

DDA REGISTRY

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5 February 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Studies in Intelligence

Studies in Intelligence was founded by Sherman Kent in 1955 to encourage the growth of a literature of intelligence. It is published quarterly by the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Office of Training and Education, and recently celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary. I am attaching a copy of the Anniversary Issue for your examination.

The Spring 1981 Issue will be consigned to the printer in three weeks.

With your approval, I should like to include in the Spring issue "The Clandestine War in Europe (1942-1945)," the text of your remarks on the occasion of the receipt of the William J. Donovan Medal in 1974 in the Spring issue, (copy also attached). I will append an appropriate editorial note.

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Editor
Studies in Intelligence
OTE

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Attachments (As Stated)

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The Clandestine War in Europe (1942-1945)

Remarks of William J. Casey
on receipt of the William J. Donovan Award
at Dinner of Veterans of O.S.S., December 5, 1974



Presentation Ceremony, left to right, William P. Rogers, Mrs. William J. Donovan, William J. Casey.

Donovan Award Citation

The Donovan Award must go to an individual ". . .with the spirit. . .and the features which characterized General Donovan's career." William J. Casey amply fits these specifications, as soldier, lawyer, author, diplomat, and banker.

It was in World War II that the O.S.S. first knew him in action. He became Chief of Secret Intelligence for the European Theatre of Operations where his great drive and judgment made their mark. One of his many dramatic hours was his lightning organization of the radio teams he parachuted into Germany to send back intelligence on enemy positions there, from the Battle of the Bulge to Hitler's last redoubt. His many operations gained military objectives, helped to shorten the war, and saved an untold number of lives.

As a public servant, he well fills the mold of William J. Donovan. Like Donovan he has been a consistent student and activist of the strategic position and problems of the United States and of the role of its intelligence and operating agencies as vital tools in foreign policy. On this plane he helped design the Central Intelligence Agency, served on the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control, on the Presidential Task Force on International Development, and is currently a member of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy.

Recently he has served with distinction as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and with notable success as Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Now, as Chairman and President of the Export-Import Bank, he is serving his government with great wisdom.

As a person, he is full of the courage that General Donovan exemplified and loved in others, and that Hemingway called grace under pressure. He has consistently shown his humanity in his work for Catholic Charities, as a Trustee of Fordham, as a Director of the International Rescue Committee, as a distinguished attorney, and as a friend to countless others.

The Clandestine War in Europe (1942-1945)

How can I adequately express my appreciation for the William J. Donovan Award. This medal has very special meaning for me. There is the great affection and admiration which General Donovan holds in my memory. There is the example and inspiration he provided during the 15 years I was privileged to regard him as leader and friend.

So many of my most cherished friendships were formed in the OSS and for all these years I have been proud of what we were able to do together.

This sentiment extends in a special way to those who have come across the Atlantic for this occasion tonight and to so many others who worked with us throughout Europe. At the time, we may have known them only as numbers or code names, like Caesar for Jean-Pierre Roselli, but strong friendships and bonds have formed and flourished across the Atlantic over these 30 years.

We have visited back and forth and attended each other's reunions. We've even overcome the barriers of language, notably when the French invited us back for the 20th anniversary of their liberation. They took us all over France and everywhere we'd go, there would be an occasion and a speech. I had to respond in my fractured French and I would begin: "Nous sommes tres heureux d'etre ici." This was intended to mean, "We are very happy to be here." After a few such performances, Barbara Shaheen, who had studied French in school, came to me and said: "Bill, you are saying, 'Nous sommes tous heros.'" which means, "We are all heroes." I hope you won't think that's what I'm saying tonight, as I tell you for the first time the full story of OSS.

For us, in the United States, it all began with a New York lawyer who saw his country facing a deadly menace and knew that it was unprepared and uninformed. It's hard for us to realize today that there was a time in 1940 and 1941 when William J. Donovan was a one man CIA for President Roosevelt.

I remember General Donovan bouncing into London, with little or no notice, brimful of new ideas, ready to approve any operation that had half a chance. He'd come tearing in from New Guinea, or wherever the last invasion had been, and go charging off to Anzio, or wherever the next landing was to be.

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He really loved the smell of battle but he'd look at you with his cherubic smile and twinkling blue eyes and explain that he had to be at these landings to see, first-hand, the conditions his men had to face.

Donovan's manner was deceptively mild. A few years earlier, running for Governor, he had campaigned through upstate New York. The local politicians, expecting this legendary World War I infantry hero to come roaring and thumping into town, were disappointed by his soft voice and his gentle manner. The saying was: "Donovan came into town as Wild Bill and left as Sweet William"

What was the OSS and what was it all about? It was probably the most diverse aggregation ever assembled of scholars, scientists, bankers and foreign correspondents, tycoons, psychologists and football stars, circus managers and circus freaks, safe-crackers, lock pickers and pickpockets—some of them in this room tonight. You name them, Donovan collected them. What did he do with them? Well, he unleashed them—John Shaheen was unleashed to capture the Italian Fleet or at least an Italian Admiral. Henry Hyde to build an intelligence network in France, Mike Burke to liberate the Vosges—and these and many others delivered magnificently.

Now, General Donovan unleashed this talent in a very intelligent and perceptive way. He knew he had a bunch of rank amateurs going into a very professional game. He knew the British had run an intelligence service for five centuries and had been working for three years to carry out Winston Churchill's dramatic order "to set Europe ablaze." So, Donovan either set up joint operations with the British as he did in sabotage and resistance support and in counter-intelligence or he set up parallel but closely related organizations and arranged for an appropriate degree of British tutelage as he did in intelligence and propaganda work.

Donovan grasped the value of the clandestine side of war as no other American of his time. But, its potential was realized not by his OSS but by the combined effort of British and American clandestine services, of the Allied Governments in exile and the resistance, intelligence and escape organization which sprang up spontaneously all over Europe. OSS, coming into the European war three years late, would not have been able to do very much at all if the British had not taken us in as junior partners and so generously taught us all they knew. For this we are ever grateful to our colleagues in the Special Forces Club which Geoffrey Walford has so graciously come here to represent tonight.

Mrs. Tronstad was close to the first and perhaps the most vital blow inside Europe. Her husband, Lief Tronstad had produced nuclear terror in England in 1942 before we ever heard of the atom bomb. Escaping from Norway, this Norwegian scientist brought intelligence which led the Combined Chiefs of Staff to believe that the secret weapon brand-

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ished in Hitler's speeches was an atom bomb based on heavy water. He had learned the Germans had ordered a tripling of production from a plant in central Norway which was the only source of heavy water in Europe. The Combined Chiefs set the highest priority on destroying this plant. Professor Tronstad knew that plant so intimately that he was able to design plastic explosives in a pattern which exactly fitted its critical distilling tubes and pipes. Nine tough Norwegians parachuted in, succeeded in entering the plant, applying the plastic designed by Lief Tronstad and escaping before the plastic explosive destroyed the plant. But several months later, the Germans had the plant back in operation. The Combined Chiefs then sent 155 American flying fortresses over to bomb the plant. This massive air raid killed 21 Norwegian civilians and 22 Allied airmen but did only slight damage to the plant. But this was enough for the Germans to decide to move the plant and its inventory to Germany.

This intelligence got back to England promptly and the Combined Chiefs ordered an air attack on the ship bringing the plant from the seaport in southern Norway across the Baltic Sea to Germany. But the plant never got that far. It had to be taken by rail to a ferryboat which would take it down Lake Tinnjo towards the Baltic seaport. Knute Haukelid, who was here with us when David Bruce received the Donovan Award, was one of the original heavy water sabotage team and had stayed behind in Norway. Singlehandedly, he entered the ferryboat, applied plastic explosive to its hull and got off before it sailed. Halfway across, the innards of the heavy water plant and some 15000 litres of heavy water went to the bottom of the lake and it's still there. This operation may have deprived Hitler of the atom bomb with all that would have meant for our civilization.

General Guerisse, who was to come here from Belgium tonight but couldn't make it because of illness, organized escape lines which ultimately brought Ralph Patten and 4500 American, British and Canadian airmen, shot down over Europe, back to England where they could fly again. Every airman as he set out on his bombing mission knew that if he had to parachute out and could find his way to a church, a school, a convent or a farmhouse, he would probably be sheltered until a guide from one of the escape lines called for him. These guides, many of them teenage girls would take 4 or 5 men speaking only in southern drawls, mid-western twangs or London cockney, move them by night on bicycles or trains, hide them by day in one of thousands of homes between the Rhine and the Pyrenees and, in a few weeks, deliver them to Gibraltar or Lisbon. Thousands of Frenchmen, Dutchmen and Belgians made their homes available knowing that if they were caught their whole family would be tortured and shot or sent to a concentration camp. General Guerisse, who was known in those days as Pat O'Leary, was himself

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captured and dragged through several concentration camps finally winding up in Dachau. Even Dachau couldn't keep Pat down and he wound up organizing the prisoners and having taken over the camp when the American forces arrived there.

Jean-Pierre Roselli is here tonight to represent the Amicale Action made up of a thousand local chapters of resistance veterans all over France. France was where we were to land and I recall the flood of information that came over some 200 radio sets and in pouches full of maps and drawings and reports picked up inside France by small planes or small boats.

These Frenchmen put 90 factories out of production with less plastic explosive than could be carried by a single light bomber. I believe the record shows that this kind of a job, when it could be accomplished on the ground by sabotage, was done more effectively and with less cost that it could be done from the air where the cost in planes and the lives of airmen and civilians could run very, very high.

