



Directorate of
Intelligence

~~Secret~~

25X1



Palestinians in Lebanon: Troubled Past and Bleak Future

25X1



A Research Paper

MASTER FILE COPY
DO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON

~~Secret~~

GI 83-10016
NESA 83-10017
February 1983

Copy **610**

Page Denied



Directorate of
Intelligence

Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Palestinians in Lebanon: Troubled Past and Bleak Future

[Redacted]

25X1

A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by [Redacted]
the Office of Global Issues and [Redacted]
[Redacted] of the Office of Near East-South Asia
Analysis. It was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council, Defense Intelligence Agency,
and Department of State. Comments may be directed
to the Chief, Near East Branch, Geography
Division, OGI, [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

GI 83-10016
NESA 83-10017
February 1983

Secret

25X1

**Palestinians in Lebanon:
 Troubled Past
 and Bleak Future**

25X1

Key Judgments

*Information available
 as of 27 January 1983
 was used in this report.*

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which targeted both Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian civilian concentrations, has left the 400,000 to 500,000 Palestinians in Lebanon with a bleak and uncertain future. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), some 90,000 of the Palestinians had registered as homeless through early December. Many more are without adequate income because of the death, detention, or deportation of breadwinners and the disruption of their economic system, which was largely organized by the PLO. Most face economic discrimination by all Lebanese factions, and many are threatened with relocation or deportation by Lebanese or Israeli authorities.

Until recently, both Israel and Lebanon had hindered UNRWA efforts to rehouse the homeless. Israel wanted no settled concentrations of Palestinians in southern Lebanon, and Lebanese authorities would prefer that most of the Palestinians leave the country. Following the massacre in September 1982, in the Beirut refugee camps, Israel reversed its position, apparently realizing it would be held responsible for the well-being of the Palestinians in southern Lebanon, and has supported reconstruction of housing in the camps.

The Lebanese Government has expressed its intention to expel all Palestinians who lack proper papers—as many as 250,000, according to one Lebanese official. We believe that only 50,000 to 100,000 actually lack papers; the great majority of Palestinians are registered with either UNRWA or the government, and some have acquired Lebanese citizenship. Any such mass deportation, however, is probably not feasible because no country has indicated a willingness to accept large numbers of Palestinians.

We believe that most of the Palestinians living in Lebanon will remain where they are, relying largely on outside assistance (mainly from UNRWA and from foreign remittances). Physical harassment of the refugees will probably increase if an Israeli withdrawal is not accompanied by the establishment of adequate security for the Palestinians. The Lebanese Government has not yet demonstrated its willingness or ability to protect the Palestinians from their often hostile neighbors and from the Christian militias. In fact, we believe that government-condoned harassment to encourage emigration is likely.

25X1

Secret

*G183-10016
 NES 83-10017
 February 1983*

Secret

25X1

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Key Judgments	iii
Historical Background	1
The Refugee Flow	1
The PLO in Lebanon	1
Palestinian Population	3
Size	3
Distribution	4
Alien Status	6
Palestinians in the Lebanese Economy	7
The 1948 Refugees	7
Post-1967	8
Social Welfare	8
Impact of the Israeli Invasion	9
Displacement of Palestinians	10
Refugee Housing	12
Poor Economic Prospects	14
Outlook	16
Appendixes	
A. Role of UNRWA in Lebanon	17
B. Individual Refugee Camps	19
Figures	
1. Lebanon: UNRWA Refugee Camps	vi
3. Countries Receiving Palestinian Combatants From Beirut	9
5. Lebanon: Areas of Control	13
Tables	
1. Lebanon: Palestinian Population	4
2. Lebanon: Population in UNRWA Refugee Camps	6

25X1


25X1

25X1

Secret

25X1

Figure 1



505626 (544600) 1-83

25X1

Secret

Secret



25X1

**Palestinians in Lebanon:
Troubled Past
and Bleak Future**



25X1

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon last summer has changed but not eliminated the problems created for Lebanon and Israel by the presence of sizable numbers of Palestinians in Lebanon since 1948. Already difficult conditions for the Palestinians have become worse. Tens of thousands are again homeless, and Lebanon remains torn by competing domestic factions and occupied by foreign forces. With the evacuation of the Palestine Liberation Organization combatants from Beirut and the south, the future of the remaining Palestinians has become particularly questionable—as was dramatically illustrated by the massacre at the Shatila and Sabra refugee camps in September 1982.



After tracing the history of the Palestinians in Lebanon, this paper provides background information on their status and role in the local economy. It then assesses the impact of the Israeli invasion on the Palestinian community and explores the prospects for this troubled people.

Historical Background

The Palestinians arrived in Lebanon in three main waves, two associated with the Arab-Israeli wars in 1948 and 1967 and one with the civil war in Jordan in 1970-71. Until the late 1960s, when the PLO wrested control of the refugee camps from the Lebanese Government, the Palestinians were an oppressed group in Lebanon. During the 1970s, their economic and political status improved, but their power was resented by other Lebanese groups.

The Refugee Flow. The first large group of Palestinians—about 50,000 businessmen and professional people who foresaw the impending conflict in Palestine over the UN decision to create Israel—moved to Lebanon in early 1948. Many became well established, particularly in southern Lebanon where they bought land, houses, and small businesses. An additional 140,000 or so refugees fled to Lebanon just before and immediately after the 1948 war to escape harassment and military actions. Most of these refugees were Sunni Muslims or Christians and were

strongly resented by southern Lebanon's backward, largely Shiite population. Within a short time, the majority settled in makeshift camps around Tyre, Sidon, Tripoli, and Beirut where they could maintain their Palestinian identity and find relative security in the hostile environment (figure 1). UNRWA aid to the camps began in 1949 (appendix A).



25X1


The refugee camps were under harsh control by the Lebanese security and military services from the time of their establishment until after the June 1967 war. The Lebanese Government devoted few resources to the well-being and comfort of the inhabitants, considering them a threat to the delicate balance of power among the country's various religious groups.



25X1

25X1

A smaller number of refugees—some 6,000—fled to Lebanon in the wake of the June 1967 war. They tended to congregate with fellow Palestinians in the camps in the southern part of the country, and UNRWA established no new camps to accommodate them. After the defeat of the Arab armies in June 1967, the Palestinians, in preparation for unconventional warfare against the Israelis, began establishing training camps, supply routes, and operational bases. The last major influx—about 30,000 PLO officials, commandos, and family members—arrived in Lebanon after their expulsion from Jordan in 1970-71.



