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China's 12th Party Congress: People, Policy, and Prospects



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An Intelligence Assessment

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China's 12th Party Congress: People, Policy, and Prospects



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An Intelligence Assessment

This assessment was prepared by [redacted]
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**China's 12th Party Congress:
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Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 20 September 1982
was used in this report.*

Deng Xiaoping made impressive personnel gains at the 12th Party Congress that improve General Secretary Hu Yaobang's chances of staying in power after Deng dies. The Congress also endorsed Deng's reform program, but we believe major obstacles remain that threaten its realization and that will force Hu to compromise with his opponents. We expect that:

- Beijing will meet stiff resistance in attempting to reform the lower administrative reaches of the party and government and may be forced to soften its reformist initiatives.
- Hu will continue to face opposition from senior military traditionalists who pose the most serious challenge to his succession, despite efforts to curry favor by moving closer to them on some issues.
- Beijing will continue to grope for solutions to its economic problems, and will have difficulty in meshing a party purge and development goals so that economic performance does not suffer.
- Ideological exhortation will fail to reverse the loss of faith in the party, and the reformists will resort to more authoritarian methods to stifle criticism and preserve their rule.

Gains made by Deng Xiaoping at the 12th Party Congress include:

- Placing nine supporters on the Politburo and removing former party Chairman Hua Guofeng.
- Replacing over half of the Central Committee with members who support his policies.
- Winning official endorsement of a party purge that will last three years and will target members who question his policies.

Deng failed, however, to remove prominent critics of both his program and his succession arrangements from the Politburo Standing Committee. In our judgment, Deng will now attempt to shift the focus of policymaking and power from the Politburo to the party Secretariat, headed by Hu.

The Congress acted on the entire range of policy questions before the leadership:

- *Military.* A number of senior Army officials were relegated to advisory status at the Congress, presaging significant shifts in the regional military commands. Nonetheless, the influential old guard remains a generally conservative force on the political scene, skeptical of the reform program, and unconvinced of Hu Yaobang's ability to lead.

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generally conservative force on the political scene, skeptical of the reform program, and unconvinced of Hu Yaobang's ability to lead.

- *Economy.* The Congress endorsed the reformist program and indicated that, despite acknowledged problems, it will continue. Economic development was declared the number-one priority, but the Congress documents and available reporting suggest to us that the Chinese are still uncertain how to proceed. The goal of quadrupled national output by the century's end, a 7-percent gain each year, in our view, is attainable only in the unlikely event the Chinese can overhaul their managerial infrastructure.
- *Ideology.* We believe the Congress's generally conservative ideological tone and its concern about the public loss of confidence in the party foreshadow increasing emphasis on stricter ideological guidelines and on combating the spread of Western values in China.
- *Foreign Policy.* The Congress endorsed the more nationalistic foreign policy line of the last year. It declared an interest in broadening relations with the United States but stressed that the Taiwan Relations Act remains "a cloud" over the relationship. The Congress also indicated an interest in expanding low-level contacts with the Soviet Union, but declared that any significant improvement in relations depends upon Moscow taking "practical steps" to diminish its threat to China.

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Standing Committee to mere membership on the Central Committee. The titles of party chairman and vice chairman were eliminated, leaving Hu Yaobang at the top of the party structure as General Secretary, charged with running daily party affairs and convening meetings of the Politburo. [redacted]

Polithuro Politics

Although some Western observers have interpreted Deng's failure to remove senior party elders and former Vice Chairmen Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian from the Politburo Standing Committee as a major setback for the reformers, we believe such a characterization is incorrect. The pattern of events and Deng's past behavior lead us to conclude that Deng realized some time before the preparatory meetings for the Congress, held in Beijing in early August, that he would have to change tactics in the face of the obstinate refusal of Ye, Li, and the other elders to retire. [redacted]

It is our judgment that Deng and the reform camp were forced to retain as members of the Politburo elderly officials who wished to remain and then opted to pack the body with elderly allies. Deng was unable to have a reduction in the role of the Politburo and its Standing Committee written formally into the new party constitution, but public statements by senior reformers indicate that the Deng camp intends to make the Politburo a "second-line" institution. Deng's group plans to shift the focus of policymaking and, therefore, power to the younger, more energetic Secretariat, headed by Hu and staffed by people close to him and Deng. [redacted]

In our view, Deng essentially is gambling that Hu Yaobang's control of daily affairs through the Secretariat will be backstopped by trusted lieutenants on the Politburo. He is also wagering that Ye and Li will be unable to exercise great influence from the Politburo Standing Committee because of their obviously increasing infirmity. We believe the average age of the new Politburo, 72—six years above its predecessor—means that it will be a less active institution in any case. [redacted]

The Leadership Mix

Politburo. We believe it is a solid demonstration of Deng's strength in the party that he was able to name



The big losers: former party Chairman Hua Guofeng and former Politburo member and secret policeman, Peng Chong. [redacted]

nine full and alternate members to the Politburo without acquiescing in the new appointment of a single known opposition figure. Old adversaries, however, such as Politburo and Secretariat member Yu Quili, who takes exception to parts of current economic policy, remain in top offices. Similarly, military officers who we suspect of resistance to Deng's efforts to professionalize and depoliticize the armed forces, such as Wei Guoqing and Zhang Tingfa, also retained their seats. [redacted]

The Politburo and its Standing Committee now contain an absolute majority of leaders who generally support reform policies, although differences within the reform camp on specific issues have emerged and will continue to complicate policymaking.² The key gains for the reformers, viewed from the perspective of guaranteeing Hu Yaobang's succession to Deng, were the removal of Hua Guofeng and Politburo and Secretariat member Peng Chong from the leadership. Hua steadily lost power after 1978, when Deng succeeded in killing the personality cult then growing

² On the Standing Committee the reform majority comprises Deng, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Chen Yun. Unlike Hu and Zhao, Chen is not one of Deng's proteges. He is a veteran party leader and economic specialist holding high office in his own right. Since returning to power in 1978, he has generally supported the reform leadership, although tending to impose outer limits on the pace and scope of change. Deng has assiduously cultivated his support, and the two have frequently been paired in the media as China's most prestigious leaders. [redacted]

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around Hua and began a slow rewriting of party history and ideology. Nonetheless, Hu and Deng could not afford to leave this symbol of loyalty to Mao and opposition to their program on the Politburo during the succession period. We believe Hua still commands some popular support in the provinces, and conceivably could have served as a rallying point for anti-Hu forces. [redacted]

The demotion of Peng Chong was an astute move that denies high office to one of the very few individuals young enough and sufficiently well connected to become a rival of Hu on his own. Peng was entrusted by Hua Guofeng with subduing Shanghai leftists when the Gang of Four was arrested in 1976, and after going to Beijing was responsible for the security apparatus. [redacted]

The promotions of military men to the Politburo leave the overall proportion of representation by the armed forces roughly the same as before, but with a more reformist cast. Yang Shangkun, who is also Permanent Vice Chairman of the party Military Commission and thus oversees its daily business, has had longstanding ties to Deng and was pilloried in the Cultural Revolution for his leadership of the party's sensitive General Office from 1945 to 1966. In a promotion we view as intended to help protect the physical security of Hu and the reformers when the succession to Deng takes place, Beijing Military Region Commander Qin Jiwei was made an alternate member of the Politburo. Qin served under Deng in the 1940s, was purged during the Cultural Revolution, and has moved ahead in step with Deng in recent years. [redacted]

Of those Politburo members dropped at the 12th Congress, one stands out as anomalous. Geng Biao, who was appointed Defense Minister under Deng's sponsorship against stiff military resistance in 1981, retired to the Central Advisory Commission without advance warning. We believe Deng may have been forced to trade Geng away in order to obtain the other military appointments he desired. [redacted]

Secretariat. Since last spring, Deng and Hu have demonstrated considerable freedom in staffing the central party departments subordinate to the general



Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian, despite their age and obvious frailty, remain powerful checks on Deng's plans. [redacted]

secretary.³ In our view, Hu is slowly building a personal power base in the Central Committee departments, and the Congress saw new gains for him. Three officials with longstanding ties to Hu were elevated to the Secretariat, and three other appointments went to officials with strong reform credentials. [redacted]

Hu's longtime protege, Hu Qili, already heads the party's General Office, guiding paperwork and administration. We expect he will assume new authority on the Secretariat in organizational and security affairs and will have a major role in the rectification campaign. Yang Yong's appointment to supervise military affairs brings a fully trusted lieutenant of Deng Xiaoping to the job. Deng chose Yang Yong as his deputy when Deng regained the position of Army Chief of Staff in 1977. [redacted]

Coping With Ye and Li

We believe the retention of the Politburo Standing Committee and its composition pose some risks for Deng. The continued presence of Ye and Li will ensure them somewhat more direct access to the levers of power than if they had been relegated to the Advisory Commission. Thus, we believe they will be able to continue supporting their patronage networks

