




Director of
Central
Intelligence

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National Intelligence Daily

Thursday
29 April 1982

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
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
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


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
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
POLAND: Problems With Youth




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Martial law hit hardest at Poland's younger generation. The drive for reform by Solidarity and its allies in student and agricultural circles was a revolt led primarily by this generation against the inefficient and corrupt system created and tolerated by their elders. 


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Resistance activities since the imposition of martial law generally have involved the young. Rebellious acts by high school students have included the printing and distribution of leaflets and the formation of small and ineffective resistance groups. 


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University students are more of a problem, and the authorities have moved cautiously to remove some popular and liberal rectors and professors. The regime's apprehension was demonstrated earlier this week when the military authorities had to threaten to close Warsaw University to prevent a strike. 

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
Comment: Although students have seemed increasingly willing to test the limits of martial law, most realize the futility of protest and fear the brutality of the security services and the loss of jobs. In the event of a clash, they probably could not count on help from the workers. 

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The party, which has little to offer young people and cannot meet either their economic or political aspirations, will continue to rely on the threat of force. The Central Committee plenum probably will produce nothing more than platitudes. 


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SPAIN-US: Tougher Negotiating Position

2/3 The Spanish Government, backed by the military, is taking an increasingly hard line in its negotiations toward a new bilateral bases agreement with the US. [Redacted]

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1/3 Chief Spanish negotiator Manueco was unusually blunt late last week in rejecting US proposals that Madrid believes would permit the US to use bases for out-of-NATO activities without Spanish approval. He said the proposed changes in the basic text would make the entire draft unacceptable. [Redacted]

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[Large Redacted Block]

2/3 1/4 Comment: Madrid's tough stance is to some degree a bargaining tactic. It also reflects, however, genuine concern about the conservative military's reaction to any language changes. [Redacted]

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2/3 Civilian politicians, generally held in low esteem by the military, feel under considerable pressure to produce an agreement demonstrably better than the one in force, which was negotiated in the last days of the Franco regime. Many officials, moreover, seem to believe that entry into NATO this spring will make Spain less dependent on the US for military support, thereby reducing the need to find acceptable compromises on the bases agreement. [Redacted]

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
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(U) EC: Budget Dispute Continues

At the EC Foreign Ministers' meeting in Luxembourg on Tuesday, London continued to block progress on settling the budget and farm price issues. Although the other nine members reportedly agreed to offer the UK a three-year rebate on its budget contribution of about \$800 million annually, London is holding out for a five-year, \$1.4 billion annual rebate. Foreign Secretary Pym again refused to lift the UK's block on setting farm prices in 1982 until the budget problem is resolved. Pym did not seek additional EC economic measures against Argentina. [redacted]

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Comment: Despite the UK's desire to maintain fragile EC unity on sanctions against Argentina, London refuses to acknowledge any link between sanctions and British positions on internal EC problems. The Danes and the Irish believe that London should moderate its rebate demands in return for EC support on the Falklands crisis, but most members appear willing to separate the issues. The French and West Germans even suggested the budget problem be dropped from the agenda in an attempt to maintain the facade of EC unity. [redacted]

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
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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

(12)

FRANCE: Review of Arms Control Policy



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The Mitterrand government is reviewing its policy toward NATO consultations on strategic nuclear arms control, hoping to strengthen its hand in resisting pressure to accept restraints on French nuclear systems. Specifically, Paris is reconsidering its decision of 1979 not to participate in NATO's Special Consultative Group on INF negotiations. A decision to join the group would tend to reinforce NATO's stand on INF deployment and to strengthen sentiment among the West European Allies for a greater say in matters of strategic arms control.

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The reassessment stems from concern that France's nuclear deterrent would be weakened if it were included, even indirectly, in an INF or START agreement. The French insist that if their comparatively small systems are to be credible deterrents, they have to be maintained and modernized.

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Paris also is against including French forces in any ceiling on US systems. The French argue that their weapons are under strict national control and would be used to pursue unilateral rather than Alliance objectives.

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New Pressures


France is increasingly aware, however, that tolerance for its position is wearing thin. The French apparently worry that the USSR will become more insistent on limiting French and UK nuclear deterrents as part of an arms control agreement with the US. Paris almost certainly is aware that its growing nuclear arsenal will complicate the task of Soviet strategic planners after the mid-1980s.

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Despite assurances from the US that it will reject Soviet efforts to introduce Allied systems into INF negotiations, Paris probably sees an erosion of Allied support for its position. West Germany believes French and

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5 UK systems must eventually be included in INF or START, a position reflected in the security resolution passed at the Social Democratic Party congress last week. Bonn probably could line up support for its position among the nonnuclear Allies. [redacted]

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5 Moreover, the Mitterrand government may anticipate problems at home with its "no negotiation" stance. Although the Socialist Party has supported Mitterrand's opposition to including French forces in strategic arms negotiations, some party officials recently have suggested that France cannot indefinitely advocate arms control while barring French systems from international talks. [redacted]

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Advantages of a Policy Change

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3 These considerations have prompted Paris to rethink tactics for gaining maximum influence over nuclear arms control developments. Membership in the SCG is increasingly attractive because it would give Paris a better forum to defend its interests in the INF negotiations. For example, Paris could argue against premature modifications of the US negotiating posture and resist pressure in the Alliance to include nuclear-capable aircraft in the INF negotiations. [redacted]

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5 France, in return for joining the SCG, also might attempt to win US support for changing the SCG mandate to include START as well as INF, or for creating a new NATO mechanism for START consultations. The Mitterrand government favors a closer link between INF and START, arguing that it is artificial and undesirable to separate the European nuclear balance from the overall strategic relationship between the superpowers. In addition, the French might see the SCG as a vehicle to express their concern that the US zero option proposal would leave Western Europe vulnerable to Soviet nuclear weapons not covered by the INF talks. [redacted]

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3 If it joined the SCG, the Mitterrand government would continue to oppose including French forces in the current round of INF negotiations. It also would take pains to refute domestic criticism that it was moving toward full reintegration with NATO. [redacted]

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Implications of French Policy Shift

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3 A decision to join the SCG probably would reinforce Allied cohesion on INF deployment by offsetting the antinuclear bias of some of the smaller Allies. It also might increase French willingness to consult on strategic nuclear issues. [redacted]

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3 If the French insisted on expanding the NATO consultative process to START, however, their membership in the SCG could complicate US efforts to limit Allied influence over US negotiating positions on strategic arms control. Moreover, French participation in NATO consultations on START would strengthen West European support for the current ABM treaty. A revised ABM treaty permitting the expansion of ABM systems would threaten the credibility of the French deterrent more than that of US and Soviet systems. [redacted]

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