



Directorate of
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~

MASTER FILE COPY
DO NOT WRITE OUT
OR MARK ON



25X1

Poland: Jaruzelski's Use of the Military as a Political Instrument



25X1


An Intelligence Assessment

~~Top Secret~~

EUR 83-10069C

March 1983

Copy 251



25X1

Page Denied



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

Top Secret





25X1

Poland: Jaruzelski's Use of the Military as a Political Instrument




25X1

An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by 
Office of European Analysis. It was coordinated with
the Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, East
European Division, 

25X1

25X1

This assessment is the first in a series of planned
research papers analyzing key aspects of the Polish
situation. Other assessments will examine the
prospects for Solidarity, the status of the economy,
and the standing of the Communist party in its
quest to recover political primacy. 

25X1



Top Secret

EUR 83-10069C

March 1983

25X1

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Poland: Jaruzelski's Use of the Military as a Political Instrument




25X1

Key Judgments

Information available as of 21 January 1983 was used in report.

Despite the "suspension" of martial law in Poland on 30 December 1982, the military's involvement in civilian political, and administrative matters has not, in our view, diminished significantly. Even the Military Council of National Salvation, the country's highest authority under martial law, will oversee the return "normalcy." Many military commissars continue to oversee key factories and government offices, and most of the military officers Jaruzelski appointed to government and party posts remain in place.



25X1


The political role of the armed forces predates martial law. As then Defense Minister Jaruzelski took over first as Premier and then as party First Secretary, he began appointing trusted military colleagues to key positions in the civilian bureaucracy. The imposition of martial law in December 1981 gave Jaruzelski even more extensive powers, which he subsequently used to place military commissars throughout the country's administrative and economic structures, give local defense committees more power, and create an armed forces inspection commission for civilian provincial officials. he believes that he alone can pull the country out of its economic and political malaise, that Poland's civilian bureaucracies must become more responsive and effective, and that the military establishment should be a model and instrument for such reform.



25X1

25X1

After a year of military rule, we conclude Jaruzelski probably is satisfied with his success at throttling Solidarity and maintaining order. But he may be disappointed that his extensive efforts have failed to significantly improve government efficiency. The general must still rely heavily on civilian bureaucrats—many of whom are strongly entrenched and opposed to change—to help run the country, and this has stymied his efforts at administrative reform.



25X1


The military's continuing political involvement, meanwhile, has created problems that we believe Jaruzelski may not have fully expected. Because of the repression associated with military rule, public respect for the Polish People's Army has, we believe, declined. This probably has further weakened the morale of soldiers already affected by the political and social



Top Secret

EUR 83-10069C

March 1983



25X1

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

upheaval of the last two years. [redacted] there has been increasing friction between Communist party officials, who have lost authority and perquisites, and many military officers, who have become disgusted with the incompetence and corruption in government and party offices [redacted]

25X1

25X1

If Poland remains calm, we believe Jaruzelski will lift martial law officially this summer, but will try to preserve much of the military's political role to pursue his unfinished agenda. We expect that he will try to deflect mounting pressure from party hardliners and from Moscow to restore the party's political supremacy, but also will have trouble trying to reform Polish civilian institutions. The longer the military remains involved in running the country, moreover, the more likely it is to be drawn into the traditional methods of Polish Communist bureaucracies, which twice since the war have thwarted reform drives. [redacted]

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Poland: Jaruzelski's Use of the Military as a Political Instrument



25X1

The imposition of martial law in Poland was a desperate move by a Communist regime to maintain its power, and it deviated from a central ideological precept of military subordination to the Communist party.¹ The party leadership, judging from its actions, recognized that because of Solidarity's considerable popularity, political strength, and ability to disrupt the economy, any move to throttle the union required a massive, well-coordinated plan involving all the regime's instruments of control. Under strong Soviet pressure to take action and with the party and government in disarray and disrepute, the party leaders concluded, we believe, that the armed forces were the only institution with enough power, prestige, organization, and discipline to impose such a plan.

The Military Tradition

In our view, many of the civilian (and military) leaders clearly hoped that respect for the armed forces would mitigate popular opposition to martial law. Poles have traditionally considered their military, along with the Church, a guarantor of nationhood and a repository of Polish nationalism. This esteem dates especially from 1918, when Polish armed forces brought the country its independence after 150 years of foreign occupation. Marshal Jozef Pilsudski, whose military exploits made him the virtual embodiment of Polish patriotism and statehood, drew the Army into a political role by ruling the country essentially as a dictatorship with military participation and support.

