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The Tanzanian Military: Nyerere's Uncertain Shield

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An Intelligence Assessment

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ALA 83-10089
June 1983

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The Tanzanian Military: Nyerere's Uncertain Shield



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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by [redacted] Office
of African and Latin American Analysis, with
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welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Africa
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**The Tanzanian Military:
Nyerere's Uncertain
Shield** [Redacted]

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Key Judgments
*Information available
as of 7 June 1983
was used in this report.*

The unsuccessful military coup plot in Tanzania early this year has fueled speculation among Tanzanian and foreign observers that President Nyerere's 22-year tenure may be nearing an end. The plot, which reflects broad popular discontent, has deeply shaken Nyerere's confidence in the armed forces. [Redacted]

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Over the past year, mounting economic troubles—particularly worsening shortages of consumer goods and major price hikes—have spurred widespread public criticism of Nyerere's regime and, most important, have demoralized Tanzania's 45,000-man military. Junior officers and enlisted men in particular have grown restive over problems affecting military living standards, such as low pay, food shortages, and lack of other basic supplies. [Redacted]

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Several events could trigger a new military coup attempt, which could come with little warning. An isolated mutiny, civil disturbances on the Tanzanian mainland, or trouble on Zanzibar could prompt elements of the military to seize power. [Redacted]

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At the same time, there are a number of factors working against a military takeover. Nyerere is still viewed within and outside the military as the country's father figure. More important, he probably can count on the loyalty of most senior commanders. He has granted them a variety of perquisites over the years and has appointed key officers to high government and party posts. Nyerere's active role in decisions affecting the armed forces and the widely held belief that informants are pervasive throughout the military also may help to deter would-be plotters. [Redacted]

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On balance, we believe that additional plotting against the government is likely, but that there is at least an even chance Nyerere will survive until his term expires in 1985. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] We do not entirely preclude the possibility that he might relinquish the presidency sooner. We view as more remote the prospect that he will voluntarily retire completely from politics within the next two years. [Redacted]


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Should a military-led government nonetheless come to power, we believe it would conclude that it had no choice but to moderate Nyerere's unsuccessful, dogmatically socialist policies. Such a regime—whether headed by senior officers or more junior personnel—probably would seek closer ties with the West and would look to the United States and West European countries for economic and other help, although it would probably maintain Nyerere's official policy of nonalignment.



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We believe some junior military personnel are leftist oriented and receptive to Soviet Bloc influence. We cannot rule out the possibility, therefore, that a military government dominated by such leftist junior officers or enlisted men might come to power. We believe even they might well look for alternatives to Nyerere's failed economic program



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
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Deployment of Major Military Units



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**The Tanzanian Military:
Nyerere's Uncertain
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Introduction

Tanzania's armed forces are among the largest and strongest in black Africa. They have played an important regional role—intervening, for example, to overthrow Ugandan dictator Idi Amin in 1979 and to help President Rene's government in Seychelles repulse mercenaries in 1981—and have been a pillar for President Nyerere's socialist regime. The uncovering of a military coup plot against Nyerere in early January of this year has raised the specter of a military takeover in Dar es Salaam, which would probably result in major changes in Tanzanian domestic policies and broader regional repercussions. This paper examines the Tanzanian military and the likelihood and implications for the United States of its possible ascendancy to power.



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The Coup Plot

Most of the people involved in the January plot were junior or noncommissioned military officers, according to open-source reporting. As of mid-May, the government had charged nine civilians, including a former presidential assistant, and 21 military personnel ranging in rank from lieutenant colonel to sergeant, with conspiracy.

The discovery of the conspiracy shook Nyerere's confidence in the military, [redacted]. In its aftermath, he placed the armed forces on alert and imposed tight security throughout the country. These measures were partially relaxed in March. In the meantime, Nyerere's new Prime Minister, Edward Sokoine—appointed in February—has taken steps to expedite deliveries of food and other basic commodities to important military units. Sokoine is giving top priority to the military in the allocation of these increasingly scarce supplies.

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Military Discontent

No high-ranking officers have been arrested, although some of the accused plotters have alleged that one senior commander, Maj. Gen. Silas Mayunga, was involved. (Nyerere has since transferred Mayunga to a civilian party post.) Our evidence indicates there was no foreign involvement in the conspiracy.

