




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Foreigners in West Germany: Source of Growing Friction



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A Research Paper

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EUR 83-10017
February 1983

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Foreigners in West Germany: Source of Growing Friction

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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by [redacted] Office
of European Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Western Europe Division, [redacted]

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**Foreigners in West
Germany: Source of
Growing Friction** [Redacted]

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Summary

*Information available
as of 31 December 1982
was used in this report.*

Hostility toward foreign workers (*gastarbeiter*) has become an increasingly important political issue in West Germany—one that could affect the fortunes of Bonn's major political parties. Recent polls indicate a growing antipathy among West Germans toward foreign residents, who now comprise about 7 percent of the West German population. Although some intolerance has always been present, the sharp increase in recent years has concerned West German leaders. In fact, Chancellor Helmut Kohl's initial speech to the Bundestag on 13 October listed the problem of foreigners in West Germany as one of four key issues facing the new government. [Redacted]

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The rise in hostility is attributable primarily to the recession (particularly the rise in unemployment) and to the burden placed on the social welfare system by the growing number of foreign families. Paradoxically, West Germans blame the foreign workers for taking away jobs while admitting that many of these jobs are undesirable. The surge in applications for political asylum from Third World countries in the late 1970s has intensified West German concern. [Redacted]

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Many foreigners, meanwhile, show a marked inclination to retain a separate cultural identity, thereby aggravating frictions with the native population. As a result, the gulf between the two groups, as well as the hostility, will probably remain. [Redacted]

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We believe the rise in antiforeign sentiment will continue to generate some violence, heightening social tensions and damaging West Germany's image abroad. Neo-Nazi groups are attempting to exploit these feelings, and some rightwingers have even advocated violence to stem the flow of immigrants and force others to leave; there have been beatings, bombings, and some deaths. Domestic violence on any scale will be regarded as a serious political problem by the West Germans, even though such extremism will in our view remain limited to small fringe groups. [Redacted]

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The pervasiveness of antiforeign attitudes limits the ability of the major political parties to take constructive steps. Measures to facilitate integration or to finance voluntary departures have been discussed within the


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government, but there has been little action so far. The new Christian Democratic/Free Democratic government ostensibly supports the dual policy of integration and repatriation for foreigners. Its emphasis, however, will almost certainly be on restricting new immigration and providing expanded financial aid for those willing to return home, and a CDU-led government after the election this March will probably establish a program along these lines. 

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Although the problems posed by resident foreigners have yet to become explicit election issues, the widespread antiforeign sentiment among West German voters means that the *gastarbeiter* issue will probably become one of the themes in the campaign debate before the national election in March. The Christian Democrats are the most likely beneficiaries, because they are more in tune with public opinion than the other major parties. 

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**Foreigners in West
Germany: Source of
Growing Friction** [Redacted]

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A Growing Problem

A poll conducted by the Godesberg Institute for Applied Social Sciences in December 1981 indicates that approximately one-half of West Germany's population resents foreign residents. Two-thirds recommend a complete halt to all immigration and want to repatriate those foreigners already present. Although the use of foreign labor in German industry has historical precedents, the high population density, growing unemployment, and general economic uncertainty—combined with a new wave of refugees from Africa and Asia—have created a resentment toward foreigners unprecedented in the postwar period. [Redacted]

Confusion and ambiguity mark the efforts to resolve the dilemma presented by this sizable and increasingly unwelcome foreign population. In the past government policy has supported rotations of workers between home and host countries, but it also has recognized the need for at least limited integration of long-term residents. Early statements indicate that the new administration of Helmut Kohl will continue to support integration formally while giving a higher priority to the repatriation of foreigners. Still, this government, like its predecessor, remains bedeviled by the lack of practical alternatives. West Berlin's governing mayor Richard von Weizaecker remarked recently that the problem was a complex one that might necessitate full integration or repatriation. [Redacted]

The foreigners originally were considered temporary "guests" who were to relieve the labor shortage and then leave, but many are becoming permanent residents. The economic advantages that attracted them remain; many have acquired permanent work over the years and now occupy an integral role in the West German economy. A number have brought their families north. In fact, a new generation of foreigners born and bred in West Germany, is entering the labor market. [Redacted]

Historical Background

The precedents for importation of foreigners to provide manpower for Germany's economy stretch back to the late 19th century, when approximately 1 million workers, mostly Poles, migrated to and settled in the Ruhr's mining and industrial centers. In addition, thousands of temporary workers came for seasonal labor on Germany's large agricultural estates. During both world wars Germany relied on forced foreign labor to maintain industrial production. [Redacted]

