

RETIRED FILE

JOB 85-00671R

BOX 2 FOLDER 016

DESENSITIZED

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REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

SAIGON, August 1, 1966

4946/XD/411

SECRETARY GENERAL

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M E M O R A N D U M

SUBJECT : Administration of R.D. Cadres.

REFERENCE: - Decree # 137-ND/XDNT, dated June 26th., 1966 concerning statute of the Revolutionary Development Branch.
- Message # 567-XD/41, dated April 16th. 1966 concerning disseminating announcement of recruiting of R.D. cadres.
- Memorandum # 4606-QP/QSI, dated May 4th. 1966 concerning recruiting of R.D. cadres.
- Memorandum # 3663-XD/41, dated June 1st. 1966 concerning provisional exemption of Revolutionary Development cadres.
- Message # 4066-XD/412, dated June 21st. 1966 concerning high-price special allowance.
- Memorandum # 4234-XD/4, dated June 29th. 1966 concerning request of decorations.
- Message # 4264-XD/4, dated June 30th. 1966 concerning issuance of Revolutionary Development cadres' identification cards.
- Memorandum # 4543-XD/410, dated July 13th. 1966 concerning forbiddingness of re-recruiting cadres who have been discharged by the Revolutionary Development, National Training Center.
- Message # 1041-XD/4, dated July 1st 1966 concerning recruitment of new cadres for replenishing purpose.
- Message # 4715-XD/4, dated July 21st. 1966 concerning regulations and conditions applied for R.D. applicants.

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ADMINISTRATION OF R.D. CADRES

In order to control the strength and the administrative situations of cadres, after the transitive phase, and in the meantime reassign cadres of various

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branches (Mobile Administration, Rural Political, New Life Hamlet and APA) to the Revolutionary Development Branch, the provinces are requested to apply the following regulations:

A. Reassignment of Branches:

According to Decree # 137-ND/KDNT dated January 26th. 1966 (Paragraph IV Art. 29-30 and 31) of the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee and successive memorandums of the Ministry, all cadres of Mobile Administration, Rural Political, New Life Hamlet and APA branches are supposed to be reassigned to the Revolutionary Development Branch.

Reassigned cadres from other branches to R.D. branches must go through with same regulations that applied to newly recruited cadres as fixed in Para II - Art. 6 of the above mentioned decree and must go through a training course at the R.D. National Training Center (Vung Tau) except the APA cadres who have been trained at the R.D. National Training Center already.

Cadres designed by the provinces to go to the National Training Center for training purposes and refuse to go will be discharged (Art. 32 of the above mentioned decree).

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B. Newly Recruited Cadres:

a. To be provisionally recruited, applicants must have the following conditions:

1/ Vietnamese nationality.

2/ Having good behavior and full rights of a citizen.

3/ At least 17 years old.

4/ Having good health, not in physical disability or cureless illness.

5/ Pledge themselves to serve the R.D. branch at least two (2) years and will reimburse training and other expenditures if leaving or deserting R.D. branch before ending of enlistment term.

6/ If the applicant is female, she must guarantee that she is not in pregnancy when going to training course and will reimburse training and other expenditures if, due to pregnancy, she cannot attend training course at the National Training Center.

False declaration of this matter would lead her to termination (by the province) and no allowances should be paid for her.

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b. Recruiting of new cadres to replace resigning, deserting or discharged cadres without consent of the Ministry is strictly forbidden (Ref. Message # 1041/XD/4/CD, dated July 1st. 1966).

c. Cultural certificates are not required from the applicant. However, we should recruit the applicants who can read and write fluently so that they may be capable to attend training courses at the R.D. National Training Center Vung Tau.

While operating at the rural areas, R.D. cadres should encourage the youths who have firm nationalist spirit to enlist to Revolutionary Development Branch.

Applicants introduced by R.D. Groups must be considered by the provinces with priority.

d. Youths of 20 years old and 30 years old (on recruiting date) should not be recruited. This regulation will not be applied for veterans.

e. Youths from 21 years old to 29 years, may be recruited despite their drafting situation is illegal except men who have deserted from Regular Forces, Regional Forces or Popular Forces.

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- f. Recruiting of Youths who have Baccalaureate I degree or higher or degrees of equal value must be restricted because the Defense Ministry does not agree to give collective provisional exemption will be considered individually and by request only (Ref. Memorandum # 4606/QP/QSI dated May 4th. 1966 of the National Defense Ministry).
- g. The number of newly recruited cadres will be fixed in advance by the Ministry before opening of each training course.
- h. If the applicant has enough conditions as required above, he will be provisionally recruited by a Mission Order of the province (carbon-copy of this Order must be sent to the Ministry Rural Operation Directorate). The province may discharge these provisional cadres.
- i. R.D. cadres must be men who voluntarily enlist and must be local people so that they might have the utmost operational efficiency. Therefore, we should only use local facilities in disseminating recruiting announcements (Ref. Message # 0567/XD/41/CD dated April 16th. 1966).

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After having graduated from the R.D. National Training Center, newly recruited cadres will be assigned to the province where they have been recruited.

- J. Despite Decree # 137-ND/XDNT dated June 21st, 1966 has clearly fixed necessary conditions concerning recruiting of R.D. cadres, the Council is advised that recruiting of cadres at some provinces is still in huddle-muddle. For example: recruiting of men who deserted from the Army or undesirable youths.

Therefore, recruiting of R.D. cadres must be applied with the following regulations:

- 1/ Before being recruited, applicants must have administrative and security clearances made by local security agencies.
- 2/ Before being sent to the R.D. National Training Center (Vung Tau), newly recruited cadres must be sent to some R.D. groups which are actually operating for observing purposes (Ref. Message # 4715-XD/4 dated July 21st, 1966).

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C. Enlistment Records:

1. Enlistment Records:

Enlistment records of R.D. cadres are composed of:

- Reassignment form (if the applicant is former cadre of Mobile Administration, Rural Political, New Life Hamlet, APA branches).
- Application form (for new applicants).
- Copy of birth certificate.
- Copy of juridical certificate (Form #3) issued by the Court (not over three (3) months).
- Administrative and security clearances (made by recruiting agency).
- Copies of diploma, cultural certificate (if existent).
- Administration certificate, office seniority certificate (for former civil servants).
- Discharge certificate (for veterans)
- Medical certificate (issued by Medical Agencies).
- Certificate stating that applicant is not in pregnancy issued by Medical Agencies

(for female applicants).

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- Enlistment bond stating that applicant will serve the Revolutionary Branch at least two years.

2. Enlistment records of Group Leaders and Assistant Group Leaders:

Especially, applicants for Group Leader level must furnish two copies of each above mentioned record.

- 1 copy will be kept at the Provincial Commanding Board.

- 1 copy will be sent to the Revolutionary Development Ministry (Rural Operations Directorate.)

D. Training:

Applicants who have enough conditions and records as requested above, will be provisionally recruited and will be sent to the R.D. National Training Center at Vung Tau for training purposes.

Only cadres who have been graduated from the R.D. National Training Center would be considered definitely recruited. Provincial Commanding Boards will make official decisions for the assignment of these graduated cadres and copies of these decisions will be sent to the Revolutionary Development Ministry for approval.

During training course, applicants who show themselves incapable or have bad behavior will be sent by the

R.D. National Training Center Commander back to their local provinces where they will be discharged.

Applicants who quit without permission or desert have to reimburse the Government all training and other expenditures that have been spent for them during the training phase.

After the training course, R.D. cadres will be sent back to their local provinces for assignment and operation.

E. Transferring:

- Transferring of cadres from province to province must be avoided.
- In irresistible cases, R.D. cadre may ask for transfers or inter-transfers with the consent of the concerned provinces.

F. Re-recruiting:

The following cadres are not subjects to be re-recruited:

1. Cadres who have been discharged by the R.D. National Training Center (Vung Tau) by disciplinary and security reasons (Ref. Memorandum # 4548-XD/410 dated July 13th, 1966).
2. Cadres who have been discharged for having refused to go to the R.D. National Training

Center for training purposes.

- 3. Cadres of the provinces who have been discharged by disciplinary and security reasons.


G. General Administration Rule :

- 1. The operation unit of the Revolutionary Development Branch is the R.D. Group which is composed of 59 men.

The R.D. Group is commanded by a Group Leader who is assisted by one or many Assistant Group Leaders. By principle, the Group is composed of the following elements:

- a. The Staff.....5 men
- b. The Armed Propaganda Inter-team...6 men
- c. The Construction Inter-Team which is composed of :
 - 1. The C.G, Team.....6 men
 - 2. The Civic Action Team 6 men
 - 3. The New Life Development Team..6 men

ORGANIZATION CHART



TOTAL: 59 Men

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2. Tasks:

Following are the tasks of the Group:

- Exploiting military victories of the ARVN and its allies in order to maintain and develop security at under-construction areas.
- Gaining people's sympathy by using good behavior and helps contribute to the people.
- Controlling, sorting out the people and extirpating the VC infrastructure.
- Improving and developing the people's economic, social and political conditions conforming to their aspirations.
- Forming democratic infrastructure at rural areas.

3. Functions:

RD cadres have only a single classification with various functions:

- Team member.
- Assistant Team Leader.
- Team Leader.
- Assistant Group Leader.
- Group Leader.

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SENIORITY REQUIRED FOR STEP PROMOTION

There are 11 steps for R.D cadres promotion

Minimum seniority required for promotion of one step is 1 year and maximum is 3 years.

To be promoted, R.D cadre must be proposed by the Provincial R.D. Council and decision will be made by the Province Chief, in the sphere of strength fixed by the Revolutionary Development Ministry for each province.

4. Assignment:

All of the R.D cadres who have been graduated from training courses reserved for Team Leaders, Assistant Team Leaders Assistant Group Leaders and Group Leaders must be assigned to their proper functions.

Cadres who want to be assigned to higher functions must have the 2 following conditions:

- Have been graduated from training courses which equal to new function.
- Have been proposed by the Provincial Promotion Council.

However, all the assignment of R.D. cadres must be restricted in the sphere of

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strength fixed by the Revolutionary Development Ministry.

All the assignment must be decided by the Province Chief, except the RD Provincial Commanding Board Chief who will be assigned by decree of the Revolutionary Development Ministry according to the proposal of the Provincial Promotion Council.

5/ Promotion Council:

The Promotion Council is composed of:

- The Chief of ProvincePresident
- The Chief of RD Provincial Council,
Standing Board....Member
- The Chief of RD Pro. Com. Board.....Member
- The Chief of District where the Group is
operatingMember
- The RD Group Leader of the concern-
ed cadreMember.

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H. Allowances and Salaries:

1. Salary of Cadres:

Following are salary rates of the R.D. cadres (Paragraph III, Art. 9 of the above mentioned decree):

- Step 1.....	2,500VN\$/month	+30%	3,250VN\$
- Step 2.....	2,700VN\$/month	--	3,510VN\$
- Step 3.....	2,900VN\$/month	--	3,770VN\$
- Step 4.....	3,100VN\$/month	--	4,030VN\$
- Step 5.....	3,300VN\$/month	--	4,290VN\$
- Step 6.....	3,500VN\$/month	--	4,550VN\$
- Step 7.....	3,700VN\$/month	--	4,810VN\$
- Step 8.....	3,900VN\$/month	--	5,070VN\$
- Step 9.....	4,100VN\$/month	--	5,330VN\$
- Step 10.....	4,300VN\$/month	--	5,590VN\$
- Step 11.....	4,500VN\$/month	--	5,850VN\$

2. Function Allowance:

- Assistant Team Leader.....500VN\$/month
- Team Leader.....1,000VN\$/month
- Assistant Group Leader....1,500VN\$/month
- Group Leader.....2,000VN\$/month

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3. High-price Allowance:

A high-price allowance rate has been fixed by the Revolutionary Development Ministry effective June 1st, 1966 (Ref. Message # 4066-XD/412/Bd dated June 21st, 1966).

I. Awards, Posthumous Awards:

R.D. cadres who have good records and achievements may be decorated by the province with:

- Letter for Service
- Certificate of Honorable Service
- Certificate of Testimonial
- Certificate of Honor

and military or civilian decorations. Also they may be offered gifts or money by the Province Chiefs.

R.D. cadres who are wounded, disabled or killed in action will be decorated or posthumously awarded with military and/or military medals.

In the meantime, the Revolutionary Development Ministry may issue various kinds of crosses, such as:

- Revolutionary Development Cross.
- Wound Cross (VN decoration)

(Ref. Circular #1912-XD/213 dated March 22, 1966)

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Referring to proposals of the provinces concerning awards and posthumous awards for wounded or killed cadres who risk their life for the Fatherland, the R.D. Provincial Councils are suggested to work it out in the following way: (Ref. Memorandum # 4234/XD/4 dated June 29th. 1966)

1. For military decorations, please contact the concerned Tactical Zone through military channels.
2. For civilian decorations, please contact the Government Representative Regional Office.

Carbon copies of these proposals must be sent to the Revolutionary Development Ministry for intervention, if needed.

J. Disciplinary Measures:

R.D. cadres would be subjects to punishment, if:

- Violating discipline as fixed by present regulations. Such as: Committing mistakes while performing one's function, insubordination, having bad conduct which can damage cadres' prestige while operating or even during off time.

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- Expressing a bad attitude which does not meet with the spirit required for men who serve the nation. Such as: escapism, evading of responsibility, counter-propaganda, contact with anti-government groups, disturbing public order, etc...

- a. Toward provisionally recruited cadres, the Province Chief has full rights to issue direct warning, animadversion and termination.
- b. Toward R.D. cadres who commit minor mistakes, the Province Chief has full rights to issue warning, animadversion which may be noted in the concerned cadres' individual record without convening the Disciplinary Council.
- c. Toward definitively recruited cadres who commit big mistakes, the Province Chief will convene a Disciplinary Council which is comprised of :
 - Chief of Province Chairman
 - R.D. Provincial Council, Chief of Standing Board Member
 - R.D. Provincial Commanding Board Chief..... Member

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- Chief of District where the Group is operatingMember
- Group Leader of the concerning cadre.....Member

The following measures should be proposed by the Disciplinary Council to the R.D. Ministry, according to the importance of the mistake:

- Postponement of promotion for 1 or 2 years.
- Reduction of grade (1 or 2 steps).
- Forced leave without pay (from 1 to 3 months).
- Termination.
- Termination without termination pay.
- Termination with " ineligible for rehire" in Government's agencies.

In case of desertion, the province will make pursuing order which must be sent to all security agencies of the country for pursuing purposes.

In case the deserting cadre is still subject to military service, besides, reports sent to security agencies and the R.D, Ministry (Rural Operations Directorate), carbon copies of these reports must be sent to the Military Office of the Special Area, The Garrison and the Mobilization Directorate of the Defense Ministry (Ref. Message # 4284-XD/4/BD dated June 30th, 1966).

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Especially, toward resigning cadres who still are subject to military service, the province must inform the local Garrison, the Mobilization Directorate of the Defense Ministry and the Rural Operations Directorate with the new address of the concerning cadre.

K. Hospitalization, KIA/MIA Allowance, Termination Pay:

1. Medical Care:

R.D. cadres and their dependents (legitimate wife/husband and children) are permitted to have medical care at public hospitals without medical fees.

2. Hospitalization:

If needed, the doctors will send the patients to the most suitable public hospital.

R.D. cadres and their dependents will be considered with same privileges reserved for civil servants of Group B on hospitalization matters.

R.D. female cadres and legitimate wives of R.D. cadres will be permitted to enter maternity hospitals for confinement as civil servants of Group B.

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3/ Hospital Fees:

Hospital fees will be paid by the province and the R.D. Ministry will reimburse it to the province.

4. Convalescence:

After leaving the hospital, sick cadres will be proposed by Government's doctors to have a maximum convalescence as follows:

- a. Normal sickness....7 days (doctor's proposal required)
- b. Sickness caused by public service... 29 days (medical Survey Council's proposal required)
- c. Wounded in Action....3 months (Medical Survey Council's proposal required)

5. Death Gratuity:

Dependents (wife/husband or parents to be fed) of Cadres killed in action or died in action, will be paid with:

- Burying allowance.....VN\$3,000
- Death gratuity equals the cadre's last month salary x 12

6. Missing or Kidnapped:

Dependents of cadres who are missing or kidnapped will be permitted to continue to get the cadre's salary for 12 months.

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7. Termination Pay:

- a. Provisionally recruited cadres (if terminated and resigning cadres will not be paid with termination pay.
- b. Cadres whose termination is not caused by disciplinary and security reasons will be paid with a 15 day termination pay for each year of service. Cadres whose seniority is more than 1 year and have an additional 6 month service will be considered as having served one more year effective their second year of service (Art. 12 of Decree # 137/ND/XDNT dated January 26th, 1966).

No cadres will be terminated for the single reason of not having been trained at the R.D. National Training Center, except in the case of the refusing to go to the training course when designed,

L. Provisional Exemption:

According to Decree # 137-ND/XDNT dated January 26th, 1966 (Par. VI, Art. 22), RD cadres are provisionally exempted while serving the R.D. Branch.

According to Memo # 4606 dated May 6th, 1966 and

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Memo # 2456 dated March 3rd. 1966, of the Defense Ministry provisional exemption will not be granted to RD cadres of following cases:

- a. Cadres who are belonging to the last limit of draft age or reaching last limit of draft age.
- b. Cadres in their very 20 years old (i.e. main class of age to be drafted each year).
- c. Cadres whose military service situation is illegal.
- d. Cadres who are graduated with Faccalaureate I or higher degree or certificates of equal value.

The four above mentioned items have caused difficulties to the Revolutionary Development Branch, therefore the Revolutionary Development Ministry has tried its best in persuading the Defense Ministry to reconsider the matter. As a result, by Memorandum # 4606/QP/QSI, the Defense Ministry has ordered that the following measures should be taken for provisional exemption of RD cadres (Ref. Memorandum # 3663/XD/41 dated June 1st. 1966):

1. RD cadres who are 20 years old (born in 1946) and have been recruited prior to April 30th. 1966 will be provisionally exempted.

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2. RD cadres from 20 years old to 29 years old (born from 1937 - 1946) and have been recruited prior to April 30th. 1966, despite illegality in compulsory service will be permitted to adjust their drafting statute and continue to serve the RD Branch.
3. Provisional exemption of RD cadres who possess Baccalaureate I or higher degrees will be considered by the Exemption Committee, individually.
4. In case that a RD cadre who resigns or is being discharged or being terminated, the province must recover all papers concerning his provisional exemption, inform the Sector. Carbon copies of reports submitted to the Sector must be sent to the Mobilization Directorate of the Defense Ministry and the Rural Operations Directorate. Cadres who leave the Revolutionary Development Branch are subject to compulsory service like any other citizen. Although the Defense Ministry did not agree to grant provisional exemption to youths of 20 years old (except RD cadres who have been recruited prior to April 30th 1966) and of 30 years old, but has given

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special favors to RD cadres. Thus, from now on the recruiting of cadres at the provinces will no longer be disturbed (please apply paragraph B of this memorandum concerning recruiting of new cadres, strictly).

However, the Provincial Commanding Boards are suggested to continue to make exemption lists for all the RD of the province (for each semester, at the end of June and December) conforming with following procedures and send them to the Rural Operations Directorate for intervention. We should not intervene to have provisional exemption for cadres of 20 years old and 30 years old.

(Counting up to the date that the exemption request is made.)

I. Period from July 1st. 1966 to December 31st. 1966:

Make 2 separate lists for:

- A. Cadres who operate permanently at villages/Hamlets.
- B. Cadres of district level or higher levels who do not operate permanently at villages/hamlets.

Each list will be listed with the following elements:

- A. 20 year old cadres who have been recruited

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prior to April 30th, 1966 (counting up to the year that list is set up).

B. Cadres from 21 years to 29 years old
(cadres of 30 years old will not be listed in this list because they are supposed to report to military authorities for military service).

C. Cadres graduated with Bacalalaureate I or higher degrees (for all classes of draft age).

D. Cadres sent to RD National Training Center (Vung Tau) for training purposes.

2. Period from January 1st, 1967 to June 30th 1967:

Make 2 separate lists to ask for provisional exemption (like part I) except cadres who are reaching 20 years old (counting up to the year that the list is set up). Especially, the RD National Training Center (Vung Tau) must set up a list (list E) to ask for provisional exemption of its cadres. Attached herewith:
Forms of lists of RD cadres who ask for provisional exemption.

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LIST OF RD CADRES WHO OPERATE PERMANENTLY AT _____

ASKING FOR PROVISIONAL EXEMPTION:

Names	Date and place of birth	Highest diploma	#, date and issuing place of ID Card	Present address	Situation of provisional exemption	Type of Cadre	Operational location (village hamlet, etc.)
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a/ 20 year old cadres:

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b/ Cadres of other classes of age (except 30 year old cadres)

.....

c/ Cadres graduated with Baccalaureate I:

.....

d/ Cadres sent to Vung Tau Center for training purposes:

.....

LIST OF RD CADRES OF DISTRICT LEVEL OR HIGHER LEVELS WHO
DO NOT OPERATE PERMANENTLY AT VILLAGE/HAMLETS ASKING FOR
PROVISIONAL EXEMPTION

From July 1st, 1966 to
December 31st, 1966

Names	Date and Place of Birth	Highest Diploma	#, Date and issuing place of ID Card	Present Address	Situation of provisional exemption	Type of Cadres	Operation Location (Villages, Hamlet, etc.)
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A/ 20 Year Old Cadres:

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B/ Cadres of Other Classes of Age: (except 30 year old cadres)

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.....
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C/ Cadres Graduated with Baccalaureate I:

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.....
.....

D/ Cadres Sent to Vung Tau Center for Training Purposes:

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.....
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M. Files, Archives and Documents:

1.- Individual Records:

All individual records of the RD cadres and of the Provincial Commanding Board will be conserved at the Provincial Commanding Office.

2. R.D. Cadres Register:

The Ministry will send to each Provincial Commanding Board a cadre register. This register has 3 copies:

- 1 copy to be kept at the Provincial Commanding Office.
- 1 copy to be kept at the Ministry (Rural Operations Directorate)
- 1 copy that will shuttle between the province and the Ministry.

This register will be up dated as the Individual qualification card is, and each trimester (at the end of March, June, September and December), the Provincial Commanding Board must make an account in order to know the real number of cadres who are actually operating, then have a cadre bring the "shuttle copy" of the register to the Ministry for comparison.

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3. Qualification Card:

Each cadre must fill 3 copies of qualification card furnished by the Ministry.

- 1 copy to be kept at the Provincial Commanding Office (blue)
- 1 copy to be kept at the Ministry (Rural Operations Directorate) (yellow)
- 1 copy (red) that will shuttle between the Rural Operations Directorate and the province. This copy will be updated by the Provincial Commanding Board with every change concerning the cadre's situation. This copy will be attached with decisions, mission orders which concern the cadre (Discharge, desertion, Termination, training, change of function, etc...), and sent to the Rural Operations Directorate in order to control and up date the copy of the Directorate. This copy will be returned to the Provincial Commanding Board.

4. R.D. Identification Card:

Each R.D. cadre will be issued a R.D. Identification card. This card has a double use:

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- To certify the mission of the cadre.
- To certify the provincial exemption of the cadre.

This card will be made by basing on the cadre's qualification card. This card must be signed and sealed by the Chief of R.D. Provincial Commanding Board and the Province Chief and must be sent to the Rural Operations Directorate to have order number, seal and plastic covering. After accomplishment, cards will be sent to the province to be issued to the cadres.

