




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Zimbabwe: The ZANU-ZAPU Rivalry



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An Intelligence Assessment

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ALA 83-10053
April 1983

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Zimbabwe: The ZANU-ZAPU Rivalry

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An Intelligence Assessment

This assessment was prepared by [redacted]
[redacted] Office of African
and Latin American Analysis. It was coordinated
with the Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council. Comments and queries are
welcome and should be addressed to the Chief,
Southern Africa Division, ALA, [redacted]

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**Zimbabwe:
The ZANU-ZAPU Rivalry**



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Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 23 March 1983
was used in this report.*

We believe that Prime Minister Mugabe's decision in January to send the North Korean-trained 5th Brigade to put down growing banditry and political violence in Matabeleland marked a turning point in his government's approach to dealing with the opposition and has important implications for other government policies as well. We believe the move was intended to destroy Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) as a political as well as a dissident force and that the effort to intimidate the Ndebele people ends any possibility of meaningful political reconciliation between the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and ZAPU.



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It is clear from US Embassy and press reporting that the repression in Matabeleland has left ZAPU in disarray, although we doubt the dissidence will end if only because of the depth of animosity between Zimbabwe's two major tribal and political groups, the Shona- and the Ndebele-speakers. We judge it unlikely, however, that there will soon be a large-scale insurrection, in part because government measures have driven Nkomo into exile and prevented the creation of an insurgent army.



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Nkomo, in our view, will find it difficult to line up sponsors for a movement in exile:

- Nkomo's old patrons, the Soviets, have been courting Mugabe since the early days of independence, and, in light of the recent warming of relations between the two countries—signaled by the first shipment of Soviet arms to Zimbabwe in March—significant Soviet involvement with Nkomo seems unlikely.
- Although we believe that South Africa probably will provide enough support to the Ndebele dissidents to ensure that the Shona-Ndebele conflict continues to destabilize Zimbabwean politics, we doubt that Pretoria will adopt ZAPU in the same manner that it backs insurgencies in Angola or Mozambique, in part because ZAPU's tribal base is too small—the Ndebele are about 16 percent of the population—and geographically localized to support a viable insurgency.



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We believe that Mugabe's shift to a hardline approach to dealing with internal dissidence may presage radicalism on a broader front. Mugabe, hard pressed by domestic problems and under pressure from party hotheads to adopt more radical approaches in foreign and domestic affairs, could well have determined that his moderate tactics have not worked and that he may as well follow his more doctrinaire beliefs. 

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Mugabe's rhetoric has become substantially more strident in recent months, and he has joined some of his more radical colleagues in the Frontline States in blaming his problems on South Africa and its alleged Western backers. He clearly resents the criticism the Western press has made of his handling of Ndebele dissidence, and he has accused US and other Western media of following a double standard in their coverage of violence in Matabeleland. We expect the Soviets and their sympathizers in Zimbabwe to attempt to exploit this state of mind. There is no doubt that Mugabe's inclinations are toward a Marxist social and economic organization. Should the use of more authoritarian political methods to control tribal rivalry and opposition stimulate these inclinations, Zimbabwe's reasonably successful economic and political relations with the West could unravel. 

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In our judgment the deepening cycle of repression and violence in Zimbabwe already has undermined an important Western goal: the creation of a moderate, democratic, multiracial society in Zimbabwe to serve as an example for South Africa. Rather than encourage those who are seeking change in South Africa, the Zimbabwean experience now seems to serve those in South Africa who are resisting political accommodation with the black majority. 

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
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**Zimbabwe:
The ZANU-ZAPU Rivalry** [Redacted]

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Introduction

Recent events in Zimbabwe—armed dissidence in the countryside, retaliatory military depredations against civilians in Matabeleland, and the flight into exile of opposition leader Joshua Nkomo—have raised questions about the stability and political direction of southern Africa’s newest and, until recently at least, most promising independent state. In particular, the violent surfacing of tribal and political rivalries has raised fears that the early successes of the Mugabe regime in handling a host of social, political, economic, and military problems will be undone in a replay of the tribally rooted violence and repression that have plagued many other African states. This paper examines the rivalry between the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), assesses the impact of recent developments on domestic stability, and discusses their implications for the United States. [Redacted]

settlers took control of the country after 1890, the Shona-speaking tribes bridled at the arrogance and affectations of superiority of the Ndebele, whom they outnumbered by 4 to 1. [Redacted]