25X1

25X1

We believe the option of martial law attracted widespread support within the top political leadership. Party hardliners had all along argued publicly for a forceful move against Solidarity, apparently calculating that such action would quickly lead to their assumption of power. Soviet pressure long had been directed at moves to squelch Solidarity and to reassert regime control. By the fall of 1981, in the face of escalating demands by Solidarity, the moderates seemed finally to reconcile themselves to martial law as preferable to Soviet military intervention. Immediately before the declaration, liberal Politburo member Kubiak told a US Embassy officer that if Solidarity did not retract its political demands the resultant chaos would necessitate emergency measures.

The Communist officer corps, which emerged after World War II under tight party control and with Soviets installed in top-level command positions, had to work hard to restore a measure of the respect its predecessors had enjoyed. Its prestige began to rebound in the mid-1950s, largely because of former party leader Gomulka's removal of Soviet officers from the ranks and the new stress on professionalism and operational expertise. The armed services recovered even more during the next two decades as pay and educational levels improved and pre-Communist military music, insignia, and other symbols were revived. In mid-May 1981, a countrywide poll by the semiofficial newspaper *Kultura* listed the military as the most respected national institution after the Catholic Church and Solidarity.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Deputy Premier Rakowski, a moderate tasked with handling government relations with Solidarity, grew increasingly embittered by what he considered Solidarity's failure to keep its promises and became convinced by December 1981 that it was impossible to reach a compromise with the union.

Soviet influence in the Polish armed forces, we believe, has gradually diminished over the last generation. Many of the senior officers who began their careers in the Soviet Army or Soviet-organized Polish units and received their early training from Soviet


25X1

¹ In the case of Poland, the Polish United Workers Party.

25X1



Top Secret



25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1



Base 505077 (547779) 4-82

officers probably continue to look to the Soviet lead. But, in our view, the more junior officers, who have received most of their professional training at Polish military schools, are much less Soviet-influenced. Poland usually sends no more than about two dozen

officers annually to the Soviet General Staff Academy, and in recent years it has sent about half that number. Many graduates,

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] regard such schooling primarily as a necessity for career advancement and not a particularly worthwhile experience. Some [Redacted] resented what they believed was second-class treatment by their Soviet mentors. [Redacted]

the enthusiasm waned when it became apparent the military could not bring about many quick or basic solutions. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Martial Law Functions

The martial law decree of 13 December 1981 drew the armed forces much further into the political arena. The provisional Military Council for National Salvation, a group of high-ranking officers primarily from the General Staff and major commands, became on paper the nation's supreme policymaking body. The National Defense Committee, an existing government organization responsible for national security policy, was designated the Council's executive arm, and an extensive hierarchy of military commissars was established to carry out its orders.² Military officers were assigned to oversee the administration of each of Poland's 49 provinces and most large cities and towns. More than 500 commissars were subsequently given responsibility for monitoring over 800 enterprises. [Redacted]

25X1

Pre-Martial Law Involvement

In the months immediately preceding martial law, the military became increasingly involved in civilian administration, largely because of Jaruzelski's assumption of the top government and party positions. Upon becoming Premier in February 1981, Jaruzelski appointed Gen. Michal Janiszewski to head his staff and subsequently selected three proteges for key ministerial posts—Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak as Minister of Internal Affairs, Gen. Czeslaw Piotrowski as Minister of Mines, and Gen. Tadeusz Hupalowski as Minister of Administration. After becoming Communist party First Secretary in October 1981, he selected Brig. Gen. Tadeusz Dziekan and Col. Jerzy Wojcik to direct the Central Committee's personnel office. [Redacted]

The martial law decree gave military courts considerable latitude with most serious violations of civil law, including treason, illegal use of firearms, and crimes against public order. The courts also enforced a decree "militarizing" more than 200 large industrial plants—requiring workers to comply with orders as in wartime. The original list of militarized enterprises [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

The armed forces also took on some unusual roles in developing and testing contingencies for declaring a "state of war." [Redacted] military planning for martial law began as early as December 1980. [Redacted]

the military's deployment of "special operations groups" throughout the country in the fall of 1981—ostensibly to alleviate serious food and energy shortages and to aid local officials in maintaining order—was primarily to test popular reaction to its increased involvement in trying to solve the country's problems. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

² The National Defense Committee, an organ of the Council of Ministers, is Poland's highest authority for national security matters both in times of peace and war. The prime minister is the ex officio chairman of the committee, while the minister of defense, the party secretary for ideological affairs, and the chairman of the State Planning Commission are the ex officio deputy chairmen. Other members include key ministers (for example, foreign affairs, foreign trade, and maritime economy) and the chief of the General Staff. The General Staff of the Armed Forces plays the predominant role in the committee's work because it generally initiates and formulates its resolutions. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Popular reaction to the military's expanding role in these months apparently was favorable, especially in rural areas, judging by the recollections of an Army major who headed one of these groups. In an October 1982 issue of the party weekly *Polityka*, the officer said that initially the populace eagerly expected the military groups to solve local problems and satisfy personal grievances. The major added, however, that [Redacted]

