




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# Pakistan: Identity Dilemma and Islamic Revitalization



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A Research Paper

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NESA 83-10027  
February 1983

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# **Pakistan: Identity Dilemma and Islamic Revitalization**



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**A Research Paper**


This paper was prepared by   
Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis. Comments  
and queries are welcome and may be addressed to  
the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA, 



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**Pakistan:  
Identity Dilemma and  
Islamic Revitalization**

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**Key Judgments**

*Information available  
as of 6 January 1983  
was used in this report.*

President Zia's Islamization concept, which is designed to attain what he calls "Islamic Democracy" by restructuring Pakistan's political, economic, and social institutions along more traditional lines, will weaken as the movement's inconsistencies become apparent and opposition to it mounts. Zia, a pious but pragmatic politician, will gradually moderate his Islamization program to try to broaden its appeal beyond the growing middle class. As long as Islamization remains on a moderate course, it will not provoke major changes in US-Pakistan relations.

Zia will encounter major obstacles and growing opposition as he tries to guide Pakistan on the course of Islamization:

- He lacks the charisma to spark a Khomeini-style religious revolution.
- The Pakistani population is too diverse, its special interests too numerous, and its sense of nationhood too undeveloped for a groundswell of support for Islamization to arise.
- Regional and ethnic differences, as well as the presence of a sizable Shia minority, hinder the cooperation necessary to carry out the program.
- Large segments of the population—including businessmen, industrialists, professional people, large landowners, and key bureaucrats—are resisting the program.
- Replacing Western-style economic and judicial systems with Islamic ones is difficult.
- The Islamic clergy, which plays a key role in implementing Islamization at the local level, lacks popular support among villagers and farmers.


Neither the conservative religious parties nor the fundamentalist student groups—which support the goal of a rigorous Islamic state—have the support among the populace to force Zia to accelerate Islamization. If, however, the Zia regime is replaced by a more conservative Islamic one, a cooling, at least temporarily, of relations with the United States and the West would ensue, but such a regime would not follow the Iranian pattern in rejecting the United States.

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**Pakistan: The Revitalization Model**



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**Pakistan:  
Identity Dilemma and  
Islamic Revitalization** [redacted]

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President Zia-ul-Haq's program to achieve "Islamic Democracy" through "Islamization"—the restructuring of Pakistan's political, economic, and social institutions along traditional Muslim lines—is, in our view, the latest attempt to solve the longstanding identity dilemma that has plagued Pakistan since its creation in 1947. Historically, Pakistani leaders have been unable to find a symbol strong enough to unite a country comprising five ethnic groups that speak 32 distinct languages. Religion was the primary criterion used to carve Pakistan from India, but conversion of a religious belief into a guiding principle for a modern state has continued to be elusive. In the five and a half years since the coup that toppled the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Zia has tried to defy the odds—with moderate success—by gradually introducing Islamic reforms to transform Pakistan into a cohesive nation based on a traditional Islamic model. [redacted]

**Development of Pakistan's Identity Dilemma**

*Vague Beginnings.* Although Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, had successfully harnessed Islamic symbols and slogans to forge a nation separate from predominantly Hindu India, he was unable to transform the symbolism into structured policies and programs once Pakistan had been created. Students of Pakistan believe that the harsh practical realities of the postpartition period forced the country's political leaders to devote their energies to the survival of the state rather than to pursuit of an Islamic identity. Settlement of 7.5 million Muslim refugees from India, conflict with India over Kashmir, Muslim-Hindu communal rioting in the Punjab, and emigration of 5.5 million Hindus and Sikhs from West Pakistan to India contributed to a breakdown of law and order that left the survival of the new nation in doubt. The death of Jinnah a year after partition and the assassination of his successor, Liaquat Ali Khan, less than two years later intensified the fragile condition of the new state. [redacted]

*Raising Doubts.* According to academic specialists, doubts within Pakistani society that led to Zia's revitalization movement began and grew from three

