




Directorate of  
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~

**MASTER FILE COPY**  
**DO NOT GIVE OUT**  
**OR MARK ON**



25X1

# USSR Monthly Review



25X1

September 1983

~~Top Secret~~

SOV IIR 83-0091X

September 1983


25X1

**Page Denied**



**Directorate of  
Intelligence**

**Top Secret**




25X1

# USSR Monthly Review




25X1

**September 1983**

The *USSR Monthly Review* is published by the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries regarding the articles are welcome. They may be directed to the authors, whose names are listed in the table of contents. 

25X1




**Top Secret**  
*SOVUR 83-009JX*  
  
*September 1983*

25X1

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

# Contents

	<i>Page</i>	
<b>The Growth of Soviet Nuclear Forces in the Far East</b>	1	25X1
<b>Perspective</b>		
The Soviets are increasing the size and effectiveness of their strategic forces in the Far East. They have made extensive deployments of land-based missiles and aircraft for use in this theater and added ballistic missile submarines for both intercontinental and regional attack. In 1978 a High Command was established in the Far East to ensure centralized command and control of Soviet forces in the region. Since then, increased emphasis on joint-force operations has been evident in exercises. The improvements in the Soviet military posture have increased the concern of East Asian nations over Moscow's political intentions in the region and have caused a number of them to seek closer ties with the West.		25X1
<b>SS-20s in the Eastern USSR</b>	3	25X1
		25X1
the Soviets will press ahead with the expansion of their SS-20 IRBM force in the eastern USSR during the 1980s, raising the number of launchers in this region from the current 108 to at least 216 and possibly as many as 270.		25X1
		25X1
		25X1 25X1
		25X1
		25X1



Top Secret

SOY UR 83-009JX


September 1982




25X1

25X1

**Top Secret**



25X1



25X1

**East Asian Perceptions of the Soviet Military Buildup**



19

25X1

The Soviet military buildup has reinforced a pervasive suspicion of the USSR shared by nearly all East Asian countries. With varying degrees of concern, they believe that Moscow is intent on becoming an East Asian power, primarily by attempting to derive political influence from its growing military capabilities. The general East Asian desire to avoid closer political and economic links with Moscow should persist as long as a credible US deterrent to Soviet military power continues to exist.




25X1

25X1



**Top Secret**



25X1


25X1

Top Secret




25X1

Other Topics



25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1




25X1

New Soviet Army Corps 

31

25X1

Recent organizational changes and equipment augmentation in two and possibly three divisions indicate that the Soviets have begun to introduce a new army corps structure. The new corps, which is larger than a division, will be better able to conduct limited, self-contained actions while separated from the main body. This could make it useful for economy-of-force, forward detachment, counter-penetration, and operational maneuver group missions. It might also be used in a rear-area protection role. 

25X1



25X1




Top Secret



25X1  
25X1

Top Secret



25X1

**Angola and the US Initiative on Namibia: The View From Moscow** [redacted] 37

25X1

Recent Soviet behavior suggests that Moscow will continue to mix pressure and blandishments to undermine the US initiative on Angola and Namibia. If Luanda nonetheless opts for the US proposals, the Soviets would probably consider new obstructionist tactics, including provocations designed to sour South Africa on the prospective settlement. Should they fail in this, or forgo such tactics altogether, they might consider offering their "cooperation" in hopes of extracting concessions from Luanda and Washington. [redacted]

25X1



25X1

**Trends in Soviet Naval Activity off West Africa** [redacted] 41

25X1

The growth of the Soviet naval presence off West Africa during the past 18 months reflects increased support for the regime in Angola, the deployment of task groups to show the flag in the region, and a limited response to the hostilities in the Falkland Islands. [redacted]

25X1



25X1

**Briefs**

**Possible Preparations for New ICBM** [redacted] 45

25X1

**Andropov on INF Talks** [redacted] 45

25X1

**Economic Experiment Announced** [redacted] 46

25X1

**The Labor Discipline Campaign—Round II** [redacted] 46

25X1



25X1

**Czechs Provide Armored Vehicle Hulls to Soviets** [redacted] 47

25X1

**Soviets Warming Up to Contadora Effort** [redacted] 47

25X1

**USSR-China: Joint Inspections on Border Rivers** [redacted] 48

25X1


**Grain Harvest Nearing Completion** [redacted] 48

25X1

**Foxhounds to the Far East** [redacted] 49

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

25X1

**Top Secret**



25X1


---

**Viewpoint**

**Did the Soviets Deceive the United States During the SALT I Negotiations?** 

51

25X1


At several crucial points in the SALT I negotiations, the Soviets are alleged to have deceived the United States about strategic capabilities soon to be available to Moscow and as a result obtained an Interim Agreement on Offensive Forces that was extremely advantageous to them. This article argues that, while the Soviets engaged in tough and sharp bargaining, they do not appear to have engaged in deliberate and consistent misrepresentation. They negotiated vigorously to protect programs that they considered important, and they considered themselves obligated to comply only with those limitations to which they had explicitly consented. 

25X1

25X1



**Top Secret**




25X1

25X1



Top Secret



25X1

# The Growth of Soviet Nuclear Forces in the Far East

Perspective



25X1

The Soviets are increasing the size and effectiveness of their strategic forces in the Far East to counter perceived threats to their security interests in the region and to increase their intercontinental strike capabilities. They already have made extensive deployments of land-based missiles and have continued the steady addition of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and strategic aircraft.

substantial additions are yet to come. Moscow's concern over the capabilities of the US Navy in the Far East has stimulated efforts to protect Soviet SSBNs. China's expansion of its missile forces, the impending deployment of the Xia-class SSBN, and the steady growth of Japan's modern Self-Defense Forces also have provided impetus to the growth of Soviet military power in the region. The Soviet programs are consistent with the steady development of the USSR's capabilities—both tactical and strategic—that has been evident for many years, but they have heightened concerns over Soviet political intentions in the region. This issue of the *USSR Monthly Review* examines the growth of Soviet forces in the Far East and the views of key Asian nations on the buildup

25X1  
25X1



25X1  
25X1

The most publicized development has been the growth of the SS-20 IRBM force. The Soviets have constructed some SS-20 bases in the Far East each year since 1976, but the moratorium on new SS-20 construction in the western USSR in 1982 apparently has enabled them to accelerate the pace of deployment in the East.

25X1  
25X1

We estimate that as many as 270 missile launchers could eventually be deployed there.

25X1




Top Secret



25X1  
25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Soviet D-class SSBNs have largely taken over the intercontinental mission in the Pacific Fleet. As a result, several Y-class SSBNs have been assigned to theater missions and have established regular patrols in the Sea of Japan. From these patrol areas the SS-N-6 missile carried by the Y's can strike targets throughout the Far East as distant as Guam and the Philippines. As more D-class and eventually Typhoon-class SSBNs enter the force, additional Y's probably will be assigned to the theater mission. The capabilities of the Y's are considerably greater than those of the G-class submarines they will be replacing.



25X1

The growth in forces in the Far East and the diversity of potential threats pose major command and control problems for the Soviets. The reestablishment of the High Command in the Far East is one of several measures taken by the Soviets to ensure the centralized command and control of the military forces in that region. Headquartered in Ulan-Ude, the command is intended to overcome the isolation of the Soviet forces in the Far East from the General Staff in Moscow and to improve the Soviets' ability to wage multitheater war.



25X1  
25X1

Since the mid-1970s we have noted an increasing number of joint-service operations conducted in the Far East. In addition to the normal training functions associated with Soviet military exercises, these operations have tested the procedures established by the High Command to integrate and operate the forces subordinate to it.



25X1  
25X1

The significance of the continuing growth of Soviet forces in the Far East—especially the SS-20 missiles—has not been lost on East Asian countries. With varying degrees of concern, all believe that Moscow is intent on becoming an East Asian power, primarily by attempting to derive political influence from its growing military capabilities. Indeed, Moscow's one major success in Asia—its alliance with Vietnam—stemmed from its ability to provide major security assistance. The general East Asian desire to avoid closer political and economic links with Moscow has caused some of these nations to strengthen their ties with the West, particularly the United States.



