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OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLA FORCES

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THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

Fort Benning, Georgia

September 1950

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FOREWORD

Guerrilla warfare is one of the oldest methods of waging war. Throughout the ages it has contributed to the victory and defeat of nations. It forms an important part of the strategy and tactics of many modern powers. A knowledge of guerrilla warfare and the means of combating guerrillas is therefore necessary.

The term "guerrilla warfare" is used loosely to describe all kinds of irregular warfare. It is generally associated with broad movements that may be briefly described as:

a. A people's war or revolution against existing authority.

b. A war conducted by irregular forces (supported by an external power) to bring about a change in the social-political order of a country without engaging it in a formal, declared war.

c. A war conducted by irregular forces in conjunction with regularly organized forces as a phase of a normal war.

d. Operations, generally of short duration, conducted by detached regular forces in the enemy's rear areas.

This manual is concerned primarily with the type of guerrilla warfare described in c above.

The first three chapters of the manual cover the general characteristics, organization, and operations of guerrilla forces. To enable the reader to understand guerrilla warfare better, the underlying factors that foster guerrilla forces are briefly discussed.

Chapter 4 develops the principles for combating hostile guerrilla forces. Since the scope of the manual applies to commanders on all levels, and because the policies of all echelons of command influence the success of a command as a whole, the principles developed extend from a national level down through the command echelons within a theatre of operations.

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CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

Section I

INTRODUCTION

1. PURPOSE

The purpose of this manual is to acquaint commanders on all levels with the organization and tactics of guerrillas and to provide a guide for combating and destroying guerrillas.

2. DEFINITION

a. Guerrilla warfare may be defined as the military, political, and economic operations of poorly armed and equipped forces against recognized civil and military authority, acting either separately from, or in conjunction with, regular forces. While regular forces may at times adopt guerrilla tactics, such operations are not included within the definition of guerrilla warfare as used in this manual.

b. In past wars, it has been common for groups and individuals to engage in subversive or overt activities against hostile armies. Any attempt at distinguishing between types of subversive or overt activities is confusing. The general terms "guerrilla" and "guerrilla warfare" therefore are applied to all these organizations and individuals and to their operations:

- (1) Fifth column
- (2) Guerrilla
- (3) Irregular
- (4) Partisan
- (5) Resistance group
- (6) Saboteur
- (7) Underground

3. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

History proves that guerrilla warfare has often been the "grain of sand" that stopped powerful military machines. In the Peninsular War (1808), Spanish guerrillas were a formidable foe to Napoleon's army. The Russian Cossacks, masters of guerrilla warfare, helped cut the French Grand Army to pieces on its retreat from Moscow (1812). The British war in South Africa (1899-1902) was prolonged about two years by the guerrilla tactics of De Wet and Botha. American military history is replete with examples of "guerrilla" and "anti-guerrilla" warfare from the time of the American Revolution through the Indian campaigns, the

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campaigns in the Philippines (1898-1901), and the Punitive Expedition into Mexico led by General Pershing just before World War I. The Arabs, led by Colonel T. E. Lawrence, gave us a very good example of guerrilla warfare during World War I (1914-1918). Guerrilla forces during World War II were employed on a larger scale than ever before (fig. 1). In Europe the notable examples were in the Soviet Union, Poland, Yugoslavia, Italy, and France, while in the Far East guerrilla warfare was effective in China, Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines.

Section II

EXAMPLES OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN WORLD WAR II

4. U.S.S.R.

a. Before the German invasion, the Soviet government prepared to carry on guerrilla warfare. Supply caches were established within the Soviet borders and Communist Party members were trained in the missions to be performed in the event of enemy occupation. Although the Germans' initial rapid advance caused widespread disorganization, the Communist Party members went underground and succeeded in recruiting and organizing partisan bands. These bands at first avoided major operations against the enemy, and confined their efforts to systematically interrupting field communications, derailing trains, blowing up bridges, and removing or destroying crops and material of value to the enemy. German counter-measures against these groups were largely ineffective.

b. In 1942 the partisan groups were given additional assistance by Moscow, and integrated into the Russian military plans. A tremendous growth of the movement followed, and the tempo of operations against the Germans increased. At one time it was estimated that between 80,000 and 100,000 partisans were active behind the German Army Group Center alone. The Germans committed larger and larger forces to guard their rear areas, but without success.

c. During the Russian counter-offensive of 1944, the partisans cooperated extensively with the Red Army, operating against the German supply lines and routes of withdrawal. On some occasions partisan armies numbering tens of thousands engaged in large-scale operations against major German combat units.

5. ITALY

a. The resistance movement in Italy had some interesting and unusual aspects. Italy was at war with the Allies; nevertheless by subversion, propaganda, and timely exploitation an effective guerrilla movement was developed. Following the armistice with Italy in 1943, trained allied personnel were parachuted behind the German lines to organize and lead those Italians who were seeking to support the Allied effort. Arrangements were made for supply by air to these units.

b. By September, 1944, it was estimated that 85,000 partisans were engaged in guerrilla warfare in the mountainous




Figure 1.

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regions of Italy, and an additional 60,000 patriots were engaged in sabotage in towns throughout Italy. In April 1945, cooperating with the Allied 15th Army Group offensive, the partisans killed or wounded over 3,000 Germans, made over 100 attacks against the enemy, liberated over 125 towns, and carried out countless "counterscorch measures" (preventing the destruction by the enemy of key supplies and installations).

6. PHILIPPINES

Soon after the Japanese landed in North Luzon, small bands of cut-off Filipino and American soldiers, constabulary members, and civilians began harrasing the enemy. Some of these groups gained radio contact with United States Armed Forces Far East headquarters on Corregidor and were authorized to organize as units of the Philippine Army. From this beginning took place a gradual consolidation of small, poorly-organized and poorly-trained groups into large, well-organized and well-trained units until at the time of the return of the American forces, a force of 28,000 existed on Mindanao, a force of 20,000 in North Luzon, and smaller forces elsewhere on Luzon and in the Visayan Islands. Radio contact with the outside, lost after the fall of Corregidor, was reestablished with South West Pacific Area headquarters in Australia in late 1942. From this time on, General MacArthur's headquarters, using radio-liaison teams infiltrated into the Philippines by submarine and small boat, brought successive units into contact. Supply of needed arms, ammunition, and medical supplies by submarine followed, and by the time of the American landing on Leyte in October 1944, all units in the islands were in contact with and functioning under South West Pacific Area headquarters. These forces furnished intelligence about Japanese activities and movements, maintained weather and ship and plane watching stations, and rescued many downed American airmen. Philippine guerrilla forces played outstanding roles in the reconquest of the Philippines by blocking and harassing Japanese movements, furnishing intelligence, and serving as guides, scouts, and flank guards. The North Luzon guerrilla force functioned as a regular combat division in its assigned sector and had U.S. Army supporting units attached and under its command.

7. BURMA

The Chin, Kachin, and Naga tribesmen in the mountains of northern Burma carried on widespread guerrilla activity during 1942. In 1943, however, Long Range Penetration Groups, specially-trained forces of regular American and British troops were sent behind the enemy lines for both guerrilla and regular type warfare. These forces were supplied and their casualties evacuated by planes. These planes often operated from air strips constructed behind the enemy lines. Native guerrillas assisted the groups. The value of these groups is still a subject of debate. They were able to inflict serious damage upon the Japanese and to facilitate the advance of the main forces. However, the air supply to the forces created a tremendous logistical problem. Casualties due to non-battle causes were high. Merrill's Marauders, which left India with 2899 men, ceased to be an effective fighting force after four months.

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Section III

VARIOUS ASPECTS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

8. CAUSES FOR GUERRILLA ACTIONS

a. Against an invading power. In general, the will of the people the world over is to resist an invader. This characteristic, if fostered and exploited, forms the basis for guerrilla warfare. The military, political, and administrative measures and policies of the invading or occupying power may further stimulate the people's will to resist. Guerrilla warfare against an invader builds up more quickly and surely if it has previously been planned and prepared for by the defending power.

b. Against existing authority. Guerrilla warfare occurs when the people revolt against existing authority on military, political, economic, or administrative grounds. These movements may be instigated, aided, and abetted by outside influence. Generally, resistance of this nature, if not assisted from outside, does not present a serious threat to strong military powers, though it may cause grave political and economic concern. However, if heavily supported from outside and particularly if coordinated with open attack by an outside power, it can present a serious threat to the existing authority.

9. APPLICATION

Guerrilla warfare may be resorted to when one party to a conflict is inferior to the other in one or more of the essentials of modern warfare -- armament, resources, regular forces, or strategic position. On the other hand, guerrilla warfare may be used by powerful forces, either separately or in conjunction with regular forces, to achieve speedy and economical fulfillment of their military, political, or economic aims.

10. GUERRILLA STRATEGY

a. The broad aims of guerrilla strategy are:

- (1) To capitalize on the enemy's inability to defend himself and his important installations at all places at all times by making use of surprise, mobility, deception, evasiveness, and concentration of force.
- (2) To inflict casualties upon his troops.
- (3) To cause damage to his supplies and installations and delay to his operations.
- (4) To lower his morale and prestige.
- (5) To maintain (or destroy) the morale and the will to resist of the population.

b. This strategy forces the enemy to divert to anti-guerrilla operations forces and materiel that would otherwise be

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available for other operations. Guerrilla operations are, by themselves, incapable of gaining a military decision. In the attainment of a military decision, guerrilla operations are always preparatory to or in support of a regular offensive effort. Guerrilla operations, on the other hand, can be of great value in assisting the defense and preventing the defeat of friendly regular forces.

c. Guerrilla forces may be expected to adopt strategic objectives that assist and are closely correlated with the general military and political strategy of a power that they are supporting. Time, space and logistical factors, and the strength of available forces will dictate the strategic objectives of guerrilla forces, as well as where, when and how missions are to be undertaken. Although guerrilla warfare may, from an overall strategic viewpoint, be either defensive or offensive, guerrilla operations are generally characterized by offensive action. Unlike regular forces, guerrillas do not seek to impose their will on the enemy by destroying his forces in normal combat. They seldom seize or defend terrain objectives. Usually they are incapable of such achievements. Major decisive actions that characterize normal warfare seldom occur in guerrilla operations. Guerrilla warfare consists principally of small scale, usually brief, operations conducted over a broad area, usually in the enemy's rear, by well dispersed forces. Guerrilla attacks make maximum use of surprise and shock action, and are followed by disengagement and withdrawal as soon as the enemy begins to offer effective resistance. Objectives of guerrilla warfare may include: undermining (or maintaining) the morale and will to resist of the population; gathering intelligence; disrupting the economy, politics, and industry of the enemy occupied area; interrupting lines of communications; wearing down armed forces; or a combination of all.

d. The general characteristics and the strategic nature of guerrilla warfare are shown in figure 2, which represents a nation's total war effort. The brain represents the command, administrative, and political forces that direct the war effort. The heart is symbolic of the economic and industrial resources necessary to support a war. The arm and the mailed fist represent the armed forces and the striking forces of a nation. The arteries are symbolic of the vital lines of communications so important to waging war. The germs of guerrilla warfare may attack any of the vital organisms of a nation's war effort. If blood cannot flow its prescribed course through vital arteries, the most capable brain and the strongest arm soon become inert and paralyzed in spite of a powerful heart.

11. FUTURE EMPLOYMENT

a. To consider probable future applications of guerrilla warfare, it is first essential to consider why guerrilla warfare became a potent strategic weapon during World War II. The reasons are:

(1) The vastness of the global area over which World War II was fought in comparison with the number of troops




Figure 2. Guerrilla Warfare attacks the war effort of a nation.
(Text key: para 10)

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employed resulted in a war of detachment, fluid battle fronts, long lines of communications, and large over-run areas that could not be occupied and defended adequately. This provided the ideal setting in which guerrilla warfare could flourish. Quick thrusts by powerful striking forces frequently isolated large numbers of trained soldiers and quantities of materiel that became available for use by guerrilla forces.

(2) Modern signal communication greatly influenced guerrilla warfare. Highly developed radio communication permitted centralized control of widely separated units and aided close cooperation and coordination with regular forces.

(3) Modern methods of supply by air and water enabled guerrillas to become less dependent on local resources. It placed means at their disposal to develop strong striking forces capable of great achievements.

(4) The ideological aspect given to the war by all sides, fostered by widespread propaganda, developed among civilian populations the will and courage to actively participate in action against the enemy or to give active support to guerrilla forces resisting the enemy.

b. Future war may be more global in scope than any war of the past. Strong airborne and highly mobile shock units, used in conjunction with strategic and tactical air, will likely be given the missions of delivering quick, paralyzing blows to vital nerve centers with little or no concern being given to occupying and holding large land masses. Such a war of detachment will unavoidably result in guerrilla warfare in its broadest aspects. The era of atomic weapons and other mass destructive means increases the importance of guerrilla warfare from the view of both defense and offense. Scientific developments are constantly producing new means and weapons that readily lend themselves to guerrilla use. Nations benefiting from the use of guerrillas in World War II can be expected to use guerrilla forces as an integral part of their military plans and strategy; they can be expected to make advance preparations for the organization, training, command, supply, and employment of guerrilla units in potential areas of operations. In any campaign of the future, the participant who fails to take proper cognizance of guerrilla warfare, either in the planning or execution stages, may suffer severe setbacks, if not eventual defeat.

12. LEGAL STATUS

The question of the status of guerrillas under the laws of war has arisen during almost every war in modern history. The rules of land warfare, that branch of international law applicable to the problem, are to be found in the written conventions and in customs and practices followed by civilized nations. For the rules of land warfare of United States Armed Forces, see FM 27-10.

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a. Applicable rules of land warfare.

(1) International law does not denounce guerrilla tactics. The commitment of bodies of soldiers to the role of guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines during the course of a war is legal. The major question of legality evolves around individuals taking part in guerrilla warfare. Whether such persons, operating against an invader, are entitled to belligerent status depends upon the following:

(a) Whether they are commanded by a person responsible for his actions and subordinated to an established enemy government, whether they respect the laws and customs of war, whether they bear distinctive insignia recognizable at a distance, and whether they carry arms openly. While guerrillas are generally commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates and responsible to a recognized (or unrecognized) government, their respect for the rules of land warfare varies, and the question of whether or not they wear distinctive insignia and carry arms openly or not is usually determined by the requirements of their own situation. During past wars, guerrillas have shown no compunction about disguising themselves as unarmed civilians when circumstances so dictated. This poses the question whether the guerrilla must wear insignia and carry arms at all times to qualify as a lawful belligerent. A regular soldier may disguise himself as a civilian to act as a spy and is, of course, subject to death if captured while spying. However, if he subsequently regains his own forces, he regains belligerent status and, if captured later, must be treated as a prisoner of war. From this precedent, it would appear that the fact that a guerrilla often disguises himself as an unarmed civilian would not bar prisoner of war privileges to him if captured while openly carrying arms.

(b) Whether the guerrilla uprising occurs in a zone of operations or in territory already occupied by the enemy. Under international law a levee en masse that takes up arms to resist an invader has the status of a belligerent, while inhabitants of occupied territory who rise against the occupier are not entitled to belligerent status. However, the rules of land warfare place upon the occupier the responsibility of making his occupation actual and effective by overcoming organized resistance and promptly suppressing guerrilla operations. It is therefore arguable that the existence of an organized guerrilla movement in an occupied area is in itself proof that the occupier has failed to make his occupation effective. The rules of land warfare are not clear as to the status of persons who, after the occupation of their country, join a guerrilla movement that had its inception prior to the occupation.