After 1945, West Germany initially had no need for additional foreign workers. It took nearly a decade to rebuild the shattered economy, and the manpower lost during the war was replaced by German refugees from Eastern Europe. By 1955, however, West German farmers were requesting permission to import Italian workers for harvesting, and a bilateral agreement was concluded later that year. [Redacted]

West Germany began to look even more to the Mediterranean countries after the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 slowed markedly the flow of labor from East Germany. The Rome Treaty of 1957 that created the European Community (EC) established the basis for the free flow of labor among member countries. Bilateral treaties with Greece (1960), Spain (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968) governed the entry of workers from other countries [Redacted]

The West German Labor Ministry established recruiting centers in several countries, advertising positions, recruiting workers, and testing and examining them. The Ministry paid for the transportation of workers to West Germany; the employers provided housing. By the late 1960s, 5,000 guestworkers were arriving daily. In 1973 nearly every eighth worker was a foreign citizen. [Redacted]

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The free movement of labor within the EC was introduced in stages between October 1961 and July 1968. EC workers are allowed three months to secure a job in the host country; if they succeed, they automatically gain work and residence permits. They hold the same rights as citizens regarding job security and trade union membership, have the right to be joined by dependents, and are entitled to social security benefits. [redacted]

The legal status for non-EC workers is much less secure. Visas must be acquired at home. Work permits are usually issued for one or two years and are renewable at the discretion of local authorities. These permits can be limited to a specific town or even an individual factory. After extended residence, however, the guestworkers from non-EC nations often obtain more durable residence and work permits, and pressure from the trade unions and churches has helped them gain many of the rights enjoyed by EC nationals. Most importantly, families can now join the worker when he has lived in West Germany for one year and has found suitable housing. [redacted]

Theoretically, labor migration can represent a blend of self-help and quasi-foreign aid. Laborers were invited for temporary visits of a few years, after which they were to return home with new skills and savings, thereby contributing to the industrial development of their native countries. At first, rotation governed by the free market appeared to work. A year after the recession of 1966/67, 100,000 guestworkers left for home. But in fact, increasing numbers are staying behind; as of last year, almost half the foreign workers in West Germany had been there 10 years or more. Many simply wait through periods of recession, subsisting on social security allowances. Others have lived in West Germany long enough to obtain extended residence and work permits. This has gradually destroyed the notion that these "guests" are temporary residents. [redacted]

Demographics of the Guestworker Population

Today West Germany has a foreign population of approximately 4.7 million—about 7 percent of the country's population. Turks represent the largest contingent with over 1.5 million, followed by the Yugoslavs with 640,000. [redacted]

Table 1

Million Persons

West Germany: Foreign Population

Total	4.6
Turks	1.5
Yugoslavs	0.6
Italians	0.6
Greeks	0.3
Spaniards	0.2
Other	1.4

Source: *Die Zeit*.

Not only have the numbers grown, but the composition has changed as well. Dependents now comprise the vast majority of those migrating to West Germany. In 1973 approximately two-thirds of the 4 million resident foreigners were workers; workers now represent only about two-fifths of the total. The shift began in 1973 when the government, concerned over the growing number of foreign workers and fearful that unemployment among West Germans would rise following the Middle East war and the oil embargo, banned all further recruitment of foreign workers. That ban remains in effect today. It destroyed the notion of rotation, convincing many workers that they had no choice but to stay since their prospects for a return to West Germany were so uncertain. [redacted]

Since foreign workers could bring their families north after one year's residence, the flow of dependents increased. Eight years ago 35 percent of the foreigners in West Germany were women; by 1981 the proportion had risen to just over 41 percent. In 1961 only 4 percent of the foreigners were under 15, whereas by 1981, 24 percent were in that age group. [redacted]

Family units now comprise the majority of West Germany's foreign population, and social issues such as housing and education have replaced work-related questions as the major problems among foreigners. Moreover, the birth rate among guestworkers now

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Table 2
Fixtures and Furniture in Foreign
Workers' Apartments

Fixtures	Percent of Apartments	Furniture	Percent of Apartments
Toilet inside apartment	42	Clothes closet	66
Toilet on same floor	29	Bed	63
Toilet outside the house	29	Table and chair	63
Cold water	60	Sofa	32
Hot and cold water	28	Additional chairs	10
Electric lights	92		
Gas	44		
Wash basin	52		

Source: M. Borris, *Auslaendischer Arbeiter in einer Grossstadt* (Frankfurt: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 1974), p. 150.

exceeds that of West Germans. Thirteen percent of all live births in 1980 were to foreign families; in Frankfurt half of the births were to foreign parents. [REDACTED]