25X1



25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

**SS-20s in the Eastern USSR**

[Redacted]

25X1

New SS-20 base construction [Redacted] indicate that the Soviets will press ahead with the expansion of their SS-20 IRBM force in the eastern USSR<sup>1</sup> during the 1980s, raising the number of launchers in this region from the current 108 to at least 216 and possibly as many as 270. Moscow apparently believes that a sizable force is required to cover the more than 300 Chinese and US installations we believe it might consider as potential time-sensitive targets in the Far East. In exchange for US flexibility on other issues in the INF negotiations, however, the Soviets might agree to either a moratorium or a ceiling on SS-20 deployments there that would allow them to complete bases already under construction at the time any proposal takes effect. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

**New Deployments**

In the past, the identification of one SS-20 regimental support base in a geographic area has been the initial indicator of the formation of an SS-20 division consisting of five or six regimental support bases. [Redacted] photographic evidence indicate that the Soviets are creating two new SS-20 divisions in the eastern USSR (at Barnaul and Kansk) in addition to the two operational divisions in the Novosibirsk and Drovyanaya areas. We estimate that each division will have six subordinate regiments, with a total of 54 launchers. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Three new SS-20 bases of the Barnaul division have been identified this year [Redacted]. We estimate that one of these became operational in February 1983, bringing the total number of operational SS-20 regiments in the east to 12 with 108 launchers (see figure 1). The other two bases at Barnaul are in the early-to-middle stages of construction and probably will be completed by early 1984. [Redacted]

25X1

**Soviet Military Requirements in the Far East**

We do not know how the Soviets calculate requirements for this missile system in terms of their expected losses, the need to maintain reserves, and reliability factors. Nor are we certain how they plan to allocate SS-20s for use against specific targets. In any case, they apparently believe they need a sizable SS-20 force to cover potential Asian targets. [Redacted]

25X1

<sup>1</sup> For the purpose of this paper, the term *eastern USSR* is defined as the territory east of 80 degrees east longitude, which includes bases at Novosibirsk, Barnaul, Drovyanaya, Kansk, [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret


[Redacted]

25X1

**Top Secret**




25X1



25X1

We have identified some 300 separate installations in the region that, from Moscow's standpoint, might qualify as time-urgent targets for ballistic nuclear missiles. Most of these critical targets are in China. They include approximately 160 ballistic missile launchers,<sup>2</sup> 100 airfields able to handle nuclear-capable IL-28 or TU-16 bombers, a few command centers, and other military targets.



US installations in the Far East also would be candidates for SS-20 targeting early in a conflict. The Soviets doubtless plan to strike at those US installations supporting or controlling forces capable of delivering nuclear attacks against Soviet territory. There are some 25 to 30 of these targets, including major airfields, nuclear weapons storage sites, naval facilities, and important command and communications centers.



25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Top Secret**



25X1

**Page Denied**

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

At a minimum, Soviet targeting requirements probably dictate that Moscow have a nuclear force adequate to assure destruction of these approximately 300 time-sensitive targets. In addition, there are many strongpoints, tactical airfields, assembly areas, administrative centers, and similar targets which would be candidates for nuclear strikes. Although the Soviets have an impressive array of tactical nuclear systems in the eastern USSR, targets deep within China cannot be covered by these forces, and some might require the higher accuracy of the SS-20. Intermediate- and long-range bombers and submarine-launched missiles also are earmarked for use against softer, less critical Asian targets, and elements of the ICBM force could be used on a contingency basis.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Moreover, the Soviets have consistently refused to consider SS-20s based in the eastern USSR as being within the scope of the current INF talks. Moscow has thus far maintained that any changes in eastern deployments would be contingent on separate INF negotiations including all nuclear weapons in Asia.

[Redacted]

25X1

There is little prospect that the Soviets will agree to dismantle forces already in existence in the eastern USSR. It is possible, however, that in exchange for US flexibility in other areas of INF, they might agree to a moratorium or ceiling on eastern SS-20 deployments. Moscow would almost certainly insist that any such arrangement would have to permit completion of at least the bases already under construction at the time any proposal takes effect. Such an arrangement, if entered into by the end of 1983, would permit Soviet deployment of at least 144 SS-20 launchers in the east—more if, as we expect, Moscow begins construction of additional new bases this year.

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

**Impact on INF Negotiating Position**

We believe that the new SS-20 deployments in the eastern USSR probably are part of a longstanding program and are not directly related to the INF negotiations. The Soviets almost certainly made the decision to build new bases in the east before the talks were under way.

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Page Denied**

Next 9 Page(s) In Document Denied

25X1

25X1


25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret




25X1

**East Asian Perceptions of the Soviet Military Buildup**



25X1

The Soviet military buildup has reinforced a pervasive suspicion of the USSR shared by nearly all East Asian countries. With varying degrees of concern, they believe that Moscow is intent on becoming an East Asian power, primarily by attempting to derive political influence from its growing military capabilities. The general East Asian desire to avoid closer political and economic links with Moscow should persist as long as a credible US deterrent to Soviet military power continues to exist.




They see these as cheap ways of keeping pressure on the Soviets and helping to isolate Moscow politically. Beijing almost certainly will continue to insist that the Soviets accommodate Chinese security concerns in at least one critical area—such as withdrawing support from Vietnam in Kampuchea or reducing Soviet forces along their mutual border—before political relations can improve appreciably. Despite General Secretary Andropov's positive statements last month on SS-20 deployments and other security issues, the Chinese—like the Japanese—remain highly skeptical that Moscow is prepared to meet their demands that Soviet forces in the region be reduced.

25X1

25X1

**China**

The Chinese regard the Soviet Union as an expansionist power challenging US strategic preeminence in Asia and, of course, as the principal threat to China's own security. They view the steady buildup and modernization of Soviet forces in the region as consistent with these objectives.



Beijing recognizes that it must rely on the United States as a strategic counterweight to the Soviets. China also recognizes that its principal appeal to the United States still is based on the notion that China—despite its relative weakness—poses a second-front consideration in Soviet strategic thinking. This factor, however, is operable only so long as there is some reasonable prospect of Sino-US cooperation in the event of war. When this prospect is questioned, Beijing's leverage with both Moscow and Washington is undercut.

25X1

25X1

The bulk of China's conventional forces—well over a million men—are deployed toward the Sino-Soviet border and opposite Mongolia where Soviet armored forces pose a direct threat to Beijing. We believe most, if not all, of China's small nuclear missile force also is targeted against the Soviet Union. China's defense doctrine of a "People's War" is designed to fight a long war of attrition against the Soviets' better equipped conventional forces.




The US response to the Soviet buildup, especially suggestions that Japan should play a larger security role in the region, introduces other uncertainties for Beijing. Discussion in Tokyo of an enhanced Japanese military role, underscored by Prime Minister Nakasone's "aircraft carrier" remark earlier this year, has shaken Beijing's perception of its own role in the region. The Chinese do not want Japan to assume any sort of regional security responsibilities because that would diminish China's importance, complicate its position regarding Taiwan, and—hypothetically, at least—reduce its leverage on the Korean peninsula. Chinese leaders may have similar concerns about a regional arms race between the United States and the

25X1

25X1


To offset their obvious military inferiority and counter Soviet pressure, the Chinese have sought since the early 1970s to strengthen their ties with the West and the United States in particular. We believe the Chinese viewed the resumption of bilateral talks with the USSR last year mainly as an opportunity to put pressure on the United States. In addition, Beijing probably hoped to gain greater room for maneuver between the two superpowers and to probe Soviet willingness to reduce tensions.



25X1

In our view, opposition to Soviet expansion will remain the keystone of China's strategic policies. As a result, the Chinese are unlikely to reduce their support for the Afghan rebels or the insurgents fighting against Moscow's Vietnamese ally in Kampuchea.