(2) The rules of land warfare are specific about the status of individuals or groups who engage in or assist guerrilla operations in support of an enemy of their own country. Such persons are classed as war traitors and are subject to severe punishment, including death. They may be tried and punished under AW 81 if their activity takes place within the military jurisdiction of the U.S. armed forces. A war traitor may be tried and punished even though captured long after the commission of his offense.

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(3) The rules of land warfare place upon the civilian population of an occupied area the obligation to take no part whatsoever in hostilities and authorize the occupier to demand and enforce compliance. The occupier is also permitted to carry out reprisals against the civilian population for breach of his regulations and to take hostages to compel observance of these regulations. He may place hostages in the leading trucks and engines of his convoys and require them to precede his patrols. The foregoing would appear to bar the civilian population from willingly supporting a resistance movement. However, guerrilla forces usually maintain the fiction that they are commandeering services and supplies from the civilian population. If the occupier grants to the guerrilla forces the status of belligerents, he cannot force the civilian population to provide him information regarding the guerrilla forces.

b. Legal status of guerrillas during World War II.

(1) Participants in World War II determined the status of guerrillas not so much by the rules of land warfare as by their own aims and the exigencies of the situation. German and Japanese policies included the following:

(a) On July 4, 1940 the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands issued the following order: "The property of persons or associations that have furthered activities hostile to the German Reich or Germanism, or of whom it must be assumed that they will further such activities in the future, may be confiscated in whole or in part."

(b) In Yugoslavia the German commander in chief issued the following decree: "Any person who undertakes to commit any acts of violence or sabotage against the German armed forces, its members, or installations, shall be punished by death."

(c) On March 8, 1945 the Japanese Fuji Army Group issued an order stating: "Shoot guerrillas. All who oppose the Emperor, even women and children, will be killed."

(d) On many occasions the Japanese accorded captured guerrillas prisoner of war status, particularly when they were former soldiers. On other occasions, to induce surrender, the Japanese announced that all guerrillas surrendering during stated periods would be granted prisoner of war status. Sometimes this promise was kept, sometimes it was not. Although the Germans were not as lenient, in several cases they were forced to grant prisoner of war status to captured guerrillas by fear of reprisals on German prisoners held by the guerrillas.

(2) Members of a defeated force who have been ordered by their commander to surrender may decide to continue resistance against the enemy as guerrillas. The question arises whether they are guilty of disobedience of orders and desertion from their own forces. This question has not been legally decided. However, precedents from World War II indicate that no legal penalty is attached to such action.

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(3) Both General MacArthur and General Eisenhower at various times during their campaigns announced that guerrilla and resistance forces in certain areas were considered as parts of their armies and warned the enemy that they must be treated as belligerents.

c. Legal status and fate if captured is usually of little concern to guerrillas and seems to have little effect on their decision to join guerrilla units. Guerrilla units likewise seldom feel bound by the rules of land warfare. When, as did the Japanese in World War II, nations at war fail to give proper treatment to prisoners of war and otherwise show a disregard for the rules of land warfare, the question of the legal status of guerrillas and their supporters ceases to have real meaning. The likelihood of both cut-off soldiers and civilians engaging in guerrilla warfare is greatly increased.

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CHAPTER 2

GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION

13. HUMAN FACTORS

a. The human factors that influence guerrilla warfare include courage, the breaking point of human endurance, and the value placed on life. Successful resistance movements can only exist among people who have the courage and stamina to withstand privations, endure hardships, and face imminent death while fighting back against innumerable odds. Command and leadership are essential to, and must be considered in conjunction with, these basic factors. Although the people individually may possess favorable characteristics, leaders must emerge to transform these characteristics into positive action.

b. A spirit of resistance and a belief of ultimate success is also necessary. This spirit is necessary not only among the guerrillas but among the civilian population as well. The people must be convinced of the possibility of ultimate victory or liberation. Public opinion must be molded into a sympathetic and supporting mood. In a country overrun by the enemy, civilian support, either voluntary, induced, or imposed, is absolutely essential to maintain guerrilla forces for a long period of time. To gain and hold this support, a resistance movement must be unified in spirit, politics, and ideals. Friction in these concepts leads to petty jealousies, internal conflicts, and even civil war. As resistance movements are usually nationalistic in character, political considerations often have great influence on guerrilla warfare.

14. EFFECT OF TOPOGRAPHY UPON CONTROL OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY

a. Terrain influences both the organization and operations of guerrilla forces. In general, open terrain with a good road net is not difficult to control by adequate regular enemy forces. Quick-moving detachments and strategically located garrisons, or strong points, normally suffice. However, if the open terrain is vast in comparison with the number of troops available to occupy it, then control and security suffer, and conditions exist that are favorable for guerrilla warfare.

b. Inaccessible terrain such as mountains, forests, jungles, and marshes is difficult to control; in these difficult areas occupying forces are usually able to secure only limited areas along vital lines of communication. This leaves vast uncontrolled areas that provide ideal protection and strongholds for guerrilla forces.

c. Generally, rural areas are suitable for large compact units engaged in overt operations. Urban centers usually restrict smaller units to covert activities.

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15. SOURCES OF SUPPLY

a. Food. An adequate food supply is essential to the existence of a guerrilla unit. Farming areas capable and willing to provide food must be within reasonable distances of guerrilla bases of operation. Although farming is impractical for active guerrilla units, they may become inactive while the men assist with the planting and harvest on neighboring farms. Necessary items of food, not obtainable from local farms, must be obtained from neighboring communities or from other areas.

b. Shelter. Climate determines the necessity for shelter and the type needed. Except where the climate is particularly vigorous, shelter does not normally create a serious problem for guerrillas. Shelters are constructed from local materials. Civilian houses are commandeered, or the guerrillas live out of doors or in caves.

c. Weapons and ammunition. Weapons are necessary for offense and defense. If an area has been the scene of heavy fighting or if a defeated force has retreated through the area, abandoned weapons and ammunition can be salvaged by guerrillas. Lax supply discipline and weapons security on the part of the invading or occupying force will make additional arms available to the guerrillas. Sporting-type rifles, shotguns, and pistols as well as explosives for mining and road construction will be utilized by guerrillas. Natives of uncivilized countries are capable of making effective use of such primitive weapons as spears, bolos, and poisoned darts. However, for a force to operate effectively over a long period of time, resupply of arms and ammunition from outside sources is necessary.

16. CHARACTERISTICS OF ENEMY FORCE

The characteristics and policies of the enemy forces have a great effect upon the likelihood of successful guerrilla warfare. When the enemy is a traditional foe, when he is of a different ethnic group, or when he does not speak or understand the local language and customs, the will to resist is promoted. When the enemy's policies and actions are so harsh and unjust as to offer no alternative except resistance or if they are so soft as to give the impression of weakness, the likelihood of guerrilla warfare is also increased.

17. MISSION

Blind resistance soon becomes meaningless. Only when a guerrilla unit has acquired a mission with measurable relation to ultimate victory or liberation can it have the necessary framework upon which to build an effective organization. The local leader may formulate the mission or the commander of the friendly regular forces may set up the mission.

18. ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR USE OF GUERRILLAS

Guerrilla warfare is given great impetus if it has been planned and prepared for in advance by either a defending or

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attacking force. Such preparations may include the following:

- a. Propaganda and indoctrination.
- b. Organizing resistance cells.
- c. Organizing commands and staffs.
- d. Organizing units.
- e. Preparing and distributing training literature, arms, and equipment.
- f. Establishing caches of arms, ammunition, and supplies. Making arrangements for future supply.
- g. Organizing communication systems.
- h. Training personnel.
- i. Preparing orders to cover courses of action to meet possible contingencies.

19. PHASES OF ORGANIZATION

When little or no advance preparation has been made for fostering guerrilla warfare, the organization of guerrilla forces normally progresses through several phases. The final organizational level is influenced by the various factors already discussed in paragraph 14. In general, guerrilla forces progress from the stage of improvisation to that of a completely military organization.

20. FIRST PHASE OF ORGANIZATION

The first phase of organization is when individuals band together under local leadership. Their main concern is shelter, food, and weapons. Shelter is provided by isolated buildings or villages on the outer limits of enemy controlled areas. Food is obtained from the local populace. Weapons are collected locally. The activities of these small bands are limited to propaganda, small-scale attacks, and sabotage.

21. SECOND PHASE OF ORGANIZATION

In the second phase of organization, the number and size of units increase. Small units unite under common leadership. The ranks of these units are further strengthened by additional volunteers, individual soldiers, and army units cut off in the course of combat. Command and leadership improve when tested local leaders emerge as commanders and as trained personnel, cut off or infiltrated from the regular forces, are added. The quantity of war materials is increased by battle-field salvage and raids on enemy installations. Efforts are made to establish contact with allied regular forces or with a sympathetic national government. Wide-spread sabotage, raids, and ambushes result in greater enemy pressure. Enemy countermeasures often break up smaller units,

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and dispersed groups join better established units. Guerrilla bases of operation are shifted to inaccessible areas or deeper into uncontrolled areas.

22. THIRD PHASE OF ORGANIZATION

a. During the third phase of organization, unified command is established over certain areas. This may result from a strong leader emerging as the recognized commander, the presence of a recognized senior military leader, or as the result of recognition or infiltration of a commander from regular allied forces. Control and coordination both within the guerrilla forces and with regular forces are established by communication and liaison.

(1) Within guerrilla-controlled areas, command, combat, and service installations are organized and protected.

(2) Effective intelligence and counterintelligence nets are methodically developed. Strict security measures and stern discipline are enforced.

(3) Extensive control is imposed on the civilian population. Additional personnel may be drafted for service in guerrilla units.

(4) Intelligent propaganda is employed to counter enemy propaganda and to stimulate the morale of both guerrillas and loyal civilians.

(5) The effectiveness of individuals and units is improved by training, engaging in operations, and obtaining technical personnel locally or from external sources.

(6) Military equipment is augmented by infiltration from allied regular forces.

b. The guerrilla forces supported by an external force develop an ability to tenaciously defend certain areas and to strike strongly at selected objectives. The activities carried out by the guerrilla forces during this phase are normally controlled by general directives from regular forces.

c. In the second and third phases of organization, units increase in size, consolidate, and unify commands; this does not necessarily mean mass concentration of personnel. On the contrary, small units remain dispersed in depth throughout the area. Now, however, guerrilla commands can assemble large forces at will. The extent to which unified commands develop is influenced by the topography of the country, enemy dispositions and control, political and administrative considerations, and policies of the regular allied forces supporting the resistance movement.

23. EFFECT OF PRIOR PLANNING

The extent of advance preparations influences the progress of guerrilla organization. Extensive preparations may permit immediate entry into the third phase of organization. Less intensive preparations may preclude all or any part of the first

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and second phases, or merely hasten development and organization through these phases. The full value of a guerrilla organization cannot be exploited until completion of the third phase of organization.

24. SOURCES OF MANPOWER

a. The populations of all countries are divided into various groups by occupation, wealth, education, race, and ideology. A war effort, or any force, that seeks to enforce a new order on the population of an area will receive support from some groups and resistance from others. These various groups provide the medium for a resistance movement and a potential source of manpower for guerrilla forces.

b. The various groups will show different degrees of willingness to actually engage in guerrilla activity. Generally, the rural dwellers, the poorer city dwellers, former soldiers, and fanatical idealists are initially the groups who are most willing to undergo the hardship of being guerrillas, while the more prosperous and sophisticated groups usually prefer to support the movement in a covert role or join after the movement is strong.

c. When guerrillas exercise complete control over large areas, they are able to conscript men from the passive elements of the population.

25. SIZE OF UNITS

a. Guerrilla forces organize along the general lines of regular forces. The organizations, as well as the particular names applied to units of various sizes, are influenced by the military knowledge and national backgrounds of the guerrilla commanders. Strategic missions, combat and logistical factors, and topography further influence guerrilla organization. The size of guerrilla units cannot be deduced from the military terms division, regiment, or battalion used to designate units. Normally the strength of these units will be less than that of regular units of the same designation and these units will not have the heavier weapons normally associated with such units. However, all guerrilla organizations have a basic unit that is given tactical and logistical autonomy. Usually this unit is called a company or detachment. The strength of these basic units may vary from 40 to 200 men. When large, they are normally subdivided into platoons, groups, and squads.

b. The over-all size or strength of a guerrilla force, as well as the potential of this force, is difficult to estimate. The armed organization and its supporting services are only one component of the entire force. Sympathetic civilians, collaborators, agents, and informers must be taken into consideration when such forces are analyzed.

26. COMMAND

a. Successful guerrilla campaigns have invariably been characterized by intelligent leadership. Guerrilla organizations that develop with little or no advance preparation are led by

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recognized local leaders. They may or may not have a military background. When a recognized over-all guerrilla commander lacks military background, allied forces may infiltrate qualified personnel to serve as military and technical advisers to the guerrilla commander. By so doing, the military capabilities of the guerrilla forces are efficiently exploited without destroying the command structure of an established organization.

b. Guerrilla forces that are organized as the result of advance planning and preparation are normally commanded by officers appointed by higher military authority. Commanders appointed from other than local sources, use local personnel who thoroughly know the country and the people.

27. DISCIPLINE

a. The terms guerrilla, partisan, and irregular warfare often suggest bodies of individuals entirely lacking in discipline. Actually the contrary is nearer the truth. Spontaneously-formed units may have poor discipline in the early stage of their organization. Unless these units learn early that discipline is essential, they meet with disaster. Undisciplined troops, whether fighting in large bodies or small isolated groups, disintegrate when faced by stiff opposition. Without discipline, security suffers; the price invariably is in lives and equipment.

b. Effective guerrilla organizations maintain strict discipline in all essential matters. Ordinarily it will far surpass the discipline found in regular units. It is enforced by quick and severe action without recourse to formal investigations and trials. Serious infraction of orders or neglect of duty are often punished by death. To achieve surprise in operations and to provide security for their commands, a guerrilla commander must insist on implicit obedience to orders.

28. MORALE

a. Morale is of prime importance in guerrilla warfare. It is a factor that must be considered for both the guerrilla and the supporting civilian. Enemy propaganda readily reaches all civilians and guerrillas. The guerrilla is not provided with the systematic supply and evacuation facilities that support regular units. The civilian is denied protection from enemy reprisals and generally there may be no pardon for the guerrilla if taken alive. Both the supporting civilian and the guerrilla realize the fight is to death.

b. The belief in ultimate victory is the most important morale factor for guerrillas and civilians alike. The constant nearness of the enemy makes every success or reverse felt through all ranks. When the cause is commonly believed to be hopeless or lost, guerrilla warfare is doomed.

c. Leaders conduct propaganda work to maintain the morale of guerrilla units and their supporters. All encouraging news from the main war front is widely disseminated while claims of enemy successes are refuted or depreciated. News of local successes and victories is widely distributed. Outstanding exploits

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of individuals and groups are publicized and honored. Where the situation permits, parades, ceremonies and social events are held. Regular periods may be devoted to political indoctrination.

29. TRAINING

a. For guerrillas to operate successfully against modern military forces without heavy losses, individuals and units must receive training and acquire certain skills peculiar to guerrilla operations. The command, staff, combat, and service echelons strive to attain the same proficiency as regular units.

b. Guerrilla forces are often capable of attaining great proficiency under the most adverse conditions. Individuals and units receive training in areas uncontrolled by or inaccessible to the enemy. Technical training is accomplished by dispatching special instructors to subordinate units. The combat skill of guerrilla individuals and units is further achieved by initially assigning relatively easy missions to them. As the subordinate commanders and individuals acquire confidence and skills peculiar to guerrilla operations, they are assigned progressively harder missions.

