




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South Africa's Black Homelands: A Handbook

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South Africa's Black Homelands: A Handbook

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This paper was prepared by [] of the
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. The

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Southern Africa Division, ALA,

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The paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations and the National Intelligence Council. []

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Conditions
and Prospects

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**South Africa's
Black Homelands:
A Handbook**

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Introduction

*Information available
as of 1 December 1982
was used in this report.*

South Africa's policy of separate development for blacks is, in our view, increasing the potential for black political activism and racial violence. The squalid living conditions that prevail in most of the 10 black homelands and the repressive character of several of the Pretoria-backed homeland regimes are fueling black discontent and creating new recruits for the African National Congress (ANC), the principal South African insurgent group. Recent increases in the frequency and daring of terrorist incidents inside or near the homelands underscore their growing strategic value as staging areas and sanctuaries for the ANC. Although we believe these trends do not pose an immediate threat to the survival of the white government, they contribute to a further polarization between blacks and whites, and among whites, over the direction of South Africa's racial policies.

Even the four homelands that have already been granted "independence" have, in reality, remained integral parts of South Africa. All 10 of the homelands depend on South Africa for budgetary support (Pretoria provides, on the average, about two-thirds of their funds), employment (more than four-fifths of their wage earners work outside the homelands), food (only one of the homelands—Bophuthatswana—produces enough to feed its population), transport access (most are surrounded by South Africa), and political contact with the rest of the world (South Africa is the only country recognizing them as independent states). Pretoria's influence is further bolstered through seconded white officials who occupy key positions in the local governments. The homelands' police and military forces also work closely with their South African counterparts.

We believe that Pretoria, in pursuing its policy of separate development, has unwittingly strengthened the bridge that had long connected the country's rural and urban blacks through steady two-way migration. Forced resettlement of blacks into the homelands has created a broader and keener awareness among blacks of both backgrounds of their common plight. At the same time, the dearth of employment opportunities in the homelands has led to a steady stream of migration back to white areas, which continues despite forced removals and an economic recession in South Africa. The combination of resettlement and migration has forced many families that just a few years ago were primarily rural or urban to divide their activities between the city and the homeland. Thus, many black urbanites who formerly had little knowledge of or ties to the homelands now have relatives there.

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Some of the leaders of the homelands have become petty dictators. These officials, viewed by much of the black populace as stooges of the South Africans, lavishly display their wealth while most of their people live in poverty. Some of the homeland leaders have blatantly manipulated the political process to stay in power. In our judgment, as blacks become increasingly disenchanted with these leaders, they will be more inclined toward militant action against them and their backers in Pretoria.



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The Evolving Homelands Policy

Origins. South Africa's present homelands policy is the outcome of more than three centuries of conflict between whites and indigenous black peoples. When Dutch settlers arrived at the Cape of Good Hope in the 1650s, they encountered the Khoisan peoples who had lived there for millennia. The first recorded black-white violence in the region occurred in 1659, when the settlers declared war on the Khoisan for stealing cattle. Quickly defeated, the Khoisan were pushed northward and were virtually eliminated by war, disease, and absorption into the gradually growing Colored, that is, mixed race, population. Meanwhile, white settlements spread eastward until they reached the territory of the Xhosa, near the present-day homeland of Ciskei. Beginning in 1779, and continuing for a century thereafter, blacks and whites battled for control of the rest of what is now South Africa. In the process, blacks were forced into small pockets of land that eventually became tribal reserves.

By the 1880s, the Afrikaner descendants of the Dutch settlers had fully subjugated the blacks by force and turned to legal channels to consolidate their control. In 1894, the government limited black land inheritance to the eldest son. In 1913, the English-dominated government restricted land ownership by blacks—who then numbered about 4.1 million—to only 7 percent of the country's area. (Indeed, the British victory in the 1899-1902 Boer War did not change the basic concepts of government policy toward the blacks.) By 1936, the growth of the black population to 6.6 million had prompted Pretoria to pass the Bantu Trust and Land Act that pledged a near doubling of these lands to an area about the size of Missouri. Progress in transferring the land was slow, however, and to this day—when the black population

has grown to nearly 22 million—black-owned land area has not reached the 1936 goal.¹

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Resettlement of Blacks. The Afrikaners, after their narrow political victory in 1948, added a new twist to the government's "native policy." While retaining its restrictions on land ownership and movement, Pretoria also began systematically to remove blacks from white areas. Central to this policy was the creation in the late 1950s of eight ethnic homelands—later expanded to 10—to which all blacks were assigned on the basis of language. Bent on solving its "black problem," Pretoria since 1976 has granted "independence" to four homelands—Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, and Venda—and has stripped their resident and assigned populations of South African citizenship. The remaining six homelands—Gazankulu, Kangwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa, and Qwaqwa—are officially "self-governing states" within South Africa. (See figure 1 foldout map on page 53.)

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In mid-1982, South Africa added another new twist to its efforts to grant "independence" to the homelands when it announced plans to cede Kangwane and part of KwaZulu to neighboring Swaziland. In addition to transferring small impoverished regions and nearly 700,000 black citizens to an internationally recognized country, Pretoria hoped to gain some legitimacy for its homelands policy. Affected blacks have vehemently opposed the transfers, largely because they would lose their South African citizenship. In November 1982, South Africa, after reaching an out-of-court settlement with Kangwane, announced its intention to

¹ The data in this report were drawn heavily from South African official sources. Their quality is relatively accurate on government expenditures, somewhat less reliable on population surveys, and unreliable on measuring unemployment. The South African Government collects almost no statistics on social and other quality-of-life indicators. Moreover, Pretoria stops collecting data after a homeland becomes "independent."

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Figure 2. South African Homeland Legislation

1894	Glen Gray Act Limits African land inheritance to eldest son.
1913	Native Land Act Prohibits blacks from purchasing white-owned land and restricts black ownership to 7.3 percent of the country's area.
1923	Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (with amendments in 1945 and later). Restricts blacks to "locations" in white cities and prohibits them from remaining in a city for more than 72 hours without a permit unless they hold residential rights under Section 10 of the act.
1936	Bantu Trust and Land Act Basis of the homelands policy. Permanently bars blacks from owning nonreserve land. Expands "reserves" to 13.7 percent of the country's area.
1936	Native Representation Act Gave blacks indirect representation in Parliament.
1945	Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act Updates 1923 act, further restricting black access to white cities.
1950	Group Areas Act Zones all of South Africa's territory according to race and creates the legal basis for the forced resettlement of blacks.
1951	Bantu Authorities Act Abolishes Western-style systems of local government in black areas and replaces them with tribal, regional, and territorial authorities.
1954	Resettlement of Natives Act Removes blacks from cities and sets up black urban townships.
1959	Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act Recognizes eight "black national units." Does not specifically mention eventual independence, but implies it. Repeals Native Representation Act of 1936.
1963	Transkei Constitution Act Makes provisions for self-government and eventual "independence."

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1970	Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act Allows homeland citizenship to be conferred on homeland subjects, in addition to South African citizenship.
1971	Black States Constitution Act Provides authority to establish organs of local government in the homelands.
1978	Bantu Laws Amendment Act Prohibits children of black legal urban residents from qualifying for urban residence if they were born after "their" homeland became "independent."
1982	Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill Restricts black access to white cities by tightening curfews and subjecting employers who hire illegal migrants to heavy fines. (Withdrawn after widespread private and parliamentary opposition. Government has announced plans to introduce a replacement bill in the 1983 Parliament.)

back down from the steps it had already taken to transfer the two territories to Swaziland. A commission to investigate the question of the transfers will continue to exist, but it may be years before action is taken, if ever. [redacted]

The US Embassy—based on sketchy official South African data, press coverage, and conversations with South African officials—has reported the resettlement of 2.3 million blacks from white areas to today's homelands since 1948. The Black Sash, a white South African group opposed to apartheid [redacted]

[redacted] puts the number at about 3 million. According to official South African reports, another 1 million blacks are scheduled for relocation during this decade; the Embassy puts the number at 2 million. [redacted]

US Embassy analysis of South African data indicates that resettlement has consisted of:

- Removal of farm tenants and squatters. Tenants and squatters on white farms have been prohibited since 1975, resulting in the resettlement of 1.3

million blacks. Blacks can now legally work on white farms only as contract laborers.

- "Black spot" removal. These are small areas in South Africa where blacks have legally held freehold tenure under the Bantu Trust and Land Act of 1936. Between 1960 and 1979, nearly 350,000 blacks were moved to the homelands. Pretoria indicates there are still at least 75 "black spots"—some critics say 150—with an estimated population of 75,000 yet to be removed.
- Homeland consolidation. During the 1970s, an estimated 300,000 blacks were relocated when their land was exchanged for white-owned land in order to consolidate homelands into fewer parcels.
- Urban relocation. The South African Government has removed blacks from white cities and shifted homeland boundaries in order to include black townships in adjacent homelands. During the 1970s, about 175,000 people were uprooted or redistricted in this manner.

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Venda. Housing in a rural area



- Strategic removals. Since 1960, some 150,000 to 200,000 blacks have been removed to make room for dams, highways, and military installations, and to create a South African "buffer zone" between Venda and Zimbabwe.

In addition, regulations require that blacks have official authorization to live in white cities. Between 1967 and 1979, about 5.5 million blacks were investigated and/or tried for violations of these rules. The vast majority were forcibly removed to their designated homeland, but many quickly returned to the cities.

Recent US Embassy and press reports show that racial separation laws already on the books are being applied even more rigorously than in the past. Still more restrictive legislation may be passed in the future; during the 1982 parliamentary session, the government introduced a bill that called for a substantial tightening of existing apartheid laws. For example, employers hiring illegal black migrants would be subject to a fine of nearly \$4,500 per illegal worker, ten times the fine in the current law. Widespread opposition to the bill—from whites and blacks alike—forced its withdrawal in October, but the government has announced plans to introduce another such bill next year.

