lost in the process, because the manuals in which they are contained are devoted to an essentially different subject. In effect, then, a separate manual would gather together these tactical procedures and would insure their integration with the principles of patience, discrimination and restraint which would govern their effectiveness.

The development of a separate manual need not obscure the fact that urban counterinsurgency operations must be tailored to the specific environment within which they would be undertaken. What is required, within the scope of

such a manual, is emphasis upon the procedures via which this tailoring
effect could be achieved. Most pertinent to this tailoring effort is
the procedure for examining the special characteristics of a given urban
environment, the analysis of those techniques which have recently failed
or succeeded within that particular environment, the production of command-
ers' guidelines which would incorporate this analysis, and the dissemination
of detailed, current guidance to all levels of the operation. In short, a
manual which deals with urban insurgency must address itself to the special
techniques necessary for providing tailored, up-to-date, locally relevant
tactics appropriate for the particular urban environment within which the
insurgency is being combatted.

Such a manual would address itself not only to the training and qual-
ification of the individual advisors who would be involved in urban insurg-
ency operations; equally important, it would provide detailed procedures
for the training and orientation of the military units engaged in counter-
insurgency operations. Because the sustained integration of political
awareness and tactical procedures is crucial to the success of an urban
counterinsurgency effort, assuring this integration will require careful
orientation of all personnel prior to their introduction into the environ-
ment within which this effort is being carried out; moreover, it will also
require the on-going review and adjustment of tactics, and hence will require
the continuation of training in the midst of the operation itself. Specific
procedures for the conduct of this training would be a central feature of
such a manual. For example, the analysis of the impact of current operations
on public opinion would require the daily consideration of how these oper-
ations are portrayed on television; in terms of the on-going training of

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units would have to undertake such operations as a secondary mission. Be-
cause of these factors, the most reasonable course of action would be to
treat urban counterinsurgency as a secondary mission to begin with, to
identify those units which might feasibly assume this mission, and to de-
velop a training program via which preparation for this mission could be
integrated into the normal training of these units.

Since the FID mission calls for advisory assistance in the initial
stages of an insurgency, unit involvement at that point would very likely
be confined to the deployment of mobile training teams capable of providing
instruction in special skills -- such as military police, military intelli-
gence, psyops, engineer or Special Forces subjects. Orienting these MTT's
in the special characteristics of urban insurgency could be achieved via
the development of a special program of instruction to be made available
prior to their deployment. While this instruction could be tailored to the
specific environment within which the MTT's would operate, its crucial con-
tent would be the detailed treatment of those political awareness factors
set forth in Chapter Eight. In effect, then, what is required is a rel-
atively brief POI -- probably no more than a two-week course -- which would
provide tactical orientation appropriate for an MTT being deployed into an
urban insurgency situation. A similar POI of somewhat greater duration
could also be developed for utilization by general purpose forces being
deployed in the later stages of an insurgency.

While such instruction would be heavily oriented toward political
awareness, its content would be essentially tactical and its successful
delivery would therefore require the development of tactical exercises in-
tegrating the principles of political awareness with operational techniques.
The conduct of such exercises need not be dependent on the availability of

expensive mock-ups of an urban area, however, for the most important training aids in this program would not be buildings; what is crucial in urban insurgency is the human element, and hence what would be required would be personnel who could play the roles of an insurgent force and, even more important, the roles of an urban population caught in the middle of an insurgent operation. In the development of these exercises, the most effective training scenario would be one which demonstrates the meaning of patience, discrimination and restraint, which provides detailed experience in how to avoid types of provocation, and which thereby amplifies the peril of escalation. The development of this program of instruction would require systematic experimentation with new methods of training, of course, but once these methods have been developed the resources required to conduct such training could be drawn from personnel already available.

Measuring the full impact of this instruction would be difficult, primarily because it would involve new techniques not yet tested under fire, and also because the successful achievement of political awareness in any given counterinsurgency environment would require attention to the subtle peculiarities of that particular environment. Nevertheless, the minimal impact of such instruction would be its capacity to create an awareness that urban insurgency is, in fact, a form of conflict which differs vastly from open warfare and which requires, as a result, a different kind of psychological orientation on the part of those personnel engaged in urban counterinsurgency operations. Once this awareness has been achieved, the task would be to reinforce it within the context of the operation itself, by means of the on-going training effort described earlier.