30. SUPPLY

a. The continued existence of a guerrilla organization and the extent to which it may be exploited strategically and tactically depends on adequate supplies and equipment. In general, guerrillas live off the land. The availability of food limits the size of the force that may be concentrated and the staying power of such a concentration.

b. Food is procured from the local populace by systematic levy. Raids on enemy supply depots and convoys supplement the local food levies. Other supply needs, including clothing, blankets, medical supplies, fuel, and communication equipment, are obtained locally. Arms, ammunition, demolitions, and other war materials come from local caches, battlefield salvage, raids on enemy installations, or external sources. Guerrillas operate small factories to produce war materials and to repair equipment.

c. The extent to which a resistance movement can flourish while depending solely on local supplies varies greatly. However, as a general rule, the full potential of a guerrilla organization cannot be exploited in modern warfare unless adequate supplies are infiltrated from external sources. The amount of external support may vary from small and irregular shipments to total logistical support.

d. The means used to deliver supplies to guerrillas from external sources depend on the topography, enemy situation, and guerrilla dispositions. Logistical support may be supplied through obscure land routes, by air, by submarine, and by surface vessels. The most common methods during World War II were air and submarine shipments.

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31. MEDICAL SERVICE

a. Medical support in guerrilla warfare is often non-existent. Lack of evacuation facilities, hospitals, medical supplies, and trained personnel may preclude the organization of adequate medical support. Guerrillas may use existing civilian facilities to care for their sick and wounded, in which case the patients pose as civilians while undergoing treatment. On the other hand, guerrilla organizations have been known to develop highly effective medical supporting units and installations. Their organizations have paralleled those of the regular forces and have included field hospitals located in inaccessible areas. They have recruited doctors, nurses, and technical personnel from local civilians, and have obtained medical supplies from the local populace, from raids, and from external sources.

b. Guerrilla forces normally do not need the same medical support provided regular forces. Most guerrilla operations result in relatively few casualties. Employing surprise and mobility, and basing their operations on excellent intelligence, the guerrillas strike weakly defended objectives or an enemy who is unprepared to offer resistance. However, this advantage is offset to some extent by increased need for medical care for sickness and infections resulting from exposure to the elements and inadequate diet.

c. When guerrilla forces are committed to operations approaching normal warfare, their casualties increase and they need more medical support. Generally, when so committed, the proximity of regular allied forces and increased outside logistical support takes care of this need.

32. TRANSPORTATION

Guerrilla forces may use transportation of every known type. They develop a cross-country mobility hard for regular forces to equal. The extent and kind of transportation is limited by the area the guerrillas control, the means at their disposal or made available to them, and the topography. Guerrillas have made extensive use of mounted and pack animals, animal-drawn vehicles, and different types of boats. Forces that reach a high degree of organization and that control large areas may be expected to use motor vehicles and aircraft. Guerrilla forces normally rely on foot movements and hand-carried loads, using civilian carriers.

33. COMMUNICATION

Communication is as important to guerrilla forces as it is to regular forces. Unified guerrilla commands establish efficient communication systems to exercise command, control, and coordination and to permit the flow of information. Intelligence, counter-intelligence, security, and propaganda likewise depend on communication. The nature of guerrilla organization and operations makes radio the most flexible and effective way to fulfill the complex communication requirements.

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34. MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

Modern, light, long-range radio transmitter-receivers provide excellent communication for guerrilla forces. Other conventional and improvised communication means are used. These include wire, visual signals, and messenger service. Depending on the topography of the guerrilla operational area, the enemy situation, and the facilities available, the guerrillas will use both mounted and foot messengers. Land communication routes through enemy-occupied territory are cleverly organized and operated. Women and children are often employed as messengers. Every conceivable ruse is used to conceal documents on the messengers. These same land routes may serve as the main arteries for the movement of personnel and supplies.

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CHAPTER 3

GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

35. CHARACTERISTICS

a. Guerrilla warfare employs surprise, shock action, mobility, and distribution of forces in depth to demoralize the enemy and upset his current and projected operations. It seeks to paralyze the enemy gradually rather than to destroy enemy forces in normal combat. Guerrilla operations follow the same principles and methods of war as regular operations; only their application differs.

b. Surprise is a major requirement of success in guerrilla operations. To offset the enemy's superiority of forces and equipment, guerrillas strike where the enemy is weak and where he least expects an attack. Operations that achieve surprise are based on reliable intelligence and sound security. Night operations are used extensively to further achieve the element of surprise. Darkness and intimate knowledge of the terrain also adds to the guerrillas' security.

c. Mobility is another important factor upon which successful operations are based -- not mobility as applied to regular forces, but mobility due to the small size of guerrilla units. During World War II, Russian partisan units were capable of moving 40-45 miles per day. Mobility helps guerrillas to achieve the all-important factor of surprise; it is also one of their strongest security assets. They can strike and be many miles away before enemy reinforcements arrive.

d. Distribution of forces in depth is a principal characteristic of guerrilla warfare. Normally guerrilla operations are small-scale operations carried on over a broad area. Guerrilla warfare is a war of detachment rather than a mass contact, a war of quick, paralyzing blows followed by swift withdrawals. Generally, guerrillas avoid pitched battle and seldom defend objectives. If hard pressed, they may disperse among the civilians and then reassemble at a prearranged place. "Nowhere yet everywhere," the motto of a guerrilla unit that operated against the Japanese in North Luzon, Philippines (1942-45), could well be applied to guerrillas in general.

36. MISSIONS

a. When acting under outside command:

(1) Missions assigned guerrilla forces are determined by the specific political and military situation. Based on the over-all strategical and tactical plan, allied governments or regular forces assign missions to guerrillas. The assigned mission may be strategical or tactical. As the area of operation of regular allied forces approaches the area of guerrilla operations, missions assigned to guerrilla forces become more tactical in nature. The effectiveness of guerrilla operations increases as the degree of control and cooperation between guerrilla forces and allied regular forces increases. To avoid unnecessary

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duplication of effort, regular forces may closely coordinate guerrilla missions with the regular land, air, and naval operations.

(2) In formulating guerrilla missions, regular forces allied to guerrilla forces are guided by several considerations. Among the factors considered are: the general capabilities and limitations of guerrilla warfare; the capabilities and limitations of the particular guerrilla forces in relation to enemy forces; and the capabilities of the supporting forces allied to the guerrillas. These considerations also govern the time that such a mission is to be executed. The time factor is of great importance. Premature outbreak of overt action by guerrilla forces may result in their destruction; severe retaliation may also be taken against the supporting populace that may jeopardize the effectiveness of the entire resistance movement. Although there are many limiting factors, guerrillas are, nevertheless, capable of giving valuable assistance to regular forces. Normally the missions assigned guerrilla forces are set forth in broad directives that may reflect the organization, areas of operations, conduct, development, and coordination. Missions may direct overt operations to inflict damage on enemy forces, installations, production, communications, and morale. Covert operations may include intelligence, psychological warfare, counterscorch activities, and aiding escaped prisoners and disabled air crews.

b. When acting independently:

Generally the missions assigned when guerrilla units are acting independently are similar to and based on the same factors as those described in the above subparagraph insofar as the guerrilla commander has enough information and ability to correctly interpret the situation. However, purely local factors, like obtaining food, security of guerrilla hide-outs, rivalries with other guerrilla units, and possible enemy retaliation against friendly civilians, influences his decisions more than they would otherwise.

37. AREAS OF OPERATION

a. In general, the areas of operation and the type of operations conducted are influenced primarily by the degree of guerrilla control that exists. During the course of a campaign this degree of control fluctuates as the result of hostile and allied action, the guerrilla forces, and the attitude of the populace. The likely over-all operational area of guerrilla forces extends from the supporting areas of the combat zone back through the communication zone and the zone of interior. Areas and operations conducted in them fall into three categories (fig. 3):

(1) Areas controlled effectively by guerrillas. Normally the headquarters and camps are located in this area. Determined resistance is offered to enemy forces seeking to penetrate the area.

(2) Areas controlled effectively by the enemy. Guerrilla activities in this area are normally restricted to undercover activities by small groups or individuals.




Figure 3. Typical guerrilla area of operations.
(Text key: para 37.)

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(3) Areas not controlled effectively by either force. This is the principal area of guerrilla offensive operations. The guerrillas seek to bring more and more of this area under effective control. They do not offer determined resistance to the enemy's entry into the area but harass his movements throughout the area.

b. If regular forces allied to the guerrillas draw nearer or if requirements elsewhere force a reduction in the enemy's garrison, the areas controlled effectively by the guerrillas may expand to the extent that the enemy is in a virtual state of siege.

c. Normally, areas of operation are divided among various subordinate guerrilla units. Within these areas each subordinate unit carries out assigned missions, exercises control over the civilian population, and collects food and supplies.

38. INTELLIGENCE

Guerrilla intelligence organization and operations are influenced by two major considerations; intelligence essential for the guerrillas' own operations, and the production of intelligence for allied regular forces.

a. A sound intelligence system is vital to successful guerrilla planning and operations because guerrilla tactics stress striking the enemy where he is weak and where he least expects to be hit. Guerrilla intelligence includes a detailed study of the terrain and of enemy strength, movements, dispositions, armament, and habits. Immediate dissemination of information, especially up-to-the-minute changes, is a necessity. Besides combat intelligence, guerrilla forces are interested in strategic considerations like the enemy's political, economic, administrative, and propaganda policies and measures.

b. Guerrilla activity readily lends itself to supplying valuable information to allied forces. During certain phases of a campaign, the primary mission assigned guerrilla forces may be that of intelligence. Regular forces allied to a resistance movement may be expected to infiltrate personnel and equipment to aid and direct the guerrillas, to collect and evaluate information, and to produce and disseminate intelligence. Unless supervised by trained personnel, guerrillas normally lack the ability to correctly evaluate reports and often pass on exaggerated information as true.

c. The organization of guerrilla intelligence staffs and nets normally parallels that of regular forces. To collect information, the guerrillas use extensive, organized nets of spies, informers, and agents. Civilians living near or working in enemy installations report on industrial operations, equipment, weapons, dispositions, habits, and morale. Government officials supply valuable information on the enemy's political, economic, administrative, and propaganda measures. Agents and observers located at strategic points report on ground, air, and naval movements.

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39. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Counterintelligence in guerrilla operations is as important to security as intelligence is to operations. Through propaganda, orders, and threats, guerrillas discourage individuals from collaborating with the enemy. Guerrilla agents and loyal civilians methodically seek out enemy spies and informers. Guerrilla counterintelligence agents are used extensively to cover all zones of guerrilla operations. They are placed in all fields of activities. Traitors to the cause are punished harshly or ruthlessly eliminated. Personnel joining the guerrilla ranks are screened thoroughly. Normally they are required to undergo a period of close observation before they are accepted as members of an organization.

40. SECURITY

Security is achieved through intelligence, counterintelligence, mobility, dispersion, organization of the civilian population, and the routine measures normal to regular forces. As a resistance movement expands, the problems of security become more complex. Headquarters, camps, and various other installations are located in inaccessible areas. All installations are kept mobile and are surrounded by an elaborate guard and warning system. Alternate locations are prepared in advance so that any installation threatened by enemy action can be evacuated quickly and become operational in a safer area. Radio stations are moved frequently to avoid being located. Important areas may be protected by a series of organized positions to meet and delay small-scale enemy thrusts. Travel of unauthorized individuals in certain areas is restricted, and information about installations is normally limited to personnel who actually man or have direct dealings with them. For example, a platoon member may not know the exact location of his company headquarters. Seldom would he know the location of his battalion headquarters. The application of this principle throughout the structure of a guerrilla organization limits the amount of information that may be extracted from captured personnel. False information about guerrilla strength may be disseminated to the enemy in order to make him cautious. Frequent ambushes make the enemy reluctant to move except by day and in large numbers.

41. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

The existence of a unified guerrilla force depends on the accord that can be brought to the various sympathies and interests of the populace who support a resistance movement. Morale stimuli and guidance, provided by an outside power to a guerrilla force, are fully exploited by the guerrillas to strengthen the common bonds of a resistance movement. Also, the enemy's psychological efforts to undermine the guerrilla forces are countered. Psychological warfare is carried on by rumors, by meetings, by indoctrination courses, by news reports and handbills, and in some cases, by clandestine broadcasting stations. Regardless of the media, guerrilla propaganda is circulated to foster high morale among friendly troops and civilians, to promote loyal, energetic support from the populace, and to undermine enemy morale.

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42. CIVILIAN CONTROL

a. To insure support and loyal cooperation, guerrilla forces exercise control over the civilian population. Guerrilla control policies and measures may include:

- (1) Propaganda, orders, and threats.
- (2) Violent action against individuals and communities that fail to cooperate.
- (3) Organization and regimentation of the civilian population.

b. Guerrilla forces use intelligent propaganda to gain and maintain civilian support. They appeal to the people's national and patriotic spirit. The most effective psychological methods, however, seldom prevent a dangerous percentage of the populace from collaborating with the enemy. To control civilian activities and to discourage collaboration, the guerrillas publish orders and policies and enforce them by acts of violence. Individuals who fail to comply with these orders and policies are ruthlessly killed or severely punished. Often communities that show antiresistance tendencies are destroyed. Normally the guerrillas make a few ruthless examples to influence a large area to comply with their desires. The guerrillas may resort to taking prominent individuals from a community and holding them as hostages. The people are made to understand that no harm will come to the hostages as long as the community remains loyal to the cause and cooperates with the guerrillas.

c. The organization of the civilians into units under local leadership is one of the most effective guerrilla methods to extend control over the civilians and to insure their loyal support. Every individual, male or female, young or old, is made to feel he is a part of the resistance movement. A portion of each supporter's time is devoted to some task in support of the guerrillas. The danger of spies, informers, and collaborators is stressed, and everyone is charged with the responsibility of detecting and reporting all suspects. Besides these counterintelligence missions, organized civilians may be used on intelligence missions, civil disturbances, sabotage, security details, and supply work. Civilians who are organized and committed to an active part in a resistance movement in conjunction with guerrilla forces seldom turn to the enemy. At the proper time the civilians provide the mass of manpower that can be exploited against the enemy.

43. CIVIL DISTURBANCES

To hamper war production and enemy morale, agents and sympathizers of guerrilla forces may be expected to organize and instigate labor strikes, slowdowns, protest meetings, and riots. Under the cover of this instigated confusion, industrial property, machinery, products, and raw materials may be sabotaged. Power, communication, and transportation facilities are damaged. Government officials, industrial leaders, and military leaders are abducted or assassinated. Communities that collaborate with the

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occupying force or refuse to support the guerrillas may be punished. This punishment may include the destruction or looting of local food supplies and stocks or blocking the movement of food supplies from rural areas. Bombs may be exploded in public gatherings, communication centers, or administrative offices. Arson is often used to destroy entire communities, thus warning all the surrounding communities to support the resistance movement. Officials or soldiers of the occupying force may be killed and the corpses may be displayed in a pro-enemy community. The discovery of the bodies exposes the entire community to investigations and punishments. Unjust or misplaced punishment to counter civil disturbance is vigorously exploited by the guerrillas to gain sympathizers and strengthen their cause.