Cadres who have no qualification cards will not be issued with RD Identification Cards. Cadres who fail to show their RD Identification Cards will not be paid.

To save time and to have good results for card making, the Provincial Commanding Boards are requested to have their representatives contact the Rural Operations Directorate directly (we should not use the PTT network, because we have to work against time).

In order to prevent undesirable people from profiting by this card as well as to assure the efficiency of the card, especially for provisional exemption matter, the Provincial Commanding Boards

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are suggested to apply the following procedures concerning issuance of RD Identification Cards:

- Keep the card clean and do not lose it.
- Handing over the card to another person is strictly forbidden.
- Inform the authorities immediately in case of loss. (Loss of card without reasonable explanation will be subject to punishment. Blame will be carried in the cadre's record.)
- Duplicate will not be issued unless investigation of local security agencies have been made to testify that the loss is an irresistible one.
- RD Cadres who are discharged or resign must return their RD cards to the Provincial Commanding Board before being paid the allowances that they are supposed to have.
- RD Cadres who have resigned or deserted and still profit by the RD Identification Card will be subject to prosecution.

This memorandum will be effective from today.

Major General NGUYEN DUC THANG
High Commissioner of Revolutionary Development
Secretary General of the National Council of
Revolutionary Development.

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COPIES TO:

- R.D. Councils of all Provinces/Towns
- R.D. National Training Center "for Execution"
- C/C to: all Tactical Areas R.D. Councils
- All Tactical Zones and Capital Special Area, "for info"

CADRE CONTROL GRP.

JOINT CADRE OPERATIONS CONTROL GROUP

JCOCG Memorandum No. 2

25 October 1966

TO : All American Field Personnel (See Distribution)

FROM : Joint Cadre Operations Control Group, American Embassy, APO 96243

SUBJECT : Memoranda of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development

Attached are two memoranda recently issued by the Ministry of Revolutionary Development: No. 1646; subject: Reorganization and Complementary Training of Revolutionary Development Groups; and No. 1650; subject: Training of Cadres and Admission of New Cadres.

All Americans associated with the RD Cadre Program, whether Embassy/OSA, MACV, USAID or JUSPAO, should become familiar with these documents.

Distribution:

Embassy/OSA	100
MACV	450
USAID	125
JUSPAO	50

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#1650/HDXDNT/TU/411/K

REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM

CENTRAL COUNCIL OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

SECRETARY GENERAL

M E M O R A N D U M

SUBJECT: Training of Cadres and Admission of New Cadres.

After one year of the Revolutionary Development Program (RD), we all realize that to build a new life in rural areas is quite a difficult and delicate task. Only men of ideals who are ready to sacrifice themselves for the benefit of the people may contribute their efforts to this kind of a revolution--to destroy "the old life" and to build "the new life". Therefore, the cadre organization must be sound if it is to meet our operational requirements. We only need men who are qualified in every field and ask them to become men who dedicate themselves to the building of a new life for our beloved rural areas.

This memorandum is to clarify the main problems concerning our 1967 cadre training plan and the admission of new cadres.

I. 1967 CADRE TRAINING PLAN:

A. OBJECTIVES: In 1967, a number of cadres will be trained to permit:

1. Replenishing the Groups which have been trained at Course I and Course II but are still lacking in personnel of authorized strength due to attrition in the ranks.

2. Form new Groups to meet the requirements of the provinces.

3. Re-train a number of Groups which have been previously trained at Vung Tau on subjects other than Revolutionary Development subjects.

B. TECHNIQUE:

1. Barring unforeseen circumstances, ten training courses will be conducted for cadres of various levels during 1967. Each course will last 15 weeks (excluding moving time).

2. The training courses will be numbered from 1 to 10 and comprise 2,500 students according to the following schedule:

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<u>Course</u>	<u>Opening</u>	<u>Closing</u>	<u>Number of Students</u>	<u>Objectives</u>
1/67	2/20th/67	5/21st/67	2,200	To form a number of cadres to replenish the Groups (trained at Course I and Course II) and new Groups.
2/67	3/27th/67	6/24th/67	2,200	From Course 2/67, downward we will train: a. New cadres to form new Groups. b. Old cadres previously trained at Vung Tau in other fields but not yet in RD field.
3/67	5/2nd/67	7/29th/67	2,200	id
4/67	5/23th/67	8/26th/67	2,200	id
5/67	7/3rd/67	9/30th/67	2,200	id
6/67	8/7th/67	11/4th/67	2,200	id
7/67	9/4th/67	12/2nd/67	2,200	id
8/67	10/3th/67	1/6th/68	2,200	id
9/67	11/13th/67	2/10th/68	2,200	id
10/67	12/11th/67	3/16th/68	2,200	id

3. To facilitate transportation and the training schedule of the R.D. National Training Center, the students will be trained in relays. Every five weeks the Center will receive 2,200 new students. The new course will contain the subjects which have been covered in the preceding course.

C. PREPARATIONS:

1. As of now, the provinces are instructed to be ready with accurate and detailed plans for sending cadres to the Training Center in 1967.

2. Preparations may be summarized as follows:

- Make census of cadres now in the province.

- Rearrange the Groups, in order to have all

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- Prepare for admission of a number of new cadres.
- Make estimate of cadres to be sent to the Training Center for each course.

II. CENSUS OF OLD CADRES AND ADMISSION OF NEW CADRES:

A. CENSUS OF OLD CADRES:

1. RD cadres, from the day that the general regulations were issued to this date, have been working in the Group/Team. The Group is the basic unit of our program. However, after one year of operation, the Central Council realized that reshuffling of the Group must be done to better our organization and meet our operational requirements.

2. Reshuffling:

a. The operational unit of the RD cadres is the 50-man Groups.

b. The strength of the Group remains at 50 cadres, but disposition must be made to conform with Memo #1646/XD/43 (dated October 7th 1966) which has been sent to the provinces.

3. According to the new policy, each Group will construct only two hamlets each year. Whenever an Old Life Hamlet has been transformed into a New Life Hamlet (completely finished and conforming to the eleven required standards), the Group will leave a static cadre at the newly constructed hamlet in order that the program will be continued. We will proceed in this manner.

To achieve good results we must have full strength in the Groups. If we fail to keep the Group's strength at the allowable maximum it will gradually become ineffective and will not be able to accomplish its mission.

4. Therefore, at this time the provinces are instructed to make a census of the Groups by the following method:

a. Form cadres graduated from Course I and Course II into full strength Groups with all necessary elements (conforming to the new organization of 50-man Groups).

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b. In these Groups, we must know how many cadres and what kind of cadres are still needed to replenish them (according to new organization).

c. All cadres who were not trained at Course I and Course II, must be formed into specific 50-man Groups.

5. In addition, due to operational requirements, the province may form a number of new Groups. Such province, based on its RD programs, will make proposals concerning the number of Groups to be formed. This will assist the Central Council in decisions on the province's proposals.

B. ADMISSION OF NEW CADRES:

1. From this date, public announcements of the recruitment of new cadres by the use of newspapers and radio broadcasts are strictly forbidden.

2. If we are to have good cadres, we must use motivation. Each Group must discover the male/female nationalist youths who are to be found among the populace on the spot where the Group is operating. The Group must contact and persuade these people. Whenever we are sure that they are convinced of our just cause they will voluntarily sacrifice themselves for the building of a New Life for the rural areas. Based on the cadres' recommendation, the Group will recommend admission of these individuals.

The enlistment of men to the RD Group is the fruit of our motivation.

Enlistment caused by selfish privileges (such as seeking for means of subsistence, military service exemption, fame and wealth, etc.) must be ruled out.

In our routine motivations, old cadres must bring to the people's attention the fact that RD cadres are not men who work for money or to be paid monthly. But they are offered an allowance by their government and will serve their country with a minimum of material facilities. The reason RD cadres are provisionally exempted from military compulsory service is that they are to be free of other responsibilities, including that of serving in the army, so the individual may contribute all his efforts to a single task. To the RD cadre, glory means readiness to endure and enjoy hardship to insure that life in rural areas may be converted into a prosperous one and the people may recover their happiness.

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3. From this date, the words "Salary", "Recruitment" are no longer to be used in the RD Branch.

We offer cadres only a monthly allowance. We admit cadres only after their motivation is established and upon an old cadre's recommendation and sponsorship.

4. Based upon the local situation and the motivation capability of the existing Groups it will be possible to estimate the number of men who can be motivated and admitted as new cadres. Thus it will be possible to estimate the number of Groups available.

A sound estimate will help us a great deal in drawing plans for cadre training in the 1967 courses.

III. PLAN OF SENDING CADRES TO TRAINING COURSES:

A. ELEMENTS TO BE TRAINED:

1. In 1967, the provinces will send the following types of cadres to training:

a. New cadres to replenish the Groups or to form new Groups.

b. Old cadres to be retrained on RD subjects.

2. Provincial Cadre Chiefs, Deputy Provincial Cadre Chiefs, Group Leaders, Assistant Group Leaders will conform to the following procedures:

a. For each Cadre Group sent to training courses (new cadres to form new Group and old cadres to be trained on RD field), the province will designate four cadres qualified in every field to be trained in Leaders' courses (Group Leaders, Political Officers, Assistant Group Leaders).

For example, if the province sends one Group, four commanding cadres would be designated; if two Groups are sent, eight commanding cadres will be designated, etc.

b. For every three Groups sent to training courses, the province will appoint a cadre (selected and elected by respective Groups) who will attend courses reserved for Deputy Provincial Cadre Chief. If six Groups were sent, then two cadres will attend this course, etc.

B. NECESSARY DOCUMENTS:

In order to put the above items into practice, the Provinces are requested to fill out the two forms attached

and forward these completed forms to the RD Ministry (Rural Operations Directorate, #5, Dinh-Tien-Hoang Street, Saigon) through the central delegation which will tour the Provinces on the first ten days of November 1966 to consider the local RD program of 1967.

Form #1 - "Organization of the RD Group"

This form has three parts:

- Part A: Reassigned authorized strength of the Group.
- Part B: The assigned strength and the elements of the Group (filled by the Group)
- Part C: Reserved for the Group to complete with the Group's under-strength and the still lacking elements. The province will issue to each Group one form; the Group Leader will complete this form with his Group's assigned strength and under-strength, sign, mark the name of the Group and send this form to the Province where it will be forwarded to the RD Ministry.

Form #2 - "Elements of cadres to go to training courses in 1967. This form has four parts:

- Part I: Reserved for the number of cadres (by specific elements) of Groups that have been trained at Course I and Course II, but after reshuffling, need additional cadres for replenishment purposes.
- Part II: Reserved for the number of new cadres of full strength (50 men) Groups sent to training courses to form new Groups.
- Part III. Reserved for number of old cadres of full strength (50 men) Groups sent to complete RD training.
- Part IV. Reserved for the number of cadres who will attend Leaders' courses (Deputy Provincial Cadre Chiefs, Group Leaders, Political Officers, Assistant Group Leaders). This form will be sent to the Ministry once every three months to help up-dating the figures if there have been any changes.

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The Central Council sincerely reminds the Provinces of the importance of the problems concerning admission, census and preparations for the training of cadres.

Please apply the above mentioned procedures correctly, and we hope that your training forms will reach the RD Ministry on time.

SAIGON, October 7, 1966

Major General NGUYEN-DUC-THANG
Commissioner General of the Revolutionary
Development Ministry
Secretary General of the Revolutionary
Development Central Council

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NUMBER AND TYPES OF CADRES OF THE PROVINCE TO
BE SENT TO TRAINING COURSES IN 1967

FORM #2

TYPE OF CADRES TO BE TRAINED		1967's Courses										TOTAL	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
I. Cadres to be trained to replenish Groups already trained at Courses I, II													
A. Staff	Group Leader												
	Political Officer												
	Medics												
	Commo. Radio Operators												
	Intelligence												
	Asst. Grp Leader (Militia Org)												
	Team Leaders												
	Assistant Team Leaders												
	Team Member												
	B. Militia Org. Inter-teams	Asst. Group Leader (Recon.)											
Team Leaders													
C. G.													
Administration													
C. Reconst. Inter-Team	Motivation												
	Team Leader												
	Culture												
	Hygiene												
	Land Reform												
	Fisheries												
	Cooperatives												
Construction P.W.													
III. Number of Cadres to be trained on R.D. field													
Commanding Cadres	Deputy Prov. Cadre Chief												
	Group Leaders												
	Political Officers												
	Asst. Group Leaders (Militia Org)												
	Asst. Group Leaders (Reconst.)												
IV GRAND TOTAL													

(DATE)

* II. Number of Cadres to be trained to form new Groups

DESIGNATION	AUTHORIZED STRENGTH				ASSIGNAL STRENGTH				UNDER STRENGTH						
	Cadres	Org.	Int.	T.	Cadres	Int.	T.	Int.	T.	Mil. Reconstr.	Cadres	Org.	Int.	Int.	T.
GROUP LEADER															
Political Officer															
Medics															
Com. Radion Opr.															
Intel. Off															
Asst. Grp Leader (Mil. Org)															
Team Leader															
Asst. Team Leader															
Team Member															
Asst. Grp Leader (Reconst)															
Team Leader															
Census Griev															
Admin															
Motivation															
Team Leader															
Culture															
Hygiene-Sanita.															
Land Reform															
Fisheries															
Coops.															
Const. P.W.															
TOTAL															

RD CADRE

DRAFT

SECTION VII

AD/FO PROJECTS

A- REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE

Purpose of the Program

- a. To establish political communications between the Central Government of Viet-Nam and the rural population for the purpose of regaining or instilling, as appropriate, the confidence and loyalty of the rural population in the Central Government.
- b. To undertake pacification activities that are ultimately designed to deprive the Viet Cong of rural population support.
- c. Through the use of 59-man cadre groups, to strengthen political leadership and organization, impose social, health and economic conditions and gather intelligence on the local VC military and political infrastructure.

Background Data

The idea of "cadre", or "can bo" in Vietnamese, goes back to the war for independence against the French. With the image created at that time of men working for the liberation of the country and the improvement of living conditions. Each government since 1954 has attempted to trade on the reputation of the Viet-Minh cadres, but these efforts have not succeeded due to the lack of effective, sincere leaders who could create the conditions necessary for positive motivation. The current Revolutionary Development Cadre program is not new, but is a combination of ideas attempted before, supplemented with more intensive centralized training, improved support, and better supervision.

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U.S. PROVINCIAL TEAM COORDINATION

1. Purpose: To disseminate guidance with regard to coordination at the Provincial level.

2. General:

a. Observation of experiments in coordination of the U.S. assistance effort - both civilian and military - at the Provincial level during recent months indicates that, in general, relationships among U.S. advisors from all agencies are cordial and productive. Mutual goodwill and dedication to a common cause normally serve to balance the natural tendency of each advisor to see as paramount the activities with which he is most intimately involved.

b. The accelerating tempo and enlarging dimensions of U.S. aid to Viet-Nam, already apparent and certain to increase in the months ahead, with consequent increases in the number and types of U.S. representatives working at Provincial and lower levels, re-emphasize the need for the closest possible coordination of the total U.S. effort.

c. The principal focal point for U.S. advice and assistance outside Saigon is the individual Province Chief, who bears the major share of responsibilities in both military and civilian fields. It is essential that all U.S. personnel dealing with the same Province Chief carry the same message, work toward the same goals, and ensure that their efforts complement and reinforce each other.

3. Procedures:

a. Coordination is a matter of utmost importance and responsibility for every advisor. Each member of the Provincial Team must insure that his colleagues know what he is doing, when, and how he plans to do it, whenever his activities affect the programs of other agencies. It is also mandatory that unity of effort be evidenced at all times and that U.S. agreement be reached prior to the proposing of new ideas or solutions to problems to GVN officials.

b. The procedures used for insuring coordination of the U.S. effort will vary with the Province. It is not the intent of this memorandum to prescribe formal coordinating procedures, but rather to provide guidelines for improving existing procedures. Frequent meetings, joint planning, full exchange of ideas and whole hearted cooperation can both enhance the total impact of U.S. and set an example for the GVN.

/s/ Henry Cabot Lodge
American Ambassador

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS

For many years the Government has been resisting the Viet-Cong with one hand and trying to improve the economic, social and cultural opportunities for its people with the other. There have been many laudable accomplishments, both on the field of battle and in the improvement of living standards. Yet, there are few places in this country where Viet-Nam's citizens can be safe at night without the presence of military forces.

This problem of security stems, in part, from a sincere desire on the part of the government to spare the mass of the population from being caught in the crossfire between the opposing military forces. The Viet-Cong, however, do not permit the people to be a neutral force; unless the people are controlled by the government they are forced to support the Viet-Cong. In fact, it is a basic objective of the Viet-Cong to so intermingle with the people that, in order for the government to attack the Viet-Cong, it must also attack the people.

In recognition that the people, if not identified with the government, will be forced to identify with the Viet Cong, the government must provide the people with the opportunity to choose the government and be secure. By so doing, the Viet-Cong would then be presented with the alternatives of:

- a. Attacking the people when they attack the government... or,
- b. Joining the people, hence, the government.

The objective of having the people identified with the government will be achieved when the people consciously and voluntarily participate in their own defense. In doing this, they will not only be serving their government, but will be permitting their government to serve them. To this end, the government has embarked this year on a new program that will be implemented by the Revolutionary Development Cadre. These cadre, newly organized into 59-member groups and centrally trained at Vung Tau, will communicate the government's intention to the people and the people's aspirations to the government. The uniqueness of the new cadre effort is not separate innovation or technique, but in the coordination of what has previously been a number of fragmented operations which did not necessarily occur in the right sequence or in proper balance. The Revolutionary Development Cadre are being trained to follow a comprehensive program that includes:

- a. The provision of continuous security while the hamlet is being organized by the cadre group.
- b. A gaining of acceptance of the cadre by the people. This will be accomplished as the result of the good behavior of the cadre, their explanation to the people of the government's program and what it can mean, and their examples of actual assistance to the people.
- c. The conduct of an effective Census-Grievance program wherein:

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- (1) A census is taken.
- (2) The people are encouraged to state their grievances and aspirations.
- (3) Follow-up action is taken on the grievances, and action is initiated to achieve worthwhile aspirations.
- (4) The VC infrastructure is identified and eliminated as the result of intelligence secured by repetitive private interview with each of the people in the hamlet.

d. Assistance in the form of technical advice and material resources is provided to enable the people to help themselves achieve economic progress.

e. The establishment of the basic structure of hamlet and village government through organization of the people and the election of their representatives.

f. The organization of the people to defend themselves. This is a total commitment wherein every able-bodied person - man, woman, or child - has a specific task to perform in defense of the hamlet, or in the event of a natural disaster.

The program of pacification will occur in the general sequence listed above; however, most of the actions are of a continuing nature and several will be going on concurrently. The organization of the cadre group into 59-members takes cognizance of this by providing personnel to perform in each functional area listed. The group organization is based on the assumption that the mix of security and specialist elements included would be appropriate for a hamlet of several hundred persons that has reasonable GVN protection against company-size and larger Viet Cong attacks. Obviously, many variations in hamlet size, security and political allegiance will be encountered in the pacification program. For this reason, the mix and number of cadres should be tailored to the particular task at hand. It is envisioned that operations in a relatively secure area may dictate the detachment of all or part of the PAT teams from the group and the possible attachment of an additional New Life Development Team. Conversely, operations in relatively insecure areas may require the attachment of additional security elements, and the lack of security may preclude initiation of a program of economic development with the New Life Development Cadre. As to how long the cadre remain in a hamlet, the best guidance was provided recently by General Thang, Minister of Revolutionary Development, when, in response to such a question, he answered: "As long as necessary".

Even when the cadre job is complete enough to permit displacement of the cadre, the real cementing action of government-people involvement has only begun. It is at this time that the technical personnel of the ministries and the services must come in to really open the door to the new life. It is a long and arduous road we must travel to meet the challenge of providing every Vietnamese citizen with opportunities that are limited only by the individual's own capacity and drive.

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PART II - SUPPORT FOR RDC AT PROVINCE LEVEL

1. The RDC is a provincial resource and is responsive to the Province Chief in its support to Provincial RD Programs. The UC provides advice to the Province Chief on RD matters to include RDC through the Provincial Team. Inter-agency cooperation and support at Province, Division, Corps/Region advisory levels is essential to the success of the Revolutionary Development Program and the contribution of RDC.

2. Responsibilities of Province Team Members

a. The USAID Assistant Provincial Representative (Cadre) has primary responsibility for this advice. He is responsible for arranging US logistical and financial support for the RDC and will insure coordination on RDC matters among US agency Provincial Representatives.

b. The USAID Provincial Representative is responsible for the coordination of Provincial Revolutionary Development Budgets and USAID supplied provincial commodity support with planned RDC activities.

c. The MACV Senior Advisor is responsible for the military aspects of security and will coordinate the integration of the various armed elements into overall security plans. In addition, the Sector Advisor has a strong supporting role in other aspects of RD and economic programs. In this latter role the Sub-Sector or Special Forces Teams at the District level will be fully utilized to give advisory support to the Revolutionary Development Program and the activities of the RDC.

d. The JUSPAO Provincial Representative is responsible for psyops support to the RDC activities in the same manner as other provincial programs are now supported.

3. Guidance

a. GVN and US staff officers have jointly prepared statements dealing with the role of the RDC and a concept of their employment in the pacification effort. The statements are attached for your guidance.

b. The necessity is reiterated of a team effort wherein the US agency representatives in each province speak with a single voice to the responsible GVN officials. You are referred to the attached statement by the Ambassador on this subject. Also, the need is stressed to have the US advisory effort be as invisible as possible, with the Vietnamese continually encouraged to manage and support all elements of the Revolutionary Development Program.

Attachments:

1. The role of the RDC in Pacification
2. RDC Employment Concepts
3. U.S. Provincial Team Coordination.

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POWER OF PROV. CHIEF

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SHOULD THE POWERS OF THE PROVINCE CHIEFS
BE INCREASED?

By Nguyen Ngoc Ne

Mr. Ne, an Administrative Specialist in the Public Administration Division, USAID, prepared this paper as an independent author. It is being distributed to stimulate interest and discussion.

The author points out that his paper obviously does not deal with the full scope of the role or responsibilities of the Province Chief. It simply deals with the formal authority - the responsibilities and powers - assigned to a Province Chief by the existing law and regulations.

In the course of 1964 and 1965, certain circles responsible for local administration in Vietnam arrived at the conviction that the powers of Province Chiefs ought to be augmented. This conviction was emphasized in May 1965, by the Director of Cabinet to the former Minister of Interior in Dr. Quat's Cabinet in connection with a projected reorganization of local government. It has also been pointed out repeatedly in relation to the Province Chief's lack of control over technical services.

In view of the little progress being made in local administration despite efforts of Vietnamese officials and abundant support from the United States, it was not unnatural that such a conclusion should be reached. If we make a careful study of all documents pertaining to the responsibilities and powers of the Province Chiefs, however, we shall see that these positions have already been invested with the broadest of powers - it would be virtually impossible to assign them any more authority. Thus, while more powers are being requested for Province Chiefs, all necessary powers have already been granted to them. This seems to be a curious contradiction and the author will try to analyze the real reasons for it.

Responsibilities and Powers of the Province Chief.

Conditions for the appointment of a Province Chief, together with his responsibilities and powers, are defined by Presidential Ordinance No. 57-a and circular No. 115-a/TTP/VP dated October 24, 1956.

