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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, Directorate of Science and Technology

VIA: Director, FBIS
Chief, AG
Chief, China Branch

FROM: [Redacted]

SUBJECT: Request for Approval of Manuscript for Publication

1. I request approval for publication the attached text titled, "Professional Military Education in the People's Republic of China."

2. When approved, I intend to submit the manuscript for publication in a book to be edited by Paul Godwin, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama and published by Westview Press. An earlier version of this manuscript was approved by DOD for public presentation at a conference of the Association for Asian Studies in March 1980 while I was still in the armed forces before I became an agency employee.

3. None of the material presented in the manuscript is, to my knowledge, classified.

4. I am not under cover. I will be identified as an FBIS employee but will append the standard disclaimer indicating that the views expressed are my own and not necessarily those of FBIS.

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STAT

Attachment: "Professional Military Education in the PRC"--two copies

I have reviewed the attached text, to the best of my knowledge have found it to be unclassified.

[Redacted]

9 JAN 1981

STAT

Director, FBIS

Date

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Executive Officer
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PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

by



STAT

 is an analyst of Chinese affairs with the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. The views in this chapter are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service or any other US government agency.

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PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

During a visit of a delegation representing the military academies of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to the United States in the fall of 1980, the head of the delegation, Xiao Ke, Commander of the PLA Military Academy and Vice Minister of National Defense, informed his guests that the Military Academy was building new facilities. He also observed that the ages of the members of his delegation were quite old; that they had not been able to retire because the devastation of military academies during the Cultural Revolution had made it impossible to properly train a generation of younger military leaders. Commander Xiao's remarks strike at the heart of the key issues for the PLA's professional military education for the 1980's: technical modernization and ideological change.

Both issues continued to be highly controversial as the decade began. China's program for economic modernization has experienced dramatic revision and there has been political instability at the highest levels. It is against this background that the professional military education system is expected to produce officers that are "politically conscious, professionally competent, unyielding in work style and physically strong¹." This chapter will examine the structure and function of the Chinese professional military education system and examine the relationship of this education to the broader questions posed by modernization.

The objective of professional military education in China cited above helps to distinguish it from concepts prevalent in the West. While Western scholars have dwelt on the unique aspects of military professionalism, the Chinese Communist approach, owing both to Chinese tradition and the revolutionary insurgency experience, has² generally downplayed its uniqueness. This important dimension will be discussed in greater detail later, but it should be noted here

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as we establish a background for our discussion by briefly outlining the organization of the Chinese professional military education system.

First of all, professional military education is pervasive in the PLA. At the apex are the three academies which correspond to the organization of the high command; the Military Academy (General Staff Department), Political Academy (General Political Department) and the Logistical Academy (General Rear Services Department). All of these are located in Beijing. Below these are service academies for the Navy and Air Force and specialized academies (e.g. the PLA Advanced Infantry Academy at Nanjing, Air Force Maintenance Academy) located in various parts of China. Little is known about the organization of the remainder of the military education system, however, it is quite clear from the prolific reports of various study and indoctrination efforts in PLA units that the system is extensive.³

Secondly, the curriculum of the military education system has been undergoing rapid change. The amount of time spent in studying "political" subjects has been reduced in favor of spending more time on "military" subjects. Military educators are concerned that the curriculum reflect the objective of military modernization. Besides studying the Soviet tank offensive in Manchuria in 1945, they are desirous of giving more attention to subjects dealing with strategy and tactics in a nuclear environment, the management of combined operations, and other aspects of modern warfare.

Finally, the organization appears to be undergoing some revamping. A conference on military academies in the fall of 1980 attended by China's top military leaders concluded that military educators must "emancipate our thinking and boldly change the content of the training and education programs" in the military education system.⁴ Though the conference did not reveal precisely how the academies were to change to accomplish this objective it did suggest that the teachers become more innovative. Consequently, any attempt to analyze

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education
the Chinese military/system must be subject to the caveat that it is undergoing change and will likely vary in structure and purpose as the PLA advances into the 1980's.