25X1

25X1

The PLO in Lebanon. Establishment of the PLO in 1964 and of its fighting units in the late 1960s helped bring about the first notable improvements in living conditions for the Palestinians in Lebanon. By 1969 the PLO had wrested control of the refugee camps from Lebanese authorities and was improving conditions in the camps, by installing electricity and running water, for example. UNRWA's charter limited its role in the camps to providing education, food, medical services, and some assistance in building



25X1

Secret



Nahr el-Bared camp, Lebanon, 1951

refugee shelters. The UNRWA camps became places to recruit additional commandos for the PLO, which was commencing cross-border operations into Israel.

The PLO's growing power and its attacks on Israeli towns in the Galilee aroused concern in Lebanon and led to violent clashes in 1969 when the Lebanese Army attempted to curb PLO activities in the south. Lebanese Army and PLO representatives, meeting later that year in Cairo, forged the Cairo Accords, which were intended to formalize the presence of the PLO in Lebanon yet prevent it from interfering in internal Lebanese affairs. The PLO, however, reneged on its part of the bargain and increasingly asserted its military and economic control over much of southern Lebanon, especially the so-called Fatah Land on the western slopes of Mount Hermon.

The arrival of the PLO's political leadership and militia from Jordan in 1970-71 created further problems for the Lebanese. As the refugee camps in the

south became armed PLO strongholds, they increasingly became targets of Israeli attacks. Moreover, the strengthening of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon drew the PLO rejectionists² into Lebanese politics, usually on the side of leftist Muslim groups. This involvement aggravated the crisis between Lebanese Christians and Muslims that erupted into the 1975-76 civil war. When the PLO and the leftists appeared to be gaining the upper hand, Syrian President Assad, determined to keep a rough balance of power between the warring factions, intervened on the side of the Christians—an action ultimately approved by the Arab League.

The civil war and Syrian intervention set the PLO back militarily and politically. Although it retained some positions in Muslim West Beirut, the bulk of its

² The PLO is split into two factions: moderate groups (led by Arafat) that disdain involvement in the internal affairs of Arab host countries, and radical rejectionist elements (PFLP, DFLP) that are committed to the elimination of conservative Arab regimes.

Secret

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Refugee Camp Conditions

The UNRWA refugee camps were originally set up on small patches of uncultivated land or on abandoned sites formerly occupied by the French Army. Crowded tent camps with the most primitive of services were gradually improved over the years. Bare earthen floors were covered by cement; tents gave way to shacks, which in turn were replaced by brick and cinder block houses; public latrines were replaced by private facilities; and water distribution systems were installed. Despite these improvements, conditions in the camps are generally simple, and housing is crowded and much inferior to that outside the camps. The camps have come to resemble large villages; small houses set along alley-like streets are interspersed with stores and mosques. In the larger camps, particularly those near Beirut, much of the housing is two or three stories high or higher.

Although facilities have improved, the camps have become overcrowded because most are surrounded by privately owned land. Living space and basic amenities designed for a certain number of refugees are now serving, in some instances, two or three times that number. With the exception of members of the Palestinian resistance movements, who reside in the camps on principle and for military reasons, Palestinians stay in the camps primarily because they cannot afford alternate housing, want to live with their families and cultural group, and are discriminated against in Lebanese society. In some cases, virtually entire villages from Galilee in northern Israel were relocated to sections of refugee camps where they have retained their identity. In addition to the Palestinians, poor Lebanese, mainly Shias from the south, and a few destitute Syrians have moved into the Lebanese UNRWA camps near Beirut because they have been unable to afford other housing.

forces were pushed into southern Lebanon where they became wedged between the Israelis to the south and the Syrians to the north. In 1977 the Arab states made another attempt to bring the Palestinians to heel in southern Lebanon—the Shtawrah Agreement.

Designed to implement a strict interpretation of the Cairo Accords, it would have greatly reduced the Palestinians' freedom of action in Lebanon but, like the Cairo Accords, was never put into practice.

In March 1978 following several Palestinian raids into Israel, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) invaded southern Lebanon and seized a 32-kilometer-wide strip of land between the Israeli border and the Litani River. Subsequently, the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was sent to the area and the IDF withdrew. However, Israel maintained a surrogate presence in the form of the Christian Lebanese militia, under Maj. Saad Haddad, which occupied a narrow strip of land along the Israeli border.

Because the Christian militia and UNIFIL were occupying the area south of the Litani River, the PLO was forced to move north of the river to the An Nabatiyah and Sidon areas. However, it retained a presence in and near Tyre, where there are three large UNRWA refugee camps. Despite the zone separating the Israelis and the PLO, occasional PLO commando infiltrations and shellings of northern Israel continued until July 1981, when a cease-fire was implemented following the heavy Israeli bombing of Beirut.

Palestinian Population

Size. Estimates of the number of Palestinians residing in Lebanon vary greatly. They range from a conservative estimate of 300,000, recently reported by an international relief official, to more than 600,000, a figure quoted by PLO and Israeli sources. We believe that at the time of the 1982 Israeli invasion there were between 400,000 and 500,000 Palestinians living in Lebanon,³ accounting for roughly 15 percent of the country's approximately 3 million people.⁴ We estimate that at least 300,000 of the Palestinians residing in Lebanon are refugees who arrived in 1948-49 or their offspring.

³ This estimate is based on a 1978 assessment by the American Embassy in Beirut of the Palestinian population in Lebanon, updated with 1982 UNRWA figures; it takes into account natural growth and emigration.

⁴ This figure was recently derived by the US Bureau of the Census and is the one we believe most reliable.

Secret

Secret

Table 1
Lebanon: Palestinian Population

Area	CIA Estimate Pre-June 1982	UNRWA Registered 30 September 1982
Total	400,000-500,000	238,663
Beirut	160,000-200,000	83,318
Sidon	80,000- 90,000	55,662
Tyre	80,000- 90,000	59,338
Tripoli	40,000- 50,000	30,561
Bekaa Valley	10,000- 30,000	9,784
Other	30,000- 40,000	

According to UNRWA, about 239,000 of the Palestinians in Lebanon prior to the 1982 Israeli invasion were registered with UNRWA as refugees. An UNRWA field director in 1978 estimated the number of Palestinians not registered with UNRWA at 190,000 to 250,000. Of the unregistered group:

- 100,000 or so—many of them Christians—had acquired Lebanese citizenship, mostly through family connections or bribes.
- 40,000 to 50,000 were registered with the Government of Lebanon's Directorate General of Palestinian Affairs and received some form of welfare benefits, but not from UNRWA.
- 50,000 to 100,000 were not registered with either UNRWA or the Lebanese Government, but have retained their Palestinian identity [redacted]