What is therefore most important about this orientation effort is the recognition that a successful urban counterinsurgency effort does not re-

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quire specially designed units. Rather, it requires the psychological prep-
aration of whatever units are to engage in such operations. Thus the task
is to develop training techniques by means of which any given unit could be
successfully oriented with regard to the political characteristics of urban
insurgency. The identification of those units likely to be required for
such operations -- that is, the identification of those units which should
undertake urban counterinsurgency training as part of their secondary mis-
sion -- could then be carried out in the manner via which other force re-
quirements are developed.

3. Training For Urban Counterinsurgency Via the CPX Method

Training doctrine appropriate for the preparation of specific units
is one thing. The development of techniques via which these units may coordi-
nate their activities with the non-military components of a counterinsurgency
effort is another thing.

This coordination is important in the containment of an insurgent threat
because military action must be integrated with civic action if undue provo-
cation and an accidental mushrooming of the insurgement movement are to be
prevented. It is equally important in the elimination of such a threat,
since elimination requires resolution of the various causes underlying the
insurgency, and since these causes are most likely to be civic in nature.
Within the context of the urban environment, such coordination between the
military effort and the civic effort is far more important than it is in
rural counterinsurgency operations, simply because the battlefield is ident-
ical with the population base for whose loyalty the battles of urban insurgency

are being fought.

Training in the techniques necessary to achieve such coordination need not involve the actual employment of military units and civic elements. It can be achieved through what amounts to a variation on the command post exercise method -- for a CPX played against an urban insurgency scenario could readily provide the experience, and hence the expertise, necessary to bring about coordination between military and civic elements. Such a CPX would involve representatives of the elements typically involved in the operation of a city: the police and fire departments, the legal and political offices, the transportation and power agencies, the hospitals, the communications centers, the schools, the churches. Indeed, a five-day CPX of this sort is presently operated on a regular basis by the state of California in training representatives of such agencies against an urban disorder scenario. At a specific moment within this scenario, participants in the California CPX are likely to be engaged in dispatching fire trucks to multiple points, committing reserve police elements to break up riots at still other points, making decisions about the evacuation of a flooded suburb, coping with a make-believe hijacking incident -- in short, with any of the metropolitan crises which daily require interaction of different civic agencies. The most important lesson to be drawn from the California model is that the mastery of coordination techniques is best achieved when such representatives play roles other than their normal roles -- when a real-world police chief plays, for example, the role of a CPX mayor, and thereby learns what the mayor's role really is. A similar CPX conducted within the framework of the FID program would have military personnel playing the role of various local agencies, as well as the role of other US Government agencies likely

to be involved in the stabilization effort -- the end product being not
only an increased understanding of what these other roles involve, but also
an increased awareness of how the military effort must be coordinated with
the civic effort if it is to be effective.

One of the immediate consequences likely to be drawn from such CPX ad-
ventures is that the initial burden of the counterinsurgency effort within
an urban complex is best borne not by military units at all, but by local
police agencies and local security forces. Indeed, the case studies of
Section II indicate that the military escalation of urban insurgency --
particularly in Algiers -- has often been due to a military lack of awareness
as to how to improve or revitalize the capabilities and functions of a local
police force. Since the basic goal of the FID effort is to prevent unrest
and subversion from escalating into insurgency at all, the development of
self-restraint on the part of military advisory personnel could be one of
the most important byproducts of the CPX training program. If the Army is
to avoid overcommitment, and if it is to avoid the erosion process upon
which revolution (and strategic insurgency) would be predicated, guarding
against its own unnecessary involvement in such counterinsurgency activities
is, of course, most important. This means guarding against the unnecessary
involvement of even local military forces, lest the insurgent situation be
thereby escalated out of control -- and hence it means the development of
advisory assistance techniques for reinforcing local security agencies other
than military forces. Indeed, learning how to rely on local police, local
security, and local government -- as opposed to relying on sheer military
force -- would be one of the central objectives of an urban insurgency CPX.

A second objective of this CPX effort would be the development of mil-

itary commanders capable of coordinating the activities of their own units with those of purely civic agencies if, in the end, US military forces were drawn into an urban counterinsurgency mission. For if that mission were actually undertaken, the day-to-day integration of the Army's actions with those of other agencies -- such as the local police and the local government -- would generate problems not likely to have been encountered before. Again, the role-reversal method of training lends itself to recognition of what these problems actually involve.