[redacted] calm has returned to the barracks, in part because of Sokoine's efforts to ensure the availability of food and other supplies.

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shortages within the military have been only partially alleviated. We believe, moreover, that Sokoine's efforts will be difficult to sustain in view of the government's acute financial problems and growing signs of popular resentment over the preferential treatment being given to the armed forces.

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The plotters appear to have been motivated primarily by frustration over the country's acute economic troubles.

Other conditions that helped spur the coup attempt also persist.

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[redacted] consumer price hikes and shortages of food and other basic supplies—problems being increasingly felt both by the public in general and by military units in particular.

[redacted] many of the shortages have been the result of

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embezzlement of funds and theft of supplies. Profiteering and corruption have been spreading throughout the military but are most blatant among senior officers. [redacted]

Military pay is another source of discontent, [redacted]. Salaries are low and have not kept pace with the 25- to 40-percent annual rate of inflation Tanzania has experienced over the past few years. [redacted] military personnel have occasionally gone on strike to demand higher wages; the most recent incident occurred at an airbase last December. In addition, promotions, particularly for those in the lower ranks, have slowed since the end of the 1978-79 military campaign that ousted Ugandan dictator Idi Amin. As a result, the high morale of Tanzanian troops at the time of the victory in Uganda appears to have given way to bitterness and frustration. [redacted]

Recent government economic measures have added to the disgruntlement in the armed forces. According to open-source reports, defense spending was cut by 40 percent in this year's budget. [redacted]

[redacted] because of budget constraints, soldiers are no longer issued some basic items such as soap. [redacted]

[redacted] many military personnel were upset by steep tax increases imposed in early January on beer, cigarettes, and other goods. Recognizing this reaction, the government decided in March to exempt members of the armed forces from the taxes. [redacted]

Another manifestation of military discontent occurred in mid-March. Six airmen claiming to be disillusioned with life in Tanzania flew a military aircraft to the Comoros, where they sought political asylum but were jailed instead. [redacted]

The Potential for a Coup

Low Flashpoint. Considering the extent of disaffection among lower ranking personnel, we believe a new move against the government could come with little warning. It might well be led by disgruntled junior officers or enlisted men. It is also possible, although somewhat less likely, in our judgment, that senior officers might mount a coup—perhaps to preempt a move by their subordinates to seize power. Forces stationed in the Dar es Salaam area would be in the best position to spearhead a takeover. [redacted]

Military action against the regime could be the result of a carefully laid conspiracy. In view of the fact that the plot exposed in January involved a variety of military personnel and civilians and was in existence for several months before being discovered [redacted]

Alternatively, a coup could evolve from a spontaneous outbreak of military or civilian unrest:

- A mutiny in one military unit, for example, could rapidly spread to others. In such circumstances, military officers might decide to remove Nyerere instead of trying to put down the disturbances.
- Similarly, uncontrollable civilian disorders could lead elements in the military to seize power. We know from US Embassy reporting that a mood of extreme discontent prevails among urban Tanzanians, in large part because of the scarcity of many food items and other commodities. A further worsening of food shortages or some other, unforeseeable event could set off major urban demonstrations. Military officers, called on to try to contain such disorders, might decide instead to force the Nyerere government to step down. [redacted]

It is less likely, in our view, that widespread disorders will erupt in the countryside. People in rural areas have long been accustomed to a life of privation and seem to have lower expectations than urban Tanzanians. In recent years, according to US Embassy reporting, many farm families have reverted to subsistence agriculture, making them less susceptible to the vagaries of the economy. [redacted]

Zanzibar. A particular development that could lead to a military power grab in Dar es Salaam would be an uprising on Zanzibar. According to US officials in Dar es Salaam, separatist sentiment has grown in recent years among the 600,000 predominantly Muslim inhabitants of Zanzibar, which joined with Tanganyika to form the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964. [redacted] Zanzibaris increasingly see themselves as politically dominated and

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The Military: History, Structure, and Mission

The 45,000-man Tanzania People's Defense Force (TPDF) includes an Army, Air Force, and Navy. As President, Nyerere is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. He exercises this authority through Prime Minister Edward Sokoine, Defense Minister Muhiddin Kimario, and TPDF Commander Lieutenant General David Musuguri. [redacted]

