

TENTATIVE PROGRAM

for a Princeton University Conference on The U.S. and China's Modernization

Sponsored by the Program in Sino-American Relations and co-sponsored by the Center of International Studies and the Woodrow Wilson School

Director: Lynn T. White III

Time and Place: Thursday & Friday, November 5 & 6, 1981, Princeton University

THURSDAY

- 1:00 Registration, Woodrow Wilson School Lobby  
1:30 Welcoming Remarks (President Bowen), WWS Auditorium  
1:45 Introductory Remarks (White)  
1:50 Session I: China's Interests in U.S. Trade (Prof. Gregory Chow, chair)  
PANEL: Prof. Nicholas Lardy, Economics, Yale (emphasizing agriculture)  
Prof. Jan Prybyla, Economics, Penn State (emphasizing industry)  
GENERAL DISCUSSION  
3:00 Session II: U.S. Interests in China's Development (Dean Donald Stokes, chair)  
PANEL: Prof. Michel Oksenberg, Political Science, Michigan (formerly NSC)  
Dr. James Lilley, National Security Council  
6:00 Reception at Prospect House  
7:00 Dinner at Prospect House  
8:15 Hon. Leonard Woodcock, Formerly U.S. Ambassador to the P.R.C.  
speaking in the Woodrow Wilson School Auditorium

FRIDAY

- 9:00 Session III: The U.S. and China's Defense (Prof. Cyril Black, chair)  
PANEL: Prof. Allen Whiting, Political Science, Michigan  
Dr. Robert Sutter, Congressional Research Service  
Dr. Jonathan Pollack, The RAND Corporation  
GENERAL DISCUSSION  
10:30 Coffee Break  
10:45 Session IV: Legal Modernization in China (Prof. Marius Jansen, chair)  
PANEL: Prof. Randle Edwards, Columbia Law  
Prof. Hungdah Chiu, Maryland Law (on the rise of proceduralism?)  
Prof. Karl Herbst, Pittsburgh Law (on inter-enterprise contracts?)  
GENERAL DISCUSSION  
12:15 Luncheon in Corwin Hall  
2:00 Session V: The U.S., China, and the U.S.S.R. (Prof. Robert Tucker, chair)  
PANEL: Prof. Harold Hinton, George Washington University  
Prof. Edward Friedman, Subcommittee on Asian & Pacific Affairs, House  
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency STAT  
GENERAL DISCUSSION  
4:00 Concluding Remarks: The U.S. and China's Modernization  
Prof. A. Doak Barnett, Brookings Institution  
5:00 Adjourn

DRAFT

It is proposed that the Conference be held in memory of Hon. David Bruce,  
Princeton, '19.

- Purpose: attempt to discuss China's relationships with the United States and the USSR from the perspective of China's own domestic affairs. China's relations with the two superpowers certainly conducted to a high degree by Beijing's assessments of the broad geopolitical situation prevailing global politics, but at the same time its approach is also conditioned and shaped by China's own internal political situation, its prevailing policies and its approach to China's modernization.
- First outline the prevailing approach today--the program associated with DXP--then outline some of the domestic pressures, constraints, sensitivities, and alternative viewpoints which line up against him; and finally suggest how these contribute to China's foreign policy, and specifically its relations with the US & USSR.
- Deng's program: essentially a blueprint for rapid, drastic economic and political reform which will (to use Beijing's phrase) "make China into a powerful modern socialist country by the year 2000."
  - +economic reform: a broad relaxation of the political constraints which had predominated during the CR years on acceptable economic institutions and activity; greater willingness to ~~xxx~~ tolerate application of advanced technology and expertise, economic diversity and managerial initiative.
  - +political reform: transform party into more suitable instrument to guide modernization through reassertion of internal party rules and procedures, loosening of doctrinal constraints (democratization), and removal of cadres promoted during CR years in favor of cadres more competent to administer increasingly complex and technologically developed society; in society itself, greater toleration of initiative and opinion conducive to modernization and rigorous application of socialist law as final arbiter of political conflict emerging from process of modernization.
  - +the implications of DXP's domestic program for foreign policy follow directly from the requirements of rapid reform:
    - period of prolonged regional tranquillity, which, in DXP's view, is secured by close association with West/US strategically against China's main enemy, the USSR.
    - extensive importation of Western/US technology, expertise and assistance to speed Chinese modernization: evidence of this everywhere in China: Xinhua bookstore foreign language texts and s&t translations.
  - +Deng's program thus a package of interrelated, highly coherent policies which presume a longterm relationship with the West and the US in particular, both for strategic and for developmental needs.

-The coherence or interlocking nature of Deng's reform program, however, makes it peculiarly vulnerable: challenge or defeat of one aspect easily translates into challenge and potentially defeat for the other aspects. Because DXP's program is so drastic, naturally it faces opposition of all sorts:

- +economic opposition: variety of people whose basic economic interests are threatened or hurt by Deng's reforms: PLA obvious example.
- +political opposition: many oppose DXP's reforms for various political reasons, either because their execution will hurt their careers or position or because they genuinely find them to violate fundamental Marxist-Leninist-Maoist principles.
- +nationalistic opposition: one kind of nationalism is served by Deng's reforms (wealth and power type); but another strain finds Deng's reforms --and particular the extent to which the "Chinese essence" is violated or corrupted by the reforms' reliance on foreign models, practices, aid, etc.

- Lots of examples of this: Deng and cowboy hat, Fang Yi and Donald Duck and Goofy; cancer research and crime;
- Most volatile symbol of this ambivalence is Taiwan question: a symbol much more explosive and sensitive than any territory deemed by the Chinese to be held by the Soviets.

-This body of opposition to Deng's reforms is by no means an organized unified or coherent opposition faction; it is a disparate group of those whose interests or political convictions are offended by one or more aspects of DXP's reform package. As a loose collection of dissatisfied groups they are not singly enough to overturn the thrust of Deng's reform effort. On occasion, however, when one particular aspect of Deng's reforms fail, this disparate opposition has demonstrated the ability to coalesce into an opposition strong enough to blunt Deng's programs and even overturn them. Two clearcut episodes in China's recent political history demonstrate this point:

- +spring of 1979: uncertain regional environment, together with domestic anxiety over spreading urban social disorders (partly springing from Deng's initiatives themselves) and new appreciation of national economy's disarray, led to serious setbacks for Deng's reform program momentarily and, significantly, a proposal to the Soviets to open broad political talks as a way of reducing tension in China's regional environment while it attempts to put its domestic house in order.
- +winter of 1980-81: bleakly pessimistic new appraisal of China's economic situation, together with escalating uncertainty in Peking over the attitudes of the new Reagan administration toward China policy led to the halting of Deng's economic reforms in their tracks, the stalling of major political efforts underway (6th plenum, HGF), and the emergence of a new foreign policy debate in the Chinese capital.

-This interlinkage between Chinese foreign policy and its domestic affairs suggests two or three general conclusions:

- +Major change in China's relationships with the US and Soviet Union will entail corresponding major changes on China's domestic scene.
- +Major changes on China's domestic scene may have correspondingly major impact on China's strategic relations with the US & USSR.
- +The foreign policy-domestic politics linkage conditions the extent and speed with which change along one leg of the Sino-Soviet-US triangle translates immediately into change along the other two: "playing the Soviet card" against the US, ~~or~~ for example is too simplistic a notion of how the geopolitics of the situation actually works: there are steps in between, on China's domestic scene, which may or may not lead to that.