The Setting

Grim Economic Picture. The fragile economies of the homelands are unable to support the 12 million people residing there, let alone the 10 million others assigned to these areas. Their resident populations are largely dependent on subsistence farming, on Pretoria's grants—which cover about two-thirds of most homeland budgets (although homeland leaders correctly note that these payments match the taxes that authorized black migrants from the homelands pay in white cities)—and on direct remittances from migrant workers. These workers are recruited through government labor bureaus to supply the needs of the mines and urban industrial and commercial firms in white South Africa. Even with the remittances from these workers, annual per capita income in the homelands barely averages \$300, leaving the typical resident no better off than a person in the poorest countries in Africa.

Bophuthatswana is a notable exception to these stagnant economies. Key advantages in this homeland include proximity to the Pretoria-Johannesburg industrial complex and a smattering of mineral deposits. Moreover, a popular, democratic government in Bophuthatswana has successfully encouraged foreign and domestic investment. The new entertainment complex at Sun City already has become a major employer.

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Table 1
South African Homelands:
Selected Economic Indicators

	Area (sq. km)	Assigned Population, 1980 (thousand)	Resident Population, 1980 (thousand)	Workers in White Areas, 1980 (thousand)	Job Entrants Employed in Local Modern Sector, 1980 (percent)	Per Capita All-Source Income, mid-1970s (US \$)
Total	156,828	20,308	10,828	1,811	NA	NA
Bophuthatswana	38,000	2,435	1,329	339	33	250
Ciskei	5,530	1,354	630	84	37	190
Gazankulu	6,750	889	477	44	20	280
Kangwane	3,720	716	160	68	86	190
KwaNdebele	750	380	166	36	NA	NA
KwaZulu	31,000	5,421	3,178	701	25	220
Lebowa	22,476	2,501	1,658	197	40	220
Qwaqwa	482	1,793	155	38	34	210
Transkei	41,620	4,298	2,622	269	15	260
Venda	6,500	521	453	35	55	250

The homelands' agricultural and mineral base is even more meager than the 13-percent share of South Africa's territory allocated to these areas would suggest. About 15 percent of the land is arable—roughly the same as in the rest of South Africa—but this indicator is misleading. In most homelands soils are far more depleted than on white farms because of misuse stemming from the absence of modern farming techniques and overpopulation—the density is three times that of South Africa overall and four times that of Sub-Saharan Africa. Aside from those found in Bophuthatswana, mineral deposits have been found in commercial quantities only in Lebowa and KwaZulu.

Efforts by Pretoria since the mid-1950s to attract industry to the homelands have failed. Those businesses that have been set up are owned for the most part by whites or Asians who repatriate their profits to white South Africa. Despite liberal tax concessions, subsidized credits, and the absence of a minimum wage requirement, potential investors are deterred by inadequate facilities, high transport costs, and a lack of raw materials. Only about 2,500 jobs have been

created annually, far too few for the 100,000 jobseekers who join the labor force in the homelands each year.

Most homeland residents are impoverished women, children, and old people resettled by Pretoria or left behind by the exodus of working-age males. Only 20 percent of South Africa's black wage earners work in the homelands. The remainder work in white areas; about 30 percent are daily commuters and 50 percent are migrants. Employment in the modern sector of the homelands ranges from a low of less than 15 percent of the work force in KwaZulu, within easy reach of Durban and other white cities, to a high of 55 percent in remote Venda, which has several labor-intensive tree and tea plantations.

The rate at which unemployed youth return to the homelands is likely to increase over the next few years for various reasons. Economic recovery in South Africa will probably fall short of the 6 percent that Pretoria acknowledges is needed just to provide jobs

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Figure 4
Black Population by Age and Sex, 1970


Percent

Black Homelands

Males

Age

Females




South Africa: Overall

Males

Age

Females




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Figure 5
South Africa: Black Population Growth,
1970-80



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for new black entrants to the labor force. In addition, South Africa's urban residence laws are likely to be more strictly enforced. Based on patterns observed during the riots that occurred in Soweto and other black townships in 1976-77, we believe returning young people will be more politically active than other homeland residents have been in the past.

Troubling Social Indicators. Soaring population growth resulting from resettlement—the homelands' population rose by an extraordinarily high 4.3 percent annually during the 1970s—has compounded economic troubles and social distress. The upheaval of resettlement is producing widespread anomie and psychological depression, according to local health workers. Endemic diseases such as tuberculosis, moreover, afflict blacks inside and outside the homelands far more often than whites. Malnutrition—estimates by South African scholars put it at 50 percent for Ciskei children—contributes to a black infant mortality rate that averages 25 percent in the homelands compared with 10 percent in South Africa as a whole.

Comprehensive data on education in the homelands are unavailable, but reporting by the US Embassy in Pretoria indicates that educational opportunities in the homelands are far more limited than in white South Africa. Most teachers in the homelands have no

more than an eighth-grade education. For South Africa as a whole, government spending per white student is about 10 times higher than for blacks, even though this represents a significant narrowing of the gap in recent years. As a result, blacks remain far less likely than whites to finish high school. Among blacks themselves, the educational outlook for those living in white South Africa is brighter than for those in the homelands, who are excluded from new mandatory attendance requirements

Repressive Internal Politics. Most of the homeland leaders tend to be viewed by politically conscious South African blacks as instruments of Pretoria and symbols of the despised homelands policy. These leaders generally argue that they, as "moderates" with whom the South African Government is willing to deal, are the only alternative to the emergence of more radical leadership. Their ability to influence Pretoria is limited, however, because they generally serve at its pleasure and lack a sizable political following.

Disillusionment with the ability of homeland governments to deal with their impoverished economies or to bring about changes in Pretoria's policies has resulted in waning public interest in electoral politics in the homelands. Voter participation has been decreasing; in the 1963 national elections, 68 percent of Transkei's voters cast ballots, but in "independent" Transkei's first election in 1976, only 43 percent went to the polls. More recently, in Bophuthatswana's general election in October 1982, fewer than 130 of the homeland's 250,000 assigned citizens living in Soweto bothered to vote, although three polling booths were set up in the township.

Local opposition to their rule has turned some homeland leaders into petty dictators. Venda's unpopular, South African-appointed Chief Minister Patrick Mphahlele, for example, has packed the homeland's legislature with loyal chiefs to ensure his control of

² A notable exception is KwaZulu Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi, a popular Zulu chief and head of Inkatha, the largest black political organization in the country. Buthelezi frequently uses his official position—and the legal protection it affords him—to criticize Pretoria. President Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana also enjoys strong popular support in his homeland but has only a limited national following.

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that body. He has also detained or expelled several members of Venda's opposition party and other real and imagined political enemies. Several other homeland leaders have adopted Pretoria's hardline tactics, including detentions and bannings to strengthen their grip on power. []

Traditional chiefs and headmen around whom opposition to the unpopular homelands regimes might coalesce have generally found it too risky to oppose authorities who are prepared to use repression and who control the traditional leaders' own stipends and patronage. In addition, the opulent living of some of the traditional chiefs discourages popular support. []

Fertile Ground for Insurgents

The African National Congress until recently paid little attention to the homelands. During the 1970s, only 23 terrorist incidents—mainly such minor acts as the burning of small buildings—were recorded in the homelands. This reflects the ANC's emphasis on targeting economic installations, few of which are located in the homelands. Most of these incidents occurred in the last half of the decade and were concentrated in Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu. Both homelands are adjacent to foreign countries that harbor ANC personnel; they are also close to white urban centers in South Africa. []

The ANC is now giving closer attention to the homelands as it attempts to broaden its strength in South Africa. It is increasingly selecting economic targets within or just outside a homeland. Of the more than 40 major terrorist incidents that occurred in South Africa during 1981, over half took place either in or within 100 kilometers of a homeland, primarily Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu. []

The homelands thus show signs of becoming staging areas for a rural-based insurgency. Pretoria, in turn, can be expected to react sharply to prevent the homelands from becoming major ANC sanctuaries. We believe South African military and security forces would not hesitate to enter any homeland—"independent" or otherwise—in pursuit of suspected terrorists. In our view, moreover, Pretoria will use its substantial political and economic leverage on those homeland leaders who might be inclined to cooperate with the ANC. []

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BOPHUTHATSWANA

Bophuthatswana became the second (after Transkei) of South Africa's "independent" homelands in December 1977. President Lucas Mangope charged at the time that he had been tricked into accepting independence without a satisfactory resolution of two issues: the citizenship of members of the Tswana tribe living in South Africa and the further consolidation of Bophuthatswana's seven widely scattered territorial units. These issues remain unresolved. [REDACTED]

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Unlike the leaders of South Africa's other "independent" homelands, Mangope enjoys public support because of his vigorous and relatively successful efforts at promoting economic development and his strong record on human rights. Indeed, Bophuthatswana's constitution contains a Bill of Rights, while South Africa's does not. The ANC has a higher presence in Bophuthatswana than in the other homelands, but this primarily results from the homeland's location—adjacent to the ANC's sanctuaries in Botswana and close to white population centers inside South Africa. [REDACTED]

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Geographic and Demographic Features

With a total land area of 38,000 square kilometers—roughly the combined size of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island—Bophuthatswana is the second-largest homeland after Transkei. It is also the most ethnically mixed of the homelands. About two-thirds of the population are Tswana. The largest minority tribes are the North Sotho (6 percent) and the Xhosa (5 percent); the Shangaan, South Ndebele, South Sotho, and Zulu tribes each account for about 3 percent of the population. The sizable non-Tswana population results from the influx of Africans into shantytowns along the homeland's border, only 25 kilometers outside Pretoria. [REDACTED]

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Since 1972, the South African Government has reduced Bophuthatswana from 19 separate parcels of land to seven, primarily through the elimination of a dozen small black enclaves, or "black spots," in white areas and the resettlement of their 120,000 black residents in other parts of the homeland. In 1979, an official South African report called for the consolidation of Bophuthatswana into one parcel. This would require the transfer of 1.3 million hectares of white-owned land to Bophuthatswana in exchange for the return to South African control of the homeland's two smallest parcels, totaling about 0.5 million hectares. According to the same report, the estimated total cost of buying out white farmers and relocating black and white residents would range between \$1.2 billion and \$3.6 billion. We believe that South Africa's economic downturn in recent years, together with opposition by white landowners who might be affected, has indefinitely sidetracked any moves toward consolidation. [REDACTED]

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Except for the South Sotho living in the Thaba 'Nchu area, most of Bophuthatswana's minorities live in the easternmost parcel, near Pretoria. Minority tribes that resent being governed by the Tswana majority are becoming increasingly critical of the Mangope government. Mangope recognizes the potential for unrest and has taken pains to respond to minority needs for housing and transportation. His responsiveness and Pretoria's public declarations that no new homelands will be created have muted calls by the minorities for separation from Bophuthatswana. [REDACTED]

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Economic Activity

Bophuthatswana has the healthiest economy of all the homelands. Measured by availability of mineral resources, degree of industrial development, and per capita income—which jumped from \$150 in 1970 to \$410 in 1975 (the latest official data) and probably has grown steadily since then—Bophuthatswanans are considerably better off than residents of other homelands. At the same time, Bophuthatswana's economic health depends largely on external factors:

- Access to the nearby Pretoria-Johannesburg industrial complex.
- A high level of government aid from Pretoria.
- Substantial Western investment.