Many West German publications express concern over the emergence of foreign ghettos in West German cities. One study of West Berlin in 1975 noted that Turkish residents in particular tended to stay among themselves, searching for compatriots on successive moves. [REDACTED]

Housing in these ghettos is often substandard, in part because foreigners accept a lower living standard but also because they try to save money to send home. These factors, plus discrimination by West German landlords, have produced overcrowded dwellings that are often poorly furnished and unsanitary. [REDACTED]

One new and pressing problem involves the emerging generation of foreign youth, now estimated at 1 million. These young people were born and bred in West Germany, have only rarely seen their "homeland," and are caught between two cultures. Surrounded by affluence, they have expectations like those of their West German counterparts. Their opportunities for fulfilling these expectations are far more limited, however, and many social scientists fear

the growth of crime and street violence. Government statistics show teenage foreigners already are responsible for a disproportionate number of crimes. [REDACTED]

A special reason for concern regarding second-generation foreigners is their lack of education and training. Approximately 60 percent of all foreign children in West Germany drop out of school by the age of 15. A study by the Labor Ministry in March 1981 noted that over half of those between the ages of 15 and 18 are without vocational training. Approximately one-third of those between the ages of 15 and 20 are neither employed nor in vocational training. [REDACTED]

This educational vacuum is attributable partly to the inability of the West German school system to absorb the growing number of foreign children, who now comprise 10 percent of West German students, compared with only 2.2 percent as recently as 1971. This inability, in part, results from the indecision of both the government and the parents as to whether these children will remain in West Germany. In addition, because the Federal Republic's decentralized school system grants full autonomy to the states, there is no uniform approach to the problem. [REDACTED]

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At present, all states attempt to introduce foreign youth to the German language and culture. The governments hope to end the alienation many foreigners feel toward West German society and to prepare them for future vocational training. Few of the children learn German at home, and transitional language instruction is available for preschool children and for the older recent arrivals, who suffer the greatest language handicap. The classes are often overcrowded, however, and the time for instruction insufficient. [redacted]

Foreign children also attend classes on the language and culture of their native countries. The rationale of the German states, explicit or implicit, is that the foreign children may return home, a point supported by many parents. Some states, such as Bavaria, emphasize such instruction in hopes of encouraging the foreigners to return to their native countries. West Berlin, on the other hand, has incorporated the foreign youth into German classes, recognizing that much of the foreign population will remain. Unfortunately the foreign children usually finish their education fully competent in neither German nor their parents' language, and they remain unprepared for life in either culture. One author called it an "education in bilingual illiteracy." [redacted]

Nationality appears to be the most significant factor influencing the decision to remain in West Germany. Between 1961 and 1976, 68 percent of all guestworkers returned home. Yet this figure differs drastically from group to group. A majority of the Italians, Spaniards, and Greeks willingly return to their native countries, whereas the two most numerous groups, the Turks and Yugoslavs, display a marked inclination to remain [redacted]

Integration is complicated by the attitudes of the foreigners themselves. The presence of entire families, the existence of ethnic enclaves, and the instruction in native languages and cultures all allow the guestworkers to retain enough cultural identity to remain separate. Many foreign workers appear to prefer it this way. [redacted]

The urge to remain separate is strongest among the Turks; "Little Istanbul" exist in West Berlin, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and other cities. Often from rural

areas, the Turks find the transition to West Germany's industrial, affluent, and secular society especially difficult. Mosques and Islamic centers function as cultural homes for some; State Department sources indicate some religious leaders in the Turkish community have cautioned their followers against contacts with the Germans to avoid adopting Western ways. [redacted]

Turkey's prospective entry into the Common Market before the end of the decade poses special problems. In 1964 Turkey signed an economic aid agreement with the EC, and in 1968 both sides agreed that this relationship should expand gradually into full membership. This prospect helped encourage the migration of Turkish workers. By 1986 the transitional stage is supposed to be complete, inaugurating the free movement of Turkish labor within the Community. [redacted]

We believe that, at the moment, the West German Government plans to support Turkish membership only if labor migration is restricted. Of the Turkish workers throughout Europe, over 80 percent have gone to West Germany, and estimates of the number of Turks waiting to emigrate to West Germany vary from 1.5 to 2.5 million. [redacted]

Political Asylum

Another element influencing West German attitudes is the growing presence of refugees ostensibly fleeing political persecution. After the Second World War, West Germany's leaders hoped to erase some memories of their recent past by providing a haven for the politically oppressed, particularly those fleeing the East European regimes. Article 16 of the West German Basic Law guarantees the right of asylum to all those escaping political oppression as long as they arrive in West Germany without the aid of the West German Government. Article 19 ensures a fair and full judicial hearing. [redacted]

