



**National
Foreign
Assessment
Center**

~~Secret~~

25X1

AFR. (GEN)
+
ARMS XFER

Conventional Arms Transfers to Africa: Motives and Prospects

An Intelligence Assessment

~~Secret~~

PA 80-10333
August 1980

Copy . 169

Page Denied



**National
Foreign
Assessment
Center**

Secret



25X1


Conventional Arms Transfers to Africa: Motives and Prospects




25X1

An Intelligence Assessment


*Research for this report was completed
on 3 June 1980.*

This assessment was prepared by 
International Issues Division, Office of Political
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Politico-Military Issues
Branch, International Issues Division, OPA,



25X1


25X1

This assessment was coordinated with the Offices
of Economic Research and Strategic Research, the
Directorate of Operations, and the National
Intelligence Officers for Africa and the Near East and
South Asia. 

25X1

Secret

*PA80-10333
August 1980*



627590 7-80

25X1

Secret



25X1

**Conventional Arms Transfers
to Africa: Motives and Prospects**



25X1

Key Judgments

Several security problems common to African states will sustain the demand for foreign-made arms in Africa during the early 1980s. Arbitrary and militarily indefensible boundaries expose many countries to separatist or irredentist activity or to turmoil in adjacent countries. Weak regimes fear political meddling by their own military or by unfriendly neighbors. To correct past neglect of their defenses, several African countries have launched long-term programs of military modernization that will require continued imports of foreign-made arms.




25X1

The USSR, which sells more military equipment to Africa than does the West, will maintain and if possible expand its security assistance throughout the continent. Arms transfers are Moscow's most effective instrument for gaining influence in Africa. Despite recent setbacks in its relations with some recipients, the Soviets have gained political influence as well as valuable military access rights from their most important clients. They will use offers of military equipment to try to expand their influence in those states, such as Zimbabwe and Uganda, that are building and equipping new military establishments, and in Zambia, which is pessimistic about the prospects for stability in southern Africa.



25X1

As long as the superpowers do not restrain their arms exports to Africa, other major suppliers are unlikely to do so. The West Europeans supply arms to support their defense industries, to obtain access to raw materials or military facilities, to counter leftist influence in the recipient countries, or to preserve close relations with their ex-colonies. France, the leading Western supplier, uses arms transfers to complement and support its other military activity in Africa. China will continue to use its modest military aid to compete with the Soviets in selected countries.



25X1

The size of the arms trade and the security problems that underlie it vary from one part of Africa to another, but arms restraint does not now seem feasible in any area.

- West Africa is the most peaceful part of the continent, but several West African states distrust their more powerful northern neighbors. The largest West African country, Nigeria, will make substantial arms purchases to continue modernization of its armed forces.
- The Arab north is by far the most heavily armed portion of Africa. The Western Sahara war, animosity between north African countries or with

Secret

25X1

other Arab states or Israel, and Libya's role as both a supplier and the leading purchaser of arms in Africa make arms transfer restraint in the area very unlikely.

- Arms transfers to central Africa are relatively light, but continuous fighting in Chad, potential instability in Zaire, and the concern of other states over a spread of this instability will maintain a market for imported weapons.
- Ethiopia's conflicts with Somalia and the Eritrean separatists, the plans of Sudan and Uganda to build up their defenses, and great power desires for access rights to support military operations in the Indian Ocean all assure continued substantial arms transfers to east Africa.
- Zimbabwe's independence has removed a major bone of contention in southern Africa. Distrust between the principal factions in Zimbabwe and continuing insurgencies in Angola and Namibia, however, suggest that the demand for arms in the area may not slacken soon.

25X1

Long-term trends in the African arms trade and persistent issues in African politics dim the prospects for arms restraint. Opposition to white rule in South Africa, which has the strongest armed force south of the Sahara, is only one of several factors that will discourage black governments from restricting their own acquisition of arms. The poverty of most African states severely limits the use of their own resources to purchase weapons, but some receive financial support from oil producers or credits from their arms suppliers. Furthermore, many black African governments believe that the low level of armaments in their region means they are less obliged than others to restrain their imports of weapons.

25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Key Judgments	iii
Introduction	1
Patterns and Trends in Arms Transfers to Africa	1
Principal Motives for Importing Arms	2
Perspectives of African States	2
West Africa	2
North Africa	4
Central Africa	6
East Africa	7
Southern Africa	9
Motives of Principal Suppliers	11
USSR	11
Western Europe	13
China	14
Prospects for Restraint	14
Appendix	
A. Arms Sales to Africa 1975-1979, by Recipient	17
B. Arms Sales to Africa 1975-1979, by Supplier	18

Secret



25X1

Conventional Arms Transfers to Africa: Motives and Prospects



25X1

Introduction

In the second and third rounds of the US-Soviet conventional arms transfer (CAT) talks, held in May and July of 1978, the United States suggested Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa as regions in which the two sides could make special efforts to restrain arms transfers, both by encouraging restraint among states in those regions and by establishing interim controls on their own exports. Although the proposal remained on the table, it made no further progress in the fourth and last round (in December 1978) owing to disagreements over the USSR's freedom to propose regions of its own choice.

Given this negotiating history, Africa could be a major topic in any future US-Soviet talks on conventional arms transfers. Early resumption of the discussions now seems unlikely, however, and any chance for CAT restraint in Africa in the near future hinges at least as much on the Africans' own military needs and their desires for outside assistance. In the meantime, arms transfers to Africa will be one channel for the recently intensified strategic competition between the great powers.

Since the CAT talks stagnated, several events besides the intensification of superpower rivalry have affected the climate for arms control in Africa, but their net impact is unclear. Warfare in the Western Sahara escalated and drew added attention to US military assistance to Morocco. Several regimes were violently overthrown—in one case through armed invasion from a neighboring country (Tanzania's toppling of Uganda's Amin). Finally, a British-mediated settlement ended the guerrilla war in Rhodesia and led to Robert Mugabe's election as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe.



This assessment examines the implications of these and other recent events for the conventional arms trade in Africa. It analyzes the motives of both recipients and suppliers, the relationship of arms transfers to other regional issues, and the likely environment for arms

transfer restraint in Africa during the coming months. The discussion covers weapons exported to all portions of the African continent except Egypt, which has never been seriously considered for inclusion in an arrangement for African CAT restraint and whose security is still more a Middle Eastern problem than an African one.

Patterns and Trends in Arms Transfers to Africa


Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for a very small proportion of worldwide conventional arms transfers before the Angolan civil war in 1975 touched off a rapid increase in military assistance to the region. A further surge occurred in 1977 as the USSR began a major military aid relationship with Ethiopia during the Ogaden war with Somalia. Despite this escalation, however, Sub-Saharan Africa still receives only 10 percent of all weapons sold to the Third World and only about 7 percent of worldwide arms transfers. The Arab states of North Africa have been heavier buyers of arms—particularly Libya, whose \$7.2 billion in weapons purchases between 1975 and 1979 easily made it the largest arms importer on the continent.¹



The USSR is the leading supplier of arms to Africa. It already was the principal supplier to Libya and Algeria when its aid programs to Angola and Ethiopia greatly increased its share of arms exports to Sub-Saharan Africa. The Soviets made about half of the sales to all of the continent outside Egypt from 1975 through 1979, although new agreements with Moscow slackened after the peak of the aid program to Ethiopia in 1977-78. France is the second leading supplier of arms to Africa, with four other Western suppliers—Italy, the United States, West Germany, and the United Kingdom—providing most of the remainder.