Rather than focusing upon the institutions which are responsible for professional military education, I have chosen to examine more closely the issues and problems with which military education must deal. I believe military education is a microcosm of many issues which are readily apparent in the other papers. Inasmuch as military education is an important vehicle for the socialization of military leaders, such issues as the relationship between ideological and technical values, the role of the military in society, and the pursuit of effective national strategy can be readily discerned in its content. The Chinese are extremely aware of the relationship between military education and socialization, consequently military education can reveal much about how the Chinese leaders view these questions as well as how the military responds to them. In the next few pages I will try to sketch out some of these issues.

Military v. Civilian

The selection of military v. civilian as a principle issue area no doubt requires some justification, particularly, since Chinese statements from the dawn of the revolutionary insurgency era have stressed the close relationship between the Army and the masses. Moreover, because of the insurgent heritage and the overlap of Party and military responsibilities in Chinese political institutions since 1949 has not led to a sharp dichotomy between the military and other segments. During the Cultural Revolution, the PLA became directly involved in political administration in many areas of China, yet it would be mistaken to say that the military had staged a coup. Persons whose careers have been predominantly active in the military may well have constituted a majority of Politburo membership in the

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late 1960's and early 1970's; yet this high level of military involvement in political decision making was not akin to the seizure of power by the military that occurs in many developing countries. The charge that Lin Biao was behind a "counterrevolutionary coup attempt" in 1971, given lengthy and detailed examination during the trial of his alleged co-conspirators in late 1980 and early 1981 suggests that the Chinese consider this kind of intervention to be particularly odious and repugnant.⁵

However, in recent times a military-civilian dichotomy has become more apparent. Besides reports of anti-PLA demonstrations on university campuses where troops remained in buildings, complaints of demobilized veterans of discriminatory treatment, and other evidence, recent editorials in the Liberation Army Daily indicate that a military-civilian cleavage has developed over other issues. The military has been particularly discontent over agricultural reforms which discriminated against families with members in the armed forces by eliminating extra work points designed to compensate for the loss of able bodied workers (and, therefore, income). A General Political Department Circular in October called for intensive efforts by the army to study the party's leadership's rural policies.⁶ Furthermore, an article in the army paper on November 20 declared that cadre adherence to the Party's political and ideological line is "the most fundamental yardstick" in PLA organizational work and warned that those who had spoken out or worked against the Party line should not be retained in leadership groups.⁷

Paradoxically, much of the reason for the civilian-military cleavage appears to stem from the modernization effort. Official military spokesmen have insisted that the PLA genuinely adheres to the principle that military modernization hinges on the other modernizations, yet there is some evidence that some disagreement has occurred over budgetary priorities. Thus, while military leaders have

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stressed the importance of developing modern and advanced weapons, civilian leaders have placed great emphasis on staying within the budget; official figures suggest that the military budget has actually been reduced. But even more important than the issue of budget priorities is the question of professionalism, a key theme of military education.

According to Chinese conceptualizations, there have been two broad approaches to military professionalism. The first may be referred to as the "Maoist" approach. This approach was characterized by stressing the importance of men over machines and the suppression of uniqueness among the armed forces as an institution. This approach recognized the importance of the military in providing national defense, but also gave equal emphasis to its role in society, the Army being a work force and a production force as well as a fighting force. A close relationship between the army and the people was an important value, as was the exemplary nature of military personnel.

The "Maoist" approach was most strongly articulated during the periods of the anti-Japanese war and Chinese civil war, and during the Cultural Revolution. It will be recalled that during much of the 1960's the entire country was supposed to "learn from the PLA" which had correctly embodied Mao's thought. During these periods, military personnel not only were responsible for national defense, but for serving as models of such values as sacrifice, selflessness, diligence, perseverance, hard work, and other "revolutionary ideals."

The Maoist approach to professionalism may be contrasted with the "Pengist" or "Dengist" approach which appears to be closer to Western concepts of military professionalism. This approach stresses the uniqueness of the armed forces, its specialization, and its diversity from society. In this approach the military stresses the importance of modernizing equipment, and of developing combat expertise over ideological training. The military should concentrate more on providing national defense, and less on performing other social tasks.