Appointment: The Province Chief and Deputy Province Chief are appointed by the President of the Republic. * The Chief is under the direct command of the President and is the representative of the Central Government in the province.

Law Enforcement: The Province Chief has the duty of enforcing the law.

General management of all provincial services: The Province Chief is responsible for the general functioning of all provincial services. In pursuance of this, he is required to make reports to the Presidency and the various ministries about operations under him or the ministries. Copies of these reports must be forwarded to the Government Delegate of the Region.

* Now by the Prime Minister.

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The Province Chief may propose transfers of technical officials assigned to his locality. He has the duty of coordinating the various bureaus and services so that the activities become more effective, and of reporting to the President about progress and discrepancies, if any. He must assist representatives of ministries working in the provinces. He must be consulted and has the right to present his opinions on the planning and carrying out of governmental projects of concern to the province. In case a ministry does not have its representative in the province, the Province Chief is to take charge of the work of that ministry.

The Province Chief exchanges correspondence directly with the Presidency and with the ministries but a copy must be sent to the Government Delegate. He may have direct contacts with the Directors General, the Directors, or the Chiefs of Service of ministries when he deems this necessary. But on more significant matters, he must first receive directions from the Presidency.

The Province Chief may receive instructions from ministries but the Minister concerned must have signed them. A copy is to be sent to the Presidency and the Government Delegate. Instructions and recommendations of a general character sent by various directorates and services to provincial representatives of the ministries must be sent through the Province Chief, although a copy may go directly to the representative. Ministry representatives, when sending correspondence to their respective headquarters must send it through the Province Chief with a copy to the Office of the Government Delegate. The Province Chief and Government Delegate, upon reviewing the correspondence, are expected to report their opinions directly to the President if necessary.

The Province Chief may discuss with various chiefs of provincial services problems related to the province. He must, after preliminary investigation, report on illegal acts committed by provincial personnel.

Concerning the activities of judicial and military agencies, the Province Chief has no power of direct intervention, but may report to the President on matters he deems illegal or inappropriate.

As regards the Treasury, the Province Chief may directly intervene in cases of theft, embezzlement or abuse and take necessary measures; but he must, without delay, report to the Presidency and the Ministry of Finance.

Maintenance of security and order: The Province Chief is responsible for the maintenance of the public security and order in the province. He is to coordinate the activities of the police and security forces such as regional forces, special police, or gendarmerie on temporary duty for the civil authorities. In case of emergency, the Province Chief may requisition armed forces. If he does so, he has to make an immediate report to the President.

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Control of Village Administration: The Province Chief controls village administrative organizations. He has the responsibility of selecting and appointing Village Committee members and for guiding them, controlling their work, and supervising the implementation of village budgets toward more rational use of local resources.

Beside all the powers and responsibilities conferred by Ordinance No. 57-a, those defined in current regulations remain valid insofar as they are consistent with that Ordinance. Separately conferred powers include the following:

Power of Establishing Regulations: The Province Chief has the authority to promulgate regulations. Any violation of decisions brought into force by him within the scope of his power is punishable under Article 471, clause 15, of the penal code. In practice, however, Province Chiefs have very few opportunities to make use of this power as the regulations are usually issued by the Central Government and apply country-wide.

Legislative power: In principle, laws, ordinances, decrees, arretes and decisions are promulgated by publication in the Official Journal of the Republic. Under law No. 5/59 of January 17, 1959, the time when these become effective without special stipulation is as follows:

- in Saigon, one full day after their publication in the Official Journal;
- in other cities and in provinces, one full day after the Provincial Administration receives the Official Journal in which the pronouncement is published.

It is for this reason that the date of the Official Journal must be registered in a special book carefully kept by the Province Chief or Mayor. In emergency situations, however, the above time limits may be shortened upon decision of higher authorities and the laws involved may be promulgated through another procedure such as posting at public places.

Powers in matters of finance: the Province Chief is the manager of the provincial budget. He also reviews village budgets and has power to act as approving officer for those whose estimates or expenditures do not exceed VN\$500,000. He may also control the execution of Village budgets.

Ordinance 57a anticipated a reorganization of provincial administration, and provided that the then current provisions on budget and taxation would remain in effect pending its occurrence. Now, 10 years later, the instruction remains unchanged.

Judicial power: The Province Chief has the capacity of a Judicial Police Agent and of an Assistant to the Public Prosecutor.

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In any province where there is a prison, the Province Chief is its Warden.

Protection under the Penal Code: The Province Chief has no conferred privileges except as an administrative officer. In this capacity, he is protected by Article 222 of the penal code with respect to private outrage against the honor or integrity of a magistrate or an administrator.

Selection of Province Chiefs

It is clear that the 1956 Ordinance conferred very extensive powers on the Province Chief. It made him representative of the Central Government in the Province. It placed him under the Direct command of the President. It opened the way for disregarding the Minister of Interior who, by tradition, had been the normal "headquarters" of Province Chiefs.

Ngô Dinh Diem issued this Ordinance when he became Vietnam's first President and wanted to implement the Presidential system. This became a vehicle for his exerting central authority throughout the country, especially since he personally selected Province Chiefs -- with little participation by Interior or the Government Delegate -- and insisted on absolute loyalty to himself.

Although invested with great power, the Province Chiefs under President Diem generally showed themselves meritorious and talented enough to make good use of their power. Most of them were outstanding government officials or army officers. Thanks to their high level of education and their broad knowledge and experience, they were able to manage the whole range of provincial affairs from administrative to political or social. Even on technical matters within the competency of the technical services such as problems of highways, health, cooperatives, agricultural credit, education, reconstruction, etc., they tended to have excellent understanding and to make appropriate decisions.

Military Province Chiefs

Military Province Chiefs, who came into being due to the necessities of the security situation in a number of provinces, were first selected from among talented army officers. Not only were they competent in military affairs, they also had a high level of education. When they moved over to the new field of administration, they could easily and rapidly adapt themselves to the new situation and showed themselves competent.

But later, when insecurity spread to almost all provinces owing to the increased V.C. activity, all civilian Province Chiefs were successively replaced by the military officers except in Quang Tri, where the Province Chief must be a civilian to be able to move within the demilitarized zone without violating the 1954 Geneva Agreements. Those Province Chiefs appointed during the latter part of the Diem regime were less

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capable because bright army officers deserving the position became scarcer and scarcer. This scarcity was accentuated because President Diem, at that time, emphasized the factor of confidence placed in a handful of people and from whom he demanded absolute loyalty.

Selections Made After The November 1, 1963 Revolution.

After the Diem regime was overthrown, almost all the Province Chiefs appointed by the former President were replaced. But the new Revolutionary Military Council did not apply the criteria of ability and education in making its selections. The appointment of an army officer to the position of Province Chief was more likely to be a reward for deeds during the Revolution. In some cases the appointment was based upon the factor of trustworthiness. Later on, the support of powerful and influential generals seemed to be the basis for Province Chiefs' appointments from among army officers.

Since the November Revolution, of course, Vietnam has undergone many upsets including a succession of coups d'etat. The replacement of Province Chiefs has occurred in some provinces as often as three times in the space of three or five months. Many an army officer, until the date of appointment to this key executive position, had only known the battlefield and had no experience in the field of public administration. In the face of this he received no training, not even an orientation course which would tell him what his responsibilities and powers were to be. A "Province Chief's Handbook" might have been helpful but it was thought that the time spent on editing such a guide was not worthwhile because it would be designed to serve only 43 people. The result of this general lack of background and guidance is what one would expect -- a number of Province Chiefs do not know how to use their powers. Some do not know the limits of their jurisdiction while others are not aware of the significance of regulations and go far beyond the prescribed limits of their authority.

Examples of a lack of orientation are numerous; here are two that come to mind. During the National Administrative and Civil Convention in March 1965, at an official reception, a Province Chief stated to Dr. Phan Huy Quat: "Mr. Prime Minister, I don't know whether I report to you or to the commander of the Army Corps". This astonished many in the audience. In the first place, there was a total absence of any mention of the Minister of Interior from whom Province Chiefs daily receive instructions. Secondly, if the Officer had read Ordinance No. 57-a, he should have known that his appointment was by the Prime Minister and, according to Article 4, was under the direct command of the Prime Minister.

At the same meeting, a Colonel Mayor of a city complained to Prime Minister Quat: "Though I am a Colonel in the Army, I have no military forces under my command; that's why I could not exert influence during the last upheaval in my city." If that Colonel had read Ordinance 57-a,

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he should have known that, even had he been a civilian Mayor or Province Chief, he would still have the right, in case of emergency, to requisition the armed forces (Art. 5, Clause B).

Conferred Authority is one thing and Actual Power Another

It is well known that an official is often weak or strong in his influence -- in his actual wielding of power -- due to his own personality and methods. So, regardless of whether it might be intended that all Province Chiefs exercise a given degree of delegated authority, there would be bound to be differences in their actual power and influence.

But in Vietnam we have a situation in which formally delegated authority is nullified by formally established procedures. This is the main reason why observers so often conclude that not enough authority has been delegated to the Province Chief. That impression is given when a ministry prescribes the details of program or method rather than giving general guidelines and consultative assistance in the field. It is given when a Corps Commander or a Minister refuses to move a representative who is supposed to be a subordinate of the Province Chief but will not follow his directions. But most of all, the impression that a Province Chief doesn't have as much actual power as it was intended is that he does not. And the one thing that contributes most to tying his hands is the accumulation of budget and fiscal procedures.

Restrictive Budget Procedures Limit the Province Chiefs' Powers.

It is apparent that the budget procedures become more restrictive. The reason is that a number of Province Chiefs have disregarded regulations and procedures. Many expenditures made in response to the Province Chiefs' orders do not comply with established procedures at all; thus they can be neither cleared nor justified.

Many disputes have occurred between Province Chiefs and their Deputies for Administration. The latter, being responsible for financial matters, could not obey their superiors' orders which were flatly in contradiction with prescribed procedures. When such violations of procedures occur, the tendency of the Directorate General of Budget and Foreign Aid is to prescribe even stricter procedures as a counter-measure to prevent recurrence. As time goes on, all these procedures accumulate and form a thick wall of obstacles erected by DGBFA. This limits the powers of the Province Chiefs and causes local administration to slow down and lose its effectiveness.

It is not too much to say that the Province Chiefs are bound hand and foot by restrictive budget procedures. One can hardly attribute all the fault to the DGBFA; the Province Chiefs and the officials who appoint and direct them should of course, assume the greater part of responsibility.

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CONCLUSION

Thus we see some of the reasons why the impression arises that Province Chiefs have limited powers whereas, in actuality, their formal delegation of authority is very broad indeed. The situation is not unlike that of a husband, quite characteristic in Vietnam, who expects his wife to manage the household finances and presumably gives her the authority to do so. But as a newly-wed she has not had experience and her mother may not have prepared her for this responsibility. So the job she does is not satisfactory to her husband. Or perhaps he keeps changing his mind about the guidelines so that, in fact, she can hardly spend a piaster without his prior approval. Yet it is probably true that, in most instances, if the housewife could learn to manage well and could help develop the necessary guidelines, the husband would be glad to have the household finance chores handled by her.

So it is with Province Chiefs. Being newly assigned to their positions without specific training and with little guidance, they may commit violations of administrative principles or budget procedures. This incites the DGBFA to impose control measures which restrict the violaters' powers and, at the same time the powers of all his colleagues.

In order to remedy this situation, the most efficient thing to do would be to train Province Chiefs in how to do their jobs. They must be informed about the laws that particularly concern them, the administrative regulations and financial procedures. Once they understand all these and apply them willingly, the controls which have been tying their hands can be gradually loosened and finally removed entirely. Then they can move effectively to run the local administrative machinery. But, even before training, of course, comes the question of selection.

In view of the foregoing we would like to make the following suggestions:

1. The choice of Province Chiefs should be based upon specific criteria committed to writing. Persons nominated for this important position should pass through a special commission which will examine each candidate in relation to the defined criteria. The Commission may, for example, establish six qualities or conditions to be weighed. For the first criterion, candidate X might receive 7 points out of 10; for the second, 5 out of 10; for the third, 8 out of 10, and so on ... In addition, each criterion may be assigned a special weight. For example, "Ethics" might have a coefficient of 4; the "Abilities" a coefficient of 3; "Decisiveness" a coefficient 1, etc.. In this way the selecting authorities may be guided by the scores assigned by the special Commission to the candidates. This will facilitate comparisons and the selection of the most capable candidate.

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2. Once a candidate has been selected by the higher authorities and appointed Province Chief, he must attend at least a one-week orientation; Preferably it should be a 3 or 4 week special training course to help him learn about his new position, his powers as well as his responsibilities, the administrative regulations and budget procedures, the activities of the provincial services, those that are under his direct jurisdiction as well as those that depend on various ministries.

3. In addition to such training, the new appointee should be provided with a "Guide Book for Province Chiefs" so that when he goes to the new post, he may refer to it whenever he needs such information.

The author is convinced, as a result of observation and study, that these measures constitute a minimum requirement. Only thus can newly appointed Province Chiefs expect to avoid embarrassment due to ignorance of the powers he is entitled to exercise and the responsibilities he is expected to carry.

For Province Chiefs already in office, in-service training must be recognized as an essential aid to self-improvement.

There has been some recognition of the need for training Province Chiefs but the belief that the present emergency does not permit much of this has led to continuing postponements. However, if we compare the difficulties of finding time for training with the serious consequences of lack of training then the training of Province Chiefs and District Chiefs proves itself to be indispensable. Only in this way can local administration in provinces, districts, villages and hamlets become more efficient and appreciated. Only thus can the people ever be won to wholehearted support of their government.

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BACKGROUND VINH BINH

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM - VINH BINH PROVINCE

1. Vinh Binh Province has a population of approximately 568,000 people with about 175,000 living within the GVN controlled area. The terrain is flat, with the highest elevation being about four feet above sea level. There are large open fields interspersed by numerous canals and rivers with heavy foliage bordering these areas. A large mango grove is located on the southern tip of the province which faces the South China Sea. Tra Vinh is the capital of Vinh Binh and has a population of about 40,000 people. The main dollar earner is rice.

2. The Viet Cong are reported to have one main force battalion of about 400 men - a provincial mobile regiment totalling about 800 men - eight district companies, and approximately 2,000 village guerrillas. The GVN has twenty regional force companies and 6,100 popular force troops. One ARVN regiment, the 14th of the 9th Division, is located in Vinh Binh.

3. The security situation is tenuous. Mining and road blocks are frequent, making travel and transportation risky. However, Vietnamese civilians can generally travel freely in daylight - night travel is prohibited.

4. In October 1965 intelligence estimates and assessments of GVN leadership showed an operationally exploitable situation to exist in Tieu Can District of Vinh Binh Province. Success was judged to hinge on planning, supporting and executing a fully integrated pacification campaign with high initial impact and great momentum. Central to the pacification campaign was to be the concept of hamlet self defense systems - around this theme would be woven all supporting activities by the GVN, via Vietnamese information service, JUSPAO, USAID, National Police, Census Grievance, Chieu Hoi, Pru and RD Cadre. In late December plans were developed, the Cadre had completed initial field work and special training and logistics requirements

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for the first six months of the campaign were worked out and material was arriving on schedule.

5. January 1966 saw the pacification of the first hamlet, since that time 17 hamlets, with a total of 12, 318 people, have been brought under firm and continuing government control. Momentum has been maintained - cadre strength has grown from one team in January 1966 to five teams today. Plans call for completing pacification of all hamlets in Tieu Can District in 1967. When this campaign began the GVN controlled only nine hamlets out of fifty in the district.

6. Description of the area:

A. GVN military situation - only three platoons of popular force (PF) troops can be made available to provide additional security during pacification operations. The remaining 15 platoons and squads are tied down with defense of routes of communication and previously pacified hamlets. ARVN forces have never operated in support of pacification in Vinh Binh Province. Realizing that adequate security is absolutely essential to RD operations, the only manner in which this security could be provided was to concentrate RD cadre strength when operating in highly insecure hamlets and then use the cadre to train a defense force generated from the hamlet population itself. Fourteen newly pacified hamlets are now defended entirely by hamlet self defense forces.

B. Enemy Situation - VC activities in Tieu Can are controlled by the Tieu Can - Cau Ke Inter-District Committee. Military units under this command include a district company, plus one full platoon of guerrilla forces attached to each village party unit. In addition, there are three under-strength provincial mobile companies of main force troops which normally operate in the Tieu Can - Cau Ke area. The enemy thus has the capability of fielding a battalion plus one main force.

C. Population - The population of this area is approximately 45,000 - this number is almost equally divided between two ethnic groups - Vietnamese and Cambodian. Administratively the district is divided into six villages and fifty hamlets. Today there are

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23, 275 people living under government control.

D. Terrain - This area is typical delta terrain - flat, broken by numberless canals, streams and rivers. The population is clustered in narrow tree lines along these streams or rivers. Rice fields stretch between the lines of cover provided by trees and brush along the streams, thus giving unbroken fields of observation or fire from 500 to 3000 meters in depth. In daylight hours a position of this type of terrain can be defended with a relatively small force - the problems come with darkness when the strength ratio of defender to aggressor must be reversed.

E. Economy - Tieu Can is one of the most productive areas in the province, with exports of rice, hogs, fish, sugar cane, and coconut oil. Viet Cong tax rates in this district are the highest of any other area, running 50 percent of a family's rice crop plus a special tax of VN \$2000 per family. Tax in other areas runs 25 percent of crop.

7. Factors of Success:

- A. A Competent District Chief and Staff.
- B. Availability of intelligence.
- C. Realistic planning done at the district level.
- D. Efficient logistics to support RD Cadre and hamlet defense.
- E. Hamlet defense theme and program.

a. District Chief and Staff:

(1) The District Chief has had over four years experience as Chief of Tieu Can District. He was discouraged with past pacification programs but was receptive to new ideas and had remained convinced that the hamlet people would respond to a campaign with real "teeth" in it. The District Chief's staff had potential and with help from the GVN province staff and members of the RDC advisors personal staff organized reporting procedures, finance and legis-

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tics to support the campaign.

(2) Although the district chief requested ARVN and regional force units to support the pacification campaign, none were forthcoming. A major decision had to be made - the risk was that without screening forces the VC might overrun the RD Cadre and initial hamlet defense groups, thus destroying that first psychological impact on which the planned build-up and momentum hinged. The decision to go ahead was made, with approval by the Province Chief. The thing that needs underlining here is the fact that this decision was made on the basis of political intelligence and sensitivity to the mood and aspirations of the people of Tieu Can. Using relative military strength as a guide the operation would have been called off. (Today a second district of Vinh Binh Province presents the opportunity for such a campaign, and in Bac Lieu Province a similar political action, mass movement operation is being carried out).

b. Availability of Intelligence:

(1) A great number of different sources provided the information that led to the estimate that this area could be exploited if a pacification campaign was tailored to the situation. After the initial estimate the primary sources of information that has gone into planning and operations has come from the National Police, the Chieu Hoi Program Chief, the District Intelligence Net and Census Grievance. The National Police provide the initial information on a hamlet's infrastructure - when a census grievance cadre is placed in the hamlet, resident VC are also his target, along with his other normal reporting. The Chieu Hoi Program Chief has the responsibility for counter-intelligence reporting on cadre personnel and on VC plans and policy within the District. The District Intelligence Net concerns itself with tactical information on VC units and movements. This information has allowed the leadership involved to better determine the strength necessary in a given hamlet, to weed out VC penetrations among the cadre themselves, to reinforce hamlets when information indicates probable VC attack and to target PRU.

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c. Planning:

(1) Within the wider picture of the Revolutionary Development Program, it is the district which is the echelon of execution - therefore, sound planning must begin at the district. The planning stages followed there were: 1. A meeting of the District Chief, the RDC Provincial Advisor, and his counterpart at which the broad outlines of the campaign were laid down, and planning requirements were discussed; 2. The submission by the District Chief of a pacification plan; 3. A study by the RDC Provincial Officer and GVN staff to determine feasibility, set priorities; 4. Coordination by RDC Advisor with other U. S. Agencies; 5. A series of meetings of the District Chief, RDC Advisor and counterparts at which time the plan was critique and details added - supervision by Province Staff and RDC Advisors of the District Chief's execution of the plan.

(2) The pacification campaign plan itself contained no radical approaches or new technology - however, two features of the plan are of special interest - firstly, given the number of GVN military forces available to support pacification operations in this area, any success would depend on political action and mass movement technique; therefore, great attention was paid to this factor in planning and training. Secondly, the use of unpaid hamlet personnel providing the security force in the hamlet when the RD cadre moved out.

(3) Throughout the planning stages, all aspects which involved other U. S. Agencies were coordinated by the RDC advisor - this insured that logistics planning, suggestions and guidance to counterparts by USAID and JUSPAO followed concepts and planning details of the campaign. The MACV sub-sector advisor was present during much of the planning and was able to daily reinforce concepts and lend assistance to the District Chief on writing support requirements. This frame work of coordination has been

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followed during the actual pacification operations and has resulted in productive participation by all members of the Province Team. (While not a charitable thought it is more than possible that if ARVN, with its history of disregarding the rights and property of civilians, its complete lack of training in, or understanding of political action and its seeming inability to conduct any sort of operation with less than a full regiment, had in fact "supported" this campaign, the pacification effort might well have failed).

d. Efficient Logistics:

(1) A highly responsive logistics mechanism was critical to maintaining the momentum of the campaign. At no time have operations or plans been held up for lack of logistical support of the RD Cadre.

e. Hamlet Defense Theme and Program:

(1) The work of the RD Cadre is not finished until the entire hamlet population is organized both politically and militarily to defend itself. The major point that was stressed in this operation was that the defending force must come from and remain organic to the hamlet. Once the political groundwork is laid and the population is actively participating in building a better life for themselves, and they have means to defend what they have built, then a more formal and much less politically oriented program such as popular force may be introduced into the hamlet. Initially, however, these types of military programs react far too slowly and do not possess that psychological impact so necessary in leading the people to identify themselves as a community tied into a government and a cause.

(2) The following propositions are the ones that have been followed in establishing a total of seventeen hamlet defense systems:

(a) The defending force must be at par in training, weapons, political education and number with the VC force most

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likely to attack them;

(b) The defending must come from and remain organic to the hamlet they are defending;

(c) The defending force must be part of a defense system which includes the entire population of the hamlet;

(d) Politically the defending force and people must be lead toward identifying themselves as a community, then to identify with larger entities of province and nation;

(e) There must be an organization at district level which frequently inspects, retrains, re-educates and re-supplies the defense system in both its political and military aspects.

(3) With early warning and intelligence collection efforts built into the defense systems, it has been proved on three occasions that a hamlet with 30 armed men can defend itself against a company of VC main force. Experience has also shown that a PF squad not organic to a hamlet defense system can be taken out at will by a VC platoon, and offers very little real security to the people of a hamlet. (The GVN, Saigon, has established a T. O. and E. of one popular force squad per new life hamlet - in Tieu Can the axiom followed is - on the basis of hamlet population, terrain and estimate of VC capabilities place as many trained, armed men in the Hamlet Defense System as is necessary to utterly deny the VC access to the hamlet population).

8. Results:

A. PACIFICATION/CIVIC ACTION:

a. Number of Hamlets secured	17
b. People brought under control	12, 318
c. USAID Self-help Project completed	11
d. Meters of road built/repared	20, 670
e. Meters of fence built	150, 925
f. Man hours to needy families	22, 693
g. Buildings built	108
h. Bridges Built	21

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- i. Wells dug 22
- j. Hamlet Committees elected 14

B. HAMLET DEFENSE:

- a. Hamlet Defense System established 17
- b. Men trained 361
- c. Outposts constructed 20

C. CENSUS GRIEVANCE:

- a. Established in 15 of the 17 Hamlets to date.

