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# **Libyan Military Aid: Trying To Buy Influence**



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**An Intelligence Assessment**

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*NESA 84-10028C*

*February 1984*

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
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# **Libyan Military Aid: Trying To Buy Influence**



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**An Intelligence Assessment**

This paper was prepared by   
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It  
was coordinated with the Directorate of  
Operations. 

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be  
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,



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**Libyan Military Aid:  
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**Key Judgments**

*Information available  
as of 6 January 1984  
was used in this report.*

Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has amassed a large inventory of Soviet-supplied arms far in excess of Libya's needs. Qadhafi has used these arms to try to buy influence with a wide variety of Third World governments and insurgent groups. Since the mid-1970s Libya has supplied over \$1 billion in arms and trained several thousand foreign dissidents and soldiers in camps inside Libya. Despite this ambitious scope, of all the measures Qadhafi has used to advance his influence—subversion, terrorism, and economic and military aid—arms transfers have been the most tangible means, yet perhaps the least effective. Few recipients have become dependable allies, and, while many continue to accept aid, often it is because they lack other suppliers. Most clients do not adhere to Qadhafi's policies simply because they have received arms.

In the early 1970s, Qadhafi handed out cash grants largely to Palestinian and other radical Arab groups and governments. This reflected the Libyan leader's fierce ambition to eliminate the state of Israel and to win adherents to his revolutionary ideas. From 1975 onward, direct arms transfers began to replace financial aid as Qadhafi sought more control over recipients' behavior. When he failed to develop a major role for Libya in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Qadhafi expanded his meddling to Sub-Saharan Africa, where weak, politically unstable nations seemed more susceptible to Libyan influence.

The shift to Africa also proved largely a failure, and Libya has developed relatively close ties only with such radical states as Benin and Ethiopia. Qadhafi has attempted to use arms transfers to create a dependency on Libya among some recipient states and in other instances to support surrogates like rebel groups in Chad. Most insurgent groups obtain arms and training from Libya because they cannot find other sources of supply or cannot pay for arms and training. Few have shown a genuine ideological affinity for Qadhafi's views.

The scope of Libyan activity has recently expanded into Latin America. Qadhafi has become convinced that the United States is his biggest threat, and he sees arms shipments to Latin America as a way to strike at the United States in its own backyard. He will continue attempts to send such aid despite the embarrassing seizure by Brazil of four aircraft carrying arms to Nicaragua in April 1983. The success of further efforts to send arms by air depends on Libya's obtaining overflight rights now denied it in West Africa.

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Tripoli generally has failed to establish lasting political influence through its military aid policies. Libya often is its own worst enemy because logistic problems, poorly qualified diplomatic and military personnel, and a lack of coherent policy direction leave both Libyan diplomats abroad and foreign clients confused and angry. Qadhafi's mercurial actions have included parsimonious fulfillment of promises of assistance; cutting off aid when groups fail to obey his directives; and alienating foreign trainees by heavyhanded revolutionary doctrine and general arrogance at the expense of practical instruction.

We believe Libya will continue its arms transfer policies despite these problems, particularly those aimed at undermining US influence. His view of military aid as a symbol of power feeds Qadhafi's self-image as a major international leader. The greatest potential danger is that Qadhafi eventually may give away more sophisticated weapons systems that would enhance the military capabilities of the recipient. To date, Tripoli has been strikingly reluctant to transfer such major weapons as fighter aircraft, armored vehicles, and top-of-the-line missile systems and tanks. Although Qadhafi wants to present his country as having the best and the most potent arsenal, Libya's overall attitude is parsimonious, with promises far outweighing deliveries. Qadhafi probably believes a certain leverage comes through simply having such an impressive weapons inventory.



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**Libyan Military Aid:  
Trying To Buy Influence**



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**Qadhafi's Objectives**

Since coming to power, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has used Libya's oil wealth to amass an arsenal far beyond his country's needs. Angered and disillusioned by the outcome of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the diplomatic efforts following it, he dedicated himself to the elimination of Israel, the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the revitalization of Muslim and Arab power. In pursuit of this policy, Qadhafi turned to the Soviet Union as the only power both willing and able to sell Tripoli the large quantities of arms Qadhafi wanted.

Libya's peripheral position in the Arab-Israeli conflict and its alienation from Egypt, its natural ally in the struggle with Israel, soon eroded the notion that Libya's formidable arms inventory would stoke another Arab-Israeli war. We believe, however, that the international attention and disproportionate influence Qadhafi gained by having such an arsenal encouraged him to exploit that influence through arms transfers to groups such as the Palestinian guerrillas who were continuing the fight against Israel and to other groups and governments who either shared Qadhafi's radical views or simply needed arms and financing from any source.<sup>1</sup>

Qadhafi's frustration over his inability to strike Israel directly has resulted in his increasingly directing his anger toward the United States. Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Qadhafi became convinced that the United States was responsible for Israel's continued existence and military success. Qadhafi's public statements make clear that he blamed the United States for Egypt's withdrawal from the Arab struggle, and he began to see US peace efforts as an attempt to divide and weaken the Arab world. Much of Qadhafi's activity since the signing of the Camp David



accords in 1979 has been directed toward undermining moderate, pro-Western Arab regimes or encouraging radicals whose activities are inimical to US interests, especially in Africa. Military aid to Latin America is the most recent example of Libyan meddling specifically designed to strike at US interests.