Bophuthatswana also benefits from the presence of commercially exploitable mineral deposits and sound governmental management that has spent its revenue wisely. These broad economic factors are reflected within Bophuthatswana in high levels of activity in construction, manufacturing, mining, and agriculture. [REDACTED]

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The Pretoria-Johannesburg industrial complex provides jobs for large numbers of daily commuters, whose earnings account for 45 percent of the homeland's wage income. Another one-third of the homeland's workers earn their livelihood locally. Thus, about 80 percent of the homeland's wage income is earned by residents and about 20 percent by migrants living in South Africa. [REDACTED]

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Pretoria's grants have helped finance the construction of extensive new facilities—office buildings, a parliament, and vast housing and shopping complexes—in Mafeking, the capital. [REDACTED]

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Supported by foreign firms, Bophuthatswana currently exploits deposits of platinum, chromite, vanadium, nickel, asbestos, granite, and manganese. In 1979, mineral extraction contributed 55 percent of the value of Bophuthatswana's cash economy but accounted for only 10 percent of its paid employment. [REDACTED]

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The US Embassy in Pretoria estimates that total industrial investment in Bophuthatswana—mainly from West European sources—now amounts to \$250 million. In addition, investments by Israeli and Taiwanese firms have recently been negotiated by the Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation. [REDACTED]

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Bophuthatswana's limited arable land—10 percent of the total—and the homeland's minimal agricultural development have led the local government to

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introduce large-scale, capital-intensive farms called temisano (or farm together). 25X1
 These farms, run by farmer cooperatives and provided with expensive irrigation
 and mechanical assistance, have been set up in semiarid areas near Pretoria. []

The government has expressed the hope that high production on these farms will
 have a demonstration effect on subsistence farmers. It is too early to be certain
 whether small farmers have been helped, but in 1981 Bophuthatswana became
 self-sufficient in maize, stockpiling enough to carry it through this year's drought.
 []

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Political Developments

Mangope's Bophuthatswana Democratic Party (BDP) won all 72 seats in the
 Legislative Assembly in the October 1982 election, Bophuthatswana's first such
 vote since "independence." The election, in our view, demonstrated Mangope's
 willingness to govern on a democratic basis—unlike any other "independent"
 homeland leader. The election had one significant failing: of the approximately
 250,000 Soweto residents who are "extraterritorial" citizens of Bophuthatswana,
 fewer than 130 bothered to vote, even though three polling booths were set up in
 the township. []

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[] as a result of Pretoria's efforts
 this year to transfer the Kangwane homeland and a portion of the KwaZulu
 homeland to Swaziland, there is fresh interest among some Botswanan officials in
 absorbing Bophuthatswana and its mineral wealth. The idea of reuniting all of the
 Tswana people has been discussed among Botswanan officials since the 1960s.

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[] Mangope's constituents now fear that
 Pretoria will try to turn over part or all of Bophuthatswana to Botswana. Mangope
 is trying to strengthen ties with Pretoria to ward off this possibility. []

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Bophuthatswana's security links with South Africa are close. Pretoria contributes
 a sizable share of the homeland's defense budget. Even more important, the South
 African military has acquired effective control over the Bophuthatswana Defense
 Force (BDF) through the stationing of South African officers on loan from
 Pretoria. []

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US Embassy

Leader

Lucas Manyane Mangope has been President of Bophuthatswana since "independence" in 1977. His political moderation and cooperation with South Africa have not prevented him from denouncing Pretoria's apartheid policies. Mangope also opposes confederation of the homelands with South Africa and Pretoria's plans to allow blacks living in white South African cities to elect representatives to the homeland assemblies. He has publicly vowed, however, not to let his homeland become a base for anti-South African activities.

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Mangope was born on 23 December 1923. After receiving a primary teacher's diploma from Bethel College in South Africa in 1951, Mangope taught high school. He was named a full-time chief of the Tswana tribe in 1959 and in 1972 became Chief Minister of Bophuthatswana, then a self-governing homeland. He visited the United States in 1971 on a grant from the privately-sponsored US-South African Leadership Exchange Program.

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Ciskei

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CISKEI

Ciskei, which became "independent" in December 1981, is believed by many South African observers to be the most politically unstable of the homelands. Long a dumping ground for unemployed, unhoused, or squatting members of the Xhosa tribe ousted from white areas of South Africa, Ciskei's population is suffering from rapid economic deterioration, rising unemployment, and severe malnutrition.

[redacted] these trends, and the Ciskei government's reputation as the most corrupt and ruthless of the homeland regimes, have given rise to concern among senior South African officials that Ciskei could erupt into anarchy in the near future. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Geographic and Demographic Features

Ciskei's population in 1980 was about 630,000, with an additional estimated 725,000 Xhosa assigned to Ciskei but living in white South Africa. The homeland's resources are meager: soils are poor, rainfall is erratic, and minerals are few. [redacted]

25X1

Although many residents have left Ciskei, South Africa has forcibly sent an estimated 200,000 to 250,000 people there since 1960, according to US Embassy reporting. Two months before "independence," for example, an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 Africans were removed from a township at the edge of the white town of Stutterheim, near the Ciskei border, and sent to the homeland. Although successive generations had lived in the township since 1851 on a freehold basis granted by the British, Pretoria simply negated their property rights. In addition, the Embassy reports that the South African Government plans to relocate 75,000 to 100,000 Xhosa from East London in Eastern Cape Province to Ciskei. Embassy reporting indicates that resettlement camps in Ciskei are seriously overcrowded and that living conditions in the camps are very poor. [redacted]

25X1

Ciskei is far more urbanized than the other homelands, in part because of its poor agricultural resources. Over half its residents live in cities and towns. Most of the urban dwellers live in Mdantsane, near East London, and Zwelitsha, on the edge of the South African city of King Williams Town. By 1990, the 23-kilometer Mdantsane-Zwelitsha corridor is expected by South African researchers to have a population of 700,000, compared with about 400,000 in 1980. [redacted]

25X1

Despite this relatively high rate of urbanization, Ciskei's rural population density is over three times that of rural white South Africa—a result of forced resettlement to the homeland. Only 14 percent of the land in Ciskei is arable—roughly comparable to the proportion of arable land in the rest of South Africa. Overgrazing of the already poor soil by cattle herds is another problem. Overcrowding, coupled with primitive agricultural practices and the fact that up to

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90 percent of the adult male population has permanently departed from some areas, has limited food production in Ciskei to around 10 to 20 percent of the homeland's needs. An estimated 50 percent of Ciskei's children suffer from malnutrition. Annually around 10 percent of the infants under age 1 die from hunger, and about half of the 2- and 3-year-olds are malnourished. []

25X1

Economic Activity

Ciskei is one of the poorest homelands and remains largely dependent on South Africa for jobs and subsidies. Pretoria underwrites up to 80 percent of Ciskei's budget. Some 70 percent of Ciskei's wage income comes from outside the homeland—30 percent from commuters and 40 percent from migrants—leaving only 30 percent to be earned locally. Because many residents of Ciskei live adjacent to white South Africa, as much as 80 percent of the wage income is spent outside the homeland. []

25X1

Mdantsane, a Ciskei city adjoining East London, further illustrates the homeland's dependence on South Africa. The city was established in 1963 as a black South African township, but Pretoria readjusted the boundary in 1966 to absorb it into Ciskei. Today, with a population estimated at 175,000, Mdantsane is larger than East London. It attracts people from throughout Ciskei because it is one of the few places in the homeland within easy commuting distance of white South Africa. Over half the people living in this city commute daily to jobs in East London. []

25X1

In an effort to reduce the flow of income out of Ciskei, the homeland government is making an effort at industrial development in central Ciskei. Only a few industries have been attracted, however—a result of Ciskei's potential for political instability and meager economic base. White managers, moreover, are reluctant to commute the long distance from King Williams Town, the nearest white town in which they could live. []

25X1

Ciskei's agricultural performance is weak. There are few storage dams to compensate for periodic drought. Even more important, in some villages over 90 percent of the working-age males have migrated to either Mdantsane or white South Africa. In addition, land allocation is controlled by local chiefs, who frequently allocate plots on the basis of bribes rather than need, compounding the problem of nonutilization of land. []

25X1

Political Developments

President Lennox Sebe resisted accepting "independence" until he was convinced he had obtained a better deal than the other "independent" homelands. His demands included South African citizenship for Ciskei residents, more land than Ciskei originally was slated to receive, and a favorable financial arrangement. Sebe believed the South African Government had agreed to these conditions, but it subsequently reneged on most of its promises. Ciskeians lost their South African citizenship, and so far the homeland has received only a small amount of additional land. The main beneficiaries of "independence" have been Sebe himself and his political cronies. []

