



Director of  
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Intelligence

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
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
Contents



25X1

5 USSR: *Tungsten Imported for Military Use* . . . . . 5

25X1



Special Analysis

18 USSR: *Second-Tier Candidates for Succession* . . . . . 12



Top Secret



29 October 1982

25X1

25X1

**Page Denied**

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied

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⑤ USSR: Tungsten Imported for Military Use

*The USSR's unusually large purchases of tungsten since 1979-- including several hundred tons reportedly purchased this year from US stockpiles--probably are earmarked for military programs.* [Redacted]

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The Soviets purchased about 11,000 metric tons in 1981, about triple the annual imports of the early and middle 1970s. West European brokers, China, Peru, and Bolivia are among the major sources. These higher imports coincide with major purchases of tungsten-related Western manufacturing technology, such as that used for armor-piercing projectiles. [Redacted]

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3 Comment: Most of the imported tungsten probably is for military production, primarily antitank projectiles and other new munitions. [Redacted]

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Acquiring the related technology opens up many opportunities for military applications. Possible future uses include solid tungsten-alloy antitank and antiheli-copter projectiles and fragmentation munitions for artillery and missiles. [Redacted]

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29 October 1982

25X1

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**Second-Tier Soviet Leaders**

**Vladimir Dolgikh**



Age:57  
Party Secretary for  
Heavy Industry  
Politburo candidate member

**Mikhail Gorbachev**



Age:51  
Party Secretary for  
Agriculture  
Politburo member

**Vladimir Shcherbitskiy**



Age:64  
Ukrainian Party Chief  
Politburo member

**Grigoriy Romanov**



Age:59  
Leningrad Party Chief  
Politburo member

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[redacted]

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## Special Analysis

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### 18 USSR: Second-Tier Candidates for Succession

*The passing of several key members of the Politburo's old guard almost certainly will improve the chances for advancement of four younger leaders--party secretaries Vladimir Dolgikh and Mikhail Gorbachev and regional leaders Vladimir Shcherbitskiy and Grigoriy Romanov. None of the four is likely to succeed President Brezhnev--at least immediately. Some are likely to join the Politburo's inner circle, however, and they thus will play an important role during what could be an unsettled transition period. One of them is likely to become party leader in the succession's second phase--probably in a few years.* [redacted]

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All of these younger leaders have the kind of technical and managerial expertise that will be sorely needed as the leadership faces up to the country's mounting economic problems. Their future policy preferences, however, are difficult to predict. The parochial concerns of these leaders now color their pronouncements on larger domestic and foreign policy issues, and their current views will be subject to change or compromise as the succession struggle unfolds. [redacted]

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### 13 Domestic Issues

Although the USSR's leaders have become increasingly concerned about the poor performance of the economy, they have yet to formulate a comprehensive program that promises significant improvement. Unlike their elders, however, the second-rank leaders all have served as regional party chiefs in the Brezhnev era. Such experience may give them more familiarity with economic problems and a greater sense of urgency in tackling management reform. [redacted]

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All four leaders have publicly espoused some degree of devolution of authority in economic management, although they tend to approach the issue from different

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29 October 1982

25X1



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directions. Dolgikh and Romanov emphasize the need for a greater regional role in planning and management. Shcherbitskiy and Gorbachev apparently would like more autonomy at the enterprise level. [redacted]

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The positions these leaders would take in any future debates on resource allocation are uncertain, but their current preferences are clearly reflected in their public statements. Gorbachev, as agriculture secretary and a former party chief in an important agricultural area, is identified with heavy investment in agriculture. The other three appear to have favored the heavy industry sector. [redacted]

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Foreign Policy

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These younger leaders have not been deeply involved in the formulation of foreign policy or development of national security options. Shcherbitskiy and Romanov generally have taken a rather unsophisticated, hardline approach toward foreign policy issues and have been unenthusiastic about Brezhnev's detente policies. Shcherbitskiy recently told a Western official that he and other Soviet leaders blamed the US for causing the fall of former Chancellor Schmidt's government in order to put an end to *Ostpolitik* and facilitate the deployment of US missiles in West Germany. [redacted]

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Gorbachev and Dolgikh seldom speak out on foreign policy, presumably because of their preoccupation with economic issues. [redacted]

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[redacted]

Prospects

As the succession struggle develops, the political prospects of the four young leaders will depend on their current contacts in the leadership, their success in forming new alliances, and luck. [redacted]

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Dolgikh, the junior party secretary responsible for heavy industry, may have the best chance for advancement. His promotion to candidate member of the Politburo in May, at a time when heavy industry chief Kirilenko was in eclipse, seemed to underscore his indispensibility. He is now the most logical choice to succeed Kirilenko, and he also has been rumored as a possible successor to Premier Tikhonov. [redacted]

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The memberships held by Gorbachev in the Secretariat and the Politburo give him the most advantageous institutional position at the moment. A fourth poor harvest, however, might demand a scapegoat. Gorbachev, with no apparent strong connections in the leadership, could find himself politically vulnerable. [redacted]

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Gorbachev also could get into trouble if the implementation of Brezhnev's food program should become more bogged down in bureaucratic infighting. [redacted]

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[redacted]

Ukrainian party chief Shcherbitskiy's career has been tied to that of Brezhnev. His failure to obtain a national-level position in Moscow, however, may have caused him to reassess his loyalties. [redacted]

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Shcherbitskiy recently was reported to have endorsed Andropov's move to the Secretariat and to have seconded Andropov's nomination of Vitaliy Fedorchuk for the top KGB job. These actions may have risked alienating Brezhnev and his protege, party secretary Chernenko, who evidently favored other candidates for the KGB post. Shcherbitskiy also has been rumored as a possible successor to Tikhonov. [redacted]

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Leningrad party leader Romanov's espousal of innovations in economic management could improve his prospects for a move to Moscow. His fortunes have ebbed substantially in recent years, however, at least partly because of his personal indiscretions and volatile temperament. [redacted]

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29 October 1982

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