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***A Model for Religious Revitalization***

*Analytical psychologists and anthropologists theorize that the loss of a people's identity is one of the major causes for the widespread return to traditional religious values in the Third World today. They believe that infusion of foreign, particularly Western, ways has led to a serious deviation from indigenous cultural values. They further theorize that the resulting unsettled social conditions have set the stage for creation of religious revitalization movements, particularly in the Muslim world, which seek to reinforce group identity along more traditional religious lines.*

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*Analytical psychologists have discovered a pattern that both societies and individuals follow when seeking to resolve an identity dilemma. Anthropologists incorporating these psychological theories have analyzed the process, which they call revitalization, that societies use to establish a new and more satisfying self-image.* [redacted]

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*According to their theory, revitalization movements strive to bring coherence to a society by eliminating those foreign cultural traits that appear to inspire self-doubt and by combining those values that are left, foreign as well as indigenous, into a more orderly cultural structure. Revitalization movements usually portray the society's new identity in dogmatic statements that, in the society's view, cannot be challenged.* [redacted]

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*Just as the original identity dilemma contributes to social instability, the revitalization movements tend to be destabilizing. The movements usually soften their early dogmatic stance by reincorporating some of the cultural traits expelled in the initial restatement of identity. Thus, the final phase of a revitalization movement is usually a balance between the social stability that existed before revitalization and the narrowly restated identity that occurred at the height of revitalization.* [redacted]

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major setbacks to Pakistan's quest for a national identity (see the chart):

- The violent anti-Ahmediya disturbances in the Punjab in 1953.
- The nine-year struggle to frame the national constitution of 1956.
- The civil war and subsequent loss of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971. [redacted]

The demonstrations against the small (less than 1 percent of the population), but politically and economically powerful Ahmediya sect resulted in a declaration by the government that the Ahmediyas were not Muslims and not entitled to full rights of Pakistani citizenship. The demonstrations and ensuing declaration, based on the charge that the Ahmediyas were heretics because they believe Muhammad was not the final prophet, led to the establishment of a national court of inquiry to determine the true nature of Islam. The ulama (religious scholars) who testified before the court could agree only that the Ahmediyas were not Muslims. In our view this lack of consensus on the nature of Islam emphasizes the difficulties that Zia faces in implementing Islamization today. [redacted]

The protracted debate accompanying the drafting of the constitution of 1956 further underlined the nearly intractable differences between Islamic traditionalists and modernist reformers. The nine years required to reach a compromise revealed the lack of any clear model for an Islamic state or any systematic method of introducing Islamic principles into a workable political system. As a result of the debate, the constitution confined Islamic principles to the preamble and to a clause stipulating that no law could be contrary to Islamic law (sharia) or tradition. [redacted]

The loss of East Pakistan in the civil war of 1971, combined with already troublesome regional, ethnic, and linguistic differences, added to popular doubts about the basis of Pakistan's nationhood. [redacted]

A conference of leading Pakistani academic figures was convened at the University of Islamabad in 1973 to probe the basis of Pakistan's identity in light of the loss of the eastern wing. The participants failed to offer workable ways to solidify a sense of nationhood and made only vague recommendations to establish

"a new Pakistan" based on a renewed and reinforced emphasis on Islam in the writings of traditionalists and fundamentalist political thinkers. [redacted]

**Renewed Doubts.** We believe that the regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, which came to power in 1971, failed to overcome Pakistan's identity dilemma through a religiously based revitalization of society largely because of the popular perception that Bhutto, a modern secular politician with a bent toward socialism, was not committed to his religious platform. He advocated "Islamization" of Pakistan's political and economic system in response to an ulama ruling that socialism was heretical and that the growing power of the religious parties should be encouraged. According to his critics, Bhutto tried to increase his appeal to Muslim traditionalists solely out of political expediency. These charges, whether valid or not, served to unify the opposition religious parties into a political coalition, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). [redacted]