History

The TPDF had its origins in the British colonial army, the King's African Rifles. The military remained politically passive in the years immediately following independence in 1961. In January 1964, however, a large number of soldiers mutinied over low pay and lack of promotional opportunities. Nyerere reluctantly called on British marines to quell the rebellion. The incident apparently convinced him of the need for a more politically reliable force. [redacted]

At about the same time, Nyerere sought new sources of military assistance, initially looking primarily to Canada. During the 1970s, Chinese and Soviet willingness to sell arms on concessional terms facilitated a major expansion of the TPDF. By 1978, on the eve of Tanzania's war with Uganda, the military had grown to a 35,000-man force. [redacted]

The war in Uganda, which began after President Amin's forces invaded northern Tanzania in the fall of 1978 and led to Amin's overthrow six months later, necessitated an even more rapid expansion of the Tanzanian military. By the end of the conflict, the Army had grown from three brigades to three divisions and had increased in numbers to a 60,000-man force. It is now approximately two-thirds of that size. [redacted]

The Services

The 43,000-man Army is the predominant service by virtue of its size and mission. It is composed of two divisions, each consisting of three infantry brigades, and other combat and support units directly subordinate to Army headquarters. [redacted]

The Tanzanian Army is one of the largest and best trained in Sub-Saharan Africa. Its mission is to defend against external aggression and to assist the police in maintaining internal order. [redacted] 25X1

The Air Force, known as the Air Wing, has about 1,000 men. It defends Tanzanian airspace and supports the Army. [redacted] 25X1

The Air Force inventory includes some 75 aircraft—32 fighters, 32 transports, and 11 helicopters. The fighter aircraft are Chinese-supplied F-5s (MIG-17s) and F-6s (MIG-19s) and Soviet-built MIG-21s. The transport aircraft include several De Havilland Buffalos and a variety of other light transports. [redacted] 25X1
 [redacted] most TPDF aircraft are grounded because of shortages of spare parts, poor maintenance, and low stocks of aviation fuel [redacted] 25X1

Similar problems impede the effectiveness of the 800-man naval force, which protects the country's coastal and territorial waters. The Navy's fleet includes a variety of Chinese-built patrol boats, gunboats, and torpedo boats, many of which are not operational. [redacted] 25X1

Tanzania also has a 35,000-man Militia that provides a pool of manpower with military skills that can be tapped in times of need, as it was during the 1978-79 Ugandan war. In peacetime, militiamen assist Army personnel in border patrols and maintaining internal security. [redacted] 25X1

To reduce military spending the government late last year announced that it would transfer 12,000 to 15,000 Army officers and enlisted men to their home villages, where they are to help train Militia personnel. These men will continue drawing salaries but are to furnish their own food and accommodations. [redacted] 25X1

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The Faltering Economy ^a

Much of the military dissatisfaction has been caused by the decline in the Tanzanian economy, which has contracted at a rate of 3.6 percent annually for the past two years.^b Agricultural and industrial production are falling, urban unemployment and rural underemployment are rising, the country's trade deficit is widening, and foreign indebtedness is growing. Nyerere blames the economic ills on factors beyond his government's control, including oil price increases, bad weather, and international recession. His claims are only partially valid, in our view. [redacted]

Oil imports last year consumed over 60 percent of Tanzania's export earnings. Continuing drought in recent years has hurt the country's harvests and increased its dependence on food imports while cutting exports. Declining world prices for Tanzania's three major exports—cotton, sisal, and tea—last year alone cut foreign exchange earnings by 10 percent. [redacted]

Government mismanagement, bureaucratic inefficiency, and Nyerere's efforts to foster a state-controlled economy are also responsible for the country's economic woes; many of the more than 400 state-owned firms are poorly run, overstaffed, and losing money. At the same time, Nyerere has been reluctant to abandon expensive social programs, such as free education and health care. Moreover, the Ugandan war cost Tanzania more than \$400 million, mostly in hard currency. [redacted]

Much of the decline in the agricultural sector—which accounts for more than half of Tanzania's GDP and over 90 percent of the work force—has stemmed from the government's longstanding program of communal farming, which has produced less than the private farms it replaced. Moreover, the low official prices paid farmers for their commodities encourages black-marketing and smuggling. [redacted]

Tanzanian industry is running at only about 25 percent of capacity—production has fallen 28 percent over the past two years—largely because of a lack of foreign exchange to import raw materials and spare

^a This survey is based primarily on US Embassy reporting.