Top Secret



25X1



Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Soviet Union that reduces China's influence. We believe these were the principal factors behind the Chinese decision earlier this year to reopen discussions of a strategic relationship with the United States. [Redacted]

25X1

**Japan**

Tokyo's concerns regarding Soviet military deployments tend to be compartmentalized. In terms of trends in conventional capabilities, the Japanese are most sensitive to:

- Growth in the Pacific Fleet, which is seen as potentially threatening to Japan's sea communications.
- The creation of a ground force coastal defense division on the southern Kurils in defiance of Japan's claim to the "Northern Territories."
- The buildup of Soviet air forces, particularly the introduction of Backfire bombers.

In terms of nuclear forces, Tokyo has focused increasingly on trends in SS-20 deployments. Japanese concerns have grown as the number of missiles in the eastern USSR has increased, particularly since the Soviets suggested in early 1983 that an INF agreement at Geneva might not rule out a shift in SS-20s from Europe to Asia. Japanese officials believe it is critical that the Japanese people not see their country's security interests being sacrificed to those of Western Europe in an INF settlement. [Redacted]

Soviet military actions in Afghanistan and Poland have begun to sensitize the Japanese to the possibility of Soviet military moves against their own country. Japanese officials, however, generally believe that Moscow will attempt to use its military power for political purposes:

- To overawe and intimidate Japan, particularly in crisis situations.
- To drive a wedge between Japan and the United States by emphasizing that Soviet forces are not targeted on Japan—only US forces based in Japan.
- To abort the effort to strengthen the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) by stimulating domestic Japanese opposition to the government's allegedly "militaristic" policies. [Redacted]

Tokyo's response over the past few years has been to tighten alliance relations with the United States and gradually strengthen the SDF. Prime Minister Nakasone has placed even greater emphasis on the importance to Japan of the Mutual Security Treaty with the

United States but has not tried to accelerate Japan's defense buildup. We believe that, if he secures his political base by winning the lower house election expected early next year, he is likely to provide an additional boost to defense spending. [Redacted]

25X1

Internationally, Nakasone is moving on two fronts to prepare the way for a more rapid defense buildup:

- In East Asia, he is attempting to reassure Japan's neighbors that they will not be threatened by a modest Japanese effort to counter the increased Soviet threat.
- To the other advanced industrial democracies, he is stressing Japan's commitment to the Western camp and its recognition that the security of the West is indivisible. [Redacted]

25X1

At home, the Prime Minister is attempting to recast popular Japanese views of military security issues and emphasize Japan's role as a leader of the Western camp. The Soviet military buildup—coupled with Moscow's continued provocative behavior toward Japan—is facilitating this task. [Redacted]

25X1

**Korea**

Korean officials on both sides of the DMZ probably view the Soviet military buildup in East Asia with mixed feelings. Bitter memories of Moscow's support for Kim Il-song's invasion of the South in 1950 keep Seoul wary, despite Moscow's continuing interest in informal contacts. Continued Soviet economic and military assistance to North Korea—albeit limited and not of the type P'yongyang desires most—reinforces these suspicions. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

This profound distrust of the Soviets is also fed by Moscow's moves outside the peninsula, including the military buildup in the region, support for the Vietnamese Communists, and the invasion of Afghanistan. The South Koreans believe Moscow has upset the military balance of power in East Asia. Expanded Soviet naval capabilities in Asia present a potential threat to South Korea's access to needed resources and export markets. Along with the Japanese, Seoul also has recently focused attention on Soviet deployment of SS-20s in the Soviet Far East within range of South Korea. [Redacted]

25X1


25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

These developments, however, strengthen the argument of those in Seoul who have pushed the idea of South Korea as a forward base for US strategic nuclear weapons. Even so, Seoul still worries that the corresponding enhancement of US military capabilities over the next few years may not redress the imbalance the Soviets have created.

*P'yongyang* has not made an issue of the buildup in its media, and we suspect that it derives some satisfaction from the challenge the Soviet buildup presents to the United States and the US allies in the region. Because it has much warmer relations with China, *P'yongyang* does not publicly support an increase in Soviet might along China's northern frontier and has consistently turned aside Moscow's periodic efforts to enlist North Korea in a Soviet-inspired Asian collective security arrangement.

The North Koreans, on the other hand, clearly do not want the Soviet buildup to provoke an even stronger US presence in Asia, strengthen US military ties with South Korea and Japan, or encourage China to deepen its strategic relationship with the United States. North Korea probably fears that Soviet actions could cause the United States to seek basing rights for strategic nuclear weapons in South Korea. *P'yongyang* would perceive such a sharp expansion of the US security commitment as a major new obstacle to *P'yongyang's* ultimate goal of reunification on its terms.

**ASEAN**

The ASEAN states for obvious reasons are less concerned with the Soviet military buildup per se than they are with Moscow's support for Vietnam and the growing Soviet naval presence in the region. In this context, the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1978 marked the major turning point in ASEAN perceptions of Soviet intentions. Until then, countries in the region saw China as the principal threat. While most Southeast Asians still have residual doubts about China's long-term intentions in the region, ASEAN states now clearly share a perception that the Soviet Union—with a strong assist from Hanoi—has become the principal threat.

*Singapore* is the most vocal of the ASEAN states in its denunciation of the Soviet presence in Southeast Asia. Particularly alarming to the Singaporeans has been the growing Soviet-Vietnamese security relationship which has resulted in a stronger Soviet naval presence in the South China Sea. Since the invasion of Afghanistan, Singapore—despite Soviet entreaties—has banned visits and repairs of Soviet naval vessels and limited the number of visits by naval auxiliary ships.

25X1

25X1

*Thailand's* concerns center on the Soviet-supported Vietnamese troops along Thailand's border with Kampuchea. The Soviet military buildup on China's border, combined with the resumption of political talks between the two Communist powers, almost certainly has also created uncertainty in Bangkok about China's willingness to try to obstruct Vietnamese expansionism in the region. The Thai share ASEAN concern over Soviet potential to dominate the Straits of Malacca and are concerned that the Soviet naval presence will expand to Kampuchean waters.

25X1

25X1

*The Philippines* also focuses on Moscow's ties with Hanoi, reflecting Manila's concern that Vietnamese expansionism is fed by Soviet support. Manila has consistently refused Soviet overtures for access to ship repair facilities in the Philippines and has resisted efforts by the Soviets to increase their diplomatic and commercial presence in the country. Manila finds it convenient, however, to use the threat of improved relations with the Soviet Union both as leverage in its dealings with the United States and to present a nonaligned image to its nationalistic domestic audience.

25X1

25X1

*Indonesia* initially viewed the Soviet military presence in Vietnam as a counterweight to perceived Chinese ambitions in the region, long Jakarta's principal concern. But Vietnam's continued occupation of Kampuchea, the threat to Thai security from Vietnam, the growing Soviet naval presence in the region, and other evidence of Soviet expansionism such as the invasion

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

**Top Secret**

[Redacted]

25X1

of Afghanistan have encouraged a less sanguine attitude. Jakarta's discovery of Soviet espionage activity in Indonesia in recent years has reinforced concern over Soviet designs on the region. Since 1980 the Indonesian military has conducted several major exercises aimed at countering a potential Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion from the north and has initiated a buildup in the strategic command stretching from Sumatra to West Kalimantan to meet any threat to Indonesian territory in the South China Sea. [Redacted]

25X1

*Malaysian* Foreign Minister Ghazali Shafie voiced concern over Soviet intentions in Southeast Asia in a 1981 white paper in which the Soviet Navy operating out of Vietnamese ports is seen not only as a challenge to China, but, more important for the regional balance of power, as a challenge to the US Navy. He believes that the growth of Soviet capabilities to counter the US military presence in Southeast Asia threatens the security of ASEAN and the other non-Communist states of the region. More recently, in the wake of revelations of Soviet espionage activities in the region and the abrasive April 1983 visit of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa to the region, Malaysian officials have renewed their criticism of Soviet regional ambitions and reaffirmed their support for Thailand on the Kampuchean question. Malaysian officials privately welcome a continued US military presence in the region, but at the same time are careful to maintain their nonaligned credentials. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