The French resistance made 950 cuts in French rail lines on June 5th, the day before D-Day, and destroyed 600 locomotives in ten weeks during June, July and August of 1944. Our greatest debt to them is for the delays of two weeks or more which they imposed on one panzer division moving north from Toulouse, two from Poland and two from the Russian front as they crossed France to reinforce the Normandy beach-head. We'll never know how many Allied soldiers owe their lives to these brave Frenchmen.

When General Eisenhower failed to destroy the Germans in France, his armies found themselves moving into Germany without the behind-the-lines intelligence which the French had provided so profusely. General Donovan brought in Milton Katz from Italy, Henry Hyde and his team which had worked on France from Algiers, Dick Helms from Washington, Mike Burke from the Vosges, Hans Tofte from the Danish desk, and Bill Grell from the Belgian desk. George Pratt and his Labor desk, including Lazar Teper and his small group of experts on controls and documentation within Germany, were enlisted. New communications, cover and air drop talent were brought in from Washington. Between October 1944 and April 1945, this combination sent some 150 men, mostly Belgians, Dutchmen, Frenchmen and Poles into Germany with identification as foreign workers. They were sent to transportation centers with radio sets or new equipment which enabled them to hold a conversation with an airplane sent out for that purpose. These brave men went into Germany blind and it was remarkable that over 90% of them came out alive. I recall parachuting a young Belgian, Emil Van Dyke, near Munich. He and his partner got jobs in the Gestapo's motor pool in Munich, driving German officers around southern Germany. After our 7th Army took Munich, Van Dyke and his partner turned up and brought me to their sleeping quarters, a cubicle in the

Gestapo garage in Munich. They showed me how they had sawed out a piece of the floor under the bed to create a hiding place for their radio set. When they returned from a trip they would take out the radio and send detailed messages to London on German troop units and their movements. His war over, Van Dyke had only one request. He wanted to meet the girl who handled his radio messages to London. They had gotten to exchange a few extra words every time he radioed in. He must have fallen for her over the air because every extra word sent out of that garage increased the chance that German direction finding equipment would close in and locate him and his radio. As it turned out, she was a corporal in the WACs, we had a fine wedding in London and they settled down in Los Angeles to raise a family.

Fleming Juncker, who is with us tonight, organized the resistance on the Jutland Peninsula in western Denmark. You'll recall that in December of 1944 Hitler gambled everything he had left in the Ardennes offensive aimed at depriving the Allies of the Port of Antwerp. Twelve German divisions in Norway were ordered to go by ship to north Jutland and then by train to join in this last desperate German counter-attack. Three hundred Danes in Jutland, Fleming Juncker's men, supported by the whole population, undertook to bottle up this force of over 200,000 Germans in Denmark. They brought the railway system in Jutland to practically a complete breakdown and it took weeks for some of these German divisions to make a journey that normally takes 12 hours. By the time they arrived at the front the battle of the Bulge had been won.

The Port of Antwerp was a great prize. When Belgium was liberated in September, the Belgian secret army had prevented the Germans from carrying out orders to destroy it. The war would have lasted a good deal longer if we had not been able to use those port facilities in the fall of 1944. Even then, the Germans put it under constant bombardment with V-2 rockets from sites near The Hague. The Dutch resistance, represented here tonight by Dick Groenewald, attacked trains carrying these rockets across Holland from Germany and destroyed a lot of rockets which otherwise would have exploded on Antwerp or London.

All this had a heavy price. As you drive through central France near Limoges, you come to Ordour sur Glane. There, a monument to the cruelties of war, stands a small village still burned to a crisp, as the Germans left it over 30 years ago, its 250 male citizens herded into a barn to be shot, its 400 women and children herded into the church to be burned. Was it worth the life of this community to keep a single German tank division away from the Normandy beachhead for two weeks? I don't know. But I do know that whether those GIs we sent to Normandy were to be swept back into the English Channel was a very, very close thing.

Even that's not the point. The truly important thing is that those Frenchmen and Belgians and Danes and Dutchmen and Norwegians rose to fight and wanted to fight and had to fight because they loved their country and what it meant to them.

Returning to General Donovan, while he loved all this action and the courage it evoked, his real genius and greatness to me was the attention he gave to the more subtle war of the mind. His organization was the only one which embraced all aspects of clandestine and intelligence activity, psychological warfare, deception and research as well as espionage, sabotage, and support of resistance. And he collected playwrights, journalists, novelists, professors of literature, advertising and broadcasting talent to dream up scenarios to manipulate the mind of the enemy through deception and psychological warfare programs.

Donovan created an outfit that was so secret it didn't have a name. We called it X-2. He put Jim Murphy, one of his closest legal associates, in charge and he integrated it with Section 5 of MI-6, the British counter-intelligence unit. They had the closest thing to a decisive clandestine impact on the war in Europe. It came not from the hundreds of men and the thousands of tons of weapons parachuted into Europe but from a handful of real German spies captured and turned around in England and a couple of dozen imaginary spies in an imaginary network carrying out imaginary operations within England. The fact is that our side operated the entire German intelligence network in England, writing their reports in London and sending them to the Germans by radio or with letters to Madrid or Lisbon in secret ink or microdot. These fictitious reports convinced the German generals and finally Adolf Hitler himself that the Allied landings would come not in Normandy but near Calais, 100 odd miles to the north.

This deception program consisted of radio traffic from a huge imaginary army located on the east coast of England opposite Calais. wooden tanks and rubber boats for the cameras carried by German reconnaissance planes, as well as false reports from non-existent spy networks. It had the Germans believing the Allies had over 80 combat divisions in England on D-Day. Actually there were less than 50 of which less than 40 were combat ready. Eight of them were to land in Normandy on D-Day, 5 more on D + 1, 4 more by D + 3 and 4 more, 21 in all by D + 12. Stiff resistance could back up the arrival of these divisions which had to come in over beaches, without a port. The Germans had about 16 divisions sitting in Normandy, a few more in reserve around Paris and by D + 2 or so had ordered 5 tank divisions from southern France, Poland and the Russian front.

Yet, for seven decisive weeks, Hitler and his generals kept 19 of the best German divisions 100 miles away from our hard pressed forces on the beachhead, waiting for an army that did not exist to make an assault that was never intended.

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The British had broken the German code used in wireless messages between Hitler and his generals. General Eisenhower and his top generals were able to actually read the orders and intelligence appreciations which passed between Hitler and his generals by wireless. Thus, it was possible for Allied strategists not only to know what kind of facts to feed the Germans but to watch them take the bait.

For example, German messages showed that Von Runsted, in command in western France, believed the landings would be launched on the shortest line, across the Straits of Dover from eastern England to the Calais area, while Hitler and Rommel, commanding in Normandy, believed it would come from the south of England to Normandy. As imaginary facts were fed out to support the Von Runsted view, the intercepted messages showed Hitler wavering and hedging. The Allied command knew the deception program had worked when Hitler refused Rommel's request for four tank divisions to back up the beaches in Normandy, but insisted on keeping them under his own control around Paris so they could go either way. Then, on June 8, two days after the landing, Hitler actually ordered five infantry and two tank divisions to move 100 miles south to reinforce the Normandy beachhead. On June 9, the Germans got a long message from London reporting that three fictitious spies believed the Normandy invasion was diversionary and intended to cause the Germans to throw in their reserves so that the massive forces in east England could land in the Calais area. The Germans swallowed this bait immediately. The next day, June 10, the orders sending the seven divisions to Normandy were countermanded and all divisions in northern France and Belgium were put on alert. One has to shudder to think of what could have happened if that force had been thrown into Normandy a few days after the landings.

The deception was so good that when the Normandy invasion plans were stolen by the Germans from the British Ambassador in Turkey and General Eisenhower had to consider changing the whole invasion plan, the decision was to intensify the signals that the invasion would be at Calais and make the Germans think that the plans for Normandy stolen in Turkey had been deliberately leaked to cover up the real landings on the Calais coast.

Later on, on the continent, Hubert Will and other X-2 officers used half a dozen German agents captured in France to feed German headquarters with tactical deception on the plans and movements of General Bradley's forces. Three of these agents were so convincing that the Germans awarded them the Iron Cross.

So you see, intelligence is a very uncertain, fragile and complex commodity:

First, you have to get a report.

Then you have to decide whether it's real or fake.

Then, whether it's true or false as you find out what other intelligence supports or contradicts it.

Then, you fit it into a broad mosaic.

Then, you figure out what it all means.

Then, you have to get the attention of someone who can make a decision, and,

Then you have to get him to act.

Because General Donovan understood all this, he scoured our campuses and mobilized thousands of the finest scholars in America to put together, assess and evaluate, and then analyze the intelligence that came in from all sources. This unprecedented collection of scholars gave Donovan enormous influence. For example, in 1944 there was a fierce struggle between the RAF and the U.S. Air Forces over bombing strategy. Donovan was able to produce a team of outstanding economists: Ed Mason, Walt Rostow, Charlie Hitch, Charlie Kindleberger, Chan Morse, Emile Despres to dissect the German economy and make the case that, by concentrating on oil depots and transportation lines, Allied air power could most effectively prepare the way for the invading armies.