Bhutto attempted unsuccessfully to curb the growing strength of the PNA by stressing Islamic themes in speeches and by implementing measures such as outlawing alcoholic beverages, gambling, and night clubs. His religious opponents, however, dismissed these overtures to Islam as politically motivated stop-gap measures and accused him of rigging the national elections of March 1977. Unable to quell the street violence after the election rigging charges, the Bhutto government fell to a military coup in July 1977. [redacted]

In his first speech after taking office as Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Zia set the tone for a more rigorous Islamic revitalization by saying that "Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will survive only if it sticks to Islam." Thus was born Zia's "Islamization" program. [redacted]

**Plan for Revitalization: Zia's World View**

We believe that Zia's design for Islamization springs from his personal experiences (see box). Unlike his predecessors, who were members of the Westernized elite, Zia is a member of the indigenous, inward-focused middle class. [redacted]

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**President Zia: A Profile**

India Today ©

- *Born in East Punjab in 1924 into the Arain caste, a low-status caste of small landholders.*
  - *Inherited deep religious beliefs from his father, who was a civilian clerk for the Royal Indian Air Force and active in religious affairs.*
  - *Left college to join the British Indian Army and was commissioned as "emergency officer" in 1945. Failure to attain his military education from the prestigious Indian Military Academy set him apart from regular officers.*
  - *Served in Jordan in 1969-70 as armor adviser to King Hussein.*
  - *Commanded Pakistan's 1st Armored Division and then the II Corps from 1972 until 1975.*
  - *Named Chief of Army Staff (Pakistan's highest military post) in 1976.*
  - *Led a successful coup against Bhutto in July 1977; named Chief Martial Law Administrator.*
  - *Assumed the presidency in September 1978.* [redacted]
- 

[redacted] he has no great liking for, or understanding of, Western political traditions. [redacted] a genuinely pious Muslim with no wish to "modernize" his religion. [redacted]

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[redacted] Zia's religious convictions have grown stronger during his more than five years in office. His intense religious faith, [redacted] [redacted] has given him the courage to stick to his course of Islamization. [redacted] [redacted] he regarded his appointment as Chief of Army Staff as an "act of God" and interpreted the successful surgery on his youngest child, who is chronically ill, as a sign from God to lead Pakistan toward a more Islamic way. [redacted]

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According to US Embassy and scholarly analyses, support for Islamization is centered among Pakistanis from backgrounds similar to Zia's—the growing middle class, often called the vernacular elite, which comprises bazaar merchants, small industrialists, professionals, middle-level civil servants, military officers, university students, and small landowners and clergy. This group, with its strong emphasis on traditional values, stands to gain most from Islamization and is most eager to establish a national identity based on a religious model. Members charge that the Westernized elite, which had played such a key role in supporting Zia's predecessors, does not represent Pakistani society and is a deterrent to attaining a satisfactory national self-image. [redacted]

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Unlike Iran, where the Islamic revolution has been propelled by a charismatic leader, Zia—despite his religious zeal—has refrained from trying to build a cult of personality. Instead, in our opinion, he believes that the Islamic model has universal appeal in Pakistan and that the country can be transformed into an Islamic state through decree and institution building (see table 1). [redacted]

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**Implementing Revitalization: The IIC and the FAC**  
Zia has organized two institutions—the Islamic Ideology Council (IIC) and the Federal Advisory Council (FAC)—to facilitate the transition to a new Islamic order. Shortly after he ousted Bhutto in 1977, Zia

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**Table 1**  
**Pakistan: Status of Islamization**