Finally, the urban insurgency CPX format lends itself to a detailed, step-by-step exploration of the problems which the Army might encounter in a specifically identified urban environment. Faced with the possibility of involvement in the affairs of a particular foreign city, the best possible command preparation for understanding these affairs in advance would be the utilization of a CPX training vehicle. In this sense, such a CPX would be an exercise in contingency planning. What would be required if, say, the local police apparatus has been infiltrated, its intelligence system has been eroded, its effectiveness has been undermined? Would military assumption of the police role be preferable? Since theoretical answers are rarely reliable in such matters, the CPX format could be adapted to accomodate such contingency thinking -- and, hopefully, could be expected to produce alternatives to military involvement. At the very minimum, it would produce the techniques and attitudes which would be necessary for the coordination of the military effort with the civic effort in a specific foreign environment.

The difficulties inherent in the mere concept of such a CPX indicate why urban counterinsurgency is itself so complex. As described earlier, it is this complexity -- particularly in the matter of coordination -- which means such operations can hardly accomodate the principle of simplicity

which governs the ideal conduct of ordinary warfare. Coming to grips with
this complexity would be, therefore, an additional benefit to be derived
from the conduct of such CPX's."

4. The Need to Develop Non-military Counterterror Capabilities

The development of a separate manual, the preparation of a special in-
structional package, and the conduct of carefully designed CPX's would assist
the Army in preparing for an urban counterinsurgency mission within the con-
text of the FID program. However, they would not meet the requirements of a
very special aspect of urban insurgency: the threat of sustained, carefully
coordinated terrorist actions, carried out across international boundaries
and effecting US strategic interests, undertaken in such a way the FID pro-
gram is not readily adaptable to their containment."

The recent operations of the so-called Black September organization
provide a hint of this potential threat." The terrorist action advocated in
Marighella's Minimanual illustrates the methodology involved: assassination,
kidnapping, hijacking, bombing. As described in Chapters Two and Three,
terrorist action of this sort could reach the intensity of an insurgent move-
ment without even appearing to do so, simply because of its dispersion through-
out a network of cities. Because of this dispersion, and because it is not
identifiable as some localized problem, the process of containment envisioned
in the FID program would be essentially irrelevant to it. And yet, because
of the way its diplomatic and technological interests are extended throughout
the world, the US is an ideal target for such terrorist action. As a special
form of urban insurgency -- and one which lends itself to future strategic
employment -- such terrorism requires special consideration.

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Combatting urban terrorism within the US itself is not, of course, an Army mission. Nor is it necessarily an Army mission within the cities of a foreign country since there, as in the US, the proper containment of terrorist incidents is primarily a function of local police agencies. Nevertheless, the Army must be concerned with the terrorist threat for three reasons. First, it is conceivable that within a foreign environment and even within the context of the FID program, a police inability to cope with urban terrorism could lead to a request for US Army advisory assistance in the techniques of its containment. Second, the possible involvement of the National Guard -- and the Army's responsibility for Guard readiness -- results in an indirect concern for even domestic terrorism. And third, its on-going need to assess the military significance of terrorism means that its intelligence apparatus must constantly evaluate these activities, lest their possible strategic importance escape notice.

Although these three factors result in separate needs, they are still interrelated in terms of the response required: a close integration of the Army's resources with those of other agencies.

Domestically, the national task must be to insure police proficiency. This means the development of both local and Federal counter-terrorist teams, whose skills would preclude the need for Guard involvement (or active Army involvement) in such matters. To insure this, the Army's task is to encourage the development of such teams and -- to the extent it can do so without aggravating public opinion -- to assist in their technical training, if need be. Public opinion is of crucial importance, however, in view of the national traditions citied earlier; thus the Army's assistance in such police-team trained must be carefully measured. All this means close coordination between the Army and various domestic security agencies to insure a proper response,

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by the proper agencies, to urban terrorism within the US.

Outside the US, the task is essentially the same: the development of adequate police capabilities. To achieve this, US governmental assistance would be primarily the function of non-military agencies -- and thus the Army's task is to encourage within these agencies the development of non-military assistance teams prepared to aid in the development of foreign police capabilities. When US interests are threatened in such a way this assistance is not readily requested, or when the terrorism is so dispersed that such a need is not readily recognized, the problem of protecting US interests without intervening in the affairs of a foreign nation becomes extremely difficult. Given the Army's traditional role in national defense, and given the problems associated with the preservation of its resources amid a dual-warfare mission, it can be argued that the worst possible reaction to such a potential threat would be the development of special US Army counter-terror teams to be dispatched in the event of such an emergency. As with domestic terrorism, the more appropriate solution would be the development of counterterror teams by Federal agencies other than the Army. As with the domestic problem, this nevertheless entails close coordination between the Army and those other Federal agencies, particularly with regard to training, operational control and intelligence assessment.

