Approved For Release 2007/08/26 : CIA-RDP84T00301R000100010031-2

Superscript

Top Secret Central Intelligence

OCO

25X1

National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

11 January 1982

Top Secret

CO NIDC 82-008C 11 January 1982

25X1

Copy 419



Approved For Release 2007/08/26 : CIA-RDP84T00301R00010001003	R000100010031-2		
Top Secret	Top Secret		
Contents			
Nicaragua: Strategic Road Construction]	L	
Ghana-Libya: Diplomatic Relations			
Haiti: Renewed Invasion Attempt	2	2	
Bermuda: New Premier To Be Chosen	3	3	
Special Analysis			
Poland: Jaruzelski's Economic Measures	4	ŀ	

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

pproved For Release 2007/08/26 : CIA-RDP84	
	Top Secret
IICARAGUA: Strategic Road Constr	uction
//The government is building a new ated northeast, where there has been an activity in recent months.//) all-weather road to the iso- i increase in antiregime
//The 425-kilometer road is scale Cuban assistance, and it wi	being built with large-
the country with the key Atlantic	coast port of Puerto
Cabezasa regional military head airfield. Military supplies for	quarters with a major government forces now
rrive primarily by air or sea.//	
//Progress on the road appear	rs to have been fairly
teady despite the difficult terrals s complete.	ainabout 65 percent
ainy season begins in May. Once ill allow better reinforcement of ave been unable to contend effect andinista bands operating from Hoave endangered important gold-min ctivities.//	f small garrisons that tively with anti- onduras, whose raids
	Top Secret

Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP84T00301R000100010031-2

1

25X1

	Top Secret
GHANA-LIBYA: Diplomatic Relations	
A Libyan delegation arrived in Accand was met by coup leader Rawlings with friendship and cooperation. Yesterday, reestablished full diplomatic relations	h expressions of th <u>e two coun</u> tries
Comment: The ousted Limann governmentations with Libya in November 1980 be of subversion. Rawlings, on the other lainly is expecting economic and military Tripoli. The nature and extent of such	ecause of fears hand, almost cer- ry aid from

HAITI: Renewed Invasion Attempt

later this week.

Government security forces apparently drove eight members of Bernard Sansaricq's exile band into the hills after they landed on Tortuga Island off Haiti's northern coast Saturday from their base on South Caicos Island. Sansaricq, whose ill-conceived plan to invade Haiti on Friday was foiled by Turks Islands and Caicos Islands officials, remained behind but claimed that his force was preparing an imminent invasion of the mainland. The Haitian Government has dispatched forces to pursue the exiles.

become known after the current talks conclude, possibly

Comment: The small size of the exile force and its lack of substantial weaponry make it an unlikely threat to the Duvalier government. Authorities in Port au Prince are calm, indicating their confidence that the exiles will be rounded up. The situation remains confused, however, owing to the poor state of communications in northern Haiti and Sansaricq's unrealistic statements to the press.

Top Secret

2

25X1

25X1I

25X1

25X1

25X1

BERMUDA: New Premier To Be Chosen
//Bermuda's ruling party will vote Friday on a replacement for Premier Gibbons, who resigned last week. Gibbons's resignation was anticipated. The United Bermuda Partywhich has ruled the island since 1968 and generally represents white interestsis to elect Home Minister Swan, a US-educated black, as his successor. Swan, like Gibbons, is sympathetic toward the US and believes Bermuda should look to Washington for its future security needs when the island achieves independence from the UKnow projected to occur within three years.//
Comment: //The ruling party has only a narrow majority

in the House of Assembly, and Gibbons's successor will be under growing pressure from the black-based opposition party to accelerate the timetable for independence, pursue a nonaligned foreign policy, and address social and racial

inequities.//

Top Secret

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP84T00301R000100010031-2

	Top Secret 25X
SPECIAL ANALYSIS	
POLAND: Jaruzelski's Economic Measures	25X
Premier Jaruzelski is turning his attentice economy, now that overt resistance to martial latemporarily suppressed. Despite the negative in on the attitudes of the workers, his program may bilization in the retail market and to increased sectors in the short run. Prospects for implement nomic reforms and policies are poor, however, are economic problems are likely to continue. This, ity, will leave the people with the same economic contributed to the events of August 1980.	aw has been at least mpact of martial law y lead to some sta- d production in some enting effective eco- nd Poland's basic , coupled with auster-
Financial problems will remain a set to economic recovery. Western creditors to restore Poland's credit until its debrescheduled. Warsaw needs to demonstrat pay at least the interest on past credit some progress toward a sustained economic toward political stability.	s are not likely ot payments are se that it can ss and to show
The regime has taken advantage of the period to schedule 300- to 400-percent in prices for a wide range of food items and utilities. These increases are to be of justments only for low income earners. To absorb the excess purchasing power in population and thereby reduce shortages hoarding and speculation.	increases in retail nd for domestic Efset by wage ad- They are needed n the hands of the
If shortages are reduced, farmers me willing to sell their production to the there would be more goods for them to be increases, however, will lead to a drast purchasing power of the population and, counts are not adjusted for inflation, to the real value of personal savings.	state because ly. The price lic decline in if savings ac-
<u>.</u>	continued

Approved For Release 2007/08/26: CIA-RDP84T00301R000100010031-2

4

25X1

Top Secret	25X
The martial law regime so far has not won the confidence of the farmers, which will be necessary if food supplies are to be increased. Although the regime has not vetoed any pending liberalization changes in agricultural policy, it has threatened to force deliveries of food. This would increase food supplies to only a limited extent, because some private farmers are likely to react by killing their livestock and destroying their crops.	25X
The recent resumption of a six-day workweek in the mines and other key industries probably will lead to some increases in production, although the lack of Western food, raw materials, spare parts, and equipment will be important constraints. Even though the regime has suggested that working hours may be reduced to previous standards once martial law is lifted, it probably will be unwilling to risk losing the added production.	25X
Coal output has already jumped substantially, according to official data. If this trend is real, and if it continues, coal production this year may reach 180 million tons, compared with the premartial law target of 168 million tons.	25X
Popular Resentment	
The austerity measures are extremely unpopular and are virtually eliminating any government hopes of winning worker support and discrediting Solidarity. Workers will remember that Solidarity attached stringent conditions to a general retail price hike and refused repeated government attempts to restore the six-day workweek.	25X
The government can hope that initial resentment may be reduced if its policies make goods more available and shopping more convenient. Authorities recognize that the price issue is an explosive one, however, and martial law controls are likely to be extended beyond the date of the price increases.	25)
continued	

Top Secret

25X1

5

Top Secret	25 X 1
Reforms of the Economic System	
Martial law has greatly reduced the prospects for basic economic reform. The government had already postponed the effective date of many reforms even before martial law. Far-reaching worker self-management is a dead issue and other measures are likely to be scaled down.	25X1
A Council of Ministers decree on 30 December further impaired planned reforms by giving branch ministries a role again in imposing "production tasks" on enterprises and by increasing the number of industrial sectors where central control will be maintained. The government is following through on the plans for wholesale price reform and for devaluation of the zloty, but those measures will be largely ineffective unless the economy is decentralized.	25X1
Familiar Responses	
Jaruzelski is likely in the short run to steer the economy rather than rely on unfamiliar economic instruments and forces. His government will find it difficult to accept decentralization of decisionmaking, reduced central planning, and use of such market mechanisms as prices, interest rates, taxes, and profits to guide the economy.	25X1
In the longer run, despite the apparently strong desire of the leadership to avoid the failings of the old economic system, the regime is likely to repeat the experiments of the 1960s and 1970s, when bureaucratic and party elements first limited the extent of the reforms of those years and eventually regained nearly total control of the economy.	٠ 25X1

Top Secret

Approved For Release 2007/08/26 : CIA-RDP84T00301R000100010031-2 **Top Secret**