Donovan's grasp of this elusive, multiple and yet crucial nature of intelligence led to the CIA, over which Bill Colby presides so gracefully, becoming not merely a spy outfit but one of the world's great centers of learning and scholarship and having more PhDs and advanced scientific degrees than you're likely to find anywhere else.

Well, we've gone around the room and fought Donovan's war in Europe all over again. I haven't touched the men and ideas Donovan unleashed in Yugoslavia where John Blatnik spent many months organizing resistance forces in Slovenia, or Thailand to which Nick Deak has referred, or Italy where Milton Katz and Mim Doddario were leaders, or Greece where Jim Kellis and Chris Fragos performed nobly, or China and Burma where General Peers distinguished himself or Indo-China, or North Africa. I have neither the time nor the knowledge to do so. It only remains for me to again thank, from the bottom of my heart, the Veterans of the Office of Strategic Services and all of you here tonight for your generosity.

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The Donovan Medal

THE HONORABLE ALLEN W. DULLES
THE HONORABLE JOHN J. McCLOY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM W. QUINN
GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
THE EARL MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
THE HONORABLE EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN
J. RUSSELL FORGAN
THE ASTRONAUTS OF APOLLO 11
THE HONORABLE DAVID K. E. BRUCE
WILLIAM J. CASEY

The Veterans of the Office of Strategic Services will award the William J. Donovan medal to an individual who has rendered distinguished service in the interests of the United States and the cause of freedom anywhere.

The purpose of this award is to foster a tradition and spirit of the kind of service to country and the cause of freedom which William J. Donovan rendered in both his private and public capacities. He was the exemplar of the citizen-soldier-diplomat who valiantly served his country and the cause of freedom throughout the world. This award, as a perpetual parallel, will be made to an individual who, in his activities, exemplifies the spirit, the tradition and the distinguishing features which characterized General Donovan's career. These include a continuing concern for the world's security and safety, for the role which the United States must play in the world, and for the rights, freedoms and welfare of individuals in our society. Perhaps the most unique feature of General Donovan's life was the continuing expression of these concerns in his private life and activities as well as in public service.

Specifically, in General Donovan's career these features were expressed, as one of America's leading citizen-soldiers, as ambassador, as intelligence chief, as assistant Attorney General, as lawyer in the courtroom and in the office, as private traveler seeing what he could learn for the benefit of his country.

The recipient of the Donovan medal will be an individual who has, in his own career, outstandingly exemplified these features of Donovan's career. He will be selected by a committee appointed by the President of the Veterans of the O.S.S.

The award will take the form of a medal, carrying a likeness of General Donovan.

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
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
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

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An annual award of \$500 is offered for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the *Studies*. The prize may be divided if the two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding. An additional \$1,000 is available for other prizes.


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The editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards but reserves to itself exclusive competence in the decision.

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A message from the Director of Central Intelligence

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF *STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE*

Stansfield Turner


All professions share certain common characteristics. Intelligence is no different. Special education and experience separate the professional from the layman. A unique sense of responsibility to society as a whole influences the profession's operating standards and ethical norms. Even when the profession demands a high degree of practical skill, that skill and the knowledge on which it is based combine with the profession's philosophical foundations to provide the intellectual unity which, more than anything else, binds the profession together.

Professions change over time. Like the society of which they are a part, they accumulate a past and work to continue to be relevant in the future. Appreciating the profession's past and understanding its vision of the future are vital to professional competence in the present. Consequently, all professions are conscious of the need not only to reflect on their amassed experience and the crecive reservoir of their knowledge, but to pass it on to the generations which follow.

"Studies in Intelligence" has performed this vital function for the intelligence profession for twenty-five years. It has done so with great distinction. Over those years it has been the principal forum for advancing ideas within the profession and has helped to establish the legitimacy of intelligence as an autonomous discipline. As the preeminent journal of the profession it has successfully explored an impressive range of issues, encouraged healthy and important dialogue, and has drawn together the most significant body of professional comment on intelligence anywhere.

As *"Studies in Intelligence"* begins its twenty-fifth year of publication, it deserves our thanks for the service it has rendered to all professional intelligence officers over the years, and our encouragement and support in the years to come.

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**THE STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE****25th ANNIVERSARY ISSUE**

As we recalled in our Spring issue, *Studies in Intelligence* began in September 1955 with the publication of Sherman Kent's monograph "The Need for an Intelligence Literature." That and succeeding monographs by Abbot Smith, Harold Kehm and Max Millikan became Volume One of *Studies in Intelligence*, although the first full year of publication did not occur until 1958.


How Dr. Kent came to inspire what has become the journal of the intelligence profession is recounted in Hal Ford's tribute beginning on page 1. The rest of this issue is devoted entirely to reprints of articles from previous issues, including Kent's own "Estimates and Influence," chosen to represent the many seminal articles he contributed to these pages over the years.

Our selections for this retrospective issue are both eclectic and limited; no single volume of *Studies* could contain even a representative selection of all the outstanding contributions to the literature of intelligence which have appeared between its covers. In addition to the Kent piece, they include Robert Cutler's article on how intelligence was geared to the national policy-making machinery at the time of *Studies*' founding; an NKVD officer's interpretation of Soviet intelligence doctrine; a classic World War II spy story by Thomas F. Elzweig; Gail Solin's prizewinning article on China-watching, as representative of the all-too-few *Studies* contributions on the intelligence analyst's art; Henry S. Lowenhaupt's "Mission to Birch Woods" (also a prizewinner), representing Hank's prodigious output of articles on scientific intelligence; one of Lawrence R. Houston's many informed reviews of legal aspects of intelligence; and, finally, an all-time favorite, "Elegant Writing in the Clandestine Services" by an officer who, after retirement, produced an eminently readable novel about clandestine service in the Vietnam War.

The book reviews in this anniversary edition are also chosen more or less randomly from past issues. The first is actually a full-blown article by Frank G. Wisner on Allen Dulles' *The Craft of Intelligence*. Next is Roger Pineau's review of David Kahn's classic *The Codebreakers*, then Charles Valpey's brief lament over the deplorable *Invisible Government* by Wise and Ross. There follows Fritz Ermarth's erudite dissection of Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision* and a companion work, *Victims of Groupthink* by Irving L. Janis. Finally, as the departing Editor's personal tribute to a respected colleague and collaborator, we have reprinted a review of one of the better books on Richard Sorge; "Edward M. Zivich" is one of the many pen names of the current curator of the Historical Intelligence Collection.


The Editors

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Studies in Intelligence *salutes*
its founder and guiding spirit

A TRIBUTE TO SHERMAN KENT

Harold P. Ford*

Whatever the complexities of the puzzles we strive to solve, and whatever the sophisticated techniques we may use to collect the pieces and store them, there can never be a time when the thoughtful man can be supplanted as the intelligence device supreme. . . . Great discoveries are not made by second-rate minds, no matter how they may be juxtaposed organizationally.

*Sherman Kent*¹

With this issue the Studies bids an official farewell to Sherman Kent, who somewhat quixotically founded the journal in 1955 and has been its prime sustainer for a dozen years. The infusions of his vigor and polymath good judgment have been so much the wellspring of its life that it has reason to tremble a little at this severance. Yet he has borne himself the wise father, encouraging spontaneity and initiative, nudging here and checking there but fostering the independent child; and he has thus brought it to a stature that can stand the shock. It can take comfort, too, that he will not be altogether out of its reach for fatherly advice. This is the end of an era, but the era's works go on.

*The Editors of Studies
in Intelligence, 1968*²

It can be said in one sense that *Studies in Intelligence* owes its birth to a slow news day some years ago. As Sherman Kent later related that genesis, it was one quiet Sunday in December 1953 when he had the morning duty in Mr. Allen Dulles' office that Sherm memorialized Matt Baird, then CIA Director of Training, arguing that the discipline of intelligence badly needed an Institute for the Advanced Study of Intelligence and an accompanying learned journal. The idea of an institute, which Sherm wanted modeled after the *Institute for Advanced Study* at Princeton, was in his words put on a back burner by history³ while the idea of a journal came to fruition in 1955.

* The author wishes to thank the many friends who have helped him prepare this article, but who bear no responsibility for its shortcomings or particular judgments. These friends are Paul Borel, Keith Clark, Mary Cook, James Cooley, Chester Cooper, James Graham, Klaus Knorr, Karen Platte, Edward Sayle, Abbot Smith, Don Smith, Mary Shaw, and Joseph Strayer.

¹ *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, revised ed. (Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. xxiv, 174.

² Remarks introducing Sherman Kent's article, "Valediction," Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter 1968), p. 1.

³ The idea of an institute refused to die, but was born again in various suggested versions over the years. In 1975 an institute at length came into being in the form of the CIA Office of Training's Center for the Study of Intelligence, similar in certain respects at least to Sherman Kent's original proposal. The Center's Senior Officers Development Course, now in preparation, may come even closer to the goal.

In a more profound sense, the idea of *Studies in Intelligence* did not of course suddenly strike Sherm out of the blue, one Sunday in 1953, but sprang from a long and intensely held conviction that intelligence should be recognized and treated as a scholarly discipline, and to that end intelligence badly needed a professional literature. We thus pay tribute to Sherman Kent not only for kindling our journal—which with this issue celebrates a quarter century of contribution to intelligence theory, doctrine, technique, and anecdote—but more importantly for the vision, perseverance, and persuasiveness that has made him a principal father of the modern intelligence profession—as well as a splendid leader and colorful personality.