44. SABOTAGE

Sabotage is used to attack the enemy's war potential. When conducted under a well-organized plan and on a large scale, it becomes one of the guerrillas' most effective weapons. Sabotage can readily be expanded from the guerrilla ranks to the hands of all sympathetic civilians. In a short time it is capable of producing material and morale disintegration. Its scope and application, in relation to both objectives and areas, are unlimited. Industry, government, administrative offices, power sources, materials, transportation, public services, agricultural production, and communication agencies are examples of possible objectives. Sabotage may be carried out from the zone of interior extending through all areas to include the combat zones. Sabotage readily lends itself to guerrilla warfare because it may be accomplished with means at the disposal of guerrillas. It requires neither elaborate equipment nor logistical support from outside sources. Methods and means used by guerrillas vary from the most common to the most unusual. Destruction or removal of cables, machinery, and rails is a common form of sabotage. Arson, varying from the most basic means to the most elaborate devices (such as clockwork) is utilized against goods, installations, and raw materials. Explosives in the form of bombs or charges are widely used to destroy buildings, bridges, and road beds.

45. THE AMBUSH

a. The ambush is the most common guerrilla method of attack. It is based on thorough intelligence and detailed planning. It is executed with surprise, shrewdness, and violent determination. Guerrilla ambushes are directed against rail and motor troop and supply movements and against closed foot columns. Defiles and ravines in mountainous or wooded areas are good sites for ambush. Road signs may be altered to lure convoys onto suitable side roads. The guerrillas, if possible, employ sufficiently strong forces to enable them to completely smother and destroy the enemy by quick shock action. Commanding ground, concealment, and camouflage are fully utilized. Attacks are usually made at close range to compensate for poor marksmanship and to gain maximum effect. Automatic fire is employed to cover the entire target in depth. Shotguns and grenades may be used. Road blocks, demolitions, mines, or recoilless weapons are used to halt fast-moving columns or trains at the desired place of ambush. (Fig. 4).

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


Figure 4. Typical guerrilla ambush.
(Text key: para 45.)

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Silence and immobility are scrupulously observed in the area of the ambush. Small enemy advance guards are usually permitted to pass through the ambush position and are dealt with by a separate element. Fire is opened, and the attack is launched upon a prearranged signal, usually given by the element charged with halting the head of the column. The action is usually violent and short lived. If the enemy is incapable of counteraction and there is no threat of local enemy reinforcements, the guerrillas quickly salvage usable supplies and equipment, destroy the remainder, and withdraw.

b. The guerrillas use extensive security measures to cover movement to the ambush position and to conceal the action and the withdrawal. Secondary ambushes, some distance from the site of the principal ambush, are frequently used to destroy or delay enemy reinforcements.

c. When the guerrillas are not strong enough to destroy the enemy completely, action is terminated by a prearranged signal when the enemy's counteraction begins to form. A planned withdrawal covered by security detachments is ordered. Often the guerrillas withdraw by detachments in several different directions to frustrate and complicate enemy pursuit. Prearranged details are used to maintain visual contact and to report on enemy pursuing units. Subsequent ambushes often delay or destroy enemy pursuing forces. In favorable terrain and during periods of low visibility, guerrillas may simultaneously ambush enemy columns moving toward one another. After deceiving the enemy and inducing a fire fight, the guerrillas withdraw, leaving the two enemy forces fighting each other.

d. For defense against ambush, see paragraphs 73-74.

46. RAIDS

a. Guerrilla forces conduct raids to destroy or carry away arms, equipment, and supplies, or to capture or kill personnel. The raiders also destroy important installations like guarded bridges, power plants, and communication centers, or harass and demoralize the enemy. The raid, like an ambush, is based on thorough intelligence and detailed planning, and is executed with surprise, shrewdness, and violent determination. The guerrilla force making a raid is usually organized into three principal elements. Each element is assigned a specific mission. One element eliminates the guards. As surprise is indispensable for the success of an operation, ruses are used to approach and eliminate the sentries before they can sound the alarm. The use of firearms in this task is forbidden. Following the elimination of the guards, another element of the force kills or captures personnel and destroys or carries off materiel. A third element of the guerrilla force covers the operation and the withdrawal. Often the guerrillas may use a fourth element in raids. This element infiltrates agents into an installation and their action from within is closely coordinated with all phases of the operation.

b. For defense against raids see paragraph 72.

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47. ATTACK IN FORCE

a. Guerrilla forces that have attained a high level of organization, and are adequately armed, equipped, and supported logistically, are capable of attacks in force against isolated enemy garrisons, combat units, and installations. Guerrilla operations of this nature closely parallel regular offensive operations and are guided by the established principles of offensive combat. Guerrilla forces may often be more effective against certain objectives than regular forces of comparable strength. The guerrillas, by exploiting their organization, mobility, intelligence of the enemy, and detailed information of the terrain, can often attack objectives from both without and within. Agents, small units, and loyal civilians are infiltrated into the objective area. Coordinated surprise attacks are launched simultaneously against every echelon of the enemy to include his security, command, supply, and communications. These operations may be closely supported by allied air, land, and sea action of regular allied forces. Normally the guerrillas attempt to isolate the objective from adjacent areas. The roads, railroads, and wire communications leading to the objective area are methodically interrupted. Guerrilla forces establish road blocks and use sabotage and ambushes to intercept, delay, or destroy all troop and supply movements into the objective area. Attacks in force become more frequent and are conducted on ever-increasing scale as the combat zone of friendly regular forces approaches the effective zone of operations of the organized guerrilla forces. Such attacks are effectively exploited by the guerrillas during the critical periods of enemy operations that require unusual movement of supplies and troops. During these critical periods, guerrilla forces are particularly capable of great achievements and of providing valuable assistance to allied regular forces.

b. The principles for defense against guerrilla attacks in force are the same as those used in ordinary defensive combat.

48. OPERATIONS AGAINST LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS

a. Guerrilla forces can operate against enemy lines of communications. They deny their use to the enemy, and harass, delay, or destroy all movements over designated routes. Units are assigned sectors of the line of communications to be blocked. Within each sector the bridges and road bed are destroyed. Trees are felled and slides are caused to further block the route. Mines and demolitions are used extensively. Guerrilla tactical units are deployed on a broad front along the line of communications. They engage small enemy forces and prevent the route from being repaired or cleared. They ambush enemy supply and troop movements. If superior enemy forces are massed against any sector, the guerrillas withdraw and seek another sector of the line of communications that is less strongly protected. By constantly shifting their forces to the enemy weak points, a line of communications may be so thoroughly disrupted that the enemy is forced to abandon the route or to employ sizable forces to protect it.

b. Even though a guerrilla force may be unable to completely block a line of communications, it may disrupt and delay traffic. Properly timed, such action seriously hampers enemy

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operations.

c. Protection of lines of communications is discussed in paragraphs 73-74.

49. DEFENSIVE COMBAT

a. Defensive combat is an exceptional form of combat for guerrilla forces. Guerrillas normally lack artillery, anti-tank weapons, and other means to face modern forces. As a general rule, they avoid a prolonged position type of defense. When committed to defensive combat, they modify the principles of defensive combat to best meet their needs and to offset their deficiencies. The guerrillas select terrain that gives them every possible advantage. They seek terrain that denies or restricts the enemy's use of armor and complicates his logistical support. In conjunction with their position defenses, the guerrillas raid, ambush, and attack the enemy's lines of communications, his flanks, reserve units, supporting arms, and installations. Camouflaged snipers fire on officers, messengers and other worthwhile targets. Routes of approach are mined and booby-trapped. Diversionary actions in adjacent areas are often intensified to distract the enemy. The guerrillas use skillful ruses to lure the attacking enemy into dividing his forces. Guerrilla forces may be expected to engage in defensive combat to prevent enemy penetration of guerrilla-controlled areas, to gain time for their forces to accomplish a specific mission, or to assemble their main forces for action. They may resort to defensive action to contain enemy forces in a position favorable for attacking the enemy's rear or flanks. Guerrilla forces may be given defensive missions to hold objectives pending the arrival of regular allied forces.

b. Attacks against guerrillas are discussed in paragraphs 76-86.

50. PRISONERS OF WAR

Guerrilla policy on taking prisoners is influenced by many factors. The treatment given guerrilla prisoners taken by the enemy may affect the guerrilla attitude. The guerrillas' ability to secure, guard, and feed prisoners may often be the guiding factor. If the guerrillas control large areas where the prisoners may be accommodated, or if they can evacuate prisoners to allied regular forces without jeopardizing guerrilla operations, then they may take prisoners. The characteristics, religious beliefs, and mental attitudes of the tribes or races that make up a guerrilla force have a great bearing on the attitude and action of the guerrillas. Many races place little value on human life and may be expected to treat an enemy accordingly. Often the guerrilla engaged in combat works himself into a blood-thirsty frenzy that is not conducive to taking enemy prisoners.

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CHAPTER 4

COMBATING GUERRILLAS

Section I

GENERAL

51. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

a. To be successful, anti-guerrilla operations must be based on a broad, realistic plan that coordinates not only the political, administrative and military phases of the operation but also the activities of adjacent areas and anti-guerrilla commands.

b. Preventing the formation of a resistance movement is much easier than dealing with one after it is formed. Putting down such a movement is much easier during its early stages than when it has reached full development.

c. Except in the immediate vicinity of a front-line combat area, guerrilla units cannot exist without the support of some segments of the civilian population. Anti-guerrilla operations must therefore include appropriate measures against these supporters of the guerrillas.

d. A firm, and if necessary harsh, attitude is necessary in dealing with guerrillas and their civilian supporters.

e. Adequate intelligence about the terrain, the population, and the guerrillas is essential.

f. Continuity of command and policy are necessary.

g. An area confronted with a serious guerrilla menace is as much a combat area as are the front lines. Commanders and troops in such an area must maintain the same alert and aggressive attitude as front-line troops. A "rear-area" psychology makes it easy for guerrillas to employ one of their most potent weapons--surprise.

h. Purely defensive security measures allow a guerrilla movement to grow and become strong. They are justified only when the importance of the area does not justify, or the lack of adequate forces permit, offensive operations. Even limited offensive operations are preferable to a purely passive attitude. Offensive action should be continuous and not interspersed with periods of inactivity.

i. Points of greatest guerrilla vulnerability are:

- (1) Support of the civilian population.
- (2) Food supply.
- (3) Leadership.

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(4) Communications and organization.

(5) Morale.

(6) Arms and ammunition supply.

j. Guerrilla security is apt to be poor during darkness and inclement weather. These periods are therefore excellent for attacks against guerrillas.

k. Secrecy of movement and surprise are essential in attacking guerrillas.

l. The aim of anti-guerrilla tactics is to destroy or capture the guerrillas and their leaders. Envelopments and encircling movements are therefore the rule.

m. Conditions permitting, one of the most effective ways to fight guerrillas is to wage guerrilla warfare against them. Elements of the population friendly to our forces are valuable for this type of operation.

52. THE OVER-ALL PLAN

a. To prevent, minimize, or combat guerrilla warfare, doctrine is formulated and plans developed for a specific area threatened by a guerrilla menace. This doctrine, based on a detailed analysis of a country, the national characteristics, and the customs, beliefs, cares, hopes, and desires of the people, must be realistic. The political, administrative, economic, and military aspects of the doctrine are closely correlated into an over-all plan. Within the over-all plan lies the best solution to prevent, minimize and combat guerrilla warfare. Political, administrative, economic and military policies, intelligently conceived, wisely executed, and supported by appropriate propaganda, will minimize the possibility of a mass resistance movement. In many areas mass cooperation may be generated; if this occurs, a sympathetic resistance movement may be organized. If such a resistance movement is exploited, a friendly guerrilla force may be developed to combat hostile forces. Although such a project would require superb diplomacy, it is possible in any country that is made up of opposing factions. On the other hand, an ill-conceived and poorly executed over-all plan may turn the populace against an occupying force. The administrative measures and the force applied to control an area may arouse the hatred of the people. This hatred may bring about hostile guerrilla warfare.

b. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in World War II is a classic example of an invading power operating under a short-sighted and poor over-all plan. Politically and economically, the Germans were favored by two major conditions. The first condition concerned the minority groups on the perimeter of Great Russia (Ukrainians, White Russians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians). These minority groups resented the domination imposed on them by the Soviet Union and hoped for independence or a government in which they would have a greater voice. The second condition was the unpopular collective farm system imposed on the peasants throughout the U.S.S.R. These two conditions, if intelligently administered, would have given Hitler a potent wedge with which to alienate the masses from the Stalin Government. Millions of Soviets and people dominated by the Soviets would have fought and cooperated with the Germans to defeat the U.S.S.R. Hitler, however, insisted on sheer German military might and a short campaign to defeat the Soviet Army. He insisted that German policy remain silent on the two major political and economic issues. This policy, coupled with the brutal, arrogant, and confiscatory attitude of the political administrators and police, generated hatred against the Germans. Even those people who welcomed the German invasion forces at first, were finally organized into the greatest partisan army in the history of war. The over-all plan of the Germans defeated their military might.

c. The plan must provide for coordination between adjacent commands engaged in anti-guerrilla operations. The

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boundaries between such areas, often located along mountain ridges or other inaccessible areas, are ideal centers for guerrilla camps and headquarters because commands often neglect to carry their operations clear to the boundaries of their areas. It is of little use for a command in one area to carry out vigorous anti-guerrilla operations if a nearby command is passive. The guerrillas will move into the quiet area until danger has passed and then return.

53. RESPONSIBILITY

a. Our National Government is responsible for formulating doctrine and policy toward foreign countries. The President of the United States administers our national doctrine and policy through the various government agencies. It is obvious that the policies followed before hostilities have a great bearing on the psychological plan to be followed in time of war.

b. After hostilities break out, our national aims and policies to be imposed on occupied or liberated countries are administered through the Secretary of Defense. When a theater of operations is organized, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the Secretary of Defense, specify the mission and responsibilities of the theater commander. The mission may set a definite course of action or it may authorize freedom of action under a broad concept of contemplated operations.

c. The major responsibilities of a theater commander include administering the civilian population. Normally he is given great latitude in the formulation and execution of policies to establish positive control of the civilian population, civilian institutions, and their resources. Besides the directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the theater commander follows the obligations of International Law (FM 27-10).

d. The theater commander's policies are implemented by the theater staff and the major subordinate echelons of command, for example: armies, area commands, and communications zone commands. The psychological plan and the policies to be followed must be clearly announced and must be thoroughly understood from the highest to the lowest echelon. When such policies are found to be detrimental to operations, these facts together with recommendations should be immediately reported to the next higher echelon. Lower echelons of the command, being in close daily contact with the people can often detect early signs of unrest. Early detection and prompt action are essential to minimize or prevent the spread of popular unrest. If permitted to grow, such unrest may develop into hostile guerrilla warfare.

e. Responsibility remains with the highest echelon of command to anticipate, detect, and evaluate a guerrilla menace, and to insure understanding of policies and uniformity of action against a dissident populace and hostile guerrilla forces.

54. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

In assessing the guerrilla menace in an area and the action to be taken, the following factors are considered:

a. Terrain and weather.

(1) Suitability of terrain and road net for guerrilla operations and for anti-guerrilla operations.

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(2) Existence of possible hideout areas.

(3) Effect of weather and seasons of year on guerrilla operations and on anti-guerrilla operations.

b. Inhabitants

(1) Loyalty of various segments of the population to the enemy. Morale, strength of will to resist, and willingness to undergo hardship of each. Particular attention is given to the following groups.

(a) Farmers and other rural dwellers.

(b) Criminal and "tough" elements of urban areas.

(2) Size and proportion of population likely to engage in guerrilla activities.

(3) Size and proportion of population likely to assist our forces.

(4) Existence of strong personalities capable of organizing a resistance movement. Present activities of such persons.

(5) Susceptibility of various segments of population to enemy propaganda and to our propaganda.

c. Resources

(1) Capability of area to furnish food for guerrilla forces, particularly if many men are not present to work the crops.

(2) Capability of our forces to control harvest and storage of food.