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The tribal rivalry gained an overlay of personal and political animosity during the Rhodesian civil war. Mugabe and many other Shona became members of ZAPU when it was founded under Joshua Nkomo’s leadership in 1961. Mugabe joined other breakaway Shonas in forming ZANU in 1963, and became its leader in 1974. Nkomo has long tended to treat him as a young upstart. ZANU-ZAPU animosities increased during the latter phase of the war for independence when Mugabe’s guerrilla forces carried the brunt of the fighting against Ian Smith’s regime while Nkomo’s conventionally equipped and Soviet-backed army waited out most of the war in Zambia. ZANU’s suspicions that ZAPU was preparing for a postindependence struggle with ZANU were fueled by Nkomo’s flirtation with Rhodesian whites and South Africa during the immediate preindependence period. [Redacted]

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Background


The depth of the rivalry between ZANU—the party mainly supported by the country’s Shona-speaking majority—and ZAPU—representative of the Ndebele-speaking minority—makes the confrontation now under way less surprising than the fact that it has taken so long to occur. The roots of the tribal enmity that underlie much of the conflict go back over 150 years when the Ndebele moved north from South Africa to invade Shona-controlled territory in what is now Zimbabwe. Better organized and militarily stronger than the scattered Shona clans, the Ndebele established a kingdom in the area around Bulawayo. Forced to coexist with the invaders after British

The Postindependence Moderation

Mugabe’s fears that ZAPU would strike a deal to overturn the victory ZANU gained in the elections in March 1980 figured importantly, in our view, in the pragmatic policy of national reconciliation Mugabe pursued after taking office:

- Although ZANU won 57 of the 80 seats in Parliament reserved for blacks and could have governed alone, Mugabe formed a coalition government that included his rivals. Nkomo, who refused Mugabe’s initial offer of the largely ceremonial position of president, was given the Home Affairs portfolio, with responsibility for the police. Three other ZAPU members and two whites were also given ministries.

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Mugabe (l) and Nkomo in 1978



United Nations

• Mugabe also set out to gain the confidence of the white community, in part because of its importance to the country's recovery from the economic effects of international sanctions and the civil war. He also wanted to convince white leaders that they had nothing to gain by colluding with Nkomo. Mugabe, therefore, resisted pressure from his party to attack white privileges. There was no immediate purge of whites from the civil service, Army, or police, nor did Mugabe move to nationalize white-owned lands and business.

• Similar motives entered into Mugabe's effort to placate the South Africans, in our view. Even before the election, Mugabe publicly assured the South Africans that he would not permit the African National Congress, the principal antiwhite insurgency, to use Zimbabwe as a base for terrorist operations into South Africa. He also promised publicly to honor Zimbabwe's \$525 million debt, owed mainly to Pretoria. [redacted]

Mugabe's concerns about collusion between ZAPU and the whites against his new government tied in directly, in our view, to the most pressing problem he faced in the immediate postindependence period—establishing control over the nearly 100,000 armed men from ZAPU, ZANU, and ex-Rhodesian units located throughout the country and in Zambia and Mozambique. Our best estimates of the forces that had to be integrated after independence, [redacted] are as follows:

| | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| Rhodesian security forces | 13,000 to 15,000 |
| Rhodesian paramilitary | 12,000 |
| Rhodesian auxiliaries | 16,000 |
| ZANU | 21,000 to 23,000 |
| ZAPU | 19,000 to 23,000 |
| Police | 8,000 |
| Total | 89,000 to 97,000 |

[redacted]

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Although the Ndebele constitute only 16 percent of Zimbabwe's population, the ZAPU military forces were equal in size to Mugabe's and, moreover, were better trained for a possible civil war with the Shona. The fear that white-led ex-Rhodesian forces would join—or at least facilitate—a ZAPU military move against his government undoubtedly was a factor in Mugabe's drive, with British assistance, to integrate the disparate military forces into a national army under the government's control. [REDACTED]

Growing Strains

Although for the most part Mugabe hewed to his cautious policy for almost two years after independence, persistent pressure from hardliners within his party and festering tensions with ZAPU and the whites marked the tenuous peace in Zimbabwe. Relations between ZANU and ZAPU, in particular, were uneasy at best. Both parties agreed in principle that a one-party state would provide greater stability than the existing system, that tribally based parties worked against national unity, and that the Western-style multiparty system tended to dissipate the energies of political leaders through constant campaigning and parliamentary maneuvering. Sporadic attempts to unify the two parties foundered, however, on Nkomo's insistence that talks proceed on the basis of parity. The demand incensed ZANU hardliners in view of ZAPU's lopsided electoral defeat. [REDACTED]