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This approach was particularly evident during the period of the 1950's when Peng Dehuai as Defense Minister followed the Soviet model in developing professionalism among the Chinese armed forces.¹⁰ More recently, this approach has been signalled since the death of Mao and the purge of the gang of four. A host of conferences, reports and articles suggest that the drive for modernization is pushing the military toward the approach where "expert" takes precedence over "red."¹¹ For example, a Red Flag article commemorating the 30th anniversary of the People's Republic of China in 1979 written by Defense Minister Xu Xiangqien stressed the importance of expertise and demanded that training in the armed forces be "geared to the needs of actual combat."¹²

Obviously, neither approach has been followed exclusively at any given time. Also, both approach to military professionalism share common aspects. Both acknowledge the importance of Party control of the armed forces; both recognize that the principle role of the military is to provide national defense. I would also argue that both accept the premise that the legitimacy of the armed forces is expressed in great measure through ideology. That is, the basis for the effectiveness of the armed forces is primarily a correct political line. Even those who stress "expertise" over "redness" do so by saying that "red" is defined by "expert." Nevertheless, the distinctions are quite apparent. The Maoist model abolishes ranks, while the "Pengist-Dengist" model encourages them. The "Maoist" approach says that military education should concentrate more on ideological study, while the "Pengist-Dengist" approach wants more time spent on combat training.

It has already been pointed out, that in the early 1980's ~~it was clear~~ ~~that~~ the Pengist-Dengist approach is once again being favored. This poses the question of whether or not the inclusion of this concept of professionalism will create a greater civilian-military cleavage. As the military becomes increasingly unique and separate from society, will it not find that its interests

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diverge greater from other institutions and sectors in Chinese society? Given the tone and content of recent statements in the official army newspaper, Chinese leaders are greatly concerned about this potential.

Consequently, China's present leaders believe that an important responsibility of military education will be to ensure the adherence of the military to Party leadership. It is implicitly assumed that as the military becomes more "expert" it will become more distinct as an interest group and that the way to deal with this is to ensure Party control. It is not surprising that the conference on military academies concluded that in the future:

The most important thing is: The cadres trained by military academies and institutions must have a firm and correct political orientation, firmly implement the party's line, principles and policies and resolutely obey the command of the party Central Committee and its Military Commission.¹³

Strategy and Doctrine

Strategy and doctrine are covered more completely in other chapters of this book, however, it is also important that they be examined in the context of professional military education. The evolution of strategy and doctrine from "people's war" to "people's war under modern conditions" presumes that the rising generations of military leaders will be able to comprehend and apply the new concepts. Yet, it is quite evident that the military education system is having some difficulties in adjusting its curriculum to explain the new concepts, perhaps because they are inherently not altogether clear.

This was amply demonstrated during a visit to the PLA Military Academy when we were informed that the students were expected to master Marxism-Leninism and Mao's thought in analyzing and solving problems. Military training also placed emphasis on Mao's teachings on war. Now that the "thought of Mao" has been redefined to a culmination of the party's collective experience rather than merely the contributions of one individual, its all-inclusive nature may lend

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itself to proper study as providing some contribution on the nature of modern warfare. Nevertheless, there are probably also some pitfalls. The leaders of the military academy seemed to give a good deal of credence to the possibility of a massive Soviet tank offensive against China, and pay special attention to the operations of the Soviet Army in Manchuria in 1945. While recognizing that there are other possible Soviet military options vis a vis China, they strongly emphasized the view that, for the Soviet Union, China was to great a problem to be handled by some kind of limited incursion or selective strike.