¹ For statistics on arms transfers to Africa during this period see appendix.



25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

North African states have imported the most sophisticated weapons in Africa; both Algeria and Libya have MIG-25 fighters, MI-24 attack helicopters, and T-72 tanks. Most materiel exported to Sub-Saharan Africa has been much less advanced, but during the last few years the USSR has introduced some of its more modern products into black Africa. These include MIG-23s provided to Ethiopia, SA-3 and SA-6 air defense missile systems to Tanzania, and SA-3s to Angola. [redacted]

Principal Motives for Importing Arms

The low level of the arms trade in most of Africa reflects the meager finances of African states more than any lack of incentives to import arms. Straining to develop their civilian economies, many of these states prefer to rely less on their armed forces than on diplomatic accommodation and the threat of intervention by more powerful friends to deter attacks from hostile neighbors. [redacted]

One source of insecurity in Africa is the colonial legacy of arbitrary international boundaries. Many of these cut across ethnic frontiers, giving rise to irredentist designs on neighboring territory. An ethnic or religious minority can more easily mount an armed resistance against a central government when it finds refuge and support among kinfolk on the other side of a political boundary. Militarily indefensible frontiers ensnare some governments in conflicts from which they prefer to remain aloof because armed groups use their territory as a base or transit route and become targets of pursuit by opposition forces. [redacted]

Fragile political institutions and the large political role of the military in Africa also affect the appetite for imported arms. Many African rulers came to power through military coups, and many civilian leaders are anxious to keep their military officers well equipped and hence satisfied, because it is relied on as a base of support or feared as an alternative government. A military government's return to the barracks does not remove these motives, because during such a transfer of power it is more important than ever to nurture the armed forces' confidence in their ability to accomplish their military mission. The military's own fragility only heightens the need to pay attention to its morale; modern weapons sometimes are viewed as the glue that

will help hold together the only institution capable of staving off internal chaos. [redacted]

Weak regimes also fear meddling in politics by neighboring governments. This meddling occurs frequently enough in Africa to justify the fear. Radical and moderate regimes are interspersed throughout Africa, adding ideological antagonisms to ethnic and religious ones. [redacted]

Although all of these factors underlie the arms trade in Africa, most African governments view their decisions to import arms as legitimate responses to similar decisions by their neighbors. Some governments that previously were content to maintain only rudimentary security forces have changed their minds in the face of increases in someone else's arsenal, and several now have significant programs of military modernization under way. Even those regimes that continue to look to a former colonial power or other patron to assure their survival often value arms transfers as a symbol of the political tie with their protector. [redacted]

Military assistance to an unfriendly neighbor is even more alarming when it includes advisers or combat troops as well as arms. This threatens not only to upset a local military balance but also to create a sphere of influence for an outside power. For this reason, moderate African governments have been expressing concern over the increase in Soviet and Cuban military activity on the continent over the past five years. [redacted]

Perspectives of African States

West Africa. Sub-Saharan West Africa is the most peaceful part of the continent, with no open warfare since the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970. This tranquillity, together with the poverty and small size (in terms of either geography or population) of all West African states except Nigeria, limits the arms trade in the area. Many countries recognize they could not maintain armed forces potent enough to cope with all possible threats to their security and have elected not to try. They have only small military establishments and rely principally on their security ties with major Western powers. Tiny Gambia has no armed forces at all, apart from paramilitary police. [redacted]

Secret

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Some tensions in the area have eased during the past year, partly because of summit diplomacy and partly because of moderation by the most radical West African regimes (Guinea and Benin). The dangers perceived by Guinea abated when Portugal vacated adjacent Guinea-Bissau. Since then President Sekou Toure has strived to improve relations with his other neighbors. In 1978 he resolved some longstanding differences with the leaders of Senegal and the Ivory Coast (where most Guinean exiles reside), and in July 1979 he signed a nonaggression and defense pact with Liberia. Benin and Nigeria recently completed a draft agreement on defense assistance and training. A border dispute between Mali and Upper Volta has subsided, thanks in part to their participation with five other members of the West African Economic Community (CEAO) in a nonaggression and mutual defense pact signed in 1977.² [redacted]

Mutual suspicions among these states linger, however, even where relations have improved. Furthermore, relations between Liberia and several moderate West African states recently have grown worse because of the excesses of the new revolutionary regime in Monrovia. [redacted]

The countries of the Sahel also perceive dangers from the north. Niger is concerned about its vulnerability to Algeria and Libya, especially in view of Libya's support to rebels in Chad and unofficial claims on Niger territory. Mali has been unable to stay out of the Western Sahara conflict because of the Polisario's uninvited use of its territory as a sanctuary. Senegal is in a less precarious position, but warfare in Mauritania nevertheless prompted it to orient its army away from internal development and toward a more traditional military mission. President Senghor was the prime mover behind the CEAO defense pact, which he deemed necessary to protect black African governments from intimidation by stronger Arab states. As the current president of the larger Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), he now is trying to win agreement of its members to a similar defense arrangement. [redacted]

² The five others are the Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. [redacted]

Civil-military relations have a large bearing on arms purchase decisions in West Africa. Benin, Liberia, Mali, Niger, and Togo all have military regimes, and the military in Sierra Leone meddles in politics enough to make the civilian leadership wary of it. The military's role perhaps is most delicate in those states—Ghana, Nigeria, and Upper Volta—where long periods of military rule recently ended with the election of civilian governments. The present rulers of those countries necessarily are paying close attention to the armed forces' needs. President Limann of Ghana, in particular, is worried about possible political activity by the military. Limann's recent requests to the United States for military equipment stem from his desire to sustain morale in the barracks and thereby reduce the chance of another coup. [redacted]

Several West African states that have hitherto relied principally on a single arms exporter apparently would like to diversify their sources of supply. They are mainly Soviet customers—Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali—that have become either dissatisfied with Soviet equipment and support or unwilling to permit Moscow to enhance its political and economic influence. Weaning themselves from Soviet arms will not be easy; Sekou Toure, for one, has hesitated to do anything that might antagonize the Soviets, fearing that a US refusal to assume the role of chief arms supplier would leave Guinea in the same position as Egypt and Somalia when they severed military ties with Moscow. [redacted]

Nigeria's disproportionate size and wealth make its motives and role in the arms trade different from those of other West African states. Oil revenues permit it to shop for weapons from a variety of Western and Communist suppliers, paying less regard to financial terms than other recipients do. Nigeria wants to make its army a smaller but more mobile and more capable force, and recent or projected purchases of materiel are designed to further this objective. Lagos probably will continue to import significant quantities of arms during the next two or three years, both to modernize and to keep the officer corps satisfied under civilian rule. [redacted]

Secret

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Nigeria's armed forces are overwhelmingly superior to those of its neighbors, and it appears to face no external threat. It is concerned about the vulnerability of the oilfields, however, and partly for this reason wants to improve its air defense. Air Force officers are displeased with the Soviet training and logistic support that followed a 1974 sale of MIG-21s, and they are considering one of several advanced Western aircraft to become Nigeria's main air superiority weapon for the 1980s. [redacted]