parts. This has contributed to scarcities of many goods, losses in government revenues, and increased unemployment. Meanwhile, severe budget constraints have led to a curtailment of major roadbuilding projects and, more generally, to a gradual collapse of the country's transportation facilities. [redacted]

To make matters worse, the Nyerere government can no longer count on large amounts of Western economic assistance. In recent years, Tanzania has received more foreign aid per capita than any other African country—a total of about \$600 million annually. Now, however, many countries—as well as the World Bank, Tanzania's single largest donor—are linking new assistance to Tanzania's adoption of stringent austerity measures. [redacted]

The International Monetary Fund is also pressing Tanzania to adopt belt-tightening policies. The Nyerere government is trying to negotiate with the IMF a two-year standby agreement that would facilitate World Bank and bilateral assistance and pave the way for a rescheduling of Tanzania's \$1.7 billion external debt. Although this indebtedness is not large by international standards, it is well beyond Dar es Salaam's ability to pay. Arrears on payments for imports currently total about \$350 million and stretch back nearly three years. [redacted]

The Nyerere government has recently adopted some measures that partially meet IMF recommendations. It has canceled or postponed a number of development projects, reduced the list of goods subject to price controls, and eliminated some consumer subsidies. [redacted]

Substantial differences probably remain between Tanzania and the Fund on several issues—especially over the extent to which Dar es Salaam will devalue the Tanzanian shilling. As a result, we believe a new agreement will not be concluded this year. Nyerere is unlikely to impose an austerity program that jeopardizes his government or is inconsistent with his socialist policies. In any case, we foresee little prospect of any early improvement in Tanzania's economy, either with or without new IMF assistance. [redacted]

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economically exploited by the 18 million mainlanders, who are largely Christian or animist. Many believe that Zanzibari President Aboud Jumbe, who also is Tanzania's Vice President, has been co-opted by Dar es Salaam and no longer represents their interests.

[redacted]

An event such as the passing of Jumbe, who is 63 and has a history of medical problems, could embolden the separatists to stir up unrest. If Nyerere proved unable to control the situation, we believe that he would suffer a serious loss of prestige and that the chances of a military move against him would increase.¹

The Tanzanian armed forces held exercises on Zanzibar last December, probably as a show of force.

[redacted] Nyerere earlier this year ordered that troops from the mainland be rotated to the brigade stationed on the island. The order is being implemented only gradually, however, and most of the soldiers in the brigade still are Zanzibaris. Although Nyerere seems convinced that forces from the mainland are more likely than Zanzibari troops to remain loyal, we believe, based on what we know about military discontent, that many mainland soldiers also might prove unwilling to risk their lives to suppress a major uprising on Zanzibar.

[redacted]

Factors Inhibiting a Coup

A Co-Opted Military Leadership. At the same time, in our view, there are a number of factors working against a military move to topple Nyerere. Perhaps the most important of these is the effort he has made over the years to shore up the loyalty of senior officers. The regime has co-opted key senior officers by appointing them to high government and party posts. A number of important positions in the official party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party)—including some posts on its National Executive Committee—are reserved for leading military personnel.

Nyerere also has permitted senior officers to become something of a privileged class. According to US officials in Dar es Salaam, many profit from owning

[redacted]



President Nyerere: New concerns about military loyalty [redacted]

Africa News

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private businesses, even though this is proscribed by the country's official "leadership code." Moreover, senior commanders are able to siphon military funds and divert rations and other supplies for their own use. Nyerere, although widely regarded as honest, seems reluctant to take strong measures to end such practices, probably reasoning that this would undermine support for his regime among senior officers.

[redacted] an anticorruption campaign Nyerere and Sokoine launched in late March—in which over 1,000 Tanzanians have been arrested thus far—probably will not extend to senior military personnel.

Nyerere also has controlled the military by personally making most of the major decisions affecting it. According to the US Embassy, he is the final authority on matters such as troop deployments, weapons acquisitions, and staffing of senior positions. He occasionally reassigns potentially troublesome officers to prevent them from developing power bases. A major reshuffle of defense and security personnel in February probably was prompted by Nyerere's doubts about the loyalty of some senior officers following the discovery of the coup plot.