D. HAMLET MEDICAL PROGRAM:

- a. Established in all Hamlets.

E. INFORMATION PROGRAM:

- a. Includes periodic showing of films in hamlets, at night - information cadre and offices in all hamlets, delivery of newspapers, magazines, etc., on a regular basis to all hamlets.

F. ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION:

- a. All roads within zone of expanding hamlet defense systems are secure.

G. VC ACTIVITIES:

- a. There has not been a VC initiated incident within the expanding zone of hamlet defense systems in six months - the VC have launched three company sized attacks on perimeter hamlets but were driven off in all three cases.

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9. Problems:

There is only one problem, a continuing one and only partially solved. There is, of course, the lack of supporting troops, a problem which may never be solved because any given number of troops do not add up to a successful RD Program. The big block was a lack of real understanding on the part of GVN officers of political action and revolutionary development, and a lack of appreciation of the power that a mass movement can generate once it is set into motion. In a continuing attempt to educate others in the concepts and techniques employed in Tieu Can, aircraft have been provided on numerous occasions for on-the-spot inspections and briefings, informal trips by personnel from Tieu Can to other areas has been arranged, briefings, talks and orders have been given at province headquarters. Out of these efforts has come a total of six GVN officers who understand what makes a Tieu Can a successful venture in Revolutionary Development, and are either supporting or directing the planning of similar campaigns in other areas of the Province.

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LECTURE

given by Mr. Nguyen-Ngoc-Ne
at the Public Administration Seminar
organized by USOM PAD
from Sept. 24 to Sept. 25, 1964

THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
OF THE HAMLET IN VIETNAM

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Throughout the history of Vietnam, the hamlet (Ap), after the family, is the basic social unit of the country. Despite political upheavals and many other changes, the structure of the hamlet has retained its essential character. This demonstrates the strength of its organization and the permanence of this basic unit. Any revolutionary movement, in order to be effective, needs therefore to start from the hamlet.

The Village (Xa), in its traditional form, was a group of families, an association possessing a well-defined amount of land, self-supporting, self-governing, and claiming the right to determine the proportionate amount of local taxes to be given to the nation.

The village, made up of several hamlets (ap) was conceived in itself to be a legal personality with the right to the full exercise of civil rights, with the powers of purchase and ownership and with free access to justice. The village managed its internal affairs as it chose, distributed the revenues, levied taxes, dispensed justice, secured order, and undertook useful public works with little or no participation by any higher authority. Depending upon the size and importance of the village, there were officers responsible for the preservation of order, public works, finance, records of births and deaths, and other public civic functions.

The present administrative structure of the village unit (xa) consists of several subdivisions called hamlets (ap). The hamlet itself is the basic administrative organization, providing the village with labour forces and contributing to the village's finances. The functioning and consistency of its organization are one of the determining factors of the nation's life. In the political, social, economic and military fields, the hamlet can be rightly considered as the nerve center of the present conflict. The outcome of the anti-communist fight in Vietnam will be determined in the hamlet.

After the signing of the Geneva Agreements in July 1954 the Ngo Dinh Diem government had to face many difficult problems. The first one was the resettlement of nearly one million refugees from North Vietnam. Then came the suppression of the Binh Xuyen clan, the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai religions sects; and South Vietnam enjoyed peace and prosperity during a two year period (1956 & 1957). In 1958, the communist cadres left behind by the VC after their withdrawal to North VN in 1954, began their agitations again. Sabotage, terrorist acts, murders committed by VC agents began to create an atmosphere of fear and terror in villages and hamlets. In the beginning there were not many of them. In each hamlet there were quite a few VC guerrillas. In the daytime they worked as peaceful peasants, but at night they came from 8 or 10 neighboring hamlets, gathered together forming a squad; with rudimentary arms and guns they succeeded in imposing their laws on peaceful people living in rural areas. They assassinated those who didn't obey them and specifically they aimed their efforts at village and hamlet officials.

By 1959 the government under President Ngo Dinh Diem could not stop the VC terrorists' acts for the following reasons:

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- There was a lack of qualified government cadres in the infrastructure.

- In contrast to conditions in North Vietnam where the inhabitants live crowded together in villages behind the green bamboo hedges, is the situation in South Vietnam where the land is extensive and thinly populated, people live scattered throughout the country. Therefore, it is very difficult for the Government to guarantee security and give protection to the peasants.

Threatened by the pressure and menace of the VC, farmers are filled with anxiety. They are compelled to feed and to supply the VC and are at the mercy of their plunders. In order to put an end to such a situation, the Government of President Ngo Dinh Diem initiated in 1959 a program of construction of agrovilles or "Khu Tru Mat" (dense and prosperous areas). Motivated by both political and economic concern, plans were established presumably for the eventual re-establishment into agrovilles of a large proportion of the rural population. For some areas, modifications were envisioned such as "row" or ribbon villages along major highways. Altogether about 20 agrovilles were completed. From an administrative viewpoint, the establishment of the agrovilles provides an excellent opportunity for improving procedural, as well as organizational aspects of communal government. From the political viewpoint, it helps eliminate communist elements and bars their infiltration into the new administrative unit.

The agrovilles had been a complete failure for the Ngo Dinh Diem government for the following reasons:

- The peasants had to work very hard to build the agrovilles.

- They had to leave their old houses they had inherited from their ancestors to live in the agrovilles which are too far from their ricefields (5 or 6 kilometers, sometimes almost 10 km).

The VC exploited the people's discontent and they frequently attacked the agrovilles. The agrovillage experiment was then ruled a complete failure.

During the years 1959, 1960, 1961, the situation in Vietnam became more and more critical when the VC redoubled their subversive activities in order to take over the whole country, in violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. Another solution to the problem had to be found. In April 1962 Ngo Dinh Nhu, brother and political advisor of President Ngo Dinh Diem, initiated a new policy of construction of strategic hamlets, thanks to which subversion of the VC was to be gradually reduced.

It is worthwhile comparing agrovilles with strategic hamlets. Both units are aimed at assembling the rural people in enclosed areas and instilling in them a spirit of cooperative effort indispensable to the preservation of peace and order and for the realization of common progress. Both of them help to

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discriminate between peaceful peasant and VC agents. But the difference between an Agroville and a Strategic Hamlet lies in the fact that the latter operates at the very lowest level of infrastructure made up by hamlets, while the former is located at a higher echelon and comprises a "row" of villages. The latter proves itself more rational because it doesn't disrupt the life of the rural people to as great an extent.

There is a similarity between Strategic Hamlets in Vietnam and clusters of hamlets in Malaya. Both of them are aimed at improving the security situation threatened by Communist insurgent activities. However, the Vietnamese technique also stresses the amelioration of the rural life, in its deverse aspects, while the Malayan organization considers security the fundamental goal.

Strategic Hamlets are fortified centers, provided with one or many guard towers, barbed wire fence or moat, bamboo stakes and mine fields, facing security problems with their own forces (self-guard, armed and unarmed Combat Youth); Ordinary hamlets are not provided with fortifications and have to rely on the regular armed forces for their defense.

The construction of Strategic Hamlets was based on the concept of Community Development whereby the local population participated in the realization of these enterprises with their own means, in proportion to their wealth. The central authorities and their representatives contributed to this collective effort through substantial assistance in terms of funds, equipment and personnel to give technical advice and guidance.

According to planning of the NGO DINH DIEM government, about 16,000 strategic hamlets should have been built gradually throughout the country. Up to October 1963, about 9,000 had been built up; over 8,000,000 peasants were living in strategic hamlets, where they enjoyed more security and benefited from some protection against VC terrorism.

Although there were many complaints from the people who were forced to contribute to the construction of those strategic hamlets with their own labor in building barbed wire fences, watchtowers, etc. (the execution of the program had been speeded up to an exaggerated extent by the officials in charge), the program of construction of strategic hamlets achieved three central purposes: (1) to cut off the Communists from contact with the people, thus depriving them of sources of information, supplies and recruits, (2) to give the average villager a stake in the fighting, and (3) to involve all of the people in their own defense.

Most distinguished statemen and many famous papers in the Free World have lauded the Strategic Hamlets policy in VN. Mr. Roger Hilsman, Director of Intelligence and Research at the US Department of State, in a statement said: "During one week in August 1962 (which he took at random as an example) over 600 VC were killed as against less than 100 killed among the pro-government forces. And of these 600 VC killed, two-thirds were killed not by the South Vietnamese regular army but by villagers armed through the Strategic Hamlet

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program. This, I think, is an encouraging indication of the attitude of the villagers."

"The Nation", the best-known paper in Rangoon, in its issue of Oct. 8, 1962 wrote: "According to observers, the villagers are becoming more cooperative in providing the government more information about the activities of the VC who are now denied their former sources of food, shelter and recruits."

The Strategic Hamlet policy was so dangerous for the VC that Communists North Vietnam declared a "hate campaign" against South Vietnam's strategic hamlets. On Nov. 29, 1962, North Vietnam demonstrated how much the Communists disliked the Strategic Hamlets by announcing it had filed a demand with the International Armistice Commission that Strategic Hamlets be dismantled".

Unfortunately, so great an achievement by the Vietnamese people, that is the construction of about 9,000 Strategic Hamlets throughout Vietnam in 2 years, has rapidly collapsed following the Revolution of Nov. 1, 1963. Of course, the new Government succeeding to Diem's had had no clear policy on the Strategic Hamlets. It did order the provincial authorities, especially the district chiefs, to maintain intact and preserve those hamlets from VC destruction. General TON THAT DINH, then Minister of Interior, once made a statement quoted in the press, saying that "the Strategic Hamlets policy kills the people".

Based upon General Dinh's statement, VC agents urged the peasants to destroy all Strategic Hamlets, beginning with their barbed wire fences. The VC then infiltrated into all Strategic Hamlets and they are now controlling most of the Strategic Hamlets. The situation has become so critical that in some provinces, for instance in Long An, the Government has lost its control of almost all Strategic Hamlets.

If the GVN cannot control the hamlets, there will be no possible administration. That is the reason why Strategic Hamlets now called New Life Hamlets, play an important role in our present fight against the Communists. The Vietnamese Government now has to carry out a program of reconstruction of the New Life Hamlets by replacing the barbed wire fences, and other defence works, but how to distinguish between peaceful peasants and VC agents, and how to eliminate the latter from the hamlets remains now a very difficult problem.

At present, the program of pacification is a problem of first priority for VN, but so far, the Government has neither a clear policy nor an adequate plan for this most important program. Each province carries out the program as it deems opportune; no precise directives have come from central agencies. There is a lack of coordination between the agencies involved. The training of cadres is being carried out by each province by its own means and in its own way. Months have elapsed without any meeting for an exchange of experiences between the provinces and agencies involved in the field of pacification. Under these circumstances, satisfactory results cannot be expected.

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As the pacification program remains a vital problem for VN, I think we should do our best, we should use all our possible means to bring this program to a successful result. We should have a nation-wide policy and plan; we should apply rational methods; there should be a close coordination between all the agencies involved. In order to reach those objectives, I would suggest that a province or an area covering two or three provinces be chosen as a pilot area for the implementation of the pacification program. All agencies involved, Vietnamese as well as American, would send there their most qualified men, cadres would be chosen among the most experienced ones and previously trained according to an adequate training program.

In a limited area, it would be easier to get closer cooperation and coordination between the officials representing various agencies. These officials should be of sufficiently high rank so that they can meet together in order to solve on the spot any new problem that may arise in the course of the implementation of the pacification program.

Experiences and lessons learned from the pacification of the pilot area will enable us to prepare a definite nation-wide policy and program of pacification. This will thereby enable us to win the hamlets, that is the rural population, and develop a sound administration from the very lowest infrastructure up through the villages, districts and provinces.

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S. V. N. L. F.

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REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
R. D. MINISTRY
RURAL OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE
TECHNICAL*SERVICE

THE AGONY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT
IN SOUTH VIETNAM

From 1954 to 1959, to realize their plan of conquering South Vietnam, the VC had motivated many political campaigns asking for trade negotiations, general elections, etc., but no results were obtained. So, on December 20, 1960, the Liberation Front came into existence to publicize the invading of South Vietnam by the VC. At first, they had got some sort of success. But since the day the United States of America and other allied nations sent their troops to Vietnam, the VC have lost their active position in the battlefield and the defeat they will suffer is near. Let's find out the causer of their failure.

I - VC'S HOPE OF VICTORY IS COMPLETELY DEFEATED

In spite of their recent efforts, the VC have failed completely in their political and military plots: the movements asking for peace and neutralization are all defeated, the supply routes blackaded, secret structures shelled and even their attacks on some separated outposts in order to calm down people's and VC cadre's spirits also bring them no good effects. The Plei-Me attack might be called the last hops of VC to retrieve their honor. Plei-Me post is located near the Cambodian border where the VC might centralize their forces and make sudden attacks. In case of failure, they might retreat into Cambodia. Thus, the VC had many maximum favorable conditions. But they were entirely vanquished. Not only could they capture that very small outpost, but they have left there more than one thousand dead bodies: the dream of organizing another Dien Bien Phu has been all broken up.

Meanwhile, North Vietnam is shelled more and more heavily everyday by US Air Force attacks right on Hong River's delta. The Phu Suong bridge on the Hanoi/Hai-Phong road was bombed seriously and the air defense pocket system of North Vietnam is all destroyed.

VC cadres' spirits are now in great crisis. They have discovered that Red China in which lay their hope and worship is nothing but a tiger made of waste papers; while USA, their adversary, so-called "false tiger" has brought the most terrible war to the North and is threatening the Chinese continent. Also, North Vietnamese's spirits are agitated by the continuous bombardment by the U.S. Air Force.

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II - THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND RED CHINA HAS BROUGHT INTO NORTH VIETNAM A VERY SERIOUS CRISIS:

For a long time, many statesmen in the world have put different interpretations on the conflict between Russia and Red China. Some say that there is no conflict between these two communist countries at all, and the quarrels and criticisms are only stage-settings. According to these statesmen, Russia and Red China are taking different tasks in resisting USA. Russia plays the conciliating role in order to bring USA to an agreement that USA's capacity of military development should be limited, while Red China plays an extremely exciting role and stands out of the agreement in order to develop its force and when it becomes stronger than USA's, Russia and Red China will cooperate to attack USA.

Other statesmen perceive that, although Russia and Red China have really quarreled, their relationship is still very stable. Because of that, they suggest that the American government should have a cautious attitude towards Red China and North Vietnam. But a number of statesmen believe that the conflict between Russia and Red China is really so serious that there is no hope for reconciliation. They persuade President Johnson to take advantage of it by attacking North Vietnam and Red China strongly. President Johnson has done this. Russia's and Red China's reactions after North Vietnam being bombed fiercely have proved that: The conflict between Russia and Red China is real and cannot be reconciled.

This conflict has pushed North Vietnam into a serious crisis. People all know that Vietnamese communists have two sides: the intellectuals follow Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap who is inclined to Russia. Meanwhile, the uneducated leaders go with Truong Chinh and Le Duan who face towards Peking. Up to now, these two sides try to be in accord because their forces are equal and because they have hoped the conflict between Russia and Red China would be reconciled. But today, that hope is ended. Russia and Red China have followed different policies. Russia urges North Vietnam to negotiate peace with USA, while Red Chine persuades North Vietnam to keep the war on.

III - RED CHINA DARE NOT COPE WITH USA DIRECTLY

Although being the war leader, Red China dare not directly face USA because it fears USA's attacks and Russia's.

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IV - VC TRY TO PROLONG THE PRESENT SITUATION IN ORDER TO WAIT FOR THE WORLD'S NEW EVENT

The hope for military success has ended. The crisis is so serious and the helplessness of Red China in this moment have informed the VC that they are now failing on South Vietnam's battlefields and if they cannot find out a way out, their troops will gradually be destroyed.

But how can they get out from these dangerous battlefields? We perceive that, even the VCs want to, they dare not negotiate peace with USA because the power of Red China in North Vietnam is still very strong. Russia's henchmen fear to be accused of being defeated partisans and that they have surrendered to the capitalist empire. Besides, the VC perceive that while they have been defeated in all battlefields in South Vietnam, a pact signed between the North and the South would contain many disadvantages for them.

Therefore, the VC try to prolong this present situation and to motivate political campaigns. On USA, with Red China's help, they organized some reflective movements. Anyhow, it was a rather hard for VC to succeed because almost all Americans have understood the real facts and schemes of the VC. They hate these movements more than they change their minds because these movements have troubled them a lot.

Therefore, nowadays, VC pay much attention to the political and economic fronts in South Vietnam. They are not interested in exciting people so as to make difficulties for Vietnamese government and to gain support for the VC.

Another scheme of VC: In recent times, the VC have tried to prop up their troops in South Vietnam by enlarging the battlefields to Vietnam's adjoining countries.

According to the Laos Royal Government's declaration, the VC have at least 7 battalions in Pathet Laos areas and have used Pathet Laos as a station to assault and oppress Seno and Savanaket. They also try to bring Cambodia into the battlefield. They have been using Cambodia to resist USA-Vietnamese united army. Some reliable sources inform that the VC have been building their structures on the Vietnam-Cambodia boundary.

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In order to satisfy Sihanouk, Communist China has given Cambodia enough weapons to arm 20,000 soldiers and 10 airplanes. But Sihanouk really understands his situation. His country cannot be called a strong one and never can he resist the US-VN army which is ready at any time to face any events.

CONCLUSION -

We notice that:

VC's hope for military victory is completely defeated. VC leaders are divided by the Russia-Red China conflict. Red China, although it urges North Vietnam to go on resisting the USA, dare not face directly with the USA. VC is trying to find out a way for the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam to get away from battlefield defeats by exciting people in South Vietnam to make difficulties for the government in political and economical areas and enlarging the war to Vietnam's adjoining countries.

But it is certain that the VC will be defeated. In the near future, VC will have only two choices.

1. They will withstand the US for a short time before thoroughly being defeated.
2. They will sign a disadvantageous agreement requiring the withdrawal of VC troops back to the North, and stopping the invasion of the South.

/gva

Oct. 31, 1966

Handwritten initials

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F.I.D. TRIP MEMO

MEMORANDUM OF FIELD TRIP

PLACE : Tay Ninh Province

TIME : October 3, 4, 1966

PARTICIPANTS :- C. Richardson, Project Manager Cadre/USAID
- Nguyen Quoc Khai, Chief of Research and Development Section,
National Training Center for Revolutionary Development Cadre,
Vung Tau
- Richard Burnham, Advisor, Vung Tau Training Center.

Tay Ninh has 8 Revolutionary Development Cadre Groups. Two Groups were trained in the first RD Training Class at Vung Tau. Two Groups have just come from Vung Tau, ending last May Four Groups have been formed from old PAT cadre, APA cadre, and a various assortment of 1965 RD Budget Cadre, supported many of whom are leaving this week for retraining at Vung Tau. We were concerned with visiting the first two Vung Tau trained teams.

Following a morning of Provincial briefing, we made a classic VIP visit of the first RD cadre Group in Truong An Hamlet, and its neighbor Truong Duc, accompanied by the Embassy Representative, the Permanent Bureau Chief, the Provincial RD Cadre Chief, and a truckload of soldiers. We were expected and briefed in the hamlet office, then driven on a tour of the hamlet. Early the next day, we returned to Truong An hamlet without the Permanent Bureau Chief, and completely unannounced. We then continued on to Hieu Thien District where the District Chief met and escorted us on a tour of RD Cadre Group II.

Exactly what the cadre have been doing, and how effective they are was very difficult to determine since we were met with an extraordinary lack of veracity wherever we turned. We were told on our visit the first day to Truong An that Group I was responsible for two neighboring hamlets, Truong-An and Truong-Duc. The next morning we returned and found them also working on two other hamlets. We were told that the cadre had helped to build a self help school. Further questioning established the fact that the money had come from the education section of the Revolutionary Development Budget, but everyone insisted that the cadre had nevertheless helped to build the school in a self help manner, and no contractor had been used. When the Provincial cadre leaders had gone, the village chief quite candidly admitted that it had all been done by a contractor. We were told that the cadre were out attempting to persuade people to join the Peoples Self Defense Force, and that the hamlet was perfectly secure, but when we drove along the road many cadres had their backs to us, facing the jungle in classic VIP guard formation. We were told that the cadre were living in the houses of the people scattered throughout the hamlet, but the cadre quite frankly told Mr. Khai that at night they all slept next to the fort.

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The Permanent Bureau Chief was very proud of 2,500 meters of ditch and fence which the cadre and people had erected around 3 or 4 hamlets including Truong An and Truong Duc. The hamlet office and its neighboring PF cement/earth blockhouse were mentioned as self help projects. PF had been recruited and were in training. A Peoples Self Defense Force was being organized, although it had no arms, and all the various census maps made and VC sympathizers identified. In the two additional neighboring hamlets, were we saw some cadre next morning, their main concern seemed to be census taking/clerical in nature - making lists of Self Defense Force members and situation maps. Although again, no verification was possible, we were told that there were several cadre in these two hamlets and they had only been there a few weeks. Some of the people working in the office were Popular Force soldiers rather than cadre.

In answer to our questioning, the Permanent Bureau Chief explained that no farmers associations or cooperatives had been formed for two reasons. First there were no provincial agricultural or cooperative organizations so no meaningful hamlet organization could be formed. Secondly, a purely local organization would make no sense because there are not enough agricultural cadre in the provincial agricultural service to help the people, consequently, they would get discouraged. Further questioning later elicited evidence of a negative attitude toward cooperatives and associations in general deriving from Diem's strategic hamlet organizations. It seems obvious from this and other Group performances which have been observed, that neither the cadre nor Provincial officials are very certain about the possibilities of local organizing for mutual economic cooperation.

Yet cooperative type activity does exist quite independent of the cadre. On our return to Truong An the next morning, we saw a complex of fish ponds which had been build by 11 cooperating families with technical assistance from the local agricultural service. We also looked for the cadre and were told that they were not working. Finally we found several of the 13 who were responsible for this hamlet. In answer to our question they replied that they were not working because they had finished all of their work. Our question, "why aren't you helping the people in the fields or in their houses?" received evasive answers.

Group II was divided into three parts each at least several kilometres from the other. 6 cadre were in Phuoc Thanh hamlet. 9 were in Phuoc Lan and 18 were in Ben Dinh and its neighbor, Bong Trang. In Phuoc Thanh we were shown 2 or 3 cadre and several local people digging up the ground in front of an old destroyed school. The District Chief who accompanied us said that the people were going to build a new school. In answer to our questions some of the people said they had started digging three days ago, some said yesterday, some this morning, some evaded the question. We asked one man what he was doing. He replied that he was digging a field. When the local RF commander came up to us, the man we were talking to was so frightened that he could no longer speak without the help of the RF commander who tried to supply all the answers everytime he saw us talking to someone. Yet just across the street from this farce, a legitimate Self Help Market, was being constructed under direction of village authorities.

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The cadre had made a census and were engaged in population control activities which were probably useful to the District Chief in his pacification efforts. They were not however adding much to the security of the hamlet since they slept one kilometer away in an outpost at night.

The second section of Group II consisting of 9 men was working in Phuoc-Lan Hamlet, Phuoc Luu Village. They had made a census, drawn a map and made lists for a self defense force.