Military aid as an instrument of influence has distinct advantages from Qadhafi's perspective. As a symbol of power it feeds Qadhafi's image of himself as a major international leader. Libya's large arsenal—even undistributed and poorly maintained—conveys power by its very existence. Qadhafi has used arms transfers to create a dependency on Libya among some recipient states and in other instances to support surrogates like rebel groups in Chad.

Qadhafi's other tactics to acquire influence have ranged from attempts at statesmanship to bribery, from economic aid to state-supported terrorism and subversion. These divergent approaches coupled with Qadhafi's unpredictable behavior make him a dangerous adversary. Economic aid for development projects to recognized governments, as well as funds to guerrilla groups, are of approximately the same magnitude as arms transfers—about \$1 billion since 1974. Money is more easily distributed than arms, making this an attractive option for Libya. The problem is that little control can be exerted over a group or government once the funds are in its hands, and we believe this is one reason why arms transfers and military training have come to figure more prominently in Libya's foreign aid policy.<sup>2</sup>

Qadhafi also has tried to woo the same governments he wishes to overthrow, a technique that US Embassy reporting indicates is perhaps more unsettling than any other to foreign governments. Tunisian, Sudanese, and Moroccan officials all viewed Qadhafi's efforts at reconciliation in the summer of 1983 with

<sup>2</sup> See appendix, "Libyan Training of Foreign Dissidents."



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
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Libyan Training Sites for Foreign Dissidents



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apprehension, since all three countries have thwarted Libyan-sponsored coup attempts in the past three years. The attempt to overthrow Sudanese President Nimeiri in February 1983 was blocked by Egyptian

and US support to Khartoum,

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
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
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We estimate Libyan military spending has remained constant since 1980 at about \$3 billion per year. We believe most of this is for domestic expenditures and arms purchases.




Over the years, Qadhafi has shown by his behavior that he is reluctant to become too dependent on the Soviets, and we believe this fear might prevent Qadhafi from agreeing to Soviet demands for expanded military access as part of a friendship treaty.

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**The Soviet Role**

Although the Soviet Union has not directly supported Libya's more extreme adventures, it has made them possible by supplying massive quantities of arms to Libya. The value of Libya's arms contracts with the Soviet Union—the first major arms deal in 1974 was worth \$2.3 billion—exceeds that of any other Soviet client state. We calculate that Libya's arms deliveries from the Soviet Union currently total more than \$8 billion. Despite different ideologies and mutual suspicion, the relationship is mutually convenient. In addition to its efforts to subvert US interests around the globe, Tripoli until recently provided Moscow with a source of much-needed hard currency. A sharp decline in oil revenues in 1982 resulted in Libya pressing Moscow to accept oil in part payment of its weapons bill.



Much of Libya's Soviet-supplied weapons inventory remains in storage, and only a relatively small proportion has been delivered to Libyan clients. Two-thirds of Libya's tanks and armored vehicles have never been assigned to operational units.

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Libya has given away only 10 percent of the more than 2,000 tanks in its inventory, the largest in North Africa. Arms transferred are often earlier models such as the BM-11 multiple rocket launcher or the ZU-23 anti-aircraft gun, instead of the more recent BM-21 or ZSU-23/4 self-propelled gun in Qadhafi's arsenal. Transfers of sophisticated weapons have been rare. Possible Soviet restrictions on such weapons transfers may be a factor,

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Syria and the Polisario Front have received SA-6 and SA-9 surface-to-air missiles; the SA-7 shoulder-fired missile is the usual item.

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Libya has sent Iran, Ethiopia, and the Polisario Front T-54/T-55 tanks, but Libya has never delivered the T-62 or its newest T-72 Soviet-built tank to any client. Few of the tank transfers appear to have

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Despite their common objectives of wanting to undermine Western influence, Tripoli and Moscow distrust each other.

Although Libya and the Soviet Union announced agreement "in principle" on a friendship treaty in March 1983, it is yet to be signed.

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

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Libyan SA-6 surface-to-air missile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL)



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appreciably improved the armored capabilities of the recipients. Only the Polisario Front guerrillas appear to have used T-55 tanks in battle against the Moroccans, according to satellite photography. The 100 tanks received by Ethiopia in January 1983 remained at the port of Aseb for over six months before some were seen at an armor training school. We believe Iran probably has attempted to use its tanks in the war against Iraq because of its desperate shortage of armor



Libya's ineptitude alienates many arms recipients. We believe Qadhafi's decision in 1979 to replace Libyan embassies abroad with "Peoples' Bureaus"—a move that swept out what little diplomatic talent remained—seriously weakened Libya's ability to carry out international diplomacy. Qadhafi has complained that reporting from his Peoples' Bureaus was inaccurate and uninformed, and in February 1982 he ordered new officials installed with some diplomatic and language training,

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Attempts to improve Tripoli's arms transfer performance also led to the creation in March 1983 of a military affairs department under Qadhafi's direct control.

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the office was established to expand assistance to governments and groups in Africa and Latin America opposed to the United States and Israel.

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**Constraints on Libyan Military Assistance**


In its arms transfer policies, Libya often is its own worst enemy. Logistic constraints, diplomatic ineptness, and a lack of direction from home often leave Libyan diplomats abroad and foreign clients confused and angry. Qadhafi has made generous promises that are not matched by deliveries and has sent weapons systems that arrive in poor working order or without component parts. Clients have reported that Libyans display evidence of poor discipline and training, which disillusion recipients about the value of what they are getting, and many Libyan instructors lack the necessary language qualifications. Finally, Qadhafi often demands more extreme policies than recipients are willing to undertake.



Central policy guidance from Tripoli is lacking to such an extent that often Libyan representatives overseas and officials back home are completely out of touch with each other.


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
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**Table 2  
Typical Military Aid Items  
From Libyan Inventory <sup>a</sup>**

**Armor**

T-54/T-55 tanks  
Cascavel armored fighting vehicle  
Possibly BRDM-2 armored fighting vehicle and/or BMP, BTR-60  
armored personnel carrier

**Artillery**

130-mm M-46 field gun  
122-mm D-30 howitzer  
Mortars, various calibers  
122-mm BM-11 and BM-21 multiple rocket launcher  
107-mm recoilless rifle

**Air defense**

23 ZU-23 antiaircraft gun  
37-mm M-1939 antiaircraft gun  
57-mm S-60 antiaircraft gun  
SA-7 Grail missile

**Antiarmor**

AT-3 Sagger antitank guided missile  
RPG-7 antitank gun  
SPG-9 antitank gun

**Small arms**

Mines  
Grenades  
Machineguns, rifles, pistols

<sup>a</sup> Meant to show items Libya usually supplies; not all inclusive.



Tripoli's problems in supplying military equipment efficiently and its sloppy training methods also diminish the value of its relationships with client states. For example, the Central African Republic (C.A.R.) was annoyed when it received armored equipment in such poor mechanical condition that Libyan instructors in Bangui could not repair it, according to the US Embassy in Bangui. In 1982 [redacted] four T-55 tanks intended for delivery to the C.A.R. reached Pointe Noire, Congo, then returned to Tripoli—probably because the Libyans could find no means to transport them farther. [redacted]




[redacted] Beninese officers prefer French to Libyan military training, while Tunisian and Sudanese dissidents have complained about the emphasis at Libyan training camps on discipline and ideological indoctrination rather than on practical instruction.



Over the years, Qadhafi's approach to military assistance gradually has become more selective, although promises still outweigh deliveries to many groups. Libyan aid in the early 1970s consisted largely of cash grants to Palestinian groups, [redacted]

[redacted] Arms deliveries eventually replaced direct financial aid after Qadhafi became angry about what he considered was misuse of funds and the recipients' failure to adhere to Libya's viewpoint. [redacted]

[redacted] Qadhafi continues to provide weapons in the hope that he will gain more control and to ensure that guerrilla leaders will fight rather than use the funds to line their pockets. [redacted]



**Patterns of Arms Distribution**

Libyan military aid falls into three categories: aid to governments, aid to dissident groups, and military training—conventional and guerrilla— mostly inside Libya. Libya has transferred arms to about 20 governments and dissident groups in the last two years, roughly the same number as during 1979-81.<sup>4</sup> The



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
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
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
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Libyan T-55 tanks have been transferred to Iran and Ethiopia



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Libyan 122-mm D-30 towed field artillery piece



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Sagger AT-3 antitank missile on BRDM-2 armored fighting vehicle




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BM-21 multiple rocket launcher



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**Table 3**  
**Recipients of Libyan Arms, 1981-83<sup>a</sup>**

Governments	Groups
<b>North Africa-Horn of Africa</b>	
Ethiopia	Somali National Movement Somali Democratic Salvation Front <sup>b</sup> Eastern Sudan Group Sudanese Socialist Popular Front Polisario Front (Western Sahara)
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>	
Angola	Chadian dissidents
Benin	Ugandan Freedom Movement
Central African Republic	Ugandan National Rescue Front
Ghana	National Resistance Movement (Uganda)
Lesotho	National Resistance Army (Uganda)
Mozambique	United Popular Front (Uganda) <sup>b</sup>
Upper Volta	Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC) <sup>c</sup>
<b>Middle East/Persian Gulf</b>	
Iran	Union of Iraqi Democrats
South Yemen	Kurdistan Patriotic Union
Syria	Lebanese Arab Socialist Union Mirabitun Progressive Socialist Party (Druze) Palestinians DFLP PFLP PFLP-GC Popular Struggle Front National Democratic Front (North Yemen)
<b>Latin America</b>	
Argentina	Farabundo Marti (FMLN) (El Salvador)
Grenada	
Nicaragua	

<sup>a</sup> Groups previously supplied arms but not noted since January 1981 are not included.

<sup>b</sup> Consolidation of previous groups.

<sup>c</sup> Ex-Katangan gendarmes.

pattern of distribution indicates that Qadhafi still is working to establish influence within the Muslim sphere and that he is concentrating on weak, relatively needy countries—primarily in Africa—where his chances of success are greater. This emphasis on

Africa as the most susceptible sphere for asserting Libyan influence is likely to continue, in our judgment.

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Political events and economic shortfalls since late 1981 have contributed to a narrowing of Libyan activity. Qadhafi's desire to gain the chairmanship of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1982 caused him to reduce sharply his troublemaking in Africa, while his financial problems led to a more cautious posture on military aid and disbursements. Scaled-down activity included the withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad in November 1981 and a short-lived deal with Morocco to stop supporting the Polisario guerrillas in Western Sahara. arms shipments to insurgents in Somalia and Uganda apparently ended in late 1982.

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Qadhafi did not completely stop his meddling, however, especially after two abortive efforts in 1982 to convene the OAU summit meeting in Tripoli, and the loss of the chairmanship removed the need for Qadhafi to stay on his best behavior. Tripoli's large arms stockpile allows Qadhafi to direct arms transfers to areas where he deems it most important. With the second invasion of Chad in 1983, we saw an upsurge in Libyan activity.

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**Africa**


Qadhafi has found fertile ground for promoting Libyan influence among the politically unstable and economically weak regimes of Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly West Africa. The prospect for success is bolstered by Libya's historic ties to several countries in the region and the presence of large Muslim groups in many of them. Fostering Muslim claims to political dominance is a cornerstone of Qadhafi's revolutionary mandate, which he claims to have inherited from Nasir. Qadhafi's personal interest in Africa and the degree of Libyan involvement there have tended to shift with the fluctuations in Qadhafi's ambitions in the Middle East—his area of primary concern. Since Libya's alienation from Egypt in the mid-1970s and more recently his isolation from even the more radical

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
Arab camp, we have seen Qadhafi's attentions increasingly focus on Africa, interrupted only periodically by such events as the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. His primary targets have been Chad and Sudan, where he has for some time sought to install regimes responsive to Tripoli's interests and eventually politically unite them with Libya.

Although the cost of such major items as tanks makes aid to Iran and Ethiopia more costly for Libya than aid given to Chad, nowhere else have the Libyans mounted an operation of such magnitude.

Qadhafi's interest in Chad stems from Libya's historic claim to sovereignty over the northern Aozou Strip. The Libyan monarchy began to aid dissident Muslim tribesmen in the late 1960s against the southern non-Muslim blacks who had dominated Chad since it gained independence from France in 1960. Qadhafi, proclaiming himself heir to Libya's 19th century religious predominance over much of northern Chad, occupied the Aozou Strip in 1973. The issue has bedeviled Libyan-Chadian relations ever since.

Although Libya has not won a clear-cut success in Chad, its hold on the northern third of the country is secure, and we believe it is unlikely to withdraw without establishment of a friendly government in N'Djamena that will honor Tripoli's territorial claims and recognize its influence. We believe Qadhafi's determination coupled with Chad's vulnerability to Libyan meddling assures that Libya will continue to support an active military training and assistance effort on behalf of one or another of Chad's political factions.


The current conflict in Chad marks the second time Libya has committed large numbers of troops to Chad's episodic civil war. In 1980-81 Libya provided materiel and logistic support to then President Goukouni, eventually dispatching a 7,000-man contingent to help in the struggle against rebel troops led by former Defense Minister Habre. Following the Libyan withdrawal in late 1981 and the ouster of Goukouni by Habre in June 1982, Qadhafi again armed and provided logistic backing to Goukouni's forces in their attempt to regain control of the country.



We believe Libya's aim in both cases has been to protect its claim to the Aozou Strip and to install a regime in N'Djamena responsive to its interests.

The amounts of arms given to pro-Libyan forces in Chad during the periods of direct intervention and in the years leading up to them are impossible to determine with any precision, given the shifting fortunes of Qadhafi's clients and the difficulty in distinguishing materiel that has remained in Libyan hands and that passed on to the Chadians.

Elsewhere in Africa, Libya has had few successes. Libya's recently bungled relationship with the C.A.R. demonstrates the pitfalls Tripoli creates for itself when it tries to use arms transfers as an instrument of influence. Libyan instructors arrived in Bangui in October 1982 to train Central Africans in tactics for a Libyan-supplied armored unit. President Kolingba told the



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US Ambassador in Bangui that he was suspicious of Libya's motives from the first, and relations between the two countries deteriorated markedly when Kolingba refused to join Qadhafi in denouncing the Chadian regime during the Central African leader's visit to Tripoli in April 1983. One month later Bangui announced the "completion" of the Libyan training mission.

Qadhafi's ties to *Benin* are among his closest in Africa. Only Benin has allowed its territory to be used as a transit point for ferrying dissidents into Chad, [Redacted] Recruits from such West African nations as Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, and Mauritania have been flown from Cotonou to Libya for paramilitary training and ideological indoctrination, and we believe many of these may later be infiltrated into their home countries to foment trouble against their governments. Tripoli promised some military equipment to Benin in May 1983—including an early warning radar that US defense attache sources saw at the Cotonou airport in early June—marking the first direct shipment from Libya in some time.

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The setback in the C.A.R. was partly offset by the coup in *Upper Volta* in September 1983 that brought to power a young pro-Libyan Army officer, Captain Sankara.

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Recent arms deliveries indicate Qadhafi's continuing interest in Benin as a staging point from which to pursue his goal of displacing Western influence in western and Sahelian Africa.

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After Sankara assumed power, he immediately claimed to have halted an "unsolicited" Libyan airlift that was mounted following his coup, according to press accounts. Despite this attempt to ease the fears of his moderate neighbors, Sankara has publicly praised Qadhafi's revolution and supported his position in Chad.

Libya has generally good relations with *Ethiopia*, with which Tripoli joined in a three-way defense pact in 1981 that also included South Yemen. Tripoli also provided considerable assistance to Somali dissidents through 1982. Over half of the more than \$700 million in aid to Addis Ababa—apart from resupplying foreign dissident camps inside Ethiopia—has been economic, however, [Redacted] The military component of the Tripartite Pact, formed as a shield against the US rapid deployment force, has failed to materialize partly because Libya has been reluctant to make good its promises to equip a trinational force and to finance construction of the necessary military facilities, beyond \$150 million possibly used for military purposes that was loaned in late 1981. The only tangible military aid Ethiopia has received under the Tripartite Pact appears to have been the delivery of 100 T-55 tanks in January 1983,

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[Redacted] Libyan arms are still arriving at Ouagadougou, possibly overland through Ghana.

Libya's demands on *Ghana* appear to be cooling that relationship.

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[Redacted] Rawlings' refusal to grant basing rights to Libya, the latest in an escalating set of Libyan requests, led Qadhafi to cut off much-needed oil to Ghana in the second half of 1983, according to the US Embassy in Accra. If Ghana cannot obtain affordable oil elsewhere, relations will warm somewhat, but with caution on Ghana's side and growing annoyance on Libya's.

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
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


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Libya's principal activity in the Horn of Africa during this period consisted of an extensive airlift to *Somali dissidents* that ended in late 1982.



Several insurgent groups in *Uganda* also have suffered from Libya dropping its earlier aid, and even that aid had been very limited. We judge that Qadhafi became more selective about his military assistance and may have realized that—as in Somalia—the insurgents were making little headway.



In the *Maghreb*, Libya's principal arms transfer activity has been the supply of Polisario Front guerrillas. Libya and Algeria have been the major patrons of the Polisario since its evolution into a fighting force in the mid-1970s. Since 1980 the Polisario Front has received SA-6 missiles, tanks, and armored vehicles from Libya. The relationship with the Polisario is a prime example of Libya's failure to translate significant arms aid into durable political influence. The Front's dealings with Libya have been so plagued by Qadhafi's inconsistent policies that few among its leadership are pro-Libyan. As a result, we believe the Polisario views Libya with considerable skepticism and disdain.

On at least two occasions—most recently in July 1983—we believe Qadhafi interrupted the flow of supplies in order to broker temporary and tactical rapprochements with Morocco. In the latest instance, the US Embassy reported that Qadhafi apparently agreed to halt his assistance to the Polisario in exchange for Morocco refraining from interference in Libya's adventures in Chad. Shortly before Qadhafi's first visit to Morocco in July 1983, he announced publicly that he was no longer concerned with the struggle to wrest control of Western Sahara from Morocco. Although we cannot confirm that Tripoli has cut off supplies or that the interruption will be prolonged, the incident further erodes Qadhafi's reputation with his clients.

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
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The smaller states of the Maghreb fear Qadhafi, who sponsored the Gafsa raid into *Tunisia* in 1980 and organized a coup plot in *Mauritania* that was uncovered in December 1982.

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
**The Middle East**

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Qadhafi's ambitions to play a major role in the Arab-Israeli conflict have been largely confined to supporting *Syria* and *pro-Syrian* Palestinians. Qadhafi warmly welcomed the recent rebellion against Yasir Arafat by hardline Palestinians and gave the rebels financial aid, and possibly arms.

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


Tripoli announced that the 600 Libyan troops in Lebanon—sent before the 1982 Israeli invasion to support Syria and the Palestinians in the Bekaa Valley—were at Druze and Syrian disposal.

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[Redacted] small arms, some artillery pieces, and some ammunition were delivered to Junblatt's forces. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] we believe Libya's ability to supply arms will ensure a continuing military relationship between the two regimes. Libya offers Tehran access to arms and East European suppliers-

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[Redacted]

This renewed activity on behalf of Syria and radical Palestinians is in keeping with Libya's past activities. In the early 1970s Libya was the principal financial supporter of the PLO, but Qadhafi broke with Arafat as the latter gradually became more moderate. When Qadhafi insisted on continued militancy against Israel, he began to give arms—rather than money—and directed the flow to the more radical groups, particularly Ahmad Jabril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).

[Redacted] Libya sent an SA-9 battery into Lebanon's Bekaa Valley in May 1981, and Libyan technicians and soldiers arrived over the next year. The Libyan forces in Lebanon initially were under PFLP-GC command,

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[Redacted] Qadhafi viewed the expulsion of the Palestinians from Beirut in autumn 1982 as a blow to Arab prestige and exhorted them to commit suicide rather than be driven out by the Israelis.

[Redacted] he temporarily stopped assistance to all Palestinian groups in disgust when they began to pull out of Lebanon. Qadhafi probably views the anti-Arafat rebellion as a chance to eliminate moderate influence within the PLO, and he is likely to continue arming those who are willing to fight the Israelis and oppose US interests.

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**Latin America**

Libya has made only limited progress in expanding its influence in Latin America, but the prospect of handouts is attractive to leftist governments and groups. Tripoli has begun the familiar cycle of offering unlimited arms to a variety of groups, with probably the same mixed results. The distance between Libya and Latin America is perhaps the greatest constraint on potential relationships. We calculate that Libya's larger cargo aircraft cannot transfer a substantial quantity of weapons without landing and refueling rights. Libya's few oceangoing vessels could transport the promised equipment, but we believe Tripoli may be unwilling to dedicate its cargo ships to a project that could involve a confrontation with US naval forces.

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Since 1981 Libya has been *Iran's* second-largest source of military hardware. The two nations have signed nearly \$350 million worth in arms contracts. The Iranian regime accepted Libya's offer to supply arms and to negotiate with third parties on Iran's behalf after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, largely because of its pressing needs and political isolation. Libya has been a difficult partner, however, providing only older model equipment and forcing Iran to transport all of its purchases.

We know of no reason why Libya has not used its merchant fleet to ship arms to Nicaragua, but Libyan behavior traditionally has been cautious on this issue.

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
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
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
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
Libya's cultivation of Latin American leftists has increased substantially in the last two years and is inspired primarily by Qadhafi's desire to cause trouble for the United States in its own backyard, according to US Embassy reporting from the region. Libya's most significant effort in the region has been in Nicaragua. [redacted] US defense attache reporting indicate Tripoli's assistance to Nicaragua in 1982 was sizable, from the standpoint of Nicaragua's limited air inventory. Libya's aid consisted primarily of at least two helicopters, four Italian light strike aircraft, and a small Libyan air training team. While Libya's periodic assistance has been a boon to the Sandinista government, Cuba and the Soviet Union deliver the bulk of military equipment to Managua.



In February 1983 [redacted] the two nations signed a military agreement that included further deliveries of helicopters, light strike aircraft, and other weapons such as SA-7 surface-to-air missiles and radars. We believe delivery of all the promised equipment would augment Nicaragua's military capabilities, but there would be no fundamental change in the balance of power in the region. Libya's L-39 jet trainers, if combat equipped, would significantly improve the effectiveness of Managua's counterinsurgency campaign, and the overall aid could help Nicaragua in a confrontation with Honduras.



Qadhafi's attempts to send this equipment were stymied in April 1983 by Brazil's seizure of four Libyan transport aircraft en route to Managua. The incident only provoked Qadhafi's ire and renewed his determination to stand up to the United States, [redacted]



Without landing rights in a West African nation—Mauritania, Cape Verde, or Morocco—Qadhafi eventually may use his few oceangoing vessels to transport arms. These vessels are rarely used outside the Mediterranean. [redacted]

Some arms went to Argentina during the Falklands war, but no durable relationship appears to have resulted. [redacted] Qadhafi's willingness to supply arms to the conservative regime in Argentina stemmed from his antipathy to the British, whom he holds directly responsible for the creation of Israel. [redacted]

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
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**Outlook**

We believe the expense and general lack of success in buying influence that Libya has had with its arms transfer program are not likely to deter Qadhafi. He operates under very few domestic constraints, and even though his adventuresome policies are not popular, there are few who would openly challenge him.

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[redacted] There have been no instances, to our knowledge, of Qadhafi moderating this aspect of his foreign policy out of concern for domestic considerations. [redacted]

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Qadhafi is generally impervious to international disapproval, with important exceptions, such as when he persistently sought the OAU chairmanship in 1982. The condemnation of the Libyan arms lift to Nicaragua—judging from Qadhafi's statements and subsequent actions—appears only to have reinforced his determination to find a way to deliver weapons to his clients. Although French and US efforts to block further Libyan penetration of Chad had an intimidating effect on Libyan battlefield operations, Qadhafi

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has continued to arm rebel forces and probably considers the current stalemate as only a temporary setback. We believe Qadhafi's cavalier attitude toward Libya's interests and those of the international community is an outgrowth of his belief that:

- He, along with other revolutionary forces, can change a neocolonialist world only by force.
- He is engaged in a mortal struggle with the United States, which initiated a campaign against him and can be deterred only by resolute Libyan action.
- He is not acting irresponsibly, as his detractors charge, but is simply adopting the tactics of other great powers that are trying to shape the world order.

We think it unlikely that recent efforts by Algerian President Bendjedid to forge greater cooperation among North African countries will have a moderating effect on Libyan policies in that region. There probably would be measurable changes only in Western Sahara and in Libyan recruitment of dissident North Africans for paramilitary training.

There is little chance that Libya's military aid program will become more polished in the near term. The lack of sophistication among Libyan diplomats, the poor coordination between the aid program and Qadhafi's political objectives, and constraints stemming from Libya's transport and servicing capabilities are likely to persist indefinitely. Despite the creation in the spring of 1983 of a new office under Qadhafi's direct control designed to coordinate arms transfers, analysis of continuing military assistance has shown virtually no change in the way Libya conducts arms transactions. Although Libyan activities have contributed to instability, particularly in West Africa, and encourage disruptive elements in a host of countries, we believe it is unlikely that Tripoli will develop close allies or wield significant, durable influence over any of its clients in the near term.

**Implications for the United States**

We believe Libya's policy of arms transfers specifically aimed at undermining US influence will continue. Activity directed at pro-Western regimes or bolstering anti-US governments allows Libya to claim it is at the forefront of the struggle against Israel and the United

States. Moreover, particularly since the Gulf of Sidra incident, Qadhafi has sought security for Libya against what he believes are increasingly overt attempts by the United States to unseat him. He is likely to be more generous with assistance to countries such as Syria that he believes can provide him with some added measure of protection.

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The greatest potential danger, in our view, is that Qadhafi—perhaps out of frustration with his failures—may become more willing in time to give away larger, more sophisticated weapon systems. He has been strikingly parsimonious in transferring such major weapon systems as aircraft, helicopters, and armored vehicles, probably largely because in his mind the offer is as good as its fulfillment. Only Iran, Ethiopia, and the Polisario Front have received tanks, and—with the exception of Syria—only light strike aircraft have been transferred in recent years. Should Qadhafi begin to transfer more modern tanks, fighter aircraft, or significant numbers of sophisticated air defense and field artillery weapons, such deliveries could enhance the military capabilities of the recipient state or group.

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
Qadhafi could continue his present scattershot approach of giving limited amounts of aid to a variety of groups and having relatively little influence, or he could select only a few key recipients. Tripoli then could concentrate on building ties and improving the military capabilities—through larger weapons flow and training—of the chosen recipients. Such a focused program could considerably augment the client's inventory—altering the military balance in a region if its neighbors were more poorly armed—but a pronounced increase in military capability is unlikely to occur if the client is dependent solely on Libyan training and maintenance.

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Qadhafi's threats against moderate regimes like Sudan, Chad, and Tunisia will ensure that these nations will continue to look to the United States and other Western nations for military and economic support and protection. Western aid to Chad during the fighting in 1983 was a key factor enabling

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Habre's regime to survive the Libyan military onslaught. Tunisia has used US assistance to fashion a limited military deterrent against Libya, according to US Embassy and defense attache reports, while Sudan's vulnerability to Libyan subversion is an important component of its relationship with Egypt and the United States. Other regimes—such as the C.A.R. and Ghana—are becoming more wary of involvement with Libya's Qadhafi and may seek closer ties with the West. [Redacted]

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Libya's arms transfer policy, if kept apace, ensures continued close Libyan-Soviet ties and the proliferation of Soviet-made weaponry in Africa and the Middle East. This policy requires a steady stream of Soviet arms flowing to Libya, increasing Qadhafi's dependence on the Soviet Union and raising the possibility that the Soviet Union eventually may become involved in decisions regarding arms transfers. [Redacted]

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Finally, Qadhafi's troublemaking and influence peddling is of concern to government leaders throughout the region who fear that Qadhafi's activities invite superpower intervention. We believe this is a primary factor in the policies of such states as Algeria and Saudi Arabia when they attempt to influence Qadhafi's unpredictable behavior. Some leaders, such as Morocco's King Hassan, believe that Qadhafi is an "Arab" problem and that dealing with him directly is preferable to ignoring him. Many states prefer to get along with Qadhafi—even occasionally accommodating him—rather than risk the involvement of outside powers, which, in their view, will drive Qadhafi further into the Soviet embrace. [Redacted]

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### Appendix

### Libyan Training of Foreign Dissidents

Tripoli has trained several thousand foreigners in commando and small-unit tactics at some 10 installations inside Libya since the mid-1970s. Some facilities are dedicated exclusively to training dissidents, while others are regular military installations. There has been limited training of regular government forces in their own countries. Qadhafi clearly believes that providing military training enhances Libya's reputation with revolutionary groups while helping to intimidate or destabilize countries opposed to his goals. We believe that such training will continue as long as he remains in power. 

Since 1981—probably the peak year of Qadhafi's subversive efforts—Libyan training of foreign nationals has declined somewhat. We believe this is largely because of the less radical posture the Libyan leader adopted in 1982 to ease his regional isolation. Recent training has involved principally North and Sub-Saharan African dissidents, particularly Sudanese and Chadian rebels. 

#### Training Inside Libya





The activity observed at these camps varies with the state of relations between Libya and its adversaries. For example, a training camp near Al Kufrah in southeast Libya, used to train Sudanese dissidents,




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Training of commandos in Libya 

has been periodically opened and closed, depending on the level of tension between Tripoli and Khartoum. Increased activity at the Sebha East facility was noted  in late 1982, which probably was linked to the training of Chadian dissidents who took the offensive against the Habre government in June 1983. 


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There is also evidence that the facilities are not well maintained during periods of low activity. At another facility in June 1983, an obstacle course, a hand-to-hand combat pit, and an SA-7 firing position appeared to be deteriorating from disuse. 

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Libyan training of subversives appears to consist mostly of instruction in the use of light weaponry and courses in small-unit tactics. 

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
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 In November 1983, Sudanese dissidents fighting in Chad were sent back to Libya, where we believe they may undergo further training

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for operations against Sudan. [Redacted]  
[Redacted] Tuareg tribesmen from Mali received training on the AK-47 assault rifle and other Soviet-made small arms in 1981 at a camp south of Tripoli.

Libyan instructors have been present to continue dissident training. We believe that since mid-1982 most of the Libyan training of Sudanese dissidents in Ethiopia has occurred at a large military facility at Dire Dawa, after forward bases near the Sudanese border were closed or scaled down because of security problems. Activity near the border increased in 1983, however, as the situation in Sudan's southern region deteriorated. Libyan second-in-command Jallud visited Ethiopia in November 1983, and [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

**Support for Governments:  
Involvement With Regular Armed Forces**

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Libya has trained a few regular personnel from Nicaragua and Iran, but [Redacted]

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[Redacted] most such trainees are African. [Redacted]

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**Recipients of Subversive Training**

We believe that Libya's military training programs were originally designed for Palestinians and other Arabs involved in operations against Israel. But as Qadhafi's ambitions as a revolutionary leader grew and the more moderate elements of the PLO increasingly minimized the importance of terrorism as a tool, the Libyans began to offer training to radical groups and subversives in many parts of the world. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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African dissident and subversive groups have emerged in the 1980s as favorite candidates for Libyan training. Although Qadhafi appears willing to offer training to anti-imperialist forces worldwide, Libya clearly has logistic advantages in Africa, where trainees can be moved into the country with relative ease. [Redacted]

Before relations soured in late 1983, the Libyans were active in training the armed forces of the Rawlings regime in Ghana. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] few Latin American dissidents have been trained in Libya, and transportation problems and the expense probably are hindrances. [Redacted]

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Activity near the Sudanese border has increased in the last few months as the situation in Sudan's southern region has deteriorated, and [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Libyan support for anti-Nimeiri forces has accelerated. The Libyans have transferred many Sudanese dissidents from training areas in Libya to bases in Ethiopia, [Redacted] and [Redacted]

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**Table 4**  
**Libyan Military Training, 1981-83**

Governments	Groups and Individuals	Location
<b>North Africa-Horn of Africa</b>		
Ethiopia		Unknown
	Somali Democratic Salvation Front	Libya
	Sudanese dissidents	Ethiopia; Libya
	Polisario guerrillas	Libya
	Tunisian dissidents	Libya
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>		
Central African Republic		Km 22 Camp, CAR
Benin		Cotonou, Benin; Libya
Ghana		Ghana; Libya
	Chadian dissidents	Southern Libya
	SWAPO (South Africa)	Libya
	Malian dissidents	Libya
	Nigerian dissidents	Libya
	FLNC (Zaire)	Unknown
	Botswana National Front	Unknown
	PAC/A (South Africa)	Unknown
	Ugandan Freedom Movement	Unknown
<b>Middle East-Persian Gulf</b>		
Iran		Libya
	Palestinians (mostly PFLP-GC)	Libya
<b>Latin America</b>		
Nicaragua		Nicaragua
	Farabundo Marti (El Salvador)	Managua; Nicaragua
	Chilean Socialist Party	Libya
	Honduran dissidents	Libya
	M-19 (Colombia)	Libya
	Costa Rican dissidents	Libya

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The Libyans have also provided training to their "anti-imperialist" allies in Iran and Nicaragua. [redacted]

about 20 Nicaraguans were undergoing unspecified military training in Libya as of late spring 1983.

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**Libyan Training: Problems and Prospects**

[redacted] In Nicaragua, according to the US defense attache in Managua, the Libyans had a 10-man aviation training team that provided instruction for SF-260 light attack aircraft and MI-2 helicopters in early 1983. Additionally,

Libya has expended considerable effort in its training programs for foreign nationals, but we believe that the results have been disappointing from Qadhafi's point

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of view. Part of the difficulty has arisen because of the generally low quality of the trainees involved and the factionalism that has undermined the effectiveness of many of the groups supported by Libya, particularly in Chad and Sudan. The Libyans, however, have produced many of the difficulties associated with their training of foreign nationals by alienating the recipients with poor instruction, heavy ideological emphasis, and general arrogance. Many trainees reportedly are forced into camps against their will and do not necessarily remain allied with Libya after their release.

[Redacted]

Despite these difficulties and irritants, we believe that Qadhafi will continue to offer military training to a wide variety of regimes and groups as long as their political orientation and goals are at least somewhat compatible with Qadhafi's. Training activity may fluctuate with the political climate, but Qadhafi clearly sees it as enhancing Libya's influence and prestige throughout the world. The fear caused by rumors of Libyan-trained dissidents probably also is a factor in Qadhafi's calculations, although—as with arms transfers—the reputation outweighs the reality.

[Redacted]

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The quality of Libyan training has often disappointed the groups and governments that have been recipients.

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[Redacted] US defense attache reporting from Managua indicates that the Libyan team there had done little to enhance Nicaraguan maintenance capabilities for their aircraft. In our judgment, this reflects Libyan inefficiency in their own maintenance procedures.

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[Redacted] Tunisians, Sudanese, and other trainees are often disaffected by Libyan methods of recruitment, discipline, and ideological instruction.

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[Redacted] Tunisians, Sudanese, Chadians, and others who have entered Libya seeking employment opportunities have been dragooned into dissident training camps. Trainees sometimes are subject to strict discipline; [Redacted] when some members of a Sudanese group in Libya wanted to stop training, the Libyans exerted severe physical and psychological pressure on them to continue and executed two trainees when they refused. Some groups are concerned about the substantial amount of Qadhafi's ideology that is included in Libyan training courses.

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