The professional integrity Sherman Kent intended for *Studies* long antedated that quiet morning in Mr. Dulles' office; indeed, it antedated Sherm's own career as an intelligence officer. While still a history professor at Yale, prior to World War II, his classes had been popular because his enthusiasm brought history to life, generously salted with his unique vocabulary; less popular at New Haven, however, was the rigor he demanded: he bestowed D's and F's with abandon when he encountered sham or lack of preparation—a characteristic some other young scholars, from the Staff of his Office of National Estimates, experienced on occasion some years later. Closely paralleling his theory and practice of professional intelligence were certain of the principles of the historian's calling Sherman Kent enunciated in his first book, *Writing History*, which he had written while at Yale. In many of its passages one need only substitute the words "intelligence officer" for "historian." One example:

When the evidence seems to force a single and immediate conclusion, then that is the time to worry about one's bigotry and to do a little conscientious introspection into why this particular conclusion stands out. Was it in the material or was it in you? The command of Socrates, "know thyself," never gave richer rewards than in the world of what we've been calling systematic study. . . .⁴

Later, during World War II, Sherm served as Chief of the Europe-Africa Division of the Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS, a direct predecessor of CIA's present National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC). It was this exposure, he recounts, which brought him to believe passionately in the need for a literature of intelligence.

The more I talked with my OSS colleagues, the surer I was that a serious book on the intelligence business was needed. It became a compulsion; I simply had to get these thoughts off my mind.⁵

These thoughts began to take specific form immediately after the war, while Sherm was serving on the staff of the National War College and before returning to Yale in 1947. At this time Sherm was taking stock of U.S. intelligence and asking how the United States could avoid another Pearl Harbor in the years ahead. In a *Yale Review* article of 1946 he wrote:

The existence of controllable atomic energy, and the dead certainty that others besides ourselves will soon possess the technical secrets, place a new and forceful emphasis upon intelligence as one of the most vital elements in our survival.⁶

⁴ Revised edition (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967), p. 5. Sherm recounts that he wrote this whole book, cover to cover, during a week's vacation in 1937 in Florida. "Then, five years and five drafts later, Appleton-Century-Crofts published it." Still later, following World War II and the establishing of the occupation of Japan, General Douglas MacArthur's headquarters had this book translated into Japanese. Kent to author, May 1980.

⁵ Kent to author.

⁶ "Prospects for the National Intelligence Service," Vol. 36, No. 1, Autumn 1946, p. 116.

During the interval before Sherman Kent joined CIA (November 1950), he contributed to the art and practice of intelligence particularly through the publishing of his *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, certainly the most influential book of its kind yet to appear. This reputation began with the book's first appearance, the *New York Times* reviewer (William H. Jackson, himself a former OSS officer) greeting it with the bouquets that Kent

knows his stuff and writes it down with persuasion and force. The result is the best general book so far on any aspect of intelligence. . . . This book should be read by all high officials charged with responsibility for the security of the country and by all those who work in the field of intelligence.⁷

Princeton Press reprinted the book in 1951 and 1953, and published a revised (paperback) edition in 1966. Archon Books published an edition in 1965. Foreign editions include Chinese, Japanese, Spanish, Portuguese, Korean, and pirated.⁸

The content of that familiar work need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that *Strategic Intelligence* conveyed refined versions of certain themes he had previously advanced in his 1946 *Yale Review* article, *supra*, plus numerous injunctions of pertinence to the intelligence world of the 1980s. A few samples:

A last reason for the misunderstandings between intelligence producers and consumers is an understandable reluctance of the part of consumers to embark upon a hazardous task on the basis of someone else's say-so. After all, if anyone is going to be hurt it probably will not be the producers. I will warrant that the Light Brigade's G-2 was high on the list of survivors in the charge of Balaclava.⁹

The main difference between professional scholars or intelligence officers on the one hand, and all other people on the other hand, is that the former are supposed to have had more training in the techniques of guarding against their own intellectual frailties.¹⁰

When intelligence producers realize that there is no sense in forwarding to a consumer knowledge which does not correspond to his preconceptions, then intelligence is through.¹¹

When the findings of the intelligence arm are regularly ignored by the consumer, and this because of consumer intuition, he should recognize that he is turning his back on the two instruments by which western man has, since Aristotle, steadily enlarged his horizon of knowledge—the instruments of reason and scientific method.¹²

Sherm still—and quite justifiably—considers this pioneer book to be basically sound: "The heart of the book is as solid as ever; the game still swings on the educated, thoughtful man, not on gadgetry."¹³

⁷ *New York Times Book Review*, 1 May 1949.

⁸ The remarkable success of this book contrasts with its humble beginnings. Various editors had told Sherm to forget about such a project because it didn't include any blood, guts, or beautiful spies, and because it wouldn't sell the 5,000 copies needed for a publisher to break even. Sherm's favorite edition is the pirated one (English-language) General Chiang Ching-kuo presented him in 1959, "with a big smile," on the occasion of a trip by Sherm to Taiwan. Kent to author.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 193.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 206.

¹³ Kent to author, May 1980.

A year after *Strategic Intelligence* was published, Sherm left Yale for the CIA. The prime movers were in effect the Korean War, the distinguished Harvard historian William L. Langer, and DCI Walter Bedell Smith. The difficulties U.S. intelligence had had in calling the North Korean invasion of the South in June 1950, and especially the massive Chinese involvement that autumn, had led to major shake-up of CIA's analytic process. One of the principal such changes determined upon by DCI General Smith was the creation of the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and the Office of National Estimates (O/NE)—to be headed by Dr. Langer, who had been the Chief of the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS. Beedle Smith proposed the NIE function at an October 20, 1950 meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (the then NFIB). On that occasion there "was general assent" with the proposals of a memorandum the DCI had had prepared on "The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for National Intelligence Estimates."

- That IAC memo set forth the concept of the NIEs as authoritative interpretations and appraisals that would help guide policymakers and planners.
- The NIEs should command recognition and respect throughout the government as the best available and presumably the most authoritative estimates.
- It was the clear duty and responsibility of the CIA to assemble and produce these coordinated estimates.

Following the IAC's discussion of that memo, the DCI proposed that an Office of National Estimates be set up in the CIA "at the earliest possible time." In his opinion O/NE would "become the heart of the Central Intelligence Agency and of the national intelligence machinery."¹⁴ O/NE was formally established just a month later, 20 November 1950.

Bill Langer, called upon by President Truman and Beedle Smith to head O/NE, thereupon put the heat on his former OSS R&A colleague, Sherman Kent, to come join the new office. Kent's recollection of being interviewed for the job by the DCI one Sunday in November 1950 (in the DCI's office), reminds us nostalgically of Beedle Smith's persuasive charm. Says Sherm:

I told the DCI I had some doubts and wasn't certain about taking the job. Whereupon, putting on that annoyed cobra look of his, Beedle snapped, "Young man, if you think I make a business of coming down to my office on a Sunday morning to talk with people who aren't sure about taking the job, you've got another think coming!"¹⁵

Sherm decided as how maybe the job was the right one for him, after all.

At first joining the newly-founded O/NE as a temporary consultant, Sherm stayed on to serve as Langer's Deputy until January 1952 when, upon Langer's return to Harvard, Kent succeeded him as chief of O/NE (AD/NE). He held that position until 31 December 1967.

Sherm had thus been AD/NE almost two years when he petitioned Matt Baird to establish an intelligence institute and learned journal. In that December 1953 memo he repeated certain of his long-standing concerns: a "sense of disquiet that Intelligence is a non-cumulative discipline"; a "sense of outrage at the infantile imprecision of the language of intelligence—I give you the NSCIDs for a starter"; and the fact that there

¹⁴ IAC-M-1, of 20 October 1950, paras, 6-7.

¹⁵ Kent to author.

existed no institutional memory—"what kind of a way is this to run a railroad?"¹⁶ To remedy that situation Sherm proposed the Institute and the journal. With respect to the latter, *the germ of Studies in Intelligence*, Sherm wrote:

I would establish a journal—probably a quarterly—which would be devoted to intelligence theory and doctrine, and the techniques of the discipline. I would have an editor who fully understood the limits of his mandate. The journal could be Top Secret; its component articles could be of any classification or unclassified.¹⁷

Once *Studies in Intelligence* was launched—with the active and good assistance of Matt Baird—Sherm contributed an article to the very first issue (Vol. I, No. 1, September 1955), which repeated his earlier themes about the necessity for a literature of intelligence. A couple of attributes he attributed to the intelligence profession at that time bear noting by later practitioners:

"We have within us a feeling of common purpose, and a good sense of mission."

People work at the intelligence calling "until they are numb, because they love it, because it is their life, and because the rewards are the rewards of professional accomplishment."¹⁸

Sherman Kent's interest in *Studies* has continued to this day. As of 1968 (his "Valediction" article), he felt that despite some problems concerning security classification and the need to twist author's arms to get articles, "it was beyond argument" that *Studies* had contributed to a "richer understanding of the bones and viscera of the intelligence calling."¹⁹ His present view is that the journal's articles have in general improved even more in sophistication and contribution since that time.²⁰ Over the years Sherm has himself contributed some nine articles, eleven book reviews, and one other review (of the worst book he said he had ever reviewed) which was so steaming it was not published—though a copy remains in the *Studies* files and in the Historical Intelligence Collection.