They were able to enumerate some of the aspirations and grievances of the people: They wanted two new classrooms. They needed 5,000 kilos more of fertilizer at official prices. Only a third of the requirement was being sold officially, the rest was at black market prices. Refugee families needed work, and the road needed to be raised above the rainy season level of the surrounding swamp. The cadre appeared to be staying in and about the hamlet headquarters which was just next to a small PF outpost and thus contributing a security element to this geographically exposed hamlet, not far from the Cambodian border.

The third section of Group II, consisting of 18 men, was working in two neighboring hamlets along the main road from Saigon to Tay Ninh, Ap Ben Dinh and Ap Bong Trang. These hamlets are on the edge of a giant French rubber plantation where the majority of the population works (\$VN45.00 a day for unskilled labor, and \$VN60.00 for skilled labor, plus some rice and salt). Security is furnished by PF outposts, and a regrouping of populations away from more exposed areas within the plantation. The cadre had completed census and situation maps, and had recruited 66 men for a Self Defense Force whose leader is the youth-security assistant of the hamlet chief. We found this force being taught in a school room by a Regional Force officer from Provincial Headquarters. He had charts blackboards, and bamboo spears, and seemed to be engaged in a serious exercise.

OBSERVATIONS: After our visits, Mr. Khai, who was able to talk to cadre and villagers more freely, summed up the situation as follows: "The spirit of the cadre, their morale, is good, but they have no program. What program they do have is the District Chief's and Provincial authorities. This is the old program and not revolutionary. There is too much for show without substance. The cadre said that at night they always slept near a fort or a secure area. They did not sleep in the houses of the people. They said there were too few in each hamlet to live scattered. They did say however that they went on some night patrols near the road."

Tay Ninh appears to have a realistic and working pacification plan. Outlying hamlets are regrouped along the principle axis of communication, and government forces are fixed in points supporting this population. There are Free World and Army Forces which work outside the perimeter; RF forces in fixed points on the perimeters, and PF stationed in small posts within the perimeter near hamlet/village offices and strategic points. The cadre, while living near PF posts are adding something to the security element,

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but whether they are adding anything more to the security element than a corresponding number of PF is questionable. Within the pacified areas, the Provincial and District authorities seem to be engaged in the organization of unarmed Self Defense Units, with some assistance from the cadre. Within this area of government control and semi control, Revolutionary Development Budget projects are being built, including self help projects. Refugees are being realistically resettled. Animal Husbandry and Agricultural cadre have gotten out to some extent. The cadre however don't seem to have anything to do with these activities.

Are the cadre then filling that gap between the extension of provincial technical cadre, and the small technical problems of the people. Are they going beyond the RD Budget funded project and simple neighborhood self help project. Are they a catalyst to bring people together to work for their own mutual improvement. The only evidence of this we saw was in building the great fence around Ap Truong An and neighboring hamlets and in assisting the District in recruiting Self Defense Forces. They did not appear to feel motivated to help the people in their small tasks on a daily basis.

The cadre are in effect an extension of the District Chief's administration at the hamlet level. In Tay Ninh Province they are not being used as revolutionary force.

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PROV. REP. MEMO

COPY

OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS OPERATIONAL MEMORANDUM No. 111-66

TO All Regional Directors and Provincial Representatives DATE 6/8/66

FROM Charles A. Mann, Director

SUBJECT Assistant Provincial Representatives (Revolutionary Development Cadre)

This is to inform you that effective June 1, 1966, USAID assumed full responsibility for U.S. support to the Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC) Program. The attached papers on operational guidelines are provided to assist field personnel in understanding their responsibilities in this important area. American personnel in each province currently charged with primary responsibility for the RDC program are now assigned to USAID and are designated Assistant Provincial Representatives (RDC). Such personnel are to be considered regular members of the USAID Provincial Team. They will continue to maintain the same effective and mutually supporting relationships with the USAID Provincial Representatives as in the past.

In connection with their responsibilities in the RDC program these newly designated USAID Assistant Provincial Representatives (RDC) will maintain a functional reporting channel directly to the Joint Cadre Operations Control Group (JCOCG) which is a combined U.S. agency group serving as advisors to the Directorate of Cadre Training and Cadre Operations of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development. The Directorate of Cadre Training and Cadre Operations is that component of the Ministry which is responsible for the RDC program.

Regional Directors will issue appropriate supplemental instructions as required.

L. Maynard:ac

Attachments 2/s.

The village of Tan Thoi Nhi, in the district of Hoc Mon, with an annual budget of VN\$ 2 million, has for 2 years obtained no authorization to repair the front part of the village headquarters.

The village of Thong Tay Hoi in the district of GO VAP, with an annual budget of over VN\$ 750,000 has to process many civil registry papers (1) since the setting up of a military cemetery within its precincts, but has just one clerk to cover the exceptionally heavy workload. This village has requested authorization to hire one more clerk but has never received a favorable answer. Yet, in the meantime, this village had to pay a monthly salary of VN\$ 7,500 to a retired civil servant who is working at a Service in the chief town. Recently, this village had to disburse VN\$ 16,000 for the payment of a bill to cover the GRALL hospital fees for the young son of the above retired civil servant! (2)

Many other villages, while not being allowed to spend money for the benefit of their villagers, are having to contribute significant amounts of money for the salaries of clerks working in the district or chief town. One example is the village of Tan Son Hoa in the District of Tan Binh. Besides paying 18 male and female clerks working at its own headquarters, this village has to carry the salaries (about VN\$ 48,000 monthly) of 15 personnel working elsewhere, at the district or chief town.

The village of Hanh Thong in the district of Go Vap, with an annual budget of over VN\$ 5 million, besides paying the salaries of 12 village employees, has to cover the salaries of 14 personnel detached to serve at district headquarters.

In short, most villages, though having significant local revenues, are required to use part of these funds for purposes other than their village and hamlet development programs. Their funds are used instead to cover many expenses which do not have a direct connection with their own village. This fact leads to the following consequences:

1. The Village Chief as well as other Village Committee members, when realizing that they cannot efficiently help the villagers, lose their status and feel on the defensive toward the villagers because

(1) Sometime hundreds of bodies of dead soldiers are brought in during a single day from various battle fields to be buried in the military cemetery and the village chief has to deliver hundreds of certificates of death to the dead soldiers' families to permit them to draw death benefits.

(2) I am told that the Province Chief, after reading the report of the Training Follow-up Committee, has quite recently authorized the Village Committee of Thong Tay Hoi to hire three more clerks to help it on civil registry work.

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they are not able to support the village's interests. They then lose enthusiasm, feel disappointed and perform their duties in a perfunctory manner.

(While interviewing village and hamlet officials I noticed, with a feeling of optimism, that most of them are very anxious to develop their villages and hamlets by building schools, maternity hospitals, infirmaries, markets, roads, bridges sewers, drainage, etc. They wish they were able to leave some good accomplishments when they resign so the villagers will remember them favorably, but they have met with refusal from higher authorities).

2. As for the citizens, when they realize that their village and hamlet administrative committees accomplish little for the community, they have no confidence in the officials and considered them incapable. They wonder where millions of piasters of their village revenues go, what purposes they are used for, because they really don't know anything about it. Hence they don't listen to the village committee's orders and they become indifferent toward village and state affairs. They have no regard for the policies dictated by the Central Government and, still worse, some people even believe that only the VCs do wish to improve the village and the country people's living conditions.

Shortcomings in the Administrative Organization of the District.

From the instances related above we clearly see that village funds are not used properly in accordance with the spirit of village autonomy. If there courageous financial inspectors came in and inspected village financial transactions, I feel sure they would detect many irregularities and even embezzlements. This is the natural consequence of a not very logical organization in local administration. I refer to the administrative organization of the district which I once dealt with in a previous report.

At present the district must be considered the most important administrative unit in local administration. The district is in close contact with villages and hamlets, the units of the infra-structure, and the district chief is closer to the country people than is the province chief. Yet, the district has no budget at its disposal and the district chief has to work under the worst conditions: shortage of personnel, motor vehicles, gas, oil and materials of all kinds. The most capable personnel are retained at the provincial capital. The less qualified or unqualified are sent to district. Good vehicles and materials are kept for use at the province capital; the left-overs may go to districts.

Under such conditions, the resourceful district chief tries to make use of revenues from the wealthier villages in order to serve the district. In the beginning he does this very honestly with the sole objective of running district affairs well and getting good results

from his management. The district chief is perfectly aware that his use of village funds is irregular but excuses himself by arguing that the district administration cannot run smoothly without such funds and that the district as a whole stands to benefit. But in the long run a dishonest district chief, noticing that his irregularities are passed over in silence by higher authorities, may ask himself this question: "Why can't I put part of the village funds into my pocket? Nobody knows about it!" And this is a first step toward theft and embezzlement which will go on increasing day by day.

Revision of district administrative organization needed. Given the above situation, I think that the administrative organization of the district should be revised. The district must be a basic administrative unit to carry out the government policies; therefore, it should be endowed with legal status like that of the village and province. A budget should be put at its disposal and used according to certain directives. It may include some redistribution of village funds, which, in practice, the District Chiefs are actually doing in oblique ways. The district should also be strengthened in the matter of personnel, finance, equipment, and supplies, through a more logical distribution of existing means rather than keeping so much for provincial services. As for the village, a concept of broad autonomy must prevail in the use of village funds, while recognizing that part of the funds of wealthier villages, not exceeding 50%, may be used to help the poor villages.

The problem of security in rural areas. In the follow-up training visits I had the opportunity for friendly talks with some district chiefs and deputy chiefs. I also had some informal talks with the village and hamlet chiefs. On three or four occasions we drank rice wine with them in their communities, some of which were insecure. I asked them if they know those V.C. operating in their villages and hamlets and most of them answered affirmatively. When asked why they don't arrest or denounce those V.C., they sadly answered that if they arrested or denounced them they would be sentenced to only two or three years of imprisonment and when released they will surely kill the accusers. These answers show that the village and hamlet officials really have no confidence in the nationalist law which they characterize as so generous that it rather favors the VCs in their terrorist activities.

A hamlet chief sadly told me this story: "I read in the newspaper quite recently that a well known VC who killed two hamlet chiefs in Gia Dinh province has just been sentenced to 10 years of hard labor by the Court of Justice of Saigon. With such a sentence the nationalist government practically raises the VC until the day when his Uncle Ho will come here!"

Said a district chief, a major of the ARVN: "Our procedure is most annoying for loyal elements. A member of the militia, after shooting a real VC one night, was summoned to the Military Police office several times for interrogations. He found it so annoying that he became weary

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of shooting the VC. He resolved never to shoot a VC unless he has to act in self-defense, just to avoid the above complications. On the VC side, a guerrilla is allowed to cut anyone's throat he considers as his enemy or dangerous for the VC. This enables a few VC to control several villages. As they often killed too many people, thereby provoking the people's discontent, VC higher authorities began issuing circulars instructing their cadres in the infrastructure to report each time they put someone to death. The document, found on a VC body, proved that a VC guerrilla had up to then been allowed to kill any citizen without having to report to their superiors!"

A deputy district chief told me this funny story: "A militiaman (under NGO DINH DIEM regime) on duty at a control station, had searched a VC and found in his handbag a grenade and a tape of VC documents. The militiaman handed him over to the Village Administrative Committee which, in its turn, led him to the district authorities; the latter then gave him up to the provincial authorities. At the province chief town he was delivered over to the court of justice. The examining judge summoned the militiaman to come to his office several times for interrogation. Each time he had to spend out of his pocket about VN\$100 for food and transportation. It was really very costly for a poor militiaman who earned at that time just a few hundred piasters a month. The end of the story was really funny: the tribunal acquitted the VC. As for the militiaman he was lucky enough to get out of the nasty mess -- he just missed being sentenced to a few months in prison. The reason was that the VC bribed some influential people and threatened some villagers, forcing them to make false declarations in favor of the accused VC. Those false witnesses declared at the court of justice that the militiaman had played a trick on the accused with the intent to taking away his wife!"

The deputy district chief then concluded: "The nationalist law and procedures are simply antiquated and no longer fit the present state of war in our country. The magistrates, who only sit in their tribunal offices in cities, don't know the actual situation in the countryside. They show themselves indulgent under every circumstance toward criminals including the VC murderers!"

U.S. advisors in law to be placed at the Ministry of Justice. The above stories remind me of a British advisor's statement on Public Administration in Vietnam when I met him in mid-1963. Said the British advisor: "The law of the Republic of Vietnam shows that this country has no clear cut attitude toward the VC. Formerly in Malaya, people were identified as of one of two kinds, either they were good citizens or they were Communist Malaysians. The good citizens were well regarded. The Communist Malaysians, on the contrary, were treated without pity. Even those who supplied a Communist with a handful of rice were severely punished. The Malayan law was clear about that. It is thanks to such a severe law that Malaya could get rid of the Communists."

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The Vietnamese law, on the contrary, is so indulgent that it turns out to favor the VC. Although the U.S. has placed advisors in most agencies and in most fields of activity such as public administration, health, public works, police and security, economy, finance, taxation, agriculture, labor, there are none at the Ministry of Justice. It is there that U.S. advisors could help Vietnamese jurists prepare a new code suitable to the war situation of this country. Vietnam continues to apply French law, some of which dates from the last century.

VCs fleeing in VC zones and their families living in Government controlled hamlets.

Whenever I came to a hamlet and heard the hamlet chief complain that his hamlet was insecure, I spontaneously asked him this question: "How many families of the fled VC are there in your hamlet?" In most cases, the answer was two or three, even five or seven such families.

Said the Hamlet Chief of an insecure hamlet in Nha Be district: "We cannot believe in the loyalty of those refugee families from the VC areas. There are in my hamlet several families which immigrated from Long An and have been allowed since the time of Ngo Dinh Diem government to be resettled here. They said they could not endure the VC regime and came to my hamlet with the intent to live quietly and work peacefully. To all appearances they seemed to be very loyal. They always obeyed our regulations and orders. Two years had thus elapsed when one day I noticed that one of these families conducted two burial processions at the same time. I made a census of the population in my hamlet but didn't find anybody dead. I finally discovered that the two dead and buried persons were the close relatives of that family, who had followed the VC and were recently killed in an aerial bombardment by government planes.

"Another resettled family consists of one woman and three children. The woman is presumed to be a widower, at least she declared so. Two years later, this family suddenly held a funeral. I made a new census of the population but found nobody missing. I then asked her and learned that it was the funeral of her husband, a VC who had just been killed by government soldiers."

The above two stories prove that the fled VC often return to their villages on the sly and their families' houses are their liaison places, their shelters and their intelligence service which enable them to commit acts of terrorism and sabotage against their villages. It may be said that those families of the fled VC are one of the main causes of the present state of insecurity in rural areas.

CASE PROBLEMS

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"REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT"

CASE OFFICER'S PROBLEMS

1. Province officials were not well informed of the GVN's RD policies. They used groups as military units--leadership at the district level was inadequate, cadres could leave their assigned hamlets and villages for Dalat without permission--some cadres were shown favoritism, e.g., allowed to work at the Mayor's office or elsewhere in Dalat rather than in rural areas, causing jealousy and loss of confidence in their leaders.
2. Inspection teams visiting the cadres made only cursory and careless inspections, never staying long enough to thoroughly check on the real situation. Provincial level leaders did not pay visits to the groups.
3. Because of the urgent recruitment requirement to meet GVN pacification goals, selection and assessment of trainees was hastily performed resulting in a very low caliber of trainees.
4. The province chief readily confesses that he had much to learn about the program. He did not devote much time or effort to the RD Program. Other responsibilities and lack of guidance from the national level were partially to blame. The district chiefs followed the same pattern with an even lesser degree of program interest and knowledge. Provincial service chiefs, i.e., public works, agriculture and fisheries, knew they were in some way connected with the RD Program but no organization or guidance was available. The Provincial RD Council and Cadre Control Committee were ineffective. Again, lack of national program direction and guidance prevailed.
5. With Major General Nguyen Duc Thang's visit in June 1966, the program received some impetus and changes for the better began to occur. A few provincial officials were replaced from Saigon, Ministry directives stressed the need for careful selection of cadres--at COD urging the National RD Seminars for province officials not only emphasized GVN interest but created a more cohesive chain of command from Saigon to district levels. After the seminar for Tuyen Duc Officials, the Province Chief promptly called a meeting of the Provincial RD Council. He dominated the meeting and stated in no uncertain terms that the RD Program was the national priority and it would be successful in Tuyen Duc Province. Later, he replaced his deputy for RD and other lesser officials. The Table of Organization was established and implemented. The trained Cadre Control Organization is now fully responsible for the direction of the cadre to ensure effective coordination. Guidance, administration, and frequent inspections of the RD groups and their activities are among their working goals. The two men chosen as deputies of the Control Organization have

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been employed heretofore as RD team leaders. Thus, they are the first to be promoted from the ranks of the cadres to the Cadre Control Committee. This should have a salutary effect.

6. Long An Province is sometimes referred to as the neck which connects the head (Saigon) to the body of the Delta. There are two ARVN regiments of the 25th. Division located in the province with a total strength of approximately 1,200 men. In addition, as of 1 October 1966, one ARVN Ranger Battalion at Go Deng and a newly placed U. S. 25th. Inf. Div. Battalion south of Ben Luc District. There are 21 Regional Force companies which are approximately 70 per cent up to strength.

7. The Viet Cong (VC) is represented by the Provincial 506th. Battalion, 2nd. Independent. Since Long An is used as a communications liaison route, other VC military units like the 504th. and 261st. occasionally add weight to other VC military units. There are varying estimates as to the number of VC hamlet and village guerrillas, most of which cannot be substantiated and actually have little value if viewed only in terms of numbers. However, there are enough, with the support of provincial battalions to have kept ARVN from accomplishing its mission of "clear and hold." Although the VC military was handed a severe defeat in February, lingering fear of VC retaliation by terror has not changed the pacification picture appreciably for the past year. The factor contributing to this lack of success is primarily due to the lack of initiative on the part of the ARVN 25th. Division command to move two regiments into the field to fill the vacuum. Instead, they are content to patrol the two bridges on Route Four during the day and return to static defenses at night.

8. There are approximately 400,000 people living in Long An Province, of which one-third are reported to be under GVN control. In this connection the only bright military accomplishment so far is that Route Four has been kept open, which is vital to the economy of Saigon. The containment of the VC military in Long An Province is attributed to excellent air support, coordinated with the spotting efforts of Forward Aerial Control (FAC). ARVN is totally ineffectual.

9. From January to June 1966 the cadre program was unsuccessful for several reasons:

- a. Lack of initiative on the part of the old PAT's and USAID-sponsored cadre programs.
- b. Insufficient interest by Provincial/District officials in cadres.
- c. An extremely tenuous military situation.

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d. A semi-hostile peasantry who had been badly let down by the earlier strategic hamlet program.

e. An unrealistic pacification program (Hop Tac) contrived in the minds of Saigon Military Commanders who were not sufficiently knowledgeable on the problems in Long An.

f. Prejudging the cadre program's performance before adequate time was allowed to weed out undesirable elements.

10. With the arrival of the first RD cadres in late May and an earlier visit of Major General Nguyen Duc Thang, the Province Chiefs recognized that more time and effort would be required if he were to keep peace in the province. Still, he was faced with unrealistic requirement of pacifying over 20 hamlets by the end of 1966. Coupled with a serious lack of military capability to support even the most modest hamlet pacification effort, he proceeded to deploy the groups in accordance with the Saigon prepared and controlled Hop Tac plan. In the past, the "paper" pacification effort was not contested, but with the arrival of a permanent cadre advisor in province he began to challenge these concepts. For example, two of the RD groups had been assigned to Ben Luc District in hamlets beyond the security protection of the GVN. Since there was no security for these two groups, which were frequently harassed by roving VC guerrillas, the people in the hamlets were unwilling to cooperate and requested that the cadres leave. The Province Chief was appraised of this situation and he immediately reassigned these groups to new locations where it was possible for the groups to function as designed. There were still efforts made to move groups in and out of hamlets merely to satisfy Ministry requirements. However, in late May, Vinh An hamlet, located three kilometers from the province capital was declared secure and pacified. The U. S. Advisor was reluctant to agree to this until he was assured that one squad of RD soldiers was assigned to guard the hamlet. The chief of the Province Committee for RD promised this would be done and that a reaction company of RF would be stationed two kilometers away to assist in the event of an attack. Three nights later a small local VC guerrilla unit entered the hamlet and destroyed the hamlet office, dispensary and bridge linking the hamlet to the province capital. Investigation showed that the RD Squad had not been in the hamlet and that the Reaction Force had been moved to another area of operation. Since that time the VC have entered this hamlet not only terrorizing the people but also destroying the only self-help project shortly after it was completed. Even though this has had a demoralizing effect on U. S. advisor teams, the Vietnamese were much more philosophical, usually grinning and shrugging their shoulders when questioned about the loss of this hamlet. Nevertheless, since this episode the U. S. Advisory Team has become much more critical in its inspections of both the hamlet and the RD cadres' accomplishments.

11. In late July 1966, a new province chief was appointed. Since he was formerly the 49th. Regimental Commander of the 25th. Division, he has been able to persuade the Division Commander to provide a more sympathetic view toward Long An Province pacification effort. A new man also was

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assigned to the RD Permanent Committee, who has to date been more receptive to advice and counsel from the U. S. Cadre Advisor. As evidence of this, an entirely new pacification program was prepared for the remainder of 1966, with a flexible schedule assigned to each cadre group working in harmony with RF elements.

12. With the establishment of the U. S. 4th. Battalion 25th. Inf. Div. Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) in Ben Luc District, RD cadres have been assigned to key hamlets in the TAOR. The teams provide a measure of security as well as a source of tactical information. Their presence has also provided a secure staging area for night 25th. Inf. Div. and PRU operations now being conducted against VC targets heretofore immune to such action. They have further been instructed to hold meetings with the hamlet residents to explain the role of the newly-arrived U. S. troops in Long An.

13. The early problems of poor discipline among cadres, ineffectual leadership, and a general lethargical attitude toward manual labor is being effectively corrected. This has been accomplished primarily by educating province and district officials who are now devoting more time and attention to the cadres. Cadres who are not willing to carry out their assignments are released and sent to serve in military units. Other members of the U. S. advisory team have also played an important role by putting their support firmly behind the Cadre Advisor so that the advisory team speaks as one.

14. Revolutionary development (RD) cadre operations in Quang Tri Province are, for the first time since the start of the Buddhist "struggle" movement in mid-March 1966, beginning to achieve modest but tangible results. Although progress has been "modest", it takes on special significance when one views the chaotic and uncontrolled situation which existed in Quang Tri, and all of I Corps, during the "struggle" period.

15. Quang Tri Province officials, like those in Thua Thien and Quang Nam, were unable to cope with the "struggle" situation and consequently the administrative machinery in the province broke-down completely. Province officials either sympathized with the "strugglers" or remained passive to mob-rule. Nguyen Truong Thoai, who was province chief during that period and who was basically anti-struggle, was unable to gain the cooperation of either the Army or the police in his efforts to contain or control the mob. There was literally no provincial government and all RD programs, including the RD cadre program, suffered critical reversals. What had been a fairly effective cadre program was ruined and many of the gains achieved over the months were lost.

16. No leadership or guidance came forth from the RD Council or Committee and to further aggravate the situation, many people believed the "struggle" propaganda that the groups were American mercenaries. Consequently, any effort by a group to move into a hamlet was either met by peasant apathy

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or out-right hostility. The fact that the RD groups maintained unity was in itself miraculous.