(3) Availability of water and other necessities for existence in or movement through certain areas.

(4) Availability of arms, ammunition, demolition materials, and other necessary supplies for guerrilla forces.

d. Relations with regular enemy forces

(1) Possibility of enemy plans for guerrilla resistance in the area.

(2) Possibility of enemy communication with the area.

(3) Capability of enemy to send organizers and supplies to the area.

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g. Existing guerrilla units

- (1) Strength.
- (2) Morale.
- (3) Personality of leaders.
- (4) Relations with civilian population.
- (5) Effectiveness of organization and unity of command.
- (6) Status of equipment and supplies.
- (7) Status of training.
- (8) Effectiveness of communications.
- (9) Effectiveness of intelligence net.

f. Size and composition of forces available for anti-guerrilla operations.

- (1) Own forces.
- (2) Forces available from higher headquarters.
- (3) Units at rest camps in area.
- (4) Police and special anti-guerrilla units organized from local population.

g. Existing policies and directives on treatment of civilian population and resistance movements.

h. Importance of area to over-all objectives of our forces and effect on other areas if it becomes a base for guerrilla operations.

i. Suitability of following courses of action, singly or combined, for dealing with guerrilla menace:

- (1) Passive defense of installations and lines of communications.
- (2) Limited offensive activities against guerrillas.
- (3) All-out offensive operations to destroy guerrillas.
- (4) Propaganda campaign addressed to neutral and friendly elements of civilian population.
- (5) Propaganda addressed to civilian supporters of guerrillas.
- (6) Propaganda addressed to guerrillas.

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- (7) Operations against civilian supporters of guerrillas and guerrilla sources of supply.
- (8) Taking hostages.
- (9) Organization of special anti-guerrilla units (para 87-92).
- (10) Promotion of conflict between rival guerrilla units.
- (11) Arranging truce with guerrillas (para 75).

55. PLANNING

The planning of a campaign takes into consideration the threat of guerrilla warfare. When an estimate of the situation indicates a guerrilla menace within an area, adequate provisions must be made to counter it from the forwardmost combat elements to the rearmost base. Guerrilla warfare may well influence the over-all strategy of a campaign and dictate the tactical steps of the strategic plan. This menace influences troop requirements in the combat, communications, and occupation zones. The effort to combat and destroy a resistance movement absorbs a tremendous number of troops and creates the need for special training and equipment. Logistical methods and means are influenced by guerrilla warfare. Everyone involved in planning must clearly understand that guerrilla warfare, if improperly resisted, will make itself felt in every headquarters and unit.

56. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

a. The basic military principles are applicable in combating guerrillas, but the doctrine and tactics must be modified to meet the peculiarities of guerrilla forces and their operations. This manual covers only the special aspects of guerrilla warfare as a possible guide to commanders in applying modified doctrine and tactics against guerrillas.

b. The basic objective of anti-guerrilla measures is to:

- (1) Isolate guerrilla forces from the civilian population and from each other.
- (2) Deny guerrilla forces contact with and support from allied forces or a sympathetic national government.
- (3) Destroy the guerrilla forces.

c. The isolation of guerrilla forces from the civilian populace may be greatly influenced by the treatment given the civilians. In all areas there are people who want peace and quiet. Friendly and cooperative elements of the populace are carefully cultivated. The news of good treatment spreads rapidly and is an important factor in establishing trust and friendly relations between the civilian population and our military forces. The populace is encouraged to band together to resist extortion and threats from the guerrillas, and cooperative elements are

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protected. Law and order is established and strictly enforced. Peacefulness is further stimulated by encouraging the people to resume their normal pursuits. Idleness and unemployment are dangerous. Restrictions imposed on the movement of civilians must be wisely and carefully applied. Religious freedom is assured. The basic essentials of food, shelter, and clothing are provided. Tyrannical action by either our forces or the local government is prohibited.

d. Propaganda plays an important role in winning the good will and trust of a people. To be effective, propaganda should concern the basic problems of the people. The media and methods of disseminating propaganda are carefully selected. Generally, the most effective propaganda is imparted man to man. The soldier of the ranks may be a valuable medium of effective propaganda if his actions and relations with the civilians are controlled. This type of psychological warfare is more fully discussed in FM 33-5.

e. In areas where the civilian population is hostile to our aims and where they stubbornly resist pacification, stern administrative measures and aggressive military action are used to establish control. Firm and impartial treatment from the outset will tend to minimize the belligerency of the populace. These measures are closely coordinated with aggressive military action to isolate the guerrillas from the civilian population and allied support and then destroy them.

57. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

a. Operations against guerrilla forces generally follow a normal sequence. A commander, charged with combating hostile guerrillas and extending control over a country, moves his assigned forces into the area, establishes local bases of operations, and takes appropriate security and administrative measures.

b. Military government is established. Our war aims, together with the measures governing political, economic, financial, social, and industrial functions, are clearly publicized. Information and propaganda should stress that the people's cooperation and acceptance of the announced policies will determine the amount of assistance and freedom of action given them. The granting of an amnesty to hostile guerrillas for a limited period of time should be considered. If granted, the terms of the amnesty are widely publicized and scrupulously observed.

c. Offensive operations in force are next launched against areas controlled by hostile guerrilla forces. The operations are characterized by bold aggressive action against guerrilla units and their command, communication, and supply. Offensive action is continued to prevent reorganization and resupply, and to destroy dispersed guerrilla groups. Throughout counter guerrilla operations, emphasis is placed on the capture or destruction of all guerrilla commanders and staffs, and their civilian counterparts. Propaganda is used to destroy guerrilla morale and induce surrenders.

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d. Operations are continued until the hostile guerrilla forces have been destroyed and control is extended throughout the country, including sparsely populated regions and inaccessible areas. Lulls in guerrilla operations or failure to establish contact with guerrilla forces should be regarded with suspicion. These conditions may well indicate inadequate methods of operation rather than complete success. The collecting and evaluating of information should be carefully reviewed to improve the entire intelligence net. Special combat and reconnaissance units may have to be organized and used. Stopping anti-guerrilla operations too soon may nullify months of rugged fighting. Continuous pressure must be maintained until the guerrilla menace ceases to exist.

Section II

FORCES EMPLOYED

58. GENERAL

a. The force assigned to combat guerrilla forces and to establish control over an area must be adequate. Its size and composition depends on the size of the area, the topography, the civilian attitude, and the hostile guerrilla forces. To assign insufficient forces may later necessitate the employment of many times the original number. The quality of the troops is also important, not only from a military standpoint, but from a political and administrative standpoint as well. The Germans during World War II used second-rate, poorly-equipped troops against the Soviet partisans. These forces often became the laughing-stock of the populace and instead of discouraging resistance, encouraged it. Finally the situation in many areas forced the Germans to withdraw front-line divisions to combat the partisans.

b. Infantry normally is the principal arm employed in active counterguerrilla operations. Available supporting arms and services are used in accordance with the situation. Air-transported and airborne units may be used effectively in many situations. All troops, both combat and service, committed to areas threatened by a guerrilla menace must be trained in the special aspects of guerrilla warfare and the active and passive countermeasures to be employed. Regular troops must be indoctrinated never to underrate guerrillas. Otherwise, they are apt to look down on guerrilla forces as inferior, poorly-equipped opponents. Such an attitude breeds carelessness and may result in severe losses.

59. CONTINUITY OF FORCES

a. The continuity of command and units within an affected area is essential. The rotation or relief of commanders and troops works to the advantage of the guerrillas. Commanders and troops need time to become acquainted with the detailed topography of the area, the civilian population, and the organization and operations of the hostile guerrilla forces. Special skill and teamwork are acquired through actual operations against the guerrillas and in dealing with the civilian population. This knowledge and skill is difficult to impart to new commanders, staffs, and troops.

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b. The Japanese, throughout 1942, maintained continuity of command and troops against the resistance movement in North Luzon of the Philippines. By 1943, the Japanese commanders and troops had become thoroughly familiar with the most inaccessible areas and had acquired considerable skill in combating the guerrillas. They succeeded in all but destroying the resistance movement in North Luzon. However, in the middle of 1943, the Japanese high command relieved these seasoned commanders and troops with units that had recently arrived from Japan. The resulting lull permitted the resistance movement in North Luzon to reorganize on such a firm basis that the Japanese could no longer cope with it.

60. ALLIED FORCES

Whenever possible, allied troops native to a liberated area should be employed against hostile subversive elements within that area. Their familiarity with the country, people, language, and customs makes them invaluable. Total responsibility for control over liberated areas should be rapidly transferred to the local government. Premature transfer, however, may threaten the stability of the re-established power. Close liaison and ample support is provided for the re-established government and its organized forces. This may be administered through advisory and liaison teams.

61. ENEMY NATIONALS

a. Combating a guerrilla menace requires the diversion of tremendous manpower. Friendly elements of the population should be used as much as possible to conserve regular forces.

b. Active employment of enemy nationals may include:

- (1) Intelligence agents and informers.
- (2) Propaganda agents.
- (3) Government and key civil positions.
- (4) Local police and constabulary forces.
- (5) Security forces.
- (6) Labor and service units.
- (7) Special anti-guerrilla combat units.

c. Use of enemy nationals must be based on sound intelligence and planning. The premature organization and exploitation of such forces may invite treachery. To avoid damaging repercussions, a commander must first establish an efficient counterintelligence organization and use it to find those enemy nationals upon whom he can safely rely. Hostile guerrilla forces may be expected to infiltrate agents into locally organized units to obtain information and to exploit these units in conjunction

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with guerrilla operations at opportune times.

d. When there are some doubts about the loyalty of enemy nationals to our cause, it may nevertheless be possible to use them for non-sensitive duties that will release regular troops. It may also be possible to use them in other areas where they do not have close relationship with the local population.

e. Within some areas, sympathetic enemy nationals may be nonexistent or too few to assist much in combating a guerrilla menace. There remains, however, still another possibility to ease the task of combating hostile guerrillas and so reduce manpower requirements. Within a national resistance movement it is not uncommon to find guerrilla forces opposed to one another over political differences. Clever diplomacy, propaganda, organization, and support may widen the differences between these factions. Such action will limit unification of the guerrilla forces. Properly maneuvered, the factions may even be induced to fight each other. In any case, a resistance movement split by internal strife is far easier to deal with than a completely unified guerrilla force.

Section III

INTELLIGENCE

62. GENERAL

Detailed intelligence is essential in combating guerrilla forces. To conduct counter guerrilla operations without sound intelligence wastes time, material, and troop effort. The intangible aspects of guerrilla warfare, together with the sympathetic support given the guerrillas by the local populace, create intelligence obstacles that can only be overcome by patient determination and the utmost resourcefulness. Extensive and intensive means and methods are used to organize the intelligence net and to collect, evaluate, and disseminate information. The general doctrine, methods, and procedures of collecting, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence are covered in FM 30-5. Only the special aspects of intelligence as they apply to counter guerrilla warfare are developed here.

63. PERSONNEL

A larger number of intelligence and counterintelligence personnel is required for counter guerrilla operations than for normal operations. Special attention must be given to obtaining trained interpreters. A command combating guerrillas is greatly handicapped if forced to procure and rely on local native interpreters.

64. SPECIAL INFORMATION NEEDED

a. An intimate knowledge of the terrain is necessary. Only when the anti-guerrilla forces' knowledge of the terrain begins to approach that of the guerrillas can they meet the guerrillas on anything like equal terms. Terrain intelligence is continuously collected, recorded and disseminated. Up to date photo

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maps are prepared. Terrain models are constructed and used for briefing subordinate commanders. Particular effort is made to collect information of the following:

- (1) Areas likely to serve as guerrilla hideouts. Such areas have the following characteristics:
 - (a) Difficulty of access, like in mountains, jungles, or marshes.
 - (b) Protection from air reconnaissance.
 - (c) Situation which favors defense and covered withdrawal.
 - (d) Location usually within one day's journey of small civilian settlements that provide food and act as outposts.
 - (e) Adequate water supply.
- (2) Roads and trails approaching suspected or known guerrilla areas.
- (3) Principal trails traversing and passing along the circumference of suspected guerrilla areas.
- (4) Principal routes connecting separate guerrilla areas.
- (5) Roads and trails near our installations and line of communications.
- (6) Location of fords, bridges and ferries across otherwise impassible rivers; seasons of the year when rivers are in flood.
- (7) Areas where drinking water is not available or where foot travel is difficult or impossible.
- (8) Location of all small settlements and farms in and near suspected guerrilla areas.
- (9) If guerrillas are known or suspected to have contact with the enemy, location of areas suitable for air-drops or boat or submarine rendezvous; roads and trails leading into enemy-held areas or neutral countries friendly to the guerrillas.

b. Personality files on guerrilla commanders, members, and civilian supporters are built up. Names and data of persons likely to be connected with the guerrilla movement are collected. Efforts are made to obtain rosters and organization data of guerrilla units. The names and locations of sweethearts, families, relatives, and friends of known guerrillas are obtained. These persons are valuable as sources of information and as hostages, and traps can be laid for guerrillas visiting them. In communities friendly to the guerrillas, some persons are usually responsible for collecting food and other aid for the guerrillas and

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for furnishing message centers and safe houses for guerrilla messengers. Every effort is made to discover such persons. It is usually preferable not to arrest them immediately but to watch their activities and contacts and seek to apprehend guerrilla couriers.

c. Communications provide the essential link between guerrilla forces and their allied forces. Control, coordination, and logistical support within unified guerrilla commands and with allied forces all depend on communications. Radio is normally the essential means of communication in guerrilla organizations. Special consideration is given to monitoring and locating guerrilla transmitter-receiver stations. Intelligence efforts should include the operation of special radio stations that enter the guerrilla radio net using guerrilla call signs and procedures. If cleverly operated, such stations may obtain valuable information or transmit messages to mislead the guerrilla forces. Radio direction finders together with mobile radiogoniometers are used to locate guerrilla transmitter-receiver stations. Guerrilla radio frequencies may be jammed to deny the use of radio channels.

d. Special effort is made to collect information that will lead to the capture or destruction of guerrilla commanders. The over-all commander and the major subordinate commanders play a vital part in guerrilla warfare. A resistance movement may never recover from such a stunning blow as loss of its commanders.

e. Special agents may be infiltrated into guerrilla forces by a wide variety of methods. Agents disguised as liaison personnel from guerrilla allied forces may be parachuted at night into guerrilla commands. Agents disguised as downed air crews of guerrilla allied forces provide an effective penetration method. The Germans, for example, infiltrated so many agents into guerrilla forces that civilians, loyal to the resistance movement, refused to establish contact between the guerrillas and the legitimate allied agents parachuted into the area. The Japanese disguised agents as liaison personnel from the South West Pacific Area. These agents succeeded in obtaining complete rosters of guerrilla units and prominent civilian contacts in the Philippines.

65. RECONNAISSANCE

The use of regular units on reconnaissance missions against guerrilla forces will seldom produce satisfactory results. In many instances, such reconnaissance may even do more harm than good. Unusual reconnaissance activities, occurring in conjunction with operations, will invariably alert the guerrillas and warn them of the coming operation. Special anti-guerrilla units are used on reconnaissance missions as outlined in Section VII. Reconnaissance missions, whenever possible, should be assigned to units with a routine mission which is habitually executed within the area and which they can continue at the same time.