[Redacted] Under a 1967 law, the National Defense Committee heads a nationwide hierarchy of subordinate defense committees and has the right to place special representatives in "state administration" and the economy. The Military Council used this provision to create the system of military commissars. [Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

Table 1
Military Officers in Key Party Posts and Provincial Governorships

Party Positions	
Director of Personnel, Central Committee	Brig. Gen. Tadeusz Dziekan
Deputy Director of Personnel, Central Committee	Col. Jerzy Wojcik
Chief of the Chancery, Central Committee Secretariat	Col. Boguslaw Kolodziejczak
Poznan First Secretary	Brig. Gen. Edward Lukasik
Provinces	
Bydgoszcz	Col. Jozef Musial (Deputy)
Elblag	Col. Ryszard Urlinski
Gdansk	Maj. Gen. Mieczyslaw Cygan
Kalisz	Col. Kazimierz Buczma
Katowice	Maj. Gen. Roman Paszkowski
Koszalin	Col. Zdzislaw Mazurkiewski
Lodz City	Maj. Gen. Jozef Kowalski
Radom	Col. Alojzy Wojciechowski
Tarnobrzeg	Col. Boguslaw Jazwiec
Warsaw City	Maj. Gen. Mieczyslaw Debicki
Wloclawek	Brig. Gen. Tadeusz Gembicki
Zielona Gora	Col. Walerian Mikolajczak

included all transportation and communication facilities, and some port complexes and military armaments factories; the decree allowed for the addition of other factories. [redacted]

The armed forces' subsequent involvement in administering the country, in our view, became considerably more pervasive than the martial law decree required:

- Military officers were placed in key governmental positions at all levels. [redacted] senior officers were brought in to oversee every governmental ministry and agency—even every department within the ministry that directs local governments. Almost a dozen senior officers were appointed governors of provinces, including Gdansk, Katowice, Radom, and the city of Warsaw. And active, retired, and reserve officers, according to the

Table 2
Selected List of Provincial Military Commissars

Provinces	Commissars
Elblag	Col. Jozef Caputa
Gdansk	Col. Zenon Molczyk
Konin	Col. Tadeusz Ryba
Warsaw City	Maj. Gen. Wladislaw Mroz
Krakow	Brig. Gen. Leon Sulima
Tarnow	Brig. Gen. Tadeusz Belczewski
Przemysl	Col. Stanislaw Jedrzejec
Katowice	Col. Czeslaw Piekart
Bialystok	Col. Leon Siemionczyk
Pruszkow	Capt. Lechoslaw Zapart
Olstyn	Col. Jan Turkan
Poznan	Brig. Gen. Piotr Przybyszewski
Czestochowa	Col. Rusonia
Koszalin	Brig. Gen. Witold Niedek
Gorzow	Maj. Gen. Jan Sosnicki

Polish press, played important roles in staffing the nationwide Citizens' Committees for National Salvation, regime-created mass organizations intended to generate support for the martial law regime. [redacted]

- Jaruzelski appointed Col. Boguslaw Kolodziejczak as staff chief of the party Central Committee, a move which we believe has allowed him to oversee that body's day-to-day activities and [redacted] reflected Jaruzelski's continuing practice of placing reasonably competent, but malleable, subordinates in key positions. [redacted]

- The activities of several military bodies clearly became very wide ranging. Some provincial defense committees (the local arms of the National Defense Committee) organized "worker inspection teams" to investigate the efficiency of local governmental offices and the distribution of agricultural products. And the number of special operations groups established in the fall of 1981 increased. According to the

Top Secret

Top Secret
[REDACTED]

25X1

Polish press, more than 2,000 groups, each composed of four to five soldiers, were charged with making detailed inspections of farms and factories. They were redispached temporarily in late November 1982, largely, we believe, to reassure Jaruzelski that local political, economic, and security conditions were conducive to an easing of martial law restrictions. [REDACTED]