The themes Sherm had championed so forcefully in his prior writings and in his arguments for a learned journal all carried over into his sixteen-year stewardship of O/NE. Keynotes there were intellectual rigor, conscious effort to avoid unconscious analytical bias, willingness to hear other judgments, collective responsibility of judgment, precision of statement, systematic use of some of the country's best experts as consultants and checks against in-house blinders, and candid admission of shortcomings.²¹ This was purposely accomplished by a modest-sized operation: generally a Board of about twelve very senior members, and a substantive Staff of a couple dozen or so. The philosophy of Langer and Kent, alike, was that the people of such a smallish office would work themselves numb, to use Sherm's figure, but would be too small to

¹⁶ "Valediction," *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 5.

¹⁸ "The Need for an Intelligence Literature," p. 2.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

²⁰ Kent to author.

²¹ Typical of Sherm Kent's candor are (1) his frank admission that O/NE had mis-called the Cuban missile crisis ("A Crucial Estimate Relived," *Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2, Spring 1964, pp. 1-18); and (2) a letter of thanks to a former O/NE staffer for some comments he had given Sherm on the overall NIE record, because those comments had highlighted "bads as well as goods; (highlighting one's own bad's is always the most uncongential of excreises). What you wrote is right on the nose." Letter, Kent to staffer, of 4 December 1974.

carry all the accoutrements of bureaucratic overkill.²² Shielding Board and Staff in this way, as well as from the passions of Washington policy advocacy, would be a necessity in view of the extremely difficult task the office faced: the venturing out beyond evidence to estimate the unknown.

O/NE was not Camelot, but Sherm did run a fine show. It was a great place to work. Enthusiasm and sense of purpose were high. Everyone was overworked. There were lots of laughs, amid countless unprintable Kentian anecdotes and aphorisms. Under Sherm, there was never any party line, other than the dogged pursuit of truth. There was M.B.O.—management-by-osmosis—and it worked. The office was miraculously shielded from non-substantive drag. The table gamesmanship was tough, sophisticated, productive, and delightful.

Sherm presided over it all firmly, but without seeming effort. He gave Board and Staff members their head(s), and asked in return only for a quality and integrity of product and conduct. He was not Olympian. He was not a purveyor of *Weltanschauung*. He was the direction-setter; the catalyst; the cold reader-critic—beware his broad pencilled questions; the weaver of product-to-policy relevance; the source of enthusiasm; the setter of standards; the rewarder of the productive and the chastizer of the unproductive; the one who demanded clear, concise exposition; and, throughout, the exemplar of purpose, good humor, a proper degree of irreverence, civility, and a supreme degree of decency.

Not too familiar to post-O/NE intelligence officers is the remarkable quality of people and product Sherm's office maintained for some years. In those years the Board included historians Langer, Kent, Raymond J. Sontag, Abbot E. Smith, and Joseph Strayer; Ambassadors Llewellyn (Tommy) Thompson, Livingston Merchant, Freeman (Doc) Matthews, and Harold Linder; Generals Harold (Pinky) Bull and Earl (Diz) Barnes; plus prominent lawyers and government executives.

Sherm has been especially proud of the substantive Staff he recruited and maintained in O/NE: "For 20 years they were the best staff in town and so proclaimed by a good number of very knowledgeable outsiders."²³ Even allowing for Sherm's understandable enthusiasm concerning his people, the caliber of these O/NE Staff officers over the years is illustrated by the responsibilities many of them subsequently gained. Three later became Ambassadors. Three became the DD/I (or D/NFAC). Three later headed O/NE. Seven became DDI (or NFAC) Office Chiefs. Five became National Intelligence Officers. Seven became Chiefs of Station abroad. Three held senior White House positions. Two became Director of State's INR. One an Undersecretary of Defense. Two, Assistant Secretaries of Defense. One an Undersecretary of State. Several became distinguished academicians and authors. One heads the Woodrow Wilson Center at the Smithsonian. One heads Washington's Institute for Energy Analysis. One heads the Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. One is a senior member of State's Policy Planning Staff. One is the Editor of *Foreign Affairs*. Not least, one is President of the Washington Audubon Society. Sherm truly had his men everywhere.

To repeat, O/NE was not Camelot. All Board members were not Langer's or Sontag's; some were later wished on Kent by his DCIs; some board members tended to

²² According to Ray Cline, first Chief of O/NE's Estimates Staff, Dr. Langer told him at the outset that DCI Smith thought that O/NE would require about 1,000 people, but that Langer had assured Beedle Smith that he could do the job well with about 60, total. Cline, *Secrets, Spies and Scholars: The Essential CIA* (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1978), p. 120. Although CIA and the intelligence community burgeoned in size over the years, Kent kept O/NE at about the 60-70 figure, total.

²³ Kent, classified study, 1976, p. 29. And, "The Staff was always the works." Kent to author. May 1980.

ramble on at great length about irrelevancies; some nit-picked the Staff up the wall; and a few must have been embarrassments to Sherm. Nor were the Staff members all clear-eyed Jack Armstrongs; some couldn't draft; some weren't good at coordination gamesmanship; some Staff alumni later gave Sherman Kent bureaucratic fits. O/NE was not a fount of ERA. In the view of some observers, O/NE later became somewhat cut off from the policy-making world, somewhat self-satisfied and resistant to change, and overly in-grown. Other elite offices developed as intelligence became more technical in many respects. In its later years bureaucratic constraints inhibited O/NE from continuing to recruit the best available Staff members from CIA's ranks. Not O/NE's fault, and indeed to its credit, was a certain fall from grace in its later years occasioned in part by the fact that certain of its estimates were not congenial to senior policy-makers. Throughout his tenure, however, Sherm Kent maintained tough, demanding standards of his officers. He maintained the integrity of the estimative process against corruption.²⁴ He was a tough warrior who protected his scholars from the bureaucratic world, while imbuing them with enthusiasm about the purpose of their common understanding. And, he had a great curiosity about the whole of CIA and its business, and he knew how the total effort all fit together.

No tribute to Sherman Kent could overlook his bright red galluses and his plug of chewing tobacco, or ignore the contributions to the profession his colorful personality has made. His versatility and style have enriched the intelligence profession and helped protect it from becoming flat and featureless. Sherm has been called a rough diamond aristocrat, a mix of Connecticut roots-schooling and California upbringing — a mix which was captured years ago by Yale undergraduate pals who dubbed him "Buffalo Bill, the Cultured Cowboy." The whole term applies, even though it's only the "Buffalo" which has survived as a favorite term among his friends. Sherm's skills include that of accomplished woodworker, whether making furniture or "Buffalo Blocks" (hand-made multi-wood blocks Sherm later had produced for commercial sale.) He is also a chef supreme. His publications concern not only intelligence and how to write history, but a book on French politics (of the 1820s),²⁵ and one for younger readers called *A Boy and a Pig, But Mostly Horses*.²⁶ Sherm's versatility helped the cause of his O/NE products because everyone in town knew him; the impact of his NIEs was facilitated by the respect in which he was held. Truly, Sherm Kent is no run-of-the-mill model of graduate student turned analyst or case officer. Personalities such as his are a good remedy against the development of homogenous CIA men or what author Stewart Alsop has termed the generation of prudent CIA professionals. Our calling needs character. It also needs characters. In the best sense, Sherm Kent has been both.

If Sherm were joining the CIA's analytic world this November rather than the one he did of 30 years ago, what patterns of consistency and change would he encounter? The major hazards of the business remain: the ambiguity of evidence; the loneliness of venturing out beyond available evidence in trying to call future trends; the problems of recognizing and diminishing analytic bias, whether conscious or unconscious; the joy of solving some of the analytic puzzles; the freedom to go wherever the evidence takes you, whatever the consequent logic for U.S. policy or policy makers;

²⁴ A DCI once intervened strongly against one of the NIE's Kent had brought to the USIB (NFIB), criticized Sherm before that body for not having sought the views of the (policy) people who "really know the situation best," and ordered O/NE to see those people and recast the NIE. That DCI later told Sherm that the original NIE had had the situation right, and that he (the DCI) had made a mistake in so intervening. Kent and other participants to author.

²⁵ *The Election of Eighteen Twenty Seven in France* (Harvard University Press, 1975).

²⁶ Dodd, 1974.

the competition for the time and attention of senior policy-making consumers; the rewards when one's judgments prove congenial to the customers; the growls—or, worse, the silence—when they do not. Other problems of 1980 differ substantially from those of 1950. There is of course now more red tape, more form and triplicate. But more importantly there are now many more world actors creating more crises than a generation ago, there is more passion and unreason in the world—and not all that is abroad—and there are more challenges to Sherm's expressed faith that reason and the scientific method will see the intelligence process through. There is also a greater need for close intelligence ties to the policy world: there have been some years which show that this can occur without necessarily corrupting the independence of intelligence judgments, and hence there is a certain questioning which can be made of Sherman Kent's certainty that intelligence analysts and estimators who go downtown will become policy advocates and begin to serve power rather than truth.

Whatever the case with respect to policy, however, the contribution of Sherman Kent to the 1980s, as to the 1950s, and 1960s, is truly considerable. Together with celebrating Sherm's key role in creating *Studies* 25 years ago, we pay tribute to the 30 years of Sherm's professional and personal contributions since he was pitched by DCI Beedle Smith that Sunday in 1950, and to the even longer period Sherman Kent has been championing those qualities the intelligence calling must possess if it is to have integrity and effectiveness.

