




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# Soviet Use of Overseas Naval Facilities



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A Research Paper

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IA 83-10129JX

December 1983

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
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# Soviet Use of Overseas Naval Facilities



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**A Research Paper**

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Soviet Analysis, and [redacted]  
Office of Imagery Analysis [redacted]

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
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**Soviet Use of Overseas Naval Facilities**

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**Summary**

*Information available as of 1 June 1983 was used in this report.*

The Soviet Navy uses port and air facilities abroad to ease the burden of sustaining peacetime deployments to distant areas. Such facilities also have some potential value in wartime or during regional conflicts. However, the Soviets' operating philosophy—reinforced by their expulsion from facilities in Egypt and Somalia—incorporates heavy reliance on large numbers of auxiliary ships and minimizes dependence on overseas facilities.

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Many of the ports to which the Soviets have access—particularly in the Third World—have such rudimentary repair or resupply facilities that they are little more than protected areas in which Soviet naval auxiliaries provide logistic services. Nonetheless, such ports offer advantages over anchorages in international waters because supplies and personnel can be transported to them, stable communications can be established ashore, and more extensive upkeep can be performed. Further, expanding access to individual facilities offers long-term possibilities of Soviet-sponsored port improvements that may later be available to Soviet ships.

[Redacted]

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One of the more valuable functions of overseas facilities is their contribution to surveillance or reconnaissance, the major peacetime missions of Soviet naval forces abroad. In the Caribbean, for example, intelligence collection platforms—Bear aircraft and specially configured ships (AGIs)—comprise most of the Soviets' marginal naval presence. Access to regional facilities is essential for the operation of the aircraft and can extend the endurance of AGIs, thereby reducing the burden on the Navy's logistic system.

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Acquisition of naval privileges diversifies Moscow's options to influence regional developments.<sup>1</sup> By helping to sustain regional deployments, such facilities improve Moscow's ability to use naval forces for rapid crisis response. None of the facilities to which the Soviets have extensive access, however, is suitable to house a regional contingency force without substantial improvements or short-term improvisation.

[Redacted]

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<sup>1</sup> Politically, Moscow views such privileges as a means of highlighting its role as an international power, underscoring its interest in a region, or enhancing its relations with a host government.

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Despite their operating philosophy and past experiences, the Soviets will continue to seize opportunities for naval privileges—particularly for reconnaissance aircraft—at overseas facilities. We do not expect their search to be more aggressive unless their requirements to support naval forces abroad expand so dramatically as to exceed the capabilities of the current mixture of afloat and land-based logistics. Neither production trends nor deployment patterns indicate such a change. Further, because much of the Soviet peacetime naval presence serves political ends, overseas facilities will continue to be located where they can contribute to Soviet regional goals. 

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### Soviet Use of Overseas Naval Facilities



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#### Introduction

Soviet naval operations in distant areas have expanded dramatically since the mid-1960s. Data provided by the Naval Operations Intelligence Center (NOIC) show that the rapid growth in out-of-area deployment stabilized in the mid-1970s but turned upward again in 1980 with the reinforcement of the Indian Ocean Squadron (see figure 1). The Soviet presence in foreign waters has declined somewhat from the 1980 record total but remains above the level of the mid-1970s.


The Soviets maintain squadrons in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, have contingents of ships operating off West Africa and in the South China Sea, and periodically deploy task groups to the Caribbean. Soviet naval aircraft fly reconnaissance or antisubmarine warfare (ASW) patrols from South Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, Cuba, and Vietnam.

To support the operation of their warships deployed to distant areas, the Soviets rely on a combination of afloat logistics and access to local facilities. Together, these provide such essential services as crew rest and rotation, maintenance, repair, and resupply of provisions and munitions. In wartime, the role of local naval and air facilities would be restricted by their vulnerability, their limited equipment, and the wariness of host governments about becoming involved.

#### Soviet Use of Overseas Facilities

In each region where the Soviets routinely station naval forces, access to at least one regional facility generally supplements the logistic support provided by naval auxiliaries or merchant tankers under naval contract. The terms of Soviet access<sup>2</sup> and the support provided at these facilities vary widely.

<sup>2</sup> Limited access, [redacted] that the Soviets have had in Annaba, Algeria, exempts a specified number of ships from normal port requirements. It may include priority for Soviet ships at berth and bunkering or repair facilities. Unrestricted access, which Soviet ships appear to have in Luanda, Angola, permits ships to operate almost as though they were in a home port, observing local regulations only for health, safety, and sanitation.




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
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**Figure 1**  
**Soviet Naval Deployments in Distant Waters, by Region, 1974-82**



<sup>a</sup> West African ship-days for 1974-75 are included in Atlantic Ocean data for those years.



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
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**Logistic Support Facilities**

**Indian Ocean.** The major land-based support areas for the Indian Ocean Squadron are at Aden, South Yemen, and Dahlak Island, Ethiopia. Soviet ships have called at Aden since 1969 and have used the port as a logistic center since Moscow's expulsion from Berbera, Somalia in 1977. Moscow does not have a formal basing agreement with South Yemen and makes only limited use of the port's potential. Aden's main contribution is its plentiful supply of fresh water. The Soviets do not appear to use the port's small repair yard or the local petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) supply, but do keep a support ship and a small oiler there. Their combatants often refuel prior to entering the harbor for reprovisioning, crew rest or rotation, and mail call. 

Syria, for maintenance of its diesel-powered submarines. The monthly upkeep cycle in Tartus extends the deployment time of the submarines that transit to the Mediterranean Sea from the Northern Fleet. In addition, the Soviets keep a stores barge in Tartus and rotate other auxiliaries—such as the Squadron's water tender—through the port. Soviet combatants do not use Syrian facilities such as the oil terminal. 


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**West African Waters.** The main port used by the small contingent of ships serving off West Africa is Luanda, Angola, where Soviet combatants generally moor at the small naval base across from the commercial port. A small repair ship services Soviet warships and Angolan patrol craft, and the oiler serving with the West African patrol normally operates from Luanda. Other support ships traveling with combatants transferring between fleets or en route to the Indian Ocean use Luanda as a sheltered harbor for maintenance.<sup>3</sup> 

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At Dahlak Island,  the Soviets have installed floating piers, POL storage, and maintenance and barracks buildings. They keep a drydock for small combatants and diesel submarines, a stores barge, and a repair ship at the island. Most combatants serving in the Indian Ocean call at Dahlak Island at least once during their deployments.


Use of these overseas facilities as sheltered areas for maintenance and resupply extends peacetime deployment periods and permits the Navy to allocate its resources more effectively. In a prewar period, overseas logistic services could enhance the combat readiness of naval forces. Without substantial upgrading, however, none of these facilities could provide logistic support for sustained combat operations in a major war. Their repair capabilities are inadequate to cope with the extensive damage that warships would be likely to sustain. The Soviets do not have naval munitions stored ashore at these facilities, have not tested their ability to resupply combatants, and do not rehearse cargo transfers to warships even in ports regularly used for arms deliveries. They do not have fuel depots ashore or supply lines to these facilities for fuel and other supplies to supplement the limited stocks carried by auxiliary ships. These ports could provide improvised wartime logistic services while improvements were being made. 

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 Dahlak's potential for expanded logistic support is limited by its lack of fresh water and its vulnerable location inside the Red Sea. It could easily be cut off from sources of supply on the mainland or in Aden. 

**Western Pacific Ocean.** Soviet ships deployed to distant areas of the Pacific use Cam Rahn Bay, Vietnam, extensively as a transit stop and to support their operations in the South China Sea. The Soviets have refurbished the two piers that originally served the US supply facility at Cam Ranh and added three floating piers. According to US Navy data, they keep about seven auxiliary ships in the area, including a small repair ship and a drydock for small combatants. Normally, combatants are replenished by oilers accompanying them; there are no bunkering or POL storage facilities. 

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
<sup>3</sup> The small floating drydock at Luanda services Soviet fisheries' ships. 

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**Mediterranean Sea.** After Moscow was expelled from its facilities in Alexandria, Egypt, the Mediterranean Squadron began to use a depot ship moored in Tartus,

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
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**Figure 2**  
**Distant Deployments of Soviet Naval Aircraft**



Aircraft days in country  
5,000  
4,000  
3,000  
2,000  
1,000  
0

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**Reconnaissance Aircraft**

The Soviet Navy's use of maritime reconnaissance and ASW patrol aircraft stationed abroad has increased more than fivefold since 1979 (see figure 2). The Soviets now keep a pair of medium-range IL-38 May ASW patrol aircraft in Ethiopia and in South Yemen, a pair of long-range TU-95 Bear D reconnaissance aircraft and a pair of long-range TU-142 Bear

F ASW patrol aircraft in Vietnam, and at least two Bear D's in Cuba. They also periodically deploy Bear D's to Angola, Bear F's to Cuba, and Mays to Libya.

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In using regional airfields, Moscow keeps its requirements to a minimum and relies on transport flights from the USSR or a small group of technicians on site to support the aircraft. Initially, transport aircraft will remain with the reconnaissance aircraft throughout the deployment, as in Libya. As the Soviets develop more extensive ground-based support, as they have in Cuba, transport flights may be irregular and eventually be discontinued. The Soviets prefer to secure an area of the airfield for their own use and to have their own POL storage, but will forgo these conveniences in the interest of maintaining a low profile.

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In Cuba and South Yemen, the Soviets have moved their air operations to upgraded military airfields, probably because of heightened security. They have improved the airfield that they use in Vietnam but have not made a major investment there.

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Aircraft using foreign facilities can monitor naval movements in areas of high Soviet interest, but there are gaps in coverage, such as the southern Indian Ocean (see figure 3).

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the aircraft make a major contribution to Soviet surveillance efforts because of their ability to provide accurate information, cover large areas, and respond quickly. During hostilities, reconnaissance aircraft could furnish locating data and target information for missile-equipped combatants so long as regional airfields remained operational. Given the size of their inventory, we do not expect the Soviets would deploy additional ASW aircraft

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overseas in wartime. The small number of these aircraft already at foreign bases is insufficient to conduct effective wartime ASW operations, and the Soviets would be likely to use them primarily for reconnaissance. [Redacted]

During regional conflicts, the Soviets could use aircraft deployed abroad to monitor ground forces activity or to provide security intelligence to the host government. In addition, airfields now used by Soviet naval aircraft, as well as those elsewhere, could be used for demonstrations of Soviet support for the host government, similar to Soviet deployment of naval aircraft to Syria for a joint exercise in 1981. [Redacted]

[Large Redacted Block]

Ocean. In 1980 reinforcement of the Indian Ocean Squadron involved a delay of at least 12 days while units transited from Vladivostok [Redacted]

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Contingency response may eventually involve the use of overseas facilities to base tactical aircraft and to pre-position supplies and personnel. Currently, the Soviets' power projection capability is modest, but the ongoing upgrading of amphibious forces and other improvements in the Navy will ultimately provide Moscow the option of using naval force against any but the most well-armed regional powers or substantial Western opposition. None of the facilities that the Soviet Navy now routinely uses is suitable to support a contingency response force larger than that routinely deployed overseas on LSTs, [Redacted]

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**Potential for Expanded Use of Overseas Facilities**

Moscow is predisposed against reliance on overseas facilities. We believe that Soviet planners regard the wartime use of foreign naval facilities as questionable because of their high vulnerability and because the most crucial naval missions in wartime will be close to Soviet home waters.<sup>5</sup> In peacetime, the Soviet Navy's system of afloat logistics and low-activity level during distant deployments minimize its need for land-based support. Moreover, their expulsion from both Egypt and Somalia has made the Soviets wary of substantial investments in naval facilities where their access is subject to unstable political agreements and has reinforced Moscow's view that local facilities are a supplement to, rather than a replacement for, afloat logistics. [Redacted]

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**Contingency Response**

To the extent that overseas facilities contribute to the Soviets' ability to maintain standing naval forces in a region, they also make it possible for Moscow to move forces rapidly to nearby crisis areas or to reinforce existing contingents. Ships lingering in Cam Ranh Bay, for example, can patrol the South China Sea and be available for emergency transit to the Indian

The problems associated with securing and maintaining access to foreign facilities reinforce the USSR's predisposition. These include Moscow's desire to avoid the "neocolonialist" label often associated with foreign "bases," reluctance to trade hard currency reserves for naval privileges as some Third World

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
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Figure 3  
Overseas Facilities and Anchorages Used by Soviet Naval Forces



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nations request, and caution about becoming entangled in the adventurous policies of a host government. In addition, the Soviets occasionally are unable to overcome the host government's fears that granting naval privileges will compromise its independence or make it a target in the event of a US-Soviet war.<sup>6</sup>

We expect to continue to see regional reinforcement when necessary but do not expect it to require major changes in land-based support.