Intelligence assessment, the third major factor governing US Army interest in world-wide terrorism, is a far more difficult consideration. Because of its dispersion, because it is ideally suited to the attack of modern technological functions (as described in Chapter Two) rather than geographically isolated targets, such terrorism makes new demands on the military recognition of a strategic threat. Indeed, part of the threat potential is this difficulty in its recognition. Because of its uniqueness, and because of the

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magnitude which it could assume, this threat literally requires the develop-
ment of new techniques of intelligence collection and evaluation. The con-
clusion to be drawn, then, is that here -- as in the development of national
and foreign police capabilities -- the Army's task is to encourage the de-
velopment of an intelligence apparatus capable of engaging in this particular
effort and, to the extent necessary, lending its own resources to this de-
velopment.

Essentially, therefore, the general conclusion to be drawn from the
current study of terrorism is that its containment is not appropriately a
US Army mission." To insure that it does not inherit this mission by default,
the Army must therefore devote attention to the threat in order to encourage
the development, by other agencies, of a more appropriate capability of
countering this threat."

5. Problems for the Future

Of the major conclusions to be drawn from the study of urban insurgency,
the two most complex are those which center upon the problem of erosion and
the problem of strategic diversion. These are, however, the most serious
problems underlying the threat of urban insurgency. For if the ultimate
meaning of the urban insurgency threat is that for the US it is not so much
a revolutionary matter as it is a matter of force stability and technological
survival, then the threat demands foresight far beyond the provisions of the
FID program and its associated doctrine.

In the sense described in Chapter Seven, the Army is vulnerable to
erosion because of the national traditions which define its character. Be-
cause of the urbanization described in Chapter Two, the US itself is vulner-

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able to a carefully controlled attack against specific technological functions. Because of all this, the US presents an ideal target for strategically-inspired insurgency, whose goal would be the diversion and erosion of its armed forces, plus the crippling of its economy. None of this is likely to go unnoticed by its enemies. The task, therefore, is to guard against this vulnerability.

One response, cited in Chapter Seven, must be the careful management of the National Guard. Although the active Army cannot be directly concerned with domestic affairs, it is nevertheless concerned with the training and peace time use of the Guard. If the Guard is diverted into an excessive domestic role, its mobilization readiness will be diminished accordingly; if its execution of the domestic disturbance role is not extremely skillful, it will suffer severe recruiting and retention problems as well. The Guard is therefore deeply vulnerable to erosion, and since the Guard constitutes half of the Army's tactical strength (and half of its overall strategic reserve), the Army's concern for its overall stability must lead to a greater concern for the Guard's role in domestic matters. Essentially, this means the Army must encourage restraint in the domestic utilization of the Guard. It also means the Army must strengthen its training assistance, particularly with regard to the development of realistic, non-provocative techniques for carrying out the domestic role. In short, it must recognize that the principles of urban counterinsurgency described in Chapter Seven apply, domestically, to the kinds of stability operations in which the Guard would be engaged -- and, further, it must insure that these principles are incorporated into Guard procedures.

Additionally, the Army must resist the temptation to become involved in insurgency outside the US. If the problem of erosion is as severe as it appears to be, the Army's task is not only to avoid over-commitment, but also

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to avoid involvement in operations which would erode its own capacity to maintain a strong conventional war capability. Half of this task would be met by the implementation of those principles set forth in Chapter Eight if, indeed, the Army becomes involved in urban counterinsurgency operations. The other half would be met by the development of a strong sense of self-restraint in seeking such involvement.

This is not to say that the threat will vanish if it is merely seen and avoided. It is not likely that the future will be so kind. But it is to recognize that the fundamental principles of revolution -- those principles which now lend themselves to action which is not so much revolutionary as it is strategic -- are principles which begin with the premise that orthodox military forces can be destroyed piecemeal if they can be drawn steadily, and unsuspectingly, into action which is essentially self-defeating. Avoiding that outcome may well be the most important single aspect of the struggle ahead.

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