Honor is perhaps due to Sherman Kent, most of all, for someone who has embodied and helped form the purpose of the intelligence profession, and who has set standards for enthusiastically working oneself numb because of the intellectual challenge and the sense of service at hand. And, tribute, too, to someone who has pointed out the folly of allowing situations to develop where these qualities do not obtain, situations for example where, in Sherm's word,

From the very beginning, there was administrative trouble of a high order, much of it avoidable; personnel actions—new appointments, replacements, and overdue promotions—moved with the ponderous slowness of the glacier or not at all. Life outside the government, or at best outside [that department], began to be more and more attractive to irreplaceable professionals. They began to leave in the order of their importance to the organization; and as replacements did not appear, morale declined.²⁷

Sherm was speaking here of the state of U.S. intelligence as it existed at the time—in 1946.

The preceding article is Unclassified.

²⁷ *Yale Review*, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

The role intelligence actually plays in the Executive Branch's forging of national security policy is described and appraised by an indubitable authority

INTELLIGENCE AS FOUNDATION FOR POLICY

Robert Cutler

An integral and in fact basic element in the formation of national security policy is the latest and best intelligence bearing on the substance of the policy to be determined. That statement is not a theoretical truism, but a description of what has by and large actually been practiced in the Executive Branch under the administration of President Eisenhower. It is based on first-hand observation: for periods totaling almost four years I was in continuous touch with the procedures for formulating, adopting, and coordinating the execution of national security policies within the Executive Branch. I assisted the President at 179 meetings of the National Security Council—almost half of all the meetings it held in the first dozen years of its existence. I presided at 504 meetings of the Council's Planning Board (earlier called its Senior Staff). I was a member and for a while Vice Chairman of its Operations Coordinating Board; I participated in meetings of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy; I represented the President on a small group which considered special operations. It is from this experience that the conclusions of this article are drawn.¹

NSC Operating Procedures

The function of the National Security Council, as defined by National Security Act, is "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security, so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of Government to cooperate more effectively in matters affecting the national security." The Act also gives to the Council the duty of "assessing and appraising the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power." The Council advises the President both on policy and on plans for its execution, but its primary statutory function thus lies in the formation of policy. The role of the Council as a planning body is subordinate to its policy function.

The Council and its subsidiary Planning Board² and Operations Coordinating Board³ constitute an apparatus available to the President to help him reach policy

¹ In 1951, in the early organizational stages of the Psychological Strategy Board, the author served as its Deputy Director and representative at meetings of the NSC Senior Staff, later to become the Planning Board. In early 1953 President Eisenhower asked him to study the organization and functioning of the NSC mechanism and make recommendations to strengthen and vitalize its structure and operating procedures. He then became the President's principal assistant with reference to the operations of the Council. He was moved from the position of Administrative Assistant (January-March 1953) to that of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, where he served from March 1953 to April 1955 and from January 1957 to July 1958.

² The NSC Planning Board, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, is composed of officials of the departments and agencies which are represented at the Council table with reference to a policy matter there under consideration. These officials have a rank equivalent to Assistant Secretary or higher. Each is supported by a departmental or agency staff. Each has direct access to his department or agency chief and commands all the resources of his department or agency for the performance of his duties.

³ The NSC Operations Coordinating Board, of which the President's Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination is Vice Chairman, is composed of officials of the departments and agencies concerned with the policies referred to the Board by the President for assistance in the coordination of planning. These officials have a rank equivalent to Under Secretary or higher. Each is supported by a small departmental or agency staff. Each has direct access to his department or agency chief and commands all the resources of his department or agency for the performance of his duties.

decisions on national security. The National Security Act is sufficiently flexible to allow each President to use this personal aid as best suits his convenience. One President may use the Council mechanism in one way, another in another. The *best* use is made of it when a President uses it in a way that satisfies his personal requirements. It has never been felt necessary to test whether the Congress can constitutionally require by statute that a President consult with specified persons or follow specified procedures in coming to a policy decision in this field.

Under President Eisenhower, the normal procedure for operating the policy-making aspects of the NSC mechanism has involved three main steps. First, the NSC Planning Board formulates recommendations as to national security policy and circulates them to Council members and advisers well in advance of the Council meeting at which they are scheduled to be considered. Then the Council considers and approves or modifies or rejects these recommendations, and submits to the President such as it approves or modifies. Finally, the President approves, modifies, or rejects the Council's recommendations, transmits those policies which he approves to the departments and agencies responsible for planning their execution, and—as a rule where international affairs are concerned—requests the NSC Operations Coordinating Board to assist these departments and agencies in coordinating their respective planning for action under the approved policies.

Thus, a policy is first determined by the President, and then the departments and agencies plan how to carry out their responsibilities to the President under it, being assisted in the coordination of this planning by the OCB. It is, of course, fundamental that the planning to execute policy responsibilities be carried out by the respective departments and agencies which are directly charged by the President with such responsibilities. No person or body should intervene, at a lower level, between the President and the department head directly responsible to him.

During the period 1953-1958, with which I am familiar, the great bulk of national security policy determinations were made by the President through the operations of the NSC mechanism just described. Because this method of policy formulation was the usual one, such policies were commonly but erroneously referred to as "NSC policies." Since it is the function of the President to determine policy in all areas under his executive control and responsibility, and national security policy may be formed in any way which he finds convenient and appropriate, the policies so formed, whatever body or individual may submit the recommendations therefor, are the *President's* policies.

There were occasions during this period when national security policy was determined by the President as a result of Cabinet deliberations (though this was a rare occurrence) or by his executive decision based on conferences with one or more of his principal department or agency heads, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or others within whose special competence some particular subject would naturally fall. There should always be complete flexibility for every President to determine however he elects the matters of high policy which it is his responsibility to decide. Because of the utility and convenience of the NSC mechanism, however, and because the present Chief Executive values the advantages of integrated recommendations and joint deliberations based on them, it has been the more or less standard operating procedure during his tenure to seek to form national security policies through the procedures outlined above.

Factual Intelligence and Estimates

In this article the term "intelligence" is used to embrace both factual intelligence and estimates based thereon. In forming national security policy both are of prime importance.

The gathering of intelligence facts is today a matter of enormous scope and hardly conceivable complexity, bearing no resemblance to the simple if hazardous personal mission of a Mata Hari. There are, indeed, many individuals working in the field of intelligence, in and out of formal government service, who must exhibit personal bravery and rare ingenuity, taking risks beyond the ordinary call of duty. Because all is grist that comes to the intelligence mill, one need not seek to measure the results of these individual efforts against the results of the world-wide scientific and technological operations employed in modern intelligence gathering.

In our continuing confrontation by a power openly dedicated to swallowing all mankind in the maw of Communism, the rapid gathering of germane intelligence on the activities of other nations in every field of endeavor has put the United States into an electronic business that is world-wide, highly scientific, incredibly complicated, and extremely expensive. It is staggering to realize the limitless ramifications of current technological procedures, the almost overwhelming amount of raw material that comes flooding in every hour of the day and night to be sifted, analyzed, codified, and—most urgent of all—communicated clearly to the decision-makers. For in the last analysis the valid use of intelligence is to build intellectual platforms upon which decisions can be made. It is not gathered to be stored away like a harvest. It must be delivered, succinct and unequivocal, within the shortest time feasible to focal points for use.

This prompt delivery is essential both to those who conduct our foreign affairs or direct our defensive military mechanisms and to those who frame our decisions of high policy. The sound concept that the national intelligence effort should be centralized is not inconsistent with a demonstrable need that each of the several departments have its own intelligence arm. The man who may have to dispatch a SAC bomber, an ICBM, a Polaris submarine, or a Pentomic task force has a dual function with regard to intelligence: he has a part in acquiring the latest intelligence for use at central headquarters, all the way up to the President; he also must himself have and use the latest intelligence in carrying out his crucial responsibilities.

It is for these reasons that the National Security Act in 1947 created a Central Intelligence Agency and a Director of Central Intelligence, who at one and the same time is chief officer of the Central Intelligence Agency, Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, and Foreign Intelligence Adviser to the President and National Security Council. Through the series of NSC Intelligence Directives the President has sought to make the gathering and dissemination of intelligence more rapid and efficient. These Directives put emphasis on the centralization of authority and responsibility in the intelligence field, on making the separate intelligence organizations of the armed services and other departments and agencies contributory to, and not independent of, such central authority, while still allowing them to meet their specialized needs.

The President has shown a constant awareness of the urgency of perfecting the national intelligence effort. He gave close attention to the reports on this effort made by the committee under General James A. Doolittle (October 1954) and by the Hoover Commission's Task Force on Intelligence Activities under General Mark Clark (May 1955). In February 1956 he formally established a President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, first chaired by Dr. James R. Killian and now by General John E. Hull. He gave this Board the continuing mission of reviewing the conduct of our foreign intelligence activities and reporting thereon periodically to the Chief Executive.

The operation of the many intelligence arms in the critical field of intelligence gathering and dissemination at all levels involves a truly vast annual expenditure. But

in terms of national survival, the prompt delivery of correct intelligence to the President, the ultimate decision-maker, is an undebatable necessity.

Beyond this requirement for current factual intelligence there is an additional requirement for intelligence estimates. These estimates may be addressed to a particular country, area, situation, armament, or function and set forth both the pertinent facts and the likely future actions predictable thereon, or they may seek to arrange logically and with precision the broadest spectrum of intelligence materials into a considered appraisal of what over-all developments may be in future time.