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We believe that there are several operational factors that may either reinforce Soviet biases about foreign facilities or encourage a more active search for naval privileges. These factors are:

Modernization of Soviet naval forces may lead the Soviets to seek additional facilities on the scale of Dahlak Island. As more technologically complex combatants replace those that have been the backbone of distant operations, such as the F-class diesel-powered attack submarine (SS), the Navy's need for interim upkeep may increase. Frequent overseas maintenance periods—although insufficient for major emergencies—could minimize the breakdowns to which these ships may be susceptible and thereby improve the Navy's ability to sustain its peacetime presence.

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- Fluctuations in the level of distant deployments.
- The changing composition of deployed naval groups as a result of force modernization.
- The capability of the auxiliary force to meet the needs of naval forces overseas.
- Changes in Soviet evaluations of the duration of a conventional phase of war.

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Expansion of overseas deployment is likely to be so gradual that it will not generate a pressing need for additional facilities abroad. The Soviet Navy already operates in those areas where we believe Moscow expects to maintain a presence in the foreseeable future, and the Navy has acquired adequate naval privileges to supplement afloat logistics during peacetime. Although the level of presence has fluctuated within and between geographic regions, the overall level of Soviet combatant presence in distant areas has remained relatively stable. Surge deployments responding to regional crises or to changes in Western force levels, which have accounted for most of the upward trends in recent years, normally do not have a permanent effect on Soviet regional presence.<sup>7</sup> We believe that the overall stability in overseas deployments of combatants indicates that they are nearly at an optimum level from Moscow's perspective. Current commitments permit the Navy to support Soviet policy abroad without sacrificing wartime readiness.

Simultaneous augmentation of naval forces in different regions might require increased land-based logistic support unless there are improvements in afloat logistics. Production of fleet support auxiliaries has come almost to a standstill in recent years. This stagnation, which raises questions about Soviet capabilities to support sustained naval combat, eventually may impinge on out-of-area operations. The existing auxiliary force is adequate for normal peacetime operations and for short-term reinforcement. Unless upgraded, however, we believe it would be hard pressed to sustain sharply increased deployments to more than one distant area.

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Finally, Soviet expectations of increased likelihood of prolonged conventional conflict with NATO naval forces may lead Moscow to seek greater use of facilities overseas, primarily to store supplies and munitions in excess of those that can be carried by auxiliary or combatant ships.

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In general we believe that these factors will encourage the Soviets to seize opportunities to improve existing facilities or secure new naval privileges, particularly for naval aircraft. They will not, however, dictate a high level of pressure on current or potential host governments. Changes in individual regions will depend partially on developments outside Moscow's

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[Redacted]

<sup>7</sup> Analysis of US Navy data shows that, following augmentation in the Mediterranean in 1981 and 1982 to monitor Western responses to Syrian-Israeli tensions, the Squadron returned to its normal size as tensions abated and ships resumed their normal duties. Data for the Indian Ocean since the dramatic upsurge in the wake of the hostage crisis show a consistent decline in force levels.

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control—the stimulus of regional tensions sparking expanded Western force levels, shifting local alliances, and opportunities presented by the insecurity of many Third World states. Currently, Libya's apparent sense of vulnerability makes it a prime target of opportunity. Moscow also has shown interest in potential naval ties with the southwest Indian Ocean states, Sri Lanka, and North Yemen, and in reversing the restrictions imposed by Tunisia, Guinea, and Singapore. Access to additional facilities in the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea appears to be of less immediate interest.

### Characteristics of Overseas Facilities Used by the Soviet Navy

The following five sections describe Soviet naval privileges in individual states and the physical characteristics of port and air facilities. Support facilities are grouped by region, and each section includes some discussion of the Soviets' use of commercial shipyards, interest in supplementary access, and reliance on anchorages in international waters (see figure 3). Data on facilities are drawn from a combination of sources, including analysis of overhead photography, Clyde Port Authority *Ports of the World*, US Navy *Port Information*, the Defense Mapping Agency *Sailing Directions*, DIA Port Studies, the *Airfield and Seaplane Stations of the World*, and conversations with DIA and CIA analysts.

Data such as berthing and storage space or capacity of repair facilities—which are presented in the tables—are the basis for evaluating a port's role in providing logistic support. A port's capability to accommodate various naval ships takes into account the mean draft, displacement, and length of the individual unit and the depths in the harbor, at the quay, and in anchorage areas. Most Soviet submarines that deploy abroad—F-, J-, E-, C-, and V-classes—have depth requirements similar to those of large destroyers or small to medium cruisers. In estimating depth requirements, we allow at least 2 meters of clearance. Length of berthing spaces is not restrictive; ships can moor stern in to conserve room.

Physical data can also help determine a port's potential as a stepping-off point for regional intervention. The composition of an intervening force is highly speculative and depends on the scenario. For example, if the Soviets were to pre-position an assault force in a foreign port area for any length of time, some semi-permanent storage, parking, and housing facilities would be required. To conceal some heavy equipment or prevent deterioration due to climate conditions, the Soviets would probably need some covered storage. A hypothetical force of some elements of a battalion landing group might need accommodations for between 700 and 800 people, 1,550 square meters (m<sup>2</sup>) of parking for support vehicles, and 1,925m<sup>2</sup> of shed space primarily for combat equipment. Moving personnel and equipment ashore from amphibious landing ships would pose no technical problem in ports with beaching areas or cargo piers. Supporting such a force over time would require allocation of some cargo facilities for delivery of spare parts and supplies, particularly in ports like Conakry where provisions are scarce.

Among the Soviets' major concerns about deployments of naval aircraft are the type of aircraft an airfield can accommodate. The field's runway length and its surface are prime considerations. Support facilities can be important for extended deployments but are less restrictive: maintenance personnel, spare parts, and POL can be delivered to poorly equipped fields. The runway length required for takeoff roll varies for different types of aircraft and is a function of the aircraft's weight, the airfield's altitude, and the temperature. At sea-level conditions and standard temperature (59°F/15°C), a TU-95 Bear D or F at maximum weight requires a hard-surface runway of about 3,000 meters for operational deployments. An IL-38 May requires about 2,000 meters under the same conditions. Lessening the aircraft's weight by removing weapons, fuel, or sonobuoys decreases the runway requirement but also cuts back the aircraft's time on station or in the search area. At higher temperatures and elevation, aircraft require greater runway roll space.

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
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**Mediterranean Sea**

In recent years, the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron has stabilized at an average of about 45 ships, including seven or eight general purpose submarines, nine or 10 surface ships, and 27 auxiliaries. The Squadron monitors Western naval movements—frequently trailing carrier battle groups—demonstrates Moscow's ties to various littoral states, and conducts training operations in the spring and fall. In wartime, the missions of the squadron would include destruction of Western ballistic or cruise missile submarines targeted against the USSR and neutralization of Western aircraft carriers and amphibious ships that might disrupt the Pact's ground campaign.<sup>8</sup>




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**Naval Facilities in Syria**

**Soviet Use.** The Soviets use the Syrian naval base at Tartus as a secure mooring for the depot ship that provides routine upkeep on the diesel submarines serving in the Mediterranean, the majority of which come from the Northern Fleet. Mobile auxiliaries shuttle water, spare parts, and other supplies from Tartus to combatants moored or operating elsewhere in the Mediterranean. The Squadron flagship calls regularly in Tartus, and, during periods of tension, such as the hostilities with Israel in the summer of 1982, Soviet combatants may remain in port or patrol the surrounding area.



**Ports and Airfields.** The port of Tartus, which is north of the city at Al Mina, was built in the early 1970s. It consists of several piers and a turning basin protected by two breakwaters (see figure 4). The harbor houses Syria's main naval base. The port is heavily congested, and long-term expansion currently under way includes the construction of a new basin between the central and north moles and the completion of the central mole. Because Tartus has no repair facilities, a shipyard and drydock have been proposed.

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


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Latakia is Syria's major seaport and a secondary naval base where some of the Syrian Navy's Osa-class patrol boats are kept. The inner harbor, defined by a breakwater that was extended in the late 1970s, has berthing on all three sides. Latakia is located on a restricted area of the Syrian coast so that approach and anchorage are carefully controlled. Because of congestion in the port, expansion is under way at Latakia. A reclamation project to the north of the original port probably will provide additional berths for merchant ships.

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Soviet ships call occasionally at Latakia but do not use the facilities there. Although the port has at least as much potential for logistic support as Tartus, the Soviets are probably put off by its commercial crowding, which would prohibit the scheduled repairs possible in Tartus. In addition, Latakia is inaccessible during heavy winter storms, which force the cessation of cargo operations.



<sup>8</sup> In September 1983 the USSR made a second deployment of May aircraft to Syria.

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
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**Syria**

**Tartus Port Facilities**


*Berths* Twelve berths at six piers; 12 anchorages inside the breakwaters.

*Depths* At harbor entrance and turning basin dredged to 11 to 13 meters; at piers, 4 to 11 meters.

*Storage space* Area of 64,000 square meters.

*Cargo equipment* At least nine cranes, including a 125-ton floating crane.

*Fuel and water* Water and bunkers are supplied by trucks on quays. Oil terminal to the north can accommodate one 100,000-ton tanker.

*Repair facilities* None. 

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**Latakia Port Facilities**


*Berths* Eight berths along 1,490 meters of quay space.

*Depths* At quays, up to 9.5 meters; at offshore pipeline berth, about 17 meters; at anchorages, up to 20 meters.

*Storage space* Area of 174,000 square meters.

*Cargo equipment* At least 50 cranes, including two floating cranes.

*Fuel and water* Water is available from hydrants on quays or from small boats (lighters); fuel is provided by trucks.

*Repair facilities* One 4,500-ton floating drydock; small boatyard in the old harbor. 


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**Tiyas Airfield**

*Main runway* 3,170 x 61 meters.

*Surface* Asphalt.

*Other runways* Five deteriorated earth strips used for emergencies.

*Fuel, maintenance, and support facilities* Two concrete hardstands, 20 hardened aircraft shelters for MIG-21 Fishbeds or SU-7 Fitters 

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Tiyas is the home base for about 50 fighter aircraft of the Syrian Air Force. The main runway could accommodate Soviet long-range reconnaissance aircraft and could be extended further. Damascus International Airfield could accommodate similar aircraft, but Latakia could not. Soviet transports have used various airfields to support the airlift of military equipment.



