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# Pakistan: Zia's Divided Opposition



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A Research Paper

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NESSA 84-10090  
March 1984

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# **Pakistan: Zia's Divided Opposition**




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**A Research Paper**

This paper was prepared by  Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. 

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESAs, on 

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**Pakistan:  
Zia's Divided Opposition**

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**Summary**

*Information available  
as of 23 February 1984  
was used in this report.*

President Zia's fragmented domestic political opposition, frustrated by continued failure to achieve consensus on political strategy, lacks the cohesion and credibility to pose a serious challenge to his rule. Except in Sind Province, where sectional discontent is at least equal in importance to political grievances, opposition leaders have not attracted wide public support or been able to coordinate their actions with antigovernment interest groups. [Redacted]

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Center-left agitation against Zia during the summer and fall of 1983 damaged his image as a strong leader but did not seriously threaten the President's control. Zia inspires little enthusiasm, but, outside Sind, he commands respect. [Redacted]

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Zia ultimately depends upon the Army to retain power. The generals are not likely to depose him unless they are called upon to put down widespread civil disorders, particularly in the key province of Punjab. Such an extensive breakdown of law and order is unlikely during the next year. [Redacted]

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Zia's main center-left opposition, the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), is not a serious threat. Faction ridden and with little conservative support, it lacks broad popular backing. The MRD is likely to splinter over divergent election strategies and the failure of several key constituents to participate fully in its civil disobedience campaign. [Redacted]

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The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) dominates the MRD and is Zia's strongest opponent. The majority party in rural Sind, it retains substantial support in rural Punjab and the cities. We believe the PPP might win an unfettered election if it could unite behind a slate of candidates. A leadership vacuum, poor party discipline, and internal bickering, however, limit the PPP's ability to effectively challenge Zia. [Redacted]

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Zia has identified the PPP as his primary threat and is determined to keep it from participating in elections. He may not succeed in completely excluding party members from office, but his countermoves probably will keep the PPP out of power. [Redacted]

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The right is critical of Zia but not hostile. It rejects the MRD and largely spurned its civil disobedience campaign:

- The principal rightist party, the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) is well organized and capable of staging serious urban demonstrations that could jeopardize Zia's rule. JI leaders are unwilling to confront the President, however, fearing his violent ouster would bring to power a PPP-left-dominated government that would reverse Zia's Islamization measures.
- Pakistan's other conservative parties have limited support and share the JI's reluctance to oust Zia. 

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India and the Soviet Union have links to MRD parties, including the PPP, and probably are giving them limited financial and tactical aid. Both probably believe that a civilian government, particularly one dominated by the PPP, would be preferable to Zia's. A victory for the right would benefit neither. 

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If Zia goes, his most likely successor would be another general with similar foreign policy views. A shift of power to the political parties would have serious implications for relations between the United States and Pakistan. A PPP victory would bring a more neutralist foreign policy, possible recognition of the Communist government in Afghanistan, and increased criticism of US Middle Eastern policy. A government dominated by the religious right would retain Zia's Afghan policy but would be more suspicious of US dealings with Pakistan and other Islamic nations. 

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**Pakistan:  
Zia's Divided Opposition** [Redacted]

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**Bleak Times for the Politicians**

President Zia-ul-Haq's political foes are far from their goal of forcing him from office. At present, the parties are badly fragmented and have little leverage. In our judgment, if the politicians could unite, they might be able to combine with other pressure groups—such as merchants, labor, and students—to undercut Zia's military backing and prompt his replacement by another general. [Redacted]

President Zia has never inspired great public enthusiasm, [Redacted] outside Sind, he still commands public confidence. Zia appears to have suffered little erosion of support among merchants, bureaucrats, and local religious leaders upon whose continued acquiescence he relies. They believe that Zia has improved internal stability and presided over a visible, if fragile, economic recovery. Zia's policy to gradually Islamize national institutions is controversial, but we believe it has struck a broadly popular vein. [Redacted]

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The successful political movements against the Ayub Khan government in 1968-69 and Prime Minister Bhutto in 1977 suggest that military intervention is necessary to effect nonelectoral change. Recent political and ethnic agitation centered in Sind Province eroded the impression that Zia was in firm control of events in Pakistan, [Redacted] his military support did not decline. We believe the Army desires a return to civilian rule, but only under terms preserving a high degree of military supervision. [Redacted]

Zia has ably exploited several foreign policy issues. US diplomats report public concern that the Afghan refugee population is becoming a burden, but most Pakistanis still approve of Zia's refusal to recognize the government in Kabul. We judge that most endorse his efforts to negotiate a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan on terms that would encourage the refugees to return voluntarily. Embassy reporting suggests that Zia is also benefiting from his success at cultivating US ties to secure increased military and economic assistance. [Redacted]

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Scholars, press, and Embassy analysis strongly suggest that the failures of civilian governments in the 1950s and 1970s have eroded public confidence in existing political parties. These observers note that the public increasingly finds civilian politicians irrelevant and driven only by a desire to return to office. Even within political circles, many fear forcing a leadership change would most likely only bring another general to power. Moreover, many moderate and conservative Pakistani politicians say anti-Zia agitation would jeopardize Pakistan's security while Soviet troops are in Afghanistan and Indian intentions are unclear. We believe Zia skillfully exploited this fear to undercut center and left opponents in Punjab in 1983. [Redacted]

**The Opposition Parties**

Zia's political opponents fall into two broad categories. The most vocal are those who seek his resignation and a return to democratic rule and who endorse agitation to achieve this goal. They include the parties allied in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), as well as the Pakistan National Party (PNP).<sup>2</sup> Predominantly center and leftist in outlook, they scorn Zia's return-to-democracy blueprint as a sham to perpetuate his rule. MRD leaders have shown little inclination to negotiate or compromise with Zia. [Redacted]

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<sup>2</sup> The PNP has associated with the MRD since September 1983 and backed the civil disobedience campaign. [Redacted] the PNP has not joined the MRD because its leaders and National Democratic Party (NDP) leaders within the MRD differ on provincial autonomy. [Redacted]


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[Redacted]

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An Indian view of the MRD anti-Zia agitation campaign (fall 1983)



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Conservative and religious parties are split over the propriety of agitation as a tool. The rightists are hostile to the PPP, and most repudiate the MRD or distrust it. The rightists, however, share the Movement's position that civilian rule should be restored, notes the US Embassy. Also critical of Zia's government, they hint it could be acceptable if Zia advances elections from 1985 and lifts his 1979 ban on party activities. Unlike the MRD, the rightists have opened a dialogue with Zia.<sup>3</sup>

leftist anti-Islamic government, according to US diplomats. The rightist parties also rejected an alignment with groups favoring recognition of the Afghan Government and decried the MRD's failure to demand intensification of the Islamization of Pakistan's institutions. Without the right, the MRD became an easily isolated center-left coalition, Embassy analysis has concluded.

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**The MRD—A Movement in Decline**

The MRD emerged in February 1981 as a multiparty alliance to lead peaceful agitation for Zia's resignation and a return to parliamentary government. Hoping to forge a broad national movement, platform drafters did not commit the MRD to specific policies, according to the US Consulate General in Karachi. When the late Prime Minister Bhutto's PPP joined, conservative and religious parties stayed out, fearing it would manipulate the MRD to replace Zia with a

MRD leaders seem to have taken few steps to build a grassroots organization before they launched their first anti-Zia campaign in February 1981. We believe they anticipated that an outburst of opposition would erode Zia's support and force him from office. The MRD push coincided with widespread lawyer and student unrest, but US diplomats report that the MRD failed to coordinate its efforts with leaders of these groups. Such weaknesses have continued to plague the MRD

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<sup>3</sup> A more detailed discussion of Pakistan's political parties is contained in the appendix

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**Zia's 12 August Plan**

On 12 August 1983 President Zia promised to reinstate the 1973 Constitution, end martial law, and restore civilian government by March 1985. Zia was ambiguous who may participate but has since said that nonparty elections are preferable because the concept of a ruling party and opposition parties is contrary to Islam. He would limit popular participation by licensing candidates of proven personal integrity and religious piety. Zia would also guarantee interest groups—merchants, landlords, clerics, and workers—seats in the national and provincial assemblies. In any case, elections are unlikely before October 1984. [redacted]

At the presidential level, Zia's statement points to enhanced executive power and the creation of a structure permitting him to run for president. [redacted]

[redacted] Zia anticipates remaining President for at least five more years. He plans to amend the Constitution and reduce the power of the prime minister, a move he will justify by citing the abuses of the late Prime Minister Bhutto. [redacted]

Zia has also said there will be a presidentially appointed National Security Council with as yet undefined powers. Most Pakistani observers expect the military will have the right to veto legislation. [redacted]

Zia hopes to adapt the Turkish model created by President Evren. Under this formula, the National Security Council would be headed by the Commander in Chief of the armed forces (Zia) and a representative from each branch. [redacted]

While we believe Zia hopes to exclude the political parties, he has left room for compromise and could recognize parties registered under a 1979 ordinance. This would legitimize the religious parties and permit some moderate MRD representation but would preserve Zia's objective of excluding the PPP from national politics. [redacted]

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**Students—A Potential Problem**

We believe that many college and university students are disaffected, but they have been relatively passive since Zia assumed control and by themselves lack the strength to threaten the government. Students largely ignored the MRD civil disobedience campaign. Scattered student protests occurred in Sind, but most were organized by student groups not sympathetic to the MRD who were protesting government policies in Sind. [redacted]

Most parties, including the PPP and the JI, have campus wings. These divisions generally have worked to the government's advantage as internecine battles have drained energy that might otherwise have been aimed at the government. Students, however, might rapidly mobilize against the government under the right circumstances. These might include serious police provocations that united opposing student groups or the emergence of a national issue with broad-based appeal. [redacted]

In early 1984 Zia banned student unions in Punjab and Sind Provinces, prompting protests in Karachi and Lahore by student activists. Most students, however, remained quiescent. [redacted]

Zia skillfully exploited MRD mistakes, according to US diplomats. He quickly labeled the MRD as an agent for civil unrest threatening Pakistan's security, a theme soon exploited by the media and the MRD's conservative opponents. During the unrest in early 1981, Zia also closed the schools and detained key MRD leaders and party workers, depriving the movement of direction and disrupting its organization. [redacted]

In March 1981 the faltering alliance suffered a serious blow when Al-Zulfikar terrorists hijacked a Pakistani airliner to Kabul and murdered a Pakistani diplomat on board. Zia capitalized on the incident by linking Al-Zulfikar to the PPP and by extension to the MRD. PPP Chairman Begum Nusrat Bhutto played into Zia's strategy by hesitating to condemn the

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***Al-Zulfikar—Double-Edged Threat***

*In the Pakistani political context, the Al-Zulfikar terrorist group is at least as great a threat to Zia's opponents as to the President. Founded by the late Prime Minister Bhutto's sons Murtaza and Shahnawaz, Al-Zulfikar has never abandoned its avowed goals of violently overthrowing Zia and avenging the execution of their father. Zia has adroitly exploited Al-Zulfikar terrorism and its foreign ties to discredit the MRD and the PPP, which he charges collaborate with it secretly. We believe this tactic has been particularly effective in undercutting opposition support in Punjab Province. While Al-Zulfikar has drawn most of its recruits from the PPP, party leaders have publicly disavowed any connection.*

[Redacted]

*[Redacted] Al-Zulfikar strength at about 1,600 to 1,800, but effective manpower probably is much lower. Authorities monitor suspected operatives closely and generally have blocked Al-Zulfikar attempts to infiltrate teams from India into Pakistan. Nonetheless, the terrorists have succeeded in murdering several Pakistani officials and, in September, conducted a bombing campaign in Lahore.*

crime. According to an MRD leader, Al-Zulfikar's act put the Movement on the defensive as Zia was able to brand it an adjunct to anti-Pakistani terrorism, a label Pakistani political observers say the MRD has never escaped.

Organizational problems, a lack of funds, and government countermeasures also impair the MRD's effectiveness. Surveillance discourages many second-echelon politicians from active MRD involvement,

[Redacted]

[Redacted] MRD had so little

***Foreign Ties to the MRD***

*[Redacted] MRD parties are receiving assistance from India and the USSR, but the extent of this aid is not clear. We judge that both Moscow and New Delhi have long cultivated ties to MRD politicians. They were encouraged by the unrest in Sind to exploit these ties in an effort to weaken President Zia's position in hopes that a center-left coalition would come to power. In our view, these efforts will add to the pressures on Zia over time but are not likely to strengthen the MRD sufficiently to cause his fall.*

*Prime Minister Gandhi is particularly concerned that Zia's growing cooperation with the United States may include US basing rights in Pakistan, [Redacted]. She has publicly stated her hope that Zia will be replaced by an elected civilian regime that will be more stable, peaceful, and receptive to New Delhi's concerns.*

[Redacted]

*Soviet media have lauded the MRD and attributed unrest to massive popular dissatisfaction over Pakistan's new military relationships with the United States and its role in aiding the Afghan insurgency. Moscow also accused Zia of being unresponsive to Pakistan's political and economic needs.*

[Redacted]

spontaneous support that it had to hire crowds but lacked the resources. The MRD's poor performance in the cities in late 1983 suggests that these problems persist.

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The US Consulate General in Karachi reports that the leftists have been more aggressive than the moderates, thereby gradually winning a disproportionate role in decisionmaking within the organization. In 1982 they engineered the creation of an MRD steering committee and promptly took control of it. Working from this base, MRD radicals—including leaders of the PPP's left wing—disregarded moderate sentiment and shifted the Movement from its original neutrality on political issues. Under leftist influence, the MRD condemned Pakistan's growing economic and military ties to the United States, endorsed direct talks with the Kabul regime, and supported women activists protesting moves to amend Pakistan's law of evidence along traditional Islamic legal lines to restrict women's testimony in court. [redacted]

The leftist ascendancy provoked two conservative parties, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (TI) and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), to reduce their support for the MRD in 1983 and to consider leaving, reports the US Consulate General in Lahore. We believe the subsequent civil disobedience campaign prompted leaders in the two parties to postpone a final decision but will not halt their drift from the Movement. One or both parties probably will defect in 1984. [redacted]

Diplomatic reporting suggests that Tehrik leaders oppose the MRD's steering committee and suspect that the PPP is exploiting the Movement to advance its own fortunes. JUI leaders, US officials report, were most unhappy that they were not consulted before the decision was made to support the women activists—whose goals the party found objectionable on religious grounds. JUI strategists also opposed the August agitation campaign. The JUI eventually gave it formal support, but the party's Punjab faction continues to show little enthusiasm for the MRD. [redacted]

We believe the MRD's decision to challenge Zia in August was prompted by a realization that Zia had



MRD leaders Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi (left) of the PPP and Meraaj Mohammad Khan (right), president of the National Liberation Front, court arrest (16 August 1983) [redacted]

captured the political initiative and was gaining popular support. Zia's successful spring tour of the major cities in Baluchistan and Sind and the MRD's repeated failure to rally the public probably heightened these concerns. [redacted]

[redacted] many MRD moderates—particularly within the PPP—feared Zia would beat a direct challenge, but the radicals prevailed by arguing that inaction risked losing any prospect of mobilizing the public. Finally, Zia threw down the gauntlet on 12 August when he announced his blueprint for institutional reform that appears to exclude the traditional parties from meaningful political participation. [redacted]

MRD organizers urged the public to repudiate Zia by refusing to pay taxes, striking, and demonstrating. Party members and professionals were urged to flout the ban on political expression and to court arrest. We believe MRD strategists hoped their tactics would polarize politically conscious Pakistanis, creating a groundswell that would force anti-MRD conservatives to join the protests. [redacted]

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Government authorities—except in rural Sind—anticipated and thwarted the MRD’s moves. [redacted]

[redacted] Concurrently, the regime detained or restricted the activities of many MRD leaders outside Sind, disrupting their efforts to organize grassroots support. [redacted]

The results of the “fill the jails” campaign were mixed, but the public’s generally tepid response bodes ill for the MRD’s hopes of removing Zia. The campaign showed unexpected strength in rural Sind, but a strong flavor of provincial—even separatist—sentiment undercut efforts to capitalize on the momentum generated there. Zia was able to weaken the MRD among non-Sindhis by accusing the Movement’s leaders of cultivating violence and undermining national security, according to [redacted] US diplomats. [redacted]

When MRD leaders suspended the agitation in December, they had not achieved their stated objectives of disrupting local elections and forcing Zia to recognize all political parties. Zia began a dialogue with rightists—leaving MRD leaders more isolated than ever—but he showed no inclination to modify his August plan. Press and Embassy reporting also suggests that the agitation has aggravated sectional tensions in the MRD. Sindhi MRD activists who courted arrest and went to jail charge their Punjabi associates left them to bear the brunt of government retaliation, the US Consulate General in Karachi reports. [redacted]

The MRD, moreover, does not appear to have increased its popular support. The religious and conservative parties are still alienated. Among interest groups, only Western-oriented lawyers and activist women—both persistent Zia critics—joined the civil disobedience campaign, and we judge that their contributions did not greatly augment MRD strength. Most students and labor groups stayed on the sidelines, say US diplomats, and merchants and bureaucrats also exhibited little support for the MRD. Most importantly, although the civil disobedience campaign prompted some senior officers to urge that Zia negotiate with the MRD, the Army backed Zia’s refusal to

**Lawyers and Women Activists—  
Interest Groups on the Defensive**

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*Pakistan’s lawyers have a tradition of political activism and have often opposed Zia, but the bar confronts Zia from a weak base. The law is an elite and increasingly isolated profession. Many Pakistanis admire Zia’s legal reforms for increasing judicial economy and swiftness. They believe the attorneys’ objections are motivated by financial considerations rather than principle and see little incentive to support them, note Embassy sources in the legal profession. The profession is overcrowded, and many lawyers are either financially strapped or heavily dependent on government patronage.* [redacted]

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*A small, but vocal number of politically organized and socially active Pakistani women have achieved international notice by opposing policies of President Zia, notes a recent Embassy assessment. These activists are primarily associated with the MRD. Their impact is countered by equally vocal and better organized pro-Zia conservatives and by the inertia of the majority of Pakistan’s women, most of whom are tied to the home, poorly educated, and politically inactive. Anti-Zia women activists played little role in the recent agitation, except in Sind, where they were visible in support of the MRD but generally ineffective.* [redacted]

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make concessions, [redacted]

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[redacted] Zia’s standing may even have risen because the Army credits him with cleverly handling the MRD. [redacted]

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**The PPP—Zia’s Principal Opponent**

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By all accounts, the PPP dominates the MRD. The PPP has fomented anti-Zia opposition since he deposed it in 1977. Despite Zia’s efforts to suppress it, the PPP remains the only party with a sizable national following and the capability to challenge him. PPP

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strength is constricted by organizational and leadership problems, however, and it is distrusted by those Pakistanis—including the military—that it does not represent, report US diplomats. [redacted]

Since Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's execution in 1979, the PPP has lacked a strong leader, a problem we believe greatly hampered the organization during the recent agitation. The titular leader of the PPP is Bhutto's widow, Begum Nusrat Bhutto, who was elected chairman after his death. [redacted]

[redacted] she has failed to unite the party. Many Punjabi party members complain that Begum Bhutto refuses to delegate power, and their grievances have grown since she left Pakistan in November 1982 for medical treatment for cancer. [redacted]

[redacted] Punjabi party members also believe Begum Bhutto and her advisers react slowly to events in Pakistan and scorn new party leaders who have shown popular appeal. [redacted]

Begum Bhutto's daughter Benazir—who was exiled in January 1984—could rally the party, in our opinion.

[redacted] she is a dynamic speaker with a strong intellect and considerable courage.

Identified with the PPP's left wing, Benazir inherited both her father's arrogance and his autocratic streak, qualities that have hindered her in uniting the party or extending her appeal beyond the PPP, [redacted]

Benazir has been working to improve her image and may be moderating her political platform. A close confidant of Benazir told US diplomats recently that she now believes the PPP must cultivate Army support against Zia, a shift from her previous denunciation of the generals for ousting her father. [redacted]

Zia respects and fears Benazir's ability to appeal to diverse elements of society and has long been concerned that she could rally a strong separatist movement in Sind [redacted] Consequently, Zia has worked to isolate Benazir, keeping her under house arrest from March 1981 to January 1984 and then allowing her to leave for Europe. Zia probably expects that once out of Pakistan, Benazir's [redacted]



Benazir Bhutto in an interview in India Today (15 February 1984) [redacted]

popularity will gradually wane. We believe, however, that she will remain a factor in Pakistani politics for the foreseeable future. Benazir's press conferences in England indicate that she persists in her fight against Zia. [redacted]

The PPP has no other clear leader. When Begum Bhutto departed Pakistan, party chiefs formed a 12-member steering committee, but this compromise solution apparently has failed. [redacted]

[redacted] illness, travel absences, and arrests had immobilized the committee. [redacted] the committee could be quickly reconstituted or that Begum Bhutto would delegate her authority as party leader. [redacted]

The PPP also is divided on how best to battle Zia, [redacted] Sindhis—particularly leftists—favor an activist approach. Many courted arrest and were jailed during the disobedience campaign. Their activism may have reflected their opposition to "Punjabi rule." Sindhi PPP leaders, including the former provincial governor Ghulam [redacted]

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Mustapha Jatoi, also have been under greater political and economic pressure from the government than those in Punjab, [redacted]

Punjabi PPP leaders, on the other hand, argue that their party should not confront Zia until sentiment against him can be broadened. Most prominent Punjabi party members took no active role in the recent agitation, notes the US Consulate General in Lahore.

[redacted] local leaders in one-third of Punjab's districts ignored party directives to court arrest. [redacted] the violence in Sind dismayed Punjabi leaders, who feared an anti-PPP backlash. [redacted]

The Sind and Punjab wings also diverged over participation in nonpartisan local elections in September 1983. The Punjabis argued that the party should participate because it needed to control development aid funds channeled through the local bodies and cultivate "grassroots" power. The Sindhis—who probably anticipated that the authorities would bar them from office—championed an election boycott. The steering committee, pressed by Jatoi and Begum Bhutto, overruled the Punjabi faction and committed the party to the MRD boycott, [redacted]

Election policy continues to bedevil the party. [redacted] significant support now exists in all provinces—including Sind—for participation in subsequent elections regardless of government restrictions or an MRD boycott. Begum Bhutto, however, still opposes participation, and PPP leaders reportedly fear the issue could split the party, [redacted]

The PPP's relationship with the MRD is ambiguous. [redacted] party leaders view the MRD as a useful device to rally the public against Zia but a potentially dangerous rival, and the PPP has little interest in formulas that would guarantee assembly seats to other MRD parties. The PPP may also have reason to distrust its allies. The US Embassy reported in late November that Tehrik leaders privately said a PPP electoral boycott would be a golden opportunity to win a larger share of National Assembly seats. They will run regardless of the election

format or a PPP/MRD boycott. We speculate other MRD parties would follow Tehrik's lead. [redacted]

**The Right—Coexistence With Zia**

The tacit support of several religious and conservative parties strengthens Zia. We anticipate that their acquiescence will continue to undercut the center and left's ability to oppose Zia. The right participated in government during 1977-79, and most rightist parties accepted Zia's invitation in October 1983 to open unofficial talks. We believe two parties in particular, the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and the Pagaro faction of the splintered secular Pakistan Muslim League, are drawing closer to Zia. Both are banned, but their activities are less circumscribed than other parties. Candidates backed by each were unofficially allowed to enter the local elections in September 1983 and did well. [redacted]

We believe the Jamaat is the most important rightist party and the group most supportive of Zia. The Jamaat officially disassociated itself from the government in 1979, complaining that Zia was too slow to Islamize Pakistan's institutions,<sup>5</sup> but members continue to serve on advisory boards and in the Federal Advisory Council. Most Pakistani political observers conclude that the Jamaat still influences government policy. [redacted]

JI leaders endorse civilian rule but do not insist upon participation of the traditional parties, suggest press accounts. According to Embassy reports, they would prefer to limit participation to persons of good "Islamic" character—a formulation Zia voices. This would exclude the PPP, whose anti-Islamic nature JI members say has remained unaltered since Bhutto's ouster. JI leaders privately tell US diplomats that Zia is the best available leader. We believe the JI would shift against Zia only if public opinion begins to run decisively against him and it was necessary to abandon him to preserve the party. [redacted]

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**Quiescent Labor**

*Organized labor does not pose a threat to Zia in the near term. A recent Embassy survey concluded that moderate labor federations have no plans to re-create the Pakistan Labor Alliance, which was an important element in Bhutto's downfall. The Embassy noted the government has encouraged the fragmenting of unions, and most members are apolitical and unprepared to confront either management or the government.* [redacted]

*Neither the MRD nor its constituent parties have attracted significant labor backing. Most unions ignored the political parties' appeal to support the MRD's national civil disobedience campaign last summer. Moderate labor leaders doubt that the rewards of political activity outweigh the risk, according to Embassy reports. Pakistan's labor leaders charge that their movement supported and trusted Bhutto, who then turned upon it, and these leaders say they will not repeat that error.* [redacted]

In our estimate the JI, which claims 10 percent of the electorate, is Pakistan's best organized political movement. It has strong support among students, professionals, and business groups in Karachi and Punjab Province, who have prospered under Zia and are not inclined to oppose his rule. Benefiting from government help, the Jamaat has also taken control of several labor unions and greatly expanded campus strength through its student wing, the Islami Jamiat Tulaba (IJT), according to diplomatic reporting. [redacted]

[redacted] IJT leaders are critical of Zia—whom they charge is insincerely exploiting Islam—but we doubt they are prepared to combine with the MRD parties. During the height of the MRD agitation, the US Consulate General in Lahore predicted that if a serious showdown between Zia and the MRD developed, the IJT would support the government to preserve Zia as the lesser evil. Zia's decision in February 1984 to ban student unions has enraged IJT activists, US diplomats report, but Jamaat leaders have continued to urge nonconfrontation. [redacted]



*In a rare display of labor support, radical labor activist Gulzar Begum is arrested while leading a Karachi pro-MRD civil agitation demonstration (30 August 1983)* [redacted]

UPI ©

The JUI and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) are much less able to muster their supporters, according to US diplomats, and lack the cohesiveness of the Jamaat. Their relations with the government are more ambiguous. They appear open to compromise with Zia but have not ruled out agitation if he excludes them from a direct role in the prospective civilian government. [redacted]

The JUI's course during the civil disobedience campaign reflected internal disarray. Pro-MRD leaders opposed the campaign and initially did not court arrest, while anti-MRD leaders remained aloof. Even after the JUI announced its support for the tactic, only a few members responded, US diplomats say. The JUI dodged Zia's invitation to discuss Pakistan's political structure by claiming that a key leader was ill. Most Pakistani observers rejected this explanation, according to Embassy reporting, and believed the party could not arrive at a consensus on a negotiating position. [redacted]

The JUP was also indecisive. The Karachi-based party president Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani publicly advocated support for the MRD to force recognition of the parties by Zia, but, the US Embassy notes,

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the party's strong Punjab wing—which has benefited from Zia's Islamization program—balked. Noorani joined Zia's talks in October but told reporters Zia was only trying to buy time. He later launched an often postponed "direct action" campaign but limited his activities to sermons appealing for an end to martial law. Not surprisingly, authorities do not consider the JUP a serious threat, [redacted]

[redacted]

**Outlook**

In our judgment, Zia has won the first round against the opposition and is in a strong position to implement the transition to civilian government on his terms. He has prevailed by setting the tone of political debate, exploiting his opponents' fragmentation, maintaining military support, and retaining the acquiescence of most Pakistanis. [redacted]

By contrast, opposition party leaders seem no more inclined than before the civil disobedience campaign to put aside their differences and unite against Zia. We believe the moderate JUI and Tehrik parties probably will defect from the MRD in 1984 after failing to reconcile their differences with the PPP and the left. The leftist parties—which have benefited from MRD affiliation—distrust the PPP and the moderates. Their failure to mobilize labor or the urban poor during the agitation shows that they will not seriously threaten the government. [redacted]

We do not believe the PPP will split, but we doubt it will act as a cohesive body. Benazir Bhutto's unexpected departure from Pakistan probably will prove to be unsettling and could prompt a battle over party leadership. We predict that during 1984, moderates will argue—with little success in the face of counter-arguments by Begum and Benazir Bhutto—that confrontation is unproductive and will urge negotiation with Zia. The Bhuttos' absence may embolden some to enter into secret arrangements with the government, further weakening the party. [redacted]

Most conservatives probably will continue to believe that Zia, with all his faults, is a lesser evil than a PPP or left government. Their view could change, however, if Zia implements his plan for nonpartisan government and it becomes clear that the right, even in an unofficial capacity, will be excluded from political

participation. In that event, the JUI and the JUP, which are least contented with Zia, might be goaded into active opposition. Without JI support, we believe their opposition would scarcely increase pressure on Zia. We doubt that the Jamaat will confront the government as long as Zia continues efforts to Islamize institutions in Pakistan. [redacted]

We anticipate that political apathy in the Punjab will persist as a major impediment to any party's hopes. With 65 percent of Pakistan's population, much of its wealth, and most of its Army and civil servants, Punjab is by far the dominant province. If the Army were called out to suppress widespread violence by fellow Punjabis, we believe Zia would become vulnerable to replacement by another general who might be willing to preside over a transfer of power to the politicians. [redacted]

We believe this is not likely to occur. Most Punjabis—including key interest groups such as bazaar merchants, local clerics, Islamic-minded students, and rank-and-file labor—seem to believe Pakistan's interests are better served by tolerating Zia than by joining political disturbances that could benefit India or the Soviet Union. Having outlined a plan for restoring civilian rule and initiated discussions with some politicians, Zia can plausibly claim his course is an alternative to continued martial law or a return to the chaotic parliamentary politics of the Bhutto era. [redacted]

Over the longer term, we believe the greatest danger Zia faces is his reluctance to reach an accommodation with Sindhis, particularly the moderate PPP leaders who represent the landowners and families who traditionally dominate politics in that province. Zia seems determined to exclude them from exercising power at any level. In contrast to Punjab, Islamabad has made no ad hoc arrangements with local Sindhi PPP politicians. Zia may be counting upon the Pagaro faction of the Muslim League and local JI leaders to fill the vacuum. We speculate, however, that the more likely benefactor will be radical and separatist movements including the Sindhi Awami Tehrik, which can exploit the hostility created by government sweeps in rural

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*The long-term danger? Sindhis alienated from their government cheer the death of a policeman killed during the MRD civil agitation (September 1983)*






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Sind. We believe prospects for a serious separatist movement in Sind will grow, but the full impact is unlikely to be felt during the next year. If Zia cannot preserve order in Sind, we believe he would face serious erosion of his crucial military support.



The economy probably will continue to be a positive factor for Zia. He will benefit from the economic stimulus of remittances from Pakistanis working abroad, completion of large-scale public projects begun under Bhutto, and business confidence that his economic course is predictable. Economic gains realized during Zia's tenure are real but fragile. If the economy sours, Zia's foes will have an issue with the potential to cut across partisan lines.

Zia's closer ties to the United States are another potential danger point. Through 1983 the rapprochement has worked to Zia's advantage. He can point to tangible defense and economic benefits gained without compromising Pakistan's nonaligned status. Many Pakistanis, however, are suspicious of US reliability,  If promised assistance does not fully materialize, Zia's credibility will be weakened. 

Zia could also suffer if the Afghan resistance goads Moscow or Kabul to attack insurgent camps in Pakistan. Zia would seek to use the attacks to rally the nation against the external enemy—a time-tested tactic—but he could be vulnerable to charges he had unnecessarily exposed Pakistan in the service of US policy interests. MRD leftists who have consistently criticized the President's US and Afghan policies would particularly benefit. 

The Army will remain Zia's power base. We believe some senior officers question whether Zia's plan to restore civilian rule can succeed without party participation, but the Army will back Zia over the politicians out of reluctance to remove one of its own to relieve political pressure. We believe that only a general breakdown of law and order—for which Zia was blamed—would provoke a reassessment of support for Zia within the Army. We do not believe either the MRD, the PPP, or the right has the organizational strength and popular backing to create such conditions in 1984. 

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In our view, three major alterations in the Pakistani political landscape would be necessary before the opposition could challenge Zia successfully. First, the political parties would have to lay aside their differences and unite against the President. Second, the parties would have to convince at least the urban populace that their policies are preferable to Zia's and are worth fighting for. Finally, the politicians would have to convince the Army, most probably through urban riots, that Zia's continuation in power threatened Pakistan's security and only his removal and a return to party government would reunite the country.

[redacted]

**Implications for the United States**

We believe the Army values good relations with the United States and will attempt to preserve them. In the unlikely event that the politicians can undermine Zia's credibility with the military, we believe that the Army would install a moderate-conservative coalition excluding the PPP and that relations with the United States would not greatly suffer. The new government probably would share Zia's suspicion of the Soviet Union and would be unlikely to soften Pakistan's present Afghanistan policy. Moreover, if the religious right, particularly the JI, dominates such a coalition, Islamabad might favor even greater assistance to the Afghan resistance. Such a government probably would be more critical of US Middle Eastern policy as too supportive of Israeli objectives, but such a shift probably would be only an irritant.

[redacted]

Although less likely, escalating violence in Punjab Province might force the Army to accept a civilian government with PPP or MRD participation. In these circumstances, we believe Pakistan's ties with the United States would weaken, and its Afghan policy could become more ambiguous as the new government tried to steer Pakistan along a nonaligned course. MRD leaders have maintained ties with Kabul, and some almost certainly would advocate quick recognition of the Communist regime. An MRD government might initially be inclined to repatriate the Afghan refugees, arguing that their presence endangers security and undermines the economy. In our view, this inclination would be constrained by Islamic state and Chinese misgivings and by the reality that no party government is likely to long survive if it ignores either the Army's interests or conservative opinion in Punjab Province.

[redacted]

We anticipate a left-dominated PPP government would pursue improved relations with the USSR and India at the expense of those with the United States, particularly if it attained power because Zia's Afghan policy had failed. Although Benazir Bhutto,

[redacted] would

not radically alter Zia's Afghan policy, the PPP's repeated condemnation of his refusal to recognize the Afghan Government suggests otherwise.

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## Appendix

### Pakistan's Major Political Parties

#### The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD)

The MRD was formed in 1981 as a nine-party alliance to force Zia to restore parliamentary government and resign.<sup>6</sup> The MRD's manifesto of February 1981 demands: Zia's resignation and an immediate end to martial law; free, fair, and impartial provincial and National Assembly elections under the 1973 Constitution; and, after this, return of power to the elected representatives of the people. A fourth point calls in general terms for restoring and protecting the interests of Pakistan's provinces. [redacted]

#### Principal MRD Parties

**Pakistan People's Party (PPP).** Most Pakistani political observers believe that the PPP, which dominates the MRD and is Pakistan's largest party, would be the likely victor in a free election. [redacted]

[redacted] President Zia shares this belief and is determined to thwart the PPP. [redacted]

The PPP was founded in 1967 by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who appealed to nationalism and popular sentiment in favor of political and economic equality. He built a coalition of peasants, rural tenants, urban migrants, industrial workers, professionals, wealthy landlords, and some industrialists. While in power (1971-77), however, Bhutto alienated the military, bureaucracy, urban middle class, bazaar merchants, religious conservatives, and the labor unions. These opponents exploited election fraud during the National Assembly elections in 1977 to unite with center and Islamic parties to undermine and topple Bhutto. The PPP has since forged an uneasy alliance with some of its political foes and appears to have regained limited

<sup>6</sup> The eight parties now comprising the MRD are: the PPP, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (TI), the Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), the National Democratic Party (NDP), the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (Rahman faction), the Pakistan Muslim League (Khairuddin Group), the Qaumi Mahaz-e-Azadi (National Liberation Front), and the Pakistan Mazdoor Kissan Party (Peasants-Workers Party). The Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference withdrew in April 1981 after MRD leaders refused to expel the PPP for its alleged ties to the Al-Zulfikar terrorist group. [redacted]

labor support, but we believe the powerful interests Bhutto offended continue to oppose the PPP's return to power. [redacted]

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Bhutto seems to have regarded the PPP as his private vehicle for gaining and holding power. He neither encouraged strong party leaders nor built a grassroots political structure. Instead, he relied upon charismatic appeal and ties to local leaders and landlords who were loyal to him but not to each other or to the PPP as an institution. [redacted]

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Since Bhutto's execution, these structural weaknesses have encouraged party fragmentation along personal and ideological lines. Loyalty to Bhutto's memory and the anticipated electoral appeal of his widow and daughter hold the factions together, but no leader capable of truly uniting them has yet emerged. The failure of PPP leaders in Punjab to generate support for PPP-encouraged mass agitation in rural Sind in 1983 is likely to aggravate tensions between the Sindhi and Punjabi wings of the party. [redacted]

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In power, the PPP satisfied best its poorest and least articulate constituents: peasants, tenant farmers, and urban laborers, who form a broad-based, loyal constituency that most observers believe would actively support the PPP in an open election. The party most successfully transcended economic class lines in Sind, where Bhutto exploited his origins and persuaded his fellow Sindhis that he could protect their interests against the Punjabi majority. According to a recent analysis by the US Consulate General in Karachi, the growing legend of Sind's "Golden Era" under Bhutto has been an important factor in shaping Sindhi resentment of the Zia government. [redacted]

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The PPP's ability to exploit its membership to mount a successful civil disobedience campaign is questionable. Rural members are scattered and easily neutralized by authorities. In rural Sind, PPP anti-Zia demonstrators showed unexpected persistence last

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Begum Nusrat Bhutto, exiled PPP chairman and widow of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (February 1982)

year, but their demonstrations were isolated and sporadic. Outside Sind, party discipline appears weak, and we believe most PPP members lack both the economic independence and the depth of commitment to risk regime retaliation. Nonetheless, the PPP's ability to mount large protests in inner Sind last summer and fall shows the party can still challenge Zia and remains his strongest opponent.

**Principal Party Leaders**

- Chairman **Begum Nusrat Bhutto** (In Europe since November 1982)
- Secretary **Dr. Ghulam Hussain** (a leader of the Punjabi left wing, in Europe since mid-1983).
- Prominent Leaders **Benazir Bhutto** (Sind, under house arrest March 1981-January 1984, in Europe since).  
**Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi** (president for Sind, moderate).  
**Mumtaz Ali Bhutto** (Sind, strong rural ties, a rival of Jatoi).  
**Makhdum of Hala** (Sind, important regional religious leader).

**Hafiz Pirzada** (Sind, allied to Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, exiled in London, former Law Minister).

**Farooq Leghari** (President for Punjab)  
**Sheikh Mohammed Rashid** (Punjab, leftwing leader with ties to Begum and Benazir Bhutto).

**Ghulam Mustapha Khar** (Punjab Governor in Bhutto era, exiled in London, alleged conduit for Libyan funding to PPP left wing in Punjab, accused by government of working with India to encourage military disaffection).

**Aftab Sherpao** (President for North-West Frontier Province, where party is weak, moderate).

**Masoud Kasur** (North-West Frontier Province, President of Peshawar High Court Bar Association, considered close to Begum and Benazir Bhutto).

**Yahya Bakhtiar** (President for Baluchistan, party weak in province).

Student Wing

**People's Student Federation (PSF).**

**National Democratic Party (NDP).** The NDP is the dominant party in the North-West Frontier Province. It has little strength elsewhere following a split in 1979 with its Baluchistan wing. Founded in 1975 by Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari, then an independent member of the National Assembly, the NDP is a moderate, left-of-center party. Diplomatic observers say that Mazari is a weak leader and that the party's real leader is Abdul Wali Khan, a former National Awami Party leader who brought many of his supporters into the NDP.

He has been critical of Zia's Afghan policy, calling frequently for direct negotiations with Kabul. Wali Khan long has been a vocal advocate of greater autonomy for Pushtunistan, a murky term usually embracing the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan.

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NDP relations with the PPP have long been strained. Prime Minister Bhutto dissolved NDP provincial governments in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan and jailed many leaders including Wali Khan. Wali Khan has told US diplomats that Bhutto ordered assassination attempts against him and has implied he distrusts the Bhutto women. Friction between the NDP and PPP may have seriously undercut MRD efforts to organize anti-Zia agitation in the North-West Frontier Province last summer. According to widely publicized Pakistani press accounts, NDP leaders announced shortly before the agitation that they were withdrawing from the MRD because they believed the PPP planned to renege on its agreement to join in a general boycott of the local elections. Although the rift was patched up, NDP members do not appear to have vigorously participated in the civil disobedience campaign. [redacted]



NDP leader Abdul Wali Khan (1971) [redacted] Pictorial Parade ©

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#### Principal Party Leaders

President **Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari.**

Secretary General **Zahrul Haq.**

Prominent Leaders **Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Nasim Wali Khan** (Wali Khan's wife and effective party leader in his absence), **Abdul Khaliq Khan, Safdar Hussain Siddiqi, and Abid Zuberi.**

Student Wing **Pushtun Student Federation (PSF)**—strong in North-West Frontier Province. [redacted]

**Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI).** The only religious party in the MRD, the JUI is beset by internal dissension. JUI strength is confined largely to Pushtun tribesmen residing in parts of the rural North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. The US Consulate General in Lahore notes that the party derived much of its appeal from former Secretary General Maulana Mufti, who died in 1980. It adds that the party has never resolved the leadership issue between Mufti's son, Maulana Fazlur Rahman, and Secretary General Obaidullah Anwar. Both apparently lack the skill to mold the JUI into a strong political organization. [redacted]

The JUI's ambivalent position in the MRD has exacerbated party tensions, according to US diplomats. The JUI previously was part of the anti-PPP Pakistan National Alliance, and party members served under Zia in a previous cabinet. Rahman says he joined the MRD because he believed Zia's Islamic measures and commitment to them were only half-hearted. He hoped the MRD might force elections in which the JUI could "encourage the selection of proper religious elements" who would peacefully replace Zia and set Pakistan on a proper Islamic course. Prior to joining the MRD, Rahman did not consult the Punjab wing, which was skeptical of the Movement and feared it was too secular and vulnerable to leftist domination. Rahman and other pro-MRD leaders increasingly have come to share this view, reports the US Consulate General in Lahore. In line with their efforts to heal the party split, they have gradually detached the JUI from the MRD. [redacted]

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#### Principal Party Leaders.

Secretary General **Maulana Obaidullah Anwar.**

First Secretary **Maulana Fazlur Rahman.**

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Amir **Maulana Abdullah Darkhasti.**  
  
Student **Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islami** (active in Sind  
Wing and Baluchistan with primary appeal to  
Pushkun students). [redacted]

**Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (TI)—Movement for Integrity.**  
Founded in 1970 by former Chief of the Pakistani Air Force Asghar Khan, the TI has been characterized by US Embassy observers as progressive with an Islamic tint. Tehrik leaders have indicated a willingness to accord Pakistan's provinces greater authority. Recent press accounts indicate, however, that the party has misgivings about provincial autonomy, and some TI leaders have threatened to withdraw from the MRD if its leaders commit the Movement to autonomy. Diplomatic reporting suggests that the party draws most of its strength from urban intellectuals and professionals, especially lawyers. It is poorly organized with little rural support and is very weak in Baluchistan.  
[redacted]

Asghar Khan's reputation as an honest, independent-minded politician is the Tehrik's strongest asset. He emerged as the leading politician in the Pakistan National Alliance in the election campaign in March 1977 and was a key figure during the subsequent protest campaign against the Bhutto government. Asghar Khan has consistently refused to reach an accommodation with Zia, saying that, while the Army should be permitted an honorable exit, it must go and should hold elections as soon as possible. In 1979 Asghar Khan was widely rumored to be a leading candidate for Prime Minister had Zia not canceled elections. He has been under house arrest since 1980. According to the US Embassy, a Zia intermediary met with Asghar Khan in October 1983, but the meeting does not appear to have been fruitful. [redacted]

**Principal Party Leaders**

Chairman **Air Marshal (Retired) Asghar Khan.**  
  
Vice **Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri.**  
Chairman  
  
Secretary **Mushir Pesh Imam** (acting party leader  
General since Asghar Khan's detention). [redacted]



*Retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan, imprisoned chairman of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal party (1981)* [redacted]

**Associated Party: Pakistan National Party (PNP).**  
Since September 1983 the PNP has been associated with the MRD. Failure to reach an accommodation with NDP leaders over personal conflicts and the MRD's position on regional autonomy have derailed several efforts to incorporate the PNP into the MRD formally. The PNP is an offshoot of the NDP and was founded in 1979. It is the predominant party in Baluchistan and stands for complete provincial autonomy with only defense, foreign affairs, and communications being left to Islamabad. The party seeks to restructure Pakistan's administration on the basis of culture and linguistic affinity and geographic contiguity. [redacted]

Party founder and President Mir Ghaus Bux Bizenjo is radical in outlook and has a reputation for opportunism. His opponents charge that he tailors his beliefs to retain office, citing his willingness to serve as governor under Prime Minister Bhutto even though he was adamantly opposed to provincial autonomy. [redacted]

**Principal Party Leaders**

President **Ghaus Bux Bizenjo.**

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
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Baluch activist Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, president of the Pakistan National Party (1981)

Secretary General **Kaswas Gardezi.**

Prominent Leader **Abdul Hamid Jatoi**

**Religious Parties**

**Jamaat-i-Islami (JI).** The Jamaat-i-Islami is Pakistan's most tightly organized political movement. Strongly anti-PPP, the Jamaat was a major factor in Zia's rise to power. Its street agitation against Bhutto began the breakdown of public order that eventually convinced the military he had lost the ability to govern.

The JI is based on an ideological commitment to transform Pakistan into an Islamic state governed by orthodox Sunni precepts. Traditionally, the JI has functioned as an elite institution seeking to shape Pakistani politics and—except in 1970—has not participated in elective politics at the national level. Candidates identified with the Jamaat ran in local elections in 1983 and did well, according to US diplomats.

Full members are admitted only after a carefully monitored apprenticeship. US diplomats estimate they number less than 5,000 but give the Jamaat a

cohesive core highly resistant to outside influence or penetration. Associate members—who number about 500,000—pledge obedience to the JI but are not held to the strict standards of Islamic conduct required of full members. They may not hold party office or vote in internal elections. The JI claims about 3 million supporters. These have no formal party ties but are counted upon for votes and money. Their contributions and foreign assistance probably make the JI the most financially sound party in Pakistan.

According to the US Consulate General in Lahore, most Jamaat supporters are urban and lower middle-class men drawn from business, the professions, and the bureaucracy. These groups generally have benefited economically under Zia JI with playing an important role in limiting anti-Zia demonstrations last summer and fall in Sind's major cities. The JI reportedly has few, if any, supporters within the landed or big business elites and has had little success in recruiting rural migrants to the cities, where the PPP traditionally has been strong. The JI does not appeal to Pakistan's Shia minority, who fear that a JI-dominated government would attempt to coerce them into observing Islamic practices they charge are actually Sunni accretions, according to the US Consulate General in Karachi

We believe JI support among students and labor is growing. The Jamaat has been particularly successful in attracting students in Punjab and is strong in urban Sind schools and the North-West Frontier Province. A Jamaat student organizer has told US diplomats in Lahore that many student recruits are villagers attracted by financial and tutorial aid. Benefiting from government help, the JI has taken control of several important labor unions, including Pakistan's largest steel union, and has built impressive support in the railroads and national airline, according to a recent Embassy estimate.

Information is limited on the Jamaat's inner workings. The US Consulate General in Lahore has identified three leadership factions. A Lahore faction under Amir Mian Tofail Mohammed predominates and favors a cooperative but critical relationship with the

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government. It is highly vocal in condemning the MRD. A Muhajir (Muslim immigrants from India) faction based in Karachi is more critical of Zia, has informal contacts with the MRD, and is next in importance. In 1981 its leader told US diplomats he had argued for joining the MRD as a means of limiting PPP influence in the Movement but was overruled by the Punjab faction. A third group in the North-West Frontier Province reportedly holds a middle position, according to US diplomats, but also spurns cooperation with the MRD. [redacted]

**Principal Party Leaders**

- Amir **Mian Tofail Mohammed** (leader of the Punjab faction).
- Vice Amir for Sind **Professor Ghafoor Ahmad** (leader of the Muhajir faction and a party moderate).
- Secretary General **Qazi Hussain Ahmed** (leader of the center North-West Frontier Province faction).
- Student Wing **Islami-Jamiat-Tulaba** (strongest in Punjab, where it dominates student politics at most major universities). [redacted]

**Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP).** The JUP has been a vocal but inconsistent regime critic under its president Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani. JUP leaders declined to join the MRD because its organizers would not endorse intensifying Islamization. Noorani, however, has established informal ties with the Movement and held out the prospect of joining it at some point if Zia continues to procrastinate in restoring civilian rule. At the same time, Noorani has kept open channels to the government and participated in Zia's October talks. According to the US Consulate General in Karachi, Noorani might collaborate with Zia under a power-sharing arrangement even if the MRD parties are excluded. [redacted]

We believe Noorani is attempting to exploit threats of possible support for the MRD to extract concessions from Zia. Noorani probably is reluctant to mobilize his party against Zia until he determines that Zia is in serious trouble and until Noorani has secured the support of other conservatives. This elusive goal is

complicated by his reluctance to associate with the JI, whose leaders, he charges, ignore the legal traditions of Islam. He also dislikes the Pir of Pagaro, who dominates the Muslim League. [redacted]

JUP strength is difficult to gauge. Most supporters are illiterate villagers in Sind and parts of Punjab mobilized by local religious leaders (pirs), reports the US Consulate General in Karachi. Noorani is a dynamic speaker who can draw large, enthusiastic crowds. The JUP fared best of the religious parties during local and provincial elections in Punjab and Sind in the 1970s but was a poor second to the PPP. In 1979 US diplomats estimated JUP strength was growing, but in 1982 it suffered a partial split when Information Secretary Zahoore Hassan Bhopali defied Noorani and joined Zia's Federal Advisory Council. Al-Zulfikar terrorists killed Bhopali in September 1982, but we presume some of his supporters are still estranged from Noorani. [redacted]

**Principal Party Leaders**

- President **Shah Ahmed Noorani.**
- Secretary General **Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi.**
- Senior Vice President **Syed Barkat Ahmad.**
- Vice President **Hamid Ali Khan.**
- Vice President, Sind **Mufti Mohammad Hussain Qadri.**
- Vice President, Punjab **Mian Jamil Ahmad Sharaquri.**
- Vice President, NWFP **Chadhury Mohammad Sarfraz Khan.**

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A gadfly on the right. President Shah Ahmed Noorani of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (February 1982)

[redacted] he plans only to incorporate League members into the nonpartisan political structure of the new civil government. [redacted]  
[redacted]

The Pir of Pagaro—the most prominent of Sind’s traditional religious leaders—heads the League and its strongest faction. A traditional opponent of the PPP, [redacted]

The US Consulate General in Karachi reports that Pagaro exploited the PPP’s boycott of local elections in Sind in 1983 to increase his faction’s representation on local councils but still has much less popular support in Sind than the PPP. We believe that the Pir expects to be rewarded politically, possibly with an appointment as Prime Minister. He could repudiate Zia if his expectations are not satisfied.

[redacted] 25X1  
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**Major PML Factions**

Vice President, Baluchistan **Qari Abdul Rehman.**

Pagaro Group (Pro-Zia) Leader **Pir of Pagaro**, Principal Adviser **Makhdumzada Hassan Mahmud.**

Student Wing **Arjuman-i-Tulaba-i-Islam** (strong in urban Sind, but weaker than IJT or center and left student groups, strength growing in Punjab. [redacted])

Khairuddin Group (MRD member) Leader **Khwaja Khairuddin.**

Qayyum Group (Neutral) No dominant figure since death of Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan. 25X1

**Conservative Secular Party**

**Pakistan Muslim League (PML).** The PML follows a conservative, secular line. It is a remnant of the coalition that led the anti-British agitation for the formation of Pakistan but proved too brittle to survive the strain of parliamentary politics in the early 1950s. A small Karachi faction led by Khwaja Khairuddin is in the MRD, but we believe most members are either neutral or anti-MRD. Although diplomats note that PML leadership is aging and the party has little popular support, its members include some influential landlords in Sind, Punjab, and the North-West Frontier Province. [redacted]

Prominent Independents **Mian Mumtaz Daultana, Sardar Shaukat Hyat Khan.** [redacted] 25X1

Zia drew heavily from the League in naming the Federal Advisory Council, prompting speculation that he intends to revitalize the League and give it a major government role under his leadership. [redacted]

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