The tensions generated by ZANU's drive to consolidate power and Nkomo's insistence that any merger of the two parties include a major role for him as well as for the Ndebele continued to mount. In January 1981 Mugabe demoted Nkomo to Minister Without Portfolio, leaving ZANU in full control of the security apparatus. ZAPU remained in the cabinet, but factional violence broke out between some of the not-yet-integrated Army units deployed near Bulawayo, the capital of the Ndebele region of Matabeleland. Over 150 former guerrilla troops were killed before ex-Rhodesian units—still largely intact—reestablished control. Within a week of the violence, Mugabe opened diplomatic relations with Moscow, a move probably intended to offset any remaining Soviet ties

to ZAPU. The violence also prompted the government to accelerate the process of integrating the Army to bring former ZAPU units under stricter control. [REDACTED]

Nkomo's Ouster. Politically, the moderate phase of Mugabe's approach to his "ZAPU problem" ended in mid-February 1982 when he expelled Nkomo and two of his closest colleagues from the cabinet. Mugabe tried to justify the move by accusing Nkomo of plotting a coup and supported his charges by pointing to the discovery of large caches of arms, ammunition, and other military equipment on farms owned by companies run by ZAPU. In our view, however, Nkomo's ouster marked ZANU's decision to pursue a strategy of trying to destroy Nkomo politically and to break the will of the remainder of the ZAPU leadership to resist absorption into a one-party state. Several factors may have contributed to Mugabe's shift in strategy—a shift which triggered the violence that has since plagued Zimbabwe:

- We believe Mugabe was being pressured within ZANU's Central Committee to tighten the party's grip on power. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Mugabe's 1982 New Year's message, in which he reverted to his traditional role as spokesman and instrument of the party, almost certainly had been spurred by a Central Committee meeting in late December that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] reaffirmed the primacy of the party over the government and decided to increase the momentum toward a one-party state. At this meeting ZANU may also have made the decision to move against Nkomo.

- ZANU concerns over a joint ZAPU-white military move against the government had probably faded. The integration of the two guerrilla armies and the former government's security forces had been completed—in effect depriving ZAPU of a military wing. Moreover, ZANU was developing its own

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military cadre—in August 1981 North Korean instructors started training an all-ZANU 5th Brigade. Nkomo prophetically charged at the time that the brigade would be used against ZAPU to create a one-party state.

- Finally, Mugabe and the ZANU leadership may have become convinced that South Africa had begun a major campaign to destabilize Zimbabwe, and that ZAPU, if not colluding with Pretoria, at least shared this goal. The sabotage of a large ammunition dump south of Harare in August 1981 and the blowing up of the conference room at ZANU headquarters in December at a time when the party's Central Committee normally would have been meeting probably played a major role in sharpening Mugabe's suspicions. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] the growing incidence of robbery and violence in Matabeleland further increased after Nkomo's top military aides were arrested in early March 1982. Mugabe's hope that Nkomo could be split from ZAPU soon proved groundless—Nkomo drew 60,000 supporters, according to press reports, to a rally in early April in Bulawayo and demonstrated that he remained the leader of the Ndebele. [redacted]

Rising Violence. By mid-1982 dissident activity began to take on more overtly political overtones. Mugabe's house was attacked in late June and six Western tourists were kidnaped in late July. Their release was tied to the freedom of Nkomo's former military aides. The sabotage, also in July, of Thornhill Air Force Base—which we believe was carried out by ex-Rhodesian security personnel in league with the South Africans—probably heightened government concern over growing dissident activity and about South Africa's involvement. Beginning in late July the Army crackdown in Matabeleland became harsher and less disciplined. There were several press reports of excesses against civilians as the search for the kidnaped tourists was pressed especially hard. [redacted]

Although Nkomo spoke out publicly against dissident violence almost from the time it began, his words had

no apparent impact. Many in ZANU viewed his lack of effect as confirmation that ZAPU was behind the growing violence. Government discomfort grew as Western countries remonstrated with Mugabe about government excesses, especially reports that prisoners—including some whites—were being tortured into giving false confessions. The government's harsh measures succeeded in temporarily suppressing dissident activity. Army forces were withdrawn from Matabeleland and the curfew was lifted by October. Nkomo's popularity only increased, in the view of most observers, as the Ndebele rallied to him in reaction to the government troops' brutality. [redacted]

Nkomo and Mugabe met in November 1982 for the stated purpose of getting ZANU-ZAPU unity talks restarted, but to little effect. Although the two agreed to appoint delegates to continue discussions, Nkomo renewed his demand for equal status with ZANU, a position which, in our view, further convinced Mugabe of Nkomo's unreasonableness and left him pessimistic about the chances of progress. When Mugabe subsequently appointed as one of his delegates a ZANU hardliner firmly opposed to any political accommodation with ZAPU, he seemed to be signaling that he was unwilling to compromise. [redacted]

Mugabe, in our view, was also concerned about increased South African pressure.² In August 1982, Zimbabwean security forces killed several ex-Rhodesian servicemen in Zimbabwe, who were later acknowledged by the South Africans to be in their employ. Mugabe's determination to reduce Zimbabwe's economic dependence on South Africa led

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him in November to send troops into Mozambique to guard the oil pipeline from Mutare to Beira. The pipeline is Zimbabwe's only alternative to supply routes in South African territory. On 9 December, the bombing of oil storage tanks at Beira—an act the South African-backed Mozambican insurgents claimed was in response to Zimbabwe's decision to send troops into Mozambique—plunged Zimbabwe into its worst fuel crisis since independence. [redacted]

The "Mailed Fist" Campaign. Renewed violence at the end of 1982 provoked the government into a full-scale military campaign against ZAPU. The dissidents attacked cars, buses, and trains and destroyed government construction equipment; they seized several hostages and killed six whites. The 5th Brigade was sent to Matabeleland in January 1983 with a mandate to be "relentless in neutralizing dissident elements," according to Minister of State for Defense Sekeramayi. Although there were some exaggerated press reports of atrocities against Ndebele villagers by the all-Shona brigade, there is little doubt it engaged in indiscriminate brutality and destroyed property, including entire villages, in several instances. [redacted]

[redacted] the government's objective in the "mailed fist" campaign in Matabeleland was, in addition to ending dissident violence, to eliminate ZAPU as a political organization. According to press reports, 5th Brigade operations were aimed especially at young Ndebele men and ZAPU political figures. In early March, several government ministers called publicly for action to "liquidate" the "dissident infrastructure," a reference to ZAPU. [redacted]

Government harassment against Nkomo also increased. He was briefly detained in February and his passport lifted when he tried to leave the country. Several government ministers said publicly that criminal charges would be lodged against him. A government sweep through Bulawayo resulted in the shooting of his chauffeur while he was at Nkomo's house. Nkomo fled the country in early March. Mugabe, who was at the time on his way back from the Nonaligned Movement's summit conference in New

Delhi, vetoed moves to negotiate Nkomo's return from Botswana. [redacted]

We believe the government intended to arrest Nkomo and probably is relieved to have him out of the country. After he fled, the government shut down several ZAPU offices in Matabeleland, and many ZAPU officials reportedly followed him into exile. ZAPU Vice President Josiah Chinamano—a Shona with little support among the Ndebele—now serves as acting president and has called publicly for new unity talks with ZANU. [redacted]

Strong government censorship has reduced reporting on the most recent developments in Matabeleland. The harshness of the government's military campaign against ZAPU—which may have resulted in as many as 2,000 deaths—appears to have abated. Attacks by dissidents on white farmers in mid-March, however, or renewed violence should Nkomo's military aides be convicted of treason and arms possession, could trigger new repressive measures. [redacted]

Outlook

[redacted] a minority in ZANU still favors political reconciliation with ZAPU. We believe the majority—including Mugabe and his closest advisers—are firmly opposed to making any concessions. ZANU probably would sign an agreement by which a now emasculated ZAPU is absorbed into ZANU, but any more balking by the minority party on terms, in our view, probably would cause the government to outlaw ZAPU, perhaps using renewed dissident violence as a pretext. [redacted]

Even if ZANU and what remains of ZAPU should merge, we expect Ndebele resentment to remain strong. The government's recent actions have largely contained the dissidence, but the intimidation campaign against the Ndebele people probably has left many of them unalterably opposed to the government. A fair number probably will join the armed dissidents, now estimated by most observers at about 1,000. The

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10,000 to 13,000 former ZAPU guerrillas still in the national Army are the largest source of potential recruits. [redacted]

We do not believe that a large-scale tribal insurrection is likely in the near future but do expect that dissident violence will resume and perhaps expand. The military occupation of Matabeleland, which the government says will continue until the violence ends, probably has prevented, in our judgment, the creation of an insurgent army. Moreover, neither Nkomo nor the ZAPU officials remaining in Zimbabwe appear inclined to lead a call to arms. [redacted]

Over the longer term, we believe Nkomo will find it difficult to line up sponsors for a movement in exile. Neither Zambia nor Botswana—Nkomo's traditional allies—wanted anything to do with him after he fled Zimbabwe. Each is already concerned about strains in its relations with Zimbabwe over Ndebele refugees and appears determined to avoid provoking Harare into cross-border operations against alleged dissidents. No other black African government appears interested in the plight of the Ndebele. [redacted]

Despite the suspicion expressed by some ZANU officials that Moscow might renew its relationship with Nkomo, the Soviets, in our judgment, probably view Nkomo as a spent force. Although the Soviets apparently continued some financial support to ZAPU in the early days of independence, they have since courted Mugabe assiduously and, until very recently, without much luck. [redacted]

[redacted] The Soviets, in our view, are unlikely to jeopardize their recent gains by embracing a secessionist movement that has no backing in black Africa. [redacted]

We believe that if Nkomo turns to the South Africans for backing, he may find them all too willing to embrace his cause, but quite stingy when it comes to actual support, at least over the short term [redacted] many of the dissidents fleeing to Botswana have continued on to South Africa and probably joined South African special units. During recent months, however, Pretoria appears to have

refrained from actively meddling in Zimbabwean affairs. It apparently is content to watch events unfold in accord with its longstanding dire prophecies for black-ruled Zimbabwe. [redacted]

[redacted] Unlike UNITA—which is supported by the largest ethnic group in Angola—and the NRM—which has capitalized on broad antigovernment sentiment that cuts across tribal lines—ZAPU's support is limited to a small portion of the population (about 16 percent) that is geographically isolated. The poor prospects for a successful secessionist movement in Zimbabwe probably would give pause to even those South African hardliners pushing partition schemes for their most hostile neighbors. Consequently, we believe South Africa will provide only limited support to the Ndebele dissidents. There will be enough to ensure that the Shona-Ndebele conflict continues to destabilize Zimbabwean politics but not enough to dismember Zimbabwe. [redacted]

Without an effective outside backer, Nkomo and his Ndebele supporters, in our judgment, do not pose a significant threat to the Mugabe government. We also believe that the government's effort to suppress the dissidents will fail and we foresee continued instability. Isolated bands of dissidents probably will continue to operate out of Botswana—and perhaps Zambia—and could provoke Zimbabwean raids that would heighten regional tensions. In addition, the violence in Matabeleland threatens to halt commercial farming. This, combined with the effects of a second year of drought, would darken an already gloomy economic picture. [redacted]

Implications for the United States

Over the past several months, relations between Zimbabwe and the West have become distinctly cooler. Mugabe and other senior government officials have expressed growing resentment over Western attention to human rights violations in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean spokesmen routinely dismiss reports of atrocities

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as fabrications of the Western press, and a senior official recently charged that biased Western diplomatic reporting was partially responsible. Zimbabwe also accuses the West of having double standards—condemning Zimbabwe while condoning offenses that are much worse in South Africa. The US Embassy has commented on the growing inaccessibility of government officials, especially Prime Minister Mugabe. [redacted]

Zimbabwe's anti-South African rhetoric also grew stronger and more strident in late 1982. In part, this reflects South Africa's actions in mid-1982. Its probable complicity in the July sabotage attack on the Zimbabwean Air Force base at Thornhill, and the growing numbers of South African-trained ex-Rhodesians captured or killed in Zimbabwe provide ready ammunition for Zimbabwe's attacks. There is also, in our judgment, some scapegoating by the Zimbabweans. Mugabe's trumpeting of the South African threat draws attention from his failure to resolve difficult internal problems. A byproduct of the growing preoccupation with South Africa—which is now being linked to the "renegade Nkomo" by senior ZANU spokesmen—is greater antagonism toward the United States. Zimbabweans have an exaggerated notion of the degree of leverage Washington has over South African leaders and readily blame the United States for failing to curb Pretoria. [redacted]

Prolonged violence probably will drive Zimbabwe further from the West. The rate of foreign private investment, already low, most likely will decline further as potential investors become increasingly concerned about the country's stability. The government's repressive policies will make it harder for Western governments to justify to their own publics economic aid programs to Zimbabwe. Sweden has already suspended next year's assistance program pending review of internal events in Zimbabwe. [redacted]

Increased instability in Zimbabwe will also create more opportunities for the Soviet Union. As Harare's anxieties over security increase, government officials may tend to ignore pressing economic problems and instead emphasize the need for military equipment and training, an area in which the Soviet Bloc has a comparative advantage over Western countries. If the

South Africans should decide to support strongly an Ndebele insurgency, Zimbabwe would come under severe military pressure and, in our judgment, probably would seek substantial Soviet assistance. Mugabe's recent arms deal with the Soviet Union—a sharp departure from his traditional anti-Soviet stance—is particularly ominous from this perspective. [redacted]

Mugabe's abandonment of a moderate course toward the Ndebele may be followed by more radical policies in other spheres, a development that would strengthen Zimbabwe's growing alienation from the West. Encouraged by Mugabe's acquiescence in a tough policy toward ZAPU, ZANU hardliners may push for more radical approaches toward the whites or the economy. Mugabe's pragmatism—which has curbed his party's impulses during the first two years of independence—may now give way [redacted]

For the West, the creation of a moderate, democratic, multiracial society in Zimbabwe was sought as a potential example for South Africa. It was hoped that such an outcome in Zimbabwe would encourage those seeking change in Pretoria. However, the inability of Mugabe and Nkomo to reconcile their tribal differences peaceably has reinforced the view widely shared by white South Africans that African tribalism is incompatible with Western forms of government. Rather than encouraging reform-minded South Africans, the Zimbabwean experience seems to serve those in South Africa who are resisting political accommodation with the black majority. [redacted]

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Appendix**Zimbabwe Chronology****1980**

- 18 April* Rhodesia officially becomes independent Zimbabwe, ending 91 years of British rule. 25X1
- June* Government severs diplomatic links with South Africa, although economic relations will continue. 25X1
- October-November* Tensions and violence between ZANU and ZAPU elements grow in anticipation of local elections and the proximity of heavily armed rival guerrilla groups. Clashes in Bulawayo result in numerous deaths. 25X1
- November* Controversial Manpower Minister Tekere goes on trial for his role in the murder of a white farmer in August during an armed raid by government forces. 25X1
- 8 December* Tekere is acquitted of murder. 25X1

1981

- 10 January* Cabinet shuffle. Nkomo demoted to Minister Without Portfolio, but Mugabe softens the blow by offering desirable jobs to some of Nkomo's key ZAPU colleagues. Tekere dismissed. 25X1
- February* Factional violence between ZANU and ZAPU troops erupts, resulting in 150 to 200 deaths, mainly in Matabeleland and Midlands Province. The government, relying on white-led former Rhodesian battalions, successfully puts down ZAPU mutinies in several battalions. Clashes continue to complicate government efforts to complete integration of the armed forces. 25X1
- 20 February* Announcement that Zimbabwe has established diplomatic relations with the USSR culminates a yearlong campaign by Moscow. 25X1
- March* Government notes that 13 whites have been killed by dissidents since independence almost a year ago. 25X1
- Zimbabwe hosts conference of Western donor nations for reconstruction and development (ZIMCORD) and receives \$2 billion in pledges of assistance, including \$225 million from the United States. 25X1
- 23 June* Government signs military aid agreement with North Korea to include advisers and equipment. 25X1
- July* ANC official assassinated in Harare; government blames South Africa. 25X1

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August

[Redacted]

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North Korean instructors begin training of 5th Brigade. [Redacted]

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15 October

Government bans political meetings without prior police approval [Redacted]

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November

Military integration program officially ends with graduation of the last of 42 integrated battalions. [Redacted]

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18 December

Six people are killed in an explosion at ZANU party headquarters at a time when the Central Committee normally would have been meeting. [Redacted]

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1982

1 January

Mugabe's New Year's message gives renewed emphasis on primacy of the party; announces government will adopt only those policies that have the approval of the ZANU Central Committee. [Redacted]

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January-February

Relations between Mugabe and Nkomo deteriorating. Government accuses some ZAPU members of collaborating with South Africa and Zimbabwe's whites in subversive activities. [Redacted]

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4-6 February

Government discovers large caches of arms, ammunition, and military equipment on several ZAPU-owned farms. [Redacted]

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5 February

Mugabe and Nkomo meet; Nkomo denies knowledge of arms caches. [Redacted]

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16 February

Government dissolves 12 businesses owned by ZAPU officials and seizes assets, including the farms where arms caches were found; ZAPU party headquarters raided. [Redacted]

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17 February

Cabinet shuffle. Nkomo and two other ZAPU ministers ousted; Mugabe publicly charges that Nkomo was planning to overthrow the government by force. Move virtually ends the governing coalition of ZANU and ZAPU although ZAPU Central Committee decides to stay in ZANU-led government for the appearance of unity. [Redacted]

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Bernard Chidzero, moderate technocrat, is given increased power over economic policy. Herbert Ushewokunze, popular among ZANU radicals and with the grass roots, is returned to cabinet as Home Affairs Minister, with authority over police and immigration, after being fired as Minister of Health last year for "misbehavior." [Redacted]

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Late February

Desertions from Army and incidents of armed robbery and lawlessness on rise since Nkomo's ouster. [Redacted]

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| <i>Early March</i> | Nine white members of Parliament defect from Ian Smith's Republic Front Party and become independents. [redacted] | 25X1 |
| <i>10 March</i> | Former ZAPU military leaders Dumiso Dabengwa (ZAPU National Security Organization Chief) and Lt. Gen. Lookout Masuku arrested in connection with discovery of arms caches. [redacted] | 25X1 |
| <i>Late March</i> | Government troops and police are sent into Matabeleland to apprehend dissidents responsible for lawlessness and violence. [redacted] | 25X1 |
| <i>5 April</i> | Nkomo gives first major address since his dismissal to a rally of nearly 60,000 supporters in Bulawayo; charges government is trying to impose a one-party state. [redacted] | 25X1 |
| <i>16 April</i> | Mugabe announces another cabinet shuffle; elevates three ZAPU members to full cabinet status and adds one new white minister and one deputy. Regarded as a reward to ZAPU members who remained with government after Nkomo's ouster [redacted] | 25X1 |
| <i>Late April</i> | Government announces intention to clamp down on "bandits and armed robbers," whom Mugabe publicly connects with the arms caches and ZAPU. [redacted] | 25X1 |
| <i>29 April</i> | Nkomo is served with a police notice of intent to prosecute him for holding an unauthorized meeting. [redacted] | 25X1 |
| <i>1 May</i> | Sabotage incidents in Beitbridge on South African border damage rail link with South Africa, electrical installations, and water tank. [redacted] | 25X1 |
| <i>March-May</i> | Desertions of former ZAPU guerrillas from Army on increase. [redacted] | 25X1 |
| <i>18 June</i> | Training of all-Shona 5th Brigade by North Koreans ends. [redacted] [redacted] | 25X1 25X1 |
| <i>Mid-June</i> | Number of dissidents in Zimbabwe estimated to be between 800 to 1300. [redacted] | 25X1 |
| <i>June</i> | Oil pipeline from Beira, Mozambique, to Mutare, Zimbabwe, resumes operation after being closed for 17 years. The line is subsequently subjected to numerous sabotage attacks by the South African-backed Mozambican insurgency, the NRM. [redacted] | 25X1 |
| <i>24 June</i> | Armed dissidents attack Mugabe's official residence and home of Minister of National Supplies Nkala, an Ndebele member of ZANU. Actions of dissidents begin to assume greater political overtones. [redacted] | 25X1 |
| <i>26 June</i> | Government seals off predominantly western suburbs of Bulawayo and conducts house-to-house search for bandits and arms; curfew imposed. Nkomo continues to publicly condemn violence. [redacted] | 25X1 |
| <i>13 July</i> | State of emergency extended for another six months; this is the sixth time since independence in 1980 it has been extended. [redacted] | 25X1 |

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- 23 July** Six foreign tourists, including two Americans, are kidnaped by former ZAPU guerrillas, who demand release of Dabengwa and Masuku, cessation of harassment of Nkomo, and return of confiscated ZAPU property. The hostages have yet to be released and their fate is unknown. [redacted] 25X1
- 25 July** Sabotage of Thornhill Air Force Base. Thirteen aircraft are destroyed or damaged, including four new jet trainers that had recently arrived from the UK. Three senior white Air Force officers, including the Deputy Air Force Commander, are subsequently arrested, after they are implicated by lower level officers. [redacted] 25X1
- July-August** Army crackdown on suspected dissidents and local Ndebele population becomes harsher and less disciplined in connection with search for kidnaped foreigners. [redacted] 25X1
- 2 August** Mugabe and Nkomo meet to discuss tensions between ZAPU and ZANU, but meeting does not result in any improvement in relations. [redacted] 25X1
- 18 August** Three white South African soldiers are killed inside Zimbabwe, allegedly on mission to sabotage rail link with Mozambique. [redacted] 25X1
- 25 August** After initial hesitation, Nkomo finally appeals publicly for locals to support police and Army efforts to rescue kidnaped tourists and calls upon the Ndebele to stop supporting armed dissidents. [redacted] 25X1
- 20 September** News conference called by lawyers of white Air Force officers arrested in connection with Thornhill Base sabotage. They allege that the officers were tortured and coerced into signing confessions. [redacted] 25X1
- October** Moves under way by ZANU and ZAPU officials to get interparty unity talks restarted. [redacted] 25X1
- 18 October** Curfew in Matabeleland lifted. [redacted] 25X1
- 30 October** [redacted] 25X1
- November** Government sends troops to Mozambique to guard Beira-Mutare oil pipeline against South African-backed sabotage. [redacted] 25X1
- 19 November** Mugabe and Nkomo meet to discuss ZANU-ZAPU reconciliation but still far apart on terms. Agree to establish a small committee with three representatives from each party to explore the issues. [redacted] 25X1
- 9 December** Sabotage of oil storage tanks at Beira, Mozambique port, and nearby pumping station; NRM claims responsibility. Leads to critical fuel shortage—worst since independence—and forces Zimbabwe to import fuel by rail via South Africa. [redacted] 25X1
- 24 December** Armed dissidents attack cars and private buses on Bulawayo-Gweru Road, killing three people and injuring 21. Most serious dissident activity since summer. [redacted] 25X1

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| <i>New Year's Eve</i> | Several incidents of kidnaping and murder of white farmers in Matabeleland. [] | |
| | 1983 | 25X1 |
| <i>5 January</i> | Representatives of Commercial Farmer's Union meet with government officials to express concern over violence in Matabeleland; ask for government protection. [] | |
| <i>Early January</i> | 5th Brigade sent into Matabeleland to counter dissidents. [] | 25X1 |
| <i>20 January</i> | Government extends state of emergency another six months [] | 25X1 |
| <i>28 January</i> | Nkomo holds press conference in Harare, criticizing government for brutal actions of security forces in Matabeleland; claims as many as 95 people have been killed since 5th Brigade was deployed. [] | 25X1 |
| <i>February</i> | Reports of excesses and brutality of Army 5th Brigade in Matabeleland increasing and receiving Western press coverage. <i>Newsweek</i> magazine alleges 500 have been killed. [] | 25X1 |
| <i>Early February</i> | Zimbabwe sends strong diplomatic note to Botswana complaining that Gaborone is not fully cooperating in return of dissidents. [] | 25X1 |
| <i>7 February</i> | Treason trial of former ZAPU military leaders Dabengwa and Masuku and five others opens; they are charged with plotting to overthrow the government. [] | 25X1 |
| <i>10 February</i> | [] | 25X1 |
| <i>11 February</i> | Army Commander Nhongo tells senior commanders of plans under consideration by government to purge Army of 7,000 to 10,000 former ZAPU guerrillas. [] | 25X1 25X1 |
| <i>Mid-February</i> | Increasingly strident public statements by Mugabe and other government officials against ZAPU and Nkomo. Government officials repeatedly deny that Army has indiscriminately killed civilians, but admit that some innocent people have been caught in crossfire between government troops and dissidents. [] | 25X1 |
| <i>19 February</i> | Nkomo is prevented from leaving the country when he attempts to board a plane to Prague, via Johannesburg, to attend a World Peace Council conference. He is detained for eight hours and then released; his passport is confiscated. [] | 25X1 |
| <i>25 February</i> | Mugabe publicly accuses Nkomo of a "positive link" with South Africa [] | 25X1 |
| <i>27 February</i> | Nkomo claims he has been placed under virtual house arrest by police, who are investigating possible criminal charges against him. [] | 25X1 |
| <i>3 March</i> | Zimbabwe reportedly receives first arms delivery from Soviets, including assault rifles and ammunition, following agreement made in November 1982. [] | 25X1 |

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5-7 March

Government troops seal off western suburbs of Bulawayo and conduct house-to-house search for dissidents. Nkomo's home is raided and his driver shot. Nkomo goes into hiding. In a secret press conference, he claims government troops were sent to kill him. [redacted]

25X1

8 March

Nkomo surfaces in Botswana [redacted]

25X1

13 March

Nkomo arrives in London from Botswana; claims he is not an "exile," will return to Zimbabwe when he has received "face-to-face" assurances from government officials of his personal safety. Chinamano is acting President of ZAPU. [redacted]

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