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Section IV

ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES

66. GENERAL

Rigid military government control and stern administrative measures are imposed on a populace collaborating with hostile guerrilla forces. The extent of control and the degree of sternness imposed on the civilian populace depend on the situation within the area. Information about public attitude must be gathered and judged with sensitive perception. Control and restrictions are relaxed on a populace in direct proportion to its efforts to cooperate. The sincere will of the civilians to oppose guerrilla coercion should be adequately supported. The basic objective, to isolate the guerrillas from the populace, must be kept in mind. Administrative measures and punishment are exercised with realistic discretion. If the people become so frustrated as the result of control and punishment that they feel their lot might just as well be thrown with enemy guerrillas, then the purpose of the measures is defeated and only the guerrillas benefit. (See FM 27-5 for details on civil affairs and military government.)

67. SPECIAL MEASURES

Administrative measures imposed to suppress an unfriendly populace and minimize its ability to collaborate with hostile guerrillas may include:

- a. Registering and photographing all civilians.
- b. Requiring individuals to carry identification passes.
- c. Controlling and restricting all movement.
- d. Curfew (allowing no one out during hours of darkness).
- e. Confiscating weapons and war materials.
- f. Controlling all communication to include private radios.
- g. Controlling all means of transportation.
- h. House-to-house searching for contraband.
- i. Controlling and rationing all foodstuffs, clothing, and medical supplies.
- j. Completely evacuating designated areas.
- k. Taking hostages.

68. PUNITIVE ACTION

Vigorous enforcement and stern punishment is applied to carry out administrative measures. Half-heartedness or any sign

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of laxness will breed contempt and defiance. Violators are apprehended and justly punished. Care is taken to punish the true offenders. The guerrillas may initiate acts of violence in communities that are earnestly cooperating to provoke unjust retaliation against those communities. Unjust or misplaced punishment at the hands of the occupying force is vigorously exploited by the guerrillas to gain sympathizers and strengthen their own cause. Every means is used to publicize the nature of offenses for which punishment is imposed. The populace is made to realize that the action taken is not arbitrary, but necessary to enforce law and order.

Section V

SECURITY

69. GENERAL

In areas threatened by a guerrilla menace security measures are taken to safeguard our troops, installations, and lines of communications. The populace and its institutions and resources are also safeguarded. Failure to do this exposes them to guerrilla coercion and exploitation. Vigilant security and sound defensive measures will not only minimize our own losses, but tend to discourage guerrilla operations.

70. TROOP SECURITY

Troop security is a command responsibility and function. All echelons must be thoroughly briefed on known or suspected hostile guerrilla forces. Combat security measures, including extensive patrolling, are employed on the march, during halts, and while in bivouac to minimize losses from guerrilla ambushes or attacks. Troops in rear areas may acquire a sense of false security and relax their vigilance even though guerrillas threaten them with dangers as great as those in the forward areas. Commanders of units that have not experienced or witnessed a guerrilla attack will have to exercise methodical supervision to maintain security discipline. As guerrilla operations may be spasmodic, long quiet periods will further tend to reduce security vigilance.

71. SUPPLY DISCIPLINE

Supply discipline is strictly enforced, and it is emphasized to troops and units that supplies lost, traded, or thrown away will be recovered by the guerrillas and used against our forces. Arms and equipment are salvaged from battlefields and from civilians who have collected them.

72. INSTALLATION SECURITY

a. Installations of all types are secured from guerrilla attacks and sabotage. Special attention is given to the security of arms, ammunition, and other equipment of value to the guerrillas. To economize on manpower, it is important to select sites for installations that readily lend themselves to defense. Installations should be grouped together so that they may be guarded as a unit. To further conserve personnel, maximum use is

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made of physical obstacles and aids like wire, mines, alarms, illumination, searchlights, and restricted areas. Fields of fire are cleared and field fortifications are constructed for guards and security forces. The guard or security system should be supplemented by a vigorous patrol system. All soldiers, including headquarters and service personnel, are trained in anti-guerrilla tactics. Specially-trained dogs may be used with guards and patrols. Rigid security measures are enforced on native labor, to include screening, identification, and supervision, as a defense against sabotage within installations. All security measures are maintained on a combat basis, and all soldiers keep their weapons available for instant use. The routine means of securing an installation are altered frequently to prevent guerrilla forces obtaining detailed accurate information about the composition and habits of the defense. Fraternization of military personnel with the civilian population is discouraged or prohibited.

b. The size, organization, and equipment of security detachments are dictated by their mission, the size of the hostile guerrilla forces, and the attitude of the civilian populace. Security detachments in remote areas will necessarily be larger than those closer to supporting forces. Patrol requirements likewise influence the size of security detachments. Remote detachments are maintained with a supply level to meet the contingency of isolation from their base for a long time. Security detachments should be independent of the local populace for supply. Special arms and equipment may be provided. Reliable communication is established between the responsible headquarters and security detachments.

3. Positions are organized and prepared for all-around defense. Adequate guards and patrols are used to prevent surprise. Precautions are taken to prevent guards being surprised and overpowered before they can give the alarm. Concealed approaches to the position are mined and booby-trapped. Areas from which short-range fire can be placed on the position are cleared and mined. Personnel are provided with auxiliary exits and covered routes from their shelters to combat positions. Buildings used for shelters are selected with care. Generally, wooden or other light constructions are avoided. If they must be used, the walls are reinforced for protection against small-arms fire. Supplies are dispersed and stored in protected caches. Adequate protection is provided for communication installations and equipment. Combat proficiency is maintained by training and alert drills. Natives are not permitted to enter the defensive positions, and natives residing in the vicinity are carefully screened or evacuated. Informers may be established along routes of approach to installation. An example of a security outpost is shown in Figure 5.

73. SECURING LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS

a. Lines of communications are difficult to secure in guerrilla infested areas. Limited manpower usually prevents adequate security for long lines of communications.

b. Railway installations and rail traffic are secured by establishing defined areas of responsibility from theater




Figure 5. Security outpost prepared for all-around defense against guerrillas.
(Text key: para 72.)

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command down through subordinate commands like army, communications zone, and area commands. Standard operating procedures, to include security measures, are announced by theater directives. Within the areas threatened by hostile guerrillas, security measures are taken to protect designated installations, railway repair and maintenance crews, and rail traffic. Important installations like bridges, underpasses, tunnels, water towers, marshalling yards, and round houses are secured. The right of way and area within 300 yards of the tracks is declared and posted as a restricted zone. Civilian inhabitants living within this zone are evacuated and unauthorized persons are forbidden to enter. Underbrush and thick forests are cleared from the sides of the road bed. Block houses and security units may be established along the right of way. Frequent patrols are made along the right of way and to the flanks to discourage trespassing in the restricted zone, to detect mines and sabotage along the rail bed, and to give warning of guerrilla operations. Armored railroad cars may be used to supplement patrolling. Railway inspection, maintenance, and repair crews are provided with armed security detachments. Trains are provided with security detachments to defend them from guerrilla attacks. When passing through areas of likely ambush (ravines, defiles, forests or areas overgrown with heavy underbrush) automatic weapons keep up a continuous fire to the flanks until the danger area is passed. Such fire, however, is opened only on the command of the convoy commander. For added protection against sabotage and mines, an engine, pushing cars loaded with rocks and earth, may be run ahead of important trains. The security detachments guarding the right-of-way have their own communications system which is tied-in to the administrative railroad communication system.

c. Highways through hostile guerrilla areas are secured by the applicable methods used for securing a railroad right-of-way. Lone vehicles and convoys not capable of providing their own security are grouped and escorted through danger areas by armed security detachments. All traffic through danger areas is controlled by traffic control stations.

74. CONVOY SECURITY DETACHMENTS

a. These units are specially organized and trained to protect convoys from the hostile guerrilla actions. They have adequate fighting power to counter likely guerrilla attacks. A detachment may be organized into two or more parts, a holding or defending element and an attacking element. The size of the detachment and composition will vary with the topography, the capabilities of hostile guerrilla forces, and the size and composition of the convoy. A typical convoy security detachment may be organized as follows:

- (1) The headquarters detachment provides the staff, communications, and medical facilities.
- (2) The armored element provides increased fire power and shock action.
- (3) The infantry detachment may be organized into a holding element and an attacking element.

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(4) The combat engineers supplement the holding element and are used to make minor bridge and roadbed repairs. They are also used to detect and remove mines.

(5) The armored infantry company is particularly suitable for this type of mission.

b. Before entering the danger area, the convoy command responsibility is clearly fixed. The commander is briefed with the latest information about the area to be passed through. He formulates his plan and issues orders to include formation, interval between echelons and vehicles, rate of travel, and detailed plans of action if guerrillas should attack. All elements are briefed to act initially according to prearranged plans, as there will seldom be enough warning for orders to be issued on the road. Canvas covers of trucks are removed and tail-gates are left down. When practicable, personnel are placed in vehicles so that they can detruck rapidly. Arms and weapons are readied for immediate action, and senior personnel in each vehicle are charged with the responsibility of seeing that all passengers are on the alert when passing through danger areas.

c. The formation of a security detachment and its integration into a convoy may and should be varied. Guerrillas may be expected to observe convoy habits and will prepare their ambushes to cope with expected formations. The holding element of the security detachment is distributed to provide close-in defense throughout the convoy (fig. 6). Armor leads the convoy as a precaution against mines. When armor is not available, a heavy vehicle with sandbags placed on the floor beneath personnel should lead the convoy. Hostages may also be placed in the leading vehicles. Armor also is distributed in depth throughout the column to strengthen the defense of the formation and to provide supporting fire for the attacking elements. Armor also provides a ready means of communication throughout the convoy. Troops riding in trucks may be protected by sheet iron placed on the sides of the trucks. Convoys may be escorted by reconnaissance aircraft or have combat aircraft on call. An advance-guard formation preceding the convoy is normally ineffective against guerrilla ambushes. The guerrillas will allow the advance guard to pass the site of the main ambush, then block the road and deal with the main body and the advance guard separately.

d. When hostile guerrillas are the governing factor, the convoy speed is kept slow (10 to 15 mph) in areas of likely ambush. When passing through these areas (ravines, defiles, forests or areas overgrown with heavy underbrush) automatic weapons keep up a continuous fire to the flanks until the danger area is passed. Fire is opened, however, only upon the command of the convoy commander. At the first indication of an ambush, vehicles stop, taking care to remain in the tracks of the vehicle in front (fig. 7). No effort is made to clear the road by driving to its side or shoulders. These may be mined. Personnel, other than drivers and assistant drivers, detruck as rapidly as possible, not waiting for the vehicles to come to a stop. Drivers turn off ignitions, brake their vehicles to a stop, set hand brakes, and leave the vehicle in gear before detrucking. Assistant drivers are alert to help if the driver becomes a casualty. Personnel

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


Figure 6. Possible formation of a convoy in hostile guerrilla area. (Text key: para 74.)

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Figure 7. Automatic weapons keep up a continuous fire to the flanks when passing through suspicious areas.
(Text key: para 74.)




Figure 7 (continued). When ambushed, personnel detruck as rapidly as possible, take positions, and open fire.
(Text key: para 74.)

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Figure 7 (continued). Security detachment commander makes hasty survey of situation and issues orders to commander of attack element. (Text key: para 74.)

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Figure 7 (continued). Attack element makes prearranged attack, usually an envelopment. (Text key: para 74.)

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upon detrucking take cover and open vigorous fire on suspected targets. Tanks open fire and maneuver to the most favorable ground in the immediate vicinity. The security detachment commander, after hastily surveying the situation, issues orders to the commander of the attacking element to begin one of the pre-arranged attacks, preferably an envelopment. The fire of the holding force is coordinated with the attacking elements by pre-arranged communication. After driving off the guerrillas, security details are posted to cover the reorganization of the convoy. The convoy commander reports by radio to a road control station a brief account of the engagement. Guerrillas captured in the action are interrogated about the location of the rendezvous where the unit was to reassemble.

e. After an ambush, patrols are sent to apprehend, interrogate, and, if necessary, make reprisal against civilians living near or along the routes of approach to the ambush position.

f. The following instructions apply when a convoy is not escorted by a convoy security detachment. Part of the available troops are placed well forward in the convoy, and a strong detachment is placed in a vehicle that follows the main body by about three minutes. Radio contact is established between the two groups if possible. Fairly fast speed is maintained. Defiles are traversed at fast speed. Sharp curves, steep grades or other areas where slow speed is enforced are reconnoitered by foot troops sent ahead. At the first indication of ambush while the convoy is in motion, leading vehicles, if the road appears clear, increase speed to the maximum consistent with safety in an effort to smash through the ambush area. Drivers or assistant drivers of vehicles disabled by enemy fire or mines seek to direct their vehicles to the sides or off of the roads in order that vehicles in rear may continue through. Troops from vehicles stopped in the ambush area dismount and return fire. Troops from vehicles breaking through the ambush, dismount and attack back against the flank of the ambush position. The rear guard of the convoy, upon learning that the main body has been ambushed, dismounts and attacks forward against the flank of the ambush position. Both attacking groups exercise care that they do not fire on each other. If the guerrillas allow the main convoy to pass through and then ambush the rear guard, troops from the main body return and relieve the rear guard by an attack against the flank of the ambush.

75. TRUCES

During World War II, truces existed between guerrillas and occupying forces in some areas for considerable periods. In some cases these were arranged by formal agreement between the two commanders. In other cases they came tacitly into existence. They usually took the form of a division of the area between the two forces or of a guerrilla agreement to stop offensive action in return for the occupying forces' stopping certain operations against the civilian population. The occasions when a truce gives advantages equally are very few, and no such arrangement should be accepted without careful consideration and the approval of higher headquarters. The truce may be offered to tide the guerrillas over a period of serious weakness, to permit them to

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receive supplies from outside, or to perfect plans and arrangements for a subsequent operation. A truce should never be offered to the guerrillas, as this would be taken as an admission of weakness. In no event should intelligence and counterintelligence efforts cease during such a truce, and there should be no hesitation in ending the truce when it is advantageous to do so or when the changed situation makes offensive operations possible.

Section VI

OFFENSIVE ACTION

76. GENERAL

A guerrilla menace should be countered at the earliest practicable time by aggressive offensive action. Continued reliance on security measures against guerrilla forces results in an ever-increasing commitment and dissipation of forces and gives the guerrillas an opportunity to unify, train, and develop coordination and logistical support. It also leaves the initiative in the hands of the guerrillas, who can concentrate superior forces against security forces, inflict severe casualties, and lower morale. Successful offensive action, on the other hand, forces the guerrillas to devote most of their efforts to self-preservation. It lowers their morale and disrupts their command structure, communications, and supply system. It weakens civilian support for the guerrillas and increases this support for our forces. Offensive counter guerrilla action is bound by the principles and methods of regular offensive combat, but their application is modified to meet the peculiarities of guerrilla warfare.

77. PURPOSE

The purpose of offensive action is the destruction of the guerrilla forces and their will, as well as the will of the populace, to continue resistance. The commander selects objectives like guerrilla concentrations, headquarters, communication centers, and food and supply sources. Specific objectives are sought that will facilitate concentration of forces, coordination of effort, surprise, and the capture or destruction of the maximum number of guerrillas. Unlike normal operations, the capture of ground contributes little to the attainment of the objective since, upon departure of our forces, the guerrillas will infiltrate back into the same areas.

78. CONTINUITY

Continuous pressure is maintained against the guerrillas by successive operations and vigorous patrolling. This keeps the guerrillas on the move, disrupts their security and organization, separates them from their bases of supply, and destroys their morale. On the other hand, offensives, followed by withdrawal for long periods, allow the guerrillas to lick their wounds, re-establish themselves, and resume offensive operations.