**Naval Facilities in Algeria**

**Soviet Use.** Three or four times a year, a Soviet submarine and tender spend several weeks in Annaba, Algeria. [redacted] the tender performs the minor maintenance chores that cannot be done at open moorings—work on outer compartments or sonar systems. Soviet surface combatants also call occasionally at Annaba, [redacted]

[redacted] there is no local support for Soviet ships. [redacted]

Soviet ships have had priority entry in Annaba since the mid-1970s, but the US Defense Attache Office (USDAO) noted in early 1982 that Algeria's cordiality was waning. [redacted] Algiers downgraded a Soviet task group visit in late 1981—the first formal call since 1978—from an "official" to a "friendly" visit. Moreover, the government also approved a US port call later the same month—the first such call in 17 years. While the Soviet group was in port, there was no local publicity and the ships were not open to the public. [redacted]

Algeria has consistently resisted Soviet efforts to link arms deals with expanded privileges. [redacted]

[redacted] Soviet prices are not good enough to warrant such concessions. Embassy sources note, moreover, that the Algerian Navy is dissatisfied with the quality of Soviet equipment, dubious about its seaworthiness, and divided on the issue of diversifying naval purchases. [redacted]

**Ports and Airfields.** Annaba is primarily a cargo port that can berth or moor ships the size of a Kirov cruiser. The port has no large-scale repair facilities, but its artificial harbor and anchorages are well sheltered and suitable for minor maintenance by auxiliary ships (see figure 5). [redacted]

The port of Oran consists of two harbors, one of which is Mers el Kebir Naval Base. The commercial port is divided by moles into four basins normally filled by medium-size freighters. The naval harbor can accommodate all sizes of combatants, but some of its berths are closed during bad weather. [redacted]

[redacted] plans to upgrade the naval construction facility resurfaced in 1981. [redacted]



Proposals have included installation of a larger floating drydock and construction of a new shipbuilding facility. [redacted]

The large artificial harbor at Algiers has three basins that can accommodate ships up to the size of large cruisers. It is a well-equipped commercial cargo port but has only small-scale repair facilities. [redacted]

The airfield 20 km outside Algiers—Dar el Beida—has regular flights to Europe and North Africa. The airfield serving Oran does not handle international air traffic. If IL-38 Mays had access to Algiers, they could conduct surveillance of the western Mediterranean, but the aircraft would have little on-station time in the eastern Mediterranean. [redacted]

**Soviet Use of Commercial Facilities in the Mediterranean**

The Soviet Navy uses several shipyards for overhaul of submarines and auxiliary ships. Although the shipyards frequently negotiate repair contracts on a commercial basis, the individual governments generally retain the right to approve, revoke, or regulate the terms of a contract. For several littoral states, repair of Soviet naval ships provides a needed source of revenue to flagging shipbuilding industries. [redacted]

**Tunisia.** In Tunisia, Moscow uses the Manzil bu Ruqaybah Shipyard at Bizerte. Located to the south of the commercial port, the shipyard has four drydocks operated by the Societe de Construction et des Reparations Merchanique et Navale (SOCOMENA). The largest of the docks can accommodate ships the size of medium cruisers. Although the work force lacks the skill for major repairs and the equipment is

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
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antiquated by Western standards, routine overhaul of medium-size combatants and diesel submarines can be done. Almost 50 Soviet naval ships (mainly auxiliaries) have been serviced at Manzil bu Ruqaybah since the first commercial contracts in 1977. Tunisia's other main ports—Tunis, Susah, and Safaqis—are either inaccessible to major combatants or lack repair facilities. [Redacted]

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Early in 1979 Tunisia decided to prohibit repairs to Soviet submarines, partly (as a Tunisian official noted) in response to Western pressure. Tunis has consistently argued that it cannot afford to cut off Soviet business completely. Its Minister of National Economy reports that Moscow has tried to have the ban reversed several times. We believe that such Soviet

efforts highlight the operational importance of local repair facilities for submarines serving in the Mediterranean. [Redacted]

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**Yugoslavia.** Legislation passed in 1974 tightly controls the use of Yugoslav ports. Foreign navies can have only two ships repaired in any one port simultaneously and can use only yards designated by the National Secretariat. Repairs are limited to warships under 4,000 tons or auxiliaries under 10,000 tons. Ships must offload all weapons, disembark one-third of their crew, and limit their stay to six months. Yugoslavia prohibits the storage of foreign fuel or equipment. [Redacted]

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**Algeria**

**Annaba Port Facilities**

*Berths* Twenty-four, of which seven are bulk cargo berths.

*Depths* At harbor entrance, 13 meters; at berths, 2.5 to 13 meters.

*Storage space* Area of 13,391 square meters of shed space.

*Cargo equipment* Twenty cranes from 3- to 110-ton lift capacity.

*Fuel and water* Freshwater is supplied at wharves; fuel oil and diesel oil are available. Port contains a five-berth tanker terminal.

*Repair facilities* One graving dock with lifting capacity of 100 to 200 tons.

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**Oran Port Facilities**

*Berths* Twenty cargo berths, two tanker berths, one RO/RO berth.

*Depths* At harbor entrance, 24 meters; at berths, 6.1 to 10 meters.

*Storage space* Area of 48,544 square meters of shed space.

*Cargo facilities* Forty-two cranes, from 3 to 40 tons.

*Fuel and water* Diesel, fuel, and gas oil are available commercially. Bunkers and water are available at the tanker terminal.

*Repair facilities* Three slipways for minor repairs.

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**Algiers Port Facilities**

*Berths* Fifty-four, including two tanker berths and three RO/RO berths.

*Depths* At entrances, 16 and 22 meters; at berths, up to 11.5 meters.

*Storage space* Extensive covered and open storage.

*Cargo facilities* Cranes at all cargo berths and two floating cranes.

*Fuel and water* Supplied by barge or pipeline.

*Repair facilities* Two drydocks with maximum capacity of 4,000 tons.

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Currently, Tivat in Kotor Bay is the only port designated for naval repairs. Yards at Rejika, Split, Zadar, Sibenik, Trogir, and Pula could also service naval ships. Several have extensive construction, repair, and bunkering facilities. Several are civilian yards whose use for military overhauls would be at the expense of substantial services to merchant vessels—many of them Soviet. [Redacted]

The Soviets have used Tivat regularly since 1974. Normally, they rotate one F-class submarine and a submarine tender for a six-month repair period, during which both usually are scraped and painted, and interior work is done on the submarine. Since March 1980, according to US Navy data, the Soviets have had an additional naval ship visiting in port when the tender arrives. By law, Yugoslav laborers do all repair work, although the Soviet crewmembers remaining aboard may take advantage of time in port for inspections and repairs. According to US Navy personnel, Soviet crews use a large warehouse or barracks building as an entertainment center, and the USDAO in Belgrade states that it is generally believed that Soviet submarine crews are housed in the shipyard. [Redacted]

The Soviets generally comply with the letter of Yugoslav law, but [Redacted] cases of evasion—such as having more than two naval units in port simultaneously, calling at nondesignated ports, exceeding the 10-day limit for port calls, and using yards other than Tivat for repairs to naval auxiliaries disguised as merchants. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

The entrance to Tivat harbor is only dredged to about 6 meters—limiting entry to small destroyers, frigates, or diesel submarines. Sava Kovacevic Shipyard at Tivat is the Yugoslav Navy's main repair yard. Repair facilities at Tivat include three floating dry-docks, the largest a Soviet-built dock with a lift

capacity of 12,000 tons. Since its delivery in 1975, the dock has been used only by Soviet tenders and submarines, although it could accommodate combatants as large as a Kresta-II. The shipyard also has a ship lifting basin (syncrolift) to move small combatants and submarines (although not F-class SS's) ashore and a 4,500-ton dock that provides warranty service for Libya's F-class submarines. The halls and shops associated with the yard appear to have the capability to repair all ships' systems. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

**Greece.** Of the numerous Greek shipyards with the capability for sophisticated repairs, the only one to negotiate a contract for Soviet naval ships is Neorion Shipyard on Siros Island. The initial agreement negotiated in 1979 resulted in servicing of six naval auxiliaries between October 1979 and October 1980. The agreement also sparked considerable controversy within NATO; the Greek Government—then engaged in discussions of reintegrating its armed forces into NATO—eventually altered the terms of the commercial contract so that each repair was examined on an ad hoc basis. Subsequent negotiations to renew this contract extended through 1981 and the election that brought the Socialists to power. [Redacted]

[Redacted] In January 1982 *The New York Times* reported Greek Government confirmation that Neorion would accept Soviet auxiliaries. [Redacted]

any ship repairs of military significance require case-by-case approval by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Redacted]

[Redacted] the work done at Neorion included replacement of engines, boiler pumps, winches, anchors, and parts of electrical systems. Greek yards have also done exterior work such as scraping, painting, and sanding. Shipyards in the more centrally located Athens-Piraeus area—Hellenic Skaramangas and Elevisis—have the capacity for similar levels of repair. The Soviets have sought

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contracts with both yards at various times, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

other major port, Banghazi, can berth ships as large as medium cruisers, but its anchorages are unserviceable for large parts of the year and its harbor is heavily congested. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]—as the renegotiated Neorion contract and the avoidance of berthing Soviet and US ships at the same time demonstrate—Athens is sensitive to the concerns of NATO and will continue to respond to political constraints in future contract negotiations [Redacted]

The Soviets have no shore establishment to coordinate their naval calls or to compensate for the deficiencies of Libyan ports. They do not use the Libyan naval POL facility at Tobruk, and the civilian POL terminal, Marsa al Harigah, is not equipped for bunkering. If Soviet tenders or repair ships would accompany combatants or remain in port—as an Oskol repair ship (AR) did in late 1982—Libya could become a maintenance stopover like Algeria. [Redacted]

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**Areas of Potential Support**

The Libyan-Soviet relationship continues to be uneasy, and we believe Qadhafi remains wary of a Soviet presence on his territory. Nonetheless, so long as he perceives a threat from US military forces, Moscow has the opportunity to pursue naval privileges. [Redacted]

Regular use of a Libyan airfield—most likely Um Attiqah where the Mays have been deployed—would significantly enhance Soviet reconnaissance capabilities in the Mediterranean. The airfield could support Bear D aircraft and its airstrip could be extended. Several other airfields—including Tripoli and Al Kufrah, for example—could also support Soviet reconnaissance aircraft. Although the USSR does not have a secured area at Um Attiqah [Redacted]

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Although the USSR is a principal source of Libya's naval equipment, Qadhafi excluded Soviet warships from Libyan ports until 1981 and had consistently rejected the legitimacy of nonlittoral navies operating in the Mediterranean. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Qadhafi was not obligated to the Soviets because he paid for his naval equipment in hard currency. [Redacted]

[Redacted] the Soviets might prefer to continue deployments there because it is a military airfield [Redacted]

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In July 1981, following a joint exercise with Syria, Soviet ships and aircraft stopped in Libya. There have been 28 subsequent calls by Soviet ships and eight additional deployments of IL-38 ASW aircraft, according to US Navy data. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Another area with considerable potential is the island of Malta in the central Mediterranean. The USSR signed several commercial and diplomatic agreements with Malta in 1981 and 1982, but it has no special privileges in Valetta. Malta's policy on naval calls, which is included in its neutrality agreement with Italy (August 1980), permits visits by ships of all nations but excludes the auxiliaries of superpower navies from Maltese drydocks. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Mintoff's perception of a threat from Libya and his search for security guarantees might provide Moscow with leverage in pressing for naval concessions. [Redacted]

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Currently, Libyan ports offer little logistic support to Soviet ships. Tripoli, Libya's main commercial and naval port, can provide oil bunkers, water, provisions, and minor repairs to patrol craft. Expansion of its quay space included construction of a small naval area, [Redacted]

[Redacted] Tobruk, the port used by Soviet ships, can accommodate all but the largest cruisers at its naval breakwater. Its naval repair facilities—improved since 1979—are sufficient for limited repairs to patrol boats and F-class submarines. Libya's

Valetta's central location and physical characteristics suit it for pre-positioning supplies and servicing naval ships. The harbor has repair facilities suitable for

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major refits, extensive cargo-handling equipment, a new container and RO/RO terminal, and a POL storage facility. [Redacted]

Tobruk, for example, apparently was established in 1975 when a tender removed the buoys from east Al Hammamat and south Cyprus and placed them near Tobruk. Auxiliary ships remaining at the anchorages create a maintenance or depot area. [Redacted]

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Most controversial is the Soviet-Maltese commercial bunkering agreement that leases 200,000 tons of POL storage space at a NATO-built terminal (Has Saptan) to the USSR. The Soviets could abuse the agreement by disguising naval oilers as merchant ships or using merchant tankers to dispense fuel from Malta to naval ships. According to *The Lloyd*, Soviet merchant calls to Valetta did rise sharply in 1981, but apparently there have been no efforts to circumvent the terms of the agreement. [Redacted]

**Indian Ocean**

The Soviets maintain a squadron of about 28 ships in the Indian Ocean to monitor Western naval activities and to support their efforts to develop influence with littoral states. Logistic ships make up roughly half of the squadron. The support facilities are at Aden, South Yemen, and Dahlak Island, Ethiopia. Soviet ships also make extensive use of international anchorages, particularly in the northern Arabian Sea. [Redacted]

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**Anchorage in International Waters**