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A private poll conducted in Ciskei just before "independence" showed that about 90 percent of the residents opposed it. Although "independence" received a majority of the vote in a government-run referendum in 1981, most urban voters boycotted the balloting. Nonetheless, the referendum was cited by President Sebe and Pretoria as proof that Ciskei residents wanted independence. [REDACTED]

25X1

Ciskei has evolved into a virtual police state. Since December 1981, Sebe and his brother, Maj. Gen. Charles Sebe—Minister of Defense and head of the Ciskei Intelligence Service—have publicly reiterated that they intend to root out all opposition to the regime. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] Major General Sebe, who formerly worked for South Africa's security forces, tends to parrot Pretoria's terminology, frequently referring to "ANC terrorists," "the Communist menace," "total onslaught," and similar concepts. [REDACTED]

25X1

By and large, Pretoria has thus far turned a blind eye to the Sebes' repressive actions, insisting that Ciskei is a "sovereign state" and that South Africa cannot interfere in its internal affairs. [REDACTED]

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25X1

According to US Embassy reporting, Pretoria's efforts to transfer Kangwane and Ngwavuma to Swaziland were watched apprehensively in Ciskei because George Matanzima, Prime Minister of neighboring Transkei and brother of that homeland's President, wants to absorb Ciskei into Transkei. Unification of the Swazi areas would create a precedent for merging the two Xhosa homelands, Ciskei and Transkei. We believe, however, that these homelands are unlikely to be merged because Pretoria's program of homeland "independence" would suffer a substantial further loss of credibility if an "independent" homeland—Ciskei—were eliminated against the wishes of its leadership. [REDACTED]

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Liaison ©

Leader

Lennox Leslie Sebe has been President of South Africa's newest "independent" homeland since 1981. Sebe lobbied Pretoria for more land, more money, and the retention of South African citizenship for all Ciskeians after "independence." US Embassy officials have noted, however, that Sebe was "so intoxicated" by the prospect of independence that he was outmaneuvered by South African officials during the negotiations and gained few of his demands. He has instituted a repressive regime that in our view demonstrates his fear of potential political unrest in the Ciskei. The President has cooperated with the South African Government to control increasingly frequent dissident activities among Ciskeian laborers located in nearby East London. He has encouraged private South African and foreign investment in Ciskeian industry and has promoted several agricultural projects, but critical South African journalists and politicians note that these efforts benefit only a few Ciskeians—mainly the President, his brother, and some of their political followers. [REDACTED]

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Sebe was born on 26 July 1926. He earned a certificate from the Lovedale Teachers Training College in Alice, South Africa, in 1947. He subsequently taught secondary school and became an administrator in the black school system of Cape Province. In 1968, he entered the newly formed Ciskei Cabinet as Minister of Education. In 1973 he became Chief Minister. He is married and has several children. [REDACTED]

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Gazankulu

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GAZANKULU

Gazankulu, located in the remote, semiarid northern Transvaal, has a weak economy. Pretoria wants to divest itself of this homeland, but it would have difficulty turning Gazankulu over to a neighboring country because the homeland is completely surrounded by South Africa and other homelands. We believe a more likely scenario is that South Africa will continue to move this homeland toward "independence." [REDACTED]

25X1

Geographic and Demographic Features

The Shangaan and Tsonga peoples who make up some four-fifths of the population of Gazankulu are closely related historically, culturally, and linguistically. Both tribes speak the Tsonga language. Outsiders tend to use the two tribal names interchangeably, but the Shangaan and the Tsonga resent being called by the other's name. The peoples of Gazankulu had difficulty agreeing on a name for their homeland, so they settled on the 19th-century name of their area of origin in Mozambique—Gaza—and added the suffix kulu, meaning "big." [REDACTED]

25X1

During the 1970s Gazankulu's population growth rate rose to 5.8 percent annually—the highest rate for any homeland except for tiny Qwaqwa—as a result of forced resettlement of blacks from Johannesburg and white areas of rural Transvaal. Nonetheless, Gazankulu remains one of the least populated homelands. An estimated 900,000 people were assigned to it in 1980, but only about half of them actually lived there. [REDACTED]

25X1

Economic Activity

Gazankulu's economy is severely hampered by the limited number of job opportunities in the homeland or within daily commuting distance. Nearly 75 percent of Gazankulu's wage earners work outside the homeland: over 60 percent have migrated to white areas—the second-highest proportion among the homelands. Because of Gazankulu's relative isolation from major industrial areas, only 13 percent commute daily. The homeland borders on Lebowa, Venda, and the Kruger National Park. [REDACTED]

25X1

Gazankulu's most conspicuous economic activity is in Giyani, the capital, where the South African Government is financing construction of government buildings, a mansion for Chief Minister Hudson Ntsanwisi, houses for civil servants, and shopping and banking facilities. The population of Giyani was officially reported at only 2,000 in 1976, but an estimated 20,000 people now live in the vicinity, mostly in small mud houses. [REDACTED]

25X1

Some 45 percent of Gazankulu's workers are engaged in subsistence farming, but the homeland produces no more than 10 to 20 percent of its food needs. Although

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18 percent of the land is arable, only 3 percent of the land is actually cultivated. With most of the men working in white South Africa, cultivation is left to the women, whose other chores leave little time to tend farm plots. Lack of money for fertilizer, improved seeds, and other inputs also handicaps farming. Yields per hectare for corn—the homeland's staple—are only about a fourth of the South African average. [REDACTED]

25X1

Political Developments

Chief Minister Ntsanwisi is under strong and growing pressure from Pretoria to accept "independence." [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] To counter Pretoria's pressure, he has sought closer association with the South African Black Alliance (SABA), an association of black political organizations headed by KwaZulu Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi that strongly opposes "independence" for homelands. [REDACTED]

25X1

Ntsanwisi, like Buthelezi, believes in dealing with Pretoria even while opposing its actions. Based on limited press reporting, we believe that Ntsanwisi's government is one of the least corrupt and repressive of the homeland regimes. [REDACTED]

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Camera Press ©

Leader

Hudson W. E. Ntsanwisi has been Chief Minister of Gazankulu since 1973. A vocal homeland leader, he has frequently served as a spokesman for the nonindependent homeland leaders. One of the few homeland leaders respected among urban blacks, the Chief Minister would like to defend the black cause more vehemently, but we believe he is unwilling to risk his personal position or the future of Gazankulu. [REDACTED]

25X1

Ntsanwisi was born on 11 July 1920. After receiving a B.A. degree in English and Bantu in 1946 from Fort Hare University—a black South African institution—he taught school. He subsequently earned a B.A. degree in 1963 and an M.A. degree in 1965 in linguistics from the University of South Africa, a correspondence school. In 1963, Ntsanwisi joined the Department of Bantu languages at the University of the North (in Transvaal) and became chairman of the department in 1967. During 1966 he studied linguistics at Georgetown University on a grant from the privately sponsored US–South African Leadership Exchange Program. He returned to the United States as an International Visitors Leader Grantee in 1973. Ntsanwisi is sophisticated and articulate and has written several works on linguistics. Ntsanwisi is married and has several children. [REDACTED]

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Kangwane

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KANGWANE

South Africa began negotiating with Swaziland in 1976 on transferring control of the Kangwane homeland to Swaziland. The major sticking point in the negotiations—Swaziland's demand that it be granted a corridor to the sea—was overcome this year after Pretoria added a portion of the KwaZulu homeland to its offer. The late King Sobhuza II of Swaziland strongly favored the land transfers. Sobhuza envisaged the reunification of all Swazi people and acquisition of a route to the sea through Ngwavuma as crowning achievements of his 61-year reign. His death in August 1982, together with Pretoria's recent out-of-court settlement with Kangwane of its lawsuit contesting the transfer, have halted the proceedings indefinitely. [REDACTED]

25X1

Geographic and Demographic Features

Kangwane's 3,720 square kilometers—slightly larger than Rhode Island—makes it one of the smallest of South Africa's homelands. Kangwane's predominately Swazi population grew from about 120,000 in 1970 to 160,000 in 1980, due in part to resettlement but mostly to natural increase. Nearly 600,000 Swazi live in white South Africa. [REDACTED]

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The Swazi ethnic group came into being in the early 19th century when several Nguni tribes were unified under the leadership of King Sobhuza I. The Swazi people were divided in 1880, when Britain and South Africa forced Sobhuza's successor, King Mbandzeni, to cede control over the northern and western portions of the kingdom. The Swazis have remained separated ever since. [REDACTED]

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In 1963, South African Prime Minister Verwoerd offered to return part of this territory to Swaziland—then a British protectorate—but Swaziland's rulers refused, holding out for the entire area that had been ceded in 1880. In 1977, Pretoria established the Kangwane homeland, which encompasses about one-third of the area ceded by King Mbandzeni. [REDACTED]

25X1

Economic Activity

Kangwane, like most of the homelands, is endemically poor; its current annual per capita income is only about \$315, or about half that of neighboring Swaziland. Agriculture accounts for about one-fourth of Kangwane's economic output, but only 15 percent of its agricultural production is marketed. Scant transport and communications facilities, the existence of far better investment opportunities in the nearby Johannesburg area, and Pretoria's longstanding policy of encouraging manufacturers to locate plants outside the homelands under its border industries program, have combined to keep industrialization in Kangwane to a minimum. Government services and small businesses account for most of the homeland's modern-sector economic activity. [REDACTED]

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As is the case with the other homelands, most income is earned outside Kangwane's borders. Migrants working in Transvaal cities, especially in the Johannesburg area, remit about 70 percent of the homeland's income. Commuters working in nearby cities account for another 10 percent. [REDACTED]

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Political Developments

For Pretoria, amalgamation of Kangwane with Swaziland has been an opportunity to rectify South Africa's longstanding border disagreement with Swaziland, get rid of an impoverished region, and remove an estimated 716,000 ethnic Swazis from South Africa's overall black population of 22 million. The issue gained public attention last December when the Kangwane Legislative Assembly, angered that the homeland was not represented in Swaziland's negotiations with South Africa, rejected amalgamation outright. [REDACTED]

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In mid-1982, Pretoria stepped up its efforts to shed Kangwane—in our view, because of the advanced age of the Swazi king and uncertainty about the attitudes of a successor. South Africa announced in June 1982 that agreement with the Government of Swaziland had been reached on transferring Kangwane and Ngwavuma—the northern portion of the KwaZulu homeland—to Swaziland. A few days later the Kangwane Legislative Assembly and cabinet were abolished and administration was taken over by the South African Ministry of Cooperation and Development. [REDACTED]

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KwaZulu officials filed, and won, three challenges before the South African Supreme Court. The court ruled that Pretoria had failed to consult that homeland's government—as required under various South African laws—before announcing its intention to make the transfer. Kangwane officials also filed suit. Expecting, in our view, that Kangwane would win its case, Pretoria agreed in November 1982 to an out-of-court settlement, whereby it would pay all court costs incurred by Kangwane. At the same time, the Kangwane Legislative Assembly and cabinet were reinstated. We believe the transfer issue could eventually reemerge, however, because the commission established to investigate the views of all parties on the transfers still functions. Moreover, Swaziland continues to insist on the “return” of the disputed territories. [REDACTED]

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The question of amalgamation has divided Kangwane's traditional and elected leaders. During King Sobhuza's reign, Kangwane's traditional headmen and chiefs supported amalgamation, wanting to be united with Swaziland under its monarch. On the other hand, the popular Kangwane Chief Minister, Enos Mabuza, speaking for the homeland government and most of its people, has strongly opposed unification. [REDACTED]

25X1

Although most residents of Kangwane seem to support amalgamation, it is difficult to determine the views of the widely scattered ethnic Swazi population living elsewhere in South Africa. Chief Minister Mabuza has asserted that these people oppose any move that would eliminate their South African citizenship and give Pretoria even tighter control over their access to jobs in white areas. [REDACTED]

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We believe that most traditional headmen and chiefs in both Kangwane and Swaziland still want to pursue the transfers, but that with Sobhuza's death their ability to influence the situation has been reduced. Moreover, some government officials in Swaziland, aware of the drawbacks of amalgamating these economically weak regions, are opposed to the transfers, and now that Sobhuza is gone they are likely to voice their misgivings openly. The judicial obstacles are surmountable: since the South African constitution allows retroactive changes in the law, the Parliament could make the transfer legal by altering the laws that require Pretoria to consult with the homelands. Amalgamation of Kangwane and Ngwavuma with Swaziland would set a precedent for turning over other homelands to neighboring countries with which they are tribally linked, such as Bophuthatswana to Botswana and Qwaqwa to Lesotho. [REDACTED]

25X1

In contrast to most of the other small, isolated homelands, Kangwane seems to have an open, efficient, responsive government. Chief Minister Mabuza has asserted that during the period in 1982 when the South African Ministry of Cooperation and Development controlled administration of the homeland, many civil servants staged a work slowdown and others took extended vacations. [REDACTED]

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Franz Furst ©

Leader

Enos Mabuza, Chief Minister of Kangwane, temporarily lost his position in 1982, when Pretoria dissolved the Kangwane Legislative Assembly and placed the homeland under the administration of the South African Department of Cooperation and Development. Mabuza filed suit to reverse South Africa's action, and in November 1982 Pretoria rescinded its decree in an out-of-court settlement. [REDACTED]

25X1

Mabuza holds two degrees in psychology from the University of South Africa. He was a school inspector until he entered politics in 1976. In 1977, as a member of the Kangwane Legislative Assembly and leader of the Inyandza National Movement—a Kangwane political party—Mabuza defeated the territory's Chief Executive Councilor, Mkholishi Dlamini, and served briefly in that post. Subsequently, the South African Supreme Court disclaimed the voting results on a technicality and Dlamini returned to the Legislative Assembly as its head until 1978. [REDACTED]

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Normally quiet-mannered, Mabuza has publicly displayed "controlled, cold anger" over the South African plan to merge his homeland with Swaziland, according to US Embassy officials. He is about 43 years old. Mabuza is married and has several children. [REDACTED]

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KwaNdebele

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KWANDEBELE

KwaNdebele is little more than a dormitory compound for the Pretoria-Johannesburg area. South Africa nonetheless is trying to prompt the homeland to accept "independence" by offering it additional land. Should this effort fail, we believe that Pretoria might eventually try to turn KwaNdebele over to Bophuthatswana or to nearby and tribally linked Lebowa. [REDACTED]

25X1

Geographic and Demographic Features

The South Ndebele people of the KwaNdebele homeland broke away centuries ago from the Nguni-speaking peoples of present-day Natal. Members of the tribe subsequently dispersed through much of central Transvaal Province and were forced to live among their more populous neighbors, especially the Tswana and North Sotho. [REDACTED]

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South Africa created KwaNdebele, the last homeland to be formed, in 1977. Pretoria apparently was surprised by the heightened ethnic tensions that were triggered by KwaNdebele's birth. Land taken from Lebowa and given to KwaNdebele intensified ethnic frictions between Lebowa's dominant North Sotho and the South Ndebele. Moreover, many of the South Ndebele wanted to remain in Lebowa with their North Ndebele kin, who form a minority in that homeland. [REDACTED]

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KwaNdebele—a single parcel of land less than half the size of Rhode Island—differs from the other homelands in that the vast majority of its people have moved there voluntarily. The US Embassy points to the relative absence of attitudes of hopelessness and anomie and the presence of a well-organized community leadership as key factors differentiating KwaNdebele from other homelands. [REDACTED]

The homeland's population was estimated at 32,000 in 1970; today South African officials estimate it at 166,000 (KwaNdebele officials claim the population is 500,000). An independent survey by the private South African Human Sciences Research Council found that 55 percent of the new arrivals came from rural areas in Transvaal Province, 30 percent from Bophuthatswana (mostly from the Winterveld squatter area), 8 percent from white urban areas, and most of the remaining 7 percent from Lebowa. [REDACTED]

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According to the US Embassy in Pretoria, the South Ndebele value the KwaNdebele homeland as a place where they are not subject to the control of other ethnic groups as they were in Bophuthatswana and Lebowa. They are content to have secure land ownership instead of the uncertainty of squatting in white South Africa, and they are gratified that their children can speak their native language in school. They attach particular importance to being able to live within commuting distance of Pretoria (75 kilometers away) and Johannesburg (125 kilometers away). [REDACTED]

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Economic Activity

KwaNdebele has no known mineral resources, limited water supplies, little fertile land, and scant commercial or manufacturing activity. Nearly all businesses are family-owned and staffed, and only 5 percent of these employ four or more people. Most businesses have no electricity or running water. Only 12 percent of the average household's income is earned within the borders of KwaNdebele, and the homeland, like many others, is a labor pool for white cities. The number of buses leaving daily for Pretoria has doubled in recent months, reflecting the homeland's population explosion and the dearth of local job opportunities. [REDACTED]

25X1

Political Developments

The KwaNdebele Legislative Assembly voted in May 1982 to seek "independence" from South Africa. According to the US Embassy, Chief Minister Simon Skosana subsequently predicted that "independence" would not be achieved for five years, an estimate with which at least one senior South African official agrees. Before Pretoria grants "independence," KwaNdebele will need the symbols of nationhood—a capital, office buildings, paved roads, and the like—which it lacks at present. In contrast to its tough approach with other homelands on the issue of additional land, Pretoria has announced plans to transfer small portions of land from Bophuthatswana and Lebowa to KwaNdebele. [REDACTED]

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KwaNdebele already shows signs of becoming a petty dictatorship. In May 1981, for example, officials of the liberal South African Institute of Race Relations and the South African Council of Churches were detained by a local headman for 10 hours without any charge being placed against them. According to Embassy reporting, the detainees concluded that local officials feared the group might publicize the political conditions they had witnessed in the homeland. Reports in the South African press indicate that KwaNdebele's cabinet—appointed by Pretoria—tends to ignore the wishes of the people. Members of the cabinet, according to these same press reports, are viewed by the population as inexperienced, poorly educated, heavyhanded, and unpopular. [REDACTED]

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Leader

Simon Skosana has been Chief Minister of KwaNdebele, the newest South African homeland, since 1981. Since the mid-1960s, Skosana has led the movement to unite his South Ndebele people in their own territory. In 1977, he became Chief Executive Officer of the Ndebele Territorial Authority, a forerunner of the homeland. Despite Skosana's public statements that he favors free enterprise, KwaNdebele citizens—according to the South African press—have complained that business opportunities in the homeland are tightly controlled by a few politicians. [REDACTED]

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Skosana, who is about 45 years old, is depicted by the South African press as a prosperous businessman. He attended night school through approximately the fifth-grade level. [REDACTED]

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KwaZulu

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KWAZULU

KwaZulu has been a self-governing homeland since 1978. Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi has long rejected "independence," but South African Government spokesmen publicly assert that Buthelezi, by accepting self-governing status, committed himself to eventual independence. Pretoria, in our view, tolerates Buthelezi's intransigence because the popular support he gains for taking such a stance tends to fragment black nationalism in South Africa. Pretoria's efforts to transfer the northernmost parcel of KwaZulu to Swaziland have been blocked indefinitely by court challenges. We believe, however, that South Africa could yet pass legislation legalizing the transfer—even though this would anger the country's 6 million Zulu. [REDACTED]

25X1

Geographic and Demographic Features

KwaZulu's fragmented character—the homeland is comprised of 19 large and about 45 small parcels of land—stems from the confrontation between Boer settlers, the British, and the Zulus in the 19th century. Originally, Zulus were protected by the colonial government from encroachment by white settlers, but the needs of the colonial economy soon won out and the blacks lost much of their land. [REDACTED]

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In the war of 1879 the Zulus were defeated by the whites, their king exiled, and their kingdom broken into separate chieftaincies. After 1904, when all African territory was opened to white settlement, Zulu landholdings fell by 40 percent within a decade, and many in the tribe were pushed onto less desirable land. [REDACTED]

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Today, about half of South Africa's Zulus live in KwaZulu, where the average population density is four times greater than in the rest of South Africa. The land is overgrazed and eroded, and malnutrition is common, especially among children. A drought in 1981 was the worst in KwaZulu's history. Considering the homeland's estimated population growth of 4.1 percent annually—due in part to resettlement—conditions almost certainly will worsen. [REDACTED]

25X1

Economic Activities

KwaZulu has virtually no prospect of becoming economically self-sufficient. Like the other homelands, it is heavily dependent on Pretoria for economic assistance and employment of a large segment of its population [REDACTED]


25X1

An educational system aimed at providing only minimum literary skills has left KwaZulu short of businessmen and administrators. These factors, together with a lack of credit and banking facilities, weak infrastructure, and high transport costs, have severely limited local business ownership. The result is that nearly all of the industry in the homeland—located almost exclusively in the Isethebe industrial zone north of Durban—is white-owned. [REDACTED]

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KwaZulu. Rural resettlement
area



Over 90 percent of the homeland's wage earners are employed in white South Africa. Only 8 percent of KwaZulu's paid employment is within the homeland. KwaZulu accounts for about 10 percent of South Africa's population, but it contributes less than 1 percent of the total gross domestic product.

Agriculture is primarily at a subsistence level: only about a third of the homeland's food supply is locally produced. With most of the men and half of the women working in white South Africa, farming is left to the remaining women, children, and old people, who manage to cultivate only half the arable land.

A land tenure system, in which individual families are assigned farm plots by the local chief, is also partly responsible for KwaZulu's low agricultural production. Zulus have little incentive to invest in the land, conserve the soil, or use good husbandry techniques. Large cattle herds have historically been used as insurance against drought and as status symbols; they are seldom used for income. Thus, less than 1 percent of the herd is slaughtered annually, compared with 10 to 20 percent annually for income-producing herds on white-owned farms in South Africa.

Political Developments

Chief Minister Buthelezi, unlike the leaders of the other homelands, aspires to and shows some potential for a wider South African political role. Through his leadership of Inkatha—the National Cultural Liberation Movement—Buthelezi has been able to build a substantial political base both inside and outside KwaZulu.

Inkatha, originally organized as a Zulu cultural institution in the 1920s, was reshaped by Buthelezi in the mid-1970s to mobilize wide support for his political and social policies. The organization currently claims about 300,000 members—20

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*KwaZulu. Makeshift buildings
in a resettlement area*



25X1

percent of whom the organization says are non-Zulu—making it the largest black political organization in South Africa. Inkatha's vague platform of black nationalism calls for majority rule, political and economic equality for blacks, and the maintenance of Zulu cultural identity.

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Buthelezi has consistently rejected "independence" for KwaZulu, arguing instead for a national political role for blacks. At the same time, he has demanded greater land concessions from South Africa to consolidate the fragmented homeland. Pretoria in the past has paid lipservice to KwaZulu's demands for more land, but opposition from whites and financial considerations have kept Pretoria from going forward with extensive consolidation of the homeland.

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A commission set up by Buthelezi to explore alternatives to "independence" for KwaZulu released its report in May 1982. It concluded that a joint regional government for KwaZulu and South Africa's Natal Province—with white, Zulu, and Indian participation—was both feasible and desirable. Pretoria rejected the Commission's recommendations, which conflicted with South Africa's plans for eventual "independence" for all the homelands. Despite Pretoria's rejection, we believe KwaZulu and Natal officials will continue to strive for some sort of political association between the two within this decade.

25X1

In early 1982 KwaZulu was drawn into South Africa's plan to transfer the Kangwane homeland to Swaziland when Pretoria added Ngwavuma—the northern portion of KwaZulu—to its offer to the Swazis. Acquisition of Ngwavuma would give landlocked Swaziland a route to the sea. Three successful court challenges by KwaZulu officials to Pretoria's right to cede Ngwavuma to Swaziland have blocked the transfer indefinitely. But Swaziland officials say they still want the land, and the South African Parliament could pass legislation legitimizing the transfer, thereby skirting the court decisions.

25X1

Secret



Liaison ©

Leader

Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu since 1978, is one of South Africa's most dynamic and renowned black leaders. Since 1976, he has also been president of Inkatha (the National Cultural Liberation Movement), South Africa's largest black political organization. As Chief Minister and head of Inkatha, Buthelezi leads approximately 6 million Zulu nationwide. Despite his widespread popularity among the Zulu, Buthelezi has been criticized over the years by other blacks (and some Zulu) for working solely within the system to achieve change. [REDACTED]

25X1

Buthelezi was born on 2 August 1928. He attended the University of Fort Hare but was expelled in 1950 for taking part in a student demonstration against a visiting British dignitary. He resumed his studies at the University of Natal and received a B.A. degree in history and Bantu administration. Alert, energetic, and cheerful, Buthelezi is an eloquent speaker. In 1977, while on a speaking tour in the United States, he met with President Carter in Washington—the first official meeting between a South African black leader and a US President. He is a hereditary chief of the Buthelezi clan. [REDACTED]

25X6

[REDACTED] He is married and has several children. [REDACTED]

25X6

25X1

Lebowa

Secret

LEBOWA

Lebowa is among the least known and publicized of the homelands as a result of its relatively remote location in semiarid northern Transvaal and its lack of well-known political leaders. Despite repeated refusals of "independence" by Chief Minister Cedric Phatudi, the US Embassy reports that Pretoria wants to divest itself of this impoverished homeland. Since Lebowa is not adjacent to and therefore could not be absorbed by any black African country, we believe Pretoria will offer financial incentives to persuade it to accept independence. [REDACTED]

25X1

Geographic and Demographic Features

The people of Lebowa, which became a self-governing homeland in 1972, belong to a variety of tribes. Most are members of the North Sotho tribal group, but small numbers of North Ndebele also live there. The North Sotho grouping consists of 12 large tribes, each of which has several subtribes. The various groups had trouble agreeing even on the name for the homeland; "Lebowa," meaning north, was a compromise solution. [REDACTED]

25X1

Demands by members of the South Ndebele group for their own homeland prompted Pretoria in 1977 to declare an area that had been the southernmost parcel of Lebowa a new homeland, KwaNdebele. Since then, some of the North Ndebele in Lebowa have voiced interest in merging with KwaNdebele. [REDACTED]

25X1

Lebowa is the third largest of South Africa's homelands, combining two large and four small parcels in an area slightly larger than Massachusetts. With an assigned population of 2.5 million in 1980, it also is the third most populous homeland. About three-fifths of the assigned residents actually live there. Pretoria's resettlement of blacks from white areas, primarily Johannesburg and rural areas in northern Transvaal, caused Lebowa's residential population growth during the 1970s to rise to 4.2 percent annually. The population growth rate without resettlement was 3.7 percent annually, on a par with most other homelands. [REDACTED]

25X1

During the late 1970s, South African authorities ordered 3,000 to 4,000 North Sotho who had inhabited a fertile valley in Lebowa for over a century to move to land that was less productive and farther from white areas. These people had formed a self-sufficient and stable community for generations, and many had commuted daily to jobs in nearby white areas. [REDACTED]

25X1

Pretoria took the area from Lebowa ostensibly to straighten the boundary, but many of the affected blacks believed they were being removed so that white farmers could have their fertile land. Most were unwilling to move to poor land or to give up daily commuting to live instead in single-sex dormitories near their jobs. As a result, only about 350 people voluntarily followed their chief to the new area.

Secret

Secret

Some of the others were forced to join their chief, and about 1,500 fled to a nearby area in Lebowa, where they settled among their ethnic kin and could still commute to work in white cities. [REDACTED]

25X1

Economic Activity

Economic activity in Lebowa consists of subsistence agriculture, chrome ore and asbestos mining, light manufacturing, retail sales, housing and road construction, and government service. Locally earned per capita income averaged less than \$100 in the mid-1970s. Even the addition of migrant income lifted the per capita average for the same period to only about \$220. [REDACTED]

25X1

South African subsidies averaged nearly 75 percent of Lebowa's operating budget in 1975-79—a higher proportion than Pretoria has assumed for most of the homelands. The South Africans further increased Lebowa's annual allocation during the 1979-81 period. [REDACTED]

25X1

Only 20 percent of Lebowa's wage earners work in the homeland. Another 25 percent commute to jobs in nearby white areas—mostly in Pietersburg, about 10 kilometers from the border—and the remaining 55 percent have migrated to distant white areas, mainly Johannesburg. [REDACTED]

25X1

Mineral production within the homeland was valued at \$75 million in 1979, but exploration and exploitation have yielded few benefits locally. Indeed, mechanization has limited the available jobs, profits are repatriated to white South Africa, processing takes place outside the homeland, and Lebowan wages are spent primarily in white-owned stores. [REDACTED]

25X1

Political Developments

Chief Minister Phatudi has consistently rejected "independence" for Lebowa. In 1979 Phatudi established a select committee of the Legislative Assembly to investigate alternatives for the homeland. The committee's report recommended rejection of "independence" and also called for territorial consolidation. Even though South Africa subsidizes such a large share of Lebowa's operating budget, Phatudi has repeatedly accused Pretoria of financially favoring the homelands that are willing to accept "independence." [REDACTED]


25X1

Phatudi seems rapidly to be losing popular support within Lebowa. A long-term resident of Soweto, Phatudi is considered an outsider by most residents of the homeland. According to US Embassy reporting, he also tends to rule by fiat rather than by traditional consensus building, and his government is generally regarded locally as corrupt. [REDACTED]

25X1

Secret

Secret



Leader

Cedric Nemedi Phatudi has been Chief Minister of Lebowa since 1973. He has frequently stressed the homeland government's commitment to free enterprise and has encouraged private US and white South African investment in Lebowa. Phatudi has headed the ruling Lebowa People's Party since 1973. Strongly anti-Soviet, he has been friendly with US Embassy officers in Pretoria. Embassy officials have noted that because Phatudi rules in an authoritarian manner rather than by consensus, political opposition to him has developed since 1979. These same officials also note that Phatudi, who resided in Soweto until the early 1970s, is regarded as an outsider by many Lebowans. He has also provoked criticism among local residents through his continued push to rename the homeland capital, Lebowa kgomo, Phatudi City. [REDACTED]

25X1

Phatudi was born in 1912. After teaching school during the early 1940s, he earned a B.A. degree in history and the English and North Sotho languages from the University of Fort Hare in 1947 and a B.Ed. degree from the University of Witwatersrand in 1960. He was subsequently a school principal and supervisor of education. [REDACTED]

25X1

Articulate and persuasive, Phatudi is reserved and has a courtly manner. US Embassy officials have observed that he is vulnerable to flattery. The Chief Minister has written and published many works in the North Sotho language, including translations of Shakespeare. He is an elder of the Dutch Reformed Church. He is married and has several children. [REDACTED]

25X1

Secret

Qwagwa

Secret

QWAQWA

The South African Government is considering two options for the future of the tiny homeland of Qwaqwa. Pretoria may:

- Decide to give Qwaqwa more land as an inducement to accept "independence," even though there is no possibility that this homeland can become economically viable.
- Choose to give Qwaqwa to neighboring Lesotho, where most of the homeland's tribal group live.

We believe that the South Africans would prefer to transfer Qwaqwa to Lesotho but that they will not take any action before the issue of transferring Kangwane and Ngwavuma to Swaziland is finally settled. [REDACTED]

25X1

Geographic and Demographic Features

Qwaqwa is inhabited by the South Sotho people, who broke away over 300 years ago from the Tswana tribe in the region that is now Bophuthatswana and migrated southward. Almost all of the 135 tribes that make up the South Sotho grouping now live in Lesotho; only three of these tribes are in Qwaqwa. [REDACTED]

25X1

During the 1970s, Qwaqwa's population soared from 25,000 to an estimated 155,000, primarily because of Pretoria's program of removing blacks from the cities of white South Africa and resettling them in the homelands. Most South Sotho remained in white areas, however, while others found jobs through hiring offices in the homeland and subsequently returned to South Africa. At present only about 10 percent of Qwaqwa's assigned population resides there—the lowest rate of any homeland. Most of the remaining 90 percent live and work on white farms in Orange Free State or in South African cities, especially Johannesburg. [REDACTED]

Pretoria's strategy of enticing blacks to Qwaqwa by not building secondary schools for them in Orange Free State towns and by expanding Qwaqwa's educational facilities beyond the homeland's immediate needs has attracted an estimated 70,000 students. As a result, Qwaqwa has many students, but few adults. Three out of four of these students come from families remaining in white areas. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Given Qwaqwa's population density of 322 persons per square kilometer and the fact that only one-tenth of the land is arable, population pressure on the land actually farmed is severe. Moreover, at least one-third of Qwaqwa's good farmland is occupied by shantytowns that have sprung up in recent years. [REDACTED]

25X1

Economic Activity

Buttressed by Pretoria's heavy budget subsidies and migrant remittances, Qwaqwa's governmental expenditures annually exceed locally generated income by nearly three times. The homeland is unable to produce enough food for its population and—like most of the homelands—depends on South Africa to make up the difference. [REDACTED]

25X1

Secret

The few jobs that exist in Qwaqwa are found in government, construction, and a few light industries geared to the local market. Economic development is severely hampered by a lack of good roads, communications, and other facilities. In 1976, Qwaqwa's local per capita income was about \$70. Even if commuter income and migrant remittances are taken into account, per capita income amounted to only about \$210 per year—roughly on a par with Africa's poorest countries. [REDACTED]

25X1

Political Developments

Chief Minister T. K. Mopeli has said he will accept "independence" for Qwaqwa only if the Thaba 'Nchu area of Bophuthatswana is included in the package. The annexation of Thaba 'Nchu would approximately double Qwaqwa's size. Bophuthatswana and Qwaqwa have long disputed the Thaba 'Nchu area, which is inhabited mostly by South Sotho. [REDACTED]

25X1

The US Embassy in Maseru reports that Bophuthatswana's President Mangope has said his government will never agree to give up the disputed area. Nonetheless, the Embassy reports that Pretoria is considering such a transfer. [REDACTED]

25X1

Meanwhile, the government of neighboring Lesotho argues that Qwaqwa and Thaba 'Nchu should be part of that country. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] in our view, Lesotho would resist absorbing Qwaqwa because doing so would heavily burden Lesotho's fragile economy. Nonetheless, if Pretoria were to succeed in transferring Kangwane to Swaziland, we believe it will press hard—and probably successfully—for the amalgamation of Qwaqwa, without Thaba 'Nchu, into Lesotho. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret



Camera Press ©

Leader

Tsiamé Kenneth Mopeli has been Chief Minister of Qwaqwa since 1975. He has publicly condemned apartheid, but has stated that change in South Africa can be accomplished through peaceful means. [REDACTED]

25X1

Mopeli was born on 20 September 1930. He began teaching school in 1951 and by 1974 he was an inspector of black schools in the Orange Free State. In 1974, he received a B.A. degree in Afrikaans and Dutch from the University of South Africa. Mopeli's political career began in 1969, when he was nominated a member of the Qwaqwa Legislative Assembly. A son of a hereditary South Sotho chief, Mopeli was entitled to one of the 26 appointed seats in the 40-member assembly. In 1974, he relinquished his appointed seat to form the Dikwankwetla Party, which in 1975 won the first general election in Qwaqwa. He was subsequently named Chief Minister. [REDACTED]

25X1

Mopeli is quiet and reserved. He has written two radio plays on the history of Qwaqwa. Until 1971 he was an elder in the Dutch Reformed Church. He enjoys reading and gardening. Mopeli is married and has several children. [REDACTED]

25X1

Secret

Transkei

Secret

TRANSKEI

Six years after becoming the first homeland to receive its "independence" from South Africa, Transkei remains mired in poverty and dependent on Pretoria for budget support and jobs for its unemployed. Transkei citizens, meanwhile, are still being forcibly removed from South Africa. [REDACTED]

25X1

President Kaiser Matanzima has suppressed political opposition. In doing so, he has patterned Transkei's security legislation after Pretoria's and has built up a security force that depends heavily on South African assistance. Matanzima supports Pretoria's goal of a South African-sponsored "constellation of states" comprised of South Africa itself, the homelands, and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. The proposed transfer of some homeland territories to Swaziland has led Prime Minister George Matanzima, the President's younger brother, to call for creation of a single homeland for the Xhosa ethnic group. [REDACTED]

25X1

Geographic and Demographic Features

Transkei, largest of the homelands, consists of one large and two small parcels of land in a combined area slightly larger than Maryland and Delaware. Nine-tenths of the land is hilly or mountainous, and much of it suffers from severe erosion due to overgrazing of cattle. Rainfall and agricultural potential are greatest along the coast and near the border with Lesotho. [REDACTED]

25X1

Transkei's Xhosa speaking peoples arrived in the area in two waves. The first group arrived before 1700 from areas to the north of present-day South Africa. These Xhosa speakers fought a number of frontier wars with Dutch settlers beginning in the middle of the 19th century. The second Xhosa influx into Transkei occurred at the end of the 19th century as a result of the Zulu tribal conquests in the area of present-day KwaZulu, which forced the Xhosa to move southward along the coast. [REDACTED]

25X1

In 1970, about 55 percent of Transkei's assigned population of 3 million lived in the homeland. By 1980, 59 percent of the 4.3 million people assigned to the homeland lived there; the increase was largely a result of forced removals from white South Africa. In addition to the Xhosa, the homeland contains about 75,000 South Sotho and 25,000 Zulu. [REDACTED]

25X1

Economic Activity

Transkei's abundant rainfall and numerous streams that flow out of the mountains give it the highest agricultural potential of the homelands. A variety of political, economic, and cultural factors, however, have seriously inhibited agricultural modernization. The most important of these factors is land tenure. Land is communally owned and arbitrarily allocated by the local chief. As a result, plots are small, uneconomic, scattered, and often distant from the family home. The

government is trying to encourage a more rational approach to land allocation, but the chiefs oppose any reforms, fearing a loss of their power. Because the chiefs are the backbone of the ruling Transkei National Independence Party, the laws are not likely to be changed. [REDACTED] 25X1

Transkei thus has realized little of its agricultural potential. Nearly 80 percent of the people practice subsistence agriculture. Only one-fourth of the arable land is cultivated, and the homeland produces only one-third of its food needs. Most of the remaining land is used for grazing. Cattle are kept primarily as status symbols and insurance for hard times, and are a cause of overgrazing and soil erosion. In 1976, for example, fewer than 1 percent of the cattle were slaughtered, compared with about 20 percent for white South Africa. [REDACTED] 25X1

There are only about 50,000 wage-earning jobs in Transkei, and many of these are in the government. Few people in Transkei can commute to jobs while living in the homeland because economic activity in nearby areas of South Africa is limited. Consequently, most workers migrate to distant cities, especially East London and Cape Town. [REDACTED] 25X1

South Africa pays for three-fourths of the Transkei budget. In addition, it exerts indirect control through seconded South African advisers, who hold key positions in various ministries and the Transkei army. [REDACTED] 25X1

Political Developments

The area that is now Transkei was annexed by Cape Colony in 1894. Whites maintained jurisdiction until the early 1950s, when they started giving more responsibility to local people. Self-government was granted in 1963. In 1974, the Legislative Assembly requested "independence" from Pretoria, which was granted on 26 October 1976. [REDACTED] 25X1

Transkei's "independence" did not proceed as planned by President Matanzima. Pretoria reneged on its agreement that the Transkei people would remain citizens of South Africa. In addition, Pretoria decided that there would be two separate Xhosa homelands—Transkei and Ciskei—because whites in the corridor between the two areas feared that otherwise they would be removed from their land. [REDACTED] 25X1

Matanzima's Transkei National Independence Party (TNIP) won 68 of 75 contested seats in a Legislative Assembly election in 1976. However, the Matanzima government's imprisonment of the leader of the opposition Transkei Democratic Party just before the election, the government's appointment of traditional chiefs to over half the seats, and the low voter turnout of 43 percent gave the victory a hollow ring. Within a year legislation had been passed that defined any opposition to the government or any open suggestions that Transkei was not truly independent as treasonable offenses. Opposition leaders soon began fleeing to Lesotho to request political asylum. [REDACTED] 25X1

President Matanzima, anxious to appear decisive after he had repeatedly tried to acquire more land from South Africa with no results, took a bold step in 1978 by

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Transkei. Dry, treeless landscape, useful primarily for cattle grazing



25X1

breaking diplomatic relations with Pretoria over the issue. Nonetheless, trade representatives were quickly exchanged with full diplomatic immunity, and Matanzima restored full diplomatic relations within two years.

25X1

In addition to suppressing opposition by arbitrary arrests and detentions and passing legislation restricting the press and personal freedom of speech, the Matanzima brothers have used their positions to enrich themselves financially. To further reinforce his position, President Matanzima has increased the power, pay, and privileges of the chiefs, who make up half of the Legislative Assembly. According to the Embassy, the chiefs see Matanzima as their benefactor and support him on all issues. The Embassy describes the Matanzima brothers as feared rather than admired by most of the population.

25X1

The Transkei Government in November 1979 banned 34 organizations, including the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-African Congress (PAC), and all Black Consciousness organizations. The list of banned organizations virtually duplicated Pretoria's list. Detentions of many leaders of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) effectively eliminated that party by 1980.

25X1

Transkei's 800-man defense force virtually collapsed when South African advisers were pulled out after diplomatic relations were severed in 1978. Even before this, however, the force had been capable only of ceremonial functions and limited operational duties. Matanzima fired the force's Transkeian commander in 1981 and replaced him with a white former Rhodesian officer. Today the force is trained and led by hired whites and funded largely by Pretoria.

25X1

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**Leader**

Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima has dominated the politics of Transkei since 1976, when South Africa granted the homeland "independence." He served as Transkei's Prime Minister from 1976 until he assumed the presidency in 1979. According to US Consular officials in Durban, Matanzima rules with little restraint through a docile National Assembly and an inner circle of traditional tribal chiefs. Generally feared by the people, Matanzima has imposed laws that make it a crime to criticize the homeland's president or its government, and he has moved swiftly to arrest Transkeian critics of his regime. Black and white South African critics of Matanzima have compared his harsh regime to that of South Africa. These same critics have called him a puppet of Pretoria, partly because he spearheaded the effort in the mid-1970s to convince the Transkei regime to accept South Africa's offer of "independence." According to US Consular reporting, Matanzima recognizes his dependence on Pretoria and has, therefore, generally accommodated South African wishes. Matanzima's younger brother, George, is Transkei's Prime Minister. [REDACTED]

Matanzima was born on 15 June 1915. After receiving a B.A. degree in law and politics in 1939 from the University of Fort Hare, Matanzima began his political career. In 1940, he became chief of the Tembe people—a subgroup of the Xhosa tribe. He passed the Transvaal bar exam in 1948 and was elected Chief Minister of Transkei in 1963. Matanzima has been divorced twice. He and his present wife have several children. [REDACTED]

Secret

Venda

Secret

VENDA

Venda, "independent" since September 1979, is located in a remote area of northern Transvaal near South Africa's borders with Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Its isolation has hindered the development of industry and ensured a high rate of emigration to white South Africa and a heavy dependence on subsistence agriculture. In addition, Venda's unpopular President Patrick Mphephu has used a variety of tactics to suppress both real and imagined political opponents. [REDACTED]

25X1

Geographic and Demographic Features

The Venda tribal group is linguistically related to the Shona of Zimbabwe and the Sotho of the northern Transvaal. The Venda first moved into the area from Zimbabwe in about 1700. Contact with whites began in 1836, but it was not until the early 20th century, after the Anglo-Boer War, that the Venda were brought under the administrative control of the Transvaal Government. [REDACTED]

25X1

Venda is located in the most fertile part of northern Transvaal. Only 10 percent of the homeland is arable, but nearly two-thirds of that area is under cultivation. Roughly the size of Delaware, Venda is divided into one large and one small parcel. Between 1970 and 1980, Pretoria's forced resettlement drove the rate of increase in resident population to over 5 percent annually, increasing the population from about 270,000 to 450,000. [REDACTED]

25X1

Economic Activities

Venda is the most isolated of all the homelands from centers of white population. Nearly all of its farmers engage in subsistence agriculture because there is scant incentive to produce crops for distant cities. As is the case in several other homelands, the large number of cattle in Venda has led to overgrazing, resulting in excessive soil erosion. [REDACTED]

25X1

One bright spot, however, is a 40,000-hectare tree plantation—planted in the 1940s by the South African Government and now controlled by the Venda Government—that will shortly begin yielding wood for processing and sale to South Africa. The US Embassy reports that, if the plantation is successful, it may be expanded by another 9,000 hectares. A 500-hectare tea plantation has started production; conditions for tea cultivation are excellent, but inefficient operations and high transport costs make Venda's tea about twice as expensive as other tea imported into South Africa. [REDACTED]

25X1

Local efforts at industrial development have failed. Venda has virtually no supporting services for industry, and transportation and communications links with South Africa are few. An industrial development consultant hired by Venda a few years ago concluded that it was futile to try to create local industrial jobs because Venda is destined to remain a labor exporter. Of the more than 3,000 people who

Secret

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Venda. Women carrying water
(u)



enter the homeland's labor market annually, most depart for widely scattered cities in white South Africa in search of employment. Moreover, a high proportion of local income is spent in white-owned stores in nearby white areas, or in local stores that are covertly owned by Indian merchants who send their profits out of Venda. [redacted]

Political Developments

The US Embassy describes Mphephu as a semiliterate and unpopular figure who has Pretoria's support because he can be manipulated easily. Mphephu has been rejected twice by Venda voters, but he has stayed in power by packing the legislature with nominated chiefs who outnumber elected representatives. [redacted]

Venda held its first election in 1973. Mphephu's Venda National Party (VNP) was opposed by the Venda Independence Party (VIP). The VIP won 14 of the 18 contested seats. Mphephu then whisked the 42 appointed chiefs, who constituted a majority of the Venda Parliament, away to a nearby resort. On their return, after several days of feting, they all backed Mphephu, who became Chief Minister. [redacted]

The VIP was again victorious in the 1978 election, winning 31 of the 42 contested seats. Mphephu, using emergency powers, detained a number of the newly elected VIP legislators until the appointed chiefs had chosen him as Prime Minister. At "independence" in 1979 Mphephu was installed as President. [redacted]

Secret

Secret

Venda. Lack of facilities and employment opportunities lead many men to migrate to white cities [redacted]



25X1

Mphephu had 14 people arrested following an ANC grenade attack in late 1981 on a police station in the capital in which two policemen were killed. The detainees included four of the nine Lutheran pastors in Venda who had ministered to the 60 percent of the Venda population that is Lutheran. The four were tortured, according to the US Embassy in Pretoria. [redacted]

25X1

Alarm over the detentions and reported torture was widespread. Even *Die Vaderland*, an Afrikaner newspaper that favors Pretoria's homelands policy, attacked the Venda Government. Mphephu's government subsequently dropped all charges against the clergymen in exchange for pleas of guilty to lesser charges. [redacted]

25X1

The VIP, according to US Embassy reporting, plans to step up the number of political rallies and other activities. The party is led by Gilbert Bakane, who claims to have the support of 80 percent of the Venda people, including most of those living outside the homeland. Bakane, who lives in Soweto, recognizes that he will be detained if he returns to Venda to take his seat in parliament. Aside from its opposition to "independence," the VIP differs little from the VNP. Both parties are moderately socialist and opposed to the ANC. [redacted]

25X1

We believe ANC infiltration into Venda from Mozambique and Zimbabwe is a distinct possibility because of their proximity and—in Zimbabwe's case—tribal and cultural ties. To prevent such penetration, the Venda National Force (VNF), an anti-insurgency unit with about 600 personnel, patrols the north of the homeland in cooperation with the South African Defense Force (SADF). Aside from these patrols, the VNF's activities are primarily ceremonial. The VNF, like the security units of the other "independent" homelands, is subordinate to the geographic commands of the South African Defense Forces. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

Secret



Leader

Patrick Ramaano Mphephu has been President of Venda since he led the homeland to accept "independence" from South Africa in 1979. Since that time, the Western press has characterized him as a manifestly unpopular, corrupt, and incompetent administrator. Although Mphephu has long had the support of the South African Government, South African diplomats in Venda have confided to US Embassy officials that Mphephu lacks sound political judgment. These diplomats have also stated that Mphephu, despite his autocratic ways, does not control the government and that traditional chiefs frequently act independently and only later inform him of their actions. [REDACTED]

25X1

Born on 4 February 1925, Mphephu holds a junior certificate—the equivalent of a fifth-grade education—from the Vendaland Institution. In 1951, he became chairman of the local tribal authority and of the newly formed Ramabulana Regional Authority—a legislative body. According to a British press report, Mphephu speaks haltingly in his native language and needs an interpreter for others. He is married. [REDACTED]


25X1

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Statistical
Summary

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Figure 1
South Africa: Black Homelands



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25X1

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