79. SURPRISE

Surprise is sought in all operations. Against well-organized guerrillas it is difficult to achieve and requires that every

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echelon of command employ the most ingenious and often the most unorthodox methods. Surprise may often be gained by conducting operations that differ from past operations and are unorthodox or unusual, like attacking at night, attacking in bad weather, attacking through difficult terrain, employing small specially organized units, and the like. Caution is exercised throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations to prevent the guerrillas from learning their nature and scope in advance. Special security restrictions are applied to the movements of commanders, communications, reconnaissance, movement of troops, and concentration of supplies. Lower echelons, upon receiving orders, are careful not to suddenly alter their dispositions and daily habits. Cover plans, ingeniously exposed to guerrilla intelligence, are used to deceive the guerrillas as to the purpose of necessary preparations and movements. Real care is exercised to keep civilian supporters of the guerrillas from learning our intentions and reporting this information to them. Where necessary, civilian communities along the route of advance are surrounded and the inhabitants held temporary prisoners to prevent their giving an alarm.

80. MOBILITY

Mobility is essential in counter guerrilla operations to achieve surprise and to counter the mobility of guerrillas. Consideration is given to the type and size of units employed; the selection, training, and equipping of individuals and units; communications; and administration. These variable factors are then considered in relation to the hostile guerrilla forces, the mission of the various command echelons, the topography, weather, and climatic conditions. The situation confronting a commander is carefully analyzed. A commander develops the desired mobility through initiative, improvisation, and aggressiveness.

81. FORMS OF OFFENSIVE ACTION

The usual forms of offensive action against guerrillas may be broadly classified as encirclement, attack, and pursuit. The variations in technique necessary to accomplish these maneuvers in guerrilla warfare are covered in detail in the following paragraphs.

82. ENCIRCLEMENT

The encirclement of guerrilla forces, whether they are large or small, is the most effective way to completely destroy them. The encirclement is made in depth with adequate reserves and supporting arms to meet possible guerrilla attack in force and to block all avenues of escape. Complete and effective encirclement operations require a relatively large number of troops regardless of the number of opposing hostile guerrillas involved. If terrain or inadequate forces preclude the effective encirclement of the entire guerrilla area, then only the most important part of the area is encircled. The planning, preparation, and execution of the operation are aimed at a sudden, complete encirclement that will totally surprise the guerrillas.

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83. MOVEMENT TO LINE OF ENCIRCLEMENT

a. All forces used to make the encirclement should reach the line of encirclement simultaneously (fig. 8). Movement from assembly areas may begin in darkness to gain surprise, but the operation is timed to insure the arrival of units and their organization of the line of encirclement during daylight. The tactical formations adopted in advancing from assembly areas to the line of encirclement are governed by the terrain, hostile forces, and security considerations. Normally, tactical deployment progresses from march security formations to full deployment of the elements that are to organize the actual line of encirclement. The density of troops of the advance echelons is progressively increased and lateral deployment is gradually extended to cover the entire zone of advance as units approach the line of encirclement.

b. Support and reserve units are committed to insure sufficient density of troops and to establish and maintain lateral contact between units. The reserve is reconstituted during the organization of the line of encirclement.

c. Throughout the early phases of the advance to the line of encirclement, speed is emphasized. Commanders are especially bold and determined in their decisions, rapid and calculating in directing the movements and deployment of their units, and demanding on the physical endurance of their troops. Such action involves risks and does not permit thorough combing of the area covered by the advance. Resistance is countered with bold aggressive action. Determined pockets of hostile resistance are by-passed by the leading echelons as rapidly as possible. Reserve units are used to contain and destroy any by-passed pockets of resistance. Less rapid and aggressive action in reaching and organizing the line of encirclement gives the guerrillas an opportunity to escape.

d. Upon arriving on the line of encirclement, units occupy defensive positions. The most critical periods in the execution of the operation are during the initial phase of occupying the line of encirclement and at night. Large guerrilla formations may be expected to react violently upon discovering that they have been encircled. The guerrillas may be expected to seek or feel out weak points or gaps. At night they may be expected to escape through gaps or attack weak points to force a gap. Units organizing the line of encirclement push strong patrols out to their front to reconnoiter and give timely warning of the approach of guerrilla formations. Air reconnaissance is used to supplement ground reconnaissance. Support and reserve units are located in depth to cover likely guerrilla escape routes. Reserve forces are committed if guerrilla forces succeed in breaking through the line of encirclement.

84. DESTRUCTION OF ENCIRCLED FORCES

a. The encircled area may be narrowed by all forces advancing simultaneously from the line of encirclement to successive designated lines in the center (fig. 9). This method can be used when the area of encirclement is small and the guerrilla

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


Figure 8. All forces make simultaneous movement to the line of encirclement.
(Text key: para 83.)

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


Figure 9. Destruction of guerrillas by tightening encirclement.
(Text key: para 84.)

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forces are comparatively weak. When vast areas are involved or the hostile forces are strong, this method has disadvantages. It is difficult to move units over varied terrain along a broad front without creating gaps through which the guerrillas may escape. When the guerrilla forces are strong, the advancing elements are vulnerable to attacks which may create gaps in the line of encirclement.


b. Encircling forces may hold their positions while other forces drive spearheads into the area and cut it into smaller parts which are then cleared of guerrillas by one of the methods described above (fig. 10). This method is suitable when the encircled area is large and sufficient forces are available. Units driving spearheads into the circle must be particularly vigilant against ambush.

c. Designated units of the encircling forces may advance to successive lines to compress the guerrilla forces against units that maintain their positions on the line of encirclement (fig. 11). This "hammer and anvil" method is especially suitable if part of the line of encirclement includes natural obstacles like a river or difficult terrain that can be held by a small force disposed for defense, while strong forces advance and drive the guerrillas toward these defended obstacles. The advancing forces use a formation in depth with adequate reserves to meet guerrilla attacks in force and to close gaps that are created during the advance. This method can take advantage of supporting arms to assist the attacking elements.


d. When information indicates that effective guerrilla forces may defend strongly fortified positions, the encirclement is completed and units maintain their defensive positions. A strong assault force advances into the encircled area and attacks known or located organized guerrilla positions (fig. 12). After it overruns all located organized positions and effectively disperses large guerrilla concentration throughout the area, the units holding the line of encirclement are advanced to compress the area as discussed above.

e. In all encircling operations various precautions must be taken by all echelons of command. Once the encirclement is firmly established, the destruction of the guerrilla forces is conducted methodically, thoroughly and without haste. The units that advance from the initial line of encirclement are impressed with the necessity of thoroughly combing every possible hiding place for guerrilla personnel and equipment. Successive echelons are used to comb the terrain again. Areas that appear totally inaccessible like swamps or marshes must be penetrated by utilizing special equipment or improvised means. Guerrilla ruses discovered during the course of operations are reported promptly to all interested units and agencies. Every native, man, woman, or child, found in the area is held in custody. They are released only on orders from proper authority. All units, supporting arms and services, and rear installations are disposed and secured for all-round defense. Adequate security measures are used to protect supply convoys and communication from guerrilla raids and ambushes.

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PHASE I



PHASE II

Figure 10. Destruction of encircled guerrillas with spearheads cutting area into smaller parts. (Text key: para 84.)

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


Figure 11. Destruction of encircled guerrillas by hammer and anvil method.
(Text key: para 84.)




Figure 12. Destruction of fortified guerrilla position within encircled area.
(Text key: para 84.)

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85. ATTACK

a. Often lack of time, inadequate forces and the nature of the terrain prevent encirclement operations. Surprise attacks followed by aggressive pursuit may prove successful in these cases. The position and strength of the guerrilla forces are ascertained by intelligence methods before launching the operation. Reconnaissance is disguised so that the guerrillas will not be alerted. The operation is conducted to achieve maximum surprise and the destruction of the guerrilla forces. The chances of completely surprising a guerrilla installation or unit with forces even as small as a company are rare, unless native guides, who are thoroughly familiar with the terrain and guerrilla dispositions, can be induced to collaborate and guide the attacking forces over concealed routes that by-pass guerrilla outposts. In order to bring maximum fire power against the guerrillas as soon after contact as possible, distances between elements are kept at a minimum and automatic weapons are kept well forward.

b. The leading elements of the tactical formation try to gain contact without being discovered. If successful, they withhold fire, remain in concealed positions, and send back continual fragmentary reports of essential information like time of contact, location, size, composition and disposition of the guerrillas, and the character of the terrain. Unless otherwise ordered, they stay concealed and prepare to guide troops into attack positions designated by the commander. When contact is gained with unalerted guerrilla forces late in the day, or at night, it is usually better for the main forces to complete the movement into attack positions during darkness and launch the attack at the first light of day. Guerrillas often stay in camps or bivouacs during the day and move at night. Part of the main forces is maneuvered and deployed at the earliest practicable time to block such movement.

c. When advance echelons contact alerted guerrillas, they act to counter guerrilla reactions. If the guerrilla forces try to withdraw, the leading elements open fire at once, seek to envelop the position, and place fire on routes of withdrawal pending the arrival of the main forces. If the guerrilla forces attack, the leading elements immediately warn the main forces and maneuver to keep contact with the guerrillas and maintain positions between the guerrillas and the main forces until the main forces can go into action. The reactions of the advanced elements are similar to those of an advance guard in normal operations. The success or failure of the whole operation depends on the quickness and aggressiveness of the advance elements and the speed of the main forces in joining the action.

d. When the situation permits, double envelopment is used in the attack of the main forces to produce the greatest possible shock and confusion on the guerrilla forces and to limit their withdrawal. The objective of completely destroying the guerrillas, rather than taking ground or dispersing them, must be kept foremost in mind. Unlike normal combat, the attack formations seldom need great depth. Reserves and support units are used to block possible routes of withdrawal and to pursue relentlessly any dispersed guerrilla remnants. As guerrillas normally

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lack supporting weapons, the attack should be pressed and the attacking forces should close more rapidly than is customary against regular forces in normal combat.

86. PURSUIT AND MOPPING UP

a. Combat groups are organized and held in readiness to pursue guerrillas who succeed in withdrawing or who are dispersed during the course of the main operation. To match the mobility of small guerrilla groups, the pursuit combat groups should be specially equipped and supplied. Artillery and air support is provided when the situation permits. During these relatively small-scale operations, the situation will often change with lightning speed. Adequate forces are held in reserve to assist units threatened by superior guerrilla forces. Their effectiveness depends on mobility and adequate communications.

b. After a successful attack on a guerrilla-held area, the area is not relinquished immediately but is combed for concealed guerrilla personnel and equipment. Documents and records are collected for intelligence analysis. Traps and ambushes are established along trails in the area, and are manned both day and night. These will catch many guerrillas who escaped the main attack and are confused about the situation. The period after guerrilla forces have been badly mauled and broken up into small groups is an excellent time for planes to drop propaganda calling upon them to give up the helpless struggle and surrender.

Section VII

SPECIAL ANTI-GUERRILLA UNITS

87. GENERAL

Special anti-guerrilla units are organized, equipped, and trained to combat guerrilla forces by using guerrilla methods. They are an effective means of carrying on offensive action with relatively small forces. Under many conditions they are more effective than larger conventional troop units. To prevent detection they avoid contact with the local populace. They march at night and remain in concealed camps during the day. Through necessity most of their operations are conducted during darkness. After an encounter or detection, and at frequent intervals, they move to new concealed camps. The chief value of these units is not their numerical strength, but the abilities of the commander and the individuals to develop special skills and teamwork. The effectiveness of a special anti-guerrilla unit increases as it becomes thoroughly familiar with the terrain and the habits of the hostile guerrillas and the supporting populace.

88. CAPABILITIES

a. Special anti-guerrilla units are used for missions like reconnaissance, security, destruction of guerrilla forces by raids and ambushes, and disruption of guerrilla communications and supply.

b. After strong guerrilla concentrations have been dispersed into inaccessible or uncontrolled areas, special

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anti-guerrilla units are committed to harass and destroy the smaller guerrilla formations and to prevent their reorganization.

c. Detailed missions within defined sectors may be assigned to special anti-guerrilla units. In general, however, the missions and area of operations of these units should be broad in scope. Commanders should be given great latitude and freedom of action. Normally, sector boundaries should not limit their area of operation. Special anti-guerrilla commanders are trained and encouraged to exercise ingenuity and to exploit opportunities to deliver crippling blows against hostile guerrillas. Special anti-guerrilla units may operate effectively in areas through which the guerrillas move, in areas where they requisition their supplies or receive them from external sources, and in objective areas that are commonly attacked by guerrillas. They cannot be used against well-organized, fortified and strongly-defended guerrilla positions unless adequately supported by larger units. A number of special anti-guerrilla units coordinated with other forces in the area, and with each other, can, however, neutralize or destroy a guerrilla menace.

d. In particular circumstances, it may be possible for special anti-guerrilla units to masquerade as guerrilla units and gain the confidence of actual guerrilla units and their civilian supporters. They may also be able to confuse the civilian supporters as to which group they can support and trust.

89. PERSONNEL


a. Individuals are selected, preferably from volunteers, who are best qualified for anti-guerrilla warfare. They should be intelligent, self-confident, and physically fit. Personal experience with unusual terrain is an asset but not essential. Hunters, trappers and combat-seasoned veterans are particularly well suited. Their ability to work harmoniously within the group is more important than their individual inherent or acquired assets. Units must be organized that will operate without friction for prolonged periods of time under unusual strain. Specialists and technicians for communication, medical, demolition, and interpreter needs are included in each team. Once the unit is organized, it lives, trains, and operates as a team.

b. Carefully screened enemy nationals are used whenever possible for guides, interpreters, and supply functions.

90. ORGANIZATION

The organization of special anti-guerrilla units will vary according to factors like topography, climate, radius of operations, logistical consideration, mission, hostile guerrilla forces, native population, and friendly supporting troops. The illustrated organization (fig. 13) may serve as a guide for planning purposes. The unit is organized into a headquarters and three or more squads. The strength of the unit is kept at a minimum to insure cross-country mobility. This also makes concealment easier and simplifies the supply problem. When necessary, a special weapons squad may be attached to the unit.

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- | | |
|------------------|------------------|
| 1 COMDR | 1 LDR |
| 1 PLAT SGT | 1 LDR ASST |
| 1 PLAT SGT ASST | 1 RMAN AUTO |
| 1 RADIO OPR | 1 RMAN AUTO ASST |
| 1 RADIO OPR ASST | 5 RMEN |
| 1 MED NCO | 1 RIFLE AUTO |
| 1 MED NCO ASST | 1 SMG CAL .45 |
| 2 MSGR | 7 CBN CAL .30 |

SUPPLY DETAIL
 NATIVE GUIDES &
 INTERPRETERS
 2 SMG CAL .45
 7 CBN CAL .30

Figure 13. Typical organization of a special anti-guerrilla unit. (Text key: para 90.)

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91. ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

Units are armed and equipped to live and operate for a prolonged time in the field without returning to their base. Balanced with staying power, the need for mobility dictates light portable loads. Armament should include light automatic weapons like the automatic rifle and sub-machine gun. The carbine may replace the service rifle in close country, jungles, thick forests, and mountains. Normally crew-served weapons are not used. Hand grenades should be carried by nearly everyone in the unit and each individual carries a knife. The terrain and climatic conditions dictate the need for special clothing and equipment. Each unit is equipped with a light portable radio to communicate with its base headquarters and with other friendly units operating in the area. This same radio can communicate with army aircraft to effect air-ground support, artillery support, and supply air-drops. To facilitate control and coordination within special anti-guerrilla units, the squads and unit headquarters are equipped with low-powered portable voice sets.

