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
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# Turkey: The General Election



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An Intelligence Assessment



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# Turkey: The General Election

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**An Intelligence Assessment**

This paper was prepared by [Redacted]  
Office of European Analysis. It was coordinated with  
the Directorate of Operations. [Redacted]

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be  
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**Turkey:**  
**The General Election**

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**Key Judgments**

*Information available  
as of 30 September 1983  
was used in this report.*

A new civilian administration will be installed in Turkey after the parliamentary election on 6 November, but the generals who have ruled since 1980 clearly are planning to retain a substantial behind-the-scenes political role until they are convinced security and stability are permanent fixtures. Kenan Evren, until recently Chief of the General Staff, has already been elected President, a position he will occupy until 1989. The military's political framework, moreover, concentrates power in the President's hands, weakens the legislature, and restricts admission to the political arena to those political parties strong enough to overcome a series of statutory hurdles. After the election, the ruling military council is scheduled to disband and reconstitute itself as a civilian advisory body to the President, empowered to oversee all acts of parliament and the government ministries.

The Turkish public so far has acquiesced in the generals' plans. Most Turks perceive a clear connection between the no-holds-barred political life of the past and the political impasses and violence that plagued the country prior to the military takeover in 1980. Consequently, Turks in general have not pushed hard for the removal of the limitations on political activity imposed by the generals.

Within the context of the "guided democracy" the generals have set in place, the ruling council has permitted some political parties to contest the election. We believe the conservative Nationalist Democracy Party, headed by retired Gen. Turgut Sunalp, almost certainly will win a significant plurality, if not a majority, of the seats. The ruling generals have already endorsed the NDP unofficially and are now trying to better the NDP's chances by limiting the number of political parties participating in the election.

In their efforts to give the election a semblance of legitimacy, the generals have given their tacit support to Necdet Calp's center-left Populist Party, but it is clear they do not intend this party to win many seats in the new parliament. The generals also have not blocked the emergence of Turgut Ozal's center-right Motherland Party, which offers the only real alternative to the military-backed parties. The MP might pick up a large portion of the votes of those disillusioned with the controlled electoral process, but it is unlikely to gain enough support to keep the NDP from becoming the largest party.

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Despite the controlled nature of the process, the election is, nonetheless, a significant step that will mark the beginning of a six-year transition to democracy. Important indications of how the process is proceeding would include whether Evren lifts martial law and permits parliament to initiate legislation or have a voice in formulating broad government policy. We expect the new parliament probably will be solidly conservative, giving Evren virtual carte blanche—at least in the short term—to pursue his austere economic measures and pro-Western foreign policy.

In our view, Evren's character and the new constitutional framework will be adequate to guarantee political stability for the next year or so. We think, though, that the sheer weight of Turkey's socioeconomic problems and the increased complexity of the governing process will make it difficult for the civilian regime to maintain the momentum established by the military rulers. As a result, criticism of the regime probably will emerge, and Evren could be tempted to impose harsh measures to maintain control. The municipal elections, which must be held not later than the fall of 1984, will be the first open test of the ability of the new civilian government to weather the challenge. In the final analysis, we believe the era of guidance by Evren and his advisers that Turkey is now entering is likely to last for at least several more years.



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**Turkey:  
The General Election**

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**The Home Stretch**

The parliamentary election on 6 November will end three years of direct military rule and usher in a new phase of political experimentation that will blend civilian government and indirect military control. The generals have set up a new political framework and are attempting to ensure that only those individuals acceptable to the ruling military council are permitted to engage in politics. While the commanders have long been committed to the restoration of civilian rule, they have consistently and openly made clear their intention to retain a substantial behind-the-scenes political role for the indefinite future. [Redacted]

intervened. As a result, they have not pushed hard for the removal of the limitations on political activity imposed by the generals. [Redacted]

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President Kenan Evren, who was elected President last November and who stepped down as Chief of the General Staff on 1 July appears confident that he will weather the coming period of uncertainty, during which civilian leaders are likely to put to the test the constitutional and statutory framework he designed. He has been manipulating the electoral process for some time to minimize potential problems. In May, for example, the ruling National Security Council, composed of the President and the four service chiefs, dissolved the Great Turkey Party, the putative successor to the banned Justice Party. The Council subsequently declared unacceptable a number of the founding members of several other political parties. Combined, these actions undoubtedly reinforced the widely held belief that the generals planned to maximize their chances of success before the election. [Redacted]