In the last few years this guarantee has been exploited by those seeking better economic opportunities in the West. In the past, once a refugee applied for political asylum, he immediately became eligible for residence and work permits as well as welfare payments. Since

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each case is decided individually, the applicant and his lawyer could use a variety of appeals to prolong the hearing as long as eight years [redacted]

West German generosity has been costly. Since 1953 around 395,000 exiles have arrived, more than half of them in the last five years. In 1977, 16,000 applied for asylum, and the figures continued to rise until the number reached 108,000 in 1980. The trend apparently has been reversed—in 1981 less than half that number requested asylum. Still, the government spent DM 500 million (about \$200 million) in 1981 on refugees; similar amounts have been estimated by knowledgeable observers for 1982 and 1983. [redacted]

The majority of these applicants come from the less developed nations in Africa and Asia, and for most of them the primary motivation is economic. A few are legitimate political exiles—since 1979 approximately 9,000 Afghans have applied for asylum. Yet large numbers of Pakistanis, Indians, Sri Lankans, and North Africans, among others, have come in recent years. East Europeans comprised only 6.4 percent of the asylum seekers in 1980, although their proportion rose to 28.9 percent in 1981 because of the situation in Poland. In 1973, 52 percent of the applications were successful; approximately 90 percent were denied in 1981. [redacted]

In the same period, West Germany contended with the arrival of Vietnamese refugees. West German leaders initially hesitated to accept Vietnamese boat people, believing that other countries should bear the responsibility for developments in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, the federal and state governments in 1979 agreed to accept 26,000 Vietnamese if rescued by West German vessels. In 1981 three states agreed to accept another 600, mostly relatives of earlier arrivals. [redacted]

The upsurge in non-European immigrants forced the West German Government to revise asylum procedures. During the summer of 1981, the Bundesrat, the upper house of the legislature, passed measures to discourage those seeking economic opportunities alone. No work permits are now issued during the first year of residence, and child-support payments are withheld pending successful completion of the judicial review. These measures almost certainly were a major

Table 3
West Germany: Applicants for Political Asylum

1980	107,800
1981	49,400
January 1982	4,300
February 1982	3,400

Source: *Die Zeit*.

[redacted] factor behind the decline in applications in 1981. The Kohl government has stated that it will extend this policy by not issuing work permits during the entire period of application, unless the applicant comes from Eastern Europe. [redacted]

None of the political parties is seeking to rescind the constitutional guarantee of political asylum, however, and the Bundesrat recently passed legislation to expedite the judicial process and to break bureaucratic bottlenecks. The federal office responsible for asylum is to open regional offices to facilitate the review of applications, and the Bundesrat has limited the appeals process in the hopes of restricting the length of the judicial review to no more than one year. The Bundesrat has also discussed replacing the review panel with a single judge. [redacted]

Foreign Political Activism

Refugees have brought many of their political disputes with them, sometimes producing violence. Indeed, the Kohl government sees this as a major problem arising from the presence of foreign colonies in West Germany. A May 1981 attack on a Yugoslav exile of Albanian extraction by agents of the Yugoslav security service and a battle between Iranian factions last April in Mainz are prominent examples. [redacted]

Yugoslavs and Iranians are among the most politically active in West Germany. [redacted] about 2,350 Iranians are active, all but 600 of them anti-Khomeini. Iranian activity is

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particularly evident in Hamburg, which has more Iranian exiles than any European city except Paris.

[Redacted]

Among the Yugoslavs, the Croats are the most active group, but recent disturbances in Yugoslavia's Kosovo Province have heightened activism among ethnic Albanians in West Germany.

[Redacted] perhaps 1,000 politically active Yugoslavs belong to various organizations in the Federal Republic; the largest is the Croatian National Council with about 700 members. Only a small minority of the Yugoslavs and Iranians resident in West Germany favor violence, but the involvement of their home governments increases the potential for violence and could present the West German Government with diplomatic problems.

Other refugee groups are active as well, including Afghans, Kurds, and Palestinians. Among Palestinians the Palestine Liberation Organization is the chief political force. The mainline PLO generally avoids violence;

[Redacted]

Extremist non-PLO Palestinian groups, such as Black June, represent much greater threats.

Guestworkers, especially Turks, have brought their political divisions to West Germany as well. Politically motivated crimes among West Germany's Turks rose from 69 in 1979 to 457 in 1980; assassinations alone increased from one in 1977 to seven in 1980. Since the military takeover in Ankara in 1980, violence has abated, but political activism continues.