Distribution. The Palestinian population in Lebanon is concentrated in the south and in the Beirut area (table 1). Over the years large Palestinian neighborhoods have grown up around the refugee camps and in the major towns. Until the recent Israeli invasion, the Palestinians, particularly the PLO, had come to dominate the southern cities of Tyre, Sidon, and An Nabatiyah. They also congregated in some of the smaller towns and villages in southern Lebanon—such as Al Burghuliyah and Adlun (north of Tyre), Arnun (near An Nabatiyah), and Al Ghaziyah (near Sidon). In some cases, particularly in towns such as Arnun, the PLO had ousted the local inhabitants and, [redacted] taken over. [redacted]

In Beirut the Palestinians have tended over the years to congregate in the vicinity of the sprawling refugee camps on the city's south side. Entire neighborhoods and suburbs have taken on a Palestinian character, especially the Fakhani and Ar Ramlah al Bayda quarters in Beirut proper and the suburbs of Burj al Barajinah, Al Awzai, and Khaldah. Smaller clusters of Palestinians have settled throughout Muslim West Beirut, and many who have reached the middle and upper income levels reside in the city's more cosmopolitan Ras Bayrut area (figure 2). [redacted]

Other concentrations of Palestinians have formed in the largely Muslim city of Tripoli in northern Lebanon, as well as in the vicinity of the two large refugee camps there. Smaller clusters live in the Al Biqa (Bekaa Valley), especially in the Balabakk area, and in the Muslim sectors of Lebanon's other cities. [redacted]

As much as one-half of Lebanon's Palestinian population continues to live in the original UNRWA refugee camps. We estimate that, prior to the Israeli invasion, the 11 occupied camps contained from 165,000 to 250,000 residents (table 2 and appendix B); for the same period UNRWA listed 13 camps with nearly 110,000 registered inhabitants.⁵ Evidently, the camps contained large numbers of persons who were not registered as camp residents or even as refugees.


Most of the camps are situated along the coast near major population centers—Tyre (3), Sidon (2), Beirut (3), and Tripoli (2). One small camp is located in the Bekaa Valley at Balabakk. In addition to the official camps, UNRWA also supplies assistance to refugees in several unofficial camps—most notably, the extensive Sabra neighborhood south of Beirut. Another

⁵ Two camps, Dbayeh, north of Beirut, and Nabatieh, in the south, are unoccupied, but are still listed as official camps by UNRWA. Nabatieh was destroyed by Israeli bombing in 1974, and Dbayeh was abandoned because of local fighting in 1978. [redacted]

Secret

4

Figure 2
Beirut and Vicinity



505669 1-83

Secret

Table 2
Lebanon: Population in UNRWA Refugee Camps

Location	PLO Estimate ^a 1975-76	UNRWA Registered ^b 30 September 1982	CIA Estimate ^b Pre-June 1982
Total	144,500-151,500	109,438	165,000-250,000
South of Beirut	114,500-121,500	80,074	130,000-204,000
Beirut Area	48,000- 55,000	19,753	47,000- 93,000
Burj el-Barajneh	18,000- 25,000	10,450	20,000- 40,000
Shatila ^c	25,000	5,865	25,000- 50,000
Mar Elias	2,000	522	2,000- 3,000
Dbayeh	3,000	2,916	0
Sidon Area	34,500	28,294	52,000- 64,000
Ein el-Hilweh	25,000	25,804	50,000- 60,000
Mieh Mieh	4,500	2,490	2,000- 4,000
Nabatieh ^d	5,000		0
Tyre Area	32,000	32,027	31,000- 47,000
Rashidieh	14,000	15,356	15,000- 25,000
Burj el-Shemali	10,000	11,256	11,000- 15,000
El Buss	8,000	5,415	5,000- 7,000
North of Beirut	30,000	29,364	35,000- 46,000
Tripoli Area	25,000	24,678	30,000- 40,000
Beddawi	10,000	8,637	10,000- 15,000
Nahr el-Bared	15,000	16,041	20,000- 25,000
Al Biqa (Bekaa Valley)	5,000	4,686	5,000- 6,000
Wavell (Balabakk)	5,000	4,686	5,000- 6,000

^a These figures are based on two PLO studies: a field study made by the Institute of Palestinian Studies in 1973-74, and an article that appeared in the *Journal of Palestine Studies* in 1975.

^b Estimates are based on figures appearing in the press.

^c Does not include the adjoining Sabra "unofficial" camp, which probably houses tens of thousands of additional Palestinian refugees.

^d UNRWA includes this camp under Sidon, although the camp is located just west of An Nabatiyah. It has not been inhabited since 1974 when it was destroyed by Israeli bombing.

unofficial camp arose amidst the ruins of the former Christian town of Ad Damur. Some 8,500 or more Palestinian refugees who fled the devastation of their former East Beirut UNRWA camps at Tall az Zatar (Dekwaneh) and Jisr el-Basha in 1976 occupied the damaged structures in Ad Damur until the Israelis moved into the area in June 1982.

Alien Status. We estimate that at least three-fourths—or 300,000 to 400,000—of the Palestinians in Lebanon are not citizens and under existing Lebanese law are ineligible for citizenship. Those who fled to Lebanon in 1948 or entered legally in subsequent

years, as well as their offspring, were entitled to register with UNRWA, or the government, and to receive residence permits identifying them as Palestinians. (According to a US Embassy assessment, many nonregistered Palestinians obtained residence permits through bribes.) Palestinians who work or travel abroad are issued special blue-colored Lebanese residence cards and are issued a special Palestinian laissez-passer (a travel document not acknowledging citizenship) by the Government of Lebanon. Whether or not they possess residence permits, Palestinians without citizenship papers are legally denied full participation in Lebanese society. For example, they

Secret

6

25X1
25X1
25X1

25X1

Secret

are excluded from public primary and secondary schools but are allowed to attend universities. Most children attend UNRWA or private schools or, until recently, PLO-operated schools. [redacted]

Intermarriage, which might lead to Lebanese citizenship by Palestinians and their children, has been rare except among Christians. Close social relationships, especially between refugee camp residents and Lebanese, have not developed because of Lebanese hostility toward Palestinians and because of the Palestinians' own desire to retain a separate identity. [redacted]

Most of the estimated 100,000 or so Palestinians who have Lebanese citizenship migrated to the country before or during 1948 or are descendants of these migrants. Some already were Lebanese citizens residing in Palestine;⁶ others had close connections in Lebanon—usually relatives. Bribes were sometimes used to acquire Lebanese names and citizenship, according to a Palestinian scholar, as reported by the US Embassy. However, for the majority of the refugees, citizenship is an unlikely prospect—probably now more than ever. [redacted]

Palestinians in the Lebanese Economy

The 1948 Refugees. The first influx of Palestinians into southern Lebanon in 1948 sparked a revival of the area's agriculture. Farming had been stagnant because local landowners found business in Beirut more profitable than agriculture. The arrival of large numbers of rural Palestinians in 1948, however, provided Lebanese landowners with relatively cheap and efficient agricultural labor, and farming in southern Lebanon began to revive. [redacted]

Like immigrants the world over, the newly arrived Palestinians were anxious to improve their economic status. Few could support themselves solely on the UNRWA-provided rations, and many of the agricultural workers used their meager savings to start small businesses inside the camps or in neighboring towns. Dr. Zvi Lanir, a Tel Aviv University social scientist, claims in an interview in the *Jerusalem Post* that the Palestinians also had access to an illicit source of

⁶ As many as 30,000 Lebanese citizens were employed as migrant workers in Palestine at the time of the 1948 war. When they fled back to Lebanon, UNRWA registered them as economic refugees from Palestine. [redacted]

income: families would draw UNRWA food rations for deceased relatives and sell them for cash on the local market. [redacted]

A few of the Palestinians who have successfully integrated into Lebanese society rank among the country's wealthiest and most prominent businessmen, holding a wide variety of positions in medicine, business, construction, and agriculture. Their prosperity is a matter of resentment among poorer Lebanese, according to many observers. Such Palestinian successes have occurred despite Lebanese Government attempts to limit their economic opportunities. According to official edicts, no Palestinian may take a salaried job without holding a government-issued work permit, which must be renewed annually. After the 1975-76 civil war, which the Lebanese believe was sparked by the Palestinian presence, the government became increasingly selective in issuing the permits. [redacted]

We believe, however, that the restriction on work permits has had little impact. Reconstruction efforts necessitated by civil war strife led the government to make exceptions in the case of construction workers. Until recently, the government's ability to enforce the permit requirement was minimal, especially in southern Lebanon and the Tripoli area, where many Palestinians are concentrated. Even in Beirut, work permits were readily available to Palestinians for the price of a bribe normally paid to the issuing bureaucrat. [redacted]

Informal limits on Palestinian economic activities, especially discrimination by the Lebanese, have probably been more effective. The 1967 crash of the Intra Bank, a large commercial bank founded and run by a Palestinian Christian, is a case in point. Intra Bank had been very profitable, but by the mid-1960s, when political tensions between Palestinians and Lebanese were increasing, it began facing serious financial problems, although these were not widely known. A US Embassy official reported that the Christian-dominated Lebanese banking community spread rumors exaggerating the bank's financial plight and

Secret

Secret

succeeded in panicking enough depositors to cause a run on the bank. As a result, Intra Bank went bankrupt in a spectacular crash. [redacted]

Post-1967. The arrival of more Palestinian refugees after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the emergence of a strong PLO structure after 1970 significantly changed the character of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. PLO spending of a large share of its income among Palestinians in Lebanon brought new prosperity to the camps, causing added resentment among their Lebanese neighbors. [redacted]

Adult males in the camps could earn a monthly income of roughly \$250—equivalent to the going agricultural wage—by enlisting in one of the PLO militias. [redacted] Because additional stipends were paid to wives and children, a family income from the PLO could rise as high as \$1,000 per month. The PLO financed some construction projects in southern Lebanon, such as repairing sewage systems and roads that, according to a wire service report, the Lebanese central government was unable or unwilling to do. [redacted]

[redacted] the PLO also helped refugees improve their living conditions and the infrastructure within the UNRWA camps. [redacted]

The relatively high wages available from the PLO lured many Palestinian workers from the farms, and agriculture in the south again began to decline after 1970. However, even those who continued to work in agriculture benefited from the PLO presence. [redacted]

[redacted] such Marxist-oriented PLO factions as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) bullied the local landowners to improve Palestinian laborers' working conditions and to raise their wages. [redacted]

The PLO earned some money through operating the ports of Sidon and Tyre, which it controlled until June 1982. It collected "customs" duties on all goods entering the ports except, according to a Lebanese Shia source of the *Jerusalem Post*, on those items destined for Palestinian merchants, who undercut Lebanese merchants in the area and made correspondingly greater profits. [redacted]

In our view, a key factor in Palestinian economic development was SAMED, the PLO's economic wing. SAMED is an umbrella organization of numerous PLO-operated businesses, primarily located in Lebanon. SAMED is mainly a device to keep Palestinians employed, although its stated purpose is "to lay the foundation for the economic structure of the future Palestinian state." According to press reports, SAMED businesses include a film studio, numerous furniture and clothing factories, handicraft shops, and other small businesses, which employed about 5,000 people and grossed some \$40 million in 1980. One press report indicated that profits were plowed back into the businesses rather than used to finance other PLO operations. [redacted]

Palestinians in Lebanon also benefited from remittances sent home by working-age male relatives who migrated mainly to Persian Gulf countries, where labor demand has been strong and wages high. In the Gulf the Palestinian workers have faced little of the economic and social opposition they encounter in Lebanon. We estimate that worker remittances totaled about \$300 million annually. This figure is based on a US Embassy estimate of the total 1981 remittances into Lebanon of both Palestinians and Lebanese and on our estimate of the proportion of Palestinians in Lebanon's population. [redacted]

Social Welfare

The PLO had a fairly formal set of social welfare programs for Palestinians residing in Lebanon, and, according to its budget documents, spent roughly \$7 million on them in 1979. Widows and children of dead PLO fighters were entitled to a stipend ("martyrs' payments"), and financial assistance was given to Palestinians wanting to rebuild homes damaged in fighting. [redacted]

Although most of the welfare programs were run directly by the PLO, some were undertaken by the Palestine Red Crescent Society, the Palestinian equivalent of the Red Cross. The PLO and the Red Crescent Society operated a number of schools and paid tuition for some Palestinians to attend other

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1


25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Figure 3
Countries Receiving Palestinian Combatants From Beirut



505628 (A01711) 1-83

schools. [redacted] Red Crescent Society hospitals treated Palestinians—and some poor Lebanese—free of charge. [redacted]

Impact of the Israeli Invasion

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 disrupted the entire Palestinian structure in southern Lebanon and Beirut. PLO strongholds were destroyed and tens of thousands of civilians were dispersed throughout the countryside. PLO fighters trapped in West Beirut were ultimately forced into exile in eight other Arab countries (figure 3). [redacted]

The main targets in the Israeli push north were the crowded Palestinian refugee camps and other Palestinian concentrations in southern Lebanon. [redacted]

[redacted] reports from US officials who visited the area confirm that the Rashidieh and Ein el-Hilweh camps, both PLO strongholds, were particularly hard hit; the latter camp was almost totally destroyed. Suspected Palestinian concentrations in the Tyre and

Sidon areas were also hit, as were concentrations in the towns of Arnun, Al Ghaziyah, Adlun, Wadi az Zaynah, and Khaldah. Khaldah, at the southern end of the Beirut International Airport, sustained heavy damage as Palestinian fighters made a stand there and at the airport. Several wholly Lebanese towns and villages suffered a similar fate; artillery duels between the IDF and Syrian forces in Lebanon's mountainous interior wrought havoc on such towns as Alayh, Bhamdun, and Al Mansuriyah. Most Palestinians in the south between the ages of 16 and 60—the most economically productive segment of the population—have fled, been killed, or taken prisoner by the Israelis. [redacted]

The siege of West Beirut was particularly devastating for the Palestinians. Two months of Israeli shelling and bombing leveled large areas of the southern part of the city and its suburbs. The Fakhani district, Ar

Secret

Secret



Remains of Ein el-Hilweh camp, leveled during the Israeli invasion

Sygma ©

Ramlah al-Bayda, Burj al Barajinah, Al Awzai, and the refugee camps—where the Palestinians lived—were especially hard hit. According to press reports, most of the refugees fled the camps for the relative safety of the Ras Bayrut commercial district where they took cover in abandoned apartment buildings, office buildings, movie theaters, parking garages, and even public parks. The Israelis then pounded “suspect PLO concentrations” in the district. [redacted]

Displacement of Palestinians. Estimates of the number of Palestinians killed, wounded, or made homeless by the Israeli invasion vary widely. Lebanese Government and United Nations sources suggest that 10,000 to 20,000 were killed and tens of thousands were wounded. In December the UNRWA Commissioner General claimed that the number of homeless Palestinians in the Beirut area and in the south numbered about 90,000, of which 55,000 were in the Sidon and

Tyre areas. The Israeli Government, in contrast, reported only 30,000 homeless. Earlier, UNRWA had estimated that an additional 12,000 Palestinians were in the Bekaa Valley and that a few thousand had fled to neighboring Syria. [redacted]

Although some Palestinian refugees fled their camps in the south for safer areas in the Bekaa Valley and northern Lebanon, the majority, we believe, stayed in the immediate vicinity, where they camped in vacated apartments, damaged buildings, store fronts, schools, UNRWA buildings, and groves of trees along the coast. Some refugees have returned to their former homesites in the camps and are living in the remaining habitable shelters while others are rebuilding their small cinder block houses with UNRWA financing.

25X1

25X1
25X1

Secret

Secret



Makeshift tents at temporary Palestinian refugee camp near Sidon, June 1982

Sygma ©

UNRWA estimates that as many as 12,000 refugees have returned to the devastated Ein el-Hilweh camp and, according to press reports, some 6,000 Palestinians have returned to the Rashidieh camp. [REDACTED]

The loss or separation of a large share of adult males from Palestinian families—especially in the refugee camps—complicates the refugee resettlement issue. Those separated include the 8,500 PLO fighters, many of whom were recruited in the Lebanese UNRWA camps where they lived with or near their families before the invasion. An estimated 13,000 others are still in the north and in the Bekaa Valley and may be sent abroad as part of any Lebanese peace agreement. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, an additional 5,300 alleged PLO

members or sympathizers are being held prisoner at the Ansar prison camp near An Nabatiyah (figure 4). Most of the Ansar group are Palestinians, although Israel has announced that it also includes about 1,000 Lebanese and 1,000 non-Lebanese Arabs. According to UNRWA and press sources, most of the Palestinian prisoners are from the refugee camps in the south.

[REDACTED]

Unsubstantiated reports in the Lebanese press claim that Israel intends to deport most of the Palestinian prisoners from Lebanon and wants their families to leave also. Neither the Lebanese Government nor


25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1



official Israeli spokesmen are known to have taken such a position regarding the families of evacuated PLO fighters, but would probably support such a move if it seemed feasible. So far, Arab countries have shown a willingness to accept only a few families of deported fighters, but if all immediate family members were to join an estimated 30,000 actual and potential deportees, the refugee population could be significantly reduced.

Refugee Housing. Providing shelter for the homeless Palestinians in southern Lebanon is an urgent task that has been delayed by confusion over Israeli and Lebanese policies. Initially, Israeli officials in discussions with US Embassy officers insisted that Palestinian civilians in groups of 100 to 200 families be dispersed within Lebanese communities if other Arab countries were not willing to take them. The Israeli

Government announced it would only allow the establishment of temporary camps north of a 40-kilometer security zone bordering Israel. (figure 5). By mid-August it was clear that time was running out, and Israeli officials told US Embassy officers that they feared they would be blamed for any illnesses or deaths resulting from exposure. Thus, in late August, the Israelis relented and announced that temporary tent shelters could be erected by UNRWA within the refugee camps in southern Lebanon.

UNRWA officials then approached the Lebanese Government for permission to clear the camps in southern Lebanon of rubble and to erect tents. According to US Embassy officials, the Lebanese told UNRWA and the United States that permission to

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

establish temporary camps would have to wait until a new government was formed, and UNRWA refused to start work at the sites without a go-ahead from the Lebanese Government. In early October the Government of Lebanon gave its tacit consent [redacted]

When the first tents were erected at Ein el-Hilweh in mid-November, camp residents protested vigorously. They claimed the tents offered only minimal protection from Lebanon's harsh winter weather and provided no security from hostile neighbors. Moreover, many of the refugees, especially the older ones, according to UNRWA reporting, viewed the tents as a return to the abhorrent conditions of 1948-49. The refugees were also concerned about the threat of fire. Nevertheless, UNRWA expected that the refugees would accept the tents when Lebanon's cold, damp, and rainy winter set in. [redacted]

Israel, meanwhile, reversed its earlier position opposing permanent shelters. In November, Economics Minister Yaacov Meridor stated that Israel would permit the rebuilding of solid shelters and would also sell Israeli-produced prefabricated housing and provide one-half ton of cement to each Palestinian family. A few weeks later, Meridor offered each Palestinian family desiring to buy a prefab, produced in Israel or not, \$250 toward the purchase price and a ton of cement for those building their own homes. UNRWA is giving each family \$750, a plot of land, and a tent; large families receive more than \$750 and get a larger plot of land and an extra tent. According to reporting from the US Embassy, the Israeli Government hopes private donations will provide funds to pay for the cement; the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee paid for the earlier Israeli shipments of cement to the refugee camps. [redacted]

Land ownership problems at the refugee camps are hampering the rebuilding. Lebanese whose land was encroached upon by the expanding camps during the past 30 years are reclaiming their property. UNRWA has not conducted a survey of camp boundaries but estimates that there may not be enough space in the camps for 20 percent or more of the inhabitants. [redacted]

An Israeli official told a US Embassy officer that Meridor reversed the ban on solid construction in the camps because the refugees indicated they could erect

Lebanon: Winter Weather

Winter weather is cool and wet along Lebanon's coast south of Beirut, where most refugees are concentrated. In a normal year, rain falls on 10 to 15 days per month from December through March. Despite its frequency, the total four-month rainfall is only five to seven inches. Maximum daytime temperatures average between 60° and 65° F, and rise into the 70's during warm spells. Minimum nighttime temperatures average about 50° F and drop into the low 30's. Snow, which is common on the higher inland elevations, rarely falls in the coastal lowland. [redacted]

better shelters than tents at their own expense. In our view, it was also because Israeli officials realized that the Lebanese Government could not deal with the Palestinian refugee problem any time soon and, in the wake of the massacre at Sabra and Shatila, that the Israeli Government would be held accountable for the welfare of the Palestinians. The US Embassy reported there are rumors that the Lebanese Government objects to solid construction in the camps, but Israeli officials have not gotten nor asked for official word from the Lebanese. [redacted]

Poor Economic Prospects. Because of the Israeli invasion, many Palestinians have lost their primary source of employment and welfare services—the PLO. The shattering of the PLO's military structure and the evacuation from southern Lebanon will cut PLO expenditures in the region substantially:

- Some Palestinians working abroad have pulled their families out of Lebanon as a result of the recent fighting, and President Jumayyil will try to expel as many others as he can. Consequently, Palestinian remittances to Lebanon also will decline over the medium term.
- We believe, based on scattered reports, that most of the SAMED plants in southern Lebanon were destroyed or badly damaged in the summer's fighting, although a press report claims that some have been

Secret

Page Denied

Secret

quietly reopened. SAMED probably intends to retain its enterprises in Lebanon, particularly those still operating in the north. [redacted]

- The departure of the top PLO leadership has probably disrupted PLO social service activities in the Beirut area and in southern Lebanon for now; advance welfare payments were reportedly distributed to cover the period from September to December 1982. State Department reporting indicates that Red Crescent Society hospitals south of Beirut are no longer operating; UNRWA is expanding its medical program to fill the gap. [redacted]

Outlook

Under almost any set of foreseeable circumstances, we believe that most Palestinians will remain in Lebanon, continuing as political and social outcasts. [redacted]

As long as Israel occupies southern Lebanon, most of the Palestinian refugees will probably be allowed to regroup in existing refugee camps. The difficulties encountered in finding other Arab states willing to accept PLO fighters have probably convinced the Israelis that finding homes for Palestinian civilians in these countries—the best solution in the eyes of the Israeli Government, according to US Embassy reporting last summer—is not feasible. The next best solution, in the Israeli view, is integration of the Palestinians into the social and economic fabric of Lebanon, which also poses major obstacles. As long as they control the area containing most of the camps, the Israelis probably will ensure that security as well as minimal standards of housing, sanitation, and medical care are maintained. We believe they will seek to have UNRWA, donors, and private voluntary organizations pay the cost. [redacted]

The Lebanese Government blames the Palestinians for the civil strife of recent years and wants them out of Lebanon. Realizing that expelling them all is impractical, the Lebanese Government, according to its spokesmen, will attempt to deport those Palestinians who lack proper papers. We believe this could be some 50,000 to 100,000, although one Lebanese official said the number may be as high as 250,000. Press

accounts of government searches of the refugee camps in Beirut indicate that the process has already begun. UNRWA officials, according to a press report, claim that 15,000 to 20,000 Palestinians from the Beirut camps had voluntarily left the country by December 1982. [redacted]

Integration of the Palestinians into Lebanese society is implausible because it is opposed by almost all Lebanese, particularly the Christian and Shia communities, according to reporting from the US Embassy. The Palestinians themselves would probably be apprehensive about such a move because they would feel neither accepted nor safe. To the extent the Palestinians use their own financial resources to build homes in the camps, they will not want to lose their investment unless they are offered a better prospect. Many cling to the hope of eventually returning to a Palestinian homeland. [redacted]

If foreign forces withdraw, Palestinians can expect harsh treatment in any areas controlled by the present, Phalange-dominated Lebanese Government. The deeply rooted animosities between the Lebanese and Palestinians make isolated incidents against Palestinians likely, and widespread violence between the two groups cannot be ruled out. Official harassment to encourage emigration probably will include denials of work permits, arrests and detentions, and further destruction of refugee housing at the slightest pretext. Such policies may bring increasing numbers of Palestinian civilians to try to join relatives who were expelled or have settled abroad, but all such attempts will be subject to the policies of the host governments. [redacted]

25X1
25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Appendix A

Role of UNRWA in Lebanon

UNRWA, created in 1948 as a temporary agency of the United Nations by the General Assembly, commenced operations in December 1949. Its mission was to aid the Arabs who fled the areas of Palestine that became part of the State of Israel. The agency's mandate is renewed periodically and was expanded after the June 1967 war to include a new class of refugees—those inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip who fled or were expelled to Jordan as well as residents of UNRWA camps in southwestern Syria. [redacted]

The agency defines refugees as those people and their descendants whose normal place of residence was Palestine for at least two years prior to the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of that conflict, lost both their homes and their means of livelihood and are in need of assistance. Sixty temporary tent camps were established in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan (including the West Bank), and the Gaza Strip. Minimal rations were provided to camp inhabitants, who in 1950 numbered almost a million. UNRWA was later forced to build more permanent shelters when it became clear that few Palestinians would be allowed to reenter Israel. [redacted]

By 1982 the total number of refugees in these countries receiving education and health and relief services had grown to more than 1,900,000. In Lebanon, the agency had 2,377 employees, 85 schools, 23 clinics, and a number of other installations, including the Siblin Vocational Training Center near Sidon, about half of which was destroyed or damaged in the recent fighting. [redacted]

UNRWA is funded by contributions from UN member nations and by donations from a variety of private voluntary organizations. The United States is the largest single contributor, providing \$62 million—about 32 percent of the agency's operating funds in

1981. Although UNRWA is a UN organization, except for its top officials who represent UN member nations, it is staffed largely by Palestinians. In fact, UNRWA is the Palestinians' largest single employer. [redacted]

Statistics based on UNRWA's registration records do not accurately reflect the refugee population. UNRWA has not been able to conduct a population count since 1975, and its published estimates have been affected by unreported deaths and births and extensive population shifts caused by the civil war and later conflicts. Nevertheless, UNRWA's figures have been generally accepted as the most official statistics available on camp populations. [redacted]

Registered refugees, whether or not they live in camps, fall into three main categories:

- "R" - those eligible for all services including basic rations (includes those living in camps: approximately 170,000 in 1981).
- "S" - those eligible for health and education services only (approximately 30,000 in 1981).
- "N" - those registered, but no longer eligible for assistance (approximately 30,000 in 1981).

After the Israeli invasion these distinct categories were suspended for the duration of the emergency period—through June 1983. UNRWA has accepted responsibility for assisting all Palestinian refugees in need—whether or not they were previously registered with the organization. [redacted]

Secret

Appendix B**Individual Refugee Camps****Tyre Area****Rashidieh**

Population: 15,000 to 25,000.¹ This is the largest refugee camp in the Tyre area, and it has been a frequent target of Israeli attacks in recent years. UNRWA estimates that the camp was approximately 60 percent destroyed by the recent Israeli shelling and bombing and by reported IDF dynamiting of bomb shelters and bulldozing of corridors along the main streets. According to press reports and UNRWA sources, most of the remaining housing suffered varying amounts of damage and some of the UNRWA service buildings were severely damaged. The UNRWA secondary school remained intact and temporarily housed hundreds of refugees. According to camp residents, casualties were minimized because most residents fled to the nearby beach and orange groves after being forewarned by the Israelis of the impending attack on the camp. [redacted]

Relief assistance has been provided largely by UNRWA, which estimated that by mid-October approximately 6,000 refugees had returned to Rashidieh to repair their dwellings; others have moved into the Burj el-Shemali and Ein el-Hilweh camps. At that time living conditions were extremely crowded—as many as 25 to a room—and there was no electricity or water. Water service is now being restored, but there is still no electricity. The nearby pumping station at Ras al Ayn, hit by the Israelis in their attack on adjacent anti-aircraft positions, was put back into operation with temporary pumps supplied by UNICEF. According to press reports, most of the male residents between the ages of 16 and 60 were taken prisoner by the Israelis, leaving mostly women, children, and the elderly to shift for themselves. A limited cleanup operation, aimed at clearing the rubble for new shelters, began in early October and was completed by the end of December, according to UNRWA officials. [redacted]

¹ Preinvasion estimates. [redacted]

As of mid-December, little reconstruction had begun at Rashidieh because of the residents' continued fear for their security. According to UNRWA officials, the refugees are afraid of venturing outside the isolated camp and are apprehensive that they will come under the control of Saad Haddad's militia after the Israelis withdraw from the area. [redacted]

Burj el-Shemali

Population: 11,000 to 15,000. This camp was often a target of Israeli air raids and shelling during the 1970s, and in more recent years was shelled by Saad Haddad's Christian forces. During the Israeli invasion, it suffered the least damage of the three UNRWA camps in the Tyre area, probably because of its location east of the main Israeli advance. About 35 percent of its shelters were destroyed. UNRWA officials reported that their service buildings also sustained some damage. No figures are available, but casualties probably were light because of the forewarning of the Israeli attack. According to UNRWA, some 7,500 refugees, including some from Rashidieh, were living in Burj el-Shemali in July 1982. They mainly included the elderly, women, and children under age 16. Rubble clearing, hindered by the steep terrain, has been completed and reconstruction has begun. [redacted]

El Buss

Population: 5,000 to 7,000. About 50 percent destroyed. Damage to UNRWA facilities was extensive and included the loss of a vocational school, a food service facility, and a handicraft center. According to press reports, about 40 residents were killed. Families have reportedly doubled up in the habitable shelters. UNRWA estimated in mid-October that 3,500 refugees (elderly, women, and children under 16) were living in these remaining shelters and amidst the rubble. Since then, rubble-clearing operations have been completed. [redacted]

Secret

Secret

Sidon Area**Ein el-Hilweh**

Population: 50,000 to 60,000. Ein el-Hilweh, the largest UNRWA refugee camp in Lebanon, according to UNRWA and other sources, was virtually razed. UNRWA's nearby Siblin Vocational Training Center also was heavily damaged. The Israelis found that the center was used as a PLO military training facility; a large cache of explosives and weapons as well as PLO training manuals were uncovered there. An UNRWA investigation verified the findings. [redacted]

Estimates of Ein el-Hilweh's prewar population vary widely, but all are higher than the UNRWA figure of 26,000 registered camp inhabitants. IDF spokesmen have given estimates of 30,000 to 40,000, while UN camp medical officers claimed that the population of the camp and adjacent areas was close to 70,000.

Lebanese officials in Sidon reported the population at about 60,000. The higher figures probably included nearby Palestinians who did not actually reside in the camp. Casualties at Ein el-Hilweh were probably high because of the heavy fighting there. Many residents fled to the coast north of Sidon at the mouth of the Awwali River. UNRWA officials indicate that about 12,000 elderly residents, women, and children made their way back to the camp and were living amidst the ruins in mid-October. They live in fear of their Lebanese neighbors, especially since the Shatila-Sabra massacre and the earlier destruction at the neighboring Mieh Mieh UNRWA camp. Rubble clearing to allow the erection of tents was completed by the end of November and reconstruction of housing is well under way. [redacted]

Mieh Mieh

Population: 2,000 to 4,000. This small camp within the Christian village of Al Miyah wa Miyah escaped with little or no damage during the fighting. However, the lower section of the camp was destroyed by the Phalangists in August. There were no casualties, but the burning of some 150 shelters left 800 additional refugees homeless. Fearing the return of Christian forces, many residents temporarily fled to the nearby Ein el-Hilweh camp or to Sidon. UNRWA estimated

the camp's population at nearly 2,600 in mid-October. The camp residents' fears of further violence have been heightened since early December when the IDF turned over responsibility for camp security to Haddad's militia. [redacted]

Nabatieh

Population: 0. Nabatieh was destroyed by Israeli shelling and air attacks in 1974 and has not been rebuilt because of repeated shelling in subsequent years by the Israelis and Haddad's Christian militia. Some 75 families returned briefly to the camp in 1978 but fled once again in the face of the Israeli invasion that year. Although UNRWA had 4,039 Palestinian refugees registered at Nabatieh until 1981, we believe most were residing in nearby towns and villages and in temporary shelters in the Sidon and Beirut areas. [redacted]

Beirut Area**Burj el-Barajneh**

Population: 20,000 to 40,000. This major PLO stronghold, located some 2 kilometers north of the Beirut airport, was more than 50 percent destroyed by more than two months of heavy Israeli bombing and shelling. Most of the camp's civilian residents fled to the relative safety of West Beirut north of the Corniche Mazraah; some seized empty or vacated apartments, and others took refuge in garages, office buildings, and public parks. As these Palestinians left, Shiite Muslims, fleeing the fighting in the south, moved in. We believe the camp may still house some of these Shiite refugees as well as Palestinians who returned after the shelling ceased. [redacted]

Burj el-Barajneh had 10,450 UNRWA-registered Palestinian refugees in 1982, [redacted] press reports [redacted] support a much higher number. In addition, primitive housing has grown up on all sides of the camp, most of which, we believe, is occupied by Palestinian refugees. Although the mid-September massacre was confined to Shatila-Sabra, the effect on refugees in this nearby camp has been

Secret

20

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

traumatic. Alarm recently spread among camp residents when the Lebanese Armed Forces began rounding up Palestinians for interrogation. American press reports state that 500 to 600 people—illegal aliens, [redacted] were arrested at Burj el-Barajneh in early October. [redacted]

Shatila and Sabra

Population of each: 25,000 to 50,000. This sprawling refugee complex on the southern outskirts of Beirut may now be the largest refugee camp in Lebanon. Shatila is the official UNRWA refugee camp; the Sabra area, just south of Shatila, is not an official camp. Shatila, although smaller in area, may contain a larger population, as most of its shelters are multi-storied. UNRWA listed only 5,865 refugees there in 1982, but [redacted]

[redacted] the camps and their environs housed many thousands of additional refugees. Apparently, a sizable number of Lebanese civilians (probably Shias) also live in the camps. [redacted]

Shatila-Sabra, a PLO stronghold [redacted] sustained damage during the Israeli siege of West Beirut. Children living at the Islamic Home for the Invalid and Retarded, located within the camp's confines, were evacuated by Mother Teresa to a convent in East Beirut during the Israeli siege. [redacted]

The vivid memories of the massacre on 16-18 September cause camp residents to live in fear that the Phalangist and/or Haddad militiamen will return to kill more refugees. Despite the presence of Italian troops of the Multinational Force (MNF), many refugees flee the camps at night to sleep with friends or in destroyed or abandoned buildings near the camp. [redacted]

Mar Elias

Population: 2,000 to 3,000. A small, predominantly Christian Palestinian refugee camp comprised of three separate small sectors. It is located near the UNESCO compound and the Soviet Embassy and is the only refugee camp within the Beirut city limits. The camp suffered minimal damage during the two-month Israeli siege, but according to press reports was

heavily shelled when the Israelis entered West Beirut in September. No casualties were reported, but some 35 families were made homeless, and the Mar Elias Greek Orthodox Church and its school sustained heavy damage. Reportedly, the camp housed no PLO fighters or arms. Press reports claim many of the camp's residents fled to the nearby Lebanese Army barracks during the attack. Most have since returned. The camp is now guarded by the Lebanese Army as well as French MNF troops. [redacted]

Dbayeh

Population: 0. The only UNRWA camp left in the northeastern Beirut area. The camp's 2,000 to 3,000 predominantly Christian Palestinians fled in 1978 when clashes broke out between the Syrians and Phalangist militias. Displaced Lebanese Christians, in turn, occupied the shelters and apparently still live there. Nevertheless, UNRWA continues to carry the camp on its rolls. Most of the Palestinians who fled moved to the Shatila camp where they were living at the time of the Israeli invasion. [redacted]

Tripoli Area

Beddawi

Population: 10,000 to 15,000. Although located in northern Lebanon near Tripoli, Beddawi has occasionally been a target of Israeli reprisal raids and sustained some damage during the 1975-76 civil war. An Israeli air raid in early June 1982, as well as later clashes in the area between the PLO and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), probably inflicted some damage. [redacted]

Fatah military forces may be stationed at Beddawi; a unit of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) also reportedly has an office there. [redacted]

UNRWA has reported that some 2,000 to 3,000 Palestinian refugees from southern Lebanon fled to the Tripoli area; it is likely that some are doubling up with refugees at the Beddawi camp. [redacted]

Secret

Secret**Nahr el-Bared**

Population: 20,000 to 25,000. The larger of the two UNRWA camps in the Tripoli area. We believe the camp houses some of the 2,000 to 3,000 refugees from southern Lebanon that UNRWA claims are in the Tripoli area. It also contains an office of the PFLP and probably some PLO fighters. In past years the camp has been the occasional target of Israeli reprisal raids, and in early June 1982 it suffered some damage from Israeli bombing. The camp probably will remain a target for the IDF and for the LAF as long as PLO forces remain there. [redacted]

Bekaa Valley**Wavell**

Population: 5,000 to 6,000. The only UNRWA Palestinian refugee camp in the Bekaa Valley. Located on a former French military base at Balabakk in Syrian-held territory, the camp is not believed to have been directly involved or damaged in the recent round of fighting. According to UNRWA, the camp has become a refuge for many Palestinians who fled southern Lebanon in the early days of the invasion.

UNRWA estimates that there are some 20,000 Palestinians in the Balabakk area, including about 9,000 recent arrivals. Not all of these are living in the Wavell camp; many have taken refuge in schools and other uninhabited structures in the area, including the famed Roman antiquities. [redacted]

Others**Bayssarieh**

Population: 0. An undeveloped site near the town of Al Bisariyah on which UNRWA planned to build a new camp. It was intended that the camp would accommodate the 8,500 refugees displaced from the Tall az Zatar and Jisr el-Basha UNRWA camps in Beirut during the 1975-76 civil war. These refugees were squatting in the damaged housing in Ad Damur before the Israeli invasion. The site was not developed because it is on rocky slopes too steep for construction of shelters. [redacted]

Ad Damur

Population: 8,500 to 14,000. A Christian town prior to the 1975-76 civil war and a PLO stronghold from then until June 1982. Now under Israeli occupation, the town has been reinhabited by many of its former Christian residents. Ad Damur never was an official UNRWA refugee camp, but until June 1982 the agency provided rations for 8,500 refugees living in the town's damaged structures. UNRWA reporting suggests that several thousand additional refugees lived in and around the town. Most of these refugees had fled the Tall az Zatar and Jisr el-Basha UNRWA camps in 1976 when the Christian Phalange militia shelled the camps and reportedly massacred 1,500 to 3,000 residents. In June 1982, heavy Israeli shelling inflicted additional damage, and the refugees were forced to flee again—this time back to Beirut. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Secret