³ A diagram of the Central Committee departments can be found in appendix D, a chart of the new party organs and organization approved at the Congress. [redacted]

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in the party, state, and Army. They may also act as brakes on the implementation of reform policies, resisting or modifying decisions in the process of consensus building. If Deng dies before Ye and Li, they will have a major say in the outcome of the succession. [redacted]

We believe the odds favor Deng and that he probably calculates that Ye and Li are so ill that he will outlive them, making their retirement a moot issue. [redacted]



Approving the party line: the dais at the opening session of the Congress. From the left: Deng Yingchao, Nie Rongzhen, Hua Guofeng, Li Xiannian, Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Chen Yun, Xu Xiangqian, and Peng Zhen. [redacted]

party, and the continuation of China's wary opening to the West. [redacted]

Given these circumstances, we believe Deng may have judged that the political cost of forcibly retiring the two elders was too high. The parternalistic nature of Chinese politics, moreover, channels power into the hands of individuals, not institutions. Relocating Ye and Li to the Advisory Commission would encumber but not end their ability to exercise influence. [redacted]

Policy

By and large the Congress endorsed the policy direction hammered out by Deng and Hu over the past few years.⁵ This included a reaffirmation of the party's commitment to gradual economic reform, the cultivation of younger and better educated talent for the

⁴ The new party constitution is written in a way that will prevent the death of Ye or Li from automatically forcing the leadership to replace either man. Only four positions in the party leadership must be filled by members of the Politburo Standing Committee, which now has six members. Deng, Hu Yaobang, and veteran Chen Yun hold all four titles: Chairman of the Advisory Commission (Deng); General Secretary, (Hu); First Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission, (Chen); and Chairman of the Military Commission, (Deng). Ye, Li, and Premier Zhao Ziyang do not hold such positions, thus their departure would not create a void on the Standing Committee that would require immediate party action to fill. [redacted]

⁵ Appendix B, key excerpts from Hu's report to the Congress, gives the party's position on major issues before the leadership. [redacted]


Rectification and Reform

The Congress committed the party to a thorough purge beginning in the latter half of 1983. The Congress was vague about the mechanics of the campaign, other than to indicate that it will begin at the top and work its way down. In our view, the delay in starting is probably to establish and staff the organs that will be responsible. The purge is to be carried out gradually over three years and will involve a review of the dossiers of all members. Those found wanting will not have their party credentials revalidated. [redacted]

Minister of Culture Zhu Muzhi, who was the press spokesman for the Congress, told correspondents that the number of those ultimately dismissed would not be large because all who are found deficient would be given an opportunity to repent and undergo reeducation. We believe, however, Beijing would not have given itself a year to prepare for the rectification and another three years to conduct it to purge a small number of recalcitrants. In our view, the number to be purged is far greater than that suggested by Zhu—perhaps several million. [redacted]

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Also on the agenda for next year is the extension of the restructuring of the central party and state organs to the provinces. The process has already begun in a few places where conditions are "especially ripe." The presence on the Central Advisory Commission of seven provincial first secretaries, three governors, four military commanders, and five regional political commissars leads us to believe that preparations for a fairly extensive shakeup of local organizations are well advanced. Although it is as yet unclear whether officials—aside from Deng—will be permitted to sit on the advisory body and retain other party or state positions, we expect that, in line with Deng's plans, if those appointed to the Advisory Commission return to their old jobs, it will be to preside over the transition to successors. The installation of fresh leadership in the provinces presumably will spur further administrative changes, first when new administrators seek to emplace their own teams and later, as initial personnel moves take root, the network of trustworthy replacements expands in trickle-down fashion. [REDACTED]

Army-Party Relations

Deng was able to make some small inroads into the military's influence at the Congress, but we believe senior political operatives in the Army remain a major obstacle to the smooth transfer of power to Hu. Military representation on the Central Committee was significantly reduced, and most military members

are now commanders and technocrats, not political commissars. A number of senior military officers also retired to the Central Advisory Commission, creating headroom for the younger officers needed to further Deng's plans to professionalize the military. [REDACTED]

The Soldier-Politicians. In our view, Deng is contending with the military on two levels. First, he is trying to limit and reduce the political influence of a group of largely elderly, respected military leaders, led by Ye Jianying, whose importance in the party rose during the 1960s. This group is unwilling to yield power and is particularly reluctant to accept the leadership of Hu Yaobang. The reformers have advanced a variety of schemes to dilute the influence of the military as a whole in the party's internal affairs. [REDACTED]

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In what we see as an important impediment to the reformers' ambitions, the new party constitution retains a major political role for the military commission. We see this as perpetuating the Army's direct influence in the deliberations of the Politburo Standing Committee, from which the commission chairman must be chosen. Although the Congress apparently failed to enhance Hu's personal influence on the commission, we believe that body is no political threat to Hu's standing as long as Deng is chairman. [redacted]

Below the Top. In order to bring about changes in the armed forces that will make Hu's task easier, Deng and some reform-minded senior officers are pressing changes on the Army at a level below the top soldier-politicians. We estimate that Deng did comparatively well in this area at the Congress as well as in the months before it, when "leading organs" under the military commission were revamped. The sharp reduction of military representation in the Central Committee illustrates this effort. Most members are professional soldiers, and political commissars hold less than a third of the military share of seats. On the Politburo, the three new military members have backed the reform program. [redacted]

The disproportionately large share of military retirees on the new Central Advisory Commission creates, we believe, additional opportunities for reformers. More than a third of the Commission consists of senior Army men whose withdrawal from active duty will give Deng the opportunity to promote more tractable officers. The retirement of six old-line administrators from the Army's leading staff schools may also facilitate modernization of training and tactics. [redacted]

Plans for the military Commission itself remain murky. In keeping with past practice, the membership of the Commission was not announced, and the publicly released list of its vice chairmen disclosed no new names. In his report, Hu indicated that the reformers plan to increase the government's role in daily management of the Army through its new Central Military Council. Nonetheless, after the Congress, reformist Politburo member Hu Qiaomu disclosed that military Commission members will hold joint appointments on the government body. We



Chen Yun, allied with Deng on most issues, sets economic policy. [redacted]

remain skeptical that the reformers can reduce the influence of the old guard in the military Commission on the management of the Army in the near term. [redacted]

The Economy

The Congress strongly endorsed the controversial economic reform program begun at the Third Plenum in 1978, and while acknowledging abuses and problems, stated that additional reforms are planned. Both Hu's report and the new party constitution hold that economic development is the party's principal task for the rest of the century. Hu reaffirmed that raising living standards will continue to be a top priority but noted that improvements will depend on increases in labor productivity, which we believe will be hard to come by. [redacted]

Goals. In his report, Hu stated that China's "strategic objective" is to quadruple the national product by the year 2000, with special emphasis on resolving problems in agriculture, energy and transport, and education and science. The remainder of the 1980s, he said, will be spent on reforming the economic management system, and growth will be moderate. Hu predicted that an "all-around upsurge" would follow in the 1990s. [redacted]

Quadrupling the national product is not a new goal. Deng made reference to it in January 1980, and both Deng and Hu have discussed it with recent foreign

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visitors including Australian Prime Minister Fraser. Chinese treatment of the goal and comments by senior economists at the Congress reflect a certain defensiveness, however, that leads us to conclude some Chinese officials believe the target is too ambitious. One leading economist rejected a comparison of the current goal with Great Leap Forward targets, and another insisted that the targets have been carefully worked out. [redacted]

We believe the target is very ambitious, and attainable only in the unlikely event the Chinese are able to complete the radical overhaul of their economic management structure scheduled for this decade. Quadrupling output by the year 2000 requires an annual average growth of 7 percent, somewhat higher than the 6-percent annual growth rate of the past 30 years. [redacted]

Hu did not present a detailed plan for achieving this goal, but he did give the most explicit timetable we have seen since 1980, when the reform program was slowed to allow Beijing to deal with the dislocations caused by it. According to Hu, "the readjustment period," during which Beijing will focus on bringing down bloated investment rates, eradicating budget deficits and inflation, and redressing imbalances among production sectors, will last for the remainder of the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-85); it was originally scheduled to run three years, 1979-81. This suggests to us that the leadership is aiming for growth of perhaps 5 to 6 percent per year for the rest of the 1980s and 8 to 10 percent thereafter. Hu expressed confidence that a master plan for reform can be designed prior to and implemented during the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-90). [redacted]

Reforms. Although the Congress strongly endorsed the goals of the economic reform program, it frankly acknowledged the abuses and dislocations that have accompanied it. Hu addressed specifically the thorny issues of decentralization of economic decisionmaking, the role of market forces, and China's economic relations with the outside world, all subjects of internal debate. [redacted]

Hu indicated that Beijing will reduce the discretionary powers of local governments and enterprises to invest and allocate scarce inputs. We expect they will

resist, further complicating Beijing's efforts to reassert central control over the economy. He also reiterated that the government intends to curtail "indiscriminate" payment of bonuses to workers and that procurement prices paid to peasants will be tightly controlled. We remain skeptical about the government's ability to do so, as similar efforts the past year have failed. [redacted]

In keeping with the general theme of reasserting more central control over the economy, the Congress stressed the paramount role of central planning and the "subsidiary" role of market forces. The Congress announced that a three-tiered planning structure will be implemented in China. According to Hu, most of the economy, including most capital and consumer goods, would continue to fall under the direction of the central "mandatory plan." A new "guidance plan" will cover goods whose production and distribution by collective and private enterprises can be guided by "economic levers," such as pricing, fiscal, and monetary policies. Market forces, the last tier, will govern seasonal goods and small commodities produced and sold locally. The Congress did not elaborate on how these three plans will mesh, when the system will go into effect, or exactly which sectors of the economy will fall under each component. The apparent complexity of this system and China's lack of experience with what will be a fundamentally new management structure for the economy suggests to us that successful implementation will be a long time in coming. [redacted]

The Congress reaffirmed China's commitment to an open-door economic policy and a "vigorous expansion of foreign trade." Hu made this point a number of times in his address and turned aside criticism from those concerned about foreign influence in China. He acknowledged that contact with capitalists can lead to corruption and bourgeois values, but he insisted that the solution is not to abandon present policy. [redacted]

Ideology

The Congress stressed a pragmatic approach to China's problems and a retreat from Maoist strictures, but also struck a more conservative, classically Leninist, tone on ideological issues. Hu returned repeatedly

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in his address to a lack of popular confidence in Communism and, by extension, the leadership of the party—China's so-called crisis of confidence. In response he stressed a harder line, indicating that anyone who sullies socialism or the party—a reference to China's quarrelsome intellectual and artistic community as well as to widespread antiparty sentiments among the young—can expect harsh treatment. [redacted]

The defensiveness of Hu's comments and an implicit reference to events in Poland underscore our judgment that the leadership as a whole—reformers and conservatives—believe they face a major problem in reviving popular respect for the party. In our view, there are differences within the party on how best to accomplish this rejuvenation. With the specter of Poland in the background, some take the view that a more open system, a responsive party, and other domestic reforms provide the best solution. Others see the need to crack down hard against all sources of potential disruption. The central party leadership has attempted to placate both groups, to the general satisfaction of neither. [redacted]

In the ideological realm, we believe the party will continue its movement toward more orthodox Marxism-Leninism. To shore up the party's image, propaganda extolling socialist values will attempt to persuade the Chinese of their superior system. More important, however, is the tightening up that is almost certain to accompany the propaganda campaign. We expect recent party and government decrees that discourage contact between private Chinese and foreigners will be strictly enforced and perhaps supplemented. The dangers of bourgeois values will remain a prominent topic, as will unfavorable characterizations of life in the West. We expect to see preparations for the coming rectification campaign stress orthodox themes that will reinforce this trend. [redacted]

Foreign Policy

Deng's opening speech to the Congress reflected extreme sensitivity toward issues involving Chinese sovereignty and independence, and we believe Deng struck an aggressive posture on this score in part to preempt critics of his handling of foreign affairs. Deng has repeatedly been forced by conservative



Deng Xiaoping, architect of the Congress and its policies, remains the most powerful man in China despite his claims of "retiring to the second line." [redacted]

elements in the leadership to defend his "open-door" policy publicly over the past year and to make adjustments giving his policy a more independent cast, less biased toward the West. The policy statement approved by the Congress endorsed this new line in terms free of doctrinaire ideology that focused instead on the concrete problems in China's relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries. [redacted]

The line adopted in Deng's speech and Hu's report did not depart significantly from that evolved over the past two years. With added emphasis on the Taiwan issue, Deng repeated in the same priority the goals for the decade first enunciated in 1980: "to intensify socialist modernization, to strive for reunification and particularly for the return of Taiwan to the motherland, and to combat hegemonism and safeguard world peace." [redacted]

Relations With the United States, USSR. The detailed portions of Hu's report asserted China's interest in expanding relations with the United States, but indicated that relations will develop "only if" the United States adheres to the provisions of the US-China communique on arms sales to Taiwan. This recapitulates the line taken when the communique was announced in August. In a statement by the Foreign Ministry spokesman, and in a *People's Daily* editorial, the Chinese hold that the Taiwan Relations Act remains a "cloud" over the relationship that forces Beijing to monitor US arms sales closely. [redacted]

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Policy toward the USSR similarly followed lines evolved over the past year. Beijing enumerated the USSR's "grave threats to the peace of Asia and to China's security"—Soviet armed forces on China's borders, support for Vietnam, and the invasion of Afghanistan. Hu echoed the Foreign Ministry's earlier response to General Secretary Brezhnev's call for improving relations in Tashkent last March by saying: "We note the Soviet leaders have expressed more than once the desire to improve relations with China. But deeds, rather than words, are important." Hu called for "practical steps to lift their threat" to China's security. The 1977 Congress document similarly called for deeds rather than words. [redacted]

The Congress, nonetheless, reaffirmed China's willingness to "safeguard and develop" friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples. We believe this formulation provides justification for continuing and expanding low-level contacts with Moscow begun early this year. Beijing agreed to exploratory discussions with Moscow at the vice foreign minister level, thus resuming the contacts interrupted in early 1980 after the invasion of Afghanistan. We believe the Chinese awaited the outcome of discussions with the United States over Taiwan before agreeing to meet with the Soviets. In our view, Deng may also have believed that timing his reply during the party Congress would offset criticism of his handling of the communique and foreign affairs generally. [redacted]

Fraternal Parties. Hu's report repeated the recent themes of China's ecumenical approach toward other Communist parties. The report stressed that each party operates under specific conditions and cannot give or accept directions from outside. This is meant in part to reassure Southeast Asia where several states remain nervous about Beijing's refusal to break ties with indigenous Communist parties and concerned about potential Chinese assistance to these insurgencies. It also tones down the strident language contained in the 1977 Congress document. [redacted]

Hu said the Chinese party is willing to learn from "all" parties on a basis of equality and noninterference, probably a hint of interest in relations with the Soviet-dominated East Europeans who do not have party relations with Beijing. Beijing has long pursued,



General Secretary Hu Yaobang, Deng's chosen successor.

[redacted]

to Moscow's annoyance, a "differentiated approach" to the Soviet and East European parties, refusing all dealings with the Soviet party while sounding out its satellites. Hu's report reinforced this distinction in an unmistakable reference to Moscow that reminded the Congress "our party has suffered from the attempt of a self-elevated paternal party to keep us under control." [redacted]

Prospects

Since proclaiming the reform agenda in speeches in 1980, Deng and his allies have, we believe, made great progress in putting the past behind them by producing a party judgment on Mao Zedong and publicly trying the Gang of Four and Lin Biao's followers. This year's reorganization of the party, government, and Army bureaucracies marked a long stride toward rejuvenation of the upper stratum of China's officialdom. Their gains notwithstanding, we believe Deng and Hu have their work cut out for them in coming months. The Congress endorsed their policies and made some personnel shifts that will help, but major obstacles remain. [redacted]

Rectification

The rectification campaign slated to begin next year will be Hu Yaobang's opportunity to clean house at the middle and lower levels of the party. These have remained largely untouched since the Cultural Revolution, and we believe they constitute a source of opposition to reform through foot dragging, inaction, and even outright resistance. The patronage networks

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that extend downward from Ye and Li to these levels would not have disappeared even if the two elderly leaders quietly retired, but we believe their obstinate refusal to do so will stiffen the resistance of their hangers-on. [REDACTED]

Even with the three years allotted by the reformers for the campaign, we expect the rectification will be a contentious, difficult process. Hu Yaobang may be forced to compromise on policy to pursue his enemies and promote his followers. We expect that Ye, Li, and the forces of conservatism they represent in the party will continue to keep pressure on Hu, inhibit reformist initiatives, and force a hard line on some social and political issues, including foreign policy. [REDACTED]

The Army

Deng's efforts to professionalize and depoliticize the military are in the beginning stage and have produced only limited results so far. The resistance of soldier-politicians at the top has forced Deng to adopt circuitous means to reform the military. We believe this process will probably require more time than Deng has. As a result, we expect Hu Yaobang will still face suspicion in the military by the time Deng leaves the scene. Up to now, Hu has demonstrated a preference for accommodation over confrontation with powerful adversaries. He may well try to win support by moving toward the positions of conservative Army leaders on policy questions, restoring and supplementing the Army budget, and adjusting the reform agenda for the Army. [REDACTED]

The Economy

While it endorsed reform, the Congress did little to clarify specific economic policies, and we believe they will continue to be a major focus of discussion and dissension in the coming year. The lack of specifics about the development program and the delay of economic management reforms until after 1985 underline that three years of experimentation have left the Chinese still "groping" for solutions. [REDACTED]

We expect the National People's Congress (NPC) later this year to focus on this problem. At a minimum, it should provide further details on economic goals. A fuller version of the 1982 economic plan and a preview of the 1983 plan are likely, and the NPC

apparently plans to finalize and adopt the Sixth Five-Year Plan. We doubt that full details of this plan will be made public. Nor do we expect to learn much more about economic management reform because the implementation of that initial program has been pushed back to at least 1986, the start of the Seventh Plan. Chinese leaders must also find a way to mesh economic reform and the upcoming rectification program so that economic performance does not suffer as it has during past campaigns. [REDACTED]

The Crisis of Confidence

We believe that restoring the party's image may be the most difficult issue to make progress on. The solution offered at the Congress—more ideological education and exhortation—is unlikely to produce significant results in our view. Other campaigns, such as the one against corruption, that are designed to restore popular confidence in the party, seem to have just the opposite effect and drive home its shortcomings. [REDACTED]

The clear trend we see in coping with this issue is toward stifling all real and potential criticism. Deng and Hu, who generally sympathize with intellectuals, have in the past favored some loosening of strictures. We believe they no longer can do so lest their opponents accuse them of fostering dissent. [REDACTED]

As practice in the Soviet Union has demonstrated, once such a crackdown begins, it is very difficult to ease the situation later. We believe this tendency, combined with Hu Yaobang's evident need to bargain with opponents in order to secure his position, will significantly reduce the pace and scope of reforms over the next several years. Senior reformers, including Deng and Hu, appear to appreciate the interrelationship between the failure to reform and the party's declining prestige. Nonetheless, we believe they have little choice but to act first to preserve their positions atop the leadership and only then to grapple with the ills of the society and economy. [REDACTED]

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
Appendix A

Figure 1
Composition of the 12th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee

Approximate Percentages

- Civilian
- Military

348 Members



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

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Figure 2
Composition of Selected Past Chinese Communist
Party Central Committees



Approximate Percentages

- Civilian
- Military



8th Central Committee
 (elected 1956)





9th Central Committee
 (elected 1969)





10th Central Committee
 (elected 1973)



11th Central Committee
 (elected 1977)



12th Central Committee
 (elected 1982)



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
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Figure 3
Percentage of Provincial Military and Civilians
on Selected Past Chinese Communist Party
Central Committees


Approximate Percentages

- Civilian
- Military


9th Central Committee





10th Central Committee



11th Central Committee



12th Central Committee



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
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Figure 4
Newly Elected and Reelected Provincial Figures
on Selected Past Chinese Communist Central Committees


Approximate Percentages

- Civilian
- Military


10th Central Committee



11th Central Committee



12th Central Committee



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Appendix B**Highlights of Hu Yaobang's Report to the 12th Party Congress, 1 September 1982⁶****Mao, Hua, and the Cultural Revolution**

The "left" mistakes made before and during the Cultural Revolution had a deep and extensive influence and caused serious damage. . . This unavoidably involved the mistakes made by Comrade Mao Zedong in his later years. Comrade Mao Zedong's contributions to the Chinese revolution were great and indelible; that is why over long years he enjoyed enormous prestige in the party and among the people and will continue to do so in the years to come. . . During the two years before the third plenary session of the 11th Central Committee, the question of rights and wrongs in the party's guiding ideology was not clarified as it should have been and the work of setting things to rights proceeded haltingly; this was because in the early days after the smashing of the Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary clique, our party was not ideologically prepared for an overall liquidation of the "left" mistakes and also because the principal leading comrade (that is, Hua Guofeng) in the Central Committee at the time continued to make "left" mistakes on a series of important issues.

Class Struggle

It is wrong, in a socialist society where the system of exploitation has been abolished and the exploiting classes have been eliminated, to declare and act on the principle of "taking class struggle as the key link." . . However, within certain limits, class struggle will continue to exist for a long time and may even sharpen under certain conditions. This is not only because pernicious influences left over by the exploitative systems and classes cannot be eradicated within a short time, but also because we have not yet achieved our goal of reunifying our motherland and other forces hostile to our socialist cause will seek to corrupt us and harm our country.

The Crisis of Confidence in Communism

The decade of domestic turmoil confounded the criteria of right and wrong, good and evil, and beauty and ugliness. It is much more difficult to undo its grave spiritual consequences than its material ones. For this and other reasons, many serious problems concerning standards of social conduct now exist in our country. The Central Committee of the party is determined to effect a fundamental turn for the better in standards of social conduct in the next five years.

The view that Communism is but a "dim illusion" and that it "has not been tested in practice" is utterly wrong. There is Communism everywhere in our daily life, of which it forms an inseparable part.

All the splendid successes of the party and the people have been achieved precisely through the inspiring example given by such a fine core of members of the party. This is the principal aspect of our party, and whoever fails to see it, or deliberately denies it, is committing a grave error.

⁶ Notes in parentheses added.

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(If we believe otherwise) we will not be able to safeguard the socialist orientation of China's modernization, and our socialist society will lose its ideals and objectives, its spiritual motivation and fighting will lose the ability to resist the inroad of corrupt influences and even develop distortedly and degenerate. Comrades, this is not just alarmist talk but a conclusion drawn from present realities at home and abroad (for example, Poland).

The establishment of the socialist system makes it possible for us to build a high level of socialist spiritual civilization while striving for a high level of material civilization, just as the development of a modern economy to a certain level and the appearance of the most advanced class of our time, the working class, and its vanguard, the Communist Party, make it possible to succeed in socialist spiritual civilization which, in its turn, gives a tremendous impetus to the former and ensures its correct orientation. Each is the condition and objective of the other.

The Economy

Of the various tasks for bringing about an all-round new situation, the most important one is to push forward the socialist modernization of China's economy . . . The general objective of China's economic construction for the two decades between 1981 and the end of this century . . . is to quadruple the gross annual value of industrial and agricultural production—from 710 billion yuan in 1980 to 2,800 billion yuan or so in 2000.

In the period of the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-85) . . . We must devote our main efforts to readjusting the economic structure in various fields, streamlining, reorganizing, and merging the existing enterprises and carrying out technical transformation in selected enterprises . . . During the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-90), we shall carry out the technical transformation of enterprises on an extensive scale and gradually reform the system of economic administration, in addition to completing the rationalization of the organizational structure in various fields . . . Therefore, it will not be possible for the national economy to develop very fast in this decade. But if we complete the above tasks, we can solve the problems left over from the past and build a relatively solid basis for economic growth in the decade to follow. The 1990s will witness an all-round upsurge in China's economy which will definitely grow at a much faster rate than in the 1980s . . . In the five years between this party Congress and the next . . . we must achieve significantly better economic results, a steady basic balance in finance and credit and basic stability in commodity prices.

A basic principle guiding our economic work is "first, feed the people and second, build the country."

In many fields, the economic results have been far from satisfactory, and there has been appalling waste in production, construction, and circulation . . . Apart from some objective factors not subject to comparison, the main causes for this are the "left" mistakes of the past, which resulted in blind proliferation of enterprises, an irrational economic structure, defective systems of economic administration and distribution, chaotic operation and management, and backward production techniques.

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Economic Reform

In the past few years, we have initiated a number of reforms in the economic system by extending the powers of enterprises in planning and by giving scope to the role of market regulation. This orientation is correct and its gains are apparent. However, as some reform measures have not been well coordinated with each other and the corresponding forms of administrative work have lagged behind, cases of weakening and hampering the state's unified planning have been on the increase. This is not good for the normal growth of the national economy. Hereafter, while continuing to give play to the role of market regulation, we must on no account neglect or relax unified leadership through state planning.

The responsibility system for production set up in various forms in the countryside in recent years has further emancipated the productive forces and it must be adhered to for a long time to come. The thing for us to do is to gradually perfect it on the basis of summing up the practical experience of the masses. In no case must we make rash changes against the will of the masses, still less must we backtrack.

Recently, the economic responsibility system has also been initiated in industrial and commercial enterprises with some good results. Although industry and commerce are vastly different from agriculture, the application for the economic responsibility system (including the system of responsibility for profit or loss in some of the state enterprises) similarly helps to implement the Marxist principle of material benefit, to heighten the workers' sense of responsibility as masters of the country and to promote production.

Bonuses and Subsidies

We can no longer increase peasant incomes mainly through raising the prices of farm produce or through lowering the fixed quotas of state purchases and enlarging the scope of negotiated prices. The increase of the average incomes of the workers and staff must necessarily be less than that of labor productivity. We must put a stop to the indiscriminate handing out of bonuses and subsidies without regard to actual state of production and profit.

Economic Principles

To bring about an all-round upsurge of China's socialist economy, we must continue to carry out in all our economic work the 10 principles for economic construction approved by the Fifth National People's Congress at its fourth session, paying special attention to solving the following major questions of principle. First, concentrating funds on key development projects and continuing to improve the people's living standards . . . Second, upholding the leading position of the state economy and developing diverse economic forms . . . Third, correctly implementing the principle of the leading role of the planned economy and the supplementary role of market regulation. Fourth, persevering in self-reliance while expanding economic and technological exchanges with foreign countries.

Economic Planning and the Role of the Market

Planning should take different forms in different circumstances. Plans of a mandatory nature must be enforced in regard to the production and distribution of capital goods and consumer goods in the state sector which are vital to the national economy and the people's livelihood, and especially in key enterprises vital to the

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whole economy . . . In addition to plans of a mandatory nature, guidance plans, whose implementation is mainly ensured by means of economic levers, should be used in regard to many products and enterprises . . . As for a number of small commodities which are low in output value, great in variety produced, and supplied only seasonally and locally, it is neither necessary nor possible for the state to control them all by planning. Enterprises may be allowed to arrange their production flexibly in accordance with the changes in market supply and demand . . . We must correctly define the respective scope and limits of mandatory plans, guidance plans and market regulation and, on the premise that basic stability of commodity prices is maintained, gradually reform the pricing systems, and establish an economic administrative system suited to China's conditions so as to ensure the healthy growth of the national economy.

Population Growth

Family planning is a basic policy of our state. We must do our utmost to keep our population within 1.2 billion by the end of this century.

Reforming the Party

A grave problem at present is that in quite a number of organizations party discipline has slackened, right and wrong are confounded, rewards and punishments are misused and there is failure to criticize or punish when necessary. This is a problem of long standing, and no marked improvement has yet occurred in some places . . . Local party committees and party commissions for discipline inspection at all levels have attained notable results in their major efforts to uphold party discipline and correct the style of the party. But they have met considerable, and in some cases, shocking, obstruction in their work.

To solve correctly the question of party leadership over government organs and over enterprises and institutions is a highly important task in the organizational reform. It is necessary to achieve a proper division of labor between the party and the government and between party work and administrative and production work in enterprises and institutions. The party is not an organ of power which issues orders to the people, nor is it an administrative or production organization. The party should, of course, exercise leadership over production, construction, and work in all other fields . . . But party leadership is mainly political and ideological leadership in matters of principle and policy and in the selection, allocation, assessment, and supervision of cadres. It should not be equated with administrative work and the direction of production by government organizations and enterprises.

The stipulation in the new party constitution that "the party must conduct its activities within the limits permitted by the constitution and the laws of the state" embodies a most important principle. It is impermissible for any party organization or member, from the Central Committee down to the grass roots, to act in contravention of the constitution and laws. The party is part of the people. It leads them in making the constitution and laws, which once adopted by the supreme organ of state power, must be strictly observed by the whole party.

The new party constitution explicitly stipulates that the party "forbids all forms of personality cult."

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The practices of "what one person says goes" and of each going his own way are no longer allowed.

During the organizational reform, we will relieve our many veteran cadres who are advanced in age of their heavy responsibilities in "frontline" posts and at the same time enable them to continue their service to the party, the state, and society by utilizing their rich experience in leadership work.

In the future, in our use and promotion of cadres, we must attach importance to educational background and academic records as well as to experience and achievements in work.

Party Rectification

The pernicious influences of the 10 years of domestic turmoil have not yet been eradicated, and there has been some increase in the corrosive inroads of exploiting-class ideologies under new conditions. It is true that impurities in ideology, style, and organization still exist within the party and that no fundamental turn for the better has been made in our party style. In the leadership work of some party organizations, signs of flabbiness and lack of unity abound.

To achieve a fundamental turn for the better in the style of our party, the Central Committee has decided on an overall rectification of party style and consolidation of party organizations, which will proceed by stages and by groups over a period of three years beginning from the latter half of 1983. This task will undoubtedly be of primary importance to the party.

In matters of organization and leadership, the consolidation will start with the leading organs and cadres and then proceed, from top to bottom, with the leading bodies at different levels which have already been consolidated leading the consolidation of the subordinate and primary organizations. Bad elements must on no account be permitted to take this as an opportunity to frame and attack good people. We must act in, and develop further, the spirit of the Yan'an rectification movement of 1942, follow its principle of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient" and its twofold objective of "clarity in ideology and unity among comrades" in unfolding earnest criticism and self-criticism, and take appropriate measures to solicit opinions from the masses outside the party. In the final stage, there will be a reregistration of all party members and, in strict accordance with the provisions of the new party constitution, those who still fail to meet the requirements for membership after education shall be expelled from the party or asked to withdraw from it. At the same time, concrete measures should be worked out to strengthen and improve party leadership so as to effect an improvement in the work of party organizations at all levels.

As for persons who rose to prominence by "rebellion," who are seriously factionalist in their ideas, who have indulged in beating, smashing, and looting, who oppose the line followed by the party's Central Committee since its third plenary session, or who have seriously violated the law and discipline, we must remove with a firm hand those among them who are still in leading posts. Persons

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who have violated criminal law must be investigated and dealt with according to law. Such people, of course, must never be put up as candidates for promotion to leading posts.

Party Organization

According to the draft constitution, the Central Committee is to have no chairman but only a general secretary, who will convene meetings of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee and preside over the work of the Secretariat. Advisory committees are to be established at the central and provincial levels to give our many veteran comrades rich in political experience a role as consultants in the service of the party's cause. Commissions for discipline inspection are to be elected by party congresses at the respective levels and, within limits prescribed by the party constitution, they are to supervise party committees and their members at the respective levels below the Central Committee, and they may report to the Central Committee any breach of party discipline by any of its members.

Party Control of the Military

We must work hard to turn the People's Liberation Army into a regular, modern, and powerful revolutionary armed force and enhance its defense capabilities in modern warfare. . . . We must continue to strengthen the militia. . . . After the new draft constitution is discussed and adopted by the forthcoming National People's Congress, the Central Committee will continue to exercise leadership over our armed forces through the State Central Military Commission which is due to be set up. We must stick to the successful practices which the party has long followed in leading the armed forces.

Intellectuals and Dissent

In the past, owing to the influence of "left" ideas and the small-producer mentality, erroneous views such as underestimation of the importance of education, science, and culture and discrimination against intellectuals were rife in our party over a fairly long time. . . . We are determined to do everything possible to create favorable conditions in which the mass of intellectuals can work with ease of mind and in high spirits in the interest of the people. In this regard, there is still a good deal of painstaking ideological and organizational work to do.

We must lay special stress on the role of the intellectuals, improve the work of ideological and political education among them to suit their special characteristics, and actively recruit into the party intellectuals who are qualified for membership.

While exercising their freedom and rights, citizens must not impair the interests of the state, society, and the collective, or the freedom and rights of others. While we strive to develop socialist democracy, all our measures must help to consolidate the socialist system and promote social production and work in other fields. On no account will hostile, antisocialist elements be given any freedom to carry out sabotage.

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Corruption

Our struggle against grave criminal offenses in the economic sphere is now being intensified. Among those guilty of such crimes, apart from lawbreakers in society at large, are a tiny number of degenerates in party and government organizations and in the armed forces who have been corrupted by capitalist ideology. . . . Such destructive elements must be severely punished by law. We have won some initial successes in this struggle. The whole party must enhance its understanding of this struggle, take a firm stand in it, and unswervingly carry it through to the end. This will be an important guarantee for our adherence to the socialist road.

The ideological, political, and organizational requirements (the) draft constitution sets for party members and cadres are stricter than those in all our previous constitutions. In stipulating the duties of party members, the draft absolutely forbids them to use public office for personal gain or to benefit themselves at the expense of the public interests, and requires that they firmly oppose factionalism and be bold in backing good people and good deeds and in opposing bad people and bad deeds.

Opening to the Outside World

It is our firm strategic principle to carry out the policy of opening to the outside world and expand economic and technological exchanges with foreign countries in accordance with the principles of equality and mutual benefit.

We must refrain from indiscriminate import of equipment, and particularly of consumer goods that can be manufactured and supplied at home. . . . In no circumstances must we forget that capitalist countries and enterprises will never change their capitalist nature simply because they have economic and technological exchanges with us. While pursuing the policy of opening to the outside, we must guard against, and firmly resist, the corrosion of capitalist ideas and we must combat any worship of things foreign or fawning on foreigners.

On the one hand, we must persist in the policy of opening to the outside as well as in our policies for invigorating the economy domestically and, on the other, we must resolutely strike at the grave criminal activities in the economic, political, and cultural spheres that endanger socialism. It would be wrong to attend only to the latter aspect and be skeptical about the former, and it would be dangerous to stress the former aspect to the neglect of the latter. All party comrades must have a clear understanding of this principle without the slightest ambiguity.

Independent Foreign Policy

Being patriots, we do not tolerate any encroachment on China's national dignity or interests. . . . Our adherence to an independent foreign policy accords with the discharging of our lofty international duty to safeguard world peace and promote human progress. . . . China never attaches itself to any big power or group of powers, and never yields to pressure from any big power. . . . The Chinese people will never again allow themselves to be humiliated as they were before, nor will they subject other nations to such humiliation.

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Relations With the United States

Since the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and the United States of America in 1978, relations between the two countries have developed in the interests of the two peoples. . . . However, a cloud has all along hung over the relations between the two countries. This is because the United States, despite having recognized that the Government of the People's Republic of China is China's sole legal government and that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China, has passed the Taiwan Relations Act which contravenes the principles embodied in the joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations, and it has continued to sell arms to Taiwan, treating Taiwan as an independent political entity. . . . Sino-US relations can continue to develop soundly only if the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in each other's internal affairs are truly adhered to.

State Relations With the Soviet Union

The relations between China and the Soviet Union were friendly over a fairly long period. They have become what they are today because the Soviet Union has pursued a hegemonist policy. For the past 20 years, the Soviet Union has stationed massive armed forces along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders. It has supported Vietnam in the latter's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea, acts of expansion in Indochina and Southeast Asia, and constant provocations along China's border. Moreover, it has invaded and occupied Afghanistan, a neighbor of China, by force of arms. All these acts constitute grave threats to the peace of Asia and to China's security. We note that Soviet leaders have expressed more than once the desire to improve relations with China. But deeds, rather than words, are important. If the Soviet authorities really have a sincere desire to improve relations with China and take practical steps to lift their threat to the security of our country, it will be possible for Sino-Soviet relations to move toward normalization. The friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples is of long standing, and we will strive to safeguard and develop this friendship, no matter what Sino-Soviet state relations are like.

Party-to-Party Ties

Our party develops its relations with other Communist or working-class parties in strict conformity with Marxism and the principles of independence, complete equality, mutual respect, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs. . . . Communist parties should of course help each other, but it is absolutely impermissible for any of them to issue orders or run things for others from the outside. Any attempt by one party to impose its views on other parties or interfere in their internal affairs can only lead to setbacks or failures in the revolutions of the countries concerned. As for the practice of one party compelling other parties to make their policies serve its own party and state policies, or even resorting to armed intervention in other countries, it can only undermine the very foundation of the international Communist movement. . . . We hold that all Communist parties should respect each other . . . we wish to establish similar contacts with a greater number of progressive parties and organizations.

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Relations With Japan

Japan is China's neighbor. . . . The Japanese militarists unleashed one war of aggression after another against China. . . . Now some forces in Japan are whitewashing the past Japanese aggressions against China and other East Asian countries and are carrying out activities for the revival of Japanese militarism. . . . Together with the Japanese people and with far-sighted Japanese public figures in and out of government, we will work to eliminate all hindrances to the relations between our two countries and make the friendship between our two peoples flourish from generation to generation.

Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao

At this point, it should be emphasized that our party faces yet another historic task, that of joining hands with all our patriotic fellow countrymen in a common endeavor to accomplish the sacred task of reunifying our motherland. Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of our motherland, and the people in Taiwan are our kith and kin. . . . It is China's internal affair with which no foreign country has the right to interfere. We hope that our compatriots in Taiwan, Xianggang (Hong Kong), and Aomen (Macao) and Chinese nationals residing abroad will urge the Kuomintang authorities to take a realistic view of the situation and put the future of our country and the interests of the nation above all else, instead of persisting in their obdurate stand, so that talks between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party may be held at an early date and, together, we can bring about the peaceful reunification of our motherland.

Policy on Insurgencies

. . . Revolution cannot be exported but can occur only by the choice of the people of the country concerned. It is on the basis of this understanding that we have always abided by the five principles of peaceful coexistence. We do not station a single soldier abroad, nor have we occupied a single inch of foreign land. We have never infringed upon the sovereignty of another country, or imposed an unequal relationship upon it. In no circumstances will we seek hegemony.

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Appendix C

Appointments and Dismissals

Appointments

New appointments are indicated by an asterisk. An (f) indicates female. Date of appointment is in parentheses, and other major posts held are given for Politburo and Secretariat members.

Politburo	Standing Committee
	Hu Yaobang General Secretary, Chinese Communist Party (Feb 1980)
	Ye Jianying Vice Chairman, Military Commission, (Nov 1966) Chairman, National People's Congress (Mar 1978)
	Deng Xiaoping Chairman, Advisory Committee (Sep 1982) Chairman, Military Commission (Jun 1981) Chairman, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (Mar 1978)
	Zhao Ziyang Premier, State Council (Sep 1980) Minister in Charge, State Commission for Restructuring of the Economic System (May 1982)
	Li Xiannian
	Chen Yun First Secretary, Discipline Inspection Commission (Dec 1978)
	Full Members
	Deng Yingchao Vice Chairman, Standing Committee, National People's Congress (Mar 1978) Honorary Chairman, All-China Women's Federation (Sep 1978)
	Fang Yi Minister in Charge, State Scientific and Technological Commission (Aug 1979) State Councilor (May 1982)
	*Hu Qiaomu Vice Chairman, Legislative Affairs Commission, National People's Congress (Jun 1979)
	Li Desheng Commander, Shenyang Military Region (Dec 1973) First Secretary, CCP Committee, Shenyang Military Region (Jun 1977)
	*Liao Chengzhi Vice Chairman, National People's Congress (Mar 1978) Director, Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs (Apr 1978)
	Ni Zhifu Chairman, All-China Federation of Trade Unions (Oct 1978)
	Nie Rongzhen Vice Chairman, Military Commission (Mar 1961)
	Peng Zhen Vice Chairman, National People's Congress (Jul 1979)
	*Song Renqiong Director, Organization Department of the party (Jan 1979)
	Ulanhu Vice Chairman National People's Congress (Mar 1978) Vice Chairman, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (Mar 1978) Vice Minister, State Nationalities Affairs Commission (Sep 1980)
	*Wan Li Member, Secretariat (Feb 1980) Vice Premier, State Council (May 1982)
	Wang Zhen Member, Standing Committee, Military Commission (Sep 1980) President, Party School (May 1982)

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Wei Guoqing	Director, General Political Department, People's Liberation Army (Sep 1977) Vice Chairman, National People's Congress (Mar 1978) Member, Standing Committee, Military Commission (Jul 1981)
*Xi Zhongxun	Member, Secretariat (Jun 1981) Vice Chairman, National People's Congress (Sep 1980)
Xu Xiangqian	Vice Chairman, Military Commission (Nov 1966)
*Yang Dezhi	Chief of Staff, People's Liberation Army (Feb 1980) Member, Standing Committee, Military Commission (Feb 1980) Vice Minister of National Defense (Feb 1980)
*Yang Shangkun	Permanent Vice Chairman, Military Commission (Sep 1982) Vice Chairman, National People's Congress (Sep 1980)
Yu Qiuli	Member, Secretariat (Feb 1980) State Councilor (May 1982)
Zhang Tingfa	Commander, Air Force, People's Liberation Army (Apr 1977) Member, Standing Committee, Military Commission (Jul 1981)

Alternate Members

Chen Muhua	Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (Mar 1982) State Councilor (May 1982)
*Qin Jiwei	Commander, Beijing Military Region (Jan 1980)
*Yao Yilin	Vice Premier, State Council (Jul 1979) Minister in Charge, State Planning Commission (Aug 1980)

Secretariat**Full Members**

*Chen Pixian	First Secretary, Hubei Party Committee (Aug 1978) Chairman, Hubei Provincial People's Congress (Jan 1980) Political Commissar, Wuhan Military Region (Jun 1979) First Political Commissar, Hubei Military District (Mar 1980)
*Deng Liqun	Vice President, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Mar 1978) Director, Policy Research Office of the Secretariat (Mar 1981) Director, Propaganda Department of the Party (May 1982)
Gu Mu	State Councilor (May 1982)
*Hu Qili	Director, General Office of the Party (May 1982)
Wan Li	Member, Politburo (Sep 1982) Vice Premier, State Council (Apr 1980)
Xi Zhongxun	Member, Politburo (Sep 1982) Vice Chairman National People's Congress (Sep 1980)
*Yang Yong	Member, Standing Committee, Military Commission (Feb 1980) Deputy Chief of Staff, People's Liberation Army (Sep 1977)
Yao Yilin	Alternate Member, Politburo (Sep 1982) Vice Premier, State Council (Jul 1979) Minister-in-Charge, State Planning Commission (Aug 1980)
Yu Qiuli	Member, Politburo (Aug 1977) State Councilor (May 1982)

Alternate Members

*Hao Jianxiu	Minister of Textile Industry (Mar 1981)
*Qiao Shi	Director, International Liaison Department of the Party (Apr 1982)

Average Ages of the Politburo and the Secretariat

Politburo: 72	Standing Committee: 74 Members: 73 Alternates: 66
Secretariat: 65	Members: 67 Alternates: 53

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Discipline Inspection Commission	Standing Committee	First Secretary	Chen Yun
		Second Secretary	Huang Kecheng
		Permanent Secretary	Wang Heshou
		Secretaries	Wang Congwu Han Guang Li Chang Ma Guorui Han Tianshui
Military Commission		Members	Cai Shunli Chen Yun Han Guang Han Tianshui Huang Kecheng Li Chang Li Zhengting Li Zhilian Ma Guorui Wang Congwu Wang Heshou
		Chairman	Deng Xiaoping
		Vice Chairmen	Ye Jianying Xu Xiangqian Nie Rongzhen
		Permanent Vice Chairman	Yang Shangkun
Full Members of the 12th Central Committee	An Pingsheng	*Hu Hong	Liao Hansheng
	Bai Dongcai	Hu Lijiao	Lin Hujia
	Basang (f) (Tibetan)	Hu Qiaomu	Lin Liyun (f)
	*Buhe (Mongolian)	*Hu Qili	*Lin Ruo
	*Chen Bin	*Hu Sheng	*Lin Fuzhi
	Chen Fuhan	Hu Yaobang	*Liu Huaqing
	Chen Guodong	Hua Guofeng	*Liu Lin
	*Chen Lei	Huang Hua	Liu Zhen
	Chen Muhua (f)	Huang Xinting	*Liu Zhengwei
	Chen Pixian	Huang Zhizhen	Liu Zhenhua
	Chen Puru	Ismail Amat (Uyghur)	Liu Zhijian
	*Chen Renhong	Jiang Nanxiang	Lu Dadong
	Chen Weida	Jiang Yonghui	*Lu Peijian
	*Chen Xitong	*Jiang Zemin	Luo Qingchang
	Chen Yun	Jiao Linyi	Ma Wenrui
	Chi Biqing	Kang Keqing (f)	Ma Xingyuan
	*Cho Nam Qi (Korean)	Kang Shien	Mao Zhiyong
	*Cui Naifu	Li Desheng	*Mo Wenxiang
	*Cui Yueli	*Li Dongye	*Mu Qing (Hui)
	Dai Suli	*Li Lian	Ni Zhifu
	*Deng Jiaxian	*Li Ligong	Nie Rongzhen
	*Deng Liqun	*Li Menghua	Peng Chong
	Deng Xiaoping	*Li Peng	*Peng Zhen
	Deng Yingchao (f)	Li Qiming	*Qian Yongchang
	Fang Yi	*Li Rui	Qian Zhengying (f)
	*Fu Kuiqing	*Li Ruihuan	*Qiang Xiaochu
	*Gao Yangwen	*Li Senmao	*Qiao Shi
	Gu Mu	Li Xiannian	Qiao Xiaoguang
	Gu Xiulian (f)	*Li Ximing	*Qin Chuan
	*Guo Liwen (f)	*Li Xipu	Qin Jiwei
	*Han Peixin	*Li Xue	Qin Yingji (Zhuang)
	Han Xianchu	Li Xuezhi	*Qin Zhongda
	Hao Jianxiu (f)	Li Yaowen	Raidi (Tibetan)
	*He Dongchang	*Li Ziqi	Rao Xingli
*He Jingzhi	Liang Biye	Ren Zhongyi	
*He Jinheng	*Liang Buting	Scypidin (Uyghur)	
*He Kang	*Liang Lingguang	*Shen Tu	
Hong Xuezhi	Liao Chengzhi	*Shen Yinluo	

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Song Ping	Wei Guoqing (Zhuang)	Ye Jianying
Song Renqiong	*Wu Jinghua (Yi)	*Yin Fatang
*Su Gang	Wu Qianqing	*Yin Yuan
Su Yiran	Wu Xueqian	You Taizhong
*Sun Daguang	Xi Zhongxun	*Yu Hongen
Tan Qilong	*Xiang Nan	Yu Mingtao
Tan Shanhe	*Xiang Shouzhi	Yu Qiuli
*Tan Youlin	Xiao Han	Yuan Baohua
Tang Ke	Xiao Hua	Zhang Aiping
*Tian Jiyun	*Xiao Quanfu	Zhang Jingfu
Tie Ying	*Xie Feng	*Zhang Shou
*Tomur Dawamat (Uyгур)	Xie Xide (f)	*Zhang Shuguang
Ulanhu (Mongolian)	*Xie Zhenhua	Zhang Tingfa
Wan Da	Xing Yanzi (f)	*Zhang Zaiwang
*Wan Haifeng	Xu Jiatus	*Zhang Ze
Wan Li	*Xu Shaofu	Zhang Zhen
*Wang Bingqian	Xu Xiangqian	Zhang Zhixiu
*Wang Chaowen (Miao)	*Xue Ju	Zhao Cangbi
*Wang Chenghan	*Yan Dongsheng	*Zhao Haifeng
*Wang Chonglun	*Yang Bo	*Zhao Shouyi
Wang Enmao	Yang Chengwu	Zhao Xingyuan
*Wang Fang	Yang Dezhi	Zhao Zhijian
Wang Guangyu	*Yang Dezhong	Zhao Ziyang
*Wang Guangzhong	*Yang Di	Zheng Sansheng
*Wang Hanbin	Yang Jingren (Hui)	*Zheng Tuobin
Wang Heshou	*Yang Rudai	Zhou Hui
*Wang Kewen	Yang Shangkun	*Zhou Jiannan
Wang Meng	Yang Yichen	*Zhou Shizhong
*Wang Quanguo	Yang Yong	Zhou Zijian
Wang Renzhong	*Yao Guang	Zhu Guangya
*Wang Zhaoguo	Yao Yilin	Zhu Muzhi
Wang Zhen	Ye Fei	*Zhu Yunqian

Alternate Members of the 12th Central Committee	*An Zhiwen	Li Changan	Ma Sizhong (Hui)
	*Wang Jinshan	*Li Feng	*Ma Weihua
	*Batubagen (Mongolian)	*Li Gang	*Ma Zhongchen
	*Chen Suzhi (f) (Manchu)	Li Huamin	*Nian Dexiang (Hui)
	*Chen Ying	*Li Huifen (f)	*Nie Kuiju
	*Chen Zuolin	*Li Jijun	*Pan Rongwen (f)
	*Ding Fengying (f)	*Li Ming	*Peng Shilu
	*Dong Jichang	Li Ruishan	*Qian Qichen
	*Dong Zhanlin	*Li Shoushan	Qian Xuesen
	*Fang Weizhong	*Li Shuzheng (f)	*Qiao Xueting
	*Gaisang Doje (Tibetan)	*Li Tiesing	Ren Rong
	*Gao Dezhao	*Liang Chengye (Zhuang)	*Song Jian
	Gao Houliang	*Liang Dongcai	*Sun Guozhi
	*Gao Zhanxiang	*Lin Jianqing	*Sun Weiben
	Gong Benyan	*Lin Yincai	*Tang Zhongwen
	*Han Ruijie	Liu Guiqian	*Tian Shixing
	*Han Xu	*Liu Guoguang	Wang Dongxing
	*He Guangyuan	*Liu Haiqing	Wang Fuzhi
	*He Zhukang	*Liu Hongru	*Wang Jialiu (f)
	*Hei Boli (Hui)	Liu Minghui	*Wang Jiangong
	*Hu Jintao	*Liu Shusheng (Hui)	Wang Linhe
	*Hu Ping	Liu Weiming	Wang Liusheng
	*Huang Demao	*Liu Yi	Wang Meng
	*Huang Ganying (f)	*Liu Youfa	Wang Qian
	*Huang Shu	*Liu Yujie (f)	*Wang Qun
	Janabil (Kazak)	*Lu Gongxun	*Wang Renzhi
	*Jiang Minkuan	*Lu Liangshu	*Wang Xuechen
	*Jiang Xiesheng	*Lu Maozeng	*Wang Yuefeng (Li)
	*Jiang Xinxiong	*Luo Gan	*Wei Jianxing
	*Jin Baosheng (Yao)	*Luo Shangcai (Buyi)	*Wei Jinshan
*Lang Dazhong (Dai)	*Ma Hong	*Wei Mingyi	
*Li Bing (f)	Ma Ming	Wu Lengxi	

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*Wu Weiran	Yang Yongliang	*Zhang Wannian
*Wu Wenyang (f)	*Yang Zhengwu (Tujia)	*Zhang Wanxin
Wu Xiangbi (Miao)	*Yangling Doje (Tibetan)	*Zhang Xiang
*Wu Zuqiang	*Ye Xuanping	*Zhang Xintai
*Xie Fei	*Yin Changmin (f)	*Zhang Xudeng
*Xing Chongzhi	*Yin Jun (Bai)	*Zhao Dongwan
*Xing Zhikang (f)	*Yu Hongli	*Zhao Zongnai
*Xiong Qingquan	Yu Sang	*Zheng Guangdi (f)
*Xu Qin	*Yu Zhenwu	Zhou Aqing
*Xu Xin	*Yuan Fanglie	*Zhou Guangzhao
*Yan Zheng	*Yuan Jun	*Zhu Houze
*Yang Haibo	*Zhang Boxiang	*Zhu Xun
*Yang Taifang	*Zhang Gensheng	Zou Jiahua
*Yang Xizong	*Zhang Jianmin	*Zou Jingmeng

Dismissals

Dropped From the Politburo	Standing Committee	Hua Guofeng	Standing Committee since Apr 1976
	Members	Chen Yonggui Geng Biao Hua Guofeng Liu Bocheng Peng Chong Xu Shiyou	Politburo since Apr 1973 Politburo since Aug 1977 Politburo since Aug 1973 Politburo since Sep 1956 Politburo since Aug 1977 Politburo since Apr 1969
	Alternate Members	Seypidin	Alternate since Aug 1973
Dropped From the Secretariat		Fang Yi Hu Qiaomu Peng Chong Song Renqiong Wang Renzhong Yang Dezhi	All were first appointed in February 1980, when the 5th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee reestablished the Secretariat.
11th Central Committee Full Members on Advisory Commission	Bai Rubing Bo Yibo Cao Lihuai Chen Xilian Chen Zaidao Cheng Zihua Deng Xiaoping Du Yide Duan Junyi Feng Xuan Geng Biao Huang Huoqing Huang Oudong Huang Zhen Huo Shilian Ji Pengfei	Jiang Hua Jiang Weiqing Kong Shiquan Kong Yuan Li Baohua Li Da Li Jingquan Li Qiang Li Renzhi Li Zhimin Liao Zhigao Liu Lantao Lu Dingyi Lu Zhengcao Qian Zhiguang Su Yu	Tan Zhenlin Tian Bao Wang Bicheng Wang Feng Wang Shitai Wang Shoudao Wang Yiping Wu De Wu Xiuquan Xiao Jingguang Xiao Ke Xu Shiyou Zhang Caiqian Zhang Pinghua Zhao Xinchu Zhou Yang
11th Central Committee Alternate Members on Advisory Commission	Du Ping He Jinnian Li Chengfang Li Jianzhen (f) Liu Daosheng	Ren Zhibin Tang Liang Wang Shangrong Wu Kehua	Xiao Wangdong Xu Liqing Zhang Lingbin Zhao Wucheng

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**Full Members Dropped From
the Central Committee**

Baoriledai (f)
Cai Chang (f)
Cai Xiao
Cao Yi'ou (f)
Chen Qihan
Chen Yonggui
Chu Jiang
Dai Guangqian
Ding Guoyu
Ding Keze
Fan Deling
Geng Qichang
Guo Yufeng
Han Guang
Han Ying
He Cheng
Huang Kecheng
Ji Dengkui
Jiang Liyin
Jie Xuegong

Kong Zhaonian
Li Chang
Li Shichun
Li Shuiqing
Li Ziyuan
Liu Bocheng
Liu Chunqiao
Liu Guangtao
Liu Jianxun
Liu Wei
Liu Xichang
Liu Xingyuan
Liu Zihou
Lu Tianji
Lu Yulan (f)
Ma Hui
Nie Fengzhi
Ren Sizhong
Ruan Bosheng
Song Shilun

Su Jing (f)
Wang Chaozhu
Wang Guofan
Wang Maoquan
Wang Mingzhang
Wang Ping
Wang Xiuxiu (f)
Wu Guixian (f)
Xi Houba
Xue Jinda
Yu Hongliang
Zeng Shaoshan
Zeng Siyu
Zhang Fugui
Zhang Fuheng
Zhang Lixian
Zhang Yuhua
Zhou Chunlin
Zhou Jianren
Zong Xiyun

**Alternate Members Dropped
From the Central Committee**


Bu Guxiang
Cai Fenglan (f)
Cao Siming
Cen Guorong
Chen Ai'e (f)
Chen Renfu
Chen Xianrui
Chen Yonglin
Chen Yubao
Cheng Yitai
Ding Changhua
Du Xueran
Feng Pinde
Feng Zhanwu
Guan Zechai
Guo Fenglian (f)
Guo Yaoqing
Hu Jindi (f)
Hu Liangcai
Hu Song
Huang Ronghai
Huang Zuozhen
Ji Guixin
Ji Yinglin
Jiang Baodi (f)
Jiang Xieyuan
Jin Minghan
Kang Lin

Li Jiliang
Li Qiaoyun (f)
Li Rinai
Li Shoulin
Li Yuan
Li Zugen
Liu Chonggui
Liu Ruiqing
Liu Xiyao
Liu Zhiqiang
Lu Cunjie (f)
Lu He
Lu Jinlong
Lu Xuguo
Lu Zhongyang
Ma Jinhua (f)
Mao Xinxian (f)
Mei Songlin
Pan Shixing
Qilinwangdan
Ran Guiying (f)
Renzengwangjie
Ruzi Tu'erdi
Shen Chuyun (f)
Shen Maogong
Song Qingyou
Sun Xuemei (f)
Tan Kebi (f)

Tang Wensheng (f)
Wang Jinling (f)
Wang Jinshan
Wang Jinyou
Wang Junshao
Wei Fengying (f)
Wei Xingzheng
Wen Xianglan (f)
Wu Huojin
Wu Jinquan
Wu Zhong
Xu Biaojun
Xu Chi
Xue Jinlian (f)
Yang Dayi
Yang Fushen (f)
Yang Junsheng
Zhang Huailian
Zhang Jihui
Zhang Linchi
Zhang Yaoci
Zhang Zhidi
Zhao Xuequan
Zhong Fuxiang
Zhu Shaoqing
Zuo Chongyi
Tan Wenzhen (f)
Pan Meiyang (f)

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Figure 5
Organization of the Chinese Communist Party
(12th Congress)



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Appendix E

The Road to the
12th Congress (1977-82)

	Events	Appointments
11th Congress and First Plenum 12-19 August 1977	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ye Jianying speech presents Hua Guofeng as Mao Zedong's chosen successor • Mao's contributions to the revolution praised • Hua Guofeng states focus of party's work should be struggling against Gang of Four followers • Hua presents "Four Modernizations" 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political Bureau Standing Committee: Hua, Ye, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, Wang Dongxing
Second Plenum 18-23 February 1978	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preparations for upcoming National People's Congress 	
Third Plenum 8-22 December 1978	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shift of priority of party's work to economic modernization • First obvious criticism of Mao, stating that no leader is completely free from error • Hua conducts self-criticism, stresses importance of collective leadership, and condemns personality cult • Important political figures rehabilitated: Peng Dehuai, Tao Zhu, Bo Yibo, Yang Shangkun • Prominent use of "seek truth from facts" slogan, and attribution of the idea to Mao • Important agricultural policy decision approved in principle 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hu Yaobang and Chen Yun to Political Bureau, Zhao Ziyang as alternate • Political Bureau Standing Committee: Hua, Ye, Deng, Li, Chen, Wang
Fourth Plenum 25-28 September 1979	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ye Jianying National Day speech discussed, approved • Third Plenum decisions on agricultural policy revised, ratified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Zhao Ziyang moved up to full membership in Political Bureau • Political Bureau Standing Committee remains unchanged
Fifth Plenum 23-29 February 1980	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constitution draft discussed • Party proposes that "four freedoms" be removed from draft state constitution • Party Secretariat reestablished • Party calls for 12th Congress ahead of time (that is, prior to 1982) • Liu Shaoqi rehabilitated, with implicit criticism of Mao 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wang Dongxing dropped from Political Bureau Standing Committee and other party leadership posts; similar fate suffered by other three members of "Little Gang of Four" • Hu and Zhao raised to Political Bureau Standing Committee • Political Bureau Standing Committee: Hua, Ye, Deng, Hu, Zhao, Li, Chen
Sixth Plenum 27-29 June 1981	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Resolution on Historical Questions" passed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hua criticized by name, resigns party and Military Commission chairmanships • Hu made party Chairman • Deng made Military Commission Chairman • Political Bureau Standing Committee: Hu, Ye, Deng, Zhao, Li, Chen, Hua
Seventh Plenum 6 August 1982	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 September date set for 12th Party Congress • Congress agenda approved 	



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