- A new military inspection commission, created in March 1982, emerged as a powerful instrument for checking on provincial administrative activities and removing ineffective party and governmental officials. Directed by the Armed Forces Inspectorate and, according to the Polish press, operating under the close supervision of Jaruzelski, the commission eventually comprised some 130 "examiners," including officials from the government's ministry for local affairs and the party's Central Auditing Commission. By the end of November 1982, the commission had investigated 10 provinces, handing out fines and reprimands to numerous officials and recommending the dismissal of others. In most cases, the inspectors presented provincial officials with lists of problems and demanded that the officials work out timetables for dealing with the issues. We know that in two provinces, for example, the failure of officials to act on commission recommendations prompted Jaruzelski to dismiss both governors and their key deputies, one of the provincial party leaders, and some senior administrative employees and factory managers. [REDACTED]

Shared Power

Despite its substantial political role, the military in our view was not able to use its expanded powers to dominate totally the civilian institutions. Rather, it became an additional participant in the chaotic Polish political process—usurping some party and government powers, but often, [REDACTED] arbitrating between strongly entrenched local bureaucracies. [REDACTED]

The Military Council, despite its supreme decision-making power under martial law, seems to have focused its attention on short-term, internal security issues. Polish press reporting indicates that most of its deliberations during the martial law period concerned



Logo of the Military Council of National Salvation

25X1

internees, curfews, and other issues related to emergency restrictions. The Council has rarely dealt with economic policy, although it has often "discussed" the country's economic situation. [REDACTED]

25X1

The Council's apparent reluctance to become involved in political and economic issues probably reflects its lack of expertise in these areas. Most members are senior professional military men who have long held command and staff positions in the Ministry of Defense or the operational forces. Although all are party members and a few belong to the Central Committee, they, like other senior officers, have not been actively involved in internal party politics or government administration. Several officers may have worked with factories producing military equipment, but even they probably never faced the range of issues that routinely confront civilian economic managers. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

We believe that the party's Politburo and Secretariat have continued to be involved in decisionmaking to varying degrees, with the Secretariat perhaps retaining more of its influence because of its day-to-day involvement in the execution of policy. The Politburo's influence on decisionmaking, in our view, may have been much less than usual, if only because divisions between hardliners and moderates over

25X1

25X1

Top Secret
[REDACTED]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Table 3
Military Council of National Salvation

General of the Army Wojciech Jaruzelski, Chairman	First Secretary, Polish United Workers' Party; Chairman, Council of Ministers
Lt. Gen. Florian Siwicki	Director, Office of the Minister of National Defense; Acting Minister of National Defense; Chief of the General Staff
Lt. Gen. Jozef Urbanowicz	Deputy Minister of National Defense for General Affairs
Lt. Gen. Eugeniesz Molczyk	Deputy Minister of National Defense; Chief, Main Inspectorate of Training
Lt. Gen. Tadeusz Tuczapski	Deputy Minister of National Defense; Chief, Inspectorate of Territorial Defense
Lt. Gen. Jozef Baryla	Deputy Minister of National Defense; Chief, Main Political Administration, Ministry of National Defense; recently named next Prosecutor General of the Armed Forces
Lt. Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak	Minister of Internal Affairs
Lt. Gen. Zygmunt Zielinski	Chief, Main Cadre Directorate, Ministry of National Defense
Lt. Gen. Tadeusz Hupalowski	Minister of Administration, Local Economy, and Environmental Protection
Lt. Gen. Czeslaw Piotrowski	Minister of Mining and Power
Maj. Gen. Michal Janiszewski	Chief, Office of the Council of Ministers
Maj. Gen. Tadeusz Krepski	Commander, Air Forces
Maj. Gen. Longin Lozowicki	Commander, Air Defense Forces
Vice Adm. Ludwik Janczyszyn	Commander, Naval Forces
Maj. Gen. Wlodzimierz Oliwa	Commander, Warsaw Military District
Maj. Gen. Jozef Uzycki	Commander, Pomeranian Military District
Maj. Gen. Henryk Rapacewicz	Commander, Silesian Military District
Brig. Gen. Jerzy Jarosz	Commander, 1st Mechanized Division
Brig. Gen. Edward Poradko	Chief, Military Security Service
Col. Miroslaw Hermaszewski	Cosmonaut
Col. Tadeusz Markarewicz	Commander, Ministry of National Defense Support Units

25X1

many political and economic issues—but not on the imperative of maintaining control—have prevented it from reaching agreement. In addition, several key government officials and bodies may have acquired increased influence on top-level policymaking, especially in the economic sphere. Deputy Premier Obodowski, for example, has added to his responsibilities for short-term economic planning the long-term planning portfolio and the chairmanship of the Economic Planning Commission. [redacted]

The influence of the Internal Affairs Ministry, in our view, expanded considerably under martial law, both because Jaruzelski relied on it heavily to maintain control and because it was successful. Jaruzelski avoided extensive use of the armed forces to quash

strikes and demonstrations, primarily we believe out of concern for the reliability of its lower ranks and the preservation of its reputation. Instead, he allowed the Ministry significant latitude in squelching dissent and disorders with its secret police and internal security forces. A party official told the US Embassy last fall that police officials often played an important role in local-level decisionmaking, and sometimes—as in the case of Gdansk and its governor (an army general)—provincial authorities and local police officials came into direct conflict over policy issues. To ensure that the Ministry remained under his control, Jaruzelski

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret
[REDACTED]

25X1

*Wojciech Jaruzelski*

selected as its director General Kiszczak, a man with considerable experience in military security matters.