[Redacted]

Antiforeign Attitudes Among the West German Public Intolerance by some Germans toward foreigners is not new, but the extent of hostility revealed in the December 1981 survey was surprising. About half admitted their antipathy, but the more significant finding was the desire of over two-thirds of the West Germans to

see the guestworkers leave. Seven months earlier only slightly over one-half had held that opinion, and in November 1978 about one-third were so disposed.

[Redacted]

West Germans also tend to blame foreigners for growing social ills. For example, nearly half of those in the most recent survey blame foreign residents for the rising crime rate and unsanitary living conditions. Two-thirds blame them for the drug traffic, and approximately one-third attribute rising rents and assaults on German women to foreigners. Many also see the foreign residents as simple welfare cheats.

[Redacted]

In fact foreigners, who comprise 7 percent of the population as a whole, make up only about 8 percent of West German welfare recipients, according to West German figures for 1981. German prejudices about foreigners' involvement in crime are somewhat better grounded: current government statistics show that 16 percent of suspects are foreigners. The group represented most heavily in the criminal statistics is young males between the ages of 14 and 21; in this group the percentage involved in violent crimes is far higher for foreigners than for Germans.

Of the various nationalities, West Germans dislike Turks the most—a result of the size of the Turkish community and the great cultural and religious gap between Turks and West Germans. A study by the Emnid Institute in 1981 showed that 36 percent of the West German public thought negatively of the Turks. North Africans were next at 18 percent, whereas Greeks, Yugoslavs, and Portuguese, seen as Europeans, generated negative ratings of only 4 to 5 percent.

[Redacted]

Xenophobia reaches all levels of West German society, but the younger and better educated the audience, the lower the level of hostility. According to the December 1981 survey, 34 percent of those between 18 and 24 were hostile; the proportion rose to more than half for those over 50. Only 28 percent of those holding the equivalent of a high school diploma were antiforeigner, half the level of those with only an elementary level education.

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
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Foreigners in West Germany: Sources of Growing Friction


West German Support for Repatriation of Guestworkers^a

General Public Support
Percent




Resident Aliens in the Federal Republic of Germany^b


Resident Aliens, 1961-1981
Millions




Support According to Age
Percent




Resident Aliens According to Age, 1981



Support According to Educational Level
Percent



Resident Aliens According to Length of Stay, 1981



^aDer Spiegel, #18, 1982
^bThe German Tribune, May 30, 1982

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West Germany's current economic difficulties provide much of the explanation for this growing hostility. During both the 1974/75 recession and the current one, the hospitality extended to the foreign guests declined. Unskilled and semiskilled workers, lower class families, low-ranking employees, and pensioners are most affected by an economic recession and compete most directly with guestworkers for jobs, less expensive housing, and social services. Indeed, an Emnid poll in March 1982 showed the presence of guestworkers to be the most common reason given by the public at large for West Germany's high unemployment rate.

In addition to economics, the sudden influx of Asian and African refugees has contributed to the intensification of antforeign sentiments. The West German public makes little distinction between refugees and guestworkers and resents the extra burden on West Germany's already strapped social welfare system. In addition, the refugees represent additional non-European arrivals in a densely populated ethnocentric country.

Guestworkers and the Economy


Popular perceptions to the contrary, guestworkers do play an integral and beneficial role in the West German economy, a point supported by government statistics. By 1973 foreign workers comprised approximately 12 percent of the West German labor force, up from less than 1 percent in 1960. Today the figure stands at around 8 percent. In the Ruhr coal mines, as well as in segments of the automotive and metal industries, guestworkers fill 25 percent of the work force. About 12 percent of the work force in the construction industry is foreign. In some states the proportion is even higher; foreign workers comprise 13.5 percent of the work force in Baden-Wuerttemberg and 10.9 percent in Hessen.

The guestworkers help hold down wage costs and occupy the unskilled and semiskilled positions that few West Germans want. This permits the native population to take more skilled, higher paying positions.

Unemployment among foreign workers tends to outpace that of West Germans. In May 1982 government statistics showed unemployment among guestworkers




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"Foreigners Out": Three Views

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at 11.1 percent, as opposed to 6.9 percent for all of West Germany. Nevertheless, guestworkers seem to West Germans an unnecessary burden during the recession. By coincidence, more than 2 million West Germans are out of work, nearly equal to the number of guestworkers in the West German economy. [redacted]

best showing occurred in Kiel, where a "citizens' initiative" captured 3.8 percent of the vote. Still, the extreme right remains discredited in West German eyes and resident foreigners do not present an issue strong enough to lift them beyond the marginal level. [redacted]