17. Following the end of the "struggle" movement, it was left to the officials of Quang Tri Province to restore order out of chaos and to begin the RD program anew. The most significant step taken in this regard was the appointment by the GVN on 15 June 1966 of Lt. Col. Nguyen Am as province chief. Lt. Col. Am began his new duties in an atmosphere of tension and instability. Overtones of the "struggle" movement remained, coupled with the normal, "palace intrigues" so typical in Vietnam. In addition, Lt. Col. Am was faced with the political power plays of the Dai Viet and VNQDD political parties. Am, who has had a distinguished military career, but no civil administrative experience, was given little chance of successfully coping with the political situation as it existed in June 1966. However, one strong factor in Am's favor was that, along with being province chief, he also was commander of the first ARVN regiment which provided him with a power base incomparably better than that possessed by previous province chiefs. This probably, more than anything else, enabled him to weather the political storm during those first critical weeks until he was able to take control of the provincial administration. Lt. Col. Am began making new appointments in the administrative and security departments of the provincial government, replacing suspected "struggle" personalities and men he knew to hold no loyalty towards himself. There is no evidence that Am's personnel changes reflected a leaning toward any particular political party or splinter group and, as of this writing, he has remained above the political turmoil and skillfully walked the political tightrope.

18. There is always the possibility that one of the political parties, namely the Dai Viet, has the potential to create discord and conceivably bring a return of instability to the province. This latter caveat is meant only to provide perspective to the provincial political situation. When one considers the orderly manner in which the Dai Viet candidates conducted their campaigns for the 11 September election to the constituent assembly, and the fact there had been no concerted effort by the party to upset the present political status-quo, the odds are good that Lt. Col. Am will maintain provincial stability. Most provincial officials and the American provincial team see little chance for a comeback by the "struggler." There was no significant effort by them to sabotage the 11 September elections and the astounding 90 per cent voter turnout, most of whom were Buddhist, indicate that the "struggle" movement, if not dead, has been rendered ineffective. The RD cadre groups in Quang Tri Province, as throughout Vietnam, engaged in successful "get out the vote campaign."

19. The 11 September election success has undoubtedly been the most striking factor contributing to the present political stability in Quang Tri Province. Prior to the election, there was a trend toward stability, but this would have been completely disrupted if the VC or militant Buddhists

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had successfully subverted the proceedings. As a result of their failure to do so, the Province Chief gained new status and popularity among the people and his control over the provincial administration has been enhanced.

20. In view of these developments, we are more optimistic about the prospects for the RD Program than at any time since mid-March 1966. The Province Chief has proven that he can provide solid leadership and if stability can be maintained, we, at least, will have two vital ingredients for a successful program.

21. In August 1966, the Province Chief appointed Captain Bach Van Can as Chief of the RD Committee. Captain Can enjoys the reputation of having been the best District Chief Quang Tri Province when he was Chief of Trieu Phong District. In February 1966, Can was seriously wounded when the VC overran Trieu Phong District Headquarters and his appointment as RD Committee Chief makes his first assignment since that time. Can, thus far, has been impressive. He has reorganized the RD Committee into a smaller, more efficient, functioning body--and, more significantly, he is enforcing regulations governing the conduct of RD cadres. Cadres guilty of misconduct and inefficiency are either being punished or dismissed from the program entirely. This has resulted in a notable improvement in team performance and morale. Lack of discipline which resulted during the leadership vacuum created by the "struggle" movement has been one of the more serious problems we have had to face regarding cadre operations.

22. As a result of the leadership provided by Lt. Col. Am and Captain Can, the RD Cadre Program has made progress in recent weeks. During the recent rice harvest, as evidenced by RD advisor inspection, the groups assisted the people with the harvest, provided security, and conducted propaganda campaigns through mass media (RD Newspaper) and PA systems. Team 10, which represented the only RD group in province until the recent arrival of our Vung Tau trainees, completed the census of Tui Tin Hamlet in Mai Linh District--formed hamlet defense cadres--organized and supervised an election to choose a hamlet government. This election was observed by the RD provincial advisor.

23. In Quang Tri Province we are faced with the necessity of repacifying hamlets which were lost during the "struggle". During August and September 1966, seven hamlets located in Trieu Phong, Mai Linh, and Gio Linh districtus were subjected to repacification operations which were fairly successful. The groups will continue to work these hamlets plus ten additional hamlets which have been designated for pacification during the forth quarter of 1966. With the formation of our new 59-man groups (a total of twelve) we are optimistic that we will begin to receive more definitive results. The problem of team leadership, however, remains and if not handled properly could create significant problems for the

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program. The Provincial Officials, along with the Advisory Staff, have been working on this matter for some time and, hopefully, the in-province training course will allow additional evaluation or those who have the potential to become efficient RD group leaders. Capable PAT leaders who are being replaced will be sent to a leadership course at Vung Tau, thus providing us a face saving mechanism and enhancing their leadership capability - some of these former PAT leaders will undoubtedly be reassigned to their former teams as leaders when they return from the national training center at Vung Tau.

24. As noted in this report, the RD Program in Quang Tri Province has revived since the end of the "struggle" movement. We still have many problems but, at least, the trend is now upward rather than downward and there is a good chance that we can succeed with the program. This is no more apparent than in the attitude of the people. The peasants have regained a measure of confidence in the groups and what they are trying to do. All hamlets visited in recent weeks demonstrated that the residents are pleased with the team efforts and, without exception, the people have requested that the teams remain with them as long as possible.

25. The need to have well-motivated, effective RD leaders cannot be overstressed. Under good leadership mediocre teams operating in difficult areas can perform well. The example, Vinh Quang Hamlet in eastern Tuy Phuoc Bay area, still infested with guerrillas hiding in mangrove swamps, was processed in May-July by average RD group with a good leader. At the time team entered the people were 75 per cent pro-VC, economy was poor, living conditions for many subsistent. After initial four-week period the people gradually began to participate in self improvement projects and to cooperate with the team in community action. This culminated in the repair of a sea wall, measuring 1500 meters, which had deteriorated under VC control. An estimated 75 per cent of the populace worked voluntarily without asking other support than guidance from the team. The result was added acreage and better irrigation which has yielded a bumper rice crop, particularly profitable to the people since they need not pay any tax while, in contrast, the VC used to tax them two-thirds of every harvest. Popularly elected Hamlet chief who is responsive to the people's needs and wishes, sparks community progress now that the RD group has departed. This Hamlet was visited by Generals Thieu, Ky and Thang, who described it as the most progressive example seen of the RD effort in Vietnam. Hamlet sentiment is now 75 per cent pro-GVN, but the fact that the other 25 per cent are still influenced by relatives serving in small, nearby VC guerrilla units requires self defense reinforcement by PAT Platoon. However, District Military/Psywar operations planned for the near future in this bay area may capitalize on lowered VC morale caused by pacification occupation of their Hamlet areas and isolation from outside support as a result of Phu Cat Mountains denial operation. The monsoon season may witness the end of the VC guerrilla threat in the bay area.

26. Unless the pacification follow-up program of continued material assistance, technical aid and motivational programs among the people fails to effectively reach the Hamlets already processed by RD teams, VC small unit harassment throughout the pacification zone soon should be almost completely eliminated. To ensure that the follow-up program is effective, provincial officials are attempting to recruit and properly train more technical cadre, but have been hampered by budgetary restrictions.

27. During the cadres' training phase, a six-man province control committee chaired by the Province Chief and a PAT representative for each district were selected by the Province Officer, approved by the Province Chief and given four weeks of in-province training. All facets of the political action program concept were explained in detail. The guidelines of the program were flexible enough to tailor them to meet the specific needs of Khanh Hoa Province. During this same period, other province officials, i.e., District Chiefs, S-2 and S-3 Officers, were also invited to attend these seminars whenever their duties permitted. None did. Appointments were then made with each District Chief for a series of PAT Program Briefings in their office. Transportation was provided by helio aircraft or helicopters to accomplish this mission. All PAT Program instructors were given a thorough indoctrination of the program by the U. S. Cadre Advisor prior to these sessions. The Vietnamese District Cadre Advisor carried credentials from the Province Chief and was introduced during these briefings. In four out of six districts, the District Chief requested the Vietnamese Cadre Advisor to assume responsibility for the program. When this was accomplished, a unilateral reporting source of cadre activities to the U. S. Cadre Advisor was established.

28. The concern over appropriate RD staffing evolved from numerous experiences during these three months of attempting to integrate the two programs and utilize the competent and experienced PAT Staff. Dedicated and productive PAT teams lost confidence with the Province Officials. PAT Staff members were not consulted or advised of province directives. The first RD-trained cadres did not receive any guidance from province officials. The province authorities continued to maintain the position/as a compromise/ that PAT and RD Programs should function separately. Deputy Chief for internal security continued to assign new personnel as members of the RD Control Committee. The PAT Committee was denied permission to give Vung Tau-trained RD teams the essential two week motivation training in Province. Experiences, proven to be of vital importance to the team's ability during the past 15 months were totally disregarded by Province officials within their RD concept.

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POLITICAL QUEST.

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PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS

Nguyen Ngoc Ne

Last August I had the privilege of participating as a member of a local committee in a follow-up study of training in Gia Dinh province. We made visits and conducted interviews in a number of villages and hamlets. Our committee findings were reported and I added supplementary observations and suggestions on training. But being interested in the future of my country, I could not avoid making observations on political questions too. Some of what I saw and heard and some of my own thoughts concerning them are reported here.

My first observations were that the rural revolution, which successive Prime Ministers have repeatedly spoken about, has practically no echo in the villages and hamlets visited. The country people are thoroughly indifferent to it; they show no concern about the Central Government's promises of rural revolution.

Ambassador Lodge's recent statement makes it clear that he too believes that a revolution is needed for this country. When speaking of rural revolution, we should first think about the village and hamlets. And we should act in such a way that the villagers will be responsive and ready to cooperate with the Government in bringing about real changes and improvements. With this necessity in mind I shall try to identify some causes of the people's indifference toward the Government.

The Vietnamese Village has gradually been losing its autonomy.

If one compares the present day Vietnamese village with that two decades ago it will be noticed that the village has been gradually losing its autonomy. This gives the villager no prospect of progress. So, before talking about rural revolution, one must first think of restoring to the villages the autonomy they enjoyed so long in spite of political upheavals and other changes during thousands of years of history.

The statement that Vietnamese villages have been losing their autonomy is based upon concrete evidence of what may be interpreted as a discouraging application of village funds. Several villages which have an annual budget of half a million to 5 million have been not allowed to spend even a small amount of money -- just a few thousands of VN\$ -- for the benefit of the village. As an example take the village of HANH THONG (District of THU DUC). Its annual budget amounts to about VN\$ 5 million, but for 2 years it has not been allowed to repair its main road which is generally in muddy condition or worse. The expense of repair has been estimated at VN\$ 60,000. This does not include labor costs because labor is to be contributed by the villagers as a community development effort.

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The village of Tan Thoi Nhi, in the district of Hoc Mon, with an annual budget of VN\$ 2 million, has for 2 years obtained no authorization to repair the front part of the village headquarters.

The village of Thong Tay Hoi in the district of GO VAP, with an annual budget of over VN\$ 750,000 has to process many civil registry papers (1) since the setting up of a military cemetery within its precincts, but has just one clerk to cover the exceptionally heavy workload. This village has requested authorization to hire one more clerk but has never received a favorable answer. Yet, in the meantime, this village had to pay a monthly salary of VN\$ 7,500 to a retired civil servant who is working at a Service in the chief town. Recently, this village had to disburse VN\$ 16,000 for the payment of a bill to cover the GRALL hospital fees for the young son of the above retired civil servant! (2)

Many other villages, while not being allowed to spend money for the benefit of their villagers, are having to contribute significant amounts of money for the salaries of clerks working in the district or chief town. One example is the village of Tan Son Hoa in the District of Tan Binh. Besides paying 18 male and female clerks working at its own headquarters, this village has to carry the salaries (about VN\$ 48,000 monthly) of 15 personnel working elsewhere, at the district or chief town.

The village of Hanh Thong in the district of Go Vap, with an annual budget of over VN\$ 5 million, besides paying the salaries of 12 village employees, has to cover the salaries of 14 personnel detached to serve at district headquarters.

In short, most villages, though having significant local revenues, are required to use part of these funds for purposes other than their village and hamlet development programs. Their funds are used instead to cover many expenses which do not have a direct connection with their own village. This fact leads to the following consequences:

1. The Village Chief as well as other Village Committee members, when realizing that they cannot efficiently help the villagers, lose their status and feel on the defensive toward the villagers because

(1) Sometime hundreds of bodies of dead soldiers are brought in during a single day from various battle fields to be buried in the military cemetery and the village chief has to deliver hundreds of certificates of death to the dead soldiers' families to permit them to draw death benefits.

(2) I am told that the Province Chief, after reading the report of the Training Follow-up Committee, has quite recently authorized the Village Committee of Thong Tay Hoi to hire three more clerks to help it on civil registry work.

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they are not able to support the village's interests. They then lose enthusiasm, feel disappointed and perform their duties in a perfunctory manner.

(While interviewing village and hamlet officials I noticed, with a feeling of optimism, that most of them are very anxious to develop their villages and hamlets by building schools, maternity hospitals, infirmaries, markets, roads, bridges sewers, drainage, etc. They wish they were able to leave some good accomplishments when they resign so the villagers will remember them favorably, but they have met with refusal from higher authorities).

2. As for the citizens, when they realize that their village and hamlet administrative committees accomplish little for the community, they have no confidence in the officials and considered them incapable. They wonder where millions of piasters of their village revenues go, what purposes they are used for, because they really don't know anything about it. Hence they don't listen to the village committee's orders and they become indifferent toward village and state affairs. They have no regard for the policies dictated by the Central Government and, still worse, some people even believe that only the VCs do wish to improve the village and the country people's living conditions.

Shortcomings in the Administrative Organization of the District.

From the instances related above we clearly see that village funds are not used properly in accordance with the spirit of village autonomy. If there courageous financial inspectors came in and inspected village financial transactions, I feel sure they would detect many irregularities and even embezzlements. This is the natural consequence of a not very logical organization in local administration. I refer to the administrative organization of the district which I once dealt with in a previous report.

At present the district must be considered the most important administrative unit in local administration. The district is in close contact with villages and hamlets, the units of the infra-structure, and the district chief is closer to the country people than is the province chief. Yet, the district has no budget at its disposal and the district chief has to work under the worst conditions: shortage of personnel, motor vehicles, gas, oil and materials of all kinds. The most capable personnel are retained at the provincial capital. The less qualified or unqualified are sent to district. Good vehicles and materials are kept for use at the province capital; the left-overs may go to districts.

Under such conditions, the resourceful district chief tries to make use of revenues from the wealthier villages in order to serve the district. In the beginning he does this very honestly with the sole objective of running district affairs well and getting good results

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from his management. The district chief is perfectly aware that his use of village funds is irregular but excuses himself by arguing that the district administration cannot run smoothly without such funds and that the district as a whole stands to benefit. But in the long run a dishonest district chief, noticing that his irregularities are passed over in silence by higher authorities, may ask himself this question: "Why can't I put part of the village funds into my pocket? Nobody knows about it!" And this is a first step toward theft and embezzlement which will go on increasing day by day.

Revision of district administrative organization needed. Given the above situation, I think that the administrative organization of the district should be revised. The district must be a basic administrative unit to carry out the government policies; therefore, it should be endowed with legal status like that of the village and province. A budget should be put at its disposal and used according to certain directives. It may include some redistribution of village funds, which, in practice, the District Chiefs are actually doing in oblique ways. The district should also be strengthened in the matter of personnel, finance, equipment, and supplies, through a more logical distribution of existing means rather than keeping so much for provincial services. As for the village, a concept of broad autonomy must prevail in the use of village funds, while recognizing that part of the funds of wealthier villages, not exceeding 50%, may be used to help the poor villages.

The problem of security in rural areas. In the follow-up training visits I had the opportunity for friendly talks with some district chiefs and deputy chiefs. I also had some informal talks with the village and hamlet chiefs. On three or four occasions we drank rice wine with them in their communities, some of which were insecure. I asked them if they knew those V.C. operating in their villages and hamlets and most of them answered affirmatively. When asked why they don't arrest or denounce those V.C., they sadly answered that if they arrested or denounced them they would be sentenced to only two or three years of imprisonment and when released they will surely kill the accusers. These answers show that the village and hamlet officials really have no confidence in the nationalist law which they characterize as so generous that it rather favors the VCs in their terrorist activities.

A hamlet chief sadly told me this story: "I read in the newspaper quite recently that a well known VC who killed two hamlet chiefs in Gia Dinh province has just been sentenced to 10 years of hard labor by the Court of Justice of Saigon. With such a sentence the nationalist government practically raises the VC until the day when his Uncle Ho will come here!"

Said a district chief, a major of the ARVN: "Our procedure is most annoying for loyal elements. A member of the militia, after shooting a real VC one night, was summoned to the Military Police office several times for interrogations. He found it so annoying that he became weary

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of shooting the VC. He resolved never to shoot a VC unless he has to act in self-defense, just to avoid the above complications. On the VC side, a guerrilla is allowed to cut anyone's throat he considers as his enemy or dangerous for the VC. This enables a few VC to control several villages. As they often killed too many people, thereby provoking the people's discontent, VC higher authorities began issuing circulars instructing their cadres in the infrastructure to report each time they put someone to death. The document, found on a VC body, proved that a VC guerrilla had up to then been allowed to kill any citizen without having to report to their superiors!"

A deputy district chief told me this funny story: "A militiaman (under NGO DINH DIEM regime) on duty at a control station, had searched a VC and found in his handbag a grenade and a tape of VC documents. The militiaman handed him over to the Village Administrative Committee which, in its turn, led him to the district authorities; the latter then gave him up to the provincial authorities. At the province chief town he was delivered over to the court of justice. The examining judge summoned the militiaman to come to his office several times for interrogation. Each time he had to spend out of his pocket about VN\$100 for food and transportation. It was really very costly for a poor militiaman who earned at that time just a few hundred piasters a month. The end of the story was really funny: the tribunal acquitted the VC. As for the militiaman he was lucky enough to get out of the nasty mess -- he just missed being sentenced to a few months in prison. The reason was that the VC bribed some influential people and threatened some villagers, forcing them to make false declarations in favor of the accused VC. Those false witnesses declared at the court of justice that the militiaman had played a trick on the accused with the intent to taking away his wife!"

The deputy district chief then concluded: "The nationalist law and procedures are simply antiquated and no longer fit the present state of war in our country. The magistrates, who only sit in their tribunal offices in cities, don't know the actual situation in the countryside. They show themselves indulgent under every circumstance toward criminals including the VC murderers!"

U.S. advisors in law to be placed at the Ministry of Justice. The above stories remind me of a British advisor's statement on Public Administration in Vietnam when I met him in mid-1963. Said the British advisor: "The law of the Republic of Vietnam shows that this country has no clear cut attitude toward the VC. Formerly in Malaya, people were identified as of one of two kinds, either they were good citizens or they were Communist Malaysians. The good citizens were well regarded. The Communist Malaysians, on the contrary, were treated without pity. Even those who supplied a Communist with a handful of rice were severely punished. The Malayan law was clear about that. It is thanks to such a severe law that Malaya could get rid of the Communists.

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The Vietnamese law, on the contrary, is so indulgent that it turns out to favor the VC. Although the U.S. has placed advisors in most agencies and in most fields of activity such as public administration, health, public works, police and security, economy, finance, taxation, agriculture, labor, there are none at the Ministry of Justice. It is there that U.S. advisors could help Vietnamese jurists prepare a new code suitable to the war situation of this country. Vietnam continues to apply French law, some of which dates from the last century.

VCs fleeing in VC zones and their families living in Government controlled hamlets.

Whenever I came to a hamlet and heard the hamlet chief complain that his hamlet was insecure, I spontaneously asked him this question: "How many families of the fled VC are there in your hamlet?" In most cases, the answer was two or three, even five or seven such families.

Said the Hamlet Chief of an insecure hamlet in Nha Be district: "We cannot believe in the loyalty of those refugee families from the VC areas. There are in my hamlet several families which immigrated from Long An and have been allowed since the time of Ngo Dinh Diem government to be resettled here. They said they could not endure the VC regime and came to my hamlet with the intent to live quietly and work peacefully. To all appearances they seemed to be very loyal. They always obeyed our regulations and orders. Two years had thus elapsed when one day I noticed that one of these families conducted two burial processions at the same time. I made a census of the population in my hamlet but didn't find anybody dead. I finally discovered that the two dead and buried persons were the close relatives of that family, who had followed the VC and were recently killed in an aerial bombardment by government planes.

"Another resettled family consists of one woman and three children. The woman is presumed to be a widow, at least she declared so. Two years later, this family suddenly held a funeral. I made a new census of the population but found nobody missing. I then asked her and learned that it was the funeral of her husband, a VC who had just been killed by government soldiers."

The above two stories prove that the fled VC often return to their villages on the sly and their families' houses are their liaison places, their shelters and their intelligence service which enable them to commit acts of terrorism and sabotage against their villages. It may be said that those families of the fled VC are one of the main causes of the present state of insecurity in rural areas.

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Strong measures to be taken against the families of the fled VCs in government controlled hamlets.

We know that the greatest sacrifices are being made in order to crush the VC. In some expensive raids, U.S. bombers based on Guam come up to South Vietnam in order to blast zones presumed to be VC bases. One wonders why those VC liaison places, intelligence network and secure shelters that are the families' houses of the fled VCs in government controlled villages and hamlet have so far been tolerated. It is thought that it is time for the VN Government to take appropriate measures against those families. I know this is a delicate problem which responsible authorities have tried to dodge rather than find a realistic solution for. But it is high time to take decisive action and drastic measures in order to guarantee peace to the rural people.

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USAID HIGHLIGHTS

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U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID)

HIGHLIGHTS FY 1966 PROGRAMS

IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

(YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1966)

July 14, 1966

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COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM

The total amount for the commodity import program in FY 1966 was \$398,174,000 which represented 68.4% of the total AID program in Viet Nam. The total for fiscal year 1965 was \$152,859,900.

The CIP has provided a brake on the inflation, provided the Government of Vietnam with support for its defense operations, and in addition, CIP funds have been used for economic development.

For economic development in FY 65, CIP funds used for capital goods amounted to \$71.8 million. This was increased to \$150 million in FY 66.

The list shown below is the commodity groups and their value:

CIP by Commodity Groups in Millions

	<u>FY 65</u>	<u>FY 66</u>
Food Stuffs	4.4	43.9
Fertilizers	10.6	15.7
Chemicals	10.5	29.8
Med./Pharm.	13.2	25.0
Yarns/Textiles	4.4	8.7
Pulp & Paper	2.7	11.8
Iron & Steel	38.6	77.7
Non-ferrous Metals	4.6	8.4
Non-Metallic Min.	11.6	8.8
Coal	7	3.0
Industrial Machinery	22.4	59.4
Vehicle Transportations	5.1	34.3
POL	17.2	27.6
Other	6.8	43.9
Total:	<u>152.8</u>	<u>398.0</u>

LOGISTICS

Surface: In the past year the number of buoy berths for ships at Saigon has doubled, with 11 new ones bringing the total in full-time use to 21. Port equipment has been increased during the year by 3 tugs, 23 modern steel lighters, and 226 pieces of mechanical cargo-handling equipment.