The generals' actions appear to have provoked negative responses only from a segment of the political elite. Some of the former politicians who are barred from politics for several years seem to have become bolder and more outspoken in their criticism of the military regime. According to press reporting, for example, former Prime Minister Demirel and his colleagues were placed under detention precisely because they tried to circumvent the generals' prohibitions. President Evren and the ruling council, moreover, have been drawing fire from the press. This has prompted the generals to close down two moderate newspapers and a weekly journal and to bring charges against several columnists and publishers for running articles critical of the government's policies. While the generals' had promised an election by spring 1984, we believe the ruling council may see holding the election this fall as a way of minimizing the further growth of such disenchantment in the political class. [Redacted]

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Despite the military regime's popularity and successes in bringing terrorism under control, turning the economy around, and restoring public confidence in government, Embassy reporting shows the Turkish public is anxious to return to the give-and-take of democratic life. The roots of multiparty democracy run deep in Turkey, and the Turks generally cannot do without the organizing, debating, and voting that pluralism entails. In our view, most Turks also see a clear connection between the no-holds-barred political life of the past and the frequent political impasses and violence that plagued the country before the military

The generals might also be thinking that returning the country to civilian rule now could help refurbish Turkey's image in Western Europe, which in the past three years has been greatly tarnished. Despite the sharp differences between the military regime and many West European governments over human rights policy, Turkey's leaders must know that they need Western cooperation to fight Armenian terrorism directed against Turks and to undertake a credible military modernization. The generals, staunch advocates of the principle of westernization propounded by Kemal Ataturk, the father of modern Turkey, probably also would like to see Turkey brought back into the West European fold. [Redacted]

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**The Rules of the Game**

The generals have consistently said privately and publicly their new political system is designed to purge the country of what they believe was the inordinate power wielded before the military takeover by politicians such as ex-Justice Party leader Suleyman Demirel and former Republican People's Party chief Bulent Ecevit. They also have said they want to establish a political system that will foster greater stability. [redacted]

[redacted] the generals blame the old political elite and the former constitutional order for bringing the country to the brink of civil war in the 1979-80 period. At that time, leftwing and rightwing extremism was taking a high toll in lives and economic productivity, and the bickering politicians were unable, or unwilling, to address the nation's problems.<sup>1</sup> [redacted]

Consequently, soon after assuming power in 1980 the ruling military council suspended key provisions of the 1961 Constitution, disbanded all political parties, and vowed to bar from politics those seen as having contributed to the instability. It also began work on a new political framework designed to overcome the perceived weaknesses of the previous system: too much individual freedom, not enough state authority, irresponsibility and divisiveness in government, and an incompetent bureaucracy. The generals' public pronouncements suggest that the military regime envisaged a new political system that would give greater weight to state prerogatives, strengthen the executive's ability to deal with domestic crises, and limit to two or three the political parties that play an important role in parliament. Bemoaning the failure of past military efforts to reform the political system, the commanders also have said publicly that they want to establish a political framework that would make military intervention in politics unnecessary. [redacted]

The generals' vision is now enshrined in the new constitution, promulgated last fall and endorsed overwhelmingly by the public in a referendum last November, as well as in the laws governing political

[redacted]

parties and elections enacted this spring.<sup>2</sup> Their distrust of civilian politicians has led them to make modifying the political framework difficult. The new constitution, for example, makes it arduous for the Grand National Assembly to amend the fundamental law during the next six years. As long as Evren is president, the passage of a proposed amendment to the constitution, will require a three-fourths majority vote in parliament. Even if Evren were to veto the amendment and parliament were to override that veto, the President could submit the proposal to a national referendum. [redacted]

The generals' desire to narrow the range of options available to the politicians and to create a two-party system is reflected in other restrictions they have imposed. Both the Constitution and the Political Parties Law, for example, prohibit the establishment of parties espousing Marxist, separatist, or religious views. They also prohibit former party leaders and ex-members of parliament from entering politics for up to 10 years. The statutes, moreover, limit a party chairman to no more than six consecutive terms of two years each, after which he may run again only after four years have elapsed. Aimed at keeping politics pure, the Elections Law requires members of the military and the bureaucracy, including university professors, to resign their posts if they should seek political office.<sup>3</sup> [redacted]