**Top Secret**

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

**Page Denied**

25X1

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

**New Soviet Army Corps** [Redacted]

25X1

The Soviets have reorganized and expanded at least two and possibly three tank and motorized rifle divisions to develop combat units similar to their World War II tank and mechanized corps. We believe additional selected divisions in most border military districts and in some internal military districts and groups of forces in Eastern Europe may adopt this structure. The new corps, composed of four or five brigades, is a significant departure from postwar Soviet organizational philosophy. Its size, equipment, and employment in exercises could make it useful for economy-of-force, forward detachment, and counter-penetration missions as well as for operational-tactical missions such as those of operational maneuver groups (OMGs). It might also be used in a rear-area protection role. [Redacted]

engineering equipment, and probably tanks. Air defense assets were both increased and placed at lower echelons. [Redacted]

25X1

The Kyakhta corps also has an air assault unit equipped with airdroppable BMD infantry fighting vehicles, but the helicopter unit at Kyakhta cannot lift BMDs. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

**New Corps Formation**

The new units, [Redacted] [Redacted] are approximately the size of US armored or mechanized divisions but have brigades rather than regiments. These brigades have battalions composed of tank and infantry companies. Previously the Soviet Ground Forces had not mixed these units below regimental level. [Redacted]

We believe that as many as eight to 10 corps may be formed. A likely pattern would be a corps in most border MDs and in some internal military districts and groups of forces. Conversion to an independent army corps does not require the most modern equipment; however, we expect that corps probably would have priority for receiving new equipment. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

We believe that the corps structure that will develop over the next year or so will consist of five maneuver brigades and an air assault regiment. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] we estimate that the authorized wartime strengths could be as high as 3,100 men for a tank brigade and 3,200 men for a mechanized brigade. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

The long-term development of the new army corps will probably focus on the modernization of equipment within the five-brigade structure over the next few years. We expect the modernization of infantry

The conversion of divisions to corps has included the addition of BMP infantry fighting vehicles, artillery,

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

**Historical Origins of the New Corps**

We believe the organization and mission of the new corps have historical roots in the Soviet tank and mechanized corps of World War II. During the war, the bulk of the Soviet army consisted of infantry divisions with few or no tanks or motorized transport. Soviet military historians have written that corps were created because a scarcity of qualified commanders forced the Red Army to adopt highly centralized, elitist organizations to get maximum value from its precious mobile forces. The corps structure centralized the scarce armored and motorized equipment under a single commander, maximizing its combat potential and increasing its responsiveness in battle. A corps usually consisted of four mechanized and tank brigades reinforced with various special units (such as tank destroyers and assault engineers) to tailor the formation for specific situations. The corps became, in effect, a special formation at the disposal of the front commander. Larger and more powerful than the standard rifle division, it was able to conduct sustained operations while separated from the main force. It was also smaller and more responsive than an army, making it well suited for rapid deployment in operational-tactical missions. [Redacted]

caused the Soviets, faced with staggering losses in 1941-42, to disband it in favor of independent brigades. These brigades did not require as much staff and special support and therefore could be more easily handled by less experienced commanders. In late 1942, when the Soviets had regained the initiative, the corps was reinstated. [Redacted]

25X1

Soviet military historians claim the tank and mechanized corps were used primarily as mobile groups during the war. Their specialty was exploiting breaks in the lines and striking deep into the German rear to seize important objectives. When its momentum was lost, the corps would dig in its infantry and hold off counterattacks until the Soviet main body could catch up. We believe recent historical writings may have given these formations more credit than is warranted. In many cases, the authors seem to be describing what they expect the modern corps to be capable of, rather than its historical performance. [Redacted]

25X1

After the war, changes in doctrine, reductions in force, and accompanying reorganizations led the Soviets to abolish the corps formations. Doctrine was modified because by the end of the 1950s increased mechanization was thought to make all Soviet divisions capable of performing exploitation missions. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

While this created a powerful formation, the large number of specialists required to man the corps

fighting vehicles and tanks, a complete conversion to self-propelled artillery, the introduction of self-propelled mortars, and an upgrading of corps air defense assets. We expect to see additional tracked and self-propelled vehicles introduced, particularly in the logistic support units of the corps, to improve its mobility and self-sufficiency. We may also see an expansion of air assault and material support regiments to brigades. [Redacted]

doctrinal innovation, changing battlefield technologies, and the character of prospective opponents. In recent years Soviet [Redacted] have been particularly concerned with the difficulties of successfully implementing offensive doctrine given the increased lethality of the modern battlefield. This has led to increases in the infantry and artillery complements of tank divisions and consideration of doctrinal refinements like the OMG concept to restore high rates of advance. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1  
25X1

**Operational Implications**

The Soviet armed forces' commitment to quick, mobile offensives to carry the fighting to enemy territory is unchanged since World War II, but their methods and forces have continued to evolve in response to

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

The new corps at Minsk and especially the one at Kyakhta will be better organized and equipped for operating apart from the main body than their predecessor divisions. Overall, their size and capability of accepting logistic and fire support attachments should give them greater staying power and combined-arms balance than motorized rifle or tank divisions. The corps should be better able to roll over light opposition or pin down stronger enemy units until the arrival of more powerful friendly forces. [Redacted]

The brigades observed at Kyakhta and Minsk provide their commanders with at least four preformed infantry-tank teams organized as mixed battalions resembling US Army battalion task forces. We do not know why the Soviets have adopted this structure, which appears to be a change in their organizational philosophy. The Soviets have a well-known dislike of ad hoc solutions to combat problems, and they may have concluded that composite units at the lower tactical levels are essential to avoid having to assemble mixed combat teams during combat. [Redacted]

We expect, however, that the new corps structure will cause problems. For example, the assignment of tanks and infantry into mixed battalions will require the development of new tactics and training in small-unit combined-arms operations. Battalion commanders, unaccustomed to managing a mixture of weapons types, will have to gain experience. Battalion staffs will need to be expanded, and logistic and maintenance problems will be compounded. The complexity of and need for more training in combined-arms skills are likely to necessitate higher peacetime manning levels for active companies and battalions within the USSR. [Redacted]

*The Corps as an Operational Maneuver Group.* [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] In Soviet doctrine, the OMG is an armor-heavy formation varying in size from division to army. A corps-sized OMG generally would be committed after the start of an offensive operation and used for preliminary exploitation prior to introduction of the second operational or strategic echelon. Once in the enemy rear, it would pursue military-geographic objectives such as nuclear delivery systems, airfields, and river crossings. The OMG

is intended to be logistically self-contained and able to operate separated from the main force. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Stronger and more versatile than a division, the new corps should also be faster and more responsive to march orders from higher headquarters than an army. This is because speed and responsiveness usually are inversely related to the size of a combat formation. As a front's OMG, where commitment could come as early as the third day of battle and rapid exploitation is crucial, a corps-sized formation might be committed faster and more effectively than an army. The successful use of the corps in an OMG role would be contingent upon solving the difficult problem of providing logistic support to the corps while it is separated from the main force. [Redacted]

*Economy-of-Force Missions.* In the US Army, armored cavalry serves in an economy-of-force role to find the enemy and develop the situation with the smallest force possible. It acts as a screen to provide reaction time and maneuver space for the main body and allow it to engage the enemy under favorable circumstances. Armored cavalry conducts reconnaissance-in-force missions, relying on its heavy firepower to destroy the enemy or at least force it to stop and deploy. [Redacted]

Although we have no evidence of corps being used as armored cavalry in command post exercises, the new corps are organized and equipped for such a role. The brigade structure is well suited to cavalry operations, and the mix of tanks and armored fighting vehicles in the composite battalions resembles that found in US cavalry squadrons. The Soviets already have a reconnaissance (armored cavalry) brigade in Mongolia that has composite battalions structured like those of the new corps, indicating they consider such a force useful, at least in the Far East. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

The force requirements of armored cavalry and OMG missions—firepower, responsiveness, speed, and ability to operate independently of the main force—are almost identical. Therefore, the testing of a new corps in the OMG role does not preclude its use as cavalry.