Entirely new programs have also been introduced since 1965. Seventeen full-time Port Advisors, working at the terminal, on ship, or both, have reinforced operations at Saigon. Several miles from the crowded center of the port construction is under way on the Thu Duc Complex, which will provide 28 warehouses, ten acres of open-storage hardstand, and approximately half a kilometer of bulkhead for lighter landings.

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Movement of goods out to the provinces has become more rapid -- up 41% in the past year, from 78,705 tons in 1965 to 111,615 tons in 1966. The largest increase was in Regions I and II, where movement more than doubled as military operations increased road security. Junk, barge, and other coastal shipping carriers have also increased in effectiveness.

Air: USAID airlift support has maintained programs in many provinces inaccessible by road or water. In June 1965 USAID hauled less than 4000 passengers and 500 tons of cargo per month. In June 1966 the number was 14,000 passengers and 2,800 tons of cargo. Nearly 500 cargo flights each month now go out to the provinces. On the 15th of April these began loading at a new cargo-handling warehouse which can load a plane in 15 to 20 minutes. USAID obtains this airlift through contract with Air America which at present operates 32 planes leased by USAID.

REFUGEE PROBLEM

In May 1965, the GVN Ministry of Social Welfare reported 307,000 refugees living in temporary shelters. As of June 30, 1966, the figure had risen to 500,732. However, a simple comparison does not tell the whole refugee story, for 501,706 others had been resettled (140,502 in their villages and 360,574, with GVN assistance, elsewhere) during the same period.

During the year refugee policy also changed to fit a better understanding of conditions. Initially, objectives were to give refugees a short period of care and return them to their villages. As it became clear that many refugees were making prolonged stays in "temporary" camps, the Government, with USAID advisory and logistic support, attacked the problem by (1) attempting to provide health, sanitation, and education facilities for refugee centers; (2) setting up community improvement and training programs in the refugee centers; and (3) finding permanent resettlement sites for those who cannot return to their home villages. In Regions III and IV entirely new hamlets have been created for resettlement. In Region II, projects are under way to settle refugees in new provinces.

The refugee problem in Viet Nam has attracted worldwide sympathy. In addition to USAID, sixteen American or Free World voluntary agencies are supporting refugee assistance programs in the Republic.

EDUCATION PROGRAMS

Teacher Education: Enrollment in elementary-teacher (normal) schools rose 13%, from 2300 to 2598. In-service training almost doubled, from 763 to 1350. Teachers upgraded by training in Mobile Science Units (teaching laboratories) more than doubled, from 5504 to 12,104.

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Hamlet Schools: Hamlet classrooms have increased to 21,005 this year, an increase averaging over a hundred a month since 1965 when 19,718 were in existence. Almost all of this increase is represented by USAID project construction. Elementary student enrollment is up eleven percent, from 1,661,324 to 1,837,864.

Vocational Education: Graduates of Vietnam's four Polytechnic schools have more than doubled, from 130 last year to 292 this year. Agriculture education has increased almost as much, from 310 graduates to 590.

Instructional Materials: Nearly half (47%) of the goal, of providing each child in elementary school with a set of five to eight books by the end of FY 1967, has been reached. Books in circulation increased by 50% during this fiscal year, from 4,500,000 to 6,762,000. Thirty-seven new manuscripts have been prepared covering ten subject areas.

PUBLIC HEALTH

Forty-five Health Assistance teams are in country, four times as many as last year. Twenty-two of these teams are American and twenty-three are from other Free World countries.

During this past fiscal year Project Viet Nam physicians, private American practitioners serving voluntarily, began working in country and 125 have been utilized to date. An average of 22 doctors have been maintained in country at one time.

Ten key province hospitals have undergone extensive renovation. Two have been completed and the remainder are in varying stages of completion.

Training of Vietnamese health technicians stepped up threefold, from 669 last year to 1856 by July 1966.

AGRICULTURE

GVN goals have been moved upward in nearly all areas of agriculture. Direct and tangible benefits during the past year were:

Making possible use of fertilizer on 800,000 hectares of land (2,000,000 acres), increasing farm income by 1.5 billion piasters.

Setting up plant protection and rodent control programs which saved food and crops worth 1,120 million piasters.

Vaccinating 2.9 million animals for disease control.

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Distributing improved seeds which (USAID Agriculture Division estimates) have sent crop yields up 20% or more.

Steadily expanding irrigation. Area improved by irrigation last year was 30,000 hectares (75,000 acres US), more than double that improved in the preceding year. 27 provinces had active irrigation projects, compared with 13 the preceding year.

Agriculture extension work also moved forward, with farm training classes last year reaching 124,456 farmers -- a 14% increase over the preceding year's 109,267.

Animal husbandry benefited from importation of 60,000 head of purebred livestock last year, twelve times the number for the preceding year. Production of livestock vaccines in Viet Nam also went up by some 20%, reaching over 5 million doses last year as compared to 4 million the preceding year.

PUBLIC SAFETY

Police Recruitment and Training: Total police strength increased from 42,000 to 54,000 at the end of FY 1966 with 13,000 police personnel having received basic and supervisory training during the past 12 months.

A Police Academy, which will provide a continuing nine months course for training 400 personnel in police supervisory work was inaugurated in Saigon this past year.

Police Field Force: In the planning stage a year ago, the Police Field Force Training Center has been completed and is in operation in Tuyen Duc Province. It has a capacity for training six companies (1200 men). Thirteen companies have graduated from the Center. Total strength of PFF to date is 3,000 men.

Resources Control: Today there are 807 static marine and mobile checkpoints manned by 6,697 National policemen compared with 696 manned by 6,522 policemen a year ago. The fair market value for the confiscated goods was estimated at VN\$ 58,968,058 for the calendar year 1965.

Identification and Records Program: A total of 181,218 ID cards was issued to persons reaching 18 years of age during this past year. This makes the cumulative total of 7,240,000 presently registered. Family census teams registered 71,732 families during the year for a cumulative total of 1,629,150 families registered to date.

Saigon Municipal Police Directorate: On June 1, 1965, the SMPD had 8,526 personnel. As of June 1, 1966 the total was 13,231, or an increase of approximately 4700 policemen. This increase has been supported by USAID in training the new personnel and in supplying weapons, vehicles and communications facilities.

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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DIVISION

The activities of this division aim at assisting the GVN to create a corps of professional-minded, well-trained civilian officials.

Training of Government officials has increased by a third, going up from 14,900 in 1965 to 20,000 in 1966.

At the same time, the National Institute of Administration increased its graduating class from 100 in 1965 to 400 in 1966. There are now over a thousand NIA graduates in key administrative positions from local to national level.

Teams of US technicians have arrived to strengthen administration in several fields. Seventeen are working in Customs Administration, seven in Taxation, and five with the National Institute of Statistics. These are new programs; in 1965 there were no such technical teams on board.

PUBLIC WORKS DIVISION

Public Works gives advisory, commodity, and funding support to the Government of Vietnam in the fields of Telecommunications, Reconstruction and Urban Planning, Electrification, Transportation, and Water Resources Development.

Electrification: 9500 kilowatts of generating capacity, two substations, and 19 kilometers of transmission line were added to the Saigon Metropolitan system in 1965. In 1966 USAID supported the addition of 45.5 megawatts of generating capacity. Action has been taken to procure twenty substations and 920 kilometers of distribution line.

Twenty-two provinces were supplied with generators totalling 1680 kilowatts during 1965. By June 1966, an additional 23 generators, totalling 1825 kilowatts, were installed.

Organization of Rural Electrification Co-ops in three provinces were completed in 1965. In 1966 support of this operation with dollar and piaster funding, and rural electrification was made a part of the Revolutionary Development Program with 28 sites being authorized this year.

Reconstruction and Urban Planning: Major projects for 1965 included rehabilitating surgical facilities in Long Xuyen and construction of a Rural Trade School there. In 1966 construction of four surgical facilities, four trade schools, and eighteen warehouses have been supported by USAID.

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Water Resources: During 1965 seven water purification units were installed in the Delta; by the end of June 1966, nineteen are installed. Water distribution pipe was installed in the provinces at an average rate of 630 meters a month in 1965. This rate increased to 2920 meters a month in 1966.

Transportation: Installation of flight communications equipment at five airfields, and ground improvement work at nine (three representing new construction) was undertaken during 1966.

Highway construction and repair has encountered fewer VC sabotage incidents during the current year. Highway sabotage dropped from an average of 22 per month in 1965 to 7 per month in 1966. Sabotage of the more vulnerable points, bridges and culverts, dropped from 56 incidents per month in 1965 to 49 per month in 1966. Sabotage incidents dropped from 78 per month to 27 per month, and casualties to personnel fell from 15 to 5 per month, in the Vietnamese railway system.

Contract arrangements were made during the year for improvements to five commercial ports.

Telecommunications: In 1965 a telecom network covering most of the Delta was completed. In 1966 contracts are in process which will supply operations and maintenance for this system. It will also provide VHF links to Dalat, Nha Trang, and Phan Rang. Installation of automatic dial telephones totalled 2800 in the provinces and 5400 in Saigon in 1965. In 1966 it is planned to install 1000 phones in the provinces and 7000 in Saigon. During the year, also, Saigon-USA telephone circuits were increased from one to eight, and international teletype circuits from one to fifteen.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Imports of industrial machinery for new ventures and expansion of existing plants more than doubled in FY 1966, reaching \$16.3 million as opposed to \$7.2 million in Fiscal 1965. The greatest increase was in the textile industry, up to \$8 million from \$1.25 million the preceding year.

Entirely new industrial projects include:

A new tire plant, the first in South Vietnam, which will use locally grown rubber and produce tires up to medium truck size.

Two steel pipe plants and a cement products plant. Previously there were no national industries covering these areas of high demand.

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USAID Private Investment and Industry Division has also expanded local procurement by identifying sources of needed commodities and providing technical assistance in upgrading quality of products. This local procurement has almost trebled in the past year (from 834.6 million piasters in 1965 to 2.5 billion piasters in 1966). Local procurement, aside from obvious savings in foreign exchange, gives local companies a chance to develop better products and relieves the burden on shipping facilities.

FOOD FOR PEACE

Supplies brought in under Food for Peace nearly doubled between FY 1965 and FY 1966, and the number of beneficiaries increased by nearly half.

Title I foodstuffs (sold for piastres) showed the greatest proportional increase, rising 122% from 180,925 tons to 382,720 tons. Title I cotton, however, fell by a third, from 88,040 bales to 58,800 bales.

Title II food (refugee and disaster relief) went up only 24%, from 77,040 tons to 95,567 tons, and the number of beneficiaries rose only 13%, from 1.56 million to 1.76 million.

Title III food (distributed through nonprofit voluntary US and Free World agencies) increased 39%, from 32,887 tons to 45,792 tons. Beneficiaries, however, increased 115%, from 701,899 to 1,501,600 individuals.

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

It was late May of last year before the 1965 program was approved and funds were released to begin it, and even by 1 July most provinces were just starting their programs. By contrast, in 1966 there are a number of significant accomplishments to report:

184 kilometers of roads constructed or repaired, with another 435 kilometers under construction or repair.

856 Self-Help projects completed.

Over 500 classrooms completed or under construction, and over 1,000 teachers trained.

In addition, there are other areas of progress which cannot be statistically reported. For the first time there are trained cadre in every province, directing and supporting Revolutionary Development at the grass-roots level. Basic needs of refugees are being provided on an orderly basis. In-service training for the cadre in Agriculture is in progress. A year ago all these developments were only unsolved problems.

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The results of all the many Revolutionary Development Programs has been to bring half a million more people under GVN protection since the beginning of 1966, with prospects of increasing this figure even more during the second half of the year.

CHIEU HOI

The Chieu Hoi ("Open Arms") Program, intended to rehabilitate former Viet Cong who renounce the Communist cause, received a monthly average of 927 returnees during 1965. In 1966 the average, despite a slump during the Buddhist anti-government disturbances, has risen to 1,588 per month. The 1966 increase is not only in numbers but in quality, as well.

During the past year 24 Armed Propaganda Platoons were established to act as field agents of the program. These groups, working in five-man cells, make personal contacts with Viet Cong and families of Viet Cong, inducing more of the active VC to rally to the side of the government. They have proved the most effective propaganda and inducement arm of the Program, and 30 additional platoons were authorized on 1 June of this year.

Vocational training and indoctrination for returnees is being started at many local Chieu Hoi centers. Training equipment has been ordered. Some vocational training, however, is already being given, through the interest and ingenuity of local Chieu Hoi chiefs and USAID Provincial Representatives in finding and using local resources.

SELF-HELP

In Calendar Year 1965 a total of 3,805 projects were authorized, of which, however, little more than half were completed during the year. After a five-month extension ending 31 May 1966 just over 77% were finished.

During the current year the goal is 2,796 projects. Of these 856 have been completed (31%). At the same time last year only 521 projects (14%) had been completed.

One of the important aims of Self-Help is to increase popular involvement -- to make the Vietnamese people feel that the projects are theirs, though made possible by GVN-USAID assistance. One measure of this is increased participation in unfunded projects, in which only materials are furnished and labor (plus locally available building supplies) is provided by the people themselves.

This year 196,653 man-days of free labor have been contributed, three times as much as the time (66,756 man-days) contributed in the same period last year. Only 25% of last year's projects were unfunded, compared to 40% so far this year.

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CADRE ACTIVITIES

At the beginning of fiscal 1966, about 11,600 GVN Cadre of no less than five types, supported by several different GVN Ministries and US Agencies, were engaged in pacification work.

During FY 1966, they were consolidated into a single category; the Revolutionary Development Cadre, under control of one GVN Ministry and receiving advisory and logistic support from one US Agency, A.I.D. At the same time GVN, with support from all the US Agencies in country, developed a more comprehensive concept of pacification, and expanded the national training centers for cadre.

By the end of fiscal 1966, trained and deployed Revolutionary Development Cadre more than doubled, with 23,300 (ethnic) Vietnamese plus 3,000 Montagnard cadre in the field.

Current plans are to expand cadre forces to a level of 100,000 by the end of CY 1968. If successful, they will provide the base on which the Government of Vietnam could eventually build a system of administration, law and justice in the rural areas of South Vietnam.

MONTAGNARD AFFAIRS

The year opened with FULRO, the Montagnard separatist movement, in active opposition; it ends with this group largely reconciled to the government and moving toward public agreement. The Highland Affairs office of GVN was raised to a Special Commissariat, with Paul Nur, a Montagnard, as its head. With collaboration established between the Commissariat, the Ministries of Justice and Education, and the new Refugee Commissariat, the Commissariat's programs are moving steadily ahead.

Construction and enlargement of boarding facilities for Highland students is under way in seven provinces, and 100 scholarships from the Asia Foundation were obtained for secondary and university-level Montagnard students.

Highlander Agricultural Training Centers have doubled -- five last year, ten this year, with an eleventh (which will complete the program) under construction.

Administrative planning for two major long-range projects has reached the program and time-table stage. These projects are the restoration of tribal courts and distribution of land titles to Montagnard farmers.

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REGIONAL FORCE/POPULAR FORCE

During the year several programs have been set up to improve the lot of the Popular Forces soldier. In FY 1965 no such programs existed, though PF men and their families were eligible to take part in self-help housing projects.

Cement and roofing is provided by USAID for Popular Forces dependent housing. (Usually dependents live in field fortifications with PF troops.) 698 of these housing units have been constructed, with 15,100 programmed for calendar 1966.

A food supplement is also being issued to PF dependents, under Title III of PL 480 (Food For Peace). It amounts to nine pounds for each dependent per month -- six pounds of cereals, a pound and a half of cooking oil, and a pound and a half of powdered milk. Since there are some 574,272 Popular Forces soldiers and dependents, this small supplement adds up to over 2,500 tons of food per month.

YOUTH AND SPORTS PROGRAM

In FY 1965 USAID began support of projects aimed at helping Vietnamese youth realize their potential for constructive action. In that year, the major effort was the 1965 Summer Youth Program. Over 200 work camps were set up, in Saigon, Da Nang, and 27 provinces, where more than 7,000 students concentrated on small-scale projects of social and economic importance -- building schools, dispensaries, refugee housing, wells, and latrines, for instance.

Another program of summer activities has been launched in 1966, under joint GVN-USAID sponsorship. It is to involve 300 work camps in 31 provinces, with 10,000 to 12,000 students participating. In addition, plans have been approved for leadership seminars and technical training courses. Further, about 150 students will work directly with USAID and International Volunteer Service personnel in Chieu Hoi centers, Agriculture Stations, and refugee camps.

While major youth programs must be scheduled for summer vacation periods, an important ongoing project has been carried out in Vietnam's most populous city. Youth and student leaders took action in Saigon's District VIII, the poorest in the city, putting in 12,000 man-days during the past ten months. With their assistance, self-help projects, cooperatives and education courses have been established and medical care, for the first time, made available to this District.

Within the past three months, USAID support for physical education and sports programs has also begun. Activities, still in their initial stages, include increasing the number of instructors, developing village-level sports programs, and assisting the Saigon Student Union Athletic Committee and the National Field and Track Team.

LABOR

The Labor Division in USAID/Vietnam came into existence in FY 1966 and most of its activity has been in recruiting advisors.

Thomas W. Gleason, President of the International Longshoremen's Association, after living and working in the port of Saigon for several weeks, made far-reaching recommendations to implement the Port Authority law, and also provided twelve technicians -- specialists in various port operations activities.

The formation of the Junk Fleet, which was worked out by agreement with the Fisherman's Federation (a Vietnamese trade union), has solved many problems of commodity distribution between the main ports (Da Nang, Nha Trang, and Saigon) and provincial areas. In addition to this primary accomplishment, the agreement also provided for establishment of a Fisherman's Welfare Fund (which has already set up four social welfare centers in Phan Thiet, on the coast between Nha Trang and Saigon). Further, the activity of the Junk Fleet has made the fishermen's union known more widely, and it has gained at least 10,000 new dues-paying members.

SOCIAL WELFARE

The Ministry of Social Welfare, with USAID support, has a number of projects aimed both at positive social improvement and the control of social evils. Support for these projects has increased significantly from 1965 to 1966.

Operation allowances for orphanages have risen 57%, from 9.8 million to 15.5 million piasters. This will support 73 orphanages containing 10,346 children, plus programmed new construction for calendar 1966.

Day nurseries' budget has risen 91%, from 1.0 million to 1.9 million piasters. 63 day nurseries, caring for 6,000 children a day, plus 11 more to be constructed, will receive support under this project.

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Boarding houses for children at primary and high schools received more than threefold increase in their operating allowance, from 182 thousand piasters to 609 thousand. At present the number of boarding houses has reached 33, with at least two others planned.

Low-cost restaurants for low-income groups have increased by a third -- from 44 in 1965 to 60 at present. Customers served increased by half -- from an average of half a million a month at the end of 1965 to three-quarters of a million a month at the beginning of 1966.

Homes for the aged have also received increased support with a 31% rise in budget, from 10.3 million to 13.6 million piasters. 28 such homes are now in existence, with ten more being built.

CIVIC ACTION

A new USAID program in calendar year 1966 provides support for "Civic Action" projects. These are community-development and public-benefit projects carried out by military units to aid the civilian population. USAID provides building supplies and a small amount of funding for such projects, which have been undertaken by US and Free World Assistance forces and ARVN regular and local troops.

PERSONNEL

Changes in the Mission's program emphasis, as well as in the scope and size of its task in Vietnam, have altered both manpower needs and staff distribution. USAID's established positions have almost doubled since July 1965. USAID employees on board have increased by just over 40%, from 578 in 1965 to 827 at present. In addition, nearly 200 Americans are employed under contract -- a number which is expected to double by the end of calendar 1966.

Much of this increase represents individuals stationed in the field, who have increased by 75% -- from 187 in 1965 to 327 at the present. They are in every province. They are further backed up by personnel stationed in Saigon who travel in the field a major part of their time, and others who are engaged in field work at locations in or near the capital. These bring the proportion of USAID Direct-Hire personnel serving in the field to over 50% of our total staff. Most of the contract employees also serve in the field.

Since the end of fiscal 1965, several new offices have been established and greater emphasis given to others. The increased effort in field work and rural development has meant expansion of the Divisions of Field Operations, Public Health, and Agriculture. New Divisions and Offices

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have been established to meet the growing problems in labor and in refugees, and to coordinate the assistance work of other Free World countries in Vietnam.

FREE WORLD ASSISTANCE

Early in 1964 the Government of Vietnam sent messages to some 50 countries formally requesting assistance in its struggle against the Communist Empire's aggression. By July of 1965, twenty-nine Free World nations had contributed civilian-type assistance. Since then the number has risen to 34. Assistance from others is promised for the future. Multilateral Free World assistance has also been contributed through special agencies of the United Nations and through regional agencies such as the Mekong Committee.

Private groups in Free World countries are taking an increased role in humanitarian assistance, largely medical, and ranging from donations of supplies and equipment to periods of voluntary field service in the Republic.

During the year just past, important Free World contributions included:

Substantial donations of food from three nations, valued at \$515 thousand.

Medicine, equipment, physicians and hospital staff from thirteen nations, valued at \$10.6 million.

Refugee relief supplies from five nations, valued at \$628 thousand.

Support for education and social welfare projects from three nations, valued at \$501 thousand.


USAID's Free World Assistance Office, organized in the spring of 1966, is now collaborating with the Government of Vietnam to identify areas of greatest need for Free World economic, social, and humanitarian assistance. The Free World Military Assistance effort is coordinated by MACV.

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RD BUDGET


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1966

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT BUDGET

AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1966



Prepared by:

AD/FO - Budget & Program Branch

Date:

17 October 1966

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OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS OPERATIONAL MEMORANDUM NO. 170-66

October 17, 1966

TO : All Regional Directors & Distribution as shown

FROM : Thomas E. Naughten, Acting Associate Director
for Field Operations *Handwritten initials*

SUBJECT : REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT BUDGET - Expenditure Report -
September 30, 1966

Attached is the consolidated expenditure report for the Provincial Revolutionary Development Budgets as of September 30, 1966.

Again it is pointed out that in some instances the expenditure figures shown in this report, reflect advances to Districts to carry out various activities, and the true expenditures may turn out to be slightly less than the amount advanced.