The most significant feature of the laws pertaining to political parties and elections is the requirement that a political party meet certain criteria in order to qualify for seats in parliament. If a party is successful

[redacted]

<sup>3</sup> Prime Minister Uluu and some members of the Cabinet have already announced their intention to run for parliamentary seats as independents on a party slate. Their "nonpartisan" status means that they need not resign their posts. There is precedent for this: the 1965 Political Parties Law also permitted a person to run as an independent on a party ticket. [redacted]

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**Main Features of the 1982 Constitution**

**The President**

- Can call parliament into special session.
- Can call for elections when the government loses a vote of confidence or when no government can be formed.
- Presides over the Council of Ministers.
- Appoints some members of the judiciary and the Council of State. Appoints all members of the Higher Education Council and the State Supervisory Council and all university rectors.
- Can submit to national referendum any law passed by parliament over his veto. [ ]

- Individuals have freedom of expression, assembly, association, and collective bargaining.
- The state may not impose ex post facto laws or restrict the freedom of the press.
- An individual is innocent until proven guilty. [ ] 25X1

**Restrictions on Rights and Freedoms**

- The Council of Ministers, under the chairmanship of the President, can declare a national emergency for a period of up to six months, subject to parliamentary approval.
- The government may curtail some basic rights and freedoms during states of emergency. [ ] 25X1  
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**The Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and Parliament**

- The Prime Minister and the Cabinet together are responsible for the implementation of general policy.
- The Prime Minister and the Cabinet must submit the government's program to the National Assembly and obtain a vote of confidence.
- Parliament may empower the Council of Ministers to issue decrees for a limited period.
- Parliament elects the President from among its members for a seven-year term.
- Parliament has the right to declare war.
- Parliament may question and censure government ministers.
- The government must strive to ensure economic stability. [ ]

**Curbs on the Abuse of Power**

- Officials accused of the improper use of authority will be subject to prosecution.
- One-tenth of the members of parliament may open an investigation of the Prime Minister or other ministers.
- Parliament may impeach the President for high treason. [ ] 25X1

**Transitional Provisions**

- The National Security Council is transformed into an advisory Presidential Council after the general election.
- Former leaders of political parties are prohibited from participating in politics for up to 10 years. 25X1
- Evren is elected President for a seven-year term with the same popular vote that approves the constitution [ ] 25X1

**Basic Individual Rights and Freedoms**

- The state must strive to remove social, political, and economic obstacles that limit the rights and freedoms of the individual.

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in organizing at all—the law stipulates it must have 30 founding members and be approved by the military council—it must then submit its program to the Interior Ministry and the Public Prosecutor. Once approved, a party must organize in at least 34 of the country's 67 provinces to be eligible to participate in elections. It is not permitted, however, to form branches at the village or neighborhood levels. Even more restrictive is the "double barrage" system, under

which a party must first win at least 10 percent of the nationwide vote and then a minimum number of votes in at least one province<sup>4</sup> to qualify for seats in parliament. [ ] 25X1

<sup>4</sup> The law says that a party must obtain at least as many votes in a province as are equal to the quotient of the total votes cast in that province divided by the number of seats allotted to that province.

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A few temporary articles appended to the laws cover only the election this fall. One of these requires the political parties to draw up their election slates—in the future, party primaries must be held—and requires the electorate to vote a straight party ticket. Another temporary provision imposes a \$12 fine for failing to vote. Perhaps the most important provisional article commits the military regime to hold a general election on 6 November. [redacted]

**The Key Players**

Evren and the ruling military council are the pivotal actors in the political process. They have set the tone and the rules of the election and are now trying to ensure conformity with their plans. We believe, Evren—the chief architect of the regime’s political framework—seems to consider a strong hand a necessity until, in his view, the Turks are imbued with an adequate sense of political responsibility and moderation. [redacted]

Evren has shown few qualms about taking stern, but legal, steps either to weaken the parties he does not support or to exclude them from the political process. The US Embassy in Ankara reports that the generals already have given their tacit support to the conservative Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP), headed by retired Gen. Turgut Sunalp, and to the center-left Populist Party (PP) led by former government official Necdet Calp. They have not, moreover, blocked the establishment of the center-right Motherland Party (MP), led by former economic czar Turgut Ozal, despite the possibility that it might detract from the NDP’s support. [redacted]