[Redacted]

greater mobility and longer range fire support relative to standard divisions could enable this task to be accomplished with fewer troops. We do not, however, have evidence of the new corps training for rear-area protection—a role traditionally assigned to the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

25X1

25X1

*Operational-Level Forward Detachment.* Like armored cavalry, the force required for a forward detachment is almost identical to that of the OMG because of the need to operate in advance of the main body. The main difference between the OMG and the forward detachment is that the latter is under the command of the formation it is serving, while an OMG would have its own command-staff element (termed an *operations group*), which could provide greater independence.

[Redacted]

**Implications**

We conclude that the Soviets probably are not satisfied with their present force structure's suitability for certain types of operations. Because the testing of the new corps has followed on the heels of tests of the OMG concept, we believe the new corps will conduct OMG field tests. They also are equipped and organized to serve as armored cavalry, operational-level forward detachments, or counterpenetration forces. The corps might be used for rear-area protection, although this function would probably be handled in a more efficient manner by smaller units.

25X1

25X1

The corps' size makes it well suited to operate as a forward detachment of an army. However, we have no evidence yet of an entire new corps being used as a forward detachment.

[Redacted]

The size and additional equipment of the new corps may provide them the quick response and maneuver speed of a division as well as the additional firepower and sustainability to conduct limited, self-contained actions while separated from the main body. The Soviets may be exploring whether such mid-sized formations would help solve the problems of conducting a high-speed offensive in the lethal environment of the modern battlefield.

25X1

25X1

*Counterpenetration Force.* A corps like those at Kyakhta and Minsk could be used to counter penetrations of Soviet lines. A front or army commander could hold the corps in reserve, relying on its responsiveness, mobility, and firepower to thwart advancing enemy forces before they could fully exploit their breakthrough. While we have no evidence that the Soviets are considering this role for the new corps, counterpenetration operations could assume greater importance for the Soviets in light of the revived emphasis on offensive operations in the US Army.

[Redacted]

Although the Soviets must see some utility for the corps against NATO, it might be less effective against NATO than against other potential opponents in roles other than counterpenetration. Strong NATO air forces, numerous attack helicopters, and modern mechanized forces well equipped with precision guided munitions could pose a serious threat to a corps operating in advance of the main body.<sup>3</sup> For the corps to attain its full potential as an OMG, we believe it would require further improvements in logistics, air defense, and reconnaissance.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

*Rear-Area Protection.* Another possible role for the new corps is suggested by the two Soviet independent brigades in Afghanistan (the 66th and 70th), which conduct guerilla-suppression and rear-area protection operations.<sup>2</sup> In forming the corps at Kyakhta, the Soviets may have decided that a quick-reaction combined-arms formation would be useful to protect the Transbaikal-Mongolia region from Chinese incursions during a Soviet advance into China. The corps'

<sup>3</sup> The OMG of a front would probably tend to operate toward the first-echelon armies' subsequent objective, generally 150 to 200 kilometers in depth. A corps-size OMG could be vulnerable to ambush and destruction if the enemy had adequate mobile reserves.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

<sup>2</sup> These brigades are composed of a motorized rifle regiment, a parachute/air assault battalion, and a multiple rocket launcher battery. They do not have composite infantry/tank battalions as do the Kyakhta and Minsk brigades.

[Redacted]

Top Secret

[Redacted]


25X1



**Top Secret**



25X1


We see many advantages for Soviet use of the new corps against China or targets in the Persian Gulf area. There the Soviets would have a better opportunity to control the air, and their opposition would not be as mobile or as well equipped. 

25X1



25X1

**Top Secret**



25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

**Angola and the US Initiative on Namibia: The View From Moscow** [Redacted]

25X1

Angola's dialogue with the United States over Namibia and related bilateral issues has been a source of concern to the Soviets since Luanda and Washington began talks in late 1981. The Soviet leadership probably views a continued stalemate in Namibia—which perpetuates Angola's dependence upon the USSR and Cuba—as preferable to a settlement, which could be seen as a Soviet "withdrawal" under US pressure.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Moscow's greatest fear in southern Africa was that Angola's ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) would "sell out" to the West. [Redacted]

The Soviets presumably believe that the establishment of an independent Namibia between Angola and South Africa, resolution of the domestic insurgency problem, and the departure of the Cuban troops would reduce Luanda's dependence upon Moscow for military assistance. This in turn would undermine Soviet influence in Angola, a country that is important to the USSR because it:

- Is an important symbol of Moscow's willingness and capability to project power to distant shores in support of its friends.
- Is currently the only area on the West African Coast where the USSR enjoys privileged air and naval access; this ensures Moscow the ability to monitor activity in parts of the South Atlantic, as demonstrated in the Falklands crisis.
- Serves as the main Soviet entree into southern Africa, through which Moscow can funnel support to the Namibian insurgents of the South-West Africa Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) and—if it decided to do so—to Zaire's Katangan rebels. [Redacted]

**The Situation in Angola: Implications for Moscow**

Some seven years after Moscow helped bring the MPLA to power, the Luanda government still faces a major threat to its position from insurgents of the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola

(UNITA), despite the support of some 25,000 to 30,000 Cuban military personnel. [Redacted]

[Redacted] stepped-up UNITA activity during the past year has already led to greater Cuban combat involvement—and a higher number of Cuban casualties. The recent UNITA victory at Cangama—one of the largest MPLA garrisons taken by the insurgents—and the continued fear of new South African military action probably prompted the unscheduled visit to Moscow of a high-level Angolan delegation in late August and early September. The visit by this group, headed by party secretary Lucio Lara and Defense Minister Tonha, comes in the wake of President dos Santos's trip to the USSR last May. [Redacted]

The economic impact of fighting a growing insurgency, maintaining a large Cuban force, and coping with the recent decline in world oil prices (oil is Angola's principal source of hard currency) have further complicated Luanda's situation. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

These problems provide incentives for Angola to resolve its security situation by agreeing to a US-brokered Namibia settlement. Soviet concern about this possibility probably has been heightened by recent political developments in Angola. Last December President dos Santos was accorded "emergency powers" by the MPLA Central Committee, ostensibly to resolve Angola's economic and security problems. The Soviets may believe this enhancement of dos Santos's authority could lead to changes inimical to their interests. The dismissal in December of several pro-Soviet figures, including party secretary for ideology Ambrosio Lukoki and Ruth Lara—wife of hardline party chief Lucio Lara—probably fueled such apprehensions about the MPLA's future direction. Concurrently, the Angolans have maintained their dialogue

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

with the United States; in April, for example, Interior Minister Rodrigues met with Vice President Bush at the White House. [Redacted]

**Moscow's Response: Current Tactics**

The Soviets have reacted to these developments with a mixture of pressure tactics, continued shows of material support, and some hints of flexibility. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

to Moscow. At that time, the Soviets made no statements of support for Angolan efforts to negotiate and publicly warned Luanda against doing business with the West. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

**Prospects**

Recent Soviet behavior thus suggests that Moscow will continue to mix pressure and blandishments in its attempts to undermine the US initiative on Angola and Namibia. It will play on Luanda's security fears and emphasize alleged US-South African collusion to bring UNITA to power. Soviet chastising of dos Santos for his "poor performance" indirectly reminds him that other leaders are available. Given dos Santos's need to balance the MPLA's hardline and moderate factions, this Soviet tack may inhibit him from moving precipitately toward a settlement. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

To strengthen their position, the Soviets have introduced some more advanced weaponry into the Angolan arsenal, including SA-8 surface-to-air missiles and MI-24 Hind helicopter gunships. [Redacted]

[Redacted] during the recent campaign to hold Cangama, for example, the Soviets sent IL-76 and AN-22 heavy-lift transports to Angola with deliveries of new military cargo. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

If dos Santos were to assemble a coalition that was prepared to move on the UNITA question and the US package on Namibia, the Soviets would probably pursue other tactics to try to obstruct a settlement. For example, they could try to:

25X1

25X1

- Provoke South Africa into scuttling the settlement. Toward this end, the Soviets could press SWAPO or the South African insurgents of the African National Congress (ANC) to undertake new military or terrorist activity that would make it politically unfeasible for Pretoria to relinquish Namibia; this, of course, would require the cooperation of SWAPO or the ANC. Short of this, the Soviets could employ such active measures as disinformation and forgeries to sour Pretoria on the settlement.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Moscow, however, apparently recognizes that it cannot afford to alienate dos Santos totally if it is to retain some influence in the event his diplomacy succeeds in resolving the Namibia question. Thus, during the May visit the Soviets also expressed some tolerance for his efforts to negotiate a settlement. Apart from reaffirming support for Angola's defense, they acknowledged "the great importance Angola attaches to the speediest just solution of the Namibian problem" and assured Luanda that Soviet leaders would give "full support" to the search for a settlement. Such formulations are strikingly different from those offered during Lucio Lara's January 1982 visit

- Discreetly encourage disgruntled elements in the MPLA or directly promote a coup against dos Santos, though this seems less likely. If the coup failed, Moscow could find itself with little or no influence within the MPLA. Moreover, given the complex of factors that define Angolan politics—race, tribe, ideology, and personality—the Soviets could not be totally certain of the final outcome in

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Angola even if a coup succeeded. In addition, a successful coup would probably further split the party and weaken the military, with the attendant effect of strengthening the position of Savimbi and his UNITA insurgents. Disclosure of Moscow's involvement in a coup would also raise doubts and suspicions among African and other Third World leaders who have close ties to the USSR. [Redacted]

- Claim a new success in independent Namibia, assuming that SWAPO won the UN-monitored elections. Moscow would claim that its support of SWAPO was vindicated and that its victory was further evidence of the positive shift in the world correlation of forces. [Redacted]

25X1

If they were convinced that progress toward a settlement was inevitable, the Soviets could decide that a constructive tack would be more conducive to their long-term interests. For example, they might offer their "cooperation" in an effort to extract concessions and assurances from the Angolans and the United States. Moscow would probably insist that the prospective settlement be finalized and implemented under the auspices of the UN Security Council so as to ensure a Soviet role in the process. The Soviets would presumably press Luanda for strong assurances about its future political orientation and continued close ties to the USSR. Those assurances could take the form of Angolan agreement to a continued Soviet—and possibly Cuban—advisory presence in Angola and the elevation of pro-Soviet ideologues to key positions in the Luanda government. [Redacted]

Should they opt for a constructive role, the Soviets might also try to exploit the settlement in the US-Soviet bilateral context. For example, they could cite their willingness to "deal with the United States" as a gesture that warranted a reciprocal US move. Although Moscow probably would expect little to come of such a ploy, successful Soviet propagandizing of the USSR's role in a settlement could diminish the image of a Namibia settlement as a US diplomatic coup. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

Such concessions could somewhat assuage Soviet concern that a Cuban troop departure from Angola would be perceived as a Soviet defeat. Moscow would concurrently try to exploit some political and propaganda benefits from a Namibian settlement. The Soviets, for example, would be likely to:

- Point to the MPLA's continued "leftist orientation"—and US recognition of the MPLA—as evidence that the USSR had not suffered a setback.
- Claim credit for resolving the Namibia problem, particularly if it were ultimately brokered under the auspices of the UN Security Council.
- Cite its "constructive" role as evidence of its peaceful intentions.
- Argue that the Cuban departure from Angola was evidence of Havana's "unselfish" motives in aiding the MPLA and other Third World regimes since 1975.

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

### Trends in Soviet Naval Activity off West Africa

25X1

The Soviet naval presence off West Africa started as a response to crises—Ghana's seizure of Soviet fishing vessels in early 1969 and Guinean President Sekou Toure's frequent requests for support following raids by exiles in late 1970. This presence has been continuous since August 1971.

The size and activities of the West African patrol have varied from year to year, reaching a peak in 1978 with over 4,000 Soviet naval ship-days<sup>1</sup> in the region. A three-year decline followed, with a low of just under 1,600 ship-days in 1981, leading to speculation about the future of the patrol. In response to regional developments in 1982, the Soviet naval presence off West Africa jumped nearly 80 percent (see figure 1). We expect the patrol to continue at about the same level—total ship-days for the first five months of 1983 are roughly the same as for the comparable period in 1982.


#### Mission

The West African patrol serves during peacetime as a token Soviet force in the region—adequate to signal Moscow's political position in time of crisis. The patrol is of particular utility in demonstrating Moscow's support for the Marxist regime in Angola. When required it has expanded its scope of operations or its composition:

- The Soviet and Cuban airlift and sealift of military equipment to Marxist rebels during the Angolan civil war of 1975-76 was a vital element in that faction's success. The Soviet effort itself was greatly aided by use of facilities in Guinea—aviation fuel storage ashore and Soviet auxiliaries in Conakry. The Alligator-class landing ship normally on patrol off West Africa was supplemented with surface combatants
- TU-95 Bear D naval reconnaissance aircraft flew from Conakry probably to monitor Western naval responses to the Soviet and Cuban activities.

<sup>1</sup> A ship-day is the presence of one ship for one day.

Figure 1  
Soviet Ship-Days off West Africa, 1976-82



25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1


Top Secret


25X1


Top Secret




25X1

- In early 1981 a minesweeper that had been deployed to Conakry, two other combatants, and three auxiliaries moved to an area off the Moroccan coast in response to the seizure of Soviet fishing boats. A minesweeper remains on patrol there as a reminder of Soviet concern for its fishing fleet.
- In mid-August 1981 the Soviets responded to the escalating conflict between Angola and South Africa by moving three combatants to Luanda. Subsequently, these ships were moved to Mocamedes—closer to the battle zone—probably to signal greater concern over South Africa's military actions. Soviet ships continued to operate off southern Angola periodically during 1982.
- Ships deployed to West Africa contributed to the limited Soviet naval response to the Falkland Islands crisis. Although it spent much of its deployment near Conakry, an F-class submarine may have monitored portions of the northern leg of the British naval transit. 




Soviet naval ships also make show-the-flag visits to other West African littoral states. In 1982 this type of activity was highly visible. A Moskva-class helicopter carrier made the first deployment of its class to the region since 1974. It led a small task group that called in Lagos, Nigeria, and Luanda. A second task group visited Pointe Noire, Congo—the first Soviet naval call there since early 1976. 


We believe that in wartime the West African patrol would play only a limited military role. The patrol is small and has few combatants. It is unlikely to be reinforced, and its limited logistic support is vulnerable. The patrol would be most useful for monitoring Western naval activity prior to hostilities. It could also provide token interference to Western sea lines of communication, but this is a low Soviet priority. 

**Composition**

In recent years the Soviet presence in West African waters has normally included a surface combatant, an F-class diesel attack submarine, a minesweeper, an

amphibious ship (LST), auxiliaries, and research ships. The units are deployed from the Soviet Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets. Ships like the Alligator LST are ideal for the role—able to cruise independently for long periods on the littoral and capable of evacuating a threatened regime or Soviet citizens if necessary. 


25X1

During 1981, however, a landing ship was absent from the patrol for the first time since 1971. A general purpose submarine was present only a few weeks, and no major surface combatants were in the area for four months—limiting Soviet presence in the area to the mine warfare ship cruising off Morocco. This probably represents about the least Moscow can deploy to the region without eliminating its capability to rapidly respond to local crises and undermining political ties in the region. 

25X1


25X1

The composition of the force in 1982 returned to pre-1981 levels:

- An Alligator landing ship was again present along the littoral for several months.
- An F-class submarine returned for most of the year, at least partially in response to the Falklands crisis.
- The presence of surface combatants more than doubled from that of 1981.
- The presence of auxiliary and research ships increased substantially.
- A V-II-class nuclear attack submarine operated in the region and called in Luanda. Previously, V-II units had been in the area only during transits to the Indian Ocean. 

25X1

25X1

The resurgence reflects the importance to Moscow of visibly supporting Angola. Overt naval support to the dos Santos regime in 1982 also included delivery of missile patrol boats, antiship missiles, and coastal defense radars. 

25X1

25X1

**Command, Control, and Communications**

The Soviet naval force off West Africa is not a formal squadron like that in the Mediterranean. It is a patrol composed of the ships found in the West African operational area. The senior naval officer present in the area, who is usually aboard a landing ship or surface combatant in Luanda, exercises command.

25X1

Top Secret




25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Figure 2  
Operating Area of Soviet Naval Forces off West Africa



700143 (A03416) 9-83

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

**Soviet Naval Aviation**

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Since Toure canceled Soviet landing rights for Bear D's in 1977, they have staged periodically to Luanda although the facilities there do not offer the same advantages. Luanda's greater distance from the Soviet Union makes it necessary for these aircraft to stop over in Cuba en route to and from Angola, and aircraft in Angola are farther away from the transit routes of Western fleets in the North Atlantic. Deployments to Luanda have been irregularly patterned in recent years, with several long gaps.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] mobile short-range radio relay vans were delivered to Angola in early 1983. The radio vans could support increased naval activity in the Angolan area. Similar equipment in Vietnam is associated with a high-frequency direction finding system. [Redacted]

**Logistic Support**

Auxiliary ships provide the bulk of logistic support for the West African patrol. The Soviets generally keep a repair ship at a small Angolan naval base near Luanda. Minor maintenance is performed in this sheltered anchorage. Other auxiliaries replenish fuel and stores in the port as well. Ashore support consists of some housing and recreational facilities. [Redacted]

Use of Conakry for similar support activities has diminished in recent years as relations between the USSR and Guinea have cooled. Transiting ships occasionally use other littoral ports as replenishment points. [Redacted]

Although the logistic support for the patrol is limited by Western standards, it is adequate for peacetime operations. We think it unlikely that the Soviets will require expanded support in the future or be willing to make the considerable investment necessary to upgrade other facilities in the region. [Redacted]

**Outlook**

The Soviets are likely to maintain their increased commitment to Angola seen in 1982 and early 1983. If tensions in the region escalate, they may be prepared to upgrade the patrol by improving its communications capability and deploying more major surface combatants. In any event, Moscow will continue low-key attempts to better its access to airfields and seaports in the region. We do not foresee any major change, however, in the patrol's operations. It will remain a flexible, though minor, formation configured to serve the interests of Soviet foreign policy along the West African littoral. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1



Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

# Briefs

## Possible Preparations for New ICBM [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] Fifty SS-11 and 40 SS-17 ICBMs currently are deployed in silos at Kostroma. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

The expansion may be intended to support deployment of a new solid-propellant ICBM. Two such systems—the SS-X-24 and the SS-X-25—currently are being flight-tested and probably will begin deployment in about two or three years. The SS-X-24—a MIRVed ICBM about the size of the MX—has been tested from silos using modified SS-17 silo components and is a good candidate for deployment in the SS-17 silos. The single-RV SS-X-25 might replace the aging single-RV SS-11s at Kostroma, but initial deployment at the Soviets' only SS-13 complex (at Yoshkar-Ola) would be more consistent with Moscow's claim that the missile is associated with SS-13 modernization. [Redacted]

25X1

## Andropov on INF Talks [Redacted]

A TASS report last month stated that General Secretary Andropov told the head of a visiting US trade union delegation that the USSR will follow a constructive and flexible line in the Geneva talks until the US Government, as a result of its INF deployments in Europe, "compels us to concentrate on defensive countermeasures." [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

While promising "countermeasures," Andropov is refraining from stating categorically that the talks would be broken off once deployment begins. In private talks with West German Chancellor Kohl in July, Andropov parried a direct question about the prospects for negotiations by downgrading their importance in the light of the "new situation" that would be created by deployment. Andropov presumably wants to avoid a repeat of the problems caused by Foreign Minister Gromyko's remarks at a press conference in November 1979. On that occasion, Gromyko categorically ruled out East-West arms talks if the NATO states agreed to the INF basing decision the following month. [Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

**Economic Experiment Announced** [Redacted]

Moscow has announced an "economic experiment," to be instituted in selected industries on 1 January 1984, that is designed to boost worker productivity and to stimulate innovation in industry. Although the implementing decree is vague on specifics, some of the more important general measures are:

25X1

- Enterprises are to be allowed greater autonomy in using investment, wages, and R&D funds to stimulate innovation and introduce new technologies; greater access to bank credit to purchase new equipment; and increased flexibility to link worker and management wages more closely with enterprise performance.
- The current number of plan indicators is to be reduced and enterprise performance evaluated more strictly on the basis of (1) sales which meet contract obligations for assortment, quality, and timely delivery; (2) scientific and technological innovation; (3) productivity increases; and (4) production cost reductions. [Redacted]

25X1

Most of the "new measures" called for have been tried unsuccessfully before. The reordering of success indicators, for example, is a familiar gambit. Also, the call for increased enterprise control over R&D, wages, and investment fails to define how such powers would be exercised and implies that central authorities still would retain leverage over plant activities. [Redacted]

25X1

**The Labor Discipline Campaign—Round II** [Redacted]

Moscow has begun another phase of its campaign to improve labor discipline. It is introducing sanctions against laborers AWOL or drunk on the job and will give financial rewards to more productive workers. These measures, announced in August, are part of the strategy introduced by General Secretary Andropov last December to stimulate the faltering economy. The initial phase included arrests and police raids designed to get laggards off the street and back on the job. These harsh tactics, however, have been largely abandoned because they fostered too much resentment among the work force. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

The impact of this latest step on economic performance is likely to be less than the regime hopes. While the managers appear to have greater authority to crack down on shirkers, the sanctions are carefully limited. Moreover, a similar decree was announced in January 1980 but was administered only half-heartedly and proved largely ineffective. Managers have been reluctant to fire unproductive workers because of the current tight labor market and cumbersome grievance procedures. Judging from Andropov's statements, additional measures to reinforce labor's commitment to better job performance may be forthcoming. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Large Redacted Block]

Top Secret

[Redacted]


25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1



**Czechs Provide Armored Vehicle Hulls to Soviets** [Redacted]

[Redacted] the Rubtsovsk Agricultural Machinery Plant was producing BMP armored infantry combat vehicles that incorporated hulls produced in Czechoslovakia. The hull producer is believed to be the Construction Equipment and Armored Vehicle Plant in Detva, Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia and Poland have supplied completed armored vehicles to the Soviet Union in the past, but this is the first known instance of a non-Soviet major subassembly being integrated into a Soviet-produced armored vehicle. The time between the production of an individual hull in Czechoslovakia and its final assembly into a BMP in Rubtsovsk is very short, suggesting that the two facilities have a well-coordinated and efficiently run working relationship. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Soviets Warming Up to Contadora Effort** [Redacted]

Soviet officials and media have begun to give cautious support to the Contadora group—Venezuela, Mexico, Panama, and Colombia—by saying it is trying to achieve “a just settlement of the conflict in the region.” In May Mexico had sought the USSR’s endorsement of the group’s role and objectives, but Foreign Minister Gromyko said then that Moscow’s endorsement might cause an adverse US reaction. The change follows Cuban and Nicaraguan endorsements of the Contadora effort. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

The Soviet attitude probably shifted as a result of growing concern about US reactions to the Central American situation. Moscow may see the effort as a way to check US activities that it believes could threaten the Sandinista regime and increase chances for a US-Cuban or US-Soviet confrontation in the region. The USSR could be moving toward a more direct and authoritative statement following talks in Nicaragua by Soviet Foreign Ministry Secretary General Fokin and in Mexico and Costa Rica by roving Ambassador Mendelevich. [Redacted]

25X1

**USSR-China: Joint Inspections on Border Rivers** [Redacted]

[Redacted] USSR and China have reached an agreement on conducting joint inspections of shipping channels and navigational markers along their border rivers. The agreement was taken into account on 22 July, when a dispute over the placement of navigational markers on the Ussuri River was referred to the joint inspection teams for resolution. An earlier agreement, reached in early June, allows both sides to send work parties across the border for survey operations. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

The two agreements indicate that the USSR and China are seeking to cooperate on routine border river matters despite the broad political problems that still divide them. Moscow may hope that their conclusion could portend bilateral discussion of its proposal for confidence-building measures to ease tensions along the disputed border. Beijing has refused thus far to discuss such measures, however, and is insisting on addressing the major security issues impeding normalization. [Redacted]

25X1

**Grain Harvest Nearing Completion** [Redacted]

With the grain-harvesting campaign in the final stages, it still appears likely that the USSR will produce about 210 million tons of grain this year—the best showing since the 1978 record of 237 million tons. According to data released by the Central Statistical Administration on 17 September, 100.8 million hectares, more than 80 percent of the total area, had been cut. Except for recent delays caused by rainfall in the northernmost parts of the grain region, this year's harvest has proceeded at an unusually brisk pace. Moreover, the Soviet press indicates that the quality of grain harvested thus far is much improved over last year. While grain quality in the wet areas yet to be harvested probably will be somewhat poorer, current weather patterns suggest that Soviet farmers should be able to complete the harvest with little loss in quality. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] grain procurement data also point toward a good crop this year. Postharvest analysis of straw dumps indicates that actual grain yields correspond closely with those estimated earlier in the crop season. Preliminary grain procurement data from about one-third of the grain-growing oblasts indicate that procurement plans have been fulfilled in several major growing areas. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Foxhounds to the Far East [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

on Sakhalin Island where the SU-15 Flagon that shot down the Korean airliner is based.

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

The Soviet air defense posture in the Far East has stiffened since the shootdown of the KAL airliner, and this probably caused the deliveries [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted] demonstrating Soviet concern over improving Japanese, US, and Chinese air capabilities in the area. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret




25X1


# Viewpoint

*The views expressed in the following article are the author's; they do not necessarily represent a CIA consensus.*


## Did the Soviets Deceive the United States During the SALT I Negotiations?


25X1

At several crucial points in the SALT I negotiations for an offensive forces agreement, the Soviets are alleged to have deceived the United States about strategic capabilities that they had then or soon would have. By taking advantage of US uncertainties about their programs and by bargaining sharply about the wording of several provisions, they are supposed to have preserved their own ICBM and SLBM deployment plans from significant qualitative and quantitative restraints. The result of their efforts is said to have been an Interim Agreement on Offensive Forces that was essentially compatible with their previously planned strategic offensive programs. 

The United States tried three negotiating approaches to constrain Soviet missiles: first, a limit on the number of heavy ICBMs that each side could possess; second, a definition of a heavy ICBM that would prevent the replacement of light missiles with heavy ones; and third, a ban on increases in the dimensions of silo launchers. During the negotiations, the Soviets rejected the idea of incorporating explicit restrictions on the numbers of light and heavy ICBMs into the written agreement, although they accepted an obligation not to replace light ICBMs with heavy ones during the process of modernization. 


25X1  
25X1

This article will examine the three most frequently cited examples of alleged Soviet deceptive behavior during the SALT I negotiations. Through analysis of the negotiating record and weapons development programs, it will endeavor to determine whether Soviet conduct was marked by deliberate and consistent misrepresentation of the issues or merely by sharp, tough bargaining. 

The Soviets also did not accept the US proposal to define a *heavy ICBM* as a missile with a volume greater than 70 cubic meters—the volume of the “light” SS-11. They argued that the sides knew which missiles were light and which were heavy through the use of national technical means of verification. They also said that a definition which permitted no increase in the size of future missiles would be inconsistent with other provisions that permitted modernization and replacement. 

25X1  
25X1

### SS-19

A major US goal in the SALT I negotiations was to limit the capability of the Soviets to attack and destroy the Minuteman land-based ICBM force. When negotiations began in 1969, the major threat to US silos was posed by the “heavy” SS-9, a missile that carried an extremely large warhead capable of destroying a Minuteman launcher in spite of its relatively poor accuracy. 

Soviet negotiators were reluctant to ban any increases in the dimensions of silo launchers, arguing that in the process of modernization the sides might find it necessary to make “certain insignificant alterations” to them. One Soviet also noted that the size of a launcher could be changed without making any


25X1

Top Secret




25X1


Top Secret



25X1


change in the size of a missile, and that the capabilities of a missile could be changed without altering its size. Such criteria, he continued, were therefore imperfect for distinguishing between light and heavy missiles. 

25X1


Prior to May 1972, the US Intelligence Community knew that the Soviets were developing several new ICBMs, but virtually no flight test data on their characteristics and sizes were available. The Community estimated that a new missile in the SS-11 class, but somewhat larger, was being developed and would be fired from retrofitted SS-11 silos. While we had indications that this missile (subsequently designated the SS-19) could be launched from a canister of about the same diameter as that used for the SS-11, we did not know the diameter or length of the new missile itself or, therefore, its volume. 

25X1

25X1

The Soviets made clear during the negotiations that they disagreed with the US-proposed definition of a heavy missile and, while they did not discuss details relating to the SS-19, were careful to oppose US proposals that were inconsistent with its characteristics. When a US adviser asked a Soviet in December 1971 if he would consider a 90-cubic-meter missile to be in the "heavy" category (which was the US view), his Soviet counterpart replied in the negative. Another Soviet adviser expressed dismay with a US proposal to define a *heavy ICBM* as a missile with a volume more than 5 percent greater than that of the largest light ICBM. 

25X1


The Soviets had their own view of acceptable criteria to distinguish between light and heavy missiles. One of their advisers at SALT told a US colleague in February 1972 that the dividing point should be halfway between the volumes of the largest existing missiles of both types, and that this point could be determined by national technical means. 


25X1

25X1

25X1

Although taciturn regarding their new ICBM programs, the Soviets did not describe them falsely. A senior Soviet negotiator told a US delegate in May

1972 that the USSR had one, and perhaps two, missiles of different dimensions under design as replacements for the SS-11 and intimated that testing of these systems had already begun. He also said that the volumes of these new missiles would fall below the halfway point between current light and heavy ICBMs. He acknowledged to his US interlocutor that the "modernized SS-11" would be less than 140 cubic meters, a number which he said was "not too far" from the midpoint between the SS-11 and the SS-9. Since the Soviets had endorsed the idea of a freeze on construction of silo launchers from the beginning of the negotiations, it was obvious that most, if not all, of these replacement missiles would have to be deployed in SS-11 silos. 

Prior to the 1972 summit, therefore, the Soviets had given US negotiators several indicators of their own views on this subject. They had mentioned a criterion for distinguishing between light and heavy ICBMs, had indicated a likely size for the SS-19 that fell within this framework, had suggested the extent of its deployment, and had intimated that production of the system was already under way. Even at the end of the negotiations, when the United States placed a "unilateral statement" in the formal SALT record that defined a *heavy missile* as one "significantly greater than the largest light ICBM now operational on either side," the Soviets submitted a response that noted that the subject had been discussed at length and that no understanding had been reached. Moscow's position, therefore, was consistently firm in reflecting a major disagreement with the US side on this subject and did not reflect an approach requiring deliberate and consistent misleading of the United States. 

25X1

**Asymmetrical Ceilings**

During the SALT I negotiations, the Soviets argued that the US forward-area submarine bases permitted US nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to remain within firing range of the USSR a greater percentage of time than Soviet submarines could remain within range of the United States. The Soviets also argued that the deployment of SLBM submarines by Great Britain and France added to US capabilities despite any direct limits on US forces.

Top Secret



25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Page Denied**




**Top Secret**



25X1

***Implications***

The negotiating record, therefore, appears to show that the Soviets practiced sharp and tough bargaining on all of these issues but did not engage in deliberate and consistent misrepresentation. They left it up to the United States to learn enough about the USSR's programs to negotiate effective limitations, did not volunteer information readily, and did not correct US ignorance or misperceptions when they worked to Moscow's advantage. The Soviets were firm in setting forth areas of disagreement with the United States and negotiated vigorously to protect programs that they considered important. They considered themselves obligated to comply with only those limitations to which they had explicitly consented. 



25X1

25X1

**Top Secret**



25X1

**Page Denied**

**Top Secret**

25X1



**Top Secret**