




**Director of
Central
Intelligence**



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National Intelligence Daily

*Saturday
6 March 1982*

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
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
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Special Analysis

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Status of the Insurgency



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The arrival of more Soviet troops in Afghanistan this past winter has done little to reverse the deteriorating situation in the countryside, although the Soviet military's dominance in key areas remains unthreatened. To avoid further setbacks, Moscow probably will make additional changes in forces and strategy over the next six months and take on more of the combat burden from the ineffective Afghan Army.

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[Redacted] government control of the countryside declined from 33 to 17 percent over the past eight months, while insurgent control rose to 68 percent. In the remaining districts the government probably controls only the principal town. [Redacted]

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The loss of control will make it difficult for the government to conscript desperately needed men for its armed forces. Recent efforts by press gangs in Kabul and other cities failed to bring in enough new men to offset discharges, casualties, and desertions. [Redacted]

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Insurgent groups in recent months have maintained their activities in the countryside and at times seized major parts of Qandahar and Herat, Afghanistan's second and third largest cities. The insurgents continue to inflict major damage on convoys and occasionally cut communication and supply lines. [Redacted]


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The level of resistance is likely to increase gradually in the coming months as the insurgents gain added experience and obtain additional arms and ammunition. Increased tactical cooperation among different ethnic groups and among tribes with longstanding blood feuds also improves prospects for future insurgent successes. The resistance nevertheless remains fragmented and has failed to develop into a politically united force that would attract broad international support. [Redacted]

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
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



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Soviet Concerns and Responses

§ Although insurgent forces can outfight the Afghan Army, they cannot defeat major Soviet units. The Soviets have met their basic goals of occupying the cities and keeping a Communist government in power but have had to take on more of the fighting to do so. 


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
§ The large sweep operations probably will not destroy more than a few small insurgent groups or permanently return territory to government control. Previous operations have temporarily restored government control to some areas, but Soviet forces are too small in number to secure the countryside. 

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Outlook

§ Moscow probably will continue to follow a course aimed at containing and gradually wearing down the insurgents. The decline of government control and the gradual increase in insurgent capability, however, foreshadow a difficult year for the Soviets. They almost certainly will experiment with new tactics and probably will introduce additional small combat units to prevent a further deterioration of the situation. 

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§ There is no indication that Moscow has become alarmed enough to bear the costs of the massive reinforcements it would take for quick victory. A Soviet withdrawal under cover of a political agreement seems unlikely, given the USSR's already heavy commitment of prestige and resources to Afghanistan and the inability of the insurgents to win militarily. 

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