Both the NDP and the PP have programs that accord well with the military’s prescriptions. In addition to calling for the pursuit of Kemalist economic policies—rapid economic growth along Western lines and state ownership of key industries—and a pro-Western foreign policy, both parties are claiming in their platforms to represent all political classes. The ranks of both include retired military officers, former bureaucrats, ex-trade unionists, and some former members of the Consultative Assembly. [redacted]

Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party seems to offer the only real alternative to the NDP and the PP. The MP espouses an unfettered free enterprise system, an

approach made popular by Ozal in his economic stabilization program of 1980. The party also stands for conservative religious values and asserts that Turkey should be open to the world of Islam, to trading with the Arabs, and to serving as a bridge between the Arab countries and Europe. The MP appeals to business groups benefiting from the austerity measures—as well as to tradesmen, farmers, many members of the former Justice Party, and religious elements. The party’s main asset in one view, is Ozal’s popularity—he receives much of the credit for Turkey’s improved economic performance since 1980—and his record as a political “survivor.” [redacted]

All the other political groups that have applied to the Interior Ministry for recognition as political parties (see table) have fallen away either because they failed to fulfill legal requirements or because they were disqualified by the ruling military council. The generals rejected, for example, the founding members of the Correct Path and Social Democratic Parties (SODEP), making it impossible for either group to participate in the election. To keep their hands in politics at this point, the members of these and other such parties have little choice but to throw their lots in with qualified parties, hoping to win favorable spots on election slates or get some minor government post in the new civilian government. [redacted]

**The State of Play**

We believe the NDP is almost certain, given the military’s support, to obtain at least a plurality, if not a majority, of the votes in the election. The extent of the NDP victory will, in our opinion, depend on the degree to which the ruling council’s recent actions—the exclusion of the Correct Path and Social Democratic Parties from politics, the closure of newspapers, the jailing of several columnists—translate into protest, and therefore anti-NDP, votes. [redacted]

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**Conservative Political Parties Formed Since 16 May 1983**

Political Party	Leader
<b>Center right</b>	
Great Turkey Party (dissolved by decree in May 1983)	Ali Fethi Esener
Nationalist Democracy Party	Turgut Sunalp
Motherland Party	Turgut Ozal
Correct Path Party	Yildirim Avcı
New Birth Party	Kemal Avsaroglu
Supreme Duty Party (ordered closed by Constitutional Court)	Baha Vefa Karatay
New Order Party	Leader unknown
Virtue Party (under investigation)	Leader unknown
Republican Conservative Party (under investigation)	Leader unknown
Prosperity Party	Ali Turkmen
Our Party (dissolved voluntarily)	Mithat Ceylan
Tranquility Party (under investigation)	Ahmet Celebi
Banner Party	Yasar Yurtovel
<b>Center left</b>	
Social Democratic Party	Cezmi Kartay
Populist Party	Necdet Calp

[Redacted]

In spite of Evren's endorsement, however, the NDP must overcome some obstacles if it is to win big. For one thing, Embassy reporting suggests that both the generals and the public consider Sunalp too inflexible and too inexperienced to be an effective national leader. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Although its chances of winning are slim, Ozal's Motherland Party has had greater success than the NDP in attracting supporters, especially since May

<sup>5</sup> There is much speculation in Turkish political circles about Ulusu's role in the government after the election. Most Turkish political observers believe that Evren would like Ulusu to be prime minister. Some pundits have suggested, however, that Ulusu might instead be named chairman of the National Assembly. In either case, he would need to win a parliamentary seat, and he recently announced his intention to run as an independent on the NDP ticket. [Redacted]

when the government banned the Great Turkey Party, commonly regarded as the successor to the banned Justice Party. The perception of the NDP as Evren's personal creation also encouraged some traditionally conservative, religious elements to gravitate toward the MP. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Evren's worries about the center left in our view are probably unfounded. Even if the election were completely open, we think historical voting patterns and the backlash against the center left—press reporting shows Turks in general blame the left for many of Turkey's problems—almost certainly would give the conservatives the upper hand (figure 1). This suggests that Evren's concerns about Ozal have less to do with the fate of the center right than with face. Evren simply may not relish the prospect of seeing an upstart challenge his own man. [Redacted]

Not surprisingly, given the ruling military council's strong preference for the center right, the generals have given little support to the Populists beyond

<sup>6</sup> Evren and Ozal have personal and philosophical differences. We believe that Evren regards Ozal as epitomizing the system that spawned the anarchy and chaos that led to the 1980 military takeover. Evren also probably considers Ozal's economic views as being somewhat contrary to Ataturk's principle of statism. [Redacted]

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
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
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**Figure 1**  
Shares of Votes by the Right and the Left of the Political Spectrum, 1961-79



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**Figure 2**  
Shares of Major Political Party Votes in National Assembly Elections, 1961-79



<sup>a</sup> Even though in the 14 October 1979 election the Justice Party won the five contested Assembly seats, the RPP losses kept the parliamentary arithmetic for the two major parties much the same.