Both types of intelligence estimates can be of the greatest possible help to policy-makers and planners. Their preparation requires expert competence and their coordination calls for objective thinking by those who have the authority to agree or differ on behalf of their organizations. Because of the prophetic nature of any estimate, it is of great consequence that the final text should seek not compromise but clarity. Many of the coordinated national intelligence estimates with which I worked during these four years clearly and fully set forth dissenting views held by competent members of the U.S. Intelligence Board.

Intelligence Orientation for the Makers of High Policy

The prompt circulation of daily bulletins and special and national estimates as basic orientation for those who make the recommendations and decisions on high policy is an obvious necessity. The Planning Board, responsible for doing the spadework in forming policy, needs to review the special and national estimates in detail, dissecting them and arguing over them until they become familiar material. And Security Council members need to get them in time to study and weigh them before the subjects to which they relate are taken up at the Council level. Both Planning Board and Council members should be *inseminated* with their contents, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In the Planning Board this insemination has been a feature of its standard operating procedure since 1953, as I will illustrate in a moment. At the Council level the education of the members is carried on in several ways.

In the NSC. The Council members receive daily, weekly, special, and general intelligence publications, and their function requires that they be familiar with this material. In 1953, moreover, in order to insure that Council members are kept fully acquainted with current intelligence, an innovation was introduced at their meetings. Until then, the oral briefing on current intelligence was given each day in the President's office to him alone. Now it became a part of the Council's established procedure to make the first agenda item at each meeting a briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence.

This oral briefing, assisted by the visual presentation of maps and charts on easels behind the Director's seat, reviews the latest important intelligence throughout the world but focuses on the areas which are to be taken up later in the meeting. It normally consumes from fifteen to twenty-five percent of the meeting time, being frequently interrupted by specific questions from the President and other Council members. These questions often give rise to colloquies and extemporaneous expressions of views which are of consequence to the policy recommendations that are to be discussed. I have always believed this direct confrontation of the Council each week with current and special intelligence to be an important aid to policy consideration and formulation. Yet the British Cabinet and the War Cabinet under Sir Winston Churchill, to the best of my knowledge, carried on their policy deliberations without the benefit of this stimulating and thought-focussing device.

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There are other ways in which the Council, as the supervisory body to which the Director of Central Intelligence reports, is kept informed about intelligence problems. The Director submits annually to the Council a summation of the problems that have faced the intelligence community in the preceding period and the measures and means adopted for dealing with them. The President and Council must also from time to time review and revise the National Security Council Intelligence Directives, which constitute the charter for the operations of the intelligence community.

The revision of one of these detailed and often complicated NSCIDs, especially in relation to the functional gathering and rapid dissemination of intelligence, may require months of prior study by a panel of specialists—perhaps scientists, technologists, or communications experts, persons of the highest intellectual and scientific standing—brought together to advise on methods and procedures. Many of the panel studies necessary for the purposes of the experts involve most carefully guarded secrets. Yet it is important that the Council understand, in general terms, how the vast intelligence community of modern days is organized, administered, and operated. The principles which emerge from the findings and recommendations of these highly classified studies are matters for action by the Council, and especially by the President.

In times of particular crisis the function of intelligence is conspicuous in its importance. In such historical crises as Indo-China in 1954, the Chinese off-shore islands in 1954-1955, and Lebanon in 1958—to cite a few at random—the intelligence appraisal of the Director of Central Intelligence, the foreign policy appraisal by the Secretary of State, and the military appraisal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were indispensable ingredients in the deliberations held before the die was cast and the policy set by the President.

In the Planning Board. The Planning Board necessarily probes deeply into the latest intelligence on each subject that comes before it. A CIA Deputy Director is in regular attendance at the Board table, bringing to its deliberations and informed knowledge of the contents of special and general intelligence estimates. He participates from his point of view in the debate on current matters, and it would be as unthinkable to overlook his views as to overlook those of the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is seated at the table as adviser on military issues.

The CIA Deputy Director and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs seek to coordinate the preparation of intelligence estimates with the forward agenda of the Planning Board. To that end the agenda is tentatively scheduled for a period of two months or more ahead so that the flow of intelligence materials can be arranged to meet the policy-makers' demands. Of course, history sometimes takes a hand, and the scheduled forward agenda has to be suspended for the immediate consideration of a special estimate that has been urgently called for. There can be nothing static or cut-and-dried in scheduling ahead the Planning Board's work-load (and consequently the Council's forward agenda); it is entirely unpredictable how long a time may be consumed in the preparation of particular policy recommendations or what interruptions may be forced by extrinsic happenings. Whatever the order of business, however, one factor is essential: a foundation of the latest and best intelligence to build upon and a constant rechecking of intelligence material as time marches on to the Council deliberation and the Presidential decision.

In the OCB. Turning for a moment from policy formulation to the coordination of plans for carrying out approved policy, we find that in this work of the Operations Coordinating Board current intelligence is again a necessary ingredient. At the weekly meetings of the OCB over which the Under Secretary of State presides, there are in

regular attendance senior representatives of Defense, Treasury, Budget, USIA, AEC, and ICA, and the two cognizant Special Assistants to the President. At the informal Wednesday luncheon which always precedes the OCB meeting the Director of Central Intelligence has an opportunity to thrash out problems of a sensitive nature. At the more formal Board meetings which follow he is a full participant. The coordination of planning in the responsible departments and agencies for the execution of a policy which the President has approved requires the same up-to-the-minute intelligence that the making of the policy did.

The Annual Policy Review. The annual Estimate of the World Situation produced by USIB member agencies is awaited each year with the greatest interest—and anxiety—by those in the policy-making apparatus. It is an invaluable production, presenting as it does a distillation of the painstaking efforts of the entire intelligence community to state as of the year-end the dimensions of the foreign threat to our national security. It is written with scrupulous care, it is well documented, and it sets forth with clear distinction, where differences of opinion occur, the opposing views of the experts who cannot agree with the majority estimate. I conceive this annual basic estimate to be of great consequence—as a stimulant, as a guide, as a frank expression of differing views on matters which may be of highest significance. It is this estimate which constitutes each spring the point of departure for the recurring review of our basic national security policy.

The first step in this review is to schedule the Estimate of the World Situation for discussion at two or three meetings of the NSC Planning Board. At these meetings it is subjected to 7 to 10 hours of controversial discussion in a search for better understanding. Its contents are analyzed and dissected so that attention can be focused upon its most important conclusions. In some years distinguished consultants from “outside of government,” such men as General Gruenther, John J. McCloy, Arthur W. Burns, Karl R. Bendetsen, and Robert R. Bowie, have been invited to these Planning Board meetings. They have been asked, after study and review of the high points in the Estimate, to discuss them with the Planning Board at a meeting of several hours’ duration. Then these points, together with the consultants’ and the Planning Board’s reaction to them, have been brought before the National Security Council at several meetings wholly devoted to their consideration. Short papers presenting the policy issues and their implications are prepared by the Planning Board as a basis for Council discussion at these meetings.

The purpose of the procedure just described is not, of course, to try at the Planning Board or Council level to change or modify any part of the annual Estimate. The purpose is to sharpen understanding of the important aspects of the Estimate and to study and discuss in open meeting the policy implications thereof. Through this procedure the Council members become sharply aware of the high points in the Estimate and the differences in view regarding them, and can join in a give-and-take discussion without feeling bound by the more formal presentation of carefully prepared policy recommendations. Almost as important as the ultimate policy decision itself is the intellectual controversy which precedes it, the educative and consolidating effect of full and frank discussion, the exposure of views which have not become fully formed in departmental exercise, the emergence of novel and interesting ideas at the highest level.

The way in which this product of the intelligence community serves as a regular precursor to the Planning Board’s annual review of basic policy is a cogent illustration of the community’s essential role in the shaping of national security decisions.

A Model Case

It may be appropriate, at the close, to describe what in my view is the *ideal* procedure for formulating a national security policy. Let us take as an example not the annual broad policy review which may consume several months, but a national policy on the State of Ruritania.

First, the Ruritania item is scheduled far ahead on the Planning Board agenda, with three to five or more sessions devoted to it. At the first of these sessions the Board will have before it a national intelligence estimate on Ruritania. It will also have before it a factual and analytical statement, prepared by the responsible department or departments or by an interdepartmental committee, on the military, economic, political, and other germane aspects of the Ruritania policy problem. To this compilation of factual data and analysis, whether supplied in separate memoranda or as a staff study, have contributed the vast resources of the informed departments and agencies of government, the brains and experience of the operating personnel who work day after day in the particular area of Ruritania and have learned at first hand the strengths and limitations involved, the very persons who staff the departments and agencies that will be called upon to implement this policy they are working on when and if it receives Presidential approval.

The intelligence estimate and the departmental material are explained, discussed, and chewed over in one or more meetings of the Planning Board. A senior representative of a responsible department is likely asked to attend at the Board table and be questioned and cross-questioned about the factual information and tentative policy recommendations submitted by his department. The Board seeks to squeeze out of the material all the juice that it contains.

After these proceedings, a draft statement is prepared by the responsible department or by an interdepartmental or special committee. This draft will consist of a set of "general considerations" (drawn from the intelligence estimate and the factual and analytical material as a basis for policy recommendations), a statement of the "general objectives" of the proposed U.S. policy toward Ruritania, a more detailed proposal for "policy guidance" in the several areas of U.S.-Ruritania relations, and appendices covering anticipated financial costs of the proposed policy and comparison of military and economic expenditures and other data for past and future years.

At as many Planning Board meetings as required this draft statement is discussed, torn apart, revised. In the intervals between the meetings revised texts are drafted by the Planning Board assistants for consideration at the next meeting. Finally, from this arduous intellectual process emerges either full agreement on the correctness of the facts, the validity of the recommendations, and the clarity and accuracy of the text, or—as is often the case—sharp differences of opinion on certain major statements or recommendations. In the latter case, the draft policy statement will clearly and succinctly set forth, perhaps in parallel columns, these opposing views.

When the draft policy has been thus shaped, reshaped, corrected, revised, and finally stated, it is circulated to the Council at least ten days before the meeting which is to take up policy on Ruritania. Council members will thus have sufficient time to be briefed on the subject and familiarize themselves with the contents of the draft, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will have time to express in writing and circulate to Council members their formal military views on the exact text which the Council is to consider.

That is my concept of how the integrating procedure of the NSC mechanism should work when it is working at its best. Some such procedure is the desired goal, a

goal often approximated in actual performance. The views of all who have a legitimate interest in the subject are heard, digested, and combined, or in the case of disagreement stated separately. In a good many instances the views of experts or knowledgeable people from "outside of government" are sought and worked into the fabric at the Planning Board level. The intelligence estimates, the military views, the political views, the economic views, the fiscal views, views on the psychological impact—all are canvassed and integrated before the President is asked to hear the case argued and comes to his decision.

It is certainly true that human beings are fallible and that the instruments which they create are always susceptible of improvement. The mechanism which I have described, and its operation, can and will be improved as time goes on. But the main course of this integrative process seems to me mechanically and operatively sound. And it must be grounded on the firm base of the best and latest intelligence.

(From Volume 3 Number 4, p. 59, 1959; Unclassified)

A thoughtful former insider examines in depth the Soviet (and Western) intelligence services

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ¹

Alexander Orlov

Like the Western intelligence services, the Russians get information about foreign states from two principal sources, from secret informants and undercover agents and from legitimate sources such as military and scientific journals, published reference material, and records of parliamentary debates. But the Russians regard as true intelligence (*razvedka*) only the first type of information, that procured by undercover agents and secret informants in defiance of the laws of the foreign country in which they operate. Information obtained from legitimate sources and publications they consider mere research data. In the eyes of Russian officers it takes a real man to do the creative and highly dangerous work of underground intelligence on foreign soil, while the digging up of research data in the safety of the home office or library can be left to women or young lieutenants just beginning their careers. The Western intelligence services, on the other hand, treat both types of information as intelligence, often with a much higher regard for research than for undercover work.

Fundamental Doctrine

It is in these variant attitudes toward the two types of information that the difference between Soviet and Western intelligence doctrine begins to emerge. The difference is not just a theoretical one; in practice it affects every phase of intelligence activity from operational planning and choice of strategy to evaluation of the reliability of information procured and its importance to policy makers.

Both Soviet and Western intelligence services strive to learn the secret intentions, capabilities, and strategic plans of other states, but they don't go about it in the same way. The Russians believe that such important secrets can and should be procured directly from the classified files in offices of the government in question and from informants among its civil servants. When the Russians suspect that another country is trying to form a coalition directed against the Soviet Union, they don't seek information about it in newspaper editorials, panel discussions, or historical precedents, although all these sources may shed some light on the matter; they set out to steal the secret diplomatic correspondence between the conspiring states or to recruit an informant on the staff of the negotiators if they don't have one there already. When the Russians want to know the number of bombers in the air force of a potential adversary, they get the figure, not by doing library research on the productive capability of airplane plants or assembling educated guesses and rumors, but by asking their secret informers within the foreign air force or war ministry and by stealing the desired information from government files.

¹ The material in this article is excerpted from the author's subsequent book, *Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1963.

The Americans, on the other hand, and to a certain extent the British, prefer to rely more heavily on legitimately accessible documents. The American intelligence agencies are said to monitor as many as five million words daily—the equivalent of 50 books of average length—from foreign radio broadcasts alone. From enormous quantities of open material like this analysts derive a lot of information about foreign countries, their economies and finance, their industries, agriculture, and trade, their population and social trends, their educational and political systems, the structure of their governments, their leaders' past lives and present views, etc. Drawing on that colossal warehouse of encyclopedic data, intelligence officers write reports and compose national estimates of foreign countries for the benefit of policy makers.

Admiral Ellis Zacharias, Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence in the last war, wrote that in the Navy 95% of peacetime intelligence was procured from legitimately accessible sources, another 4% from semi-open sources, and only 1% through secret agents. Another authority on American intelligence, Gen. William J. Donovan, who headed the Office of Strategic Services during the war, expressed the same predilection for "open sources" by saying that intelligence is not the "mysterious, even sinister" thing people think it is, but more a matter of "pulling together myriad facts, making a pattern of them, and drawing inferences from that pattern." This predilection for open sources lies at the core of the American doctrine of intelligence.

But how can intelligence officers pick out from the vast amount of encyclopedic data that flows in to them the key developments for their purposes? One of the chiefs of American intelligence, a distinguished professor and noted scholar, had this to say on the subject:

How can surveillance [of the world scene] assure itself of spotting . . . the really unusual? How can it be sure of putting the finger on the three things per week out of the thousands it observes and the millions that happen which are really of potential import? The answer is . . . procure the services of wise men—and wise in the subject—and *pray that their mysterious inner selves are of the kind which produce hypotheses of national importance.*

In the Russian view, such an approach is but one step removed from mysticism and metaphysics. What if the "mysterious inner selves" of the researchers and analysts fail to produce the right hypotheses? How safe is it, in general, to rely on hypotheses in matters of such profound complexity as world politics, where nothing is stable and enemies of yesterday become today's friends and fight together against their former allies? A hypothesis may be wisdom itself, yet turn out to be utterly wrong. Not only intelligence officers but statesmen of the highest caliber have time and again been proved wrong in acting on undeniably wise hypotheses.

In 1940-41 Stalin based his strategy on the calculation that Hitler would not attack the Soviet Union. He knew that it was not in Germany's interests to get into a two-front war, and he thought that Hitler understood this too. In the spring of 1941 the British Joint Intelligence Committee also estimated that Hitler would not be so foolish as to add the powerful Soviet Union to his formidable enemies in the West. But these logical hypotheses went up in all-too-real smoke on 22 June that year.

Stalin, who was his own intelligence boss and liked to take a personal part in the cloak-and-dagger business, warned his intelligence chiefs time and again to keep away from hypotheses and "equations with many unknowns" and concentrate instead on acquiring well-placed informants and access to the secret vaults of foreign governments. He used to say, "An intelligence hypotheses may become your hobby horse on which you will ride straight into a self-made trap." He called it "dangerous guess-work." In 1932 he had ordered that our quarterly intelligence surveys of foreign

countries no longer be sent him. Although based on secret data, these surveys were interspersed with unsubstantiated hypotheses and subjective views; they corresponded roughly to the national estimates which the American intelligence agencies produce for the National Security Council. After that the NKVD sent him the cream of raw intelligence only—summaries of important documents stolen from other governments and reports from exceptionally valuable secret informants like foreign ambassadors and general staff officers.

During his periodic conferences with the chiefs of the intelligence services Stalin would often interject: "Don't tell me what you think, give me the facts and the source." But sometimes he would violate his own rule and ask one or another intelligence chief for an opinion. Such was the case during a joint conference which Stalin and Voroshilov had in the summer of 1936 with the chiefs of the NKVD and the Red Army Intelligence Department. Stalin asked Artouзов, deputy chief of military intelligence, "With whom would Poland side in a war between Germany, Italy, and Japan on the one side and Russia, France, and England on the other?" Without hesitation Artouзов answered: "Poland will always be with France and England." "You are a jackass," retorted Stalin. "If Poland didn't side with Germany against us, she would be crushed by the German mechanized divisions on their way to the Soviet Union and would not live to see another day, whereas if she allied herself with Germany she could hope to expand if things went well, and if things went badly she might still get a negotiated settlement." Artouзов did not live to see his illogical prediction come true; he was shot in the great purge, in 1937.

In the Soviet Union research on publicly accessible materials is conducted by the Academy of Sciences, the universities, the scientific journals, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Industry, Trade, Finance, and Statistics. The NKVD based its work 100% on secret sources and undercover agents. The Main Intelligence Department of the Army did study some legitimately accessible sources, but only those dealing with military matters, such as foreign military and scientific journals, army and navy manuals, military textbooks, topographic explorations, and anything printed anywhere about the armed forces of the world. But even in army intelligence the main efforts, at least 80% of the total, were concentrated on building and operating networks of secret informants and on the procurement of secret documents.

Had the Soviet intelligence agencies put their main efforts and resources into building up encyclopedias of world-wide information from overt sources and on processing and analyzing that enormous amount of incoming raw material, they would have never been able to acquire the secrets of the manufacture of the atomic and hydrogen bombs or the blueprints of the American nuclear-powered submarines or to infiltrate the key departments of the American, British, and European governments. Important state secrets and especially clues to the intentions and plans of potential enemies cannot be found in libraries or encyclopedias, but only where they are kept under lock and key. The task of intelligence services is to acquire the keys and deliver the secrets to their governments, thus providing them with the foreknowledge and orientation needed for the making of decisions.

When General Douglas MacArthur, who had been blamed for not having foreseen certain developments in the Korