



Directorate of  
Intelligence

~~Secret~~



**MASTER FILE COPY**  
**DO NOT GIVE OUT**  
**OR MARK ON**

25X1

# Zimbabwe: Trends and Prospects



25X1

An Intelligence Assessment

~~Secret~~

ALA 84-10027  
March 1984

Copy 287

**Page Denied**



**Directorate of  
Intelligence**

**Secret**

25X1

# Zimbabwe: Trends and Prospects

25X1

**An Intelligence Assessment**

25X1

This paper was prepared by   
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It  
was coordinated with the Directorate of  
Operations.

25X1

Comments and queries are welcome and may be  
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA, on

25X1

**Secret**

*ALA 84-10027  
March 1984*

Secret

**Zimbabwe:  
Trends and Prospects**

25X1

**Key Judgments***Information available  
as of 14 February 1984  
was used in this report.*

Since Zimbabwe gained independence in March 1980, the country has fared neither as well as its supporters had hoped nor as poorly as its detractors had predicted. Prime Minister Mugabe moved quickly in the immediate postindependence period to integrate the two former rival guerrilla armies with the old Rhodesian forces and eased the threat of the conflagration that many feared was likely. Politically, he pursued a policy of reconciliation. Former Rhodesian officials were retained in key positions in the security apparatus, and Mugabe treated the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo like a coalition partner—albeit a junior one—when the parliamentary strength of Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was sufficient for it to have governed alone. Undoubtedly influenced by the experience of his neighbors, Mugabe left the preindependence economic structure alone. He also followed conciliatory policies toward whites, preventing the mass postindependence exodus of skilled individuals that devastated other African nations. Internationally, he succeeded in maintaining the confidence of aid donors in the West.

25X1

If Mugabe's fans abroad found much to cheer about during Zimbabwe's first two years, his detractors have had much to point to since then. Mugabe ended the political entente with Nkomo in early 1982 when, in our view, he calculated that ZAPU no longer represented a serious threat. Since then, Mugabe has been quick to intimidate political opponents, to use emergency powers inherited from the Rhodesian regime to advance the interests of ZANU, and to attempt to crush antigovernment sentiment among the Ndebele minority by military means. The economy has performed poorly, primarily because of protracted drought and worldwide recession, but also because foreign investors have been scared off by some of Mugabe's policies. In foreign affairs, Mugabe has recently pursued doggedly nonaligned policies, taking anti-Western stances in the United Nations and engaging in ever sharper anti-Western rhetoric at home. Finally, Mugabe has made plain by word and deed his determination to establish a one-party, socialist state in Zimbabwe.

25X1

A key determinant of the direction of government policy over the near term will be the outcome of the ZANU party congress now scheduled for August—the first full-fledged meeting since the party was organized 20 years ago. ZANU leaders frequently state that the party congress will position ZANU to implement the one-party state. We believe that intra-ZANU competition for power will heavily influence nearly all government

Secret

ALA 84-10027  
March 1984

**Secret**

25X1

activity until the congress meets and that the tone of political rhetoric will become more strident as Mugabe and other government leaders strive to keep themselves in the limelight and to seek support from the generally militant party rank and file. We believe, however, that Mugabe will not be challenged as party president and that ZANU will emerge from the congress intact and determined to implement a one-party state. [redacted]

25X1

Mugabe appears to have no new strategy to reach a political accommodation with ZAPU that would bring the Ndebele-speaking people that ZAPU largely represents into the economic and political mainstream. Consequently, we believe that the antigovernment violence that has plagued the nation since early 1982 will continue. Although we do not believe the unrest will develop into a civil war, neither do we anticipate that the government's military tactics will succeed in suppressing the dissidence. [redacted]

25X1

Although economic revival depends to a large degree on elements beyond the government's control—the end of drought and the strength of worldwide recovery—poor economic performance is generating pressures that could lead Mugabe to alter his moderate economic policies. Zimbabwe is experiencing a third year of drought, and prospects for the 1984 crop are dismal. Moreover, we expect only gradual improvement in the prices of Zimbabwe's mineral exports, and the country has large stockpiles to draw down once foreign demand picks up. Consequently, Zimbabwe will have to continue the austerity measures that have generally won approval from international observers but that are politically risky. If, as we expect, the pragmatic policies of Finance Minister Chidzero fail to bring economic dividends over the next year, Mugabe's own socialist predilections as well as pressure from party militants may cause him to change his heretofore moderate, cautious approach to Zimbabwe's economic problems. [redacted]

25X1

Mugabe's harsh treatment of his opponents, his socialist principles and commitment to a one-party state, and his government's tendency to view the world through Third World lenses will in all likelihood continue to frighten off foreign investors and from time to time alienate Western governments and their publics. These occasional strains in relations with the West will not, in our view, lead Mugabe to turn his back on the West or to move sharply toward the Soviet Union. Moscow's support for his rival, ZAPU leader Nkomo; during the civil war left lingering suspicions. Moreover, we believe that Mugabe has learned from the experiences of other African states that the Soviets are unable to supply economic aid in amounts that would compare with aid provided by the United States and other Western countries. [redacted]

25X1

**Secret**

Secret

25X1


**Contents**

	<i>Page</i>
<b>Key Judgments</b>	iii
<b>Introduction</b>	1
<b>The Press of Problems</b>	1
Persistent Dissident Violence	1
The South African Connection	2
Economic Policy and Performance	3
Racial Relations: Strained but Stagnant	4
<b>Toward a One-Party State</b>	5
Mugabe's Agenda	5
The Tools and Tactics of Transition	5
<b>ZANU Internal Dynamics</b>	8
The Party Congress	8
Mugabe's Role in Party Politics	8
Ethnic and Ideological Divisions	10
<b>ZANU's Attitudes Toward the West</b>	11
<b>Outlook</b>	13
Political and Security Prospects	13
Economic Prospects	14
Prospects for Relations With the West	15

Secret

25X1

**Tribal Composition of Zimbabwe**



701644 3-84

25X1

Secret

Secret [redacted] 25X1

**Zimbabwe: Trends and Prospects** [redacted] 25X1

**Introduction**

Political, security, and economic problems beset Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe during 1983. Continuing dissident violence, in particular, sapped government resources, exacerbated tribal tensions, and undermined the confidence of domestic and international investors. After independence in 1980, Mugabe pursued conciliatory policies toward Zimbabwe's white population and the minority Ndebele tribe, an approach that earned him a favorable reputation in the West. Over the last year and a half, however, he has shifted to more hardline tactics in dealing with internal political and security challenges, a trend that we believe will continue to lead to incidents of repression and human rights abuses and, in turn, to sometimes tense relations with the West. [redacted]

This paper reviews political, security, and economic developments over the past year and assesses the prospects in these areas over the next year or so. It focuses on Mugabe's personal agenda for Zimbabwe and the implications of intraparty politicking as the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) approaches its party congress in August. Finally, we examine why relations between Harare and Western capitals will remain difficult and consider some of the implications if they deteriorate further. [redacted]

**The Press of Problems**

**Persistent Dissident Violence**

Antigovernment dissidents continue to disrupt the southwestern provinces of Zimbabwe. Although we believe the dissidents—estimated at 600 to 1,000 active within the country at any one time—do not now pose a direct threat to Mugabe's regime, their persistence has sapped scarce government resources, undermined the confidence of commercial farmers in the region, and created tensions with Botswana. Moreover, traditional resentment between the Ndebele-speaking minority, mainly represented by the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and the

Shona-speaking majority who dominate the ruling ZANU party, has deepened and appears likely to disrupt Zimbabwean politics for some time. [redacted] 25X1

The cycles of dissident violence and harsh government reprisals began in February 1982, when Mugabe expelled ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo from the cabinet and had several ZAPU military leaders arrested for alleged complicity in arms caching. Disaffected former ZAPU guerrillas who deserted or were demobilized from the new Army after independence have since committed repeated acts of terrorism and banditry, finding shelter among the local Ndebele populace, which is caught between the dissidents and government security forces. The most widely publicized government repression occurred in early 1983 when the North Korean-trained 5th Brigade, consisting primarily of Shona speakers, killed some 2,000 civilians. Although the government claims that its security measures are aimed solely at ending dissident violence, [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] the ZANU-dominated government also is trying to eliminate ZAPU as a political force in the region. [redacted] 25X1

The government has made little headway in stemming the dissident violence, despite its continuous military presence in Matabeleland North and South and parts of Midlands Provinces, the areas where dissidents are active. The number of dissident incidents—attacks on government facilities and property such as schools and rail lines, murders of white farmers, increasingly brutal treatment of local residents who are accused of "selling out" to the government, and acts of banditry and lawlessness—have remained at a fairly high level, perhaps as many as 100 per month, [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] Government security forces are hampered by poor intelligence and communication, and [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] the troops are poorly disciplined. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1



Secret

Relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana have been seriously damaged by the dissidents' use of Botswana as a staging area and sanctuary. In late 1983, Zimbabwean troops on several occasions crossed into Botswana to hit suspected dissident encampments. Clashes occurred between Zimbabwean and Botswanan troops, and on one occasion a Zimbabwean soldier was killed. Representatives of the two governments have met several times to try to reach an accommodation, and Botswana has repatriated many Zimbabweans. Nonetheless, mistrust between the two governments remains strong, [redacted]

[redacted] Although Botswana's official policy is to cooperate, the vast border area is difficult to monitor, and we believe that some Botswanan residents and officials in the border area sympathize with the Ndebele dissidents because of historical and ethnic ties. [redacted]

**The South African Connection**

Top Zimbabwean officials are convinced that South Africa is responsible for the continued dissident activity, [redacted]

[redacted] In

October, the government widely publicized the capture of four dissidents who admitted to being trained in South Africa and to participating in numerous acts of terrorism and sabotage in Matabeleland. [redacted]

Although we believe that the dissident problem largely reflects ethnic conflicts, South Africa's low-level support to the dissidents is probably enough to ensure that the Shona-Ndebele conflict continues to disrupt Zimbabwean politics. Moreover, we believe that Pretoria could easily increase its involvement if it deemed this necessary or useful. South Africa has demonstrated frequently its willingness to use covert operations to make life difficult for Mugabe's regime. [redacted]

Nonetheless, Pretoria apparently has not mounted any direct covert operations against Zimbabwe since the probable involvement of South Africa in December 1982 in the sabotage of oil storage tanks at Beira,

Mozambique, which plunged Zimbabwe into a severe fuel crisis. This restraint, in our view, reflects a perception by South Africa that events in Zimbabwe are already unfolding according to its earlier predictions—that is, that blacks are incapable of governing a modern society without succumbing to tribal rivalries. Pretoria also is satisfied [redacted]

[redacted] that Mugabe is holding to his policy of not allowing the African National Congress (ANC) or the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)—the two anti-South African groups that have unofficial "offices" in Harare—to stage operations into South Africa from Zimbabwean territory. [redacted]

Pretoria's restraint, however, has not softened Harare's belief that South Africa is Zimbabwe's number-one enemy nor reduced its fear of South Africa's capacity to destabilize the country. Pretoria is the favored scapegoat for many of Zimbabwe's economic and political woes, and the "racist apartheid regime" is denounced regularly in the media and by government spokesmen. South African newspapers return the fire, and anti-ZANU propaganda is broadcast over a clandestine station called Radio Truth.<sup>2</sup> [redacted]

The hostile rhetoric and Mugabe's refusal to accede to South African demands for ministerial-level meetings remain major irritants to bilateral political relations. [redacted]

[redacted]

<sup>2</sup> Zimbabwean officials believe Radio Truth is located somewhere in the Transvaal. According to the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, it began operations on 10 March 1983 and over the past year has generally broadcast twice a day in English, Shona, and Ndebele. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

South Africa is Zimbabwe's single most important trading partner and largest foreign investor. The two countries have exchanged resident trade representatives, and commercial and banking transactions operate smoothly, according to industry spokesmen. Zimbabwe also relies on transportation routes through South Africa because of the shortcomings and insurgent disruptions of its alternative routes through Mozambique. As a consequence, Zimbabwe tries to keep its economic relations with South Africa divorced from rhetoric and politics, according to US Embassy reporting, because it recognizes that its heavy economic dependence on South Africa provides Pretoria with powerful leverage. [redacted]

**Economic Policy and Performance**

Despite the pressures Mugabe feels to meet rising black expectations from the "revolution" and his personal commitment to socialism, his economic and social reforms continue to be cautious. Indeed, his approach has been a blend of often harsh rhetoric with a tolerance of the capitalistic economic structure he inherited at independence and that remains the backbone of the economy.<sup>3</sup> [redacted]

**Austerity and Inflation.** In spite of following generally pragmatic economic policies, Zimbabwe now faces its worst economic problems since independence. A devastating drought—now in its third year—and the continuing effects of worldwide recession are largely responsible for a slowdown in real GDP growth from annual rates of 12 percent in 1980 and 1981 to only 2 percent in 1982 and a decline of about 3 percent last year. To cope, Harare has had to adopt tough austerity measures that Finance Minister Chidzero has admitted will delay the government's "socialist transformation." [redacted]

[redacted] austerity measures—required by the IMF guidelines that Harare accepted in March 1983 in return for a \$325 million [redacted]

standby loan and a \$62 million compensatory financing facility—have included a currency devaluation, cuts in foreign exchange allocations, reduced consumer subsidies, a freeze on government hiring, and limited wage increases that have not kept pace with the country's roughly 18-percent inflation rate. [redacted] 25X1

The impact of austerity measures on the standard of living of rural and urban dwellers alike has been substantial. The government has drawn sharpest criticism for the steep increases in food prices that resulted from subsidy cutbacks. The price of corn, the dietary staple, rose nearly 40 percent in September 1983 alone, for example. The cost of other consumer goods and household commodities also has climbed in response to dramatic transport, fuel, and electricity price increases, reinforced in part by the higher cost of imports following devaluation. [redacted] 25X1

**Production Shortfalls and Falling Exports.** Sharp increases in wages and other costs of production since independence have combined with shortages of foreign exchange, the government's unwillingness to ease price controls, stiff taxation of profits, and collapsing domestic demand to threaten the viability of many industrial producers. According to press reports and official government statistics, three-fourths of manufacturing firms are operating below capacity. The volume of output in most manufacturing sectors fell by as much as 16 percent in 1982 and probably by a similar amount in 1983, despite a roughly 30-percent devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar since late 1982 aimed at boosting export sales. [redacted] 25X1

Insufficient foreign exchange has constrained manufacturers, particularly in export industries, by restricting purchases of imported machinery and spare parts. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] these exchange shortages also have recently forced a reduction in Zimbabwe's emergency fuel stocks and may lead to curtailed imports of fuel this year. [redacted] 25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

A second year of severe drought curtailed agricultural exports in 1983. According to press and Embassy reporting, agricultural production, which has accounted for as much as 47 percent of total exports and 18 percent of GDP, fell by an estimated 25 percent last year. The decline was led by a 50-percent drop in the corn crop, which had been a major export earner in previous years. In the face of dwindling stocks, the government in October announced Zimbabwe's first-ever corn rationing and has requested additional food aid from the United States in an effort to stretch supplies until the harvest in April. The government has authorized higher producer prices to stimulate 1984-85 crop production, but this will also push food prices upward. [redacted]

World prices for gold and Zimbabwe's other principal mineral exports—including chrome and copper—have recovered only slightly from the lows of recent years. Mineral production fell in 1983 for the seventh consecutive year; as a result, export earnings from minerals will show a decline of at least 10 percent for 1983, according to preliminary projections by the US Embassy. These problems have resulted in several mine closures and, in a few cases, emergency government loans to keep mines open and preserve jobs. [redacted]

Mugabe increasingly has sought scapegoats for the country's economic problems. At a political rally in late December, for example, Mugabe charged that the drought-induced cornmeal shortage was caused by milling companies owned by whites and foreigners who wanted to "suck the wealth of the country." The Finance Minister told US Embassy officials that he believes such political rhetoric, which he agreed had taken on a more radical tinge, is in part an attempt to compensate for the pragmatic economic policies that are unpopular among members of the government advocating a more rapid move toward socialism. [redacted]

#### **Racial Relations: Strained but Stagnant**

Harare's efforts to improve the lot of blacks have shown mixed results so far. A gradual program of land resettlement—long trumpeted as the main objective of ZANU's struggle for black rule—was started soon after independence, but its pace remains slow. The government has so far resettled only some 40,000 families onto their own farmland, far short of its

planned goal of 162,000 families by 1985. Other programs designed to benefit blacks have included higher minimum wages, free health care for the poor, and free primary education. All these began during the brisk economic recovery that followed the end of the civil war but are now constrained because of budget cuts. [redacted]

Mugabe's recognition that the white community is a major source of capital and skills critical to the country's economy has led him to continue to accommodate whites. They continue to hold most key positions in business and the professions. Whites earn most of the foreign exchange, and the approximately 4,200 white commercial farmers—who occupy about one-third of the best farmland—produce 80 percent of the country's agricultural output, including most of the country's food and virtually all of its agricultural exports. [redacted]

Nonetheless, white emigration has continued at a steady pace; the white population has dwindled from about 220,000 at independence and may be as low as 115,000 today. The attitudes of the whites that remain vary considerably, but in general most are not sanguine about their long-term future. Although many have accepted the loss of political power and probably have become more thickskinned about socialist rhetoric, they are heavily influenced by government actions that erode their economic position or affect such issues as the quality of health care and schooling. They are quick to seize on rumors—often fueled by ill-conceived government announcements—that the government plans to repeal dual citizenship laws, renege on promises to pay pensions, or to confiscate land. For example, when the Education Minister threatened in November to close private schools that did not meet a 60-percent black enrollment quota, the US Embassy noted that the announcement, even though the government later backtracked, further increased the substantial numbers of whites who had already made plans to emigrate at the end of the 1983 school year. The government's inept handling of such sensitive issues is a frequent occurrence. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Toward a One-Party State**

**Mugabe's Agenda**

Mugabe's vision is gradually, under the guidance of his party, to transform Zimbabwe into a socialist society. He admits this will take many years; his short-term goal, therefore, is to establish a one-party state so that ZANU's stewardship of the transition can be guaranteed. [redacted]

25X6

Dismissing the failure of other one-party African regimes, Mugabe claims that a one-party state can be a democracy if it is run by democrats, a tyranny if led by a tyrant. He promises that under ZANU there will be adequate competition for office and that there will be open discussion within the party's councils. Once a consensus is reached within the party, however, Mugabe envisions an end to debate. [redacted]

25X1

Mugabe has stated that he will not use extraconstitutional means to establish a one-party state, although he complains that the constitution for Zimbabwe agreed to at Lancaster House "does not correspond to the genuine wishes of the people." Nonetheless, he intends to move toward a one-party state with or without the cooperation of opposition parties. He commented recently that ". . . our position is that they must accept that the people have chosen ZANU as the umbrella," referring to ZANU's overwhelming 1980 electoral victory. [redacted]

25X1

**The Tools and Tactics of Transition**

**Party Politics.** Although Mugabe has often declared his dedication to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, we believe that he views security of the state and continuation of a ZANU-dominated government as higher imperatives. Thus, even as Mugabe preaches a policy of "national reconciliation," he uses the political and security tools at ZANU's disposal to undermine the influence of the opposition. [redacted]

[redacted] government minister—have disrupted opposition party rallies and destroyed property. There are credible reports from Embassy and open sources that residents in Matabeleland have been forced to obtain ZANU party cards in order to receive government-supplied goods and services. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] there is a systematic effort to harass and intimidate opposition leaders, who are regularly denounced for allegedly refusing to accept ZANU's "hand of friendship" and bitterly accused of engaging in a variety of subversive activities and colluding with South Africa against the regime. Members of ZANU's youth brigade—described as the "eyes and ears" of the party by one

ZANU has also promoted its candidates in local elections through questionable means, according to US Embassy reporting. For example, ZANU candidates won several contests by wide margins in traditional ZAPU strongholds during the past year. Even though the government defended its legality, voters were almost certainly intimidated by having to line up behind the candidate of their choice instead of casting secret ballots. Nevertheless, opposition parties are still represented in Parliament and criticize the government openly in the Assembly, where lively debate on controversial issues is still common. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

**The Military and Security Forces.** ZANU also has increased its influence over the military, according to the US defense attache in Harare. The demobilization exercise begun at independence, while aimed at reducing the overall size of the Army, has resulted in an officer corps and rank and file that are dominated by former ZANU guerrillas. The government also has created two all-ZANU units in the Army: the 5,000-man 5th Brigade—which Nkomo had prophetically charged when it was created in 1981 would be used to suppress the Ndebele—and a 3,000-man Presidential Guard; both units have been trained by the North Koreans. [redacted]

The police force too has been politicized by favoring ZANU personnel in hiring and promotions. [redacted]

[redacted]

A police intelligence unit, created in 1982 by former Home Affairs Minister Ushewokunze, has sparked controversy by engaging in unlawful searches and detentions. [redacted]

A people's militia, organized in 1982 in response to the worsening security situation in Matabeleland, has a dual political-military role. According to a published government report, the militia was created to mobilize peasants against bandits and dissidents, to gather intelligence, and to serve as a reserve adjunct to regular police and army forces. An article in the Zimbabwe press openly stated in September 1983 that candidates for the militia are selected with the help of local ZANU leaders to ensure that only those loyal to the Prime Minister and government are allowed to join. According to a government spokesman, 1,500 instructors, most of whom were trained by the North Koreans, have been deployed all over the country to train 2,500 men and women in each of Zimbabwe's eight provinces. [redacted]

**Emergency Powers and Other Measures.** Mugabe has periodically renewed, purportedly to combat dissident violence, the emergency powers regulations that Zimbabwe inherited from the Rhodesian regime. The government's use of these powers, which confer extensive detention authority upon the Home Affairs Minister and the police that overrides several constitutional guarantees, has led to numerous human rights violations over the past two years. [redacted]

Security Minister Munangagwa told Parliament in July 1983 that 1,334 people had been detained on recommendation of the country's intelligence service over the preceding year. Of that total, 49 were held indefinitely without trial under the emergency powers regulations; others were either released or turned over to police or Army custody. At the same time, however, then Home Affairs Minister Ushewokunze refused to reply to the parliamentary request about the fate of those in police custody, citing "security reasons." The US Embassy estimates that several hundred people, primarily Ndebele, are currently being detained. [redacted]

Particularly damaging to Zimbabwe's international image has been the government's use of emergency powers to overrule unpopular judicial decisions in several widely publicized, security-related trials. During 1983, at least 12 individuals considered to be security threats by the government were rearrested after they were acquitted by the courts. [redacted]

The government's impatience with its independent judiciary has been mirrored in its attitude toward the press. Harare's main newspaper, which is owned and administered by an autonomous, government-appointed and government-financed trust, as well as the country's radio and television stations, are increasingly parroting the official line of the ruling party. The government has also stepped up its campaign against the foreign press, which government spokesmen charge is biased and presents a distorted view of events in Zimbabwe. The government expelled several foreign journalists during the year. [redacted]

Most recently, Harare used its emergency powers in late 1983 to prohibit temporarily media reporting on acts of terrorism or sabotage and on government countermeasures "in designated areas" unless it has been cleared by the government. The ban effectively curtailed reporting on such activities in Matabeleland during November and December before it was allowed to expire. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

**The Withering of Opposition Parties**

**Nkomo and ZAPU**

The government's harassment of ZAPU, the main opposition party, and its leader, Joshua Nkomo, climaxed in March 1983 when Nkomo fled the country during government antidissident operations in Matabeleland, claiming that his life was in danger. Nkomo's flight left ZAPU in disarray, with many of its officials following Nkomo out of the country. Others were detained or killed, and ZAPU offices were closed. [redacted]

Although Nkomo returned from exile five months later, he has remained politically isolated, his party financially crippled and its leadership divided.



[redacted] ZAPU leaders believe that Nkomo is an obstacle to any reconciliation with the government and would like him to step down, [redacted]

[redacted] We believe these leaders will continue to pursue unity talks with ZANU, but reporting indicates that they do not reflect the views of or have much influence over the party's rank and file in Matabeleland. [redacted]

In any event, ZANU leaders, including Mugabe, have taken a hard line toward accommodating ZAPU. The majority of ZANU leaders believe that the best policy toward ZAPU is one of "benign neglect," [redacted] hoping eventually that some prominent ZAPU members will defect to ZANU. [redacted]

**Muzorewa and the UANC**

The arrest in November 1983 of Bishop Abel Muzorewa focused attention on the former Prime Minister and United African National Council (UANC) leader. His party holds only three seats in Parliament, which it is likely to lose in the next election,


according to US Embassy reports. Several Zimbabwean officials admitted that Muzorewa's detention reflected ZANU's suspicions about his links with South Africa and was meant to teach him and other political opponents a lesson. [redacted]

25X1

Muzorewa was arrested following a trip to Israel, where he urged closer relations between that country and Zimbabwe, and government officials say they subsequently discovered he had been planning a trip to South Africa. Mugabe publicly charged that Muzorewa was conspiring with South Africa, with the assistance of Israel, Zaire, and the United States, to destabilize Zimbabwe. Since independence in 1980, the government has consistently claimed—without justification, in our view—that Muzorewa has 5,000 troops receiving military training in South Africa.

25X1

25X1



25X1

**Ian Smith and the Republican Front**

Like other opposition figures in the country, Republican Front (RF) leader and former Prime Minister Ian Smith was the target of government harassment on several occasions over the last year. Government security officials questioned him and temporarily confiscated his passport following a foreign trip during which he denigrated Mugabe's government. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Smith's Republican Front party lost two parliamentary byelections during 1983—the RF's first defeats by the white electorate since 1962—and did not even contest another local election in February 1984. Independents now hold 12 of the 20 seats reserved for whites in the House of Assembly, where they oppose the RF's obstructionist tactics and occasionally vote with the government. Although white voter turnout in the byelections has been low, the victories of the independents, in our view, suggest that many hardline Smith supporters were among those who emigrated. Moreover, there may be a growing belief among whites that independents may be better able to defend their interests by not antagonizing the government. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

**Table 1**  
**Zimbabwe House of Assembly (Parliament)**

	Number of Seats
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>
Black seats	80
ZANU	57
ZAPU	20
UANC	3
White seats	20
RF	8
Independents	12

[Redacted]

**ZANU Internal Dynamics**

**The Party Congress**

Preparations for the ZANU party congress now scheduled for August—the first full-fledged meeting since the party was organized 20 years ago—will, in our view, generate an intense competition for influence within the party, and the results will determine the future direction of government policy. ZANU leaders frequently state that the party congress will position ZANU to implement the one-party state. The long-overdue congress climaxes ZANU's campaign launched in 1981 to reorganize and strengthen the party at the local level and improve party finances. [Redacted]

According to Embassy reporting, the congress plans to adopt a new constitution that will institutionalize the party's predominance in the government. It will also elect a new central committee, which will be enlarged from its present size of 28 to at least 60 and possibly as many as 100, according to several reports. With the expansion of the Central Committee, however, the principal policymaking function will be entrusted to a smaller group of about 15, a move that is likely to arouse stiff competition for these spots. The coveted post of secretary general—now occupied by Mugabe in an acting capacity—already has generated considerable rivalry between several candidates and their supporters. [Redacted]

Embassy reporting suggests that it was Mugabe's lack of confidence that he could manage the process of enlarging and staffing the Central Committee that largely accounted for the repeated postponements of the congress over the past several years. Now that the dates have been publicly announced and preparations are well under way, we believe this signals that Mugabe is more confident of the outcome and that his position as party president will not be challenged. [Redacted]

**Mugabe's Role in Party Politics**

Mugabe, in our view, is a solitary and strong-willed man who has demonstrated himself to be skillful at balancing competing interests within the party and government. He encourages consensus decisionmaking within the party's Central Committee. [Redacted]

Mugabe's approach is often attributed to Shona tradition; his style is to move slowly and cautiously on controversial issues, delaying decisions until he has patiently lined up support. [Redacted]

[Redacted] his ability to get his way is reflected in the number of technocrats without strong party ties retained in the [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

**Table 2**  
**Zimbabwe Cabinet**

Portfolio	Name	Tribal Affiliation
<b>ZANU Central Committee Members <sup>a</sup></b>		
Prime Minister and Minister of Defense	Robert Mugabe	Zezuru
Deputy Prime Minister	Simon Muzenda	Karanga
National Supplies	Enos Nkala	Ndebele
Trade and Commerce	Richard Hove	Karanga
Education	Dzingai Mutumbuka	Karanga
Community Development and Women's Affairs	Teurai Ropa Nhongo	Zezuru
Justice, Legal, and Parliament Affairs	Eddison Zvobgo	Karanga
Transport and Road Traffic	Herbert Ushewokunze	Zezuru
Health	Sydney Sekeramayi	Zezuru
Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office (Industry and Technology)	Kumbirai Kangai	Manyika
Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office (Security)	Emmerson Munangagwa	Karanga
Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office (Defense)	Ernest Kadungure	Zezuru
Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office (Political Affairs and Provincial Development Coordination)	Maurice Nyagumbo	Manyika
<b>ZANU Non-Central Committee Members</b>		
Finance, Economic Planning, and Development	Bernard Chidzero	Zezuru
Local Government and Town Planning	Enos Chikowore	Zezuru
Lands, Resettlement, and Rural Development	Moven Mahachi	Manyika
Foreign Affairs	Witness Mangwende	Zezuru
Construction and National Housing	Simbarashe Mumbengegwi	Kalanga
Information, Posts, and Telecommunications	Nathan Shamuyarira	Zezuru
Labor, Manpower Planning, and Social Welfare	Frederick Shava	Zezuru
Youth, Sport, and Culture	Simba Makoni	Manyika
Home Affairs	Simbi Mubako	Karanga
National Resources and Tourism	Victoria Chitepo	Identifies with Manyika
Minister of State in the Deputy Prime Minister's Office (Energy Resources and Development)	Oliver Munyaradzi	Karanga
Minister Without Portfolio	Farai Masango	Karanga
<b>Independents</b>		
Agriculture	Dennis Norman	White
Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office (Public Service)	Chris Anderson	White
<b>ZAPU</b>		
Mines	Callistus Ndlovu	Kalanga
Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office (Water Resources and Development)	Cephas Msipa	Karanga
Minister of State to the Deputy Prime Minister	John Nkomo	Kalanga
Minister Without Portfolio	Daniel Ngwenya	Ndebele

<sup>a</sup> There are 28 Central Committee positions, but several of them are officially listed as vacant. According to Embassy and press reporting, other ZANU Central Committee members include: Robson Manyika, Deputy Minister of Labor; Mark Dube, Deputy Minister of Lands, Resettlement, and Development; Robert Marare, Deputy

Minister of National Housing; William Ndangana, Deputy Minister for Paramilitary Training; Rex Nhongo, Commander of the Army; Joshia Tungamirai, Air Force Deputy Commander; Didymus Mutasa; Justin Chauke; Sarudzai Chinamaropa; Sally Mugabe; Don Muvhuti; Mayor Urimbo; and Sheba Tavarwisa.



Secret

Cabinet, such as Finance Minister Chidzero and Agriculture Minister Norman, and in the demotion of Ushewokunze, who is popular among party militants.

[Redacted]

Although Mugabe's caution has sometimes been criticized as weakness, he is capable of acting more decisively on issues he believes have limited political ramifications at home. Foreign policy questions in particular seem to fall into this category. [Redacted]

**Ethnic and Ideological Divisions**

The party factions that Mugabe has to contend with were forged during the war years and generally are the product of subtribal affinities, ideology, and personal rivalry. The cleavages are not always clear cut, however, and we do not fully know just how these internal party dynamics ultimately affect government policy. [Redacted]

ZANU's leadership mirrors in microcosm the subtribal makeup of the Shona-speaking people. Although Karangas constitute the largest subgroup, non-Karangas have traditionally banded together to deny the Karangas the top ZANU positions and otherwise to prevent them from dominating the party. Indeed, Mugabe is a member of the second-largest Shona subgroup, the Zezurus. Several Zezurus who lack strong party roots seem to be influential with Mugabe: Mangwende, the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Shamuyarira, the Minister of Information; and Chidzero, the Minister of Finance. [Redacted]

Karangas in the party feel threatened by the Zezurus' dominance, [Redacted] there is a general belief within ZANU that many Karangas are more sympathetic toward reconciliation with ZAPU because they see the Ndebele as potential allies if the Karanga-Zezuru rivalry ever splits the party. The Karangas are plagued, however, by their own internal rivalries, epitomized by the bitter dispute between Simon Muzenda, the recognized leader of the Karangas, and Eddison Zvobgo, the politically ambitious Minister of Justice. [Redacted]

Members of the third-largest subtribe, the Manyika, also are concerned with maintaining their unity so as not to lose any more influence in the party and government relative to the Zezurus and Karangas,

[Redacted] The election last fall of former ZANU secretary general, Edgar Tekere, as the party's chairman in Manicaland Province—even though ZANU's central leadership favored another candidate—was, [Redacted] due largely to support from his fellow Manyika. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Tekere may be backed by the Manyika as their candidate for secretary general, which may be another reason Mugabe would like to abolish the position. The controversial Tekere was fired from his Cabinet post and suspended from his party position in 1981 following involvement in a murder for which he was subsequently acquitted on a technicality. [Redacted]

Our understanding of the ideological divisions within ZANU is much more limited than our knowledge about its tribal dynamics. We believe that many in the leadership can be characterized either as "moderates" or "militants" on important policy matters, particularly those relating to the pace of Zimbabwe's transition to socialism and the extent to which Zimbabwe should rely on the West for economic and security assistance. The stance of many individuals, however, appears to vary from issue to issue, making it difficult for outside observers to determine the state of play in Central Committee and Cabinet deliberations. [Redacted]

Moreover, ideological differences and tribal subdivisions within ZANU do not neatly coincide. Although many Karangas appear to take generally pragmatic positions on most issues, some Karangas, such as Justice Minister Zvobgo, take militant positions, at least in public. Similarly, while many Zezurus—for example, Ushewokunze, Mangwende, and Shamuyarira—often appear militant, others like Chidzero hold moderate views; Chidzero, however, probably has little influence on noneconomic issues. [Redacted]

Although we have been able to identify more pragmatists than militants in important government posts, the militants, in our judgment, have an influence that outweighs their actual numbers in the leadership.

25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

They espouse views that are popular among the rank and file, many of whom are former guerrillas—and Mugabe seems well aware of them. Ushewokunze and Tekere, both of whom at one time or another have been demoted by Mugabe, are cases in point. While both have been outmaneuvered by Mugabe in the past, they have considerable latent support at the grassroots level that has forced Mugabe to treat them gingerly and has enabled them to make political comebacks. In addition, although Mugabe frequently has followed pragmatic policies, we believe many of his personal beliefs are those of a party militant. Consequently it is often difficult to tell the extent to which his actions reflect pressure from party hardliners or his own predilections. [redacted]

#### ZANU's Attitudes Toward the West

We believe that Mugabe's socialist leanings and ZANU's origins as a liberation movement have set the tenor of Harare's attitudes toward the West and have contributed to the strained relations over the last year. The long struggle to overthrow the white minority regime, which most black Zimbabweans believe was supported by the West, colors their world view, according to US Embassy reporting. We believe it causes the country's leaders to define their foreign policies dogmatically on the issues of nonalignment and sovereignty and to side automatically with any group calling itself revolutionary or "progressive." Mugabe, for example, strongly identifies with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and insists that Zimbabwe's votes in the United Nations are not meant to be anti-US, but are made consistently on the basis of principle, according to Embassy reporting. [redacted]

Mugabe, in addition, is especially proud of Zimbabwe's independence and is especially prickly on issues that he perceives as meddling in the country's affairs. He has stated repeatedly in public and private that he will not alter Harare's policies or actions to please aid donors and that Zimbabwe will reject aid rather than accede to any conditions. A senior Zimbabwean official described the Prime Minister as a man who stands on principle, regardless of the consequences. Thus, we believe that Mugabe's moral posturing often conflicts with his generally pragmatic political style and causes him to take actions that to Western observers sometimes seem counterproductive. [redacted]

In addition, we believe that institutional biases and bumbling within Zimbabwe's Foreign Ministry have contributed importantly to recent strains with the West. The US Embassy reports that the Foreign Ministry is staffed by many officials who lack experience, are bureaucratically inept, and display both considerable naivete about international affairs and an anti-Western bias. There is ample evidence that Foreign Minister Mangwende and Information Minister Shamuyarira, who appears to be influential with Mugabe on foreign policy issues, along with other advisers and Foreign Ministry officials put proposals forward in a manner that portrays the West or the United States in a bad light and that plays to Mugabe's own suspicions of the West. [redacted]

Embassy reporting also indicates that, in advocating policy options, these officials fail to warn Mugabe of the implications or repercussions of specific actions. For example, after the Ministry unofficially boycotted a memorial service for US and French servicemen killed in the October 1983 Beirut bombing, Mugabe seemed surprised by the generally negative reaction of the diplomatic community. Moreover, even though Mugabe appears to be consulted on broad policy questions, the Foreign Ministry seems free to implement policy in its own way. [redacted]

We believe that Mugabe desires good relations with Washington and the West, in large measure because he recognizes that Western aid and investment are vital to Zimbabwe's economic success. Harare appeared to be somewhat shaken by the US decision to cut fiscal year 1984 aid from a proposed level of \$75 million to \$40 million, and there are signs suggesting that Mugabe wants to prevent further isolating himself from the United States. For example, Mugabe's public reaction to the aid cut was moderate and restrained; he said he was grateful for US aid to date, but opposed linking aid to Zimbabwe's foreign policies. Moreover, there has appeared, according to Embassy reporting, a new attitude of cooperation within the Foreign Ministry, while the Zimbabwean Information Minister visited the United States in early February to explore ways to improve Zimbabwe's image in this country. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

---

**Frictions With Washington and London**

Zimbabwe's relations with the United States soured in the fall of 1983 as Harare took a number of actions that put it at loggerheads with Washington. The US reactions to these incidents aroused particular concern in Harare because many Zimbabweans believed that there already had been growing sentiment in Washington to cut aid to Zimbabwe. Several of the incidents coincided with, or shortly followed, Mugabe's unsuccessful fence-mending visit to the United States in September:

- Zimbabwe cosponsored a Nicaraguan resolution in the UN Security Council and General Assembly condemning the US invasion of Grenada. Reporting on Grenada by Zimbabwe's semiofficial news media was also harshly anti-US.
- Zimbabwe had earlier abstained on the Security Council vote deploring the shooting down of a South Korean civilian airliner by the Soviet Union, despite a direct US appeal to Mugabe, who was in the United States at the time. He defended his country's position by insisting that Zimbabwe's abstention represented the views of other states in the region and that the incident had taken on overtones of East-West confrontation.
- Zimbabwe switched its vote in both the Security Council and General Assembly on Kampuchea, from supporting Vietnam's withdrawal to abstention. According to US officials at the United Nations, no other Frontline or leading nonaligned states changed their votes. Zimbabwean officials later claimed the switch had been an error and that Zimbabwe continued to oppose all such cases of interference in another country's affairs.

- Zimbabwean Foreign Ministry officials discouraged members of the diplomatic community in Harare from attending a memorial service arranged by the French and US Embassies for members of their contingents to the multilateral force killed in the bomb attacks in Lebanon in October 1983. In a series of telephone calls to all diplomatic missions and international organization offices, the Foreign Ministry stated that it had not been consulted about the event and would not be sending a representative. [redacted]

The United Kingdom was also the target of Zimbabwean anti-Western actions:

- In September, at a press conference in Harare, Mugabe lashed out at the British for "interfering" in Zimbabwean affairs, and anti-British demonstrations were staged in Harare. British criticism of Mugabe's decision to redetain six white Air Force officers after they had been acquitted by the courts on charges that they participated in the sabotage of Thornhill Air Force Base in July 1982 (the officers have since been released and have left the country) led to Mugabe's claim that the British Government had orchestrated a public and diplomatic campaign to gain the officers' release. Mugabe threatened that, if London cut its assistance to Zimbabwe, he might confiscate white-owned farmland or default on his pledges to pay pensions to civil servants and military men who served under the Rhodesian regime. London reassured Mugabe that it had no intention of cutting aid and launched a concerted effort to mend fences, which culminated in a meeting between Mugabe and Prime Minister Thatcher in December that seemed to heal the breach. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Nonetheless, we believe the recent frictions may have left long-lasting scars. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

moderates in the government, aside from their concern about the economic consequences of the aid cut, also believe that their position has been weakened by lingering resentment over what is widely viewed as the political motivation behind the US move. Mugabe

could find it difficult to stem this trend without jeopardizing the delicate balance of factions in his party or sacrificing his proclaimed principles. [redacted]

political mainstream. Moreover, the military campaign in Matabeleland will continue. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Outlook**

**Political and Security Prospects**

We believe that preparations for the ZANU party congress will heavily influence government activity. Government leaders seem increasingly preoccupied with party business, and behind-the-scenes maneuvering is likely to increase as ZANU leaders hammer out areas of compromise and mutual support. We agree with the Embassy that the congress is likely to endorse the outcome of this political power struggle rather than serve as a genuine forum for spontaneous debate on personnel or policy. [redacted]

[redacted] Efforts to bully the Ndebele into not supporting the dissidents, however, will only entrench the cycle of violence and antigovernment sentiment in Matabeleland. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

In general, we expect the tone of political rhetoric to become more strident as government leaders strive to keep themselves in the limelight. We believe that Mugabe in particular will not let himself be outflanked by party militants. He already has begun to create scapegoats, such as Zimbabwe's white businessmen and South Africa in general, in an effort to deflect criticism for the country's economic and security problems. Such statements, which are likely to be picked up by the Western press, will continue to cause concern among foreign investors and Western governments. [redacted]

Although we believe dissident activity is short of that necessary to spark a civil war, the dissidents probably can continue to deny the government firm control of a large area of the country. While the government has the ability to mount sporadic large-scale military operations, such as the one in early 1983, security forces do not appear to us capable of ending the violence. If the dissidents were to receive substantial outside support, more violence over a larger portion of the country would be likely, in our view. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Mugabe and ZANU probably will emerge from the party congress strengthened and more confident, if only because the party infighting that preceded the congress will be over. We expect that Mugabe's personal grip on the party will be tighter than ever and that no damaging fissures will appear within the party on most issues. We also believe that ZANU's tolerance for dissenting views and opposition figures will lessen as the momentum toward a one-party state builds. [redacted]

South African actions will continue to be the unpredictable factor in the already turbulent situation. We believe that for now Pretoria's objectives are limited to keeping Mugabe's regime weak and disrupted, both politically and economically. Consequently, we do not expect that South Africa will back Ndebele dissidents to the extent that it has supported insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique. A resumption of more covert pressure against Zimbabwe is possible if relations between the two countries deteriorate; Zimbabwean control of the ANC is a touchstone for the South Africans in this regard. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

We expect more violence in Zimbabwe, and we see little prospect that the government will relinquish its use of emergency powers. As a consequence, human rights abuses, especially in Matabeleland, are likely to occur. In late January the government again renewed the state of emergency for another six months, the eighth renewal since independence. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

The ruling party appears to have no new strategy to try to reach a political accommodation with ZAPU that would bring the Ndebele into the economic and

25X1

One positive step Mugabe has taken is the appointment of Simbi Mubako, a lawyer and known moderate, to replace the controversial Ushewokunze as Home Affairs Minister. Mubako has stated that he intends to urge colleagues in other ministries not to resort to emergency powers when ordinary laws could be used; the US Embassy noted that the government has grown increasingly dependent on emergency powers in its day-to-day operations. [redacted]

[redacted]

Mubako, however, may have little power or inclination to prevent politically motivated arrests, such as that of former Prime Minister Bishop Abel Muzorewa in November 1983. [redacted]

**Economic Prospects**

We doubt that Zimbabwe's economic performance will improve significantly in the near term, although it may do better than it did in 1983 when there was negative growth. Although the economy is basically sound, according to Embassy and other reporting, recovery depends to a large degree on elements beyond the government's control: the end of drought and the strength of worldwide economic recovery. [redacted]

Zimbabwe is experiencing a third year of drought, and the prospects for 1984 crops are dimming. According to the Embassy, the government has already begun to discuss drought contingency measures. Moreover, we expect only gradual improvement in the prices of Zimbabwe's mineral exports, and the country has large stockpiles to draw down once foreign demand picks up. [redacted]

Mugabe, in our view, will continue to rely on the private sector to provide jobs, exports, and growth, but potential investors both at home and abroad are likely to remain discouraged by socialist rhetoric, lack of government incentives, and the absence of precise investment guarantees. Moreover, any deepening of the foreign exchange crisis could prompt the government to enact measures—already hinted at publicly by Chidzero—to restrict dividend and pension remittances abroad, resulting in a further weakening of both investment incentives and morale among whites. [redacted]

Even the resumption of economic growth is likely to create problems, in our view. ZANU is politically committed to expanding the public sector as well as social welfare measures, objectives that would conflict with and could quickly stifle any renewed growth. Mugabe will continue to come under strong political pressure to increase wages and to maintain or restore consumer subsidies, particularly if the economy picks up, but social programs are likely to continue to be underfunded, especially since military expenditures are growing. [redacted]

Mugabe's challenge will be to bring greater economic benefits to black Zimbabweans, who form the base of his support, while not disrupting the private sector. The problems are not only racial, but reflect a growing divergence between the poor—who have inflated expectations—and a burgeoning black middle class—which bears the brunt of higher prices and taxes. [redacted]

We expect continued tension between pragmatists and ideologues over the pace and form of Zimbabwe's socialist transformation. The austerity measures that have generally won approval from the business community and international observers are especially risky politically. If they fail to bring economic dividends over the next year, Mugabe will come under more pressure to abandon his slow, cautious approach toward reforming the economy, and Finance Minister Chidzero may be increasingly isolated. Mugabe's retention of him in the January Cabinet shuffle suggests that the Prime Minister remains confident in Chidzero's counsel, but the Minister's departure from the scene (Chidzero has sometimes talked of resigning) could presage the unraveling of pragmatic policies. [redacted]

Mugabe may, in any event, move to put his personal stamp on some aspects of economic management. For example, he recently expressed his dissatisfaction with the level of state participation in industry, and in the Cabinet shakeup he moved the minister responsible for this issue into the Prime Minister's office. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

---

**After Mugabe . . . What?**

*Mugabe, in our view, will play a critical personal role in determining the course of events in Zimbabwe over the next few years, with the result that our projection of trends would change significantly if he were suddenly removed from the political scene. Mugabe's position as head of the party and government currently appears secure to us, and we believe that he remains vulnerable only to unexpected death by accident, natural causes (although we believe the 60-year-old Prime Minister is in good health), or assassination.* [redacted]

*Under such circumstances, we believe that ZANU is well enough entrenched that the transition would occur relatively smoothly and in accord with constitutional provisions. Under these provisions, President Banana would probably appoint Deputy Prime Minister (and ZANU Vice President) Simon Muzenda to succeed Mugabe, who would retain domestic and foreign policy continuity. The character of the new government, however, would be colored by the manner of Mugabe's death. If he were assassinated by an embittered white or an Ndebele dissident, we would expect any new leadership to follow severely repressive policies against Zimbabwe's minorities.* [redacted]

*We also believe that an intense and possibly prolonged power struggle within ZANU would ensue—one that Muzenda, in our view, would have difficulty controlling. Uncertainties raised by Muzenda's ascendancy would, at a minimum, sharpen subtribal rivalries within ZANU.* [redacted]

*Further, we believe that party militants—frustrated by Mugabe's cautious approach—would probably view his passing as an opportunity to move more aggressively to install ZANU as the single party, to*

*socialize the economy, and to reduce remaining white privilege. Pressure to quicken the pace of land redistribution by confiscating property or to take over critical industries such as corn milling could become self-generating as those competing for power tried to outbid each other for popular support. Moves in these directions, although politically rewarding in the short run, would lead to white flight and economic havoc.* [redacted]

*We believe that a somewhat similar scenario would unfold if our assessment of the outcome of the party congress proved incorrect and Mugabe emerged weaker rather than stronger. It is possible, although not likely, that a personality such as Tekere or Ushewokunze could prove capable of mobilizing rank-and-file support for populist and radical policies. Under these circumstances, we would expect a reinvigorated, and more radical, Central Committee to assert policy primacy over a weakened Prime Minister Mugabe.* [redacted]

*Under either scenario, a breakdown in Mugabe's modus vivendi with South Africa would be likely. The pitch of anti-South African rhetoric from Harare would increase and pressure could grow for increasing Zimbabwe's assistance to anti-South African groups like the ANC. South Africa, always ready to anticipate the worst from its black-ruled neighbors, would probably need little provocation to increase its support for Zimbabwean dissidents or to strangle the Zimbabwean economy. The radicalization of the regime's domestic policies alone, with its adverse effects on Zimbabwe's economy and human rights record as well as on regional stability, would have damaging repercussions on Harare's relations with the West.* [redacted]

---

**Prospects for Relations With the West**

On balance, we see little prospect for change in the dynamics that have strained relations between Harare and the West during the past year. Occasional outbursts of anti-Western sentiment, often stemming from internal tensions, seem unavoidable as long as Mugabe is committed to a one-party, socialist state

with a doggedly nonaligned view of the world. Harare's actions, both domestically and in international forums, probably will continue to alienate Western governments and their publics, raise human rights concerns, and frighten off foreign investors. [redacted]

Although Mugabe apparently has reined in some Foreign Ministry officials who recently have been

more cooperative in consulting with US representatives, we believe a major shift in foreign policy is unlikely. Foreign Minister Mangwende was retained in the January Cabinet shuffle, and, in our view, the Foreign Ministry is carrying out—albeit clumsily and without tact—a foreign policy that is sanctioned by the country's leadership and that reflects Mugabe's deep commitment to nonalignment and to a jealous defense of Zimbabwe's sovereignty. [redacted]

**Mugabe's Limited Options.** We do not expect Zimbabwe to seek significantly closer ties to Moscow just because relations with the West have cooled. In principle, Mugabe distrusts both superpowers. So far, he has been content to manifest his nonaligned credentials mainly by maintaining warm relations with those Eastern Bloc countries, such as Romania and North Korea, that supported ZANU during the war and with those socialist states that he believes can serve as a model for the kind of economic and social development he believes is appropriate for Zimbabwe. Moreover, in our view, he is aware that Moscow and its allies have been unwilling and increasingly unable to match the West in supplying economic aid to Africa. [redacted]

Relations with Moscow developed slowly because of the USSR's support for Nkomo and ZAPU during the war and Harare's nagging worry [redacted]

[redacted] that Moscow might be covertly aiding the dissidents on ZAPU's behalf. During the past year, Zimbabwe took delivery of a shipment of small arms from the Soviets, accepted a number of scholarships, signed a trade agreement with Moscow, and sent several ministers to the Soviet Union to explore party-to-party relations. We believe that Mugabe will continue to move cautiously to expand ties with Moscow. Other tangible signs of improving relations might include a firm scheduling of Mugabe's visit to Moscow—which was postponed several times last year, according to Embassy reporting—the opening of a Zimbabwean Embassy in Moscow, and further low-level military cooperation. [redacted]

A sharp deterioration in the security situation could nevertheless drive Zimbabwe further from the West. The government's record so far suggests that ZANU, if threatened, would pursue repressive measures to maintain control, which could initiate another round of misperceptions and hostility between Harare and Western capitals. Diminished Western support, reduced aid, and lack of foreign investment could reinforce the government's reliance on coercion to quell antigovernment forces or to stifle growing domestic pressure for economic relief. Zimbabwe probably would then look to the East for military assistance it believed it needed—an area where the Soviet Union and its allies have a comparative advantage over the West. [redacted]

Deteriorating relations with the West also could tend to encourage the regime's internal and external opponents. Dissidents probably would see it as a sign that their activities were paying off and would be encouraged to step up the pressure. If South Africa believed that the West no longer viewed Zimbabwe as a model for a democratic, multiracial society in southern Africa, it could be tempted to renew its pressure on the regime either in the form of increased support to anti-ZANU dissidents or economic strangulation tactics. [redacted]

Finally, Zimbabwe's reduced reliance on the West would almost certainly further strengthen the hand of party militants and could lead to more precipitous moves to socialize the economy or to impose the one-party state. We doubt that Mugabe, in the long run, could stand up to leftist pressure from within ZANU in the face of a deteriorating security situation, declining economic resources, and sharp Western criticism. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Secret**

**Secret**