[REDACTED]

The military's arrogation of power at the local level seems to have varied considerably from locality to locality, with the party, government, and police bureaucracies wielding differing degrees of influence. In some regions, provincial military commissars aggressively asserted their control over the local party and government bureaucracies. Col. Tadeusz Ryba, for example, said in an interview with a Polish newspaper that he fired nearly 30 factory and government office managers in Konin Province in his first three months as provincial commissar. On the other hand, some officers, like a former commissar in a small town in Silesia, apparently had little influence over the local administration, either because of bureaucratic resistance or apathy. This officer candidly told a Polish journalist in October 1982 that as a commissar he had no appreciable effect on the "business as usual" attitude of local bureaucrats. In general, however, all

commissars asserted their full authority in the area of greatest immediate concern to the martial law regime—order in the factories and the streets. [REDACTED]

25X1

Jaruzelski's Personal Power

25X1

Although the armed services as an institution have not wielded absolute power in the governance of Poland, Jaruzelski as its leader has had no serious rival. Having held the top party, government, and military positions since before 13 December 1981, in our view he clearly used the military's expanded role under martial law and the disruption of traditional power relationships to consolidate his personal political position. [REDACTED]

25X1

We believe Jaruzelski's accumulation of power was facilitated by his firm control over the top levels of the armed forces. He acquired that control, following his appointment as Minister of Defense in 1968, by

Top Secret
[REDACTED]

25X1

Top Secret

[redacted]

25X1

gradually placing a number of loyal associates in key positions. Most notable of these, [redacted] [redacted] are the Acting Defense Minister, General Siwicki; Deputy Defense Minister General Baryla; two Military District Commanders, Generals Uzycki and Oliwa; former Defense Ministry staff chief (and now staff director for the Premier) General Janiszewski; and Defense Ministry personnel chief General Zielinski. He also eased out of positions of authority some senior officers—like Generals Sawczuk and Urbanowicz—who [redacted] says, posed potential threats to his position [redacted] while Jaruzelski was Minister of Defense he was criticized by some senior officers both for his occasional indecisiveness and for specific decisions, but his overall leadership of the military was never seriously challenged. [redacted]

old colleagues whose attitudes no doubt complement and reinforce Jaruzelski's own basically cautious approach. It also has included three civilians whom we regard as political moderates: Deputy Premiers Rakowski and Obodowski, and party Politburo member Barcikowski—reportedly a close personal friend.

25X1
25X1

[redacted]

25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1

Results of Military Rule

The martial law authorities did a good job of fulfilling their main goal—throttling Solidarity. The union, which once claimed almost 10 million members, could do little to oppose the imposition of martial law and was unable to mount significant protests in response to its legal abolition in October. We believe the military regime's success reflects the priority that the authorities gave to suppressing strikes and demonstrations. They intimidated most would-be strikers in the factories by firing those who participated in job actions and by arresting union activists who tried to organize protests. They stifled demonstrations with overwhelming force and effective crowd-control tactics. According to the US Embassy, the internal security services infiltrated Solidarity so thoroughly that they thwarted its communications and sowed considerable confusion. The arrest of a leading underground union leader just days before scheduled demonstrations in October, for instance, significantly disrupted union preparations. [redacted]

25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1

Because of his control over the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, Jaruzelski in our view has dominated the Military Council, despite [redacted] the representation in it of a range of political views and loyalties. [redacted] a few—most notably Generals Molczyk and Urbanowicz—owe their positions to their relationships with Soviet officials, a majority of the Council members are beholden to Jaruzelski. [redacted] Generals Siwicki, Hupalowski, and Oliwa—recognize the need to take Soviet concerns seriously, but nonetheless place Polish national interests ahead of Moscow's predilections. At least one member—Deputy Defense Minister Tuczapski—has been vocally anti-Soviet. [redacted]

The military regime, however, made little progress in finding long-term solutions to Poland's economic problems. Although it was able to stem the decline in industrial production and impose substantial price increases without significant popular reaction, the economy is stagnant and seems unlikely to rebound any time soon. Western economic sanctions made the regime's tasks more difficult, further reducing imports of already scarce raw materials and spare parts. Jaruzelski has withheld full implementation of some much-heralded economic reforms, in part, we believe, because the economic situation remains poor and because the reforms have encountered stiff bureaucratic resistance. [redacted]

25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1

After the imposition of martial law, Jaruzelski further centralized power in himself. [redacted] he made many decisions only after debating the options with a small group of close advisers drawn from the party, government, and armed forces—a practice he no doubt still follows. [redacted] this informal directorate probably has comprised about eight people who represent a cross section of political attitudes and bureaucratic interests. [redacted] Jaruzelski has deliberately included people expressing a range of opinions, but that moderates predominate. The directorate has included, among others, Generals Siwicki, Kiszczak, and Janiszewski,

Top Secret

[redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Jaruzelski encountered obstacles and delays in the political arena as well. Even with the military's wide-ranging involvement, especially in the state administration, he was not in our view able to impose discipline on the government or party bureaucracies or significantly improve their efficiency—particularly below the national level.

[redacted] Polish media have

25X1

admitted openly that the movement has experienced problems in developing credibility among the populace

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] the

considerable power many military commissars at first exercised over government administrators waned after a few months, and many local bureaucrats eventually returned to their old ways of doing business. Jaruzelski, moreover, was unable or unwilling to devote much attention to revamping party organs. Just one provincial party chief—in Poznan—was replaced by a military officer, and that appointment,

The limited success of the military regime in coping with Poland's political and economic difficulties has made it sensitive to criticism about the qualifications of some of its officers. An article in a military periodical in September 1982 took great pains to discount "rumors" and leaflets depicting military commissars as rural and poorly educated. Polish media have tried to portray commissars and officers appointed to civilian posts as ombudsmen and professional managers making the system work. Many officers have realized their shortcomings.³ Reports from the US Embassy and the Polish press indicate that some have expressed surprise at the complexities of managing a province or town. One local commissar complained that the job was impossible because of the need to deal with so many centers of power and policymaking—the party, the Military Council, the Army, and ministries of the national government.

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] was essentially an effort to dampen local bureaucratic infighting. Furthermore, Polish media reports indicate that the personnel replacements brought about by the military inspections did not include many local party officials.

The regime probably underestimated the difficulties or time involved in trying to clean out provincial party and government offices. We believe the military inspections, although seemingly comprehensive, were slower than planned. In press interviews, some members of the commission expressed astonishment at the extent of the corruption and inefficiency they encountered. We believe that the unforeseen scale of the problem is probably the primary reason why, according to the Polish press, only 10 of the 49 provinces were inspected before the "suspension" of martial law. Jaruzelski, moreover, may have concluded that tackling the party and state bureaucracies concurrently was too much, so he tried to concentrate on the latter—which he probably regarded as an easier target and one of far greater, short-term importance. He may also have calculated that, for the near term, circumventing local party authorities through military operations groups and commissars would be easier and more effective than trying to manipulate or purge them.

Other Effects of Military Rule

25X1

We believe that public respect for the armed services—something Jaruzelski counted on to mitigate reaction to martial law—diminished under military rule, particularly among the youth.

25X1

25X1

[redacted] many Poles initially favored military intervention, apparently expecting some real abatement of Poland's problems. Jaruzelski's continued use of force to maintain order and his delegalization of Solidarity, however, encouraged the public to view martial law (and the armed forces) as another instrument for repression.

25X1

³ Maj. Gen. Roman Paszkowski—governor of Katowice Province—had been the Polish Ambassador to Angola and Sao Tome, and Col. Alojzy Wojciechowski—governor of Radom Province—had been deputy chief of the Defense Ministry's Motor-Tank Services.

25X1

25X1

Jaruzelski's attempts to drum up popular support for his policies, especially through his much-heralded Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth, have been no more successful.

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

The erosion of popular respect for the armed forces as a national institution has no doubt been vexing for many officers. Some have probably considered it a serious setback in their efforts over the last two decades to overcome the stigma of being an appendage of the Soviet army. Others, particularly the young officers in units that directly supported martial law and who, by many accounts, were already uncomfortable with their "backup" role to the police, probably have become even more perplexed that many of their civilian peers now regard them as protectors of and accomplices to an increasingly repressive regime. [Redacted]

Martial law also produced growing friction between the military and the increasingly frustrated Communist party functionaries. The military's opinion of the party declined markedly as its increased involvement in running the country brought home the flaws of party rule. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] at least some military officers, such as Warsaw city military commissar and chief of the military inspection commission General Mroz, wanted more extensive purges of the party. Within the party, members from both ends of the political spectrum came to believe that the military increasingly was overstepping its bounds. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

This concern, in our view, has only compounded the uneasiness within an officer corps already disturbed by the realization that Solidarity had made some early inroads at influencing the attitudes of draftees. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Polish military leaders were concerned about morale and discipline months before the imposition of martial law, and terms of service for conscripts were subsequently extended last fall, we believe, to avoid an influx at that time of even more politically sensitized recruits. [Redacted]

Martial Law "Suspended"

25X1

The laws passed by parliament in December 1982 "suspending," but not abolishing, martial law removed some of its more obvious trappings while leaving intact many aspects of the military's political involvement. The State Council has taken over the so-called administrative functions of the Military Council—including the power to reimpose martial law selectively or nationwide—but the Military Council remains to serve as the "guarantor" of a safe transition to "normalcy." The authority of the military courts over civilians has been significantly circumscribed, but military prosecutors still have purview over certain serious economic and political crimes. The number of military commissars overseeing factories [Redacted] is shrinking as plants are "demilitarized," but this appears to be a slow process, judging by the regime's elaborate procedures for removing special controls, and by its announcement that commissars would remain in enterprises and agencies deemed "critical" to national interests. Moreover, most military officers in high-level government and party posts—including ministers, provincial governors, and Central Committee

25X1

Though traditionally, and we think still, one of the more conservative institutions in Communist Poland, the officer corps itself was not immune to the political and social upheaval of the last two years. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted] We believe that age, experience, education, and social pressures largely explain these perceptions. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] some senior and even general officers—such as Gdansk Province Governor Maj. Gen. Mieczyslaw Cygan—have also shown sympathy for Solidarity's ideals. This mixture of diverse political attitudes in the officer ranks, however, did not affect the military's loyalty to the regime or its performance under martial law—though the armed forces were not seriously tested as a domestic security force. [Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

staffers—have stayed in place. And the National Defense Committee and its hierarchy of subordinate committees remain active in civilian matters, particularly in helping to ensure law and order. [Redacted]

25X1

Furthermore, we believe that Jaruzelski may use the next several months of transition to place even more of his military people in the government and party bureaucracies. An article in the daily military newspaper in October 1982, for example, raised the possibility of assigning reserve officers to provincial party organizations. In late January 1983 he appointed Maj. Gen. Tadeusz Gembicki as governor of Wloclawek Province, by our count the 12th officer placed in such a civilian post. And the "special training" in economic reform that the government newspaper recently announced is to be given to officers of the Army's Quartermaster Service may be a precursor, we believe, to involving the military even more in the civilian economy, especially in the provinces. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

party's leadership and outmaneuvered some prominent party figures, including his most serious rival, hardliner Stefan Olszowski. [Redacted] he has fought off attempts by Politburo hardliners to block completely his more moderate policies on economic reform. [Redacted]

Jaruzelski's apparent attachment to middle-of-the-road domestic politics is paralleled, in our view, by his treatment of Polish-Soviet ties. [Redacted] he has never been outspokenly pro- or anti-Soviet. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] We believe Jaruzelski finds that an enigmatic image has helped him build and maintain power both in the military and in the party. Whatever the depth of his nationalism and the nature of his relationship with Moscow, his actions, as the US Embassy in Warsaw points out, are those of a "cool realist." [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Jaruzelski's efforts to keep the military significantly involved in running the country reflect, in our judgment, his concern for domestic order, his distrust of the civilian bureaucracies, and a desire to bolster his personal power. [Redacted] he believes that he alone can lead his country out of its crisis and he wants to continue using the military to build a power base strong enough to accomplish his goal. In our view, he appreciates the persisting strengths of the various party and government bureaucracies and believes that an important element of the long-term solution to Poland's problem of recurring economic crises is making these institutions more efficient and responsive. He will continue trying to use his authority—and the armed forces as a model and instrument—to effect such administrative reform during this period of transition and beyond. [Redacted]

Jaruzelski doubtless recognizes the need for close ties with the Soviet Union, and his priorities often coincide with or are influenced by Moscow's. In our estimation, however, the general believes he has some latitude for independent action. While Minister of Defense he consistently treated Poland's armed forces in public as an integral part of the Warsaw Pact, but [Redacted] he was equally consistent behind the scenes in resisting Moscow's attempts to place Soviet advisers in Polish military units. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] We believe his current handling of Soviet-Polish relations is largely responsible for the comparatively tepid reception Jaruzelski received in Moscow last December when newly elected Soviet party chief Andropov met with all the Bloc leaders. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

The general, in our judgment, believes that bureaucratic reform and economic recovery cannot be achieved by looking to the political extremes. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] his actions strongly indicate an intent to establish the image of a centrist. Judging by several significant personnel changes over the last year, he has effectively pared away the extreme wings of the

25X1

Outlook
We judge that Jaruzelski, as he has indicated, probably will lift martial law completely this summer if the country remains calm, but we believe such a move will

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[redacted]

25X1

not lead to an immediate, significant decline in the military's political involvement. Some of the special bodies set up by martial law, including the Military Council and its local "Citizens' Committees for National Salvation," presumably will be dissolved. [redacted]

[redacted] Jaruzelski hopes to use the many retired and active members of the military who figured prominently in staffing those citizen groups as his local "eyes and ears" within the new "Patriotic Movement." The regime's cautious retirement of military commissars strongly suggests that some will remain even after the formal dissolution of martial law. We believe that the military inspection commission will need much more time to streamline the bureaucracy. Although the commission may turn over its work to a civilian counterpart once military rule is totally lifted, experts from the armed services most likely will be given a close advisory role. [redacted]

For the more distant future, as long as Jaruzelski remains in a position of political power, he will, in our view, continue to look to the military establishment for support. A midlevel party functionary has told the US Embassy he expects that most of the officers occupying civilian jobs will keep those positions indefinitely. Indeed, Warsaw Mayor Major General Debicki in an interview with a popular Warsaw daily newspaper on 12 December subtly rejected the idea that his civilian duties might end any time soon. The same party source has, in fact, declared that the military's future role in Poland is both "bright and durable," particularly in local government administration. [redacted]

Some officers who may not be willing to relinquish their political powers too quickly probably will not have much trouble convincing Jaruzelski to keep them on for some time. By all appearances at least a few, such as Koszalin Province Governor Col. Zdzislaw Mazurkiewski, truly believe they can contribute substantially to civil administration and have said so publicly. Others may feel they would be leaving a job unfinished. Their sensitivity to criticism, unhappiness with the Communist party's shortcomings, and failure to substantially improve economic performance and government efficiency probably have prompted many to renew their commitment to current roles. Admitting failure would be a bitter pill for many officers,

especially if military rule would be remembered primarily for its suppression of Solidarity. [redacted]

[redacted]

We believe that pressure will continue to mount on Jaruzelski to take concrete steps toward revitalizing the party and restoring its preeminence. The very lifting of martial law restrictions seems likely to raise expectations of a return to Communist party dominance, and party hardliners who disagree with Jaruzelski's policies and who want to weaken him will try to exploit these hopes. Other party officials who resent the military's intrusion or have lost their jobs may rally behind calls for an early restoration of the party to its traditional role. Soviet political leaders, anxious for a return to orthodox Communist rule, may put additional pressure on Jaruzelski. [redacted]

Jaruzelski may make some gestures toward expanding the party's involvement in decisionmaking, but we think he probably would move slowly and make changes only when confident of his control. Meanwhile, the friction between frustrated and disenfranchised party functionaries and military officers who are becoming ensconced in the civilian bureaucracy is likely to increase. [redacted]

Because Jaruzelski has made only a beginning on the agenda he set forth in his first speech after imposing martial law, we doubt he plans to relinquish his party position any time soon. Indeed, rumors persist in Warsaw that he may eventually assume the title of state president—while relinquishing the premiership—and have the president's authority considerably strengthened, possibly by expanding it to include the duties of "commander in chief of the armed forces." [redacted]

* Some, moreover, may not be able to return easily to their previous jobs because, [redacted] the military has a glut of midlevel officers, many of whom have been promoted to fill the vacancies created by martial law assignments. [redacted]

Top Secret

[redacted]

25X1

25X1
25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1


25X1

25X1

Top Secret




25X1

For all Jaruzelski's efforts to gather tighter the reins of power, however, we believe there are limits to the exercise of that power. His attacks on corruption and inefficiency, although the most extensive ever undertaken in Communist Poland, seem not, in our view, to stand a much better chance than those launched by former party leaders Gomulka and Gierek. He, like his predecessors, still will have to rely heavily on the party and governmental bureaucracies—which historically have been extremely resistant to change—to help administer Poland. His proposed economic reforms will continue to provoke foot-dragging and obstructiveness from those same bureaucrats whose privileges they threaten. And, finally, the longer the military is involved in administering the government and the economy, the more likely it, too, will be drawn into the traditional ways of Polish Communist bureaucracies and become even more discredited in the eyes of the public. 

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret