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The Military Factor in Chinese Politics



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A Research Paper

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The Military Factor in Chinese Politics

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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by [redacted] Office
of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
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**The Military Factor
in Chinese Politics**

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Summary

*Information available
as of 28 February 1983
was used in this report.*

The People's Liberation Army (PLA), as represented in politics by a handful of powerful soldier-politicians, has frequently been a locus of opposition to the reform policies associated with Deng Xiaoping. In our analysis, however, during the period of Deng's ascendancy beginning in 1978, what the civilians have asked of the PLA they have generally received. If the army and its leaders at times have gone along reluctantly, they nevertheless have gone along.

We believe the following statements characterize army-party relations and the military factor in Chinese politics today:

- The PLA does not present a solid institutional front in the face of civilian domestic and foreign policy initiatives.
- It is not an aggressively interventionist political actor but is frequently a reluctant partner.
- Civilian party leaders have fashioned policies that are not to the PLA's advantage but have suffered none of the fatal consequences anticipated in some conventional assessments of army-party politics.
- Although the PLA is an important political player, it by itself does not have veto power over Chinese policies or in the political succession to Deng. Senior military figures seem content to influence the political process rather than seek to dominate it.

China's senior soldier-politicians provide the military with an important political voice, however. The military has a long tradition of partnership with the civilian party. It is amply represented on the party Politburo and Central Committee, and all available evidence indicates that the party does take into account the full range of military interests. Although civilians clearly set the political agenda, they do so in consultation with their military colleagues.

There are pronounced differences on some policy questions between party and army leaders but none that the military regards as a matter of life and death and beyond compromise. We believe that many of the recent strains in the army-party relationship have in fact had their roots in the PLA's General Political Department, which last September was placed under new

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leadership. Generally speaking, a pattern of give and take, in which the party has made modest concessions in return for support on larger issues, has been characteristic of contemporary army-party politics:

- China's senior soldiers and the civilian leadership are generally in agreement on the priority of military professionalization but differ over the army's relative priority in the overall modernization plans.
- The senior soldier-politicians have generally cooperated in efforts to revise recruitment criteria, retire aged or incompetent personnel, consolidate commands, demobilize excessive ground forces and support personnel, and purge the politically unreliable despite some reservations voiced within the PLA.
- The problem of Mao's legacy has not completely been laid to rest, and the army still seeks to salvage whatever elements of Mao's doctrine that appear relevant to current conditions.
- The conservative disposition of some PLA leaders has led them and like-minded civilians to voice reservations about some of Deng's economic reforms and undesirable side effects generated by the policies, but Beijing's senior civilians have generally sought to revise policies to meet these objections.

Data on military opinions concerning foreign policy is particularly thin; we believe foreign policy is essentially a civilian preserve.

We believe that for the duration of Deng's active political life, the party will generally have the cooperation of the military. The prospects for Hu Yaobang, Deng's political heir, to succeed Deng and to preserve army-party harmony are enhanced by the continuing personnel turnover in the PLA. Hu will be able to count on the support of senior military men who have a vested interest in the policies initiated by Deng and who would probably take their lead from civilian leaders with whom they are allied. We believe that the influence of the senior officers may increase during the succession period but not to the point where they exercise a veto over Hu's continuation as general secretary.

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Deng Xiaoping . . . born 1904 in Sichuan . . . Chairman, Military Commission and member, Politburo Standing Committee . . . China's paramount leader . . . former political commissar, 2nd Field Army . . . Long March veteran . . . apparatchik par excellence . . . party Secretary General before Cultural Revolution . . . PLA Chief of Staff 1975-76, 1977-80 . . . leading voice for civilian and military reforms . . . pace of public activity has slowed as younger proteges assume more of his workload . . . has stated desire to remain politically active through 1985, enabling his oversight of PLA transition to new generation of commanders.

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The Military Factor in Chinese Politics

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The Cultural Revolution era (1966-76) saw an unprecedented politicization of China's military establishment and the expansion of the military's influence in all aspects of Chinese life. Indeed, by the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, the forces of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) were administering the entire country and were widely perceived by Chinese and foreigners alike as the only force capable of preventing chaos following the destruction of the party and state bureaucracies by Mao Zedong.

The PLA's action in this period gave rise to an interpretation of the army's role in politics that has varied little to this day. At its most extreme, the conventional wisdom posits that the army aggressively asserts its institutional interests at every opportunity; that it has across-the-board differences with China's civilian leadership; that civilian failure to propitiate this purported military opposition runs the risk of some unspecified—but presumably violent—retaliation; and that, as a consequence, the military in effect remains the arbiter of Chinese politics.

In our analysis, army-party relations are not nearly so strained; although there are significant differences on a number of issues, we judge army-party relations to be on an even keel. Moreover, in evaluating the PLA's political role, we believe a good case can be made that:

- The PLA does not present a solid institutional front in the face of civilian political initiatives.
- It is not an aggressively interventionist political actor—its forceful intervention during the Cultural Revolution in fact was at the behest of the civilian leadership.
- The civilian party leaders have fashioned policies that are not to the army's advantage but have suffered none of the fatal consequences anticipated in conventional assessments of army-party politics.
- Although the PLA is an important political player, it is in no way the overriding factor in Chinese politics or in the political succession to Deng.

There is little information that directly illuminates the questions involved in assessing the political role of the army. The Chinese maintain an obsessive secrecy about anything that concerns the military. In preparing this paper, we have drawn on the full range of intelligence information and diplomatic and press reporting. The bulk of our assessment, however, is derived from analysis of Chinese propaganda. Although we are confident we understand the issues in army-party relations, our knowledge of the decision-making process relating to those issues is less complete.

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The Political Context of Army-Party Relations¹

At the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in 1978, Deng Xiaoping and his political allies won endorsement of a program that effectively sought to reverse the radical political, economic, and social orientation that had been set by Mao. Plans initially drawn up by Deng in 1974 and 1975 to reform the large Chinese military establishment were also revived. The new economic priorities, then designated the "Four Modernizations," included the modernization of China's military but gave it the lowest position on the grounds that the national economy must improve before substantial material benefits would accrue to the PLA.

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¹A note on terminology: Throughout this assessment, the term "party" will generally be used to mean the civilian party, and the terms "army" or "military" will generally be used to designate the PLA. In adopting this usage, we do not overlook the fact that in many cases leaders who are customarily regarded as civilians—Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun, for example—have significant military responsibilities or that senior military leaders of the founding generations—Nie Rongzhen or Xu Xiangqian, for example—may effectively transcend differences between the party and army by virtue of their long service in the interests of both.

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The purely military component of China's reform program called for:

- Sharp reduction in troop strength to create a "leaner, meaner" military.
- New recruitment criteria to improve the average education level of young enlistees and thereby prepare the PLA for the advent of modern weaponry.
- Changes in training that played down traditional Maoist people's war precepts and placed more emphasis on joint-service operations and warfare under modern military conditions.
- Retirement of superannuated, incompetent, or politically unreliable officers to create headroom for a new generation of commanders.
- A consolidation of commands, stressing the simplification of organization and the elimination of redundancy.

Although these changes tended to reduce the influence of the military conservatives and were unpopular in some quarters, senior commanders endorsed them, indicating a basic sympathy with the program's broad goals. Indeed, since the Third Plenum, the PLA's budget has been cut, demobilizations have reduced the ranks by approximately 1 million, some elderly officers are beginning to retire, the simplification of command has begun, and the army is preparing—along with the civilian party—for a large-scale purge later this year.² [redacted]

Deng has moved cautiously in implementing his reform policies, wherever possible attempting to convince skeptics of the wisdom of his program rather than ordering compliance. In making sensitive personnel appointments, he has taken into account the opinions of the senior soldier-politicians. He has also made concessions on such issues as ideology and culture to the more conservative sensibilities of the PLA. In instances where new economic programs have discriminated against rural dependents of serving soldiers, adjustments have been made to benefit military families. [redacted]

² See appendix B for a summary of recent military personnel changes. The 12th Party Congress and its creation of a party advisory commission for senior officials has stimulated a large turnover of high-ranking officers, especially in the regional military commands. [redacted]

Most of the issues in army-party relations today appear to us to fall into the realm of routine politics, which require no extraordinary measures to resolve. In our judgment, senior military officers do not feel alienated or powerless, nor do they seem out of sympathy with the central goal of Deng's program: the creation of a stable, less ideological regime governed by a collective leadership that has as its paramount goal the raising of living standards. Senior military figures seem content to influence the political process rather than seek to dominate it. [redacted]

The Mechanics of Military Influence

Sources of Political Power

In no other Communist state has the military persistently wielded as much influence or been consistently so well represented in the leading party organizations—the Central Committee and its Political Bureau (or their equivalent bodies). When we speak about the "army's role" or the "military's influence," we are actually talking about the power and authority of senior soldiers, essentially the military members of the Politburo and the Secretariat, and the PLA's high command—all probable members of the party's Military Commission,³ which sets military policy and is China's most powerful military organization. In Chinese politics influence tends to be linked to personalities rather than to institutions; a person is powerful because of who he is and the loyalties he commands, not by virtue of the office he holds. In effect, then, the influence of the military is essentially the sum of the personal power of a handful of soldier-politicians. [redacted]

³ We presume that membership on the party's Military Commission includes not only the publicly identified members (chairman, vice chairman, secretary general, deputies secretary general) but also: military region commanders, directors and political commissars of the PLA's three general departments, the Minister of National Defense, the commanders and political commissars of the service arms (Air Force, Navy, and so forth), and eminent senior officers who no longer have specific job responsibilities. The membership probably includes civilians whose work brings them into close contact with military matters, such as heads of the armaments ministries and public security officials. Thus, we estimate that the Commission probably has in excess of 50 members. [redacted]

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Ye Jianying ... born 1897 in Guangzhou to wealthy Hakka family ... member, Politburo Standing Committee ... vice chairman, Military Commission ... "The Dog Meat Marshal" ... Long March veteran ... former Minister of National Defense ... survived Cultural Revolution with prestige relatively intact ... an early, vocal supporter of deposed party Chairman, Hua Guofeng ... in the mid-1970s shared most of Deng's ideas on army reforms ... apparent falling out over Hua's removal, pace and scope of Deng's overall program, "deMaorization" ... arch-traditionalist on the Politburo who has slipped into senility ... infrequent public appearances ... after persistent refusals to retire, submitted resignation to NPC, will not return as Standing Committee Chairman at coming session.



Wei Guoqing ... born about 1907 in Guangxi ... Zhuang nationality ... member, Politburo ... ideological hardliner and obstructor of reform ... 3rd Field Army and Long March veteran ... served under Deng Xiaoping in 1930s and along with Xu Shiyu protected Deng when he was purged in 1976 ... longtime party and government leader in native province ... presided over bloody suppression of Red Guards ... transferred to Guangzhou after Cultural Revolution ... made Director of General Political Department after Deng's second rehabilitation in 1977 ... espoused orthodox Maoist views long after they had lost currency, which ultimately cost him GPD post ... remains publicly active as vice chairman of National People's Congress Standing Committee.

The political prominence of China's ranking soldiers is partly a legacy of the Chinese revolution and the wartime partnership between army and party. Since the founding of the People's Republic, virtually all of its national leaders have been former soldiers whose service in the Communist army dates from the years when party and army were virtually indistinguishable.⁴ Only in the early 1950s did career patterns differentiate and "civilian" and "military" become relatively unambiguous categories of leadership in

⁴ The most striking contemporary example of civilian-military continuity is the Politburo itself, where five of the six members of the Standing Committee—Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, Li Xianman, Chen Yun, and Hu Yaobang—made the Long March as members of the Red Army.

China. For the topmost military leaders who serve in the highest party bodies, however, the distinction continues to be blurry.

The consistently martial cast of Communist China's early program, goals, and exigencies also enhanced the army's influence in policymaking. These early years were marked by suppression of remnant Nationalist forces or other designated "class enemies," intervention in Korea, an initial five-year plan that emphasized heavy industry and military modernization, and other measures that required substantial military contributions both in planning and execution.

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Nie Rongzhen ... born 1899 in Sichuan ... Vice Chairman, Military Commission ... member, Politburo ... "the father of the Chinese atomic bomb" ... headed the National Defense Science and Technology Commission until the Cultural Revolution ... attacked then but came out relatively unscathed ... one of four surviving marshals named in 1955 ... an intellectual, studied engineering in Belgium and France ... North China Field Army and Long March veteran ... generally inactive now ... many recent statements on behalf of expanded role of intellectuals and science in the military ... almost certainly backs Deng's goals, but lack of hard information prohibits placing Nie squarely in reform camp.



Camera Press ©

Xu Xiangqian ... born 1902 in Shanxi ... Vice Chairman, Military Commission ... one of four surviving marshals ... former primary school-teacher ... Long March and North China Field Army veteran ... [redacted] probably unable to contribute to policy discussions ... survived attacks during Cultural Revolution, but standing in leadership declined ... Defense Minister under Hua Guofeng, apparently compromise choice ... rarely attends public gatherings, but receives visitors and grants interviews at home or in hospital ... most recent public statements uniformly support Deng's reforms.

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The early importance of the military was also reflected in the presence of soldiers on the highest party bodies, which has continued over the past 30 years. Military representation on the Central Committee has ranged from a high of about 45 percent in 1969 to a low of about 20 percent in 1956 and at present. Although the amount of influence members of the Committee exert as members is open to question, membership nevertheless confers prominence within the 39-million-member party, elite status throughout China, and, presumably, access to the upper reaches of the party bureaucracy. [redacted]

Military representation on the Politburo is even more pronounced. Of its 28 current members, seven are career soldiers. Three others, including Deng Xiaoping, have mainly worked as civilians but now assume

important military responsibilities. Two—Wang Zhen and Wei Guoqing—currently have an indeterminate relationship with the military but still retain significant PLA ties.⁵ [redacted]

The military as an institution—as opposed to the sum of the personal influence of soldier-politicians—gains influence from its role as a national model for civilian emulation. This reached its heyday in the years

⁵ On the inner sanctum of the Politburo, its Standing Committee, two men may be said to represent military "constituencies"—Deng and Ye Jianying, who since the Third Plenum of 1978 have been frequently at odds. We believe that both men share substantially the same views on military affairs but have differed over broader questions of national policy. Both, however, are probably perceived by soldiers as advocates. [redacted]

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immediately preceding the Cultural Revolution, when everyone was admonished "to learn from the PLA." This type of exhortation has declined, and, because of the reform program, a PLA career is not as attractive to young Chinese as it once was. On some matters, however—especially the recent drive to revive traditional moral precepts under the guise of "socialist spiritual civilization"—the PLA is still held up as a national exemplar. [redacted]

The military as an institution undoubtedly draws influence from its heavy involvement in key economic and S&T projects. Much of the most sensitive research work is carried out under military auspices or at military facilities. Until recently, the PLA had primary responsibility for much state construction, and retired or demobilized officers routinely received management positions in civilian enterprises. [redacted]

Impact of Crosscutting Loyalties

As far as we can determine—and our evidence is subjective and thin—the Chinese officer corps has not developed a strong corporate sense—that is, they do not as yet perceive their profession to be one that separates them from the rest of society or imposes a commonality of interests. We can cite no instance of the Chinese officer corps closing ranks to defend what might be defined as purely military interest, although the possibility is high that if such an event occurred we might not know about it.⁶ [redacted]

Lacking a strong corporate sense, the potential political pressure that the Chinese officer corps can bring to bear is diminished. Indeed, the military does not have a uniform point of view. All the shades of opinion in China are also reflected in the PLA, although not necessarily with the same emphases.⁷ We can identify no single, unified "military opinion" or political interest, no homogeneous PLA opposition to

⁶ Ironically, perhaps, to the extent the military reform program increases professionalism, the Chinese officer corps will presumably begin to think and act more in corporate terms. At the same time, professionalism also implies a diminished political presence, which would correspondingly sharpen the focus of the PLA's corporate interests on traditionally military concerns. [redacted]

⁷ For instance, we believe that to a greater extent than society in general, the PLA tends to view events in Maoist terms, which are out of step with Deng's reform program. Nonetheless, many senior officers, such as Chief of State Yang Dezhi and Defense Minister Zhang Aiping, support Deng's efforts to professionalize and modernize the military. [redacted]

Deng's reformist proclivities, and no one officer who personifies the army's views with the authority enjoyed by Peng Dehuai or Lin Biao during the Mao era. In China's current political context, the phrase "military opposition" can make sense only if understood as the disagreement of one or more senior officers with a specific policy, and not, as frequently understood, as wholesale rejection by "the military" of Deng's entire reform package. The net effect, we believe, is that it is impossible for any one man to deliver the military on any question. [redacted]

Crosscutting loyalties reinforce differences of military opinion that tend to dilute corporatism in the officer corps. Each officer has at least one primary institutional affiliation but has other allegiances as well. For instance, every officer in the Chinese high command is a party member of long standing, and, having risen through a military culture that emphasizes discipline and unity, we believe there is a strong impulse among officers to close ranks behind the party's line. An officer may just as likely have primary loyalty to his service branch or administrative bureaucracy within the PLA. Purely nationalistic considerations motivate most Chinese civilian and military leaders at least part of the time and may be especially important among those soldiers who have had doubts about Mao's particular vision of Communism in China. [redacted]

Playing the Game: The Exercise of Power

We know relatively little about the modes of military involvement in Chinese political decisionmaking. Since the fall of the Gang of Four, however, we know of no instance in which an individual soldier-politician or any presumed group of soldier-politicians threatened to use armed force for personal or political ends.⁸ We believe that military influence is exerted in three

⁸ In the history of the regime, there have been two alleged attempts to use force in a political matter: the so-called coup attempt by Lin Biao and the paramilitary contingency plans of Jiang Qing and her three associates. The facts of these incidents have never been clarified, and there is some debate over what actually occurred, but perhaps the most relevant aspect of the two "conspiracies" is that while PLA loyalties to the political center may have wavered, they were never severed. Indeed, in both incidents the military stood by the civilian party authorities and on orders moved against the conspirators. [redacted]

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general ways: participation in party and government councils; through the media; and in policy implementation. [redacted]

Party and Government Councils. In our analysis, political decisions within the decisive party arena are reached by consensus, which gives senior soldier-politicians ample opportunity to shape decisions. Even Deng, who is first among equals, cannot dictate policy to his peers. Each member of the leadership brings to policy deliberations his own ideological, political, and institutional baggage, and during these initial exchanges—while the issue presumably remains wide open—individual influence is perhaps most pronounced. The soldier-politicians operate as do any other members of the political elite.⁹ [redacted]

Military officers often are able to find allies among civilian leaders, who are equally affected by reform policies. Rather than clearly defined factions these are probably shifting coalitions based on specific issues. We believe that, on resource allocation questions, soldier-politicians are natural allies of economic planners and administrators who favor greater emphasis on central planning and heavy industrial production. Soldiers who favor a more professional, less politically active army have allies among civilians who share that outlook and who stress professional competence rather than political reliability as criterion for all leadership. The generation of officers between ages 30 and 50, who will inherit the positions cleared through Deng's retirement policy, are probably the PLA's strongest supporters of reform.¹⁰ [redacted]

⁹ A crucial area of speculation concerns the personal staffs of the leadership and how they interact. Chinese leaders tend to have a rather small personal staff but can also task the much larger staffs that are attached to both policymaking and administrative organizations. The Secretariat, for example, has several subordinate research offices—for policy, agriculture, and so forth. We know nothing of how staffers are apportioned among the leadership or what relative advantages in the routine processes of consensus building are conferred by various staffing arrangements. The Chief of China's General Staff has three senior officers who have been identified as his assistants, and each assistant presumably directs a small staff. [redacted]

¹⁰ We also believe such alliances occur at the local level. Civilian-military alliances at the provincial level and lower were also fairly common during and immediately after the Cultural Revolution. The central leadership, however, has attempted to reduce the probability of such alliances by periodically transferring regional military commanders. There have been three such rotations since 1973. [redacted]

The military, like other groups in China, increasingly is using the annual meeting of the National People's Congress, the nominal parliament, to express opinions on national issues. In recent sessions they have criticized cuts in the PLA budget, rural responsibility systems that make the army a less appealing alternative to the farm than it once was, the scale of the shift of military industries into civilian production, and morale problems created by wide-scale demobilizations without sufficient promise of adequate civilian employment. [redacted]

Publication of these complaints in the party press—itself a daring departure from the past practice—has the effect of legitimizing the military's grievances as well as its right to criticize party policy. The party's apparent confidence, however, in allowing mildly heterodox opinions to air suggests to us that it believes relations with the army are basically good. [redacted]

The Role of the Media. An important arena in which both army-party and intraservice disputes are played out is in China's public media. The PLA has its own restricted distribution newspaper, the *Liberation Army Daily* (LAD), which is edited and published by the PLA's General Political Department. The overwhelming majority of LAD's content is uncontroversial. On occasion, however, the LAD publishes views that stray from the central line, usually as a signed article or a "contributing commentator" written by an author who is not on the regular staff of the paper. Such pieces cannot be regarded as the military position on an issue—only editorials have that status—but they often reflect the views of a sizable group within the PLA, which, through the media, seeks to influence opinion among a broader audience. [redacted]

The Bai Hua and Zhao Yiya incidents are examples of how the military media attempt to influence policy. In the spring of 1981, the LAD published an article by a contributing commentator that sharply denounced "Bitter Love," a screenplay written by an army writer named Bai Hua. The commentator singled out Bai and his work as examples of the increasing tendency of China's literary and intellectual community to question the party's legitimacy and to

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criticize the army's behavior during the Cultural Revolution. The civilian party media—most notably *People's Daily*—supported Bai Hua and increased artistic freedom. The debate was ultimately resolved in favor of the LAD position and new controls were imposed on China's artistic and literary community.

On the eve of the 12th Party Congress in late August 1982, the LAD ran a signed article by Zhao Yiya, another army writer, that implicitly criticized much of Deng's reform program. In this instance, the LAD lost and was forced to publish an open "self-criticism" that called the publication of Zhao's article a "grave political and organizational error." Whether as precipitating cause or mere pretext, the August article also led to the dismissal of Politburo member Wei Guoqing as director of the General Political Department, the military organ responsible for the LAD, and a new round of media criticism of "leftism" with the PLA.

Policy Implementation. Military influence over policy is not exerted solely by the most senior soldier-politicians. In contrast to their active advocacy at the political center is the passive resistance of lower level commanders and commissars, who like other Chinese officials, sometimes attempt to circumvent policy by not vigorously enforcing it.¹¹ Officers are frequently given only general instructions and have the flexibility to tailor implementation to specific conditions within the command. Subsequent noncompliance at times is effective in pressuring the central leadership to modify policy. Physical distance from the capital, powerful support at higher levels, a strong local position with civilian support, and mixed signals from the center all work to the advantage of regional military figures. During the past two years, however, it has become more and more difficult for local leaders to resist central policies as the Dengist leadership has consolidated its position.

¹¹ Recent complaints in the open media, for example, indicate Beijing has had difficulty getting unspecified "comrades" to retire aged officers, to make adequate preparations for demobilization work, and to sufficiently conduct propaganda on the latest central policies.

Issues in Army-Party Relations

China's obsessive secrecy in military affairs and the use of slogans make it difficult to understand at times exactly what is at issue and to distinguish between commitment and cant. At a minimum, we assume the majority of Chinese military professionals want for their armed forces what soldiers elsewhere characteristically seek:

- A measure of autonomy in military matters and sympathetic consideration by civilian politicians of their views and program to meet national security needs.
- Recognition of their importance and contribution to China.
- Modernization of military hardware over time.

In our judgment, there are pronounced differences on some policy questions between party leaders and military officers but none that the military regards as a matter of life and death. The following review of issues in recent army-party relations suggests that a spirited and on occasion heated dialogue has taken place, but essentially over priority and pace, not goals. As a consequence, army-party differences have been amenable to compromise. Although, as far as we can determine, the political agenda is clearly dictated by the civilian leadership, the record shows that Deng and his allies generally take the views and interests of the senior soldier-politicians fully into account.

Military Issues

Professionalism and Politics. In the PLA, which is and will remain a highly politicized army, professionalism has had an uneven record. Officers have had to adapt not only to changing criteria of military expertise but also to repeatedly shifting political requirements. In our view, there appears to be substantial consensus among civilian and military leaders on the need to create structures that circumscribe the military's political role and preclude the possible manipulation of the army to advance the political ends of one man or a small group.

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Li Desheng ... born 1916 in Hubei ... member, Politburo ... Commander, Shenyang Military Region ... a political enigma with keen instinct for survival ... Long March veteran ... rose from a corps commander to Politburo during Cultural Revolution ... directed the General Political Department during early 1970s ... member of Politburo Standing Committee during 10th Central Committee (1973-1975) ... meteoric rise presumed the result of leftist connections, but Li defies categorization ... has generally made appropriate public endorsements of Deng's reforms ... must be considered a swing vote on the Politburo, but real key may be long service under Deng in 2nd Field Army system.

The relative weight to assign to the PLA's military and political activities, however, continues to be contentious. Our reading of the civilian and military press as well as US military attache reporting suggests that the majority of China's senior soldier-politicians favor a sharper, more exclusively military role. They seek the attributes of increased professionalism: improved unit and individual training; regulations governing ranks, promotions, and career development; and institutions that clearly establish responsibility at each level of command. They also seek to reduce the army's involvement in areas where the army and society in general have overlapped, such as public security, civilian construction, and, of course, political activism.

[Redacted]



Qin Jiwei ... born 1914 in Hubei ... Alternate Member, Politburo ... Commander, Beijing Military Region ... a Deng Xiaoping protege ... commander of Kunming military region when purged in 1967 ... returned to command Chengdu Military Region in 1973, shortly after rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping ... a Long March hero ... served under Deng in 2nd Field Army ... presumed also to be supporter of Hu Yaobang, perhaps an old Field Army connection ... a vocal supporter of Deng's reform priorities.

[Redacted]

Civilians are in general agreement with this but above all want an army on board with the party's policies. Although interested in a politically nonintrusive armed forces, civilian leaders by no means want a "depoliticized" army; they basically seek a "de-Maoized" army. DeMaoization includes eliminating from the ranks those remaining officers and men unalterably committed to Mao's ideas and vision.

Because they are political rather than military professionals, the army's political commissars stand to lose positions and authority under military professionalization. The General Political Department (GPD), which

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Wang Zhen ... born 1908 in Hunan ... member, Politburo ... troubleshooter for Beijing, especially in minority areas ... 1st Field Army and Long March veteran ... was member of party Military Commission probably through 12th Party Congress and may still be ... was Minister of State Farms and Land Reclamation 1956-1966 ... the first official of ministerial rank to be publicly ridiculed during the Cultural Revolution ... rebounded quickly, but in trouble again late 1969 ... worked primarily in national defense industrial sector in mid-1970s ... strong early support of Deng and reform priorities. [redacted]



Yang Dezhi ... born 1910 in Hunan ... Chief of the PLA General Staff ... Politburo member ... Deputy Secretary General, Military Commission ... generally unscathed during Cultural Revolution ... later commanded Jinan Military Region ... later commanded Wuhan and Kunming Military Regions ... Long March veteran ... service in 2nd Field Army system under Deng Xiaoping, probably knows Hu Yaobang from same period ... military representative on Secretariat, 1980-1982 ... now China's most influential career soldier ... publicly has taken strong reform positions. [redacted]

directs political indoctrination within the ranks and most important controls personnel matters, is the parent unit of the commissars and has been a haven for orthodox Maoist sentiments. [redacted]

To a large extent, many of the recent tensions in army-party relations in reality are strains in party-GPD relations. The Department's importance cannot be overestimated. Its bureaucratic infrastructure potentially enables a small group of leaders to quietly campaign against central policies. The GPD has its own chain of command, its own media voice, and oversees the party activities of all units. In this system of dual command, the political commissar is in effect a unit cocommander and generally the secretary of a unit's party committee. [redacted]

Deng and the reformers have had only limited success in bringing the GPD to heel. Shortly after Deng's second rehabilitation in July 1977, Wei Guoqing, a close ally, was named to head the Department. [redacted]

[redacted] Wei proved incapable of purging the department. Subsequent events suggest that what transpired was a classic instance of "bureaucratic capture," in which Wei wound up protecting the activities and viewpoints he was commissioned to eliminate. [redacted]

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Yang Shangkun ... born 1907 in Sichuan ... Permanent Vice Chairman and Secretary General, Military Commission ... member, Politburo ... headed party General Office from 1945 until purged in 1967 ... returned to public life in 1978 ... close political ally of Deng Xiaoping ... may be most powerful man in the PLA ... oversees day-to-day affairs of Military Commission ... a persistent spokesman for military reforms, especially upgraded education requirements and younger commanders ... his age poses problems for reformers, who must soon find younger successor. [redacted]



Yu Qiuli ... born 1914 in Jiangxi ... Director of General Political Department, member of the Politburo and Secretariat ... appointment in September 1982 a puzzle ... replaced Wei Guoqing in GPD shakeup following Zhao Yiya affair ... inherits Wei's mandate to clean house in the GPD ... 1st Field Army background and Long March veteran ... active duty PLA until 1958 ... afterwards worked in civilian planning bureaucracy ... believed a partisan of "heavy industry first" approach that fell into disfavor following Third Plenum ... as GPD director has been scrupulously faithful to the reform line in military affairs, thus perhaps demonstrating that differences over economics do not preclude agreement on other matters. [redacted]

We believe that if army professionalization is to proceed smoothly, the party must ensure the absolute reliability of the GPD to implement revised personnel policies. In September Wei was replaced by Yu Qiuli as GPD director, and the public media immediately embarked upon renewed criticism of leftism within the army. Yu almost certainly has the responsibility for bringing the GPD fully on board with the party line. Yu will be assisted in his efforts by the coming party rectification, which formally begins late this year. If he succeeds, we believe a major source of army-party conflict will have been defused. [redacted]

The Central Military Commission. Deng and his military allies have also attempted to symbolically distance the military from the locus of political power by making a sharper bureaucratic distinction between the party and the PLA. At the heart of this effort is

the Central Military Commission, established under the new state constitution to "direct the armed forces of the country." In form if not in substance, the new Commission moves the PLA out from under the direct subordination to the party's Military Commission,¹² which has a heavy contingent of military conservatives, and places it under the National People's Congress, where civilians presumably can exert greater influence. [redacted]

¹² The Central Military Commission should not be confused with the party's Military Commission. The identity of the two names (*junshi weiyuanhui*) seems intentionally to denote a virtual interchangeability. The state organization is generally denoted by the prefix "central" (*zhongyang*). On rare occasions, however, the party body is also referred to as the "Central Military Commission." [redacted]

It is also worth noting that China's reformers are seeking to separate party committees from day-to-day administration in all organizational hierarchies—governmental and economic, for example—and to clarify lines of responsibility. [redacted]



Zhang Aiping ... born 1910 in Sichuan ... Minister of National Defense ... Deputy Secretary General, Military Commission ... Deputy Chief, PLA General Staff ... purged in 1967, returned to active political life in 1973 ... succeeded Nie Rongzhen as head of National Defense Science and Technology Commission and director of Chinese military R&D in 1975 ... 3rd Field Army and Long March veteran ... outspoken advocate of military modernization, increased R&D efforts ... reportedly in trouble in mid 1970s for refusing to employ incompetent university graduates at NDSTC ... reliable supporter of Deng's program



Zhang Tingfa ... born around 1910 ... provincial origins unknown ... Commander of the Chinese Air Force ... member, Politburo ... the least well-known of China's senior soldier politicians ... purged during Cultural Revolution, rehabilitated in 1973, promoted from deputy commander in 1977 ... Air Force once a Lin Biao preserve, but as highly technical service arm has large stake in modernization program ... regularly speaks in support of reform priorities.

[redacted] must be counted as an "unknown," swing vote on Politburo. [redacted]

[redacted] press reports initially suggested that the party's Military Commission would be abolished following the 12th Party Congress. This did not happen, and the ambiguous status of the CMC--no members have been publicly identified nor has it met to our knowledge--suggests some soldier-politicians, whom we cannot identify, oppose its activation. The reform leadership may still seek to transfer command responsibility to the new state Commission, while perhaps retaining the party body to establish broad guidelines. Under this arrangement, party control would still be effected in the CMC because its membership would be composed of essentially the same types of officials we believe are on the current party Military Commission--all having strong party credentials--but presumably without the ancient warriors and with a greater percentage of civilians. [redacted]

Modernization Priorities. Although we believe that civilian and military leaders agree on the primacy of professionalization in the PLA, there are probably differences over the relative priority of military modernization within the overall reform program. [redacted] the civilian party leaders consider China's national economy to be the first priority. The civilians argue that the army will eventually reap the benefits of China's economic growth once current policies come on track, and, hence, military modernization has the lowest priority among China's "Four Modernizations" (in industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense). [redacted]

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The periodic appearance—such as during the 1980 session of the National People's Congress—of views critical of the PLA's low priority and recent attempts in the public media to rebut such opinions lead us to conclude that China's soldiers have only grudgingly accepted the situation. In our view, which is based on both public and private statements of military spokesmen, the PLA's acceptance of the current priorities—including a cut in China's defense budget—turns on a civilian promise of increased future outlays. [redacted]

It is unlikely, however, that this arrangement can last indefinitely. The statements of PLA spokesmen over the past two years indicate that, during the life of the current five year plan or early in the next—around 1986—the senior officers expect China's economic policies to generate the necessary resources for additional military expenditures. Delay beyond that time will likely bring this simmering issue to a rolling boil. [redacted]

“Rice Bowl” Issues

Efforts to modernize on the cheap by bureaucratic streamlining and personnel measures threaten the livelihood of many rank-and-file military men and thus are politically sensitive. The effects of crosscutting loyalties and interservice rivalry undermine the military's ability to resist these policies, however, and the demographics of the officer corps also works to attenuate such resistance as arises. Natural attrition is claiming many of the old soldiers at whom the most controversial measures are aimed:

- The *reestablishment of ranks*, which were abolished in 1965, is a sensitive matter because it would most likely be accompanied by regulations governing the service of officers, as was the case in 1955. These would impose strict “up or out” criteria on officers who also have in many cases been serving for 20 years or more in essentially the same posts. The army high command would also have to determine at a single swoop who would be a general, who a colonel, and who mustered out. Plans to restore ranks have been delayed repeatedly. We believe the civilian and military reformers can afford to wait on this measure, as the longer implementation is delayed, the smoother it will go. We expect any trouble that arises when the rank system is finally implemented to be brief and uneventful.

- Current Chinese *recruitment policy* favors high school graduates for the enlisted ranks and military academy graduates for the officer corps. Both are sharp departures from the earlier practice of extensive recruitment among the peasantry and promotion through the ranks. The official media admits the new criteria worries the currently serving, relatively unsophisticated officers who fear the increased competition. In our view, the reformers seem confident that the gradual personnel turnover during the next several years will eliminate the aggrieved and thus defuse the problem.

- The party has offered lucrative *retirement benefits to encourage the PLA old guard* to step down, but, [redacted] they remain fearful that they will be left adrift. Despite considerable effort, the party has met with only limited success in clearing headroom for a new generation of impatient young commanders. If the party can demonstrate satisfactory personal arrangements have been made, we expect it will get better cooperation from the army elders.¹³

- The *consolidation of commands*, such as the Engineer Corps' absorption into the General Staff Department and the downgrading of both the armor and artillery as independent service arms, will eliminate hundreds of slots now filled by superannuated officers and political commissars. At the same time, the *demobilization program*, which we estimate has reduced the PLA by about 1 million men since late 1980, is paring the entire force of its least promising members.¹⁴ The national emphasis on expertise leaves many demobilized personnel unqualified for

¹³ The central leadership here seeks to create the momentum necessary for a “demonstrator” effect. This effort was aided by the 12th Party Congress last September and the founding of the Central Advisory Commission for old cadre, where fully one-third of the seats will be occupied by former officers. [redacted]

¹⁴ The published strength of the uniformed PLA was given as 4.23 million following China's 1982 census. This substantially squares with our tally. [redacted]

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managerial and administrative positions once routinely filled by former soldiers. On this issue as well, senior civilian and military leaders seem confident that the personnel problems can be handled at the local levels, and we see little probability of a dangerous strain in army-party relations. [redacted]

The Legacy of Mao Zedong

Military and civilian leaders have significantly different views of Mao, which are rooted in different sets of needs. Civilian leaders basically want to rewrite Mao's ideological legacy so that it cannot be used to attack their program. The frequent attacks in the Chinese media on the continuing influence of leftism in the military indicate that the last great repository of diehard Maoism indeed lies within the PLA. [redacted]

Some PLA concerns on this score are personal. Conservatives in the party and army fear the party's legitimacy as well as their own careers—which had been founded on adherence to Mao's thought—could be irreparably damaged if Mao's ideas and policies are formally rejected. Other concerns are less self-centered. Some PLA voices argue, for example, that for the current period of economic austerity, Mao's prescriptions for "people's war" and a politicized military remained the only sure cement for the PLA. We believe the army is caught in a difficult position; the rest of Chinese society is being encouraged to loosen ideological constraints on initiatives and pursue material rewards at a time when military expenditures are being held down and ideological incentives are the only ones the army can offer. [redacted]

The party's verdict on Mao's legacy, the Resolution on Historical Questions that was adopted at the Sixth Plenum in June 1981, was a compromise document. It toned down many of the harsh criticisms of Mao that appeared in earlier drafts and made concessions to military sentiments. Mao's mistakes were noted, but they were presented as the well intended if tragic misjudgments of a senile old man who, in the final assessment, was nevertheless "a great revolutionary." Mao's military writings were salvaged as acceptable and continue to be touted as indispensable "magic weapons" of the PLA. Moreover, the resolution placed the army's role in the Cultural Revolution in a

generally favorable light, noting that it contributed to the restoration of order in a particularly difficult time. [redacted]

The extensive propaganda campaign within the army to study the resolution met with puzzlement and confusion. The study drive continued in the PLA longer than elsewhere, far into 1982. The ongoing turnover in military personnel through retirements, demobilization, and natural attrition presumably will assist the party and its military allies in weaning the PLA from its habitual Maoism. [redacted]

We suspect, however, that the issue will not go away. The resolution in our judgment did not mark an end to the controversy over Mao; it merely moved it to another stage. Articles in the Chinese press indicate military leaders are still attempting to thrash out what parts of Mao's military doctrine remain suitable for "people's war under modern conditions." [redacted]

National Social and Economic Concerns

[redacted] some traditionalists within the PLA—whether out of sincere concern or political expedience—believe Deng's economic reforms have unacceptable social consequences. In particular, the military press has expressed concern over the influx of Western values and their impact on Chinese youth. It has also tied the policies to the rising incidence of official corruption and the tendency of writers and artists to produce works that openly or indirectly question the legitimacy of the party's rule. [redacted]

The party has to some extent conceded that its critics are correct by clamping down on corruption and taking steps to contain foreign influences. At the same time, military and civilian reformers assert that China "cannot stop eating for fear of choking." They have consistently denied that the policies themselves are flawed and have sought to place the blame on "weak individuals" who are susceptible to the blandishments of foreign crooks and the conscious subterfuge of provocateurs. [redacted]

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Qin Jiwei instructs Hu Yaobang while Deng Xiaoping benignly watches the parade.



Liu Huaqing ... born 1916 in Hubei ... Commander, PLA Navy ... Deputy Chief, PLA General Staff ... identified as "a comer" by US military observers ... protege of Deng Xiaoping ... veteran of Deng's 2nd Field Army and Long March ... a technocrat ... has served on National Defense Science and Technology Commission and in Chinese Academy of Sciences ... service in Navy dates to 1950 ... was overall tactical commander for Chinese assault on Paracels, 1974 ... on General Staff was responsible for weapons development and acquisition ... visited United States in 1980 ... strong supporter of Deng's military priorities.

the crucial Beijing Military Region and a soldier-politician of growing importance. Hu has also demonstrated a willingness to court the PLA and accommodate their interests.¹⁸ We believe much of the military opposition to Hu comes from the oldest age cohort, and military opposition should diminish as they die and Hu and Deng promote reform-minded officers.

[REDACTED]

The Outlook for Army-Party Relations

Under Deng

Despite all the pulling and prodding as the party has sought to bring the army fully on board with the reform program, we believe army-party relations are on an even keel. On balance, what the civilians have required of the PLA they have generally received. If the army and its leaders at times have gone along reluctantly, they nevertheless have gone along. [REDACTED]

Although the PLA, as represented by its senior soldier-politicians, continues to have a strong political voice, civilians clearly set China's political agenda. The simple balance of political forces at the pinnacle

¹⁸In each of his extensive investigation tours throughout China, Hu has invariably paid a well-publicized call on the local garrison to "solicit views" and "offer guidance." [REDACTED]

of power suggests to us that informal consultations within the Deng group alone are sufficient to establish a consensus on all but the most controversial issues.

[REDACTED]

Based on the record of the past decade, our most fundamental judgment is a commonplace one that needs to be repeated in the Chinese context: in times of pronounced domestic disorder and disunity in the political center, the military assumes heightened political prominence and influence. When the civilian center is strong and relatively unified, the military generally seeks to disengage from high politics and returns to its normal defense and internal security roles. [REDACTED]

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Xu Xin ... born 1921 in Hubei ... Deputy Chief, PLA General Staff ... identified by Chinese defense officials as a rising leader ... North China Field Army veteran with later service in 1st Field Army ... corps commander during Cultural Revolution ... unscathed despite ties to Peng Dehuai ... a former assistant to Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi ... apparently has assumed military intelligence role as successor to the retiring Wu Xiuquan ... a strong supporter of military reform ... US military observers suspect Xu is being groomed to succeed Yang Dezhi as Chief of Staff.

The general trend since 1978 has been one of Deng and his allies steadily improving their political grip and of a corresponding decrease in the political significance of the military. In our judgment, if the present trend toward professionalization continues as we believe it will ... the military effect on policies with which the senior officers disagree will largely be reduced to a nuisance factor. China's senior soldier-politicians can complicate arrangements by their obstinacy, can impede progress or delay decisions, but for all ostensible purposes they have either acquiesced in or lacked the stamina or support to oppose the programs Deng has sought to implement. We believe that for the duration of Deng's active political life, the party will generally have the cooperation of the military.

The reorganization last year of the central party and state bureaucracy, moreover, further reduced the military's potential for acting by depleting the ranks of former soldiers in high administrative and ministerial positions. The most recent appointments of army men to the Politburo -- Yang Dezhi, Yang Shangkun, and Qin Jiwei -- are closely allied to Deng, as were all recent civilian appointments. Only two other members of the Politburo with PLA ties -- Ye Jianying and Wei Guoqing -- are generally believed to fundamentally disagree with many aspects of Deng's reforms, and Ye is incapacitated while Wei has few remaining allies in the party's upper echelons.

We expect the pattern of trade-offs we have seen before each of the recent major party convocations -- the Sixth and Seventh Plenums of the 11th Central Committee and the 12th Party Congress -- to continue through the Deng period. For example, the soldier-politicians retained an unchanged number of representatives on the Politburo and continue to have a sizable -- albeit reduced -- contingent on the Central Committee. Moreover, none of the aged "old marshals" on the Politburo -- Ye, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen -- were relegated to the Central Advisory Commission, and the party generally continues to go slow on forcing the retirement of army elders from the active ranks. Partly in return for these modest measures, Deng and his allies won substantial gains in personnel appointments to the Politburo and Secretariat as well as the Central Committee's formal approval of the resolution on party history and Deng's political agenda for the 1980s.

After Deng

The continuing personnel turnover in the army can only help the succession chances of Hu Yaobang. Lacking a substantial base of military support, Hu nevertheless has a large bloc of natural allies in the generation of frustrated middle-level commanders whose promotions have been blocked while the old guard continues to serve. Were Deng to die today, Hu would be locked in a contest for influence and would

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Good friends: (L. to R.) Qin Jiwei, Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and Yang Dezhi review the troops following an autumn 1981 exercise.



face challenges from conservative forces—civilian and military—in the leadership. His most pressing problems would be to hold the reform coalition together and to maintain the appearance of a strong political center, thus denying a natural opening to those who would attempt to exploit the situation. [redacted]

Our impression of China's military leadership is that it is a basically traditionalist, professionally oriented group. Many of its members would welcome restrictions on Hu's authority, and we believe their influence may increase during the succession period as civilian contenders for influence compete for the support of the senior soldier-politicians. On the other hand, it is our view that Hu will be able to count on the support of senior military men who have a vested interest in the policies begun under Deng and who would probably take their lead from the civilians with whom they are allied. [redacted]

At this point, however, we do not believe that the more ideologically orthodox soldier-politicians by themselves hold the key to the succession or that they have a veto over Hu's continuation as general secretary. Indeed, the ability of relatively orthodox forces in the military to influence the succession declines as the military reforms now being implemented advance and older military figures, such as Ye Jianying, retire or perish. In any case, it is our judgment soldier-politicians will continue to exercise their influence within the political rules of the game, as part of the total leadership, in conjunction with the civilian elite. [redacted]

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Appendix A

A Note on High Command Promotions

Members of the PLA's high command invariably wind up on the party's Central Committee, which in turn generally serves as the talent pool from which candidates for even higher office are drawn. The example of Yang Dezhi—who progressed rapidly from military region commander through chief of the PLA General Staff to the party Secretariat and now the Politburo—holds open the possibility that the most important military leaders will continue to follow their army predecessors into the highest political reaches.

Appointments to high military positions fall under the scrutiny of the party's Military Commission. We believe that the civilian party has with some exceptions permitted high-level military appointments to be controlled by the senior soldier-politicians. China's top soldiers have consistently reserved the distinction of high command for those who, in their estimation, have the requisite age, experience, and standing.

In advancing the promotion of peers, the senior soldier-politicians have almost mechanically adhered to criteria that we have determined through analysis of recent personnel changes:

- First priority still is given to Long March (1934-36) veterans.
- Ranks, which were first assigned in 1955 but were abolished in 1965, remain important. The highest posts are reserved for those who in 1955 were full generals or lieutenant generals; the four living marshals are all physically incapable of assuming any command positions. A generational shift to the next lower grade, major general, has occurred in the most recent spate of appointments within the service arms and military regions.
- All leading candidates have had combat experience against the Japanese or the Nationalists, but further combat duty in Korea seems to enhance a candidate's chances.

- Recent appointees tend to have stronger "professional" credentials than "political" ones—that is, in the recurrent "red" versus "expert" debates of the Mao era, they have consistently favored on the side of expertise.
- It almost goes without saying that each candidate must be a longstanding party member. To this we believe is added an evaluation of a candidate's skill as an advocate. It is logical that the recommending officers insist not only on command ability, but also on political effectiveness—which turns on connections, personal prestige, persuasive skills, and outlook.

Although most recent appointees handily conform to these criteria, there have been a few glaring anomalies. Most noteworthy are the two men who have served as secretaries general of the Military Commission since the Cultural Revolution: Geng Biao and Yang Shangkun. Before their appointments, both had worked entirely in civilian capacities since 1949.

The secretary general is arguably the most powerful military official in China because of his day-to-day oversight of the Commission's work. In light of the known insistence by senior officers for one of their own in critical posts, it appears unusual that the secretary general is an outsider. Very little is known about the functions of the office, and it may be that the post is now expressly reserved for a senior party administrator—this was not the case before the Cultural Revolution—with military background and standing as only secondary considerations.

Patron-client relations are the elemental stuff of Chinese politics. Leaders seek to promote proteges with whom they have long familiarity and developed a basis of mutual trust. Frequently, long personal associations between Chinese leaders have their roots in

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wartime service. The importance of China's five "field army systems" in establishing networks of political associations and patron-client relations is well known. Thus, for example, Lin Biao, as Mao's "closest comrade-in-arms" and the great patron of the 4th Field Army system, promoted dozens of his old associates in attempting to expand his personal influence. Service in the 4th Field Army became a political liability following Lin's fall from Mao's grace. Deng Xiaoping, a patron of the 2nd Field Army system, currently is filling a disproportionate number of key vacancies in the PLA with old field army associates. This not only augments Deng's influence, but—more important for the present purpose—enhances the influence of proteges who have "the ear of the prince."

Analysis of field army affiliations is not an infallible guide. Often a close association over a long period under adverse conditions produces enmity rather than enduring friendship and loyalty. However, the pattern of patron-client relations is persistent and helps explain the continuing importance of officials who lose their institutional positions—a prime example is Deng during the Cultural Revolution and in 1976—but who retain political influence.



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Appendix B**Senior Military Appointments
Since the 12th Party Congress****National-Level
Appointments****Military Commission of the CCP-CC*****Permanent Vice Chairman***

Yang Shangkun (12 September 1982)—concurrently member of the Politburo and Vice Chairman, National People's Congress.

Deputy Secretary General

Hong Xuezhi (20 October 1982)—concurrently director of the PLA General Logistics Department.

Yang Dezhi (3 January 1983)—concurrently chief of the PLA General Staff and member of the Politburo and the Secretariat.

Yu Qiuli (25 December 1982)—concurrently director of the General Political Department and member of the Politburo.

Zhang Aiping (25 October 1982)—concurrently Minister of National Defense.

Ministry of National Defense***Minister***

Zhang Aiping (19 November 1982)—concurrently deputy secretary general of the party Military Commission.

General Staff Department***Deputy Chief of Staff***

Xu Xin (10 December 1982)

General Political Department***Director***

Yu Qiuli (28 September 1982)—concurrently deputy secretary general of the party Military Commission and member of the Politburo and the Secretariat.

General Logistics Department***Deputy Director***

Bai Ziangguo (22 January 1983)

Zheng Jian (17 October 1982)

Zhang Xiang (27 January 1983)

Navy**Commander**

Liu Huaqing (7 October 1982)

Second Artillery Corps (Strategic Missile Command)**Commander**

He Jinheng (11 February 1983)

**Regional Military
Commands****Beijing Military Region****Political Commissar**

Cheng Zhengfei (4 February 1983)

Fu Chongbi (27 October 1982)

Deputy Commander

Yan Tongmao (27 October 1982)

Yuan Jie (10 November 1982)

Chengdu Military Region**Commander**

Wang Chenghan (23 October 1982)

Political Commissar

Wan Haifeng (9 October 1982)

Deputy Commander

Yuan Shouqing (28 October 1982)

Zhang Zhili (28 October 1982)

Guangzhou Military Region**Commander**

You Taizhong (2 November 1982)

Deputy Commander

Xu Fangchun (2 November 1982)

Zhang Xudeng (2 November 1982)

Jinan Military Region**Political Commissar**

Liu Lian (6 November 1982)

Deputy Commander
Li Suiying (6 November 1982)

Kunming Military Region

Political Commissar
Xie Zhenhua (3 October 1982)

Lanzhou Military Region

Commander
Zheng Weishan (16 January 1983)

Nanjing Military Region

Commander
Xiang Shouzhi (9 November 1982)

Shenyang Military Region

Political Commissar
Liu Zhenhua (October 1982)

Wuhan Military Region

Commander
Zhou Shizhong (November 1982)

Deputy Commander
Zhang Wannian (9 November 1982)



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Appendix C

Probable Political Allegiances of Military Politburo Members

Generally Associated With Deng and Hu

Deng Xiaoping (chairman of the party Military Commission).

Wang Zhen (career military through 1950s and subsequent involvement in military industries).

Yang Dezhi (chief of the PLA General Staff).

Yang Shangkun (secretary general, party Military Commission).

Qin Jiwei (alternate Politburo member; commander, Beijing Military Region).

Unknown, Neutral

Zhang Tingfa (commander, Air Force).

Xu Xiangqian (a surviving "old marshal").

Li Desheng (commander, Shenyang Military Region).

Nie Rongzhen (a surviving "old marshal").

Yu Qiuli (director, General Political Department).

Generally Believed in Opposition to Deng

Wei Guoqing (former director, General Political Department).

Ye Jianying (Politburo Standing Committee member; a surviving "old marshal").



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