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
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Other Impediments. US Embassy reporting indicates that, although Nyerere's popularity among Tanzanians has declined in recent years, he continues to enjoy prestige both inside and outside the military as the country's father figure. Moreover, even though military personnel, like Tanzanians more generally, may be more inclined than before to blame Nyerere's dogmatic socialism for the country's economic decline, we believe he is still credited to a considerable degree for the regime's accomplishments. These have been evident mainly in the educational and health fields. Since Tanzania became independent in 1961, according to open-source reporting:

- Life expectancy has risen from 37 years to 51, while the infant mortality rate has dropped from 175 to 140 per thousand.
- Primary school enrollment has jumped from 25 percent to over 90 percent, with about 80 percent of children now regularly attending school.
- Literacy is up from less than 30 percent to over 70 percent.
- Over a third of the country's 8,200 villages now have clean water and health clinics—a substantial increase since the early 1960s. [redacted]

Another factor that works against a successful military coup is the absence of any opposition political group within the country that might provide a rallying point for military dissidents. Externally based opponents of the regime, such as former Foreign Minister Kambona who has been exiled since the late 1960s, appear to have only a limited following within Tanzania. We believe they constitute little more than an occasional embarrassment to the government. At most, Kambona could serve as a figurehead in a future military government, lending it a patina of legitimacy. [redacted]

Also absent from the Tanzanian scene is a tradition of military intervention in politics. Tribal rivalries, moreover, are less likely to trigger a power grab in Tanzania than in many African states. Unlike countries in which a few major tribes perennially vie for control, Tanzania has around 120 ethnic groups, and the largest—the Sukuma—constitutes only 15 percent of the population. [redacted]



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Prospects

On balance, we believe that additional coup plotting is likely in the next year or two, in view of the extent of dissatisfaction among lower ranking personnel and the poor prospects for improvement in the underlying economic situation. We are not aware of any coup plotting, but our knowledge of the day-to-day attitudes and intentions of military personnel is limited. [redacted]

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It is more difficult to predict whether any such conspiracies will be successful. Chance factors, such as whether the government's security service manages to uncover plotting in time as it did last January, could prove decisive in determining whether a conspiracy leads to a successful coup. Whether or not an incident will spark the sort of uncontrollable civilian or military unrest that could lead to a takeover is equally unpredictable. Our best overall judgment is that there is at least an even chance Nyerere will remain in office until his term ends in 1985. [redacted]

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[redacted] Nyerere has said privately that when his term expires he would like to turn the presidency over to Prime Minister So-koine, retaining power behind the scenes by remaining party chairman for a few more years. We do not rule out the possibility that he might make such a move sooner, considering the intractability of the government's problems, or he might remain president beyond 1985. It is less likely, in our view, that Nyerere—who at age 60 appears healthy and fit—will voluntarily retire completely from public life within the next two years. He almost certainly knows this

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Some Top Military and Civilian Leaders

1. Brigadier A. T. Kitete
2. Major General T. N. Kiwelu
3. Major General M. M. Marwa
4. Major General S. L. Mayunga
5. Major General H. P. Lugppo
6. Lieutenant General A. Twalipo
7. Secretary-General R. Kawawa CCM
8. President J. K. Nyerere
9. Colonel M. Nnauye
10. Lieutenant General D. B. Musuguri
11. Unidentified
12. Vice President A. M. Jumbe
13. Major General I. H. Kombe
14. Major General J. B. Walden



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could trigger a power struggle among a broad range of military and civilian officials and would prompt charges of abandoning his country at a time when it was beset by acute difficulties that to a considerable extent had been caused by his own policies. [redacted]

bureaucracy, stimulate private enterprise, and cut government spending, although not necessarily at the expense of the armed forces. [redacted]

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A military-led regime would inherit all of the economic troubles that bedevil Nyerere. In view of the severity and intractability of these problems, such a regime might quickly become unpopular and could prove unstable. [redacted]

Such a government probably would seek closer ties with the West and look to the United States, other Western nations, and Western-sponsored multilateral institutions for economic assistance. It would also expect US political support and might ask for military aid. At the same time, it would be likely to maintain Nyerere's official policy of nonalignment to stay on good terms with fellow African and other Third World countries. [redacted]

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Considering the failure of Nyerere's doctrinaire socialism, the acuteness of the government's financial difficulties, and the political views of the officers (see appendixes A and B), we believe a military-led government would modify many of Nyerere's domestic policies. Such a regime, whether headed by senior officers or more junior personnel, probably would conclude that it must try to reduce the size of the