The Soviets use their anchorages in the Mediterranean extensively. Some of the anchorages are inside the territorial waters claimed by the littoral states—Hurd Bank and Kithira, for example. [Redacted]

**Naval Facilities in South Yemen**

**Soviet Use.** The Soviet Navy began to use South Yemen's main port at Aden as a logistic center following Moscow's expulsion from Berbera, Somalia, in 1977. The Soviets moved most of their equipment—a floating drydock and communications gear—to Aden from Berbera. Data collected by the US Navy show that naval calls to South Yemen doubled in 1978. [Redacted] Moscow periodically had made requests for special naval privileges there throughout the 1970s. Despite the frequency of calls, Soviet ships make little use of the facilities available at Aden. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Moscow has demonstrated the importance of sheltered anchorages by appealing to the Greek Government to guarantee the Soviet floating base in Greek waters and by offering political concessions in return. [Redacted]

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Soviet use of anchorages fluctuates seasonally and in relation to levels of naval activity. US Navy data show that combatants have lingered at Cape Andreas and Cyprus, for example, throughout the crisis in Lebanon. The anchorages seem to be waiting stations for ships sent to the eastern Mediterranean—landing ships, for example—on a contingency basis. Some, such as Sollum and Al Hammamat, are normal gathering points for units preparing for or involved in training exercises. The Limnos Island and Kithira anchorages frequently serve as replenishment areas for ships entering or leaving the Black Sea. Lesser anchorages in the central and western Mediterranean support submarines or minor combatants conducting patrols or surveillance of US carrier transits. An anchorage established off Tunisia's Kerkenah Island in 1981, for example, complements Al Hammamat and may permit observation of activity near the Tunisian-Libyan border. [Redacted]

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Soviet anchorages generally consist of several mooring buoys. They are easily implanted or removed by special buoy tenders (ALBDs). The anchorage near

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Perim Island in the Bab el Mandeb Strait is a derelict British facility. During 1980 [Redacted] the installation of a small floating pier and POL storage tanks and the upgrading of personnel accommodations and electronic and communications equipment. The island is defended by a Yemeni infantry battalion, and the Yemeni Navy keeps an OSA-II patrol boat there. According to US Navy data, Soviet ships call occasionally to support the Yemeni garrison, and the Soviet yard oiler from Aden periodically stops when en route to Dahlak Island, Ethiopia. [Redacted]

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Soviet naval aircraft have flown maritime reconnaissance and ASW patrols from Aden since 1978. Generally, there have been two pair of IL-38 Mays deployed to Aden for periods of one and a half months. The deployment pattern was interrupted in 1982 when the Soviets cut back to one pair of aircraft in Aden. [Redacted]

Moscow moved the aircraft to Al Anad Airfield (see following discussion). The move is probably permanent and may be connected with Soviet intentions to improve security around their aircraft, to deploy a different type of aircraft to Aden, or to complement surveillance from South Yemen with the use of airfields elsewhere in the Indian Ocean. The Mays deployed to Aden serve primarily to monitor Western naval traffic in the northern Arabian Sea. [Redacted]

Socotra Island to the west of Aden is an unlikely staging area for naval activity. The waters close to the island are hazardous year round, and the facilities at its ports are rudimentary, serving only small coastal craft. Approaches to the island are mountainous, the climate is semiarid, and fresh water is scarce. Contrary to frequent rumors [Redacted] imagery shows that there is no naval base at Socotra. [Redacted]

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**Ports and Airfields.** Aden is an improved natural harbor that can accommodate about 50 large ships at a time, including the largest of Soviet combatants (see figure 6). Aden is a well-equipped commercial port, but much of its cargo-handling equipment and many harbor craft are aging. Its small repair facilities are limited by a lack of skilled personnel, raw materials, and spare parts. The Soviets do not appear to be involved in upgrading its facilities; the major project in the port—installation of new cargo facilities and wharfage—is financed primarily by Arab sources. [Redacted]

The main airfield in South Yemen is Aden's Khormaksar International, a former Royal Air Force base. The airfield has been undergoing renovation for several years. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] when using the inner harbor, Soviet combatants normally moor at berths opposite the oil storage tanks in the inner harbor. The small naval harbor that houses the South Yemeni Navy can accommodate only ships up to the size of an LST. [Redacted]

Completion of the runway extension at Khormaksar and the movement of both Soviet aircraft and some elements of the Yemeni Air Force to other airfields may presage changes in Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) deployments to Aden. Moscow may want the option of putting TU-95 Bear D's there to expand surveillance to include the southern Indian Ocean. A less likely possibility is the deployment of longer range ASW aircraft (TU-142 Bear F's); the operational utility of ASW patrols in the Indian Ocean by aircraft intended to detect Western SSBNs or to protect Soviet SSBNs is marginal. [Redacted]

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To the north of Aden, Al Mukalla, South Yemen's other port, has little value for naval support. It is not a natural deepwater harbor and is completely open to the sea. Ships must anchor well off shore, and the port is not usable during monsoons. [Redacted]

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**South Yemen**

<b>Aden Port Facilities</b>	<b>Berths</b>	<i>More than 30 buoy and dolphin berths, 13 oil bunkering berths. Additional berthing for small ships is at Home Trade Quay, Ma'alah Wharf, and Admiralty Jetty.</i>	
	<b>Depths</b>	<i>Entrance channel, 11.9 meters; in harbor, 12.5 meters; at berths from 5.5 meters to 12.8 meters.</i>	
	<b>Storage space</b>	<i>Area of 45,000 square meters of covered storage.</i>	
	<b>Cargo equipment</b>	<i>Twenty-eight mobile cranes from 7 to 32 tons; one 30-ton and one 25-ton floating crane; no container equipment.</i>	
	<b>Fuel and water</b>	<i>Submerged pipelines served by major oil companies provide fuel; barges supply water. One pier can supply water for oceangoing vessels.</i>	
	<b>Repair facilities</b>	<i>One 4,500-ton floating drydock at National Dockyard Company; slipway for small combatants.</i>	[Redacted]
	<b>Al Mukalla Port Facilities</b>	<b>Berths</b>	<i>None.</i>
<b>Depths</b>		<i>At anchorages, 27.4 meters.</i>	
<b>Storage space</b>		<i>Unknown.</i>	
<b>Cargo equipment</b>		<i>Three mobile cranes, 10- to 20-ton lift capacity.</i>	
<b>Fuel and water</b>		<i>Not available.</i>	
<b>Repair facilities</b>		<i>None.</i>	[Redacted]
<b>Khormaksar International Airfield</b>		<b>Main runway</b>	<i>Extended to 3,500 x 46 meters.</i>
	<b>Surface</b>	<i>Asphalt.</i>	
	<b>Fuel, maintenance, and support facilities</b>	<i>Electronic and maintenance shops, ordnance storage, several hangars. More than 60 maintenance buildings, aboveground POL storage.</i>	[Redacted]
<b>Al Anad Airfield</b>	<b>Main runway</b>	<i>2,890 x 46 meters.</i>	
	<b>Surface</b>	<i>Asphalt.</i>	
	<b>Fuel, maintenance, and support facilities</b>	<i>Fenced-in area and widened revetments for IL-38 May aircraft.</i>	[Redacted]
<b>Ras Karma Airfield</b>	<b>Main runway</b>	<i>2,879 meters.</i>	
	<b>Surface</b>	<i>Natural.</i>	
	<b>Fuel, maintenance, and support facilities</b>	<i>None.</i>	[Redacted]

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Al Anad, a military airfield north of Aden, houses at least two squadrons of Yemeni MIG-21 Fishbeds (see figure 7). It was first reported under construction in September 1977 (before the Soviets' expulsion from Somalia), [Redacted]

[Redacted] The airfield has been operational

since late 1978, but Soviet reconnaissance aircraft did not use Al Anad until the Mays were deployed there in 1983. [Redacted]

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which houses Yemeni fighter and bomber aircraft. The new airstrip was operational by early 1982 and could accommodate May aircraft. It appears that the project is for civilian use, however, under an Indo-Kuwaiti contract. [Redacted]

reason for Moscow's reliance on Dahlak Island is that Ethiopia's other ports are vulnerable to guerrilla attacks. Also the Ethiopians may have resisted a more extensive Soviet naval presence. [Redacted]

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The airfield at Perim Island can accommodate only light aircraft or helicopters. It has no support facilities and would require extensive work in order to be used for regular deployments. [Redacted]

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Ras Karma Airfield on Socotra is a military airfield. No aircraft are stationed there, but transport aircraft and helicopters use the airfield occasionally to support the Yemeni garrison. [Redacted]

Pairs of Soviet naval ASW patrol aircraft have deployed to Johannes IV International Airfield (outside Asmera) periodically since January 1980. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] considerable work on the crude natural surface would be required before even South Yemeni fighter aircraft could operate from it. [Redacted]

[Redacted] the aircraft normally stage through Aden both for deployment and for missions, suggesting minimal use of ground support facilities at Asmera. Like the aircraft based in Aden, IL-38 Mays conduct three or four ASW patrols or reconnaissance flights over the northern Arabian Sea during their stay in Asmera. [Redacted]

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**Naval Facilities in Ethiopia**

*Soviet Use.* Before 1978 Soviet combatants and research ships made infrequent calls to Ethiopian ports, generally in connection with the celebration of Ethiopian Navy Day. According to information collected by the US Navy, these ceremonial visits normally included a high-ranking naval officer aboard a destroyer. The sealift to Ethiopia during the Ogaden war initiated a dramatic increase in Soviet calls to both Mits'iwa and Aseb, largely by amphibious ships that were able to offload military supplies despite damage to or overcrowding of regular port facilities.<sup>10</sup> Aseb remains the major arms delivery port, and Mits'iwa serves for arms transshipment to northern Ethiopia. Soviet combatant calls to both ports have declined since late 1978, however, and none were made to Aseb in 1981. [Redacted]

[Redacted] aircraft deployments to Ethiopia were interrupted for several months in 1982, possibly because of the danger of damage to the airfield or aircraft by insurgent attacks. The Soviets are unlikely to be interested in using alternate Ethiopian airfields that are located near guerrilla strongholds. [Redacted]

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According to US Navy data [Redacted] the Indian Ocean Squadron began to call at Ethiopia's Dahlak Island in April 1978 and has gradually increased its use of the facilities there. Soviet ships appear to have almost unrestricted access to the island but not to other naval facilities in Ethiopia. One [Redacted]

*Ports and Airfields.* The Soviet facility on Nocra Island in the Dahlak Chabir group is a renovated British prison camp with sparse accommodation ashore for logistic support and security personnel (see figure 8). The small facility is fenced and defended by armored personnel carriers (APCs) and antiaircraft (AA) guns. Dahlak serves primarily as secure anchorage for support auxiliaries. The logistic units normally present can provide minor repairs for small cruisers or destroyers, submarines, and patrol craft. The floating drydock has been used by both Soviet and Ethiopian combatants.<sup>11</sup> [Redacted]

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
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[Redacted] Ethiopian access is limited. There are no signs of improvements to Dahlak's derelict airfield that would permit large fixed-wing aircraft to support Soviet personnel. [Redacted]

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Ethiopia's major mainland ports Mits'iwa and Aseb would be superior logistic centers if they were secure from sabotage. Both would require some upgrading to adequately serve Soviet forces. Mits'iwa, which consists of three connected peninsulas and an island, can

accommodate destroyer-size ships at the berthing area of the island and larger ships at the New Pier on Kader Peninsula. Mits'iwa is primarily a cargo port with minimal support facilities. Its cargo equipment has deteriorated, and the port has suffered commercial losses because of its location. As a result, it is rarely congested. [Redacted]

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Aseb, located farther south, originally served as the trade center for Ethiopia and for considerable international trade. In the mid-1970s, Aseb was one of the Middle East's more modern harbors, but British personnel visiting there in 1982 noted several deteriorating wharves and jetties and large numbers of

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**Ethiopia**

**Dahlak Island Facilities**

*Berths* Two 100-meter floating piers.

*Depths* Unlimited.

*Storage space* Eight repaired British buildings and 13 or more new buildings serve as storage and housing space. A Soviet stores barge is anchored at Dahlak.

*Cargo equipment* None.