Demographic trends make the guestworkers seem expendable, as large numbers of young Germans are entering the job market—around 80,000 a year between 1975 and 1985. After the mid-1980s, however, the demographic surge will begin to recede and in the 1990s the native work force could decline by 1 million. Some West German observers assert that the West German economy will need between 1.5 and 2 million foreign workers by the 1990. [redacted]

Influence on Major Parties

The antiforeign sentiment will obstruct the efforts of the parties to resolve the issue constructively. Supporters of the Christian Democrats display the least tolerance. Recent polls indicate that 54 percent of those voters are antiforeign, and nearly three-fourths endorse the departure of all guestworkers. These attitudes will reinforce CDU policies, which already endorse the restrictions of new immigration and financial aid for those wishing to return. [redacted]

Rightwing Extremism

Antiforeign propaganda by rightwing groups has increased over the last year. Parallels with Nazi ideology are obvious. Above all, these propagandists consider the foreign community a threat to German culture and racial purity. Some groups even advocate terrorism to halt the flow of refugees and guestworkers. [redacted]

Of the other two major parties, Free Democratic voters display the most openness toward foreigners; even in that group, however, the hostile outnumber the tolerant by 37 to 30 percent and fully two-thirds of FDP voters would like to see the guestworkers leave. [redacted]

Such appeals to antiforeign sentiment have led to occasional violence, but only a few deaths. Generally, the violence has involved attacks on foreign shops or individual beatings. The bombing of two refugee camps by neo-Nazis in August 1981, however, has raised the prospect of terrorism. The first occurred at an Eritrean camp in Baden-Wuerttemberg; the second came in Hamburg, where a 22-year-old Vietnamese lost his life. While violence attributable to fringe groups probably will continue and possibly increase slightly, we believe such violence will remain isolated with very little popular support. [redacted]

In the party that is officially the strongest proponent of integration—the SPD—antiforeign sentiment outweighs friendlier attitudes by 47 to 29 percent; two-thirds of those surveyed favor the guestworkers' departure. It is among the SPD's blue-collar constituency that resistance to integration is greatest. Antiforeign platforms have won their greatest support in working-class districts, such as Gaarden-Ost in Kiel, where the "citizens' initiative" won 6.2 percent of the vote. It is in just those districts possessing a high concentration of both foreign and German workers where the SPD could lose votes either to rightwing extremists or to the Christian Democrats. [redacted]

Even if the extreme right benefited at the polls from antiforeign sentiment, we would expect only limited gains. The rightwing National Democratic Party (NPD) hopes to exploit the sentiment against foreigners to improve its poor electoral prospects, while neo-Nazis hope to generate popular support for national socialist ideals. Numerous "citizens' initiatives," usually sponsored by the NPD, have emerged to call for a halt in the admission of foreigners to West Germany. These groups have had some minor successes—the

This working-class hostility has so far not affected the proforeigner policies of the German Trade Union Federation (DGB), which generally supports the SPD. During the 1960s and 1970s, the DGB opposed discrimination against foreign workers, campaigning for equal pay, better housing, and a graduated system of residence permits based on length of stay. In 1972-73 the DGB encouraged Turkish workers to join its

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ranks and the unions improved foreign representation after a wave of wildcat strikes in 1973. The unions have performed valuable educational and orientation services, publishing brochures and providing legal services for guestworkers. As of 1980, over a third of foreign workers belonged to unions, and foreigners have also experienced some of their greatest integration at the factory level, where they are represented in works councils and union boards. [redacted]

The record has not been perfect, however. Foreign workers often object to a lack of representation at higher levels of the union hierarchies, and some unions bar non-EC nationals from holding office. During recessions DGB leaders have expressed concern over the free movement of EC workers, yet when former DGB Executive Board member Karl Schwab spoke along these lines in 1978, he was criticized by union officials for deviating from DGB policy. Given the current leadership within the DGB, the unions are unlikely to alter their policy of support for limited integration and aid for the foreign worker. [redacted]

Current Policies

The guestworkers occupy positions on the margins of West Germany's social and political life, and this situation is not likely to change in the near future. Extensive moves to alter this are also unlikely before the next election. All political parties agree that the ban on the further entry of foreign labor must be maintained, and the last government took measures to limit the flow of dependents as well. Wives and youths must now wait two years for a work permit, and the maximum age of dependents allowed to enter West Germany has been cut to 16. Although strong resistance from the Foreign and Interior Ministries blocked the Schmidt government from lowering this age to 6, the current Minister of the Interior, [redacted] has revived the proposal. Nonetheless, child support payments (370 DM for up to three children, and an additional 240 DM for every extra child) continue to encourage the immigration of foreign dependent children. The current coalition plans to restrict such reunions, but has offered no specific proposals as yet. [redacted]