A government dominated by leftist junior officers or enlisted men might come to power. We believe some of the junior personnel are leftists and receptive to Soviet Bloc influence. Like Nyerere, senior officers tend to distrust Moscow. [redacted]

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The Military's Regional Role

Tanzania's armed forces are among the largest and strongest in black Africa, and they have been called on to assist other Africans on a variety of occasions. TPDF personnel are serving in several neighboring states, including Uganda, Mozambique, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe. [redacted]

modest augmentation of the Tanzanian presence but probably would resist a substantial increase unless security sharply deteriorated or Kampala were willing to foot the bill. [redacted]

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Tanzania does not appear to face an external military threat at this time. Although the country's perennially uneasy relations with Kenya were further strained last year when Dar es Salaam granted asylum to two leaders of a failed coup attempt by Kenyan Air Force personnel, we believe a major Tanzanian-Kenyan conflict is unlikely, in part because both governments are preoccupied with serious internal problems. [redacted]

Approximately 150 TPDF personnel have been in Mozambique since the fall of 1982 training enlisted men and junior officers; the Tanzanians have also been training Mozambican military personnel in Tanzania. Between 200 to 230 Tanzanian troops are in Seychelles helping protect President Rene's government, which barely survived a mercenary attack in November 1981 and an Army mutiny last August. According to the US Embassy in Dar es Salaam, the Nyerere government would like to withdraw these forces but fears such a move would jeopardize Rene's position. A similar number of Tanzanian troops were in the Comoros from 1975 until 1978, when the socialist government in power there was overthrown by a more Western-oriented group. [redacted]

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Relations with President Obote's government in neighboring Uganda are friendly. [redacted] about 50 TPDF personnel are now in Uganda serving as artillery and officer candidate instructors. As many as 40,000 Tanzanian troops were stationed there during the 1978-79 war to oust Ugandan dictator Amin. [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] In our judgment, Nyerere might agree to a

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Moscow almost certainly is trying to exploit its military aid program in Tanzania to cultivate officers at various levels who could participate in a future government. [redacted]

Nyerere's departure also would probably weaken the Frontline States, at least temporarily. Nyerere for years has been the chairman and main driving force behind this six-country grouping.² If he were removed from office, the group's ability to speak with one voice on Namibia and other southern African issues—already frayed as a result of ideological and tactical differences among the member countries—would be weakened further until someone else filled Nyerere's Frontline role. [redacted]

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A military power grab in Tanzania might have a regional impact. In our view, a successful coup in Tanzania could have a "demonstration effect" in neighboring East African countries. In particular, we believe a takeover by lower ranking military men in Tanzania might embolden junior personnel in such countries as Zambia and Kenya, just as Flight Lieutenant Rawlings's 1979 coup in Ghana was followed by similar moves elsewhere in West Africa. [redacted]

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² The Frontline States include two Marxist-oriented countries (Angola and Mozambique), three nations that strongly espouse socialism (Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), and democratic, moderate-leaning Botswana. [redacted]

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Appendix A

Key Defense Officials

Name	Rank	Position	Ethnic Affiliation
Julius K. Nyerere		President, TPDF Commander in Chief	Zanaki
Edward M. Sokoine		Prime Minister and Secretary, CCM Defense and Security Committee	Masai
Muhiddin M. Kimario	Brigadier	Minister for Defense and National Security	Chagga
David B. Musuguri	Lieutenant General	TPDF Commander	Zanaki
Abdallah Twalipo	Lieutenant General	Minister Without Portfolio	Ngoni
Ernest M. Kiara	Major General	Commander, 30th Division	Kuria
Tumainieli N. Kiwelu	Major General	Regional Commissioner for Tanga	Chagga
Imran H. Kombe	Major General	Director, Tanzanian Intelligence and Security Service	Chagga
Herman C. Lupogo	Major General	Commander, 20th Division	Matengo
Michael M. Marwa	Major General	Regional Commissioner for Mara	Kuria
Silas P. Mayunga	Major General	Regional Commissioner for Kilimanjaro	Sukuma
Martin N. Mwakalindile	Major General	TPDF Chief of Staff	Nyakyusa
John B. Walden	Major General	Commander, Militia	Nyamwanga (mulatto)
William G. Cathles	Brigadier	TPDF Chief of Personnel	Hehe (mulatto)
Joseph R. Hall	Brigadier	Commander, TPDF Training Team, Mozambique	
Yusuf Himid	Brigadier	Active in Zanzibari politics	Zanzibari
Said S. Kalembo	Brigadier		Matumbi
A. R. Kamazima	Brigadier	Unknown	Haya
January C. Kisanko	Brigadier	Deputy Head, CCM Defense and Security Committee	Muha
Ahmad T. Kitete	Brigadier	TPDF Chief of Operations and Training	Manyema
G. B. Kusiga	Brigadier	Executive, Tanzania Wood Industry Corp.	Hehe
Sam T. Laiser	Brigadier	Chief, Military Intelligence	Mwarusha
Oswald C. Liganga	Brigadier	Commander, 203rd Brigade	Makua
Peter S. Ligate	Brigadier	TPDF Comptroller	
James Luhanga	Brigadier	MP and Executive Chairman, Air Tanzania	Hehe

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Key Defense Officials (continued)

Name	Rank	Position	Ethnic Affiliation
Mwilipanga R. Lupembe	Brigadier	Commandant, Military Academy	Kinga
Rowland L. Makunda	Brigadier	Commander, Naval Force	Makua
Robert P. Mboma	Brigadier	Commander, Air Wing	
Hamis Hemedi	Brigadier	Commander, 301st Brigade	
Juma M. Mheza	Brigadier	Commander, 201st Brigade	Zanzibari
Gideon F. Sayore	Brigadier	Commandant, TPDF Infantry School	Mwarusha
Seif Bakari	Colonel	Deputy Minister for Defense and National Security	Zanzibari
Sylvester A. Hemedi	Colonel	Acting Commander, 202nd Brigade	Zanzibari
Beatus K. Kabogo	Colonel	Acting Commander, 320th Brigade	
R. R. Kizoka	Colonel	Commander, 401st Brigade	
Adam C. Mwakanjuki	Colonel	TPDF Political Commissar	Nyakyusa
Moses Nnauye	Colonel	CCM Central Committee member	Makonde

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Appendix B

Selected Senior Officers



Brig. Muhiddin M. Kimario
Minister of Defense and National Service

Career military officer who distinguished himself during the Ugandan campaign. Appointed in early 1983. Previously served as Minister of Home Affairs, regional party commissioner, and elected member of parliament. US Embassy officials describe him as young, bright, and ambitious. Although a mainlander, is one of the country's most prominent Muslims.

[redacted] Viewed by Embassy as possible darkhorse for the presidency [redacted]



Lt. Gen. David B. Musuguri
Commander, Tanzania People's Defense Force (58)

One of the most popular and respected officers in the armed forces, according to US Embassy officials. Has held post since November 1980. Thought to be a cousin of Nyerere and to enjoy the President's full trust. Began military career in colonial army and has little formal education. [redacted]

[redacted] Probably resents taking orders from Defense Minister Kimario, whom he outranks. [redacted]

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Lt. Gen. Abadallah Twalipo
Minister Without Portfolio (61)

Longtime Nyerere loyalist. A former Defense Minister and TPDF Commander. Joined colonial army as a private in 1945. Rose through the ranks despite being virtually illiterate. US Embassy reports indicate he lacks drive, ability, and initiative [redacted]

[redacted] Likely to retire and to play little if any role in future military affairs [redacted]

Maj. Gen. Ernest M. Kiara
Commander, TPDF 30th Division

Poorly educated. [redacted] Commands key division responsible for both Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar. Career military officer. Previously commanded Militia. Appointed in February 1983. Member of the Kuria tribe, which has the largest representation of any ethnic group in the TPDF. Has headed military delegations to the Soviet Union and China. [redacted]

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Maj. Gen. Herman C. Lupogo
Commander, TPDF 20th Division (Midforties)

Since February has commanded one of the TPDF's two divisions. US Embassy views him as intelligent, confident, highly loyal to Nyerere. Among the more competent officers in the TPDF. Young for a senior TPDF commander. [redacted]

[redacted] Formerly TPDF chief of logistics and engineering. A rising star. [redacted]

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Maj. Gen. Imran H. Kombe
Director, Tanzanian Intelligence and Security Service

A favorite of Prime Minister Sokoine, who probably chose him for his present post. Sandhurst educated, joined the Army in 1963. Performed well in Uganda and was named TPDF Chief of Staff. Bright and hard working [redacted]

[redacted] Has advanced rapidly despite allegations that he has misappropriated military funds and that he has ties to dissident Oscar Kambona, to whom his wife is said to be related. [redacted]

[redacted]



Maj. Gen. Michael M. Marwa
Regional Commissioner for Mara (61)

Unhappy with his party post, which he views as a form of military exile, [redacted] Had been commander of the TPDF's 20th Division until last February. Began career as enlisted man in colonial army. Once enjoyed close ties to Nyerere but in recent years has fallen into disfavor.

[redacted] has promoted the interests of his fellow Kuria tribesmen within the military. Thought to dislike the Soviets and their allies. [redacted]

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Maj. Gen. Martin N. Mwakalindile
TPDF Chief of Staff (39)

Appointed in February 1983 after serving briefly as Militia Commander. Sandhurst educated. Previously was Chief of TPDF Operations and Training and before that headed Tanzanian military assistance team in Mozambique.

[redacted]
Described as pro-Western. [redacted]

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Maj. Gen. Silas P. Mayunga
Regional Commissioner for Kilimanjaro

[redacted]

[redacted] Had been commander of the important 30th Division until last February. Probably suspected by Nyerere of possible role in recent coup plot or, at a minimum, of failing to detect it. Remains popular among fellow Sukuma, the country's largest tribe.

[redacted]

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Appendix C

Communist Aid to Tanzania

The TPDF depends on Communist countries for almost all of its military equipment and training assistance. The USSR replaced China as the principal source of such support in the mid-1970s, when the Nyerere government decided it needed more sophisticated arms than Beijing could provide. [redacted]

During the 1970s China supplied F-5 and F-6 fighters, armored vehicles, rocket launchers, and naval craft, all on concessional terms. The Chinese have continued to provide military aid in recent years, but on a reduced scale. In 1981, for example, the two countries concluded a \$7 million military agreement.

[redacted] there are now about 55 Chinese military personnel in Tanzania overhauling tanks, repairing artillery pieces, and helping maintain naval facilities. Another 45 are to arrive this year to repair Chinese-manufactured naval gunboats that are inoperative. [redacted]

The military's large inventory of Soviet hardware includes MIG-21s, armored vehicles, artillery, and trucks. Moscow also has provided radars as well as SA-3, SA-6, and SA-7 missile systems. As of last year, approximately 120 Soviet military advisers were in Tanzania training TPDF personnel to use and maintain Soviet equipment as well as infantry weapons provided by Moscow's East European allies. [redacted]

In recent years, Tanzania's inability to pay for Soviet arms on time has led to occasional strains. Given its weak financial position, Dar es Salaam probably will be unable to make major purchases of new Soviet equipment any time soon. [redacted]

The UK, Egypt, India, and West Germany have provided small quantities of arms or training over the past several years. In our view, however, these countries are unlikely to supplant the USSR as Tanzania's preeminent arms supplier and source of training in the near future. The following tabulation shows training received by Tanzanian military personnel in Communist countries last year and during the period 1955-82:

	1982	1955-82
Total	25	3,185
USSR	25	2,110
Eastern Europe	NA	50
China		1,025

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Appendix D

**Estimated Value of Military
Assistance Agreements With Tanzania***Million US \$*

	Total 1955-82	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Total	644.6	228.0	41.7	39.5	102.1	7.0	0
Communist	570.6	201.0	39.7	38.8	102.1	7.0	0
Bulgaria	82.9		27.0		48.1		
China	118.0	9.0	4.0	15.0		7.0	
Cuba	NEGL						
Czechoslovakia	2.0		2.0				
East Germany	5.0		2.0				
North Korea	13.0			12.0			
Romania	3.0		1.0				
USSR	340.0	192.0		10.0	54.0		
Yugoslavia	6.7		3.7	1.8			
Non-Communist	74.0	27.0	2.0	0.7			0
Algeria	0.6			0.6			
Australia	0.2						
Belgium	0.3						
Canada	33.2	24.0					
Egypt	7.0						
West Germany	4.6						
India	2.2						
Italy	5.9	3.0	1.5				
Mozambique	0.6		0.5	0.1			
Sweden	6.1						
Uganda	1.0						
United Kingdom	12.3						

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