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undercutting the other center-left parties that have sprung up. If the Populists qualify for participation in the election at all, they are likely, in our view, to find it difficult to attain the 10-percent nationwide vote necessary to win seats in parliament. The PP seems to have failed in recruiting prominent social democrats, and various press reports suggest that the party is on the verge of collapse.

and the Republican People's Party together averaged 74 percent of the vote and nearly 82 percent of the seats in parliament (figures 2 and 3). Nonetheless, during this period the larger parties often had to rely on the support of minor parties, such as the Islamic fundamentalist National Salvation Party and the neofascist Nationalist Action Party, to establish governing majorities. These small parties, as a result, acquired disproportionate amounts of power.

**The Balance of Power**

The NDP's competition in the election is, therefore, likely to come mainly from the MP. If Evren could get over his pique with Ozal, we think he probably would not be averse to having a two-party system under which two center-right parties vied for control—a situation that existed in the 1950s. Many Turks would probably argue, in our view, that the country would be better off with two parties that were less alike, but the generals will still not have much trouble selling the notion of a two-party system. Even as splinter parties proliferated in the period 1961-79, the Justice Party

Although the military regime shows every intention of making good this fall on its promise to return a limited measure of power to civilians, democracy will not be firmly reestablished in the country for some-time. By the time of the election, direct military rule will have lasted three years. Indirect military control of politics is likely, we believe, to last much longer—at least until the parliamentary election in 1988. It is

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
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**Figure 3**  
**Share of Votes and Seats by Party in National Assembly Elections, 1961-79**



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clear to us that Evren and his colleagues will not relinquish power until they believe security and political stability are permanent fixtures in Turkey.

Evren is trying to consolidate his power without seeming too repressive. He already has resigned his position as Chief of the General Staff. The Constitution stipulates that the other members of the National

Security Council will resign their commissions immediately after the election and reconstitute themselves as a civilian advisory body to the President, empowered by the Constitution until the end of Evren's term to oversee the government machinery, legislation, and ultimately the politicians.

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Evren and his colleagues on the Presidential Council will have a great deal of power. Under the new Constitution, only the President is empowered to appoint the Prime Minister, the government ministers, and most senior government officials. Various councils attached to the president's office, moreover, will supervise the operations of the government, relegating parliament's watchdog function to secondary importance. The President's right to submit important legislation to national referendum, even after parliament has overridden a presidential veto, will greatly undercut the National Assembly's ability to take bold steps on controversial issues.

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Parliament, however, will retain some residual authority that could eventually translate into real power. For one thing, the Constitution requires that all legislation gain the approval of parliament. Evren technically could submit large numbers of bills to referendum, but for practical reasons he will not be able to resort to this option too often: he will have to work with parliament if he is to be effective. During Evren's tenure, however, we believe the President's stature and what we anticipate will be a strong conservative majority will limit parliament's role to reacting to legislation inspired by Evren or his allies. We think parliament will play a more active role only in the unlikely event the center right wins less than a majority in the election or if the center left fares well in municipal elections next year. By that time, the military council will have dissolved. Evren, moreover, will not have any say over who runs in the municipal elections and this could make for a more freewheeling contest. Beyond Evren's term, another factor will affect a balance of power between the executive and legislative branches: parliament's responsibility to select the president every seven years.

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**The Likely Policies of the New Regime**

Odds are that Evren is likely to find it relatively easy to persuade the new parliament to extend the generals' economic recovery program and their efforts to fight terrorism. The President and his ministers will, in our judgment, try to focus on economic and social issues the military regime has been unable to resolve: an excessively large public sector, an inequitable tax structure, an outdated banking system, high unemployment, and inadequate public housing. [redacted]

The new civilian regime is also likely to adopt the foreign policies of the military regime. Evren is a staunchly pro-Western secularist who sees no alternative to Turkey's military and political ties to the West. We believe he will want to build on the basic cordiality that has characterized US-Turkish relations in the past three years. We see little chance, however, that he will advocate revising Ankara's longstanding policy of denying Washington the use of Turkish territory for any military operation outside the NATO context. [redacted]

Evren's grip on the political process could tighten in the unlikely event that the Aegean and Cyprus disputes flare up or if Turkey is drawn into any of the conflicts in the Middle East, such as the Iran-Iraq war. Turkey's relations with Greece appear to have improved somewhat in recent months, but the Middle East conflicts pose some immediate problems for Ankara. The Turks reportedly are worried, for example, about the use of Kurds—Turkey has a sizable Kurdish minority—as combatants in the Gulf war. Ankara's relations with Syria, which reportedly has been training and supporting anti-Turkish terrorists, have also deteriorated markedly. As the principal foreign policy decisionmaker, Evren conceivably could delay relaxing his hold on politics until these and other foreign policy issues are addressed to his satisfaction. [redacted]

The government is likely, in our view, to seek improvements in Ankara's relations with Western Europe, which have deteriorated sharply in the past three years. Five West European nations have brought charges against Turkey in the European Human Rights Commission, and the Council of Europe already has voted to exclude Turkish members, to be selected after the election, from the Council's

Parliamentary Assembly. We thus doubt that the transfer to civilian administration will lead to a rapid improvement in Turkish-West European relations. [redacted]

We expect Evren will also advocate expanding economic ties to Middle Eastern countries if for no other reason than to undercut Ozal, who has been the most outspoken exponent of this course. In this effort, we think Ankara will focus on preserving its strong economic links to countries like Iran and Iraq for the purpose of enhancing the export sector, which has expanded dramatically in the past three years. [redacted]

For reasons already noted, most members of parliament will toe Evren's foreign policy line when it comes time to vote. To establish their nationalistic bonafides, however, many members of the National Assembly will, we believe, be tempted to argue in debate for a more independent foreign policy; closer ties to the Arab world; and a tougher stance on Aegean seabed, airspace, territorial issues, Cyprus, and Greek-Turkish relations. The conservative makeup of the Assembly probably would make it prone to favor closer relations with the United States, providing Washington is forthcoming on military and economic aid. [redacted]

**Outlook**

The short-term outlook for political stability under civilian rule is good. Evren's strong presence and the new constitutional framework will, in our view, combine to yield a governing process with a measured, conservative character. At least for the near term, we believe that his former colleagues in the military will be quick to lend the President their moral support at the first sign of divisiveness among the political elite, political violence, or serious public dissatisfaction with the policies of the government. [redacted]

While the new constitutional framework is thus likely to produce the stable governments Evren and the generals want, we think the new administration will have trouble demonstrating continued progress in coping with Turkey's massive economic and social problems. Although there will still be many restrictions on political activity, the governing process will

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inevitably be more cumbersome and complex than it was during the past three years. Evren, for example, will be obliged to work through the parliament, and, although it will be sympathetic, it will also be full of politicians inclined to act with at least one eye on the future possibility of establishing independent political bases in a more openly democratic system. In short, the legislature will be something less than the rubber-stamp it has been for Evren since 1980. Even the Constituent Assembly, formed soon after the generals came to power to act as the legislative branch of government, has shown a willingness to defy the ruling military council on occasion. The Assembly, for example, recently shelved a proposal by Admiral Tumer, a National Security Council member, to restrict the 1984 municipal elections to those political parties participating in the general election. [redacted]

Added to such procedural questions, there is the sheer weight of Turkey's domestic problems. The generals have made impressive progress toward stopping the terrorism that was claiming an average of 20 lives a day before the military takeover, but they have so far dealt more with symptoms than with causes. Although about 40,000 terrorists have been jailed since 1980, little has been done to eradicate the conditions that spawned them—high unemployment in overcrowded, service-poor urban areas and an insufficiently developed commitment to traditional Western political values, such as the concept of a loyal opposition, limited experience with political moderation, and the slow pace of social and political change compared with rapid industrialization. And on the economic side, the success of the general's austerity measures masks a lack of progress toward addressing structural deficiencies like an antiquated tax system and inefficient public sector.<sup>7</sup> [redacted]

We think that having to grapple with such intractable problems will test the government's tolerance for the criticism of its policies that is sure to arise. Given Evren's penchant for security and stability we expect him to wield a heavy hand until he is convinced that the politicians will act responsibly. We also expect the

<sup>7</sup> The 1980 economic stabilization program led to the reduction of the inflation rate from 120 percent in 1979 to 25 percent this year, to the elimination of the consumer shortages, and to the dramatic expansion of exports. [redacted]

Turkish military to take a more active interest in the country's political development, especially if the politicians again begin to act divisively. Indeed, if the government is criticized severely for failing to produce solutions Evren could be tempted to delay lifting martial law, which will remain in place until parliament rescinds it, or to impose other restrictive measures to maintain control. In the final analysis, we cannot rule out another military intervention in Turkish politics if the economic and internal security situations take a turn for the worse and the new administration is unable or unwilling to cope with the problems. [redacted]

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We would view certain actions that Evren might take within the next year as indicators of whether the country is progressing toward the restoration of democratic rule. Permitting members of parliament to initiate legislation or to have a voice in formulating broad governmental policy, for example, would indicate a softening of Evren's stand on political participation. The lifting of martial law, moreover, would suggest a desire on the part of the military to return to the barracks, an action that would go a long way toward placating Evren's foreign and domestic critics. [redacted]

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Finally, the municipal elections that by law must be held by fall 1984 could also be an indicator of how relations are developing between civilian and military authorities under the new Constitution. The generals have introduced legislation to restrict the number of parties contesting the local elections to those competing in the general election. The Constitutional Committee of the Consultative Assembly has rejected the proposal, but the ruling military council could still override the rejection and limit the number of parties in the municipal elections. If the campaign is not restricted in this way, however, competition for the municipal election could be a lively affair compared with the tightly controlled election process unfolding this fall. The question is whether Evren and the generals will have developed enough trust in the Turkish elite by then to let politics take its course under the rules they have laid down. On balance, we think the generals will lean toward maintaining some form of "guided democracy" for at least several more years. [redacted]

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
## Biographic Profiles



### Necdet Calp

The Populist Party chief is known as a technocrat and an effective administrator. He has served several tours as a provincial governor and, until he resigned to establish the Populist Party, was attached to the Prime Minister's Office. The 61-year-old Calp has considerable political experience, having been active in the now-banned Republican Party for many years, but we believe he lacks the personal presence necessary to achieve national prominence. [redacted]

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### Turgut Sunalp

An ex-general, the 65-year-old leader of the Nationalist Democratic Party is still more a military man than a politician. He has a reputation for outspokenness that may have been the cause of his retirement from the military in 1976 after 40 years of service. We believe he is perceptive and decisive. As a civilian, he has served as Ambassador to Canada. We expect him to maintain his longstanding pro-US views, although as in the past he will not hesitate to criticize specific US policies. [redacted]

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Camera Press ©

### Bulend Ulusu

Prime Minister Ulusu, 60, has been an effective liaison between the Cabinet and the ruling military council. An ex-admiral, Ulusu is a team player and an excellent organizer with a quick and retentive mind. While most reports indicate that he is firm and self-confident, others note his receptiveness to criticism and his soft-spoken, easygoing approach to management. Prior to his appointment as Prime Minister in 1980, he served tours as Deputy Minister of Defense and as Commander of the Navy [redacted]

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Euromoney ©

### Turgut Ozal

Turgut Ozal first designed the economic stabilization of 1980 program and then found himself retained by the military regime to implement the measures. He resigned in July 1982, however, over what he publicly called "a disagreement in implementation." Ozal, about 56, is known for his integrity, competence, frankness, and self-confidence. In addition to serving as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State under former Prime Minister Demirel, he has also worked in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. [redacted]

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Camera Press ©

### Kenan Evren

Elected Turkey's seventh president in November 1982, Kenan Evren has been Chairman of the ruling National Security Council since the military takeover in 1980. He served as Chief of the Turkish General Staff from 1978 until this year. US Embassy officials describe Evren, about 65, as soft-spoken, modest, cautious, and thoughtful. He is also known to have a strong sense of duty and to be self-reliant. He is both decisive and comfortable with wielding authority. He is, however, receptive to advice and tends to avoid conflict when possible. His devotion to the principles of Ataturk and to secularism at times make him seem rigid in his rejection of demands for political participation by the left and Islamic fundamentalists. [redacted]

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