The government also attempts to control the distribution of foreign residents. About 80 percent of West Germany's foreigners live in four states—North

Rhine-Westfalia, Bavaria, Hessen, and Baden-Wuerttemberg. Individual cities also suffer from over-concentration. West Berlin's mayor, Richard von Weizsaecker, recently stated that the foreign residents (12 percent of the population, over half of whom are Turks) represent his city's greatest dilemma. [redacted]

When the proportion of aliens reaches 6 percent, West German cities can ask the federal government for the authority to deny residence permits to new arrivals. If the percentage reaches 12, a city automatically can declare itself closed to all new immigrants. The rationale is that beyond this point the social and economic infrastructure (housing, employment, welfare payments) can no longer support the burden of new aliens. So far, West Berlin, Cologne, Frankfurt, Hannover, and Munich have applied for or imposed such bans. Cities may also apply the ban to individual districts when they pass the 6-percent mark, and West Berlin has done so in three districts, in one of which the population is 25 percent foreign born. [redacted]

The West German political parties differ, however, on how to handle foreigners already resident. The Christian Democrats maintain that West Germany should not become a land of immigration and that guestworkers should not have the option of naturalization.¹ They also favor some time limit on a foreign worker's stay in West Germany. Ostensibly, the Christian Democrats reject the notion of forcible rotation, but they also publicly endorse a program of financial incentives and educational programs to encourage foreigners to return home. [redacted]

The idea of encouraging repatriation through financial incentives is not new, and it has found support among Social Democrats and Free Democrats as well. The issue arose as early as 1976, when then Minister President Hans Filbinger of Baden-Wuerttemberg introduced it to the state's electoral campaign. The idea was endorsed by the Christian Democrats and Free Democrats in their coalition agreement. [redacted]

¹ Naturalization for any non-German is an extremely difficult process, requiring a minimum of 10 years' residence, competence in German language and history, and no criminal record. Even then, an alien may receive citizenship only "if it is in the interests of the Federal Republic." [redacted]

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The program would allow unemployed guestworkers to convert portions of their social security income—primarily pension savings, unemployment compensation, and child-support payments—into cash to finance their return home. The coalition's program also spoke of a time limit, which would probably correspond to the former government's proposal. The longer the guestworker waited after becoming unemployed, the less he would receive. [redacted]

West Germany has also attempted to encourage workers to invest in their native countries in the hope of making repatriation more attractive. One model of worker investment has been a large cement plant in central Turkey. In 1976, moreover, the federal government established a savings account for Turkish workers who wished to invest in Turkey. The Kohl government has also spoken of the need to channel some foreign aid into developmental programs, thereby reducing the need of foreigners to emigrate. Although a number of firms have been established with these funds—the Center for International Immigration in Frankfurt claims that over 250,000 Turks have invested more than half a million dollars in such prospects—to date they have had little effect on the immigration of foreign workers. [redacted]

For their part, the Social Democrats support the gradual integration of the foreign residents into West German society, although the previous coalition failed to implement specific means to promote it. According to statements by party leaders, the SPD does not wish to limit a foreign worker's time in the Federal Republic; it supports the idea of permanent residence after a stay of five or eight years. Representatives also have suggested making the acquisition of citizenship an option for foreign children born in West Germany when they become 18. The SPD platform also has recommended measures to further integration, such as more job training and educational opportunities for foreign youth, more subsidized housing, greater dispersion of foreigners to combat isolation, and greater political rights. [redacted]

The position of the Free Democrats generally corresponds to that of the Social Democrats. FDP policy supports greater political rights, extended residence permits for foreign workers, and the acquisition of citizenship after the age of 18. It is not yet clear how

much influence the FDP holds over government policy, but the reference in the coalition agreement with the CDU/CSU to the promotion of integration and the maintenance of the foreigners' cultural identity was probably the result of the FDP presence. If the FDP retains its position in the government after the March election, the party could continue to exert a moderating influence. [redacted]

The SPD and FDP muted their support for the integration of foreigners during the last few years of the social-liberal coalition once this policy became a political liability. The deep-seated belief in the need to foster integration, as well as doubts regarding its feasibility, almost certainly prevented the government from directly addressing the growing concern in West Germany over foreign residents. During the current election campaign, both parties will probably try to avoid the issue unless the Christian Democrats suggest solutions that would infringe upon civil liberties. [redacted]

Political rights for foreign residents remains perhaps the most contentious issue. Guestworkers do not possess the right to engage in political activity in the Federal Republic; political activism can provide grounds for expulsion even though the West German constitution guarantees the freedoms of speech, assembly, and organization for all residents. Participation in political organizations, and even in some trade union activities such as strikes, thus remains precarious for foreign residents. [redacted]