Nigeria currently has only a limited capability to manufacture its own weapons, but it clearly has greater potential for developing an arms industry than does any other black African state. It has contracted with an Austrian firm for construction of a plant to manufacture armored cars and all-terrain vehicles, although the new government is holding the arrangement in abeyance. Memories of the arms embargoes imposed on the federal government during the 1967-70 civil war are still fresh, and Lagos may take further steps to lessen its dependence on foreign supply for relatively unsophisticated equipment. Although this would reduce its imports of arms, Nigeria would become more opposed to CAT restraint if it began to seek export markets to support an infant arms industry. [redacted]

Lagos already is skeptical about restraining arms transfers to Africa. After the third round of the US-Soviet talks in 1978, Nigerian officials told the United States that it would be very difficult to reduce the overall flow of arms to the continent while ensuring that each state receives the materiel needed for self-defense. Nigeria then cited a need to provide more weapons to the resistance movements in southern Africa, and it gave some logistic support to guerrillas in Rhodesia. [redacted]

North Africa. Several problems impair the climate for CAT restraint in North Africa. In addition to having tensions among themselves, the North African states are enmeshed in the politics of the Arab world and thus involved to varying degrees in the Middle East conflicts. Algeria and Libya have oil revenues available for purchases of weapons, and Morocco has a willing financier in Saudi Arabia. Not the least important, the competing claims on the Western

Sahara have produced a guerrilla war with no end in sight. [redacted]

As one of the main protagonists in that war, Morocco is unlikely to accept curbs on its own arms imports for the foreseeable future. Although the war is an economic drain, King Hassan has shown no inclination to reach a compromise settlement. Even with peace in the Sahara, Hassan would have other reasons to retain access to foreign weapons. Tensions almost certainly would persist between his conservative government and the radical regime in Algeria, whose armed forces along their common—and disputed—border are superior to his own. He also probably would want to complete a military modernization program that was devised before the Saharan war broke out but then delayed by that conflict and by financial constraints. [redacted]

Moroccan officials have expressed skepticism that arms transfers to Africa could be curtailed, given the lack of Soviet restraint in exporting arms. Rabat is concerned about the spread of Soviet influence on the continent, and to counter this it has provided its own military assistance to moderate regimes to the south. This aid has included military vehicles given to Gabon and Zaire and most of the troops in the Inter-African Force sent to Zaire's Shaba Region in 1978. Assured reductions in Soviet military assistance to African states probably would be necessary before Morocco would agree to curtail either aid to other governments or arms purchases for its own forces. [redacted]

Having withdrawn from the Saharan war, Mauritania currently has less desire to purchase arms than does any other North African state. The war still presents it with security problems, because both Morocco and the Polisario make uninvited use of its territory. It is too poor to buy much, however, and in any case it would not have the capacity to absorb enough weapons to make it a significant factor in northwest Africa's military equation. The government probably would welcome a lessening of the flow of arms to the area, but the leadership is divided over the more specific issues of US military assistance to Morocco and the political future of the Western Sahara. [redacted]

Secret

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Algeria enjoys a military edge over its neighbors but nevertheless has strong reasons not to accept CAT restraints in its region. Most important is the Saharan war, in which Algeria is an important patron of the Polisario guerrillas. Algiers also would want to preserve its freedom and capability to provide military assistance to Palestinian resistance groups. Any Algerian decisions on arms transfers would be guided by the military establishment, which has considerable influence in Algerian politics. [redacted]

Algeria relies chiefly on Soviet arms. It has taken some steps toward diversification of its sources of supply, evidently because of President Bendjedid's desire to lessen dependence on the USSR and to make Algeria's nonalignment more credible. [redacted]

Conservative Tunisia is wedged uncomfortably between two leftist states, each of which has armed forces much stronger than its own. Tensions with Algeria eased somewhat after Tunis ceased to support Morocco on the Western Sahara issue, but relations with the Qadhafi regime have remained poor for several reasons, including rancor over the failure of a 1974 agreement to merge the two countries. Tension with Tripoli increased further in late January 1980 after Libyan-backed Tunisian exiles attacked the town of Qafsah. Following this incident, the government requested emergency military assistance from several Western powers and began receiving heavy equipment, including armored personnel carriers, from the United States for the first time. [redacted]

Despite its relatively weak finances, Tunisia is moving aggressively to acquire new weapons. It fears possible future attacks like the Qafsah raid and wants to complete a program of military modernization begun in 1975 to make up for previous inattention to its armed forces. Tunis is looking to Saudi Arabia and other conservative Arab states to finance its purchases. The Saudis have demurred in the past on the grounds that they do not wish to arm one Arab country against

another, but their concern over Libyan actions may be leading them to fund some Tunisian arms imports. [redacted]

Libya probably presents the greatest obstacle to arms transfer restraint on the entire continent. The Qadhafi regime has demonstrated its extravagant tastes in foreign-made weapons with its purchases of the past several years, which have given it one of the largest and most advanced arsenals in Africa. Libya has purchased arms far beyond its capacity to absorb them; foreigners help to maintain and operate some of the more sophisticated weapons, while others remain in storage. [redacted]

Libya has acquired this stockpile partly to be able to furnish arms to favored governments and movements elsewhere, thus enhancing Tripoli's bargaining position in the Arab world. The practice of purchasing in volume and paying cash also has enabled Libya to reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers. Even its chief supplier, the USSR, has failed to obtain base rights or other substantial concessions from Tripoli in return for arms. In short, Libya sees its lavish military spending as important in spreading its own influence and remaining free of the influence of major powers. [redacted]

Given Colonel Qadhafi's expansive views of Libya's international role and his pretensions to Arab and revolutionary leadership, Libya has numerous opponents against whom it might use its weapons, either directly or as aid to like-minded governments or resistance groups. Qadhafi is vehemently anti-Israel and has furnished assistance to Palestinian rejectionists based in Lebanon. Egypt is a more immediate adversary, with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty having exacerbated the already considerable ill will between Tripoli and Cairo. Egypt's position in the Middle East probably precludes its participation in an arrangement for African CAT restraint, but Libya would oppose any limitation on its acquisition of materiel that was unaccompanied by restrictions on Cairo's armed forces. Libya also has meddled extensively in fighting within its southern neighbor Chad and currently occupies the disputed Aozou strip. [redacted]

Secret

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Libya has furnished military aid to a number of African states or movements. It supplied Soviet-made weapons to Algeria when the Saharan dispute intensified in 1975. It also has provided equipment to Benin, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Togo, and Sao Tome and Principe, and provided both arms and troops to Uganda's Amin before his fall last year. Libya has financed purchases of arms by other African states and has given various forms of support to the Polisario guerrillas in the Sahara, the Muslim Frolinat in Chad, and separatist movements in Eritrea. [redacted]

In sum, Libya is deeply involved in the African arms trade as both recipient and supplier. Qadhafi values arms and armed forces as instruments to further his international aims and would be reluctant to curb his use of them. He particularly would oppose any initiative on CAT restraint by outside powers as another attempt by developed states to stifle the Third World. [redacted]

Central Africa. The most recent armed conflict in central Africa has been in Chad, where a civil war was interrupted last year by a peace agreement that established an interim coalition government comprising the country's 11 dissident factions. The truce broke down in March 1980 when fighting erupted in the capital between the two main northern factions. Since France withdrew its 1,200-man military contingent from Chad in May, there has been no armed force capable of acting on the government's behalf. Even if a new truce were to take hold, the factions would use the opportunity to prepare themselves for future fighting, thus assuring a Chadian market for imported arms despite the absence of a national army. Purchases of weapons are aided by Libya, which has subsidized every faction at one time or another in an effort to nurture a future Chadian regime friendly to it and its claims to the Aozou strip. [redacted]

Second only to Chad, Zaire has the largest security problem in central Africa. Its huge territory embraces a diverse and disunited population and borders on nine other states of varying ideological persuasions. Internally, President Mobutu perceives opponents among disaffected residents of Shaba Region, remnants of a former rebel movement inhabiting the eastern portion of the country, and elements in the military. [redacted]

Externally, Zairian officials feel threatened by Soviet and Cuban attempts to make inroads in central Africa. They interpret the two invasions of Shaba by Angola-based rebels as part of the Soviet effort. Kinshasa recently has tried to maintain good relations with all its neighbors, but it distrusts those with a leftist orientation—particularly the Congo and Angola, both of which play host to Cuban troops. The use of neighboring territories by Zairian anti-Mobutu forces also is a concern, although Mobutu reportedly agreed with the presidents of Angola and Zambia last year not to harbor dissidents seeking to overthrow each other's government. [redacted]

Inadequate equipment is one of many weaknesses of the Zairian armed forces. (Poor training and maintenance are others.) Kinshasa will continue to rely on several Western suppliers (particularly France and Belgium) to meet its needs for weapons. China also has provided Zaire with significant grants of military aid in recent years. President Mobutu, who tries to convey to his people the impression that the United States firmly supports him, would no doubt welcome increased US military assistance. [redacted]

Zaire would be skeptical about an agreement on CAT restraint for Africa, worrying especially that it would be left militarily weaker than Angola. It might demand that some Soviet-made equipment in Angola be withdrawn or that its own inventory be augmented before agreeing to a freeze or significant curtailment of future arms imports. Kinshasa also would fear Soviet circumvention of any agreement on supplier restraint through the use of Cubans or other surrogates to accomplish Moscow's objectives. [redacted]

Ethnic tensions in Rwanda and Burundi are security concerns for the military regimes in those two countries. The Tutsi rulers of Burundi are wary of both the Hutu majority within Burundi and Hutu dissidents that have fled the country. The Hutu-dominated Rwandan Government has similar fears about exiled Tutsi in addition to its concern over growing Soviet and Cuban influence in Burundi. Neither government would be likely to greet initiatives on CAT restraint with enthusiasm. [redacted]

Secret

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

The former French colonies south of Chad might receive arms restraint in Africa more warmly. None of these countries faces a significant external threat and none is large enough to absorb much imported military equipment. Nevertheless, more general fears about activity beyond their borders would make them reluctant to limit their future freedom to import arms.

The Marxist regime in the Congo has received substantial credits and grant military aid from Communist states in recent years and probably expects this largesse to continue. The moderate governments in Cameroon and Gabon share a concern about Soviet influence in central Africa and instability in nearby states like Chad and Zaire. Both would look to France or other Western powers to rescue them from serious difficulty, but they still import Western arms, both as a symbol of the West's support and to enable their own forces to police frontiers and maintain internal order. Equatorial Guinea and the Central African Republic recently have emerged from economically debilitating periods of tyrannical rule and are less likely than nearby states to import significant quantities of foreign-made arms during the coming months. French troops now provide most internal security in the Central African Republic.

East Africa. Most recent arms transfers to East Africa have been related to conflicts involving the area's most populous country, Ethiopia. Ethiopia itself has imported by far the largest quantity of weapons—chiefly Soviet equipment received since 1977. Addis Ababa faces insurgencies in both the Ogaden region (where regular Somali troops are supporting the guerrillas) and Eritrea. Ethiopia is determined to crush the Eritreans militarily in spite of its substantial losses during the past two years and the Soviet and Cuban preference for a negotiated settlement.

Even though it already has more military equipment than its neighbors, Ethiopia has shown no sign of being satisfied with the materiel it has already received or been promised by Moscow. Late last year it requested further Soviet military aid, including two frigates, two additional squadrons of MIG-23s, and construction of maintenance facilities. So far, the Soviets apparently have agreed only to build the maintenance facilities.

Since the severing of its military aid relationship with the USSR in 1977, Somalia has obtained arms from several sources, including other Islamic countries (especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan), West Europeans (mostly Italy and France, with France often routing its arms through Saudi Arabia), and China. Iraq has offered aid on condition that Somali President Siad Barre reject US requests for access to his military facilities. Somalia has not, however, found replacements for much of the heavy equipment lost in the Ogaden war. These losses, the influx of Soviet arms to Ethiopia, and Somalia's continued support of insurgents in the Ogaden will induce Siad to keep seeking a major military aid relationship.

During the past year, Mogadishu explored several possibilities for establishing such an arrangement. A Somali delegation traveled to China in mid-1979 to discuss military assistance, and the visit reportedly resulted in Beijing's agreement to provide additional small arms, artillery, and antiaircraft guns on long-term credit. More recently, China has agreed to supply F-6 aircraft.

Although Siad also has indicated a desire to reopen a military aid relationship with the USSR, he realizes there is little likelihood the Soviets will agree to one as long as he refuses to renounce his irredentist claims on Ethiopian territory and to stop supporting the Ogaden guerrillas. Nevertheless, he sees flirtation with Moscow and with radical Arab states as useful in extracting support from Saudi Arabia, and from the United States and other Western countries.

Siad's arguments for US military assistance combine expressions of fear with promises of favors. He has indicated concern that his support for President Sadat's peace diplomacy may lead the Saudis to withdraw their assistance. More recently, he has argued that permitting US military forces to use Somali air and naval facilities would make his regime even more vulnerable to pressures from the USSR or others, thus increasing the need to bolster his own forces. The United States' current interest in using such facilities no doubt has convinced Siad that the prospects for receiving substantial US military assistance are better than they have been any time in the past two years; consequently, he probably would oppose any arms transfer restraints.

Secret

Secret

Located between two larger feuding neighbors and subject to ethnic divisions among its own people, Djibouti is a ward of France, which has approximately 4,000 troops stationed there. President Gouled has been unhappy, however, over the failure of France and other Western suppliers to meet his requests to equip his own small army. By suspending diplomatic ties with Egypt last year, Djibouti has stayed in good grace with Arab states able to provide arms or to finance their purchase. [redacted]

The willingness of at least some Djibouti officials to turn to radical suppliers was demonstrated in late January when Libya began delivering several plane-loads of armored personnel carriers and other materiel. The Djiboutian Government professed surprise at the move, but it is likely that the shipments were arranged as a way of pressuring France and Saudi Arabia into accelerating their deliveries of arms. The tactics succeeded in getting Paris to expedite delivery of five armored reconnaissance vehicles. France probably will remain Djibouti's principal source of security assistance, but Tripoli's gifts appear to have strengthened pro-Libyan and pro-Arab elements in the government and may facilitate future imports of arms from leftist suppliers. The shipments also have complicated Gouled's uneasy relations with his military, although the arrival of the French equipment could alleviate the concerns of some army commanders. [redacted]

Sudan sees Ethiopia as its main external threat. Dissidents opposing each regime reside in the territory of the other, and the war in Eritrea sometimes has spilled over the unmarked border into Sudan. Libya—a lesser threat—sponsored an unsuccessful coup attempt against President Numayri in 1976. Numayri's belief that the USSR was involved in this and other efforts to overthrow him underlay his expulsion of the Soviet military advisory group in May 1977. (Sudan also cited other reasons for the eviction, including delays in maintenance and alleged tampering with Sudan's radar system to enable Soviet overflights to go undetected.) [redacted]

The termination of Moscow's decade-long role as Sudan's principal military supplier left Khartoum without a source of spare parts (except for some sent by China) and thus set back modernization of its military. The modernization program lacks funds, and no single supplier has stepped in to fill Moscow's former role. The Sudanese probably recognize that they would be weak competitors in any local arms race and consequently might welcome arms transfer restraint. The extent to which such sentiments are overridden by the more immediate objective of bolstering Sudan's defenses will depend on the availability of foreign financing of arms purchases, particularly from Saudi Arabia. Recent Saudi procrastination in funding the purchases of US F-5s must be discouraging to Sudan, but its muting of support for the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement suggests that it still hopes for Arab financial support. [redacted]

Partly because of the late President Kenyatta's distrust of the military, Kenya allowed its armed strength to lag behind that of its neighbors for many years. In 1976, Nairobi finally launched an ambitious program of military procurement in response to several persisting concerns—Somalia's irredentist designs on north-east Kenya, instability in Ethiopia and Uganda, and a general feeling of encirclement by leftist states. Financial problems forced deferral of purchases beginning in early 1979, but this is only a slowdown in the modernization program, not an abandonment of it. Nairobi will continue to shop among several Western suppliers, including the United States, from which it has obtained F-5 aircraft. Kenya hopes that under its new relationship with the United States, Washington will provide the necessary military support against better armed neighbors. [redacted]

Kenyan officials expressed little support for CAT restraint in Africa when they were briefed on the progress of the US-Soviet talks in 1978. They are aware of the many subregional imbalances in military strength, skeptical that the USSR really would forgo the arming of revolutionary groups, and irritated that non-African powers were discussing what was good for the continent without involving the Africans themselves. No events in the interim probably have changed this attitude, particularly with regard to CAT restraint initiatives from outside powers. [redacted]

Secret

25X1
25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Tanzania has been equally dubious in the past about the feasibility of CAT restraint in Africa, citing the higher priority that it, as a Frontline State, places on overturning white minority rule in southern Africa. In addition, Tanzania has used its own armed forces in other regional roles, including military cooperation with Seychelles and the invasion that drove Idi Amin from Uganda. The Ugandan operation also increased the Tanzanian military's domestic importance; an additional motive for arms purchases may be to placate officers who have complained periodically about their lack of advanced equipment. [redacted]

[redacted] Despite lack of funds, Tanzania also is shopping for arms in China, Brazil, and Western Europe. [redacted]

Tanzania faces no serious threat to its territory, and even without major new purchases of arms it is militarily stronger than any of its immediate neighbors. Furthermore, some senior Tanzanian military officers are having second thoughts about the rapid acquisition sophisticated equipment, which has exceeded Tanzania's needs and ability to operate it. Nevertheless, Tanzania clearly intends, financial troubles notwithstanding, to import additional foreign-made weapons during the coming months. This objective and Nyerere's willingness to facilitate the shipment of arms to the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) probably will deter him from endorsement of CAT restraint in the near future. [redacted]

The former Ugandan government of Godfrey Binaisa had just begun constructing a new national army when it was ousted in a military coup in May. Further rebuilding of the armed forces will be impeded by personal and tribal rivalries among military leaders and by general internal disorder. With the Ugandan economy in disarray, financing arms imports will be difficult. [redacted]

[redacted] Binaisa wanted to limit contacts with the USSR (which was Idi Amin's main supplier of arms), but Moscow now has an opportunity to reestablish military ties with Kampala, particularly if left-leaning former President Obote returns to power. Obote probably would seek arms from diverse foreign sources but might wind up relying primarily on Soviet weapons, particularly if they were available on easy financial terms. [redacted]

Southern Africa. Southern African states have not imported weapons as sophisticated as the advanced Soviet-built aircraft obtained by Ethiopia and Libya. Nevertheless, the subregion has had the least favorable climate for arms restraint in Africa in recent years, with more governments and resistance groups being directly involved in armed conflict there than in other parts of the continent. Furthermore, the governments of Mozambique and Angola are still attempting to convert anticolonial insurgent forces into conventional armies. In some respects, this makes military modernization more difficult for them than for African states that inherited a military structure from their colonial rulers. [redacted]

The conclusion of the guerrilla war in Rhodesia and the fortunes of the new Zimbabwe Government will affect the demand for arms in southern Africa more than any other recent event. A long period of peace under Mugabe would remove many of the concerns that have supported the arms trade in the area, but distrust between the principal factions in Zimbabwe suggests that each will want continued access to modern arms. Furthermore, security problems elsewhere in southern Africa will remain and probably will receive even more attention. [redacted]

Mugabe's own government will rely heavily on foreign military assistance during the coming months. Zimbabwe's proximity to South Africa will lead many to consider it the newest Frontline State in the struggle against white minority rule even if Mugabe himself tries to keep his southern border peaceful. Furthermore, his government needs to convert the equipment and logistics of insurgent and counterinsurgent forces to those of an efficient standing army. This will be

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

difficult in view of the varied sources of supply of the forces that fought the war. Establishment of a new, major supply relationship with an outside power could ease this task. The USSR has signaled its willingness to provide military equipment to the new government in Salisbury, but Mugabe is suspicious of Soviet ties with his former guerrilla rival, Joshua Nkomo, and his forces, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU). Mugabe probably will look more to the West, particularly the United Kingdom, and to East European suppliers for assistance. [redacted]

Apart from Zimbabwe itself, the peace settlement most directly affects the military needs of the three Frontline States that border it (Botswana, Mozambique, and Zambia). Their proximity ensnared them in the guerrilla war and would cause them renewed security problems if disorder prevailed in Zimbabwe. Stability across the border would give them the opportunity to repair some of the economic damage the war inflicted on them. Despite competing priorities, however, none of these governments probably is optimistic enough about security in southern Africa to curtail its current plans for military development. [redacted]

Zambia's President Kaunda demonstrated his pessimism by recently negotiating a new \$100 million arms deal with the USSR. The agreement apparently includes MIG-21 fighter aircraft and SA-3 surface-to-air missiles. Kaunda sees potential security problems in all directions: his relations with Mugabe are cool; he considers the governments in Angola and Mozambique to be unpredictable; and his territory is used by SWAPO (thus becoming a target of South African raids) and by Katangan dissidents. Kaunda is wary of Soviet intentions but complains that Western arms suppliers have not provided sufficient equipment to enable him to cope with these threats. Some party and government officials, however, are pressuring Kaunda to reduce government spending, particularly on Soviet weapons. An economic review now under way in Luanda could help determine Zambia's future policies on arms procurement. [redacted]

The result of the Rhodesian election cheered Mozambique more than any other Frontline State, since it had aided Mugabe's forces, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and considers Mugabe himself virtually a native son. The installation of a friendly

government in Salisbury also means an end to Rhodesian support for the National Resistance Movement, a guerrilla group that had used bases in Rhodesia to strike against President Machel's government since 1977. Nevertheless, Mozambique continues to look to foreign military assistance, particularly from the USSR, to complete the job of converting the Frelimo military elements into a national army. [redacted]

Botswana did not give Mugabe and Nkomo's Patriotic Front the kind of direct support provided by Zambia and Mozambique, but unauthorized use of its territory by the guerrillas caused border incidents and prompted the government to decide, in March 1977, to create a defense force. That force is small, but Gaborone now is seeking arms—preferably from the United States and Western Europe but if necessary from other suppliers, such as Yugoslavia or even South Africa. [redacted]

Another Frontline State, Angola, has major security problems in its own territory. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) operates over much of the southern countryside and will keep military pressure on the Luanda regime as long as prospects for a negotiated settlement remain bleak. This implies that each side will continue to rely on foreign military aid. For Luanda, this means primarily Soviet arms and Cuban troops. [redacted]

Security in Angola is linked to the political future of Namibia, partly because South Africa uses its cross-border raids and support for UNITA to restrict SWAPO's military capabilities as well as to punish Luanda. Mugabe's victory in Rhodesia reinforced South Africa's inclination to delay acceptance of UN-sponsored elections in Namibia. A continuation of SWAPO's insurgency and its demand for imported arms thus are likely to continue. Even a peace settlement in Namibia would not significantly curtail this demand, since a newly independent Namibia would want to organize an effective permanent security force—difficult enough even if SWAPO elements were the sole basis for such a force—and would see CAT restraints as hindering this task. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Three aspects of South Africa's security situation would influence its views on arms transfer restraint:

- Its military forces are by far the strongest in southern Africa.
- It is the object of a UN-sanctioned arms embargo, voluntary since 1963 and mandatory since November 1977.
- It has the only sizable arms industry in Africa, which produces most of its small arms and ammunition as well as some armored vehicles, aircraft, and other materiel. [redacted]

The embargo has been the principal incentive for Pretoria to strive for self-sufficiency in arms manufacture. It used the 14 years of the voluntary embargo to import from willing suppliers (chiefly France, Italy, and Israel) not only weapons but, when possible, production technology and assembly rights as well, thus improving its ability to weather the later mandatory embargo. All three factors suggest that South Africa would have little to lose from a regional agreement on CAT restraint. It receives no military assistance from other governments, and it would welcome any curtailment of Communist arms shipments to nearby states or movements as a brake on both local military threats and the influence of hostile outside powers. [redacted]

Although it has coped well with the embargo, South Africa would see tempting opportunities if the embargo could be removed. Overt arms deals with foreign governments would offer better financial terms and quality control than it now gets with its secret procurement on the private arms market and a greater variety of equipment than it can obtain from either private dealers or its own production. Nevertheless, Pretoria almost certainly believes that the political climate in Africa and the UN preclude removal of the embargo. It thus would probably endorse regional arms restraint if asked to do so. [redacted]

In the meantime, Pretoria might use arms transfers to develop its "forward" regional security policy, which envisions military cooperation with other southern African states. South Africa previously has provided

advisers or small amounts of equipment to Malawi and Swaziland, and it might use its transportation network and experience in the international arms market to assist these countries and possibly others to equip their forces in the future. Any South African military aid would be token, however, because of the higher priority Pretoria would continue to give to its own forces. [redacted]

Motives of Principal Suppliers

USSR. Africa became an increasingly important market for Soviet arms during the 1970s. Libya and Algeria already were customers at the start of the decade. Soviet arms exports to sub-Saharan states became substantial with sales to Nigeria, Somalia, and Tanzania in 1974, expanded further with Moscow's involvement in Angola in the mid-1970s, and peaked when the very large agreements with Ethiopia were signed in 1977 and 1978. Since 1975, approximately 30 percent of Soviet arms exports have gone to Africa—a much higher proportion than previously. [redacted]

Moscow relies on arms transfers to supplant the influence of the Western powers and China as well as to secure transit rights and access to air and naval facilities. Arms transfers, particularly to the Frontline States, also have been useful in burnishing Moscow's revolutionary and anti-imperialist image. Economic motives are less important; the Soviets seem willing to offer generous credit terms to cement a political or security relationship with a client too poor to purchase arms with cash. In some cases, however—notably Libya—the Soviets have seemed intent on maximizing their hard currency earnings through arms sales. [redacted]

Although frictions sometimes arise over spare parts, training, and other aspects of their military assistance programs, the Soviets have competed for influence in Africa more effectively with arms exports than with other instruments of foreign policy. They have been able to supply with little delay a wide variety of weapons and generally have been more willing than Western suppliers to export advanced arms to the region. In contrast, their economic assistance to the continent during the last 25 years has been less than one quarter the amount of their military aid. Most African governments criticize this imbalance and view

Secret

Secret

the West as a more promising source of development assistance. Moscow also has succeeded less often than the West in playing an influential role in the mediation of African crises. This has been particularly true in southern Africa, where the United Kingdom mediated the Rhodesian peace settlement and a Western diplomatic consortium leads negotiations on Namibia. The USSR's principal means for influencing the future of Namibia is military aid to SWAPO. [redacted]

Moscow has been flexible in its choice of customers. Although its most obvious gains have come in leftist states relying heavily on Soviet support (particularly Ethiopia and Angola), the Soviets are willing to deal with more moderate regimes that also purchase weapons from the West or China. Arms shipments to a nonaligned state like Tanzania do not always buy the Soviets close security ties or access to military facilities. The chance to benefit in more subtle ways, however, such as by undercutting Chinese influence or winning friends among the recipient's officer corps, makes a military assistance program seem worthwhile. [redacted]

The USSR has been moderately successful in gaining access rights from several clients in return for military equipment. Naval facilities along the Ethiopian coast, particularly at Dahlak Island, provide support to Soviet forces operating in the Red Sea and the northwest Indian Ocean. Angola gives the USSR access to its ports and airfields, from which the Soviets have staged long-range TU-95 reconnaissance flights over the Atlantic. The Soviets have also found useful access to air and naval facilities in Benin, Congo, Guinea, and Mali. The exchange of military assistance for such access rights tends to feed on itself, because the shipments of arms to the more distant clients (particularly Angola during its civil war) is one of the military missions that has required refueling stops at intermediate locations like Conakry, Guinea. [redacted]

The Soviets have had less success in redirecting the internal policies of African clients, even Ethiopia. Although Addis Ababa has supported Moscow's foreign policy line as well as permitting Soviet military use of its territory, it has not followed Soviet advice to negotiate a settlement with the Eritrean insurgents. Neither has it moved rapidly to organize a political party along Marxist-Leninist lines. [redacted]

African purchasers of Soviet arms have several reasons to avoid a close embrace with the USSR. Some are dissatisfied not only with the low level of Soviet economic aid but also with aspects of the military assistance program, including the arrogance of Soviet military personnel, poor maintenance support, and the withholding of spare parts in an effort to gain leverage. Several governments have eschewed a major military aid relationship in order to minimize the potential for Soviet subversion and to avoid heavy dependence on the USSR or Soviet influence in their military establishments. The Frontline States did not encourage Moscow to play a major combat role in the Rhodesian war partly for these reasons and also to avoid a South African military response or a Western perception of the struggle as an East-West issue. [redacted]

During the last three years, the USSR's military relations with African states have suffered several setbacks that partially offset the gains in Ethiopia and Angola. The most dramatic was Somalia's ouster of the Soviets in 1977 following the Soviet embrace of Ethiopia. In the same year, Sudan expelled the resident Soviet military advisory group, and Guinean President Sekou Toure revoked permission to operate TU-95 flights from Conakry. Guinea requested the withdrawal of most Soviet advisers in 1978, and Nigeria has shown increasing reservations about its limited military aid relationship with Moscow. More recently, frictions have arisen with Mali over payments for arms and the provision of spare parts. [redacted]

Despite these reverses, Moscow will continue to view arms transfers as an important instrument for furthering its objectives in Africa, one it would be loath to restrict. In the conventional arms transfer talks, the Soviets declined to discuss Africa seriously, partly because the United States had proposed it as a topic but refused to address regions proposed by the USSR. Apart from this procedural difficulty, the Soviets were concerned that the Frontline States would see any arms restraint initiatives from the major powers as directed against them and tending to preserve the military superiority of South Africa and Rhodesia. Moscow's participation in an initiative to curb arms transfers would have forfeited the political advantage it hoped to maintain by virtue of its military support to forces seeking to overthrow white minority rule. [redacted]

Secret

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1
25X1

Secret

Zimbabwe's independence may change the USSR's tactics but will not discourage it from using arms transfers as a major tool of its African policy. Even before the Lancaster House settlement, Moscow may have increased its indirect shipments of arms to ZANU via the Organization of African Unity. The establishment of a new national army in Zimbabwe—as in Uganda—is an opportunity to use arms exports to nurture ties with an insecure government and its nascent military establishment. The Soviets already have indicated their willingness to extend military aid to Mugabe's government, but he has rebuffed these overtures.



25X1

The European powers' historical ties to Africa also underlie their military assistance programs. Arms exports have mirrored past colonial relationships: France is the principal supplier for the moderate francophone states; the United Kingdom has sold primarily to Kenya and Nigeria; Italy's exports have gone mostly to Libya and Somalia; and Zaire has been Belgium's chief customer.

25X1

25X1

The increase in tensions with the United States following the invasion of Afghanistan has decreased further any incentives the Soviets may have had to restrain their exports of weapons to Africa. The United States now appears less likely to restrain its own arms transfers to the region (and to Egypt, whose impending acquisition of US-made armor and combat aircraft is, given the peace with Israel, directed chiefly against Libya). Also, the intensified strategic rivalry in the northwest Indian Ocean makes access rights in East Africa for Soviet forces—and the denial of such rights to US forces—even more important.

France, in particular, has tried to maintain close military ties with its former colonies. These links include arms transfers, training and advisory services, and in some instances the deployment of French troops, as in Djibouti and the Central African Republic. Although specific instances of favorable treatment cannot be attributed to arms transfers alone, France has derived several benefits from the close relations with its ex-colonies, including greater access to airfields, transit routes, markets for its nonmilitary exports, and raw materials like Niger uranium.

25X1

25X1

Western Europe. West European states supply arms to Africa partly for the same economic reasons they export them anywhere else. Foreign sales help to sustain arms industries and reduce unit costs for weapons the Europeans use in their own armed forces. As with other exports, they also help to compensate for slow domestic expansion and to alleviate balance-of-payments problems. The poverty of black Africa and the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, however, mean that the sub-Saharan portion of the continent purchases only a small proportion of exported European arms. In North Africa, though, Libya is a major buyer, particularly of Italian hardware.

Protection of its military presence in Africa has itself become an important motive for some French arms transfers to the continent. One of France's reasons for providing arms to Somalia is to correct what it sees as a disequilibrium in that area that could threaten Djibouti, where French forces not only ensure the host country's security but also support France's naval activity in the Indian Ocean. Assisting Mogadishu helps to offset Ethiopia's military superiority and possibly tempers Somalia's own designs on Djibouti.

25X1

The West Europeans view their arms exports to Africa partly as a defense of the West's overall interest in countering leftist activity and influence on the continent. Again, this is most true of France, which sees itself as the principal bulwark against such threats and as shouldering a burden that the United States has been lax in assuming.

25X1

25X1

Access to oil also is an important economic motive for some European arms exports to Africa. This includes shipments not only to Libya but to Somalia, which does not produce oil but whose security has become a special concern of Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil-producing states.



25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Although the major West European suppliers share most of these motives, the emphasis they place on each objective varies. No other supplier seems as concerned as France with countering leftist influence, and no other supplier stresses economic benefits as much as Italy. The United Kingdom will be particularly careful to avoid any decisions on arms exports that could jeopardize the Rhodesian peace. West Germany will probably continue to have the most restrictive arms export policy, although Bonn faces internal pressures to loosen it. Despite these differences, however, all of the European suppliers probably rate as slim the prospects for curbing arms transfers to Africa. Skepticism about Soviet willingness to exercise restraint, which the West Europeans expressed when the CAT talks were in progress two years ago, undoubtedly has increased. They will consider it consistent with their economic needs, special interests in Africa, and responsibilities as Western allies to export arms to the continent during the coming years at least at the rate of the past decade. [redacted]

China. China lacks the superpowers' ability to project military force in Africa or the adjacent oceans and thus does not share their interest in access or transit rights. It would be difficult for Beijing to become the sole or even principal supplier of arms to an important African state because it cannot match the USSR's capacity to deliver large quantities of advanced equipment. Most of China's military assistance to Africa has consisted of small arms and ammunition sent to recipients (principally Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, and ZANU) that also rely on other suppliers. [redacted]

China's chief concern in Africa is to check the expansion of Soviet and Cuban influence. Accordingly, Beijing has used its modest military aid program primarily to react to Soviet moves, rewarding those who reject Moscow's advances and bolstering those who feel threatened by Soviet surrogates. For example, its gift of infantry weapons to Sudan in 1977 was a gesture of appreciation for President Numayri's expulsion of Soviet military advisers. Much of its military aid to Zaire during the last few years was in response to the two invasions of Shaba by Angola-based rebels. In Mali, China increased its assistance after an unsuccessful coup attempt by a group that favored closer military ties with the USSR. [redacted]

Given its comparative weakness as an arms supplier, China probably would welcome an agreement that restricted exports of arms to Africa, particularly the more advanced weapons furnished almost entirely by the USSR. It undoubtedly considers such an agreement unlikely, however, and it will continue its exports, particularly of relatively unsophisticated arms, to Africa. ZANU's election victory in Rhodesia and the apparent desire of several Soviet customers elsewhere in Africa to diversify their sources of supply probably have bolstered Beijing's belief in the usefulness of its military aid. [redacted]

Prospects for Restraint

In the near term, the prospects for significantly curbing conventional arms transfers to Africa, through either multilateral agreement or unilateral restraint, are dim. In addition to old antagonisms among African states, the recent increase in East-West tensions has diminished the chances for CAT restraint in several ways. First, early resumption of the US-Soviet talks now seems even less likely than before. Second, arms suppliers and financiers feel more concerned about what their adversaries are doing in Africa and less restrained in helping their friends there. Third, some African states are more fearful of becoming incidental victims of an extended great power rivalry and thus are more inclined to seek security assistance. Finally, increased military assistance from the great powers will accompany their efforts to secure access to strategically located facilities. [redacted]

The end of the Rhodesian war and the easing of tensions in some other parts of Africa may offset these effects to some extent. Nevertheless, it sometimes takes a long time for an arms race to dampen after the issue that started it is removed. A neighbor's acquisition of arms itself becomes an object of suspicion as the neighbor launches a long-term program of military modernization and orders weapons that it will receive and absorb over a period of years. [redacted]

The growth of subregional security arrangements, like the West African Economic Community's (CEAO) defense pact and any military extension of South Africa's proposed "constellation" of southern African states, would affect the African arms trade in complex ways. To the extent that pledges of assistance from

Secret

Secret

one's neighbors seem to enhance deterrence of aggression, such schemes would lower some of the fears that underlie arms purchases. Subregional pacts could also serve as vehicles for detente among their own members and for collective commitments, similar to the Declaration of Ayacucho in Latin America, to exercise restraint in the acquisition of arms. To the extent that such schemes tend to divide the continent into rigid blocs, however, they would risk amplifying and spreading some tensions and thereby encouraging new arms races. They also would focus attention on defense requirements and probably increase the legitimacy of military modernization by making it an alliance obligation and not just a product of unilateral ambition. [redacted]

The future African arms trade will depend at least as much on more permanent features of Africa's politics and economy. One is the poverty of most African countries and their desire for economic development, which will severely restrict the use of their own resources to purchase arms. Financial difficulties, coupled with the limited capacity of their armed forces to absorb new arms, already have caused some African leaders and military officers to have second thoughts about their more ambitious modernization plans. [redacted]

Opposition to white minority rule in South Africa will remain strong throughout black Africa. This will discourage arms restraint by black-ruled states even if peace prevails elsewhere in southern Africa and no one mounts a serious military challenge to Pretoria's rule within the republic itself. Although no black African state can hope to match South Africa's military strength, none will want to forswear the right to do so. Furthermore, the issue of minority rule in South Africa will continue to make Soviet and Cuban military activity on the continent seem more legitimate to many of these states than it otherwise would. [redacted]

Some leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa feel that the relatively low level of arms transfers to their region, rather than making CAT restraint more feasible there than elsewhere, means they have less obligation to curtail their acquisition of weapons than do governments in more heavily armed regions. Furthermore, minor arms suppliers—including some less developed countries outside Africa that are vigorously promoting their exports in order to sustain infant defense industries—can more easily acquire a significant proportion of the trade in less sophisticated weapons in areas where the trade now is small. The cooperation of many suppliers thus would be necessary for effective curbs on sales to Sub-Saharan Africa. [redacted]

Skepticism about the feasibility of CAT restraint will persist throughout most of the continent. It stems from suspicions both of neighbors and of unfriendly outside powers. South Africa's adaption to the mandatory arms embargo has reinforced such skepticism, since it demonstrates how even widespread governmental commitment to observe an embargo has failed to stop clandestine shipments of weapons, particularly the smaller, less advanced arms that are most important to most African states. [redacted]

25X1
25X1

25X1
25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Appendix

Table 1

Million US \$

Arms Sales to Africa
1975-1979, by Recipient ¹

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total
Libya	617.4	66.7	4,636.5	1,404.5	515.3	7,240.4
Algeria	794.5	39.5	800.7	400.3	2,200.5	4,235.5
Ethiopia	51.5	411.2	1,219.0	815.2	.6	2,497.5
Morocco	981.6	313.3	537.8	330.0	14.5	2,177.2
Angola	298.9	388.9	186.3	112.0	34.1	1,020.2
Nigeria	66.9	26.9	396.4	53.4	193.8	737.4
Somalia	153.2	46.2	63.1	449.5	40.0	752.0
Kenya	1.6	167.1	114.0	194.7	140.3	617.7
Sudan	42.3	0	149.4	205.1	149.6	546.4
Ivory Coast	11.5	.6	156.0	256.9	0	425.0
Mozambique	29.1	117.5	60.9	28.2	113.9	349.6
Tanzania	9.0	33.4	228.3	42.1	30.4	343.2
Tunisia	13.3	44.0	128.5	21.3	85.5	292.6
Zambia	14.8	6.8	71.2	26.8	115.9	235.5
South Africa	80.4	91.2	34.2	16.1	.5	222.4
Zaire	11.5	52.2	39.2	41.1	58.8	202.8
Ghana	4.2	67.7	38.4	32.2	0	142.5
Gabon	17.3	28.0	4.2	52.9	.8	103.2
Togo	19.0	32.9	42.6	7.8	0	102.3
Mauritania	2.5	28.8	42.4	19.6	3.3	96.6
Mali	5.2	5.0	61.8	7.8	14.7	94.5
Guinea	.9	3.0	0	86.1	3.0	93.0
Uganda	.4	34.1	40.0	0	0	74.5
Senegal	3.3	0	52.5	11.8	0	67.6
Congo	29.0	26.4	3.3	.3	4.5	63.5
Niger	.3	2.0	28.8	20.0	0	51.1
Rhodesia	2.4	2.4	7.3	3.5	24.2	39.8
Benin	1.5	12.8	13.7	7.7	2.0	37.7
Malawi	15.6	0	0	17.5	0	33.1
Cameroon	.5	5.0	7.7	7.5	4.0	24.7
Others	26.8	37.4	27.7	21.2	23.8	136.9
Total	3,306.4	2,091.0	9,191.9	4,693.1	3,774.0	23,056.4

¹ Includes all sales to continental Africa except Egypt.

25X1

Secret

Secret

Table 2

Million US \$

**Arms Sales to Africa
1975-1979, by Supplier ¹**

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total
USSR	874.4	834.6	6,184.3	1,627.4	2,556.4	12,077.1
France	1,083.6	81.0	733.6	847.9	143.6	2,889.7
Italy	293.7	42.6	420.9	777.7	80.6	1,615.5
United States	327.5	340.8	236.4	258.8	165.5	1,329.0
West Germany	335.0	96.5	474.7	60.1	323.5	1,289.8
United Kingdom	69.9	146.8	28.6	205.7	79.4	530.4
Spain	0	62.2	157.7	87.8	10.0	317.7
North Korea	4.0	0	2.0	108.3	127.5	241.8
Czechoslovakia	3.5	12.1	199.4	11.0	0	226.0
China	35.5	32.1	41.8	29.2	65.9	204.5
Belgium	4.1	169.3	10.7	13.6	3.4	201.1
Cuba	147.0	0	15.0	0	0	162.0
Bulgaria	0	12.7	8.8	135.5	1.9	158.9
East Germany	1.0	17.2	79.5	38.5	5.0	141.2
Yugoslavia	4.7	12.0	81.2	11.7	28.3	137.9
Poland	0	0	23.7	110.5	.4	134.6
Netherlands	18.5	23.8	42.8	38.8	8.0	131.9
Romania	1.5	4.4	87.5	16.2	17.8	127.4
Israel	60.1	5.8	55.4	0	2.5	123.8
Others	42.4	197.1	307.9	314.4	154.3	1,016.1
Total	3,306.4	2,091.0	9,191.9	4,693.1	3,774.0	23,056.4

¹ Includes all sales to continental Africa except Egypt. US sales are by fiscal year, all others by calendar year.



25X1

Secret

Secret