Without debating the merits of the Chinese view, it does appear that the PLA leaders are reluctant to modify a strategic image which they have held for some time. As others have pointed out, the deterrent value of "people's war" is of more limited utility in projecting foreign policy, as the "defensive counterattack" against Vietnam in 1979 has suggested. But in spite of the constant articles and statement calling for "people's war under modern conditions" there is apparently a bureaucratic tendency to cling to what is known.¹⁴ During our visit to the Military Academy we were told that the curriculum was undergoing revision so that the principles of modernization could be more fully brought into play in the program of instruction. When the reciprocal delegation from China visited the US a year and a half later, we were told the same thing--that the curriculum was undergoing change in accordance with the demands of modernization. This is not to say that curriculums should not be constantly revised and updated, they quite obviously are in any good system of professional military education; but it seems in the Chinese case, there is continuing uncertainty over just what is is you teach in matters of strategy and doctrine in order to contribute to modernization. There were some hints that the Chinese were coming to grips with the issue in the fall 1980 discussions when they explained that they were trying to teach the relationship between diplomacy and military power; they were also very anxious to know how US military education taught the subject

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of warnings of impending surprise attack. Chinese professional military education, like other systems of education in China, is trying to impart greater technical and scientific knowledge. Any of these subjects, depending on how they are taught could induce momentum away from classical concepts of doctrine and strategy.

As Chinese military education enters the 1980's, it is still the long march generation that has ultimate responsibility for what is taught. In spite of the great attention given to modernization in various speeches and writings, it will likely be some⁴time before a full transition in strategic and doctrinal concepts will occur in the professional military education system. Ultimately, the current mixture of classical aphorisms on people's war, and a good deal of talk about modern conditions, will give way to a more coherent system of education in these subjects, but for the time being, there is likely to be a continuing ad hoc character to ~~these~~^{them} subjects.

Generational Change

At a speech commemorating the 30th anniversary of the PLA Military Academy on January 15, 1981, Xiao Ke identified the central task of the Military Academy as "to bring up a new generation of middle-ranking and senior commanding personnel." ¹⁵ Indeed, this issue is paramount throughout the professional military education system, that is, the socialization of a new generation of leaders at all levels of the military command structure. A primary function of the military education system to to transmit the values of one group of leaders to the next, and in this the Chinese have a unique situation.

It will be recalled that during his meetings with US military educators, Xiao Ke noted the age of the Chinese delegation and suggested they could not retire for a while because of the disruptions created in socialization during the Cultural Revolution. Yet, this approach involves a paradox in that the long

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march and revolutionary war generation insists on clinging to authority until it can be assured that the newer generations are correctly socialized, thereby blocking a transition that is almost certainly necessary if the goal of modernization is to be achieved.

The problem is closely related to the problem of defining professionalism and strategy and doctrine discussed above. Those in authority in the military education system at the highest echelons are older veterans for the most part. Very little, if any "new blood" has been brought into the system. Consequently, while much lip service is given to modernization, both the curriculum and teaching methodology tend toward the "tried and true" system of the past. This was reflected to a great extent during our visit to various military facilities and in our discussions with Chinese leaders.

For example, during our visit to a model division near Tianjin we were treated to tours and demonstrations illustrating the principle that the PLA is "a fighting force, a working force and a production force" (indeed, one of the things most impressive about Chinese museums and exhibits in general was their ability to articulate a common theme through organization and presentation). Thus, we witnessed PLA soldiers engaged in climbing and descending walls, hand-to-hand combat, and other basic skills. We also visited the unit's fields, factories (including seeing officers' wives make vitamins), and other facilities, and were entertained by the Cultural groups. While it was obvious that this was a showpiece unit designed to impress foreign visitors, we were surprised that its presentations had changed little, if any, since the early 1970's when westerners first visited it.

At one point during the tour I asked the cadre in charge of political work who was conducting the tour how modernization would affect all of this. When he finished his answer, which stressed the importance of modernization,

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the necessity of improvements, and so on, I could not ascertain that there was any sense of immediate relevance for that particular unit. I was left with the distinct impression that modernization was something which might incrementally filter down to various units as time went by. I do not suggest that the same situation exists in all units. There are numerous reports in the Chinese press of unit technical innovations which supposedly contribute to modernization, and of increased time spent in learning technical information. However, there is a very strong legacy of the way things are to be done that seems to have a good grip on the vast majority of units.

This should not be surprising. Given the public relegation of military modernization to fairly low priority and the fact that traditionalists head the military education system why should units make dramatic changes in the way they go about doing things? Thus, there is the very paradoxical situation of leaders constantly alluding to the need for fresh thinking, innovation, modernization, while the system itself is strongly wedded to seniority, tradition, and continuity. While it would be unfair to say that the older generation is incapable of promoting change, it does seem true that the present socialization scheme does not agree well for the kinds of values that the Chinese leaders are saying must be inculcated.

In summary, the military education requires new leadership which can effectively impart new values and methods if modernization is truly to become in practice as well as in theory part of the system. As long as present leaders are dissatisfied with the results of the military education system, as they have been expressing since the criticism of the Cultural Revolution began, and are unwilling to surrender control to new and younger personnel (presuming those with proper technical backgrounds can be found), we can anticipate that there will be only halting steps toward revamping of the professional military

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education system. Consequently, the generational issue will continue to be of significance in the 1980s.

The Politics of Modernization

All of the issues discussed above, military v. civilian, strategy and doctrine, the question of leadership transition are closely related and might be conceivably/subsumed in a more broad general issue, that of the politics of modernization. Modernization, besides being an important slogan in the Chinese lexicon, has become an intensely political question. Debates over strategies to achieve modernization resulted in severe political cleavages and leadership change during the early 1980s, and in many respects professional military education represented a microcosm of the larger questions under debate.

One of the major questions related to modernization was defining China's relationship with the west. Much as the self-strengthening movement at the turn of the century sought to define the Sino-Western relationship, the current leaders of China are considering the impact of both western technology and ideas. ¹⁷ This issue is of great importance to the Chinese military. A greater reliance on western technology in weapons procurement, for example, would presumably necessitate greater specialization in military training. With this would almost certainly come a refinement of the concept of professionalism in the armed forces. That is, it implies a shift toward the Pengist-Dengist model discussed earlier.

Increasing specialization and changes in professionalism must necessarily have a political impact. The bifurcation of Party and military offices within the military might help to ensure the continued dominance of the military by the Party, but at the same time, increasingly specialized military technicians would demand greater influence in decisions over doctrine

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and strategy. Presumably, over an extended period of time, the PLA could evolve into something akin to the Soviet armed forces, however, given the heritage of the PLA, this would require some fairly dramatic changes.

Even if it were to be assumed that the Chinese leadership had a clear idea of which way they wanted the military to evolve, (which ~~is~~ obviously cannot be assumed), the implications for military education are staggering. The military education system would somehow be expected to divorce itself from current practices and to produce a group of loyal adherents to the Party who are also technically proficient managers (precisely the task that the military academies are calling for). The military education system would have to quickly resolve the question of authority between those with seniority and those with technical expertise.

Also, the whole question of political education, one of the major components of professional military education, would have to be addressed. In the present system the major political questions have arisen over the question of political line. Thus, the debates of the 1960's and 70's were carried over into the content of political education. Shifts in the wind could be managed by experienced personnel responsible for political education, although during major upheavals such as occurred during the Cultural Revolution many of these people found themselves on the wrong side (in many instances, no matter which side they were on). A review of the General Political Department over the past few years shows many criticisms of political cadres for not being able to keep up with the correct political line; even the most adept could not escape blame altogether.

However, the issue now at stake is infinitely more complex. In addition to coping with shifts in the political line, the professional military education system faces a restructuring more profound than was envisioned in the

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Cultural Revolution. The reason for this is that the Maoist citizen-soldier model must necessarily yield to the modernization model under conditions of increased technical specialization. In the past when the Maoist model was more closely adhered to by the PLA, the authority of the command structure was based on close identification with ideologically specified values. Repeating an observation made earlier in the paper, while Maoist ideology does not deny modernization, it places greater emphasis on non-technical values. In many instances, specialization violated the concept that the soldier must remain close to the masses. If we assume that technical change will result in increased specialization and that promotions, awards, recognition and so forth, will be based increasingly on technical expertise, then on what will command authority be based? Rhetorically we may answer that it will be based on the expertise of the commander, but as in the case with other technologically improving military organizations in the world, not necessarily on specific abilities in weapons systems (though, of course, this skill will be important), but on managerial skills.

In other words, the military education/system will be called upon to provide skilled managers, not better combat technicians, or political thinkers, or high level decision-makers. Unfortunately, it does not appear that this has been fully grasped by the leaders of the military education system. Once again, however, it must be pointed out that the reason it has not been fully grasped, is because the Chinese themselves are not certain they are fully committed to a shift away from the Maoist model in spite of the lip service given to modernization. The Chinese professional military education system and its curriculum are ample evidence of the tentative commitment.

By way of contrast, professional military education in the United States reflects the results of modernization. At various levels, both the organization and the curriculum have historically reflected the perceived increasing need for training in management skills, leadership, communication

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and other subjects more akin to the social sciences than other scientific and technical subjects, or subjects uniquely related to combat. Part of this is due to the fact that officers with college degrees frequently have strong technical backgrounds upon which to draw, however, the main reason has to do with what is perceived as necessary for operating modern military forces. During the visit of the Chinese military educators to Washington in the fall of 1980 the point was made that the successively higher levels of professional military education in the United States increasingly reflect emphasis on political subjects. The curriculum of the National War College for example stresses international relations, the development of strategy, budgetary politics, and the operation of the upper echelons of the national security system.

When the Chinese say that 80% of their curriculum is military and 20% is political, they mean that much of their training deals with combat operations and about 20% of it is indoctrination in Marxist-Leninist theory. Combat operations are stressed even at the highest level of Chinese professional military education, the PLA Military Academy. Even though the PLA has historically been heavily involved in political decision making at the highest levels, there seems to be little, if any, formal instruction in subjects such as management or public administration. An attribute of modernization it seems would imply greater attention to these kinds of subjects.

If we assume that modernization of professional military education will contribute to specialization and a new definition of professionalism in the PLA, what will that mean about its political role, an issue mentioned briefly earlier in this chapter? Past models of the military's political role have stressed that "the party controls the gun" and present emphasis in ^{professional military education} ~~the~~ suggests that Party leadership will continue to be important. ^{is} However, in the past professional military officers have been involved in the Politburo--the Party's highest decision-making organ--directly. Since the Tenth Party Congress in 1973 there has been a tendency toward the reduction of military representation at this level, a tendency which

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will probably continue into the 1980's. The questions becomes whether the military will be willing to strive for its interests within bureaucratic and party channels as it is losing its high level access.

A situation could be envisioned in which the PLA, its access to top-level decision making curbed, its interests challenged, and its prestige damaged, would thereby experience tremendous pressures to stage a coup. This would not be a Lin Biao style coup attempt in which a leader elicits segments of the military to challenge others for power (although another coup attempt of this type can by no means be completely ruled out), but one in which the military seizes power with design to advancing its own organizational interests, a situation which has arisen in many developing countries facing problems similar to those of China. Obviously, China's leaders are desirous that such a development not occur. Therefore, we can expect to see that a problem for professional military education will be to socialize military leaders in such a manner as to minimize the possibility that they will want to circumvent normal channels for achieving their political objectives.

The obvious response to this problem is what the Chinese are already doing--heavy ideological indoctrination which emphasizes loyalty, discipline and other values. Nevertheless, to the up-and-coming generation of Chinese military leaders who have witnessed the vicissitudes of the Cultural Revolution and the ongoing movement to "deMaoify" Chinese ideology, finding committment in ideologically expressed values must be somewhat difficult. There is already considerable evidence that top military leaders question the effort to denigrate Mao, moreover, there is considerable uncertainty as to where this ideological trend will lead. Just as other aspects of the political process in China have reflected turbulence over this question, so must professional military education.

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Conclusions

The primary purpose of this chapter has been to look at professional military education in the PLA , especially the issues that face it in the coming decade. It briefly considered the structure and curriculum of PME as it now stands, but deals mainly with the issues that will confront it in the future. Professional Military Education is a microcosm of basic economic, social and political issues in China today. The Chinese Communists are committed to the modernization of China, of which military modernization has been defined as an important component. Military modernization is seen not only as the acquisition of new weaponry, but as the increasing specialization and technical expertise of armed forces personnel. At present, professional military education reflects primarily past values which are not altogether congruent with modernization and specialization. For example, little attention is given to public administration, management, or other similar training as is typical in most higher professional military education systems in other countries, while a great deal of emphasis is placed on combat operations. Nevertheless, a good deal of lip service is given to the rubric of modernization.

Though the strategy of how to modernize has been constantly undergoing redefinition in China, and the effort to modernize the armed forces has been halting at best, it is unlikely that the commitment will diminish. The content of professional military education as expressed in the curriculum will change gradually to reflect the demands of specialization. However, the content must also cope with the changing political role of the PLA, thereby producing a generation of loyal and technically proficient (in managerial skills) military leaders. The evidence provided above suggests that this task will be extremely tortuous. For the most part, the PLA's professional military

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education system seems to have done its work well in the past. At least that is the opinion of Chinese military leaders, except for their reservations about what happened during the Cultural Revolution. The next decade may well provide even greater tests.

NOTES

1. XINHUA (New China News Agency), 7 November 1980; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report (People's Republic of China) 10 November 1980, L 4. (This source is hereinafter referred to as DR/PRC).
2. For a discussion of the approach to professionalism in the PLA see Paul Godwin, "Professionalism and Politics in the PLA: A Reconceptualization" paper presented before a conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, October 1976. In this paper Godwin examines professionalism in the PLA in the context of various theories of professionalism advanced by Western military sociologists, and also examines the issue of modernization.
3. Most of the standard works on the PLA have had little to say about professional military education, probably because the Chinese have not had a great deal to say themselves. For a more extensive discussion of the present system see William Heaton, "Professional Military Education in China: A Visit to the Military Academy of the People's Liberation Army," The China Quarterly (March 1980), pp122-8. Also see my unpublished report on the meeting of our delegation of the National Defense University with representatives of the PLA Air Force Academy on 2 May 1979 in Beijing, and also my unpublished report on our discussions with a reciprocal delegation of Chinese military educators on 14 October 1980 in Washington, DC.
4. XINHUA, 7 November 1980; DR/PRC, 10 November 1980, L 4.
5. For example see the editorial in RENMIN RIBAO of 26 January 1981 hailing the verdict against the "Lin Biao-Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary cliques," which among other things argues that the crimes of the usurpers are so great that "not even all the water of the Changjiang River is enough to wash away their crimes." DR/PRC 26 January 1981, L 24-28.
6. XINHUA, 11 October 1980; DR/PRC 14 October 1980, L 26. Also see the authoritative RENMIN RIBAO Commentator Article, "Further Successfully Carry Out the Work of Giving Preferential Treatment," 12 November 1980; DR/PRC 20 November 1980, L 33-34.
7. Portions of a 20 November JIEFANGJUN BAO Commentator article "Attach Importance to Selecting and Promoting Cadres Who Uphold the Party Line," carried on Beijing Radio's domestic service on 24 November 1980; DR/PRC, 25 November 1980, L33-6.
8. PRC Finance Minister Wang Bingqian reported to the third session of the Fifth National People's Congress in August 1980 that the 1979 defense budget totalled 22.27 billion yuan, 2.04 billion yuan above the original target, and said that the budget for 1980 would be 19.33 billion yuan or a cut of 2.94 billion yuan. XINHUA, 12 September 1980; DR/PRC Supplement, 23 September 1980, p. 19, 23. The Japanese News Agency KYODO cited Chinese officials as indicating that Premier Zhao Ziyang had decided to cut defense spending by 1 billion yuan in 1981, and that cuts may be even greater. Kyodo also said that China has been reducing the size of its armed forces because of budgetary reasons; DR/PRC, 21 January 1981, L 1.

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9. cf. Godwin's section on conflict over ethics, pp. 18-25.

10. See Ellis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964 (Cambridge: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 1967).

11. William Heaton, "China Visit: A Military Assessment," ARMY (November, 1979), pp. 22-7. Also see the chapter by Richard J. Latham on "The Rectification of Work Style in the PLA."

12. Xu Xiangqian, "Strive to Achieve Modernization in National Defense-- In Celebration of the 30th Anniversary of the Founding of the People's Republic of China," HONGQI No. 10 (October 2, 1979), pp. 28-33. Translated in US Joint Publications Research Service, China Report #74680 (30 November 1979), pp. 49-50.

13. XINHUA 7 November 1980; DR/PRC 10 November 1980, L 4.

14. For example an article by Yi Li, "What the Afghan War Tells Us" HONGQI No. 1 (January 1, 1981) contains comments on the strategy of the Afghan insurgency which reflects the strong influence of Mao's military thinking. The article at length discusses why it is possible for the Afghan insurgents to fight against the Soviet Union, a formidable military foe. Among other points:

The Afghan people are able to continue the fight against the Soviet aggressors because they have adopted correct military tactics. They have been able to overcome the enemy's superiority--concentrated forces, strong firepower and good mobility, and have given full play to the power of people's war. Their troops are scattered and hidden. They have seized opportunities to make sudden attacks upon the enemy, to intercept enemy motorcades, to skillfully seize strongholds, to burn warehouses and to attack the airport. In this way the enemy has been put into a passive position and has been tired out by too much moving around. . .

Fighting for the purpose of safeguarding the independence of the motherland and the survival of the nation and adopting the correct military tactics are the fundamental reasons why the Afghan people can and are still fighting in the war.

. . . The struggle of the Afghan people tells all people in the world the following truth: Despite their military strength, the Soviet social imperialists are not irresistible. When a small nation is invaded, its people can mobilize all patriotic forces and adopt military tactics which conform with the specific conditions of their own nation to deal with even such a military superpower like the Soviet Union. This is an encouragement to all countries which are being occupied, controlled, suppressed and threatened by the Soviet Union. . .

15. XINHUA, 15 January 1981; DR/PRC 16 January 1981, L 10-11.

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16. Some of China's current leaders can certainly be considered innovative, among them, Deng Xiaoping, who seems quite willing to tinker with political and social institutions. Nevertheless, for every innovator, there is an army of recalcitrant bureaucrats ready to wear down any new policy, at least if Chinese press comment can be believed. Much of the problem is related to what theorists of political socialization have termed "manifest" and "latent" socialization. The "manifest" aspects of socialization consisting of numerous speeches, articles, and policy documents calling for modernization are very prominent. The "latent" aspects consisting of the organizational structure of the professional military education system, careerism, promotions and other aspects of "how the system really works" are not as easily seen, yet have a very real impact on how military professionals conceive of the military role, and their own role in the military.

17. For example see Chalmers Johnson, "The Failure of Socialism in China," Issues and Studies (July 1979), pp. 22-33; see especially pp. 28-31. In the summer of 1980 a series of articles on the "westernization" movement at the end of the Qing dynasty appeared in the Chinese press. The allegorical debate had obvious significance for present issues. Some of the more notable are Qiao Huantian "Brief Account of the Discussions on Certain Questions Regarding the Westernization Movement" RENMIN RIBAO (taken from BEIFANG LUNCONG), 14 July 1980; DR/PRC, 30 July, L 19-22; also Qiao's article "A Brief Discussion on How the Westernization Group Arranged for the Building of Coastal Defenses," GUANGMING RIBAO, 29 July 1980; DR/PRC 12 August 1980, L 13-15. Qiao generally makes a positive assessment of the "westernization" movement.

18. See the speech by PLA Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi to the graduating class of the PLA Military Academy on 23 January 1981. Among other points Yang made the following:

. . . Every comrade must subordinate himself to the needs of the revolutionary cause, bring into full play the spirit of waging arduous struggles, practice strict economy, combat waste, build the army and run all undertakings with diligence and thrift.

According to the XINHUA account of the speech, Yang "particularly stressed the importance of strengthening political-ideological work under the new circumstances" and asked the students to conscientiously carry out the line and policies laid down by the 3rd plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee. XINHUA 23 January 1981; DR/PRC, 27 January 1981, L 9.