92. TRAINING

a. The training of anti-guerrilla units, like their organization, is as flexible as needed to best prepare individuals and units for operations in specific areas. It is assumed that all men have been specially selected; that all have completed basic training; and that the technicians are fully trained and qualified in their special fields. Throughout training, emphasis is placed on individual initiative to encourage men to take proper action when alone and specific orders are not available.

b. Training procedures are adopted which increase the men's confidence in the officers and noncommissioned officers of the unit. This may be accomplished to some extent by having the officers and noncommissioned officers undergo a special preliminary course in anti-guerrilla warfare. Units are then organized around these specially trained officers and noncommissioned officers who in turn conduct the individual and unit training of their own unit. Throughout the training period, men are closely observed to detect misfits; these are promptly replaced.

c. Although the training courses vary to meet the special conditions of various areas of operations, some subjects are common to the individual and unit training of all anti-guerrilla units. Improvisation is stressed throughout training. Training subjects include:

- (1) Field craft (adapted to the terrain and climatic conditions of the area).
- (2) First aid.
- (3) Water skills.
- (4) Weapons.
- (5) Clothing and equipment.

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- (6) Physical training.
- (7) Map reading and sketching.
- (8) Scouting, patrolling, and sniping.
- (9) Communications.
- (10) Air-ground operations.
- (11) Artillery sensing.
- (12) Unarmed defense.
- (13) Demolitions and booby traps.
- (14) Security.
- (15) Night operations.
- (16) Special tactics (ambushes, raids, etc.).
- (17) Intelligence.
- (18) Hostile guerrilla forces.
- (19) Native populace.
- (20) Language.
- (21) Questioning guerrilla prisoners and native
civilians.
- (22) Use of native guides and collaborators.
- (23) Supply and administration.
- (24) Field exercises.

Section VIII

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

93. GENERAL

In anti-guerrilla warfare the emphasis shifts from the use of large units to the use of small, highly mobile units. The strategy, tactics, and techniques of regular combat are modified to cope with the irregular aspects of guerrilla warfare. Special consideration is given to command and leadership, morale, organization, equipment, training, supporting units (ground and air), communication, logistical support, and operation methods. To outline all the factors that might receive special consideration, however, is beyond the scope of this manual. Even the following discussion of factors and principles that deserve special consideration in anti-guerrilla operations is not to be regarded as final.

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94. COMMAND AND LEADERSHIP

The general principles of command and leadership are applicable to anti-guerrilla operations, but the techniques of their application must conform to the conditions imposed by various situations.

a. Morale of forces engaged in anti-guerrilla warfare presents problems quite different from those encountered in normal combat. Operating against an elusive, violent destructive force that seldom offers a target, that disintegrates before opposition, and then reforms and strikes again is quite different from operating against the more tangible forces encountered in normal combat. Visible results can seldom be observed. The comforts of remaining passive in garrison will often seem preferable to tramping the hills in search of an evasive enemy. Units placed on anti-guerrilla duty during periods of rest from front-line duty will be resentful. This will result in a temptation for men and junior leaders to make only half-hearted efforts to locate and eliminate the guerrillas. This problem must be countered by strong and capable leadership, by indoctrination in the importance of the anti-guerrilla effort, and by utilizing reliant and daring junior leaders.

b. Anti-guerrilla warfare requires the use of many small patrols and detachments, often for considerable periods of time. Being separated from their major units and surrounded by a hostile and unfriendly population has a deteriorating effect on the morale of the men in these small groups. Once again, strong leadership and thorough indoctrination, plus maintaining the offensive, assist the commander in dealing with this problem. This problem is also minimized when troops are kept in the area long enough to become familiar with it and when small units are granted a great degree of initiative in developing methods of combating the guerrillas. Heroism and excellence in anti-guerrilla operations must be given the same recognition and reward as in regular combat.

c. Commanders of all echelons find themselves operating for prolonged periods of time on independent missions where much of their support, both moral and material, depends on their own ingenuity, skill, knowledge, courage, and tenacity.

d. The scope and nature of a commander's mission may include political and administrative aspects seldom encountered in normal operations. The methods and technique of combat that commanders have been trained to apply within their parent organizations may have to be modified or even disregarded.

95. ANTI-GUERRILLA INFANTRY UNITS

Infantry units have a very difficult task in anti-guerrilla warfare. Operations in inaccessible terrain frequently deny them the normal support of artillery, armor, mortars, and heavy machine guns. To develop cross-country mobility, they may be compelled to operate with hand-carried arms and equipment. Reduced loads, necessary to prolong the endurance of the men, result in a serious decrease in striking power. They are denied much of the individual

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and unit equipment that enhances the comfort of the soldier in the field. In vast areas that lack adequate roads and trails, resupply and care and evacuation of wounded are factors that not only materially affect operations but pose grave morale problems. Even in the best trained units, morale may be quickly undermined by the lack of means to evacuate casualties. It is comparatively easy to penetrate guerrilla-controlled areas with relatively small regular units, but to maintain and support those units so that they can accomplish their mission is more difficult.

96. USE OF ARTILLERY

a. The terrain in which guerrilla forces take refuge will usually limit or prevent artillery support of ground units in the conventional manner. However, the demoralizing effect of artillery fire on guerrillas will often justify its use when there is little possibility of its inflicting material damage. Before artillery support is ruled out, all limitations are carefully studied and analyzed. Flexibility and ingenuity will often make artillery support possible under what are seemingly the most adverse circumstances. Range and trajectory capabilities, the cross-country mobility of tracked prime movers, and the capabilities of radios and army aircraft are fully exploited. Pioneering work may permit the use of trails and dry stream beds to reach the interior. All leaders down through section must be skilled in reconnaissance, pioneering, and field expedients. Thorough aerial, map, and ground reconnaissance aids surprise. Ground reconnaissance is accomplished by a limited party disguising their intentions, and positions are occupied quickly just before the attack.

b. A combat-tested way to use artillery against guerrillas is illustrated in figure 14.

(1) Artillery is emplaced around the perimeter of the area to be cleared of guerrillas. It may be used by battalion, battery, platoon, or section. Positions are set up with barbed wire obstacles for all-around defense. Additional personnel may be required for this. A computer is stationed at each firing position. A firing chart (either from observed fire or built up from a map or aerial photograph with gun positions indicated by survey or inspection) is maintained at each position. As survey of the target area is usually impracticable, angle-of-site computations and accurate target location are quite difficult.

(2) The decentralization of artillery units and their control places a burden on communication and fire control facilities that can be met only by improvisation. As radio is the most flexible and mobile and at times the only possible means of communication in guerrilla terrain, it may be necessary to use army aircraft as radio relay stations between the guns and the forward observers with the infantry. Observers in army aircraft may also function as a flying fire direction center (FDC) to control and mass fires. In this situation, the observer in the aircraft not only relays and monitors, and at times observes fire missions, but he also decides which guns can best handle the mission. Guerrillas retreating from the fire of guns on one side of the perimeter may be hit by artillery fire from the other side.




Figure 14. Use of flying fire direction center to control and mass artillery fires against guerrillas.
(Text key: para 96.)

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(3) Transportation is limited in most anti-guerrilla operations. The greatest use possible is made of army aircraft to transport all types of supplies including ammunition.

97. USE OF ARMOR

a. Security or offensive forces can often use armor effectively. The mere presence of enemy armor is demoralizing to guerrilla forces. The poor terrain normally occupied by guerrilla forces, however, usually prevents the massing of armor.

b. Armor used against guerrillas must be closely supported by infantry. Guerrillas in the past have ordinarily lacked adequate and effective antitank weapons. However, they are quite skilled at improvising means to destroy or cripple tanks and the development of recoilless weapons and light rockets has changed their potential ability to combat armor.

98. USE OF AIRBORNE UNITS

Airborne units, when available, can be of tremendous value in anti-guerrilla operations because they possess the advantages of surprise, mobility, and shock action. Attacking airborne units may be dropped inside the security perimeters of the guerrillas, thus increasing the possibility of surprise. Use of these units permits encircling movements that the nature of the terrain and routes of approach (fig. 15) would otherwise prevent. Airborne units may be dropped to cut off guerrillas being pursued after an attack or to relieve a distant detachment besieged by guerrillas.

99. USE OF RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT

The principles governing the use of reconnaissance aircraft are applicable in counter-guerrilla operations. In areas where hostile air and anti-aircraft weapons are ineffective, slow-flying army aircraft are better suited to observe scattered guerrilla installations and small, slow-moving formations than are the conventional combat reconnaissance planes.

100. AIR-GROUND SUPPORT

Close air-ground support is highly flexible and effective in counter-guerrilla operations. To provide it, special consideration is given to communication and the organization and employment of tactical air control parties (TACP). The use of conventional TACP is impracticable when a great number of small mobile units are operating on a broad front, because of the large number of TACP that would be required. To provide air-ground support to any number of small ground units, an improvised, highly mobile and flexible system must be devised. A description of a system that would provide support under these conditions follows (fig. 16):

a. Two radios are installed in each army aircraft. One, a very high frequency (VHF) set, permits communication with Air Forces tactical aircraft. The other, a ground high frequency (HF) set, permits communication with ground combat units. The pilots and observers in these aircraft are used as mobile TACP.

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


Figure 15. Use of airborne units in encirclement of guerrillas.
(Text key: para 98.)

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


Figure 16. Use of tactical air control party liaison plane for close air-ground support. (Text key: para 100.)

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b. Each ground unit is equipped with HF radio to communicate with its headquarters and with TACP aircraft.

c. A ground unit wanting air support requests an air strike through channels in the manner prescribed in FM 31-35. If the request is approved, the air strike is set up and the requesting unit is notified that a TACP liaison plane will circle the position at a designated hour, contacting the unit for further target information and directing the air strike.

d. A TACP liaison plane is dispatched to the combat unit's area before the scheduled air strike. On arriving over the ground combat unit, it circles the position, contacts the ground unit by radio, and is briefed on the target mission.

e. The TACP liaison plane stays over the target area until the combat planes arrive. On their arrival, the TACP liaison plane contacts the flight leader and directs the air strike. Two or three TACP liaison planes, with their great flexibility, can furnish close air-ground support to any number of ground combat units in a broad area of ten to fifteen thousand square miles.

101. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT BY AIR

Light loads increase the mobility and endurance of anti-guerrilla units but reduce their staying power. Improvised ground resupply systems may require excessive manpower. Aircraft, however, can usually supply units of all sizes. Small units may be supplied by army aircraft. Sick and wounded may be evacuated by helicopters, or if suitable landing sites can be prepared, by airplanes. Although logistical support by air is flexible, it has limitations. Operations against guerrillas often take place in mountains, woods, jungles, and marshes. It will often be difficult to select drop zones. Inclement weather may also hamper air supply missions. The rapidly changing situations that characterize anti-guerrilla operations may require the location of drop zones to be changed on short notice. This is difficult unless radio communication is maintained with ground combat units. The danger of supplies falling into the hands of the guerrillas is a constant danger that must be minimized by detailed planning and meticulous execution.

102. HELICOPTERS

The helicopter has wide application in counter guerrilla operations. Its ability to land in a small clearing or hover above a point on the ground makes it highly suitable for reconnaissance, liaison, supply, and evacuation. It is extremely valuable for transporting, supplying and evacuating small units over inaccessible terrain.

103. INTERFERENCE WITH GUERRILLA SUPPLY FROM REGULAR FORCES

a. Hostile guerrilla forces often depend on logistical support by air. Men and supplies are delivered at night by parachute, transport, or glider. Interceptor aircraft are used to disrupt or destroy enemy supply planes. In areas known to be used by guerrillas for aerial resupply, all-weather fighter units are used to prevent this resupply.

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b. Another frequently used channel for supply of guerrilla forces is submarine. The waters of all coastal areas adjacent to guerrilla areas that are favorable for submarine contact should be patrolled and mined. In the absence of wharfs, submarine cargos are transferred to shore in small boats. The activities of all small craft belonging to civilians must therefore be rigidly controlled. The rapid transfer inland of large submarine cargos requires great numbers of civilian parties. The concentration of large numbers of male civilians in a coastal area should therefore be regarded with suspicion.

104. COMMUNICATION

The dispersion of units in counter guerrilla operations places a strain on communication facilities throughout a command. The greatest difficulties are in the lower echelons. Operations are expanded throughout all echelons and this increases the communication requirements. Local facilities are fully utilized to help expand the communication nets. These facilities, however, are not reliable. They are not only extremely vulnerable to guerrilla attacks but are also exposed to guerrilla use. Radio is the most flexible of the communication means. Special consideration is given to the need for additional and special communication equipment over and above standard allowances.

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APPENDIX I

REFERENCES

FM 27-5, UNITED STATES ARMY AND NAVY MANUAL OF CIVIL AFFAIRS
MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

FM 27-10, RULES OF LAND WARFARE.

FM 30-5, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE--COMBAT INTELLIGENCE.

FM 30-10, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE--OBSERVATION.

FM 30-15, EXAMINATION OF ENEMY PERSONNEL, REPATRIATES, CIVILIANS,
DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL.

FM 30-20, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE--MILITARY MAPS.

FM 30-21, AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY MILITARY APPLICATION.

FM 30-22, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE--FOREIGN CONVENTIONAL SIGNS AND
SYMBOLS.

FM 30-25, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

FM 30-28, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, MILITARY CENSORSHIP.

FM 30-30, RECOGNITION, PICTORIAL MANUAL, AIRCRAFT.

FM 30-40, RECOGNITION, PICTORIAL MANUAL, ARMORED VEHICLES.

FM 30-50, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE--RECOGNITION PICTORIAL MANUAL,
NAVAL VESSELS.

FM 31-35, AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS.

FM 33-5, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN COMBAT OPERATIONS.

FM 100-5, OPERATIONS.

SR 320-5-1, DICTIONARY OF UNITED STATES ARMY TERMS.
DICTIONARY OF UNITED STATES TERMS FOR JOINT USAGE.

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APPENDIX II

ADVICE TO INSTRUCTORS

1. SCOPE

The scope of this manual is so broad that there will be few occasions when the entire manual is applicable to a particular teaching situation. The following advice is offered to instructors as a guide in using this manual to meet training problems in the subject of anti-guerrilla warfare.

2. GENERAL

All students should be familiarized with the general characteristics of guerrilla warfare. For this purpose the material in paragraph 10 and paragraphs 13-50 will be of value. All students should be made to fully realize that guerrilla warfare can seriously interfere with the operations of regular forces. The advantages and disadvantages of guerrilla warfare should be stressed as a basis for future instruction in the principles and tactics of anti-guerrilla operations.

3. INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL UNIT TRAINING

The most important lesson to be taught is that constant alertness is the best protection against the effects of guerrilla attack. The defensive tactics of anti-guerrilla warfare as described in paragraphs 72 and 74 should be well covered by lecture, demonstration, and practical application.

4. TRAINING OF LARGER UNITS

The application of the offensive and defensive tactics of anti-guerrilla warfare as described in paragraphs 69-74 and paragraphs 76-86 should be covered in training larger units. Guerrilla warfare situations should be included occasionally in field exercises and maneuvers.

5. OFFICER AND STAFF TRAINING

The command and staff requirements of anti-guerrilla operations should be included in this type of training. The material in paragraphs 51-104 will be valuable for this purpose.

6. MILITARY GOVERNMENT TEAMS

The administrative aspect of anti-guerrilla operations should be emphasized in training these teams, and the integration of anti-guerrilla policies with other occupation and military government policies should be thoroughly covered and discussed. The administrative aspect of anti-guerrilla operations is described in paragraphs 51-57, paragraph 61, and paragraphs 66-68.

7. SPECIAL ANTI-GUERRILLA UNITS

Besides the material described in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the special material in paragraphs 87-92 will be of value.

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