Measure	Description	Action Thus Far	Comment
Islamic prohibitions	Bans alcoholic beverages, night clubs, usury, Western dress by government workers, gambling; advocates seclusion of women.	In force	Designed to "cleanse" Pakistan society of foreign influences.
Huhud ordinances	Prescribes punishments for certain crimes according to the Koran, such as stoning to death for adultery, amputation of a limb for thievery.	Proclaimed in 1977	Punishments not yet upheld by higher civil courts. Shariat court ruled stoning un-Islamic, but decree could be reversed.
Namaz	Five daily prayers, one of "five pillars of Islam."	In force	Government offices break for prayers; department heads lead prayers.
Shariat courts to try all cases	Civil and criminal cases to be tried under Islamic law.	In progress	Any Muslim citizen can challenge any law as being un-Islamic under shariat system; ulama (Islamic scholars) to sit on bench; courts to operate without lawyers.
Friday replaces Sunday as weekly holiday	Friday is traditional Muslim holiday.	In force	Businesses are free to stay open on Friday but must close for noon prayer and mosque attendance.
Urdu declared national language	Urdu replaces English as language of government, education, and mass communications.	In force	Slow process: bureaucrats and educational leaders trained in English; measure seen as step backward by Westernized elite.
Daawa-Islamic education	Spread message of Islam.	Promulgated June 1982	\$1 million to be spent to teach principles of Islam in schools and universities.
Qarz-e Hasna	Financial assistance to promising indigent students.	In force	\$500,000 initially earmarked; to be increased to \$1.5 million in 1982-83.
Create national and Islamic identity	Create new education curricula and textbooks based on Islamic model.	In progress	Progress expected to be slow; no consensus of view on Islam.
Zakat	Compulsory alms tax for the poor, one of "five pillars of Islam," introduced nationally on small scale.	In force	Mandatory zakat of 2.5 percent per annum levied on all institutional savings of \$100 or more; raised to \$200 in 1981. Through March 1982 total collections of \$160 million distributed to orphans, widows, handicapped, disabled, and poor students. Shia Muslims, whose interpretation of zakat differs from new law, are exempt.
Ushr	Tax on agricultural produce.	In effect with winter 1982/83 crop	To be collected from landholders; tax to be 5 percent of value of produce (less 10 to 25 percent cost of production); non-Muslims, non-Pakistanis, those who receive zakat, and those who produce less than 5 wasqus (about 430 pounds) are exempt.

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Table 1 (continued)

Measure	Description	Action Thus Far	Comment
Musharika	Interest-free working capital loans to be provided.	New measure June 1982	A "temporary partnership" between customer and bank; profits to be distributed, after payment of management fee, to customer according to ratio agreed on by both parties.
Leasing and "hire purchase"	Interest-free investment instrument introduced to open industrial investment to persons of limited means.	New measure June 1982	Under leasings, customer pays bank rent for use of industrial equipment; under hire purchase, payment includes portion for acquisition of ownership as well as rent.
Small Business Finance Corporation	Provides financial assistance consistent with Islamic principles of finance to small industrial concerns.	In effect	Currently provides up to \$15,000 to industrial concerns with assets up to \$50,000. Loan limit is to be raised to \$50,000 with assets of \$150,000.

[Redacted]

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reinstated the Islamic Ideology Council, which had been established by the constitution of 1973, as the principal instrument to implement, institutionalize, and give sanction to Islamization. Zia charged the IIC, which has no power to enforce its recommendations, with the following tasks:

- To steer the country in the path of correct Islamic practices in all fields.
- To test current legal statutes for their conformity with Islamic law and practice.
- To advise the government on those laws and practices that would implement a truly Islamic society.

[Redacted]

The IIC has taken stands on religious issues independent of—and often in conflict with—President Zia which, in our opinion, impairs its effectiveness as a revitalization tool. We believe that its independent views, well to the right of Zia's more pragmatic approach to an Islamic state, have gained it a reputation within the government for making radical political, economic, and social recommendations that would require revolutionary change to implement. Zia, according to Pakistani press reports, has rejected some IIC recommendations:

- An Islamic political system that would have permitted opposition political parties.

- The total Islamization of the banking system.
- The plan for a national education system. [Redacted]

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The 350-seat Federal Advisory Council, which fulfilled Zia's pledge to convene a representative consultative body, first met in January 1982. It is, as Zia said in a speech inaugurating the Council, an interim body designed to encourage the building of his planned "Islamic Democracy" and eventually facilitate the transition to civilian rule. It, like the IIC, has no legislative authority. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] the FAC lacks the independent credentials of the IIC and merely endorses proposals. Embassy reporting indicates that its membership is composed of Zia's allies and that members are either from the right of center or are from the moderate ranks of the old Pakistan People's Party. Religious figures outnumber all other categories of members, but large landowners and tribal leaders also have disproportionately large representation. Leftists have been excluded, and potential opposition groups such as labor leaders, journalists, and lawyers have only token representation. [Redacted]

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**Highlights of the Islamic Ideology Council's  
Recommendations for an Islamic Political System**

- *Adult franchise should be pro-Islamic.*
  - *Female franchise should be allowed, provided women observing purdah may designate a proxy.*
  - *Rights of non-Muslims to vote should be forfeited if they act in a manner derogative to Islam or the Islamic state.*
  - *Voters should be 21 and literate.*
  - *Political parties should be allowed, but only if they demonstrate firm faith in Islam and the ideology of Pakistan.*
  - *Government should be federal; regional divisions should be elevated to provincial status in order to "do away with political prejudices."*
  - *The president should be male, Muslim, sane, and at least 40. He may serve up to three five-year terms.*
  - *Legislative powers should rest with a National Assembly made up of 60 elected members, 25 representing trades and professions, 15 chosen by the president, and seats guaranteed for non-Muslims.*
  - *The president should be bound by the Assembly's decisions.*
- 

In our opinion, the FAC is clearly under the thumb of Zia, but his claim that the Council represents the Koranic injunction for consultation between leaders and followers helps to legitimize his martial law regime. The FAC gives the appearance of representative government without the danger of the people's actually making or enforcing decisions. The Islamic nature of the FAC is emphasized in news coverage by the government-controlled *Pakistan Times*.

In addition to the shortcomings of the IIC and the FAC in carrying out their missions, we believe that other cracks in Islamization are beginning to show as

the economic and social programs based on an Islamic model are put into practice.

**Adaptation: Opposition and Inconsistencies Revealed**

We believe that Pakistan's revitalization through Islamization has reached the stage labeled by anthropologists as "adaptation," which characteristically occurs when a society, upon implementing the revitalization plan and discarding foreign institutions and values, begins to uncover inconsistencies and gaps in the plan. On the basis of the theoretical revitalization model, the patterns of other revitalization movements, and events unfolding in Pakistan, we expect Zia to encounter major obstacles and growing opposition as he tries to guide Pakistan through this process of renewal.

**The Opposition.** The chief opposition to Islamization comes from the formerly powerful elite—bureaucrats, businessmen, industrialists, lawyers, large landowners, and Westernized women—who not only are losing their political influence but believe that they stand to lose their wealth and customary lifestyle as well. According to US Embassy reporting, most members of this group are nonpracticing Muslims who resent the restrictions such as the prohibition of alcohol that Islamization has already imposed on their behavior. According to Embassy reporting, the Westernized women are among the most vocal opponents of the restrictions—such as limiting women to teaching or nursing—that Islamization has introduced.

The US Embassy does not believe that Zia can count on even the tacit support of religious conservatives. The Embassy, as well as Pakistani academic sources, believes that Zia's policies fall far short of the conservatives' goals for an Islamic state and that, consequently, the Islamic parties may increasingly move into open opposition to the regime in order to assert leadership over the masses and fundamentalist student groups. Left-of-center political parties and Shias form other significant centers of opposition to Zia.