Resistance to the extension of voting rights, especially in federal elections, is strong within all parties. Opponents argue that such a move would contravene the provisions of the constitution that prohibit voting by noncitizens. The right to vote in local elections is nonetheless winning gradual acceptance. Last year Kassel joined cities such as Nuremberg and Munich in allowing aliens at least to form an advisory council and voice their views to city parliaments and district committees. The national platform of the FDP advocates letting foreigners vote in local elections, whereas the SPD currently advocates extension of voting

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rights only to nationals of EC countries. The current coalition will almost certainly avoid this issue for the near future, however [redacted]

Even limited voting rights for foreign residents would represent a major step toward integration. The logic behind the extension of communal voting rights—that foreigners should be able to vote locally because that is where most decisions affecting their lives are taken—can be extended, as one journalist noted, to state and federal elections as well. With voting privileges come social and political responsibilities, such as military service, that would incorporate the foreigners further into West Germany's social and political fabric. This very logic assures resistance to the extension of communal voting rights among segments of the West German population. But we think the growing support for this idea among the major political parties points to the adoption of this proposal within the next few years, if only on a geographically limited basis [redacted]

Outlook

We believe antforeign sentiment will remain a political and social dilemma in West Germany for years. The foreigners are likely to be a source of social conflict and a catalyst for rightwing sentiment whenever West German economic prosperity or political stability appear threatened. Resident foreigners, for their part, are also likely to show increasing signs of frustration; the self-immolation of a young Turkish woman in Hamburg last summer is just one reflection of the hopelessness affecting many foreign youths. Despite such incidents, we doubt that foreigners will respond in kind to rightist violence, even though they are likely to stage demonstrations to protest their treatment. [redacted]

Reflecting the seriousness with which West Germans view the problem, some journalists and politicians are now speculating that the growth in hostility to foreigners could spur a resurgence of rightwing extremism. They base this view on the increasing alienation on many West German youth and their penchant for violence that often victimizes West Germany's foreign population. Such violent incidents have so far included beatings, bombings, and a few deaths. In addition, nationalistic groups, such as the

neo-Nazi National Democratic Party, have achieved some minor successes running on platforms that promote the expulsion of foreigners. [redacted]

Although such antforeign violence may increase, we believe on balance that such activities will remain confined to the fringes of West German society—primarily extreme rightists or groups of aimless and frustrated youths. Even disturbances of that magnitude, however, will have significant political repercussions in West Germany, where dealing with problems of public order remains an especially sensitive issue. It would be an exaggeration to suggest that antforeign attitudes threaten West Germany's democratic institutions—the vast majority of West Germans will seek to solve the problem through traditional political means—but we do expect the controversy to affect the fortunes of the major political parties. [redacted]

The issue is now a daily press topic, and Kohl's decision to include the problem on his high-priority agenda is the clearest sign that politicians now think antforeign sentiment is too widespread to ignore. [redacted]

Despite Kohl's emphasis on the issue, we think he will be reluctant to go beyond a stopgap approach before the election on 6 March. Kohl or any other chancellor almost certainly would rule out simple solutions such as expulsion, not only because of humanitarian convictions, but also out of concern for West Germany's image abroad, and possible diplomatic repercussions. Instead, the current coalition probably hopes to reduce the number of foreign residents through financial incentives to return home and restrictions on family reunification and recruitment. If the Christian Democrats or the present coalition wins a secure majority in the national election, we expect a more extensive program to alleviate the problem. [redacted]

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This would probably be an extension of proposals discussed earlier, in particular those encouraging the repatriation of foreign workers. For example, West German contributions to the current OECD aid package for Turkey include 19 million DM for the resettlement of Turkish guestworkers. If this program proves successful, we think the government would consider channeling more West German aid toward developmental projects that encourage the return of foreign workers to their homelands. In addition, any new government in Bonn will almost certainly retain restrictions on the immigration of new foreign workers and consider restricting further opportunities for family reunifications in the Federal Republic.

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These measures, however, would be intended primarily to mollify the West German public. Bonn's ability to control the number of foreigners is limited principally to those seeking political asylum and non-EC workers and their dependents, and any impact on the labor force will be minimal. EC nationals are free to seek employment in any member country, and many non-EC foreigners have lived in West Germany long enough to obtain extended residence permits. In addition, both business and labor recognize that foreign workers have become an integral part of the West German economy, precluding any immediate and extensive reduction in the number of *gastarbeiter*. At best, the government probably will hope that incentives to return home will reduce the number of foreigners enough to alleviate public pressure for government action.

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