*Fuel and water* Two POL storage areas probably store fuel for vehicles and small support ships or limited amounts of water. There are no bunkering facilities and almost no fresh water. A yard oiler brings fuel to Dahlak from Aden; supplies and stores come from Ethiopia by helicopter.

*Repair facilities* Small repair ship and 8,500-ton floating drydock.

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**Mits'iwa Port Facilities**

*Berths* 900 meters of berthing at six quays at Mits'iwa Island, a pier and sea terminal at Mits'iwa Island, two deepwater berths at New Pier on Kader Peninsula.

*Depths* At entrance, 11.9 meters; at quays, up to 8.8 meters; at new pier, seven meters alongside.

*Storage space* Capacity of 75,900 cubic meters.

*Cargo equipment* Six 6-ton cranes, five mobile cranes.

*Fuel and water* Fuel bunkers for oceangoing ships are available at some quays and at a pipeline off the marine pier. No boiler water is available.

*Repair facilities* Two small marine railways; sheet metal and electric shops are at the naval base.

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**Aseb Port Facilities**

*Berths* Two major piers both over 400 meters long.

*Depths* At piers, 8.8 to 10.7 meters.

*Storage space* Area of 14,400 square meters and new areas under construction.

*Cargo equipment* One 30-ton crane, one 90-ton and one 150-ton mobile crane.

*Fuel and water* Bunkers are unlimited at berths. Water is available at piers.

*Repair facilities* Minor machine repairs only.

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**Johannes IV International Airfield**

*Main runway* 3,144 x 61 meters.


*Surface* Blacktop.

*Other runways* 1,820-meter blacktop strip.

*Fuel, maintenance, and support facilities* Eight hangars, six blacktop parking aprons, four ammunition storage sheds, more than 60 support buildings, two horizontal and four vertical POL tanks.

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ruined buildings in the area. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Currently, the port can handle about nine merchant ships (the size of small cruisers) at its two piers and can service similar ships at its tanker terminal. The lack of repair facilities limits its capability for support. A missile storage area 2 miles outside Aseb consists of several quonset huts and storage buildings. It services Ethiopian Styx (SS-N-2) cruise missiles.

[Redacted]

Johannes IV International Airfield has adequate parking, maintenance, and storage space to support Soviet reconnaissance aircraft, but its elevation prohibits deployment of Bear D's. We believe that the interruption of Soviet deployments to Ethiopia during 1982 may reflect the Soviets' concerns about security or the Ethiopians' dissatisfaction with the terms of access.

[Redacted]

Although Moscow has used only one Ethiopian airfield—Johannes IV—for its naval patrol aircraft, there are several other airfields suitable for such deployments: Tenna-Dejazmatch Yilma Airfield at Dire Dawa, Harar Meda Airfield and Bole Airfield at Addis Ababa, Gode Airfield in the Ogaden, and Aseb Airfield. All have hard-surface runways capable of accommodating May aircraft, and some have runways long enough for the heavier Bear D's. There are drawbacks to the use of these airfields, however. Harar Meda Airfield, for example, offers no advantage over Asmera: Mays would still need to stage to Aden before patrols, and fully loaded Bear D's probably could not use the airfield because of its elevation. Moreover, because it is a busy fighter base that sometimes supports aircraft deploying to the north, it is a potential target for insurgents.

[Redacted]

**Soviet Use of Sri Lanka's Commercial Facilities**

Since April 1982 at least two Soviet naval auxiliaries have used Colombo, Sri Lanka, for repairs.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Soviets are increasingly interested in Colombo as an alternative to Singapore, which has been closed to naval auxiliaries in response to the invasion of Afghanistan. If naval auxiliaries had access to Colombo, the now congested Pacific repair yards would be freer for repairs to combatants. Colombo can accommodate an aircraft carrier and its escorts. It has 15 modern alongside berths at depths ranging from 9 to 10 meters—suitable for medium and large cruisers—and commercial drydocks capable of overhauling cruisers. However, the two drydocks at Walkers and Sons, the largest repair facility, suffered a shortage of skilled labor in 1979 and operated only part time, according to US Navy reports. Colombo has neither the skilled workmen nor the capacity for the volume of work that Singapore has.

[Redacted]

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**Areas of Potential Support**

[Redacted] the Soviets' interest in acquiring naval privileges at ports in the southwest Indian Ocean or other littoral Indian Ocean states.<sup>13</sup> Most would contribute only marginally to supporting the Indian Ocean Squadron unless Moscow were to refocus its naval activity; some are several days' steaming time from the Arabian Sea. In addition, although they are attractive rest ports, most would require extensive upgrading in order to provide significant logistic services:

- Port Louis, Mauritius, can accommodate two or three destroyer-size ships inside the harbor, but larger ships cannot turn around and generally moor outside. Its POL supply is limited, and it has no repair facilities for oceangoing ships.
- Port Victoria, Seychelles, can accommodate ships up to the size of Kirov-class cruisers at anchorages and can berth two to four ships from destroyer to medium-cruiser size. Servicing is limited to the purchase of provisions and small amounts of POL.

[Redacted]

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
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• Malagasy ports—Diego Suarez and Tamatave—are closed to foreign naval ships. The harbor at Diego Suarez is suitable for a mixed force of about 20 ships, the smaller ones berthing at its commercial quay. Formerly a French shipyard, Diego Suarez could service medium cruisers and destroyers. The shipyard and the labor force probably have deteriorated somewhat since the departure of the French. Tamatave, which is suitable for ships up to the size of small cruisers, has extensive cargo-handling equipment, but no repair facilities.

• Maputo,<sup>14</sup> Nacala, and Beira, Mozambique, could provide berthing and some provisioning for large combatants. None has repair facilities for oceangoing ships. Viewed from the Soviet perspective, all three suffer the drawbacks of deterioration, hazardous weather conditions, and the danger of sabotage by guerrilla forces.

• At least all three of India's regional maritime complexes—at Bombay, Cochin, and Vishakhapatnam—can accommodate and replenish oceangoing ships. Each complex includes either a civilian shipyard or a naval dockyard. Bombay shipyards build and repair major surface combatants. Shipyards at Vishakhapatnam have demonstrated a capability to repair India's F-class submarines.

• The Yemen Arab Republic's only major port is at Ahmadi to the north of al Hudaydah. [redacted] its cargo-handling facilities have been expanded and modernized in the last two years. The port contains no drydock but can provide limited quantities of provisions, fuel oil, and boiler water. Information about port capacity is scarce and unreliable; the new port area can accommodate Soviet RO/FLO ships, but depths restrict berthing at the old quay to small cruisers. [redacted]

Moscow is interested in landing rights for naval aircraft in many of these nations as well. In particular, medium-range ASW patrol aircraft deployed to the Southwest Indian Ocean islands or refueled there would expand Soviet surveillance to cover the area

<sup>14</sup> A small Soviet drydock at Maputo is used by the Soviet fishing fleet. [redacted]

around the US naval base at Diego Garcia (see figure 9). Moreover, some airfields in Mauritius, Madagascar, and Seychelles could accommodate the heavier, longer range Bear D's. [redacted]

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#### Anchorage in International Waters

[redacted] Soviet ships make extensive use—as the monsoons permit—of anchorages off Socotra Island. It is not unusual for several combatants and auxiliaries—often including the Squadron flagship—to congregate there or at an anchorage just outside Aden. Frequently these ships are between routine port calls or conducting periodic replenishment. [redacted]

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Combatants between port calls in the southwest Indian Ocean occasionally use Coetivy anchorage north of Seychelles and an anchorage outside Port Victoria. In the summer of 1982, for example, according to US Navy data, Soviet ships that had called in Port Victoria lingered at Coetivy for several weeks while the Mauritian elections were held and tensions in Seychelles were calmed. Because Soviet ships do not operate extensively in the southwest, however, Coetivy is not a major anchorage. In both 1981 and 1982 it was used by research ships supporting Soviet space recovery operations. [redacted]

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A Soviet frigate or minesweeper generally occupies an anchorage in the Strait of Hormuz. The anchorage is used for surveillance rather than logistic support.



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#### Pacific Ocean

During 1982, Soviet presence in the distant waters of the Pacific increased about 16 percent, largely as a result of expanded operations in the South China Sea. Soviet ships deployed outside home waters generally

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


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Figure 9  
Potential Maritime Surveillance Areas by Soviet Naval Aircraft



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included four ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), six general purpose submarines, three surface combatants, and more than 13 fleet support ships. The general purpose ships do not constitute a formal squadron and include units in transit to or from the Indian Ocean. In wartime, the missions of these deployed forces would be to conduct strategic strikes, to protect the SSBN force, and to defend the distant sea approaches to the USSR. In peacetime, they contribute to the Soviets' seaborne strategic deterrent force, demonstrate Moscow's political commitment to Hanoi, and monitor the activities of Western and Chinese naval forces.<sup>15</sup> [Redacted]

**Naval Facilities in Vietnam**

**Soviet Use.** Soviet use of Vietnamese facilities began in early 1979, as tension between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) and the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) increased. Within four months of the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Treaty and 10 days after the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, the first Soviet combatant called at Da Nang. A Soviet task group of eight ships operated in the South China Sea throughout the period of border clashes and was reinforced shortly after the invasion. At the same time, Moscow initiated an air-and-sea lift to Vietnam and provided Soviet personnel for technical assistance at Vietnamese ports and airfields. Soviet Alligator-class landing ships shuttled deliveries between Vietnamese ports. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Soviet pressure for access to Vietnamese facilities predated the invasion. Resistance to Soviet requests faded in the face of the Chinese threat, but the SRV continued to reject formalization of a permanent Soviet naval presence. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Soviet ships make about 15 calls a month in Vietnam. These ships—particularly the general purpose submarines that accounted for the lion's share of increased presence in the Pacific in 1982—continue to depend primarily on afloat logistic support, however. Vietnamese ports lack bunkering or repair facilities suitable for extensive land-based support. According to [Redacted] Moscow is beginning to use the yards at Ho Chi Minh City for overhaul of Pacific Fleet auxiliaries, but the port is not suitable for large combatants. It has serviced ships scheduled for Fleet repair rather than those operating outside home waters. [Redacted]

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Two pairs of Soviet naval aircraft deploy regularly to Cam Ranh and conduct both reconnaissance and ASW patrols. The Soviet aircraft—Bear F's or Bear D's—made 13 deployments to Cam Ranh during 1982. The Bear F's focus on patrols in the northern Philippines Sea, and the Bear D's range further afield to cover US and Chinese naval targets. The Soviets have marginally improved Cam Ranh airfield with the installation of POL storage and ground control approach systems for operations at night and during bad weather (see figure 10). Soviet air traffic controllers operate the equipment, and naval transport aircraft bring in additional support. [Redacted]

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
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**Ports and Airfields.** Cam Ranh Bay is an extensive deepwater harbor with the excellent natural protection of surrounding peninsulas and islands (see figure 11). It is easily secured because of the absence of any large town or commercial activity. Ships up to the size of the largest Soviet cruisers can berth at the principal piers or use the more than 40 deepwater anchorages in the inner and outer harbor. Quay space is limited to ships the size of small frigates. Two of the piers can handle bulk cargo. 

Since 1979 the Soviets have refurbished the old piers located near the naval training center and have installed three floating piers  the Vietnamese Navy uses one of the floating piers. A water supply system installed since March 1980 provides freshwater to at least four of the piers. Electric power may also be available since the delivery of new generators in early 1983.

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**Vietnam****Cam Ranh Port Facilities**

**Berths** Two fixed piers and three floating piers provide about 10 berths; 40 deepwater anchorages.

**Depths** At deepwater berths, 9 to 12 meters; at wharfs, 6 meters; at POL berth, 22 meters.

**Storage space** Area of 38,350 square meters in derelict US warehouses and new storage buildings in pier area.

**Cargo equipment** Only two piers can handle cargo.

**Fuel and water** There are no bunkering facilities; oil pipeline is unserviceable. Water is supplied by pipeline at four piers.

**Repair facilities** Small boatyard, small floating drydock [redacted]

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**Da Nang Port Facilities**

**Berths** Two wharfs, one pier, and one pontoon pier at commercial port; four piers at naval base; 47 anchorages for oceangoing ships.

**Depths** At entrance to the commercial port, 4.88 meters; at naval piers, up to 9 meters; at anchorages, 11 meters.

**Storage space** Extensive warehouse space from period of US operations.

**Cargo equipment** One 3-ton and one 7-ton crane; three forklift cranes; three 60-ton mobile cranes, two floating cranes.

**Fuel and water** No bunkering facilities; water is available by barge.

**Repair facilities** A small shipyard at the naval base can accommodate patrol craft [redacted]

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**Ho Chi Minh City Port Facilities**

**Berths** Fifteen alongside at three quays; 21 buoy berths; two tanker berths.

**Depths** At entrances, 6.5 meters and 9.3 meters; at quays, 7.9 to 10.9 meters; at buoys, 7.9 to 14 meters.

**Storage space** Area of 73,600 square meters.

**Cargo equipment** One 35-ton, one 50-ton, and one 100-ton floating crane; two 3-to 12-ton mobile cranes; six electric cranes.

**Fuel and water** Diesel oil is available; water is supplied by barges.

**Ship repairs** Two graving docks, one floating drydock, one Soviet 8,500-ton floating drydock. [redacted]

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**Haiphong Port Facilities**

**Berths** Six cargo berths, five tanker berths, four naval berths (3,300 meters).

**Depths** At berths, 6 to 10 meters.

**Storage space** More than 15 warehouses in the central port area.

**Cargo equipment** About 50 cranes of various types.

**Repair facilities** Small craft only; [redacted]

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**Cam Ranh Airfield**

**Main runway** 3,048 meters, two runways (one serviceable).

**Surface** Concrete sealed.

**Fuel, maintenance, and support facilities** Extensive parking area; POL storage installed early 1980. [redacted]

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**Da Nang Airfield**

**Main runway** 3,048 meters (two runways).tl

**Surface** Asphalt.

**Fuel, maintenance, and support facilities** Eleven parking aprons, 12 hangars, extensive fuel storage. [redacted]

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Buildings constructed near the new piers provide additional maintenance, storage, or administration space. [redacted]

Navy and, [redacted] its management includes Soviet advisers. [redacted]

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The two major drawbacks to Cam Ranh are its lack of bunkering facilities and its rudimentary repair capability. There are two POL piers to the south of the naval training center, and some POL storage tanks are intact. The pipeline, however, is unusable, and the Soviets have taken no steps to reconstruct it. Repairs—other than those that can be performed at a small boatyard near the POL piers—are limited to maintenance by a Soviet repair ship stationed in port or in a small floating dock that has been at Cam Ranh since late 1980. The dock, which is normally used to transport submarines, can accommodate small destroyers or diesel submarines for minor repairs. Without a more extensive repair capability or shore-based bunkering facilities, Cam Ranh can offer little support to Soviet naval units. [redacted]

In December 1982 the Soviets delivered an 8,500-ton floating drydock—larger than the one at Cam Ranh—to Ho Chi Minh City. [redacted] Moscow has been scheduling overhaul of naval auxiliaries and hydrographic research ships at Ho Chi Minh City since early 1982. The new drydock—which can accommodate destroyers, small cruisers, and most attack submarines—improves the port's capability for maintenance of Pacific Fleet units, and eventually it may service combatants operating in the South China Sea. The Soviets are unlikely to become dependent on Ho Chi Minh City, however, because its approaches could easily be blocked at a number of choke points. [redacted]

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The commercial port facilities at Da Nang to the north of Cam Ranh are suitable only for coastal craft, but the Da Nang naval station can berth ships up to the size of small cruisers at two of its piers. All Soviet combatants could use anchorages in the outer harbor, but depths in the inner harbor limit its use to tank landing ships (LSTs), tugs, and small boats (lighters). Da Nang is primarily an arms transshipment port and is unattractive for naval support because of its congestion. The Soviets would be unlikely to disrupt arms deliveries to Da Nang by using the port for limited support to combatants. [redacted]

Haiphong, 10 miles upstream from the Gulf of Tonkin, is less well suited to support naval operations in the South China Sea than are the southern ports. Four oceangoing ships can berth in the harbor, but ships larger than small cruisers cannot be accommodated. The port is used mainly as a transshipment point for material used in defense of the north—the role it played during the sealift of 1979—and its cargo equipment was upgraded in the late 1970s. [redacted]

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Vietnam's small shipbuilding industry is centered in Ho Chi Minh City, where Ba Son Shipyard is located (see figure 12). Ho Chi Minh City's large and efficient commercial port can berth nine to 11 deep-draft ships and handle 8 million tons of cargo a year. The condition of warehouses and cranes since the departure of US forces is unknown. The naval shipyard has two graving docks that can accommodate destroyer-size ships for repairs and one floating drydock. The yard and drydock appear to be in good condition; but [redacted] Ba Son suffers from a lack of spare parts, equipment, and skilled labor. Apparently Ba Son was forced to provide material and personnel to shipyards in the north in 1975 and has not recovered. The shipyard is subordinate to the

Vietnam has two airfields, Da Nang and Cam Ranh, that the Soviets could use for reconnaissance aircraft. Initially, Soviet Bears deployed to Da Nang. We believe that Moscow chose to move its air operations to Cam Ranh for these reasons:

- To avoid the congestion at Da Nang, which is the center of Vietnamese air operations.
- To acquire the increased security of a remote, unpopulated location.
- To centralize naval activity in one area.

Soviet personnel continue to advise Vietnamese naval air forces at Da Nang, but Soviet naval aircraft do not deploy there. [redacted]

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
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**Soviet Use of Singapore's Commercial Facilities**

Before 1980, Soviet naval auxiliaries used the repair yards at Singapore regularly; a total of more than 70 ships received repairs or overhaul from 1969 to 1980. Following the invasion of Afghanistan, Singapore banned calls by Soviet naval ships.

[Redacted]

Loss of access has caused Soviet planners to find alternate repair sites or to reorganize schedules at congested Pacific Fleet yards and may account for Soviet interest in repair contracts in Sri Lanka and at Ho Chi Minh City.

[Redacted]

The Singapore Port Authority operates two major shipyards—Keppel and Sembawang—and recently opened a new facility in Keppel harbor. Keppel Shipyard, where Soviet ships generally are repaired, has seven drydocks and over 2,000 meters of repair berths. Its skilled labor force and modern machinery can perform all types of repair and maintenance, including rebuilding engines and servicing navigational and automated equipment. Sembawang, a former British naval base, houses two graving berths, four floating drydocks, and seven repair berths. The new repair yard will be able to service ships the size of

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large cruisers. Singapore is also an exceptional oil port with modern storing, blending, refining, and distributing facilities. Five of the world's largest petroleum organizations have installations in or near the harbor.

[Redacted]

**Anchorage in International Waters**

Because Soviet ships do not operate extensively in distant areas of the Pacific, their reliance on anchorages in international waters is limited. Some anchor off Cam Ranh before or following operations or transits; others congregate south of Singapore before or after passing through the Malacca Straits. An anchorage in the Mariana Islands is available for training operations in the Philippine Sea.

[Redacted]

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**An Area of Potential Support—Kampuchea**

Since 1979 there have been unconfirmed reports of Soviet interest in Kampuchean ports—Kampong Saom and Ream. Neither port has adequate support facilities, and [Redacted] none is under construction. We do not believe the Soviets currently are interested in creating naval support facilities in Kampuchea: its ports would require considerable investment and are not as well located as Vietnamese ports to support South China Sea deployments.

[Redacted]

**West African Waters**

The Soviets have maintained a small contingent of ships in the waters off West Africa since 1970. Soviet naval presence in the region rose sharply in 1982 after reaching a record low in 1981 and generally included two or three combatants and several auxiliaries. Ships of the West African patrol were relatively inactive in the late 1970s, but in recent years they have responded to regional political tensions. The Soviets now keep at least one minesweeper on duty in the fisheries zone off the southern Sahara. They also have used naval forces to highlight their commitment to the Dos Santos regime in Angola. Other naval activities include ceremonial port calls and operational calls by transiting units. In addition, maritime reconnaissance aircraft based in Angola monitor Western naval operations in the central and southern Atlantic.

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Seven Soviet combatants have called in Kampuchea. One visit by an F-class research submarine may have been an unplanned stopover for minor maintenance; aerial photography indicates that the submarine's outer hull plating was damaged.

[Redacted]

No Soviet ships receive support at the naval base at Ream despite rumors of Soviet plans to expand the facilities there

[Redacted]

**Naval Facilities in Angola**

**Soviet Use.** The Soviets' naval privileges in Angola stem directly from the support they provided during the Angolan civil war. Soviet ships made their first five calls to Luanda in 1976 and from 1977 through 1979 called more than 25 times a year. The USSR sealift to Angola included deliveries to all three of Angola's ports, [Redacted] and initiated a precedent of independent activity by Soviet ships in port. An evaluation by the Center for Naval Analyses notes that, during the sealift, the West African patrol probably served as an escort for cargo ships and provided communications support for transport aircraft. Although Soviet naval presence declined as regional tensions abated, Moscow moved rapidly to

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Kampong Saom is Kampuchea's only deepwater port. Its two piers, two quays, and two anchorages can accommodate about six ships of destroyer size. The port has about 470,000 square feet of covered storage and could handle 4,000 tons of cargo per day.

[Redacted] antiquated cargo-handling techniques and the workers' apathy limit the efficiency of the port.

The small naval base at the fishing port of Ream is adequate to berth patrol craft but has little protected anchorage for oceangoing ships. No combatants or merchant ships visited Ream between its capture by the Vietnamese in 1979 and mid-1983, when a Soviet minesweeper and a Soviet degaussing ship from Cam Ranh called there briefly.

[Redacted]

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consolidate its access to Angolan facilities, initially to complement and then partially to replace access in Guinea [redacted]

Since August 1981, Soviet combatants have also called periodically in Mocamedes, now called Namibe. The initial visit to this southern port was a gesture of support for President dos Santos during a period of high tension with South Africa. By continued use of Mocamedes, Moscow may hope to deter seaborne raids on the port, which supports Cuban and Angolan troops in southern Angola. [redacted]



Long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft, which have been deployed to Luanda periodically since 1977, monitor Western naval movements in the southern Atlantic from the tip of the Cape of Good Hope to the area off Senegal and out as far as Ascension Island. They also may collect information about South African naval forces. The Soviets rarely use the full range or endurance of the aircraft. During the Falkland Islands crisis, for example, there were no Soviet aircraft in Luanda when they might have been used to monitor the southern leg of the British transit. There have been unexplained gaps in deployment patterns, which suggest that the presence of the aircraft is less

than critical to Soviet activities. Luanda's location is too far south to permit the aircraft to cover the main transit lanes from the United States to Europe. Moreover, we do not believe that Moscow expects aircraft based in Angola to contribute extensively to wartime operations. Nonetheless, the Bears maintain a symbolic Soviet presence in West Africa and reinforce Soviet access [redacted]

**Ports and Airfields.** The port of Luanda is inside a protective barrier formed by a long narrow island roughly paralleling the coast. The commercial port facilities on the mainland, which have been undergoing expansion since the 1960s, can accommodate ships up to the size of the Kiev-class cruisers at the main pier and adjacent quay (see figure 13). Vessels of any size can anchor in the harbor, and there is generally a large backlog of merchant ships. The naval installation on Ilha de Luanda has a wharf suitable for one ship the size of a Kiev-class cruiser or two small destroyers. More ships can be accommodated if they moor stern to the quay as the Soviets do. Luanda can provide replenishment services but no repairs for major combatants. [redacted]

Mocamedes is Angola's principal fishing port and a main outlet for iron ore exports. It is congested because of the volume of the military equipment shipped from Luanda to forces operating in southern Angola. Mocamedes has a single quay capable of accommodating a large cruiser alongside. The two berths at the iron ore terminal (Porto Saco) across the bay could accommodate ships the size of medium cruisers if necessary. The few Soviet ships that have called at Mocamedes have anchored outside the port rather than entering to berth. [redacted]

Lobito is an excellent natural harbor sheltered by a sandspit breakwater. Its two quays can berth and reprovision several large cruisers and oceangoing tankers. The port houses Angola's only shipyard, Soreframe, which, with the help of local machine shops, can perform repairs on small craft. [redacted]

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**Angola**

**Luanda Port Facilities**


**Berths** *Eight berths at six piers and one quay in commercial port; one 300-meter pier at naval base.*

**Depths** *At entrance, 27.5 meters; at piers, 4.5 to 10.4 meters; at naval pier, 17 meters.*

**Storage space** *Area of 55,000 square meters.*

**Cargo equipment** *Twenty-eight 3- to 5-ton cranes; two 10-ton cranes; one 150-ton crane; mobile cranes 3 to 5 tons. Limited offloading of container cargo.*

**Fuel and water** *Fuel and gas oil bunkers are available from major oil companies. Fresh water is available, but only in small quantities at the offshore tanker terminal.*

**Repair facilities** *Two 700- to 1,200-ton slipways and shops for hull work and boiler cleaning. Small marine railways at the naval base.* 

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**Mocamedes Port Facilities**

**Berths** *480-meter concrete quay and wharf space for coastal craft.*

**Depths** *At entrance, 10.6 meters; at quay, 10.3 meters.*

**Cargo equipment** *Four 5-ton cranes; two 3-ton cranes, one 10-ton crane. Additional cargo-handling facilities and storage space at Porto Saco, the iron ore terminal 10 km from the main harbor. No container or RO/RO cargo facilities.*

**Fuel and water** *Fuel oil and blended oil are obtainable at Porto Saco via pipelines at the docks. Water supply is unrestricted, but there is no water barge to supply anchored vessels.*

**Repair facilities** *Negligible.* 

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**Lobito Port Facilities**


**Berths** *Six to eight berths at two concrete quays; four tanker berths.*

**Depths** *At entrance, 18.3 meters; at quays, 10.36 meters.*

**Storage space** *Fifteen warehouses and sheds.*

**Cargo equipment** *Twenty-seven 3- to 22-ton cranes; no container or RO/RO facilities.*

**Fuel and water** *Fuel oil and gas oil bunkers are available. Water is supplied by pipeline at all berths.*

**Repair facilities** *Slipways for vessels up to 1,200 tons; 2,000-ton floating drydock.* 


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**Luanda Airfield**

**Main runway** *3,665 x 45 meters.*

**Surface** *Blacktop.*

**Other runways** *2,635 meters.*

**Fuel, maintenance, and support facilities** *Four ordnance storage buildings, four large maintenance buildings, two POL storage areas* 

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The airfield at Luanda supports international air traffic, as well as Soviet reconnaissance aircraft and elements of the Angolan Air Force. Soviet Bear D's normally use the main parking apron northeast of the runway, which is large enough to accommodate more than a single pair of the aircraft. The military area of the airfield is not separately secured, and the aircraft parking area is congested. The single taxiway to the parking area complicates maneuvering on the ground.

[Redacted]

If the Soviets wanted to move their air operations away from the main international airfield as they have done in Cuba and Vietnam, their only alternative is Lubango Airfield in southern Angola. We do not think such a move is likely. Lubango is a large military airfield with numerous hardened positions and bunkers, and Angola has begun to relocate its Fishbeds there. The airstrips could accommodate Bear D's, but the airfield has narrow taxiways, sharp turnarounds, and no parking area large enough for Bear aircraft. Lubango is too close to the conflict-ridden border areas for adequate security. Moreover, Bears flying from Lubango would be unable to cover the extreme northern portions of the surveillance area covered by Luanda-based Bears, a disadvantage Moscow would be unlikely to accept unless it had secured renewed landing rights in northern Africa.

**Naval Facilities in Guinea**

*Soviet Use.* Until the late 1970s, Conakry was the principal port used by Soviet ships serving off West Africa. Following the Soviets' initial naval support to Toure in the wake of a Portuguese-sponsored guerrilla raid in 1970, Soviet ships spent an increasing amount of time in Conakry. In the early years, ships of the West African patrol were generally inactive and spent considerable time berthed or moored in the harbor. The initiation of the April 1975 sealift to Angola made facilities in Conakry important for supporting Soviet naval forces. Calls to Guinea doubled in 1976, according to US Navy data. During this period, Soviet ships received routine, automatic entry clearance and,

[Redacted] They berthed regularly at Minier Quay—occupying space that could be turned to commercial profit [Redacted]

[Redacted] Soviet naval personnel—advisers,

technicians, port administrators, rotating ships' crews, and support teams for naval aircraft—accompanied the increasing Soviet naval presence. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Soviet offers to construct a naval base on Tamara Island near Conakry. President Toure outspokenly rejected Soviet proposals, particularly the suggestion that a portion of a base be reserved for Soviet use. Moscow's persistence suggests some dissatisfaction with the terms of access to Conakry throughout the seventies and certainly following the chill in Soviet-Guinean relations that began in 1977. [Redacted]

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Despite frequent calls to Conakry, Soviet ships actually made little use of facilities there. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Workshops of the joint Bauxite Company fabricated spare parts for minor repairs and stored Soviet supplies. [Redacted]

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Soviets assisted Guinea with the improvements of cargo-handling facilities and the installation of a conveyor system in the port, but these are for commercial rather than naval use. Moscow also constructed a fuel depot at Conakry in 1976 to store aviation fuel delivered to the port by Soviet tankers. Neither Soviet oilers nor combatants obtain fuel in port. [Redacted]

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By the late 1970s, Soviet practices in port had led to numerous complaints, which contributed to Toure's decision in 1977 to restrict the Soviet presence in Guinea and may have reinforced Moscow's interest in a secure facility separate from the commercial port. By this time, however, Soviet ships had begun to use Luanda, and the overall Soviet presence in the waters off West Africa was declining. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Toure altered the regulations for the entry and movement of Soviet ships in 1979. That seems to be the only change in Soviet port privileges, other than a case in 1978 when Soviet ships were told to leave port in preparation for President D'Estaing's visit. US Navy data show that calls to Conakry dropped sharply in 1979, but the decline over the next three years was consistent with the contraction of the West African patrol [Redacted]

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**Guinea**

<b>Conakry Port Facilities</b>	<i>Berths</i>	<i>Nine berthing areas with 2,000 meters of wharf space.</i>
	<i>Depths</i>	<i>At entrance, 9.1 meters; at quays, 3.5 to 11 meters.</i>
	<i>Storage space</i>	<i>Area of 32,000 square meters.</i>
	<i>Cargo equipment</i>	<i>Eight 50-ton cranes; three 10-ton forklifts.</i>
	<i>Fuel and water</i>	<i>No bunkers were available in 1976, and none are recorded for 1981. Water can be obtained at all berths but may be scarce from December to April.</i>
	<i>Repair facilities</i>	<i>None.</i>
<b>Conakry Airfield</b>	<i>Main runway</i>	<i>3,300 x 50 meters.</i>
	<i>Surface</i>	<i>Concrete.</i>
	<i>Fuel, maintenance, and support facilities</i>	<i>One hangar, nine fighter shelters, limited electronic and maintenance shops. POL storage in three underground tanks and three aboveground tanks is about 134,000 liters. Additional fuel is stored in trucks and trailers at the terminal. Forty horizontal tanks near helicopter parking area have a capacity of 160,000 liters.</i>

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Despite the continued coolness in Soviet-Guinea maritime relations noted by US personnel, calls to Conakry increased in 1982 as the West African patrol expanded. Conakry is more conveniently located than Luanda to support the fisheries protection patrol off Morocco, and it was the operating base for a diesel submarine deployed to West Africa during the Falklands crisis.

if the focus of naval interest shifts to the north, they may well revive proposals for expanded privileges or a separate naval facility at Conakry

Soviet naval aircraft used Conakry Airfield periodically between 1973 and 1977 to monitor Western naval operations and carrier transit lanes in the Atlantic and to participate in Soviet exercises, sometimes in conjunction with Bear D's deployed to Cuba. During this period the Soviets provided mobile ground-controlled approach equipment and some vehicles to upgrade the airfield. In 1977 the Soviets augmented aviation fuel storage by building a POL storage depot at the airfield to complement the facility near the port. A direct pipeline connected the depot

to the original storage facility,

the only Guinean involvement in the storage and use of aviation fuel was to be informed of deliveries. The fuel facilities, although used less often after 1977, continued to supply Soviet and Cuban civil aircraft and Soviet transport aircraft. Currently, the Soviets retain landing rights in Conakry for the aircraft that support Bear D deployments to Angola.

**Ports and Airfields.** Conakry's port facilities are on the seaward side of Tombo Island in southern Guinea (see figure 14). The port is a natural basin sheltered by Kassa and Tamara Islands and two protective breakwaters. Several quays could accommodate destroyers or small cruisers, but the alongside berthing of larger ships would be risky, and silting—a perennial problem—makes recorded depths somewhat unreliable.

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


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Dredging operations keep most of the harbor and channel accessible to destroyer-size ships, and there are limited anchorages outside the port for them. As an export port for bauxite, iron ore, and aluminum, Conakry is equipped to handle heavy cargo and processes arms shipments for Guinea and other African nations. Storage in the port is limited by commercial use, [redacted]

Toure used the excuse of inadequate storage as a reason for slowing Malian arms shipments in 1979.



The absence of provisioning, refueling, or repair capability partially accounts for the way the Soviets have used the port and undercuts its potential for naval

support. Moreover, US ships visiting Conakry report that pilots are inept and have little understanding of modern navigation. [redacted]

In addition to Conakry Airfield, whose major advantage is the two POL storage depots that the Soviets built, Guinea has two other airfields with runways in excess of 3,000 meters. Kankan could accommodate IL-76 transport aircraft; Lobe is suitable for IL-18 transports. Cuban engineers and laborers have worked on both airfields. Both are to the east of Conakry and

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
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appear less well equipped. Major drawbacks at Conakry include lack of well-trained ground controllers, poor quality fuel, and inadequate drainage that makes runway operation difficult during heavy rains. These, however, are Western judgments and do not seem to diminish Soviet interest in access to Conakry. 


**Areas of Potential Support**

In recent years, the Soviets have shown some interest in the naval facilities of such littoral West African states as Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Nigeria. Soviet initiatives have ranged from isolated port calls to assistance in upgrading or building facilities, such as Benin's new airfield or Cape Verde's fishing ports. In none of these nations have the Soviets undertaken an intense campaign to gain naval privileges. With the possible exception of Lagos, Nigeria, most port facilities are at or below the level of those in Luanda and Conakry and would require improvement. Most could accommodate the Soviet ships operating off West Africa, either at berths or inner anchorages, but have primitive repair and bunkering facilities. Several are major national commercial ports and would be hard pressed to sustain both naval and commercial traffic. Moreover, some of the governments concerned are wary of Soviet interest and reluctant to alter their nonaligned principles. 

Cape Verde's international airport, Amilcar Cabral, probably is the most valuable of the alternatives the Soviets have considered. It supports major international air traffic and could accommodate Soviet reconnaissance aircraft. Aircraft deployed to Cape Verde would restore Soviet aerial coverage of the central Atlantic. Soviet approaches for such access have been refused by Cape Verde's President Pereira. 

**Caribbean Sea**


Soviet naval forces in the Caribbean are modest, normally consisting of three or four hydrographic research ships and naval auxiliaries. Combatant task groups deploy to the region periodically, but no Soviet warships operate there on a continuing basis. Since the late 1970s, task groups have been present less frequently than earlier in the decade, when they

appeared two or three times a year and often included cruise missile submarines (see table). Soviet maritime reconnaissance aircraft are deployed regularly to the Caribbean to monitor US naval activity in the Atlantic and to collect intelligence against US east coast naval bases. In early 1983, long-range antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft conducted their first missions from Cuba. 


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**Naval Facilities in Cuba**

*Soviet Use.* Soviet requirements for support facilities in the region are minimal. Oceanographic research ships and those on the east coast intelligence patrol call regularly in Cuban ports. They made 46 such visits in 1981, for example, and about 40 in 1982. These calls are generally for reprovisioning or rest and recreation, according to US Navy data. In 1971 the Soviets carried out extensive charting of Cuban waters but more recently have merely monitored changes in those areas already surveyed. In addition, since 1970, the Soviets have kept an oceangoing tug or salvage ship in Havana to support ocean rescue and hydrographic operations and to assist in delivering combatants to Cuban naval bases. This auxiliary serves in Cuba for more than a year at a time. 


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Soviet combatants first called in Cuba in 1969, and task groups have made more than 20 subsequent trips to the Caribbean. Task group visits often coincide with Cuban national holidays that include naval celebrations in Havana or Cienfuegos. Since 1971 Soviet combatants have generally conducted joint training in ASW and coastal defense with the Cuban Navy. They have also made cruises through the Gulf of Mexico to demonstrate their ability to operate in international waters near the United States. The most recent task group deployment took place from late November 1982 to mid-January 1983. 

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Soviet warships calling in Havana generally berth at the naval landing wharf. Those at Cienfuegos normally use the Sugar pier (Tricontinental) or the rail pier (Ferrocarril), rather than Cayo Loco naval base.

 the first Soviet combatant to call at Punta Movida naval base was the

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**Soviet Task Group Deployments to the Caribbean and Cuba, 1970-82**

Date of Deployment	Task Group
1970 6 May to 10 June	Kresta-I CG Kanin DDG Two F-class SS's E-II-class SSGN
4 to 23 September	Kresta-I CG Kanin DDG Alligator LST
30 November to 29 December	Kashin DDG F-class SS
1971 9 February to 9 March	Kresta-I CG N-class SSN
22 May to 11 June	E-class SSGN
30 October to 21 November	Kresta ICG Kashin DDG Two F-class SS's
1972 26 February to 8 May	Kotlin DDG F-class SS G-II SSB
24 November to 16 February 1973	Kresta-I CG Kanin DDG E-II SSGN F-class SS
1973 2 August to 16 October	Kresta-II Kanin DDG E-II-class SSGN F-class SS
28 April to 1 June	Two Krivak-I FFG's G-II SSB
25 September to 12 November	Two Kresta-II CG's
1975 26 February to 5 April	Two Krivak-II CG's
21 May to 7 June	Two Kanin DDG's
1976 16 August to 21 September	Two Krivak-I FFG's
1977 26 June to 22 July	Kresta-II CG Krivak-I FFG Krivak-II FFG
13 December to 18 January 1978	Two Krivak FFG F-class SS's
14 March to 7 May	Mod Kashin DDG Natya MSF
12 September to 11 December	Mod Kashin DDG Two Krivak FFG's F-class SS
1979 13 to 14 August	Kresta-II CG Krivak-II Possible C-class SSGN No visit to Cuba
1981 12 April to 11 May	Kara CG Two Krivak FFG's
1982 25 November to 31 January 1983	Kresta-II CG Krivak-II FFG Tango-class SS

T-class diesel submarine accompanying the 1982 task group. Despite reported construction in 1970<sup>16</sup> of a support base at Cienfuegos for Soviet nuclear-powered submarines, the Soviets do not have their own naval bases in Cuba and visiting combatants receive little land-based support.

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Soviet combatants have not been repaired at Cuban shipyards and are refueled by an accompanying oiler. We believe that the ongoing expansion of Cuban naval facilities<sup>17</sup> is part of the upgrading and modernization of the Cuban Navy. Although not designed to support Soviet deployments, such facilities could provide emergency services and eventually may be available routinely to visiting Soviet warships.

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There have been reports from refugees that Soviet naval personnel use the recreation facilities built by the Soviets in 1970 on the island of Cayo Alcatraz in Cienfuegos Bay. We cannot confirm Soviet use from imagery, but it seems likely that any Soviets present at Cayo Alcatraz would be technical advisers involved in construction at Punta Movida.

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There have been more than 70 deployments of pairs of SNA Bear D's to Cuba since 1970, including the aircraft stopping in Havana to refuel during flights to and from Angola. Until early 1982 the aircraft were stationed at Jose Marti Airfield, Havana's civilian airport, and made only infrequent landings at military airfields like Holguin Air Base and San Antonio de los Banos. Soviet transports supported the Bears until 1978 but no longer remain throughout the deployments, suggesting the development of more extensive ground support facilities. Currently, Soviet aircraft operate from San Antonio de los Banos, some 15 km outside Havana.

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The Soviets' shift to a military airfield affords them two major advantages. Flight operations can be conducted without interfering with civil aviation.

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tighter at the military airfield and was upgraded throughout 1983 with the installation of additional early warning radar and new air defense sites and the assignment of additional security forces. 





The naval base across the bay from Havana's commercial port is the main repair base for the Cuban Navy. Upgrading of the naval shipyard, which is colocated with Mambisa Shipyard, took place in the late 1970s. Granma Naval Repair Base is capable of servicing diesel submarines and small frigates but has never repaired Soviet combatants. The naval base receives some of the combatants delivered by the USSR. 

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Cuba's other large port is the Cienfuegos Complex, which includes two commercial port areas and Cayo Loco Naval Base (see figure 16).<sup>18</sup> The naval base—which has been expanded since 1981 to include clerestory, support, and maintenance buildings, and additional berthing and repair space—is the home port of some of Cuba's patrol boats. The base is not suited for major combatants because of its muddy, shallow approaches  upgrading continues at Cayo Loco, but its expansion potential is limited physically by proximity to the congested commercial port. 


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
Of the two commercial port areas, Cienfuegos Northwest is the most suitable for Soviet naval ships. Soviet ships have made relatively short visits to Cienfuegos Northwest and the smaller commercial area, where there are two piers infrequently used for arms deliveries. 

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Construction at Punta Movidá Naval Base south of Cienfuegos began in 1977 and, according to overhead imagery, included the installation of two new piers capable of berthing four submarines and construction of a naval ordnance depot with a clerestory building for torpedo and missile handling (see figure 17). There are no repair facilities at the base, however, so Cuban

<sup>18</sup> In 1970 Soviet involvement in construction of facilities on Cayo Loco Island and expansion of Cayo Loco Naval Base was evident. In addition, the Soviets delivered two barges associated with support of nuclear-powered submarines to Cienfuegos. These developments sparked a protest by the United States. 

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**Ports and Airfields.** Havana, Cuba's major port, contains more than 20 docking complexes designed for sugar, molasses, grain, fertilizer, and POL cargoes (see figure 15). Shortage of equipment, frequent breakdowns, and inefficient management combine to add to congestion at Havana, however, and there frequently are 20 or 30 ships waiting to offload. The port houses a civilian shipyard, Mambisa, which could repair ships up to the size of small destroyers in its drydock. Plans for continued expansion of Havana focus on upgrading cargo-handling facilities. 

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
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



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submarines will continue to use Havana Naval Shipyard for servicing. Punta Movidá could accommodate all but the largest Soviet combatants, but it is most likely to serve as a home port for Cuba's diesel submarines. 

Cuban naval bases at Mariel, Cabanas, and Nicaro remain under construction, but they are unlikely to interest the Soviets. They lack large-scale logistic support facilities (although a large naval ordnance depot is under construction at Cabanas) and are designed primarily for patrol craft, minesweepers, and amphibious ships. 

Cuba has several airfields that could accommodate Bear aircraft, but they currently use the military airfield at San Antonio de los Baños (see figure 18). Construction before the arrival of the Bears included renovation of eight hardstands. Additional upgrading completed during 1982 or still under way—runway extensions, construction of shelters for fighter aircraft, renovation of existing parking areas, and improvement of support facilities—serves both expanded Soviet deployments and the upgrading of Cuba's Air Force. The Soviets use an isolated area of the airfield that is fenced. It includes an operations building and

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**Cuba**

<b>Havana Port Facilities</b>	<i>Berths</i>	<i>Twenty commercial cargo areas.</i>	
	<i>Depths</i>	<i>In channel, 12.8 meters; at anchorages, 10 meters; at quays, range up to 10 meters.</i>	
	<i>Storage space</i>	<i>Extensive warehouses for primary cargoes at all major quays.</i>	
	<i>Cargo equipment</i>	<i>Bulk cargo facilities at major quays, container RO/RO facilities.</i>	
	<i>Fuel and water</i>	<i>Fuel and diesel oil available at docks and by barge.</i>	
	<i>Repair facilities</i>	<i>Mambisa drydock for vessels up to 7-meters draft. A reliable repair shop is associated with Mambisa.</i>	
<b>Cienfuegos Port Facilities</b>	<i>Berths</i>	<i>Five berthing areas.</i>	
	<i>Depths</i>	<i>In entrance channel, 11.28 meters; at berths, 7.3 to 17.68 meters.</i>	
	<i>Storage space</i>	<i>Unknown.</i>	
	<i>Cargo equipment</i>	<i>Suitable for bulk cargo.</i>	
	<i>Fuel and water</i>	<i>Fuel and diesel oil bunkers require advance notice; freshwater is available at all piers.</i>	
	<i>Repair facilities</i>	<i>Light repairs only.</i>	
<b>San Antonio de los Banos Airfield</b>	<i>Main runway</i>	<i>4,000 x 46 meters.</i>	
	<i>Surface</i>	<i>Concrete block, resurfaced since 1980.</i>	
	<i>Other runways</i>	<i>Two blacktop runways less than 3,000 meters.</i>	
	<i>Fuel, maintenance, and support facilities</i>	<i>The major POL storage area includes six vertical tanks; others are contingency POL storage on six to eight railcars. No maintenance facilities large enough for Bears are available yet nor are weapons storage buildings. Eight hardstands with connecting taxiways are the main parking area. Fighter aircraft shelters are under construction. There is a building under construction in the parking area near the Bears for maintenance vehicles.</i>	

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personnel bunkers and is close to the POL storage area. The airfield has a single POL depot that is more than sufficient for Soviet and Cuban needs and contingency storage nearby. We have not identified any weapons storage under construction, and the airfield has no special maintenance area for the Bears. The main airstrip was resurfaced in 1980, possibly in anticipation of the arrival of the Bears.

maritime ties with others, such as Nicaragua. We do not believe that the Soviets are interested in developing naval logistic centers in these nations:

- Many of the port facilities are primitive and would require considerable Soviet investment before they could accommodate Soviet combatants.
- Soviet deployments to the Caribbean are not extensive enough to require additional land-based support.

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**Areas of Potential Support**

Moscow has close or improving relations with several Latin American governments and has established

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
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If the Soviets expand their naval presence in the Caribbean, they probably will use Cuban ports more frequently, particularly for routine upkeep on submarines. Naval privileges at other regional ports might be valuable politically but would have operational utility only in the unlikely event of a breach between Havana and Moscow. Access to additional airfields would provide backup landing areas but would not significantly expand the area coverage of Bear D's based in Cuba 

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**Appendix**

**Overseas Facilities Formerly Available to the Soviet Navy**

Facilities that were formerly available to the Navy in Egypt and Somalia are often compared with the types of logistic centers the Soviets now use. Loss of access to both Alexandria and Berbera contributed to Moscow's reservations about reliance on overseas facilities. 

At Alexandria, the Soviets maintained a repair ship, a barracks ship, a large covered stores barge, a small ammunition ship, light cargo ships, a rescue tug, and several yard craft. These units provided support in port and routinely serviced Soviet ships at anchorages in the eastern Mediterranean. Soviet diesel submarines received regular midpatrol maintenance and repairs at Al Gabbari Shipyard, which the Soviets had designed and built. In addition, the Soviets routinely used Mersa Matruh and Port Said and maintained a naval air unit in Egypt from 1968 to 1972. President Sadat curtailed Soviet access in July 1972 and again in June 1975 before finally expelling the Soviets in April 1976. 

At Berbera the Soviets installed a floating drydock for diesel submarines and smaller combatants, built a missile-handling facility, a POL storage hold and a housing compound, and established a communications relay facility. Soviet ships used Berbera regularly for routine maintenance and crew rest. They did not bunker there but did replenish provisions and water. In addition, Soviet maritime reconnaissance aircraft were based at a Somali airfield that the Soviets improved. The Soviets also constructed a larger airfield at Berbera. In November 1977, Moscow's decision to support Ethiopia in the Ogaden war led Somalia to revoke its Treaty of Friendship with the USSR and withdraw all Soviet naval privileges. 

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