We believe that the bureaucracy is one of the major obstacles to attainment of a state based on Islamic principles. It has tried to curb the influence of the religious conservatives—the IIC and the religious

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parties—in order to head off challenges to its own political hegemony and, we believe, with at least Zia's tacit approval, to bar a more radical road to Islamization. According to Embassy reporting, a group of senior bureaucrats under the leadership of Finance and Planning Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan has slowed the pace of Islamization by obstructing IIC proposals. [redacted] Ishaq's reluctance to enforce zakat (the Islamic alms tax) and an interest-free banking system ensures that both measures will fail. [redacted]

**Islamic Economics: Ideals Meet Reality.** In our view, the three key ingredients of an Islamic economic system that have already been introduced on a small scale as part of Islamization—zakat, ushr (tax on farm production), and interest-free banking—would all pose severe drawbacks if they formed the basis of a contemporary economic system:

- The US Embassy in Islamabad reports that Pakistanis already complain that zakat is regressive and that wealthy Pakistanis are able to avoid payment by circumventing the collection system. We believe that even pious Muslims who agree with the concept of zakat would resist paying compulsory zakat administered by local bureaucrats because they believe that it should be given voluntarily.
- Government officials at both national and provincial levels are skeptical that ushr can be implemented as an official government tax:
  - The officials point out that replacement of the present land revenue system by a locally administered tax would remove national and provincial government influence at the village level.
  - Local committees, lacking the statistical data to calculate the tax, would be unable to allocate the ushr payments equitably.
  - Local groups would feud over the value of crops and amounts to be paid for ushr.
- According to Embassy reporting, the experiment with interest-free banking, which began in 1980, is already faltering. The amount deposited in profit-and-loss-sharing accounts has leveled off at about

35 percent of total bank deposits, foreign as well as Pakistani, in the country. (Since foreign banks are not required to conform to Islamic laws, they have been thriving.) [redacted]

**Confusion in the Legal System.** We believe that replacement of the present Western-style judicial system with an Islamic system of justice, as envisioned under Islamization, would encounter opposition from the legal establishment. The legal establishment, according to Embassy and press accounts, scorns the shariat court system, shies away from Islamic legal reforms, and seeks to legitimize existing Western-style practices and codes by reinterpreting Islamic law. The courts have resisted imposing Islamic punishments such as lashings, amputations, and stonings for criminal offenders. [redacted]

Even if this judicial change was accomplished, we expect that the lack of restrictions on cases tried by the shariat court would lead to confusion, legal bottlenecks, and to an overloaded system. The shariat courts have the authority to rule on the petition of any citizen on the repugnancy to Islam of any law except the constitution. [redacted]

**Antimullah Feelings.** In our opinion, the rise of the village mullah (Muslim clergy), whose power has been heightened by Islamization, will ultimately work against Islamization. The mullahs, according to many observers, have never been popular. Farmers and villagers regard them as puppets of the landlords and parasites on the local community. Since features of Islamization at the local level such as zakat distribution and enforcement of codes of behavior are influenced by the mullah, we expect that the movement could backfire as the unpopular clergy tries to exert more control. [redacted]

**Regional Rivalries.**<sup>1</sup> We expect regional and ethnic rivalries, which remain a major factor in Pakistan's identity dilemma, to hinder the cooperation necessary

[redacted]

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to carry out Islamization. Resentment of Punjabi domination of the government has often been expressed by the minority groups (principally Sindhis, Baluch, and Pushtuns). According to academic sources, Islamization is seen by the minorities as one more move by the Punjabis (who comprise 55 percent of the population) to maintain the dominant political role that they have held since the birth of Pakistan. [ ]

**Sunni-Shia Secular Differences.** We believe that traditional Muslim sectarian tensions will continue to work against successful Islamization. Tensions between the Sunnis and Shias, who comprise less than 10 percent of the total Pakistani population, have often erupted into violence. According to Embassy reporting, although the Shias support in principle Zia's moves toward a more Islamic state, they believe that the Sunni-dominated government discriminates against them, fear that Islamization will have a Sunni bias, and have already resisted many of the points of Islamization:

- According to the Embassy, the Shias staged protest demonstrations against zakat in Islamabad in 1980 on the grounds that their beliefs did not oblige them to pay the state-sponsored tax. They have since been exempted from zakat.
- The Shias have also been exempted from ushr, although they did not actively lobby against it.
- Shias complain that they are underrepresented on the Federal Advisory Council and on the Islamic Ideology Council, according to Embassy reporting.
- Shias claim that they have been unable to express their religious views on radio or television and that the media offend their religious sensitivities. Their dissatisfaction on this issue sparked a massive protest in Islamabad in July 1980. [ ]

#### Conservative Disarray

There are two conservative segments of society—the religious parties and the fundamentalist student groups—that support Islamization and normally would be major factors in favor of its success. Both, however, support a more rigorous model for an Islamic state than Zia and a more radical approach to

achieve it, and we believe that Zia sees them as more a detriment than a help in achieving his Islamization goals. [ ]

In our view, disarray among conservative religious parties, which have long advocated establishment of an Islamic state, hinders Islamization because they are unable to agree among themselves on how to attain their common goal (see table 2). They all oppose foreign influence and advocate broader use of the sharia, but none has set forth an explicit model for an Islamic state nor plans on how to attain it. [ ]

We also believe that the rightwing students, who would prefer a tougher Islamization program, lack the organization and support to do much about it. Our Embassy reports that a number of fundamentalist students regard Zia's regime as being un-Islamic and that they believe that Zia has been exploiting Islam for his own political purposes by announcing plans to introduce Islamic measures and then implementing them only superficially or not at all. [ ]

[ ] the students are fragmented regionally and polarized politically, split about equally between the right and left. The Islami Jamiat Tulaba (IJT), the best organized and potentially the most troublesome group, has been restrained by pro-Zia leaders in the Jama'at-i-Islami (JI), its parent political party. [ ]

We believe that the IJT's recent success in campus elections indicates that the organization has considerable attraction for many of Pakistan's young elite. It dominates most campuses in the Punjab and has shown its determination to hold power by stockpiling weapons, intimidating political opponents and university administrators, and fixing student elections. Despite its attraction among the students, we believe the IJT lacks an issue that would galvanize off-campus support unless Zia retreated significantly on Islamization and lost the support he currently enjoys from the vernacular middle class. [ ]

#### Outlook

We do not believe that President Zia will be able to resolve Pakistan's identity dilemma through Islamic revitalization. In our view, the Pakistani population is

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**Table 2**  
**Pakistan: Major Islamic Parties and Sects**

	Ideological/Theological Leanings	Comment
<b>Parties</b>		
Jamiat-ul-i-Islam (JUI)	Membership composed of orthodox Sunnis of Hanafi school.	Appears to be strongest among tribes.
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP)	Emphasis on mystical elements of Islam and worship of saints and shrines.	Broad following among uneducated rural and urban lower class; tends to be anti-intellectual and anti-Shia.
Jama'at-i-Islami (JI)	Advocates return to Koran and traditions of the Prophet and first four Caliphs; doctrine consistent with extremist Wahabis of Hanbali school.	Smallest of Islamic parties; greatest support from "vernacular elite"; believed to be loosely tied to Muslim Brotherhood in other Islamic countries; alleged to receive financial support from Saudi Arabia.
Islami Jamiat Tulaba (IJT)	Student wing of the JI.	Attracts young elite; well organized, has demonstrated willingness to confront authorities; Zia government appears to have no effective control over IJT.
<b>Sects</b>		
Ahl-e-Hadis	Most puritanical of Pakistani sects; advocates strict application of Koran and traditions of the Prophet.	Not politically active, but has place on Islamic Ideology Council and representation on Federal Advisory Council equal to JUI, JUP, and JI.
Nadvis	Seeks moderate Islamic course between puritanical Ahl-e-Hadis and Hanafi orthodoxy	Not politically active, but has seat on Islamic Ideology Council.
Tehrik-i-Nifaz-Jaffaria	Shia Muslim organization.	Supports Islamization with reservations; antagonistic toward three leading religious parties, each of which exploits anti-Shia prejudices among Sunnis.

too diverse, its special interests too numerous, and its sense of nationhood too undeveloped for a groundswell of support to arise. We believe that resistance to the elements of Islamization that have already been initiated such as zakat, ushr, interest-free banking, and traditional dress in government offices indicates the problems that Zia will encounter if he continues to promote the program. Pakistan's difficulties in establishing a cohesive national identity over the course of its 35-year history support our thesis that Zia faces major obstacles in tying national identity to an Islamic model. [redacted]

While we agree with other observers that Islamization enjoys strong appeal among Pakistan's vernacular

middle class, we believe that this group is not yet strong enough to parlay its support into political power. We expect resistance from other groups within the society—ranging from Westernized elites and bureaucrats to peasants—to continue to work against implementation of all or specific facets of Islamization and to dampen Zia's hopes for creation of an "Islamic Democracy." [redacted]

Although their influence is ebbing, we expect the Westernized elite and the upper echelon of the bureaucracy to continue to lead the opposition to Islamization. Members of these groups have traditions

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deeply rooted in British intellectual and legal institutions and see Islamization as a threat to their interests. The bureaucracy has already dragged its feet in implementing many of the measures of Islamization, and we expect no change in its attitude.

Even though we project a dim future for Islamization as perceived by Zia, we nonetheless believe that he will continue to press for additional measures to mold Pakistan to his design for an "Islamic Democracy." We believe that his own religious convictions as well as support and pressure from the vernacular middle class and conservative groups such as the students will keep him on this course. For this reason and because of the ripple effects of the worldwide Islamic "resurgence," we expect Pakistan to continue to incorporate more Islamic ways and institutions into its political and economic fabric for the foreseeable future. We do not believe, however, that these changes will trigger widespread support for an Iranian-style Islamic revolution.

We do not believe that either the conservative religious parties or the rightwing students have the organization or support to overthrow Zia, let alone to follow an Iranian model to achieve an Islamic state. In our view, Zia would have to falter dramatically on his Islamization course to unify rightwing opposition and to galvanize support from other groups that currently support Islamization. We also expect that opposition from the Westernized segment of society as well as Pakistan's undeveloped sense of nationhood would work against the replacement of the Zia regime by a fundamentalist one.

In our view, a moderate course to a more Islamic society would not necessarily trigger changes in Pakistan's foreign policy detrimental to the West. We would expect, however, a cooling of relations with all non-Muslim countries as Pakistan establishes its Islamic credentials and builds closer ties with other Muslim states. As long as the United States maintains good relations with key Muslim countries, particularly with Saudi Arabia, and avoids a high profile in Pakistan, we would not expect the evolution of a more Islamic society in Pakistan to impair Islamabad's relations with the United States.

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***Pakistan Versus Iran:  
The Basic Differences***

*In addition to the factors that prevent a successful identity renewal through religious revitalization, we believe that four other social and economic features of Pakistan distinguish it from prerevolutionary Iran and work against a successful Islamic revolution along the Iranian model:*

- *Religious groups in Pakistan are more divided—both between and within the Sunnis and Shias—than in Iran.*
  - *Pakistan has no religious or spiritual capital, such as Qom in Iran, to concentrate religious dissent.*
  - *Zia, unlike the Shah, is from the lower middle class and understands the values and needs of the shopkeepers, government servants, minor clerics, and other members of this class. Unlike their Iranian counterparts who provided the muscle for the revolution, they have benefited from Pakistan's economic development and support the regime.*
  - *Pakistan's economic development and accompanying cultural change have been neither as far reaching nor as threatening to the traditional classes as they were under the Shah.*
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