Attachments: a/s

PBORresen:lrc

DISTRIBUTION:

<u>EMB</u>	Deputy Ambassador (4)
<u>USAID</u>	All Provincial Representatives
	DIR MIS
	FXSEC CRC
	ADM AGR
	ADPE EDU
	ADFO PAD
	ADFM FWD
	ADL IDD
	ADPS LAR
	ADFH FWA
	JUS/L (Information Office)
	EDU-Long Xuyen - Mrs. Philpott
	ADSP MRCC
	C&R
<u>SLO</u>	
<u>MACV J-33</u>	(6)
<u>DGBFA</u>	(3)
<u>M.R.D.</u>	(6)

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1966 REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT BUDGET

SUMMARY OF BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURES BY REGIONS

AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1966

REGION	TOTAL BUDGETS	EXPENDITURES CUMULATIVE	THIS MONTH'S PERCENT	LAST MONTH'S PERCENT	NUMBER OF PROVINCES REPORTING
I	303,701,000	150,036,239	49%	42%	ALL
II	395,639,000	192,081,596	48%	43%	ALL
III	425,937,000	260,563,348	61%	56%	ALL
IV	691,764,000	403,747,733	58%	52%	ALL
TOTAL	1,817,041,000	1,006,428,916	55%	49%	

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1966 REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT BUDGET

SUMMARY OF BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURES FOR REGION I

AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1966

PROVINCE	TOTAL BUDGETS	FUNDS RELEASED PERCENT	EXPENDITURES CUMULATIVE	THIS MONTH'S PERCENT	LAST MONTH'S PERCENT
Quang Tri	62,079,000	62,281,385	27,454,750	44%	40%
Thua Thien	53,979,000	54,199,220	25,038,770	46%	37%
Quang Nam	43,925,000	43,875,945	25,071,139	57%	54%
Quang Tin	48,794,000	49,137,000	20,859,407	42%	25%
Quang Ngai	64,664,000	72,192,170	46,315,414	71%	65%
Da Nang City	30,260,000	31,007,850	5,296,759	17%	13%
TOTAL	303,701,000	312,693,570	150,036,239	49%	42%

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1966 REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT BUDGETSUMMARY OF BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURES FOR REGION IIAS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1966

PROVINCE	TOTAL BUDGETS	FUNDS RELEASED DGBFA	EXPENDITURES CUMULATIVE	THIS MONTH'S PERCENT	LAST MONTH'S PERCENT
Kontum	20,951,000	21,290,145	9,070,941	43%	38%
Fleiku	22,605,000	33,925,482	9,541,735	42%	38%
Binh Dinh	55,304,000	61,584,382	24,485,398	44%	41%
Phu Bon	12,053,000	17,585,899	8,089,988	67%	65%
Phu Yen	33,679,000	33,679,573	20,213,025	67%	67%
Darlac	39,066,000	39,437,365	21,454,342	55%	46%
Khanh Hoa	35,767,000	38,961,143	17,155,114	48%	43%
Ninh Thuan	33,637,000	37,028,151	15,736,439	46%	44%
Binh Thuan	28,590,000	28,834,657	16,792,216	58%	52%
Tuyen Duc	48,352,000	51,760,171	23,881,641	49%	39%
Quang Duc	18,749,000	18,749,256	9,425,647	50%	38%
Lam Dong	23,849,000	23,963,443	9,315,728	39%	24%
Cam Ranh City	16,067,000	16,664,000	5,328,992	33%	36%
Da Lat City	6,970,000	3,470,000	1,590,390	22%	
TOTAL	395,639,000	426,933,667	192,081,596	48%	43%

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1966 REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT BUDGET

SUMMARY OF BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURES FOR REGION III

AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1966

PROVINCE	TOTAL BUDGETS	FUNDS RELEASED DGBFA	EXPENDITURES CUMULATIVE	THIS MONTH'S PERCENT	LAST MONTH'S PERCENT
Tay Ninh	46,987,000	46,987,749	35,866,610	76%	67%
Hau Nghia	32,063,000	32,063,888	17,158,164	53%	48%
Long An	54,242,000	56,315,320	34,409,169	63%	62%
Bien Hoa	38,972,000	41,816,159	22,625,544	58%	46%
Gia Dinh	99,882,000	104,148,498	57,178,502	57%	57%
Phuoc Tuy	26,268,000	29,629,222	16,765,932	63%	60%
Vung Tau	15,448,000	15,448,708	9,012,223	58%	53%
Binh Duong	42,516,000	45,360,872	20,335,040	47%	40%
Binh Long	14,306,000	14,306,232	8,904,764	62%	53%
Phuoc Long	17,094,000	17,361,582	10,278,381	60%	44%
Long Khanh	16,134,000	25,488,932	7,673,644	47%	45%
Binh Tuy	22,025,000	28,108,711	20,355,375	94%	94%
TOTAL	425,937,000	457,035,873	260,563,348	61%	56%

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1966 REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT BUDGET

SUMMARY OF BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURES FOR REGION IV

AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1966

PROVINCE	TOTAL BUDGETS	FUNDS RELEASED DCBFA	EXPENDITURES CUMULATIVE	THIS MONTH'S PERCENT	LAST MONTH'S PERCENT
Go Cong	31,930,000	33,352,691	18,949,844	59%	53%
Dinh Tuong	43,253,000	49,899,480	21,684,632	50%	44%
Kien Hoa	41,462,000	42,551,291	23,415,935	56%	50%
Kien Tuong	19,814,000	19,814,466	12,271,029	61%	48%
Kien Phong	45,191,000	45,191,014	28,040,147	62%	54%
Vinh Binh	42,204,000	42,204,820	31,223,395	74%	67%
Vinh Long	54,566,000	55,988,572	26,239,501	48%	43%
An Giang	129,801,000	135,489,614	74,154,460	57%	56%
Chau Doc	57,096,000	57,096,656	30,637,919	53%	55%
Kien Giang	46,551,000	47,183,565	26,189,338	56%	50%
Phong Dinh	37,856,000	37,856,360	25,237,480	66%	57%
Chuong Thien	31,893,000	33,193,630	25,710,369	80%	53%
Bac Lieu	36,223,000	36,223,699	13,573,234	37%	28%
Ba Xuyen	43,995,000	43,995,586	26,149,886	59%	51%
An Xuyen	29,929,000	35,129,306	20,270,564	67%	64%
TOTAL	691,764,000	715,170,750	403,747,733	58%	52%

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1966 REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT BUDGET - ALL REGIONS

BREAKDOWN OF EXPENDITURES BY BUDGET ITEMS

AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1966

REGION	CADRE	RELOCATION & LAND CLEARING	SELF-HELP	P. O. L.	WAREHOUSES	EDUCATION	ROADS & BRIDGES	CHIEU HOI	AGRI. IRRIGATION
I	5,478,071	18,139,648	23,977,600	5,481,006	3,510,652	36,902,715	12,557,000	7,192,320	13,217,108
II	212,390	27,391,850	22,272,223	10,189,101	1,641,492	45,232,356	29,562,016	14,151,486	10,597,974
III	8,397,325	28,090,686	29,172,360	10,231,979	1,063,190	80,083,561	53,147,530	13,961,743	4,521,008
IV	5,860,271	44,425,333	46,281,717	14,755,315	1,785,692	95,401,871	77,490,051	20,437,301	49,883,928
TOTAL	19,948,057	118,047,517	121,703,900	40,657,401	8,001,026	257,620,503	172,756,597	55,742,850	78,220,039

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Approved For Release 2000/05/31 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000200170001-3

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FINANCIAL STATUS BY ACTIVITY

AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1966

ACTIVITY	BUDGETED As of September 66	EXPENDITURES CUMULATIVE	% EXTENDED
Cadre	38,714,000	19,948,057	51%
Relocation & Land Clearing	268,095,000	118,047,517	44%
Self-Help	147,580,000	121,703,900	82%
P.O.L.	85,308,000	40,657,401	47%
Warehouses	33,729,000	8,001,026	23%
Education	344,150,000	257,620,503	74%
Roads & Bridges	395,097,000	172,756,597	43%
Chieu Hoi	116,633,000	55,742,850	48%
Irrigation	97,162,000	78,220,071	80%
Animal Husbandry	62,694,000	41,203,312	65%
Agri. Extension & (
Seed Improvements & (66,515,000	34,936,407	52%
Montagnard Agri. (
Fisheries	54,628,000	27,435,522	50%
Rural Electrification	35,549,000	6,672,005	18%
Unforeseen Expenses	38,637,000	22,202,906	57%
Rural Health	32,550,000	1,280,862	39%
TOTAL	1,817,041,000	1,006,428,916	55%

ALL REGIONS

REGION	ANIMAL HUSBANDRY	AGRI. EXTENSION	AGRI. SEED IMPROVEMENT	FISHERIES	MOUNTAINARD AGRI.	UN- FORESEEN	RURAL ELEC.	RURAL HEALTH	T O T A L
I	5,009,057	2,459,018	1,612,492	4,397,095	177,563	3,720,035	5,924,000	280,862	150,036,239
II	9,370,648	3,558,946	2,843,665	5,886,494	3,403,674	4,764,578	2,704	1,000,000	192,081,596
III	11,840,784	4,174,711	4,185,959	5,459,250	513,869	5,597,852	121,493		260,563,848
IV	14,982,823	5,343,792	6,662,718	11,692,683		8,120,441	623,808		403,747,133
TOTAL	41,203,312	15,536,467	15,304,834	27,435,522	4,095,106	22,202,906	6,672,005	1,280,862	1,006,428,116

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1966 REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT BUDGET - REGION I

BREAKDOWN OF EXPENDITURES BY BUDGET ITEMS

AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1966

PROVINCE	CADRE	RELOCATION & LAND CLEARING	SELF-HELP	P.O.L.	WAREHOUSES	EDUCATION	ROADS & BRIDGES	CHIEU HOI	AGRI. IRRIGATION
Quang Tri (1)	996,777	7,698,600	3,177,600	936,185		5,206,378	2,754,558	617,800	3,054,770
Thua Thien (2)	646,778	889,871	5,800,000	656,898		4,571,750	2,905,936	2,388,768	3,119,711
Quang Nam (3)	1,399,795	6,435,500	5,000,000	1,003,916		6,383,233	449,857	1,186,006	283,200
Quang Tin (4)	728,075		3,500,000	797,999		8,361,500	1,387,975	1,692,000	1,832,210
Quang Ngai (5)	1,229,050	3,000,000	5,500,000	1,850,745	3,366,148	11,327,896	3,826,663	1,104,546	4,927,210
Da Nang city	477,596	65,677	1,000,000	235,263	144,504	1,051,958	1,232,011	203,200	
TOTAL	5,478,071	18,139,648	23,977,600	5,481,006	3,510,652	36,902,715	12,557,000	7,192,320	13,217,674

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REGION I

PRO- VINCE	ANIMAL HUSBANDRY	AGRI. EXTENSION	AGRI. SEED IMPROVEMENT	FISHERIES	MONTAGNARD AGRI.	UN- FORESEEN	RURAL ELEC.	RURAL HEALTH	T O T A L
1	925,359	461,421	176,700	676,432		491,302		280,862*	27,454,750
2	827,644	391,572	216,700	2,280,840		342,876			25,038,770
3	667,675	484,004	248,530	718,041		761,351			25,071,139
4	708,020	350,000	297,460	204,131		1,000,000			20,859,407
5	1,505,702	759,002	673,102	326,935	177,563	816,350	5,924,000		46,315,414
6	374,657	13,020		190,716		308,156			5,296,759
TOTAL	5,009,057	2,459,018	1,612,492	4,397,095	177,563	3,720,035	5,924,000	280,862	150,036,239

* Training Center

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1966 REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT BUDGET - REGION II

BREAKDOWN OF EXPENDITURES BY BUDGET ITEMS

AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1966

PROVINCE	CADRE	RELOCATION & LAND CLEARING	SELF-HELP	P. O. L.	WAREHOUSES	EDUCATION	ROADS & BRIDGES	CHIEN HOI	AGRI. IRRIGATION
Koobum (7)		1,857,800	1,000,000	641,031		2,712,592	181,280	785,336	
Fiakku (8)		1,948,672	440,000	345,939		1,693,416	812,554	2,339,460	711,82
Binh Dinh (9)		2,000,000	3,800,000	1,242,418		5,684,394	1,942,516	3,456,455	3,550,00
Phi Bon (10)		1,220,000	1,206,000	441,530	299,832	1,494,213	1,359,282	117,085	
Phu Yen (11)	156,250	4,641,500	1,784,500	641,957	599,990	4,129,103	2,091,825	3,623,974	
Da Nac (12)		7,307,210		1,979,215	305,670	3,240,325	4,052,609	1,634,604	
Thanh Hoa (13)		841,200	2,500,000	612,520		7,451,652	1,902,469	540,715	676,21
Ninh Thuan (14)		625,739	2,620,000	454,816		4,199,465	2,821,658	106,299	2,550,51
Binh Thuan (15)		575,100	1,646,019	1,254,418		4,353,215	4,313,182	749,894	100,28
Fuyen Duc (16)	56,140		3,335,000	771,422	436,000	5,522,102	6,904,441	461,161	2,250,18
Quang Duc (17)		3,671,187	900,000	841,075		1,566,800	969,146	91,552	250,00
Lang Dong (18)		1,075,492	1,680,135	739,904		2,119,579	1,092,480	216,406	
Chau Binh (19)		1,627,950	1,080,569	162,735		661,850	1,077,759	28,545	
Da Nhat City (19a)			280,000	60,121		403,650	40,815		489,93
TOTAL	212,390	27,391,850	22,272,223	10,189,101	1,641,492	45,232,356	29,562,016	14,151,486	10,597,97

* Added with Warehouses

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REGION II

PRO-VINCE	ANIMAL HUSBANDRY	AGRI EXTENSION	AGRI. SEED IMPROVEMENT	FISHERIES	MONTAGNARD AGRI.	UN-FORESEEN	RURAL ELEC.	RURAL HEALTH	TOTAL
7	649,232	222,380	222,000	186,633	386,940	225,717			9,070,944
8	479,660	248,228		98,044	266,350	91,585			9,541,737
9	1,003,805	1,032,625		326,825		496,360			24,485,398
10	531,770	185,908	323,190	85,740	265,306	560,130			8,089,988**
11	1,037,209		486,203	281,284		739,228			20,213,020
12	1,232,377	37,800	576,611	637,770	244,773	205,379			21,454,344
13	910,594	299,500	100,000	775,009		542,536	2,704		17,155,114
14	607,311	339,124	136,860	207,353	291,029	776,266			15,736,435
15	1,040,749	471,860	64,992	1,935,136		283,368			16,792,217
16	434,070	264,560	358,660	591,721	1,181,295	311,880		1,000,000	23,881,645
17	407,219	256,020	149,720	47,100	239,154	36,675			9,425,645
18	609,500	200,941	223,841	531,259	528,827	297,364			9,315,725
19	253,970		166,055	133,620		135,940			5,328,999
19a	173,182		35,533	49,000		62,150			1,590,399
TOTAL	9,370,648	3,558,946	2,843,665	5,886,494	3,403,674	4,764,578	2,704	1,000,000	192,081,599

Approved For Release 2000/05/31 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000200170001-3

** Last month's figure

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1966 REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT BUDGET - REGION III

BREAKDOWN OF EXPENDITURES BY BUDGET ITEMS

AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1966

PROVINCE	CADRE	RELOCATION & LAND CLEARING	SELF-HELP	P.O.L.	WAREHOUSES	EDUCATION	ROADS & BRIDGES	CHIEU HOI	AGRI. IRRIGATION
Quang Ninh (20)	1,381,750	3,264,469	2,750,000	446,123		9,863,000	10,494,314	1,799,421	2,336,192
Hue (21)	500,113	2,068,500	1,850,000	1,372,502		6,346,977	241,705	1,623,534	204,410
Lang An (22)	1,556,135	2,460,000	2,800,000	1,363,125		7,096,367	13,185,195	2,151,595	6,500
Ben Hoa (23)	1,208,837	2,902,850	3,850,000	1,958,657		6,153,814	1,280,433	1,054,522	739,937
Gia Dinh (24)	1,690,382	4,946,500	8,900,000	1,578,603	471,075	28,761,499	5,545,412	459,312	419,000
Phuoc Tuy (25)	563,733	2,950,034	2,300,000	584,994		3,897,710	2,439,180	1,135,378	
Vung Tau City (26)	84,200		1,150,000	207,745		3,233,769	2,594,943	318,122	699,028
Binh Duong (27)	1,412,175	1,641,500	1,700,000	490,839		5,674,938	5,672,849	1,428,486	
Binh Long (28)		2,276,500	791,300	408,831	192,115	1,582,603	2,005,296	437,040	
Phuoc Long (29)		2,620,333	700,000	451,258		1,107,265	3,003,606	485,425	
Long Khanh (30)		1,000,000	1,031,060	440,152		2,083,004	1,539,188	423,353	
Binh Tuy (31)		1,960,000	1,350,000	929,150	400,000	4,282,615	5,145,409	2,645,555	
TOTAL	8,397,325	28,090,686	29,172,360	10,231,979	1,063,190	80,083,561	53,147,530	13,961,743	4,521,067

* Added with Electrification

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REGION III

PRO-VINCE	ANIMAL HUSBANDRY	AGRI. EXTENSION	AGRI. SEED IMPROVEMENT	FISHERIES	MONTAGNARD AGRI.	UN-FORESEEN	RURAL ELEC.	RURAL HEALTH	T O T A
20	1,066,057	254,727	513,445	657,110		1,000,000			35,866,611
21	1,047,698	301,038	461,804	720,534		389,350			17,158,161
22	2,009,222	490,191		779,898		429,945			34,409,169
23	1,270,403	540,258	398,025	287,809		1,000,000			22,625,511
24	1,707,295	51,180	901,476	1,134,274		500,000	121,493		57,178,501
25	988,140	853,640		565,647		487,475			16,765,932
26		151,950	99,238	354,726		124,502			9,012,221
27	854,633	423,200	150,800	353,041		532,583			20,335,011
28	707,125	249,435				254,522			8,904,761
29	686,742	249,725	310,959		513,869	149,200			10,278,381
30	413,394	191,567	341,112			210,815			7,673,641
31	1,090,075	417,800	1,009,100	606,211		519,460			20,355,371
TOTAL	11,840,784	4,174,711	4,185,959	5,459,250	513,869	5,597,852	121,493		260,563,341

** Other

*** Last Month's Figure

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1966 REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT BUDGET - REGION IV

BREAKDOWN OF EXPENDITURES BY BUDGET ITEMS

AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1966

PROVINCE	CADRE	RELOCATION & LAND CLEARING	SELF-HELP	P. O. L.	WAREHOUSES	EDUCATION	ROADS & BRIDGES	CHIEU HOI	AGRI- CULTURE IRRIGATION
GO CONG (32)	224,025	2,007,526	2,000,000	1,965,012	698,748	4,388,595	2,598,795	1,937,013	
DIEN TUONG (33)	632,475	3,500,000	1,000,000	1,368,562		5,921,746	2,938,562	1,325,600	1,247,891
KI HOA (34)	460,533	3,480,000	2,800,000	524,626		7,622,610	3,064,147	1,821,987	1,520,112
KI TUONG (35)		2,429,686	993,249	376,554		2,791,643	2,571,554	863,635	
KI PHONG (36)	199,150		5,700,000	943,300		7,067,684	2,092,672	842,732	7,311,731
VINH BINH (37)	305,292	5,157,000	5,000,000	1,165,413	493,910	6,893,565	3,147,898	2,152,247	2,233,971
VIA LONG (38)	594,532	210,000	5,855,825	1,648,020	393,034	8,380,352	3,958,273	1,537,476	
AN GIANG (39)	604,850	4,985,580	4,679,220	904,737		21,478,450	18,650,460	537,946	17,058,315
CHAU DOC (40)	327,350	927,500	2,500,000	895,828		1,486,920	8,335,666	1,000,000	12,699,296
CON GIANG (41)		8,120,500	2,948,719	1,452,949		4,587,467	5,698,672	1,032,068	14,500,111
PHONG DINH (42)	147,430	1,700,000	2,940,798	1,115,690	200,000	6,326,628	6,257,576	1,897,523	1,648,629
CAHONG THIEN (43)		2,848,191	2,000,000	920,514		5,117,825	10,204,289	1,514,019	5,000,000
TA LIEN (44)	860,841		1,000,000	498,361		2,695,804	5,239,452	666,330	
TA TUYEN (45)	1,503,793	2,561,000	4,900,000	625,530		4,633,748	2,344,936	1,092,856	5,518,900
AN XUYEN (46)		6,498,350	1,963,906	350,219		6,008,834	387,099	2,215,869	
TOTAL	5,860,271	44,425,333	46,281,717	14,755,315	1,785,692	95,401,871	77,490,051	20,437,301	49,883,926

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REGION IV

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PROVINCE	ANIMAL HUSBANDRY	AGRI. EXTENSION	AGRI. SEED IMPROVEMENT	FISHERIES	MONTAGHARD AGRIC.	UN-FORESEEN	RURAL ELEC.	RURAL HEALTH	TOTAL
32	1,050,335	353,139	380,039	873,494		473,121			18,949,811
33	511,243	423,758	695,293	1,119,500		1,000,000			21,684,631
34	759,968	701,457		160,485		500,000			23,415,935
35	764,372	389,046	297,431	505,724		288,135			12,271,062
36	951,083	458,407	375,000	1,685,967		412,822			23,040,115
37	1,282,394	604,839	604,800	1,264,259		917,808			31,223,391
38	1,411,506	480,618	285,969	704,404		779,493	623,808		26,239,501
39	1,558,146	342,626	1,244,149	1,035,945		450,225			74,154,459
40	799,862	320,757	468,360	752,761		123,618			30,637,999
41	1,001,555	368,835	105,000	272,925		455,187			26,189,338
42	1,181,620	350,700	662,000	411,690		397,198			25,237,460
43	718,839		576,702	433,000		876,990			25,710,389
44	886,235	309,794	404,485	396,426		615,505			13,573,284
45	1,140,043		345,590	1,200,711		282,779			26,149,886
46	965,622	239,816	217,900	875,392		547,560			20,270,514
TOTAL	14,982,823	5,343,792	6,662,718	11,692,683		8,120,441	623,808		403,747,733

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
- 2 -

The program is one that will continue for at least the next 5 years and perhaps indefinitely. While now entirely supported by US Funds under US supervision, the program will eventually become a major activity of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development.

Programming, Planning and Budgetary Data - Country Basis:

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
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- b. CY 1966 Commodity Support: No direct commodity support for Cadre was planned for CY 66 by USAID, however, Provinces support activities of Cadre in the same manner as they would consider other Funded or Non-Funded Self-Help projects.
 - c. CY 1966 Objectives.
 - 1. Expansion of Vung Tau National Training Center to a capacity of a student level of 7500.
 - 2. Graduation of approximately 5000 students every 12 weeks, first class on 21 May, second class on 19 September and third class about 9 Jan 67.
 - 3. Anticipate having 39,000 trained cadres in the field by end of CY 1966.

Special Instructions

This chart represents in general outline the control for the overall RD program to include cadre as it fits into the program,

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- = Pay & Logistics plus Advice
- - - - - = Advisory
- = Commodity Support for RDC thru Regular Prov GVN channels
- ====> = Command Responsibility while in District

- 4 -

As depicted by the above chart, direct responsibility for the RD Cadre program from the U.S. position is carried out by the OSA (cadre) Advisor in the Province.

The Provincial Representative becomes involved in the Cadre program from the overall standpoint of how the Cadre is employed in relation to the entire Revolutionary Development Program. That is to say - the Province Rep may influence action of the cadre in the realm of projects based on his knowledge of the overall budgeted RD program by recommending to the Province Chief that certain projects in hamlets where the cadres are working be considered for funding. He also will recommend commodity support of Cadre hamlet activities where only commodities are needed and no money is available. The province Reps office may also be used to procure certain welfare items that may be needed by the Cadre in their social welfare activities.

MACV at the Province level becomes involved in Cadre operations from three major standpoints:

- (1) How the Cadre is to be employed in relation to GVN or FWMAF military operations.
- (2) Cadre operations in coordination with US & GVN Civil Affairs activities.
- (3) By providing on the spot advice, training and inspections of Cadres at the sub-sector level to assist the OSA (cadre) Advisor.

Project References

1. OFFICE of FIELD Opns Memo No. 34-66, subject CADRE: Transmittal of Revised statute on RC Cadre (Arrete 137) and Related Documents.

- 5 -

2. OFFICE of FIELD Opns Memo No. 111-66, Subject: Assistant Provincial Representatives (Revolutionary Development Cadre).
3. OFFICE of FIELD Opns Memo No. 152-66, Subject: Administration of Revolutionary Development Cadres (VN Memorandum # 4946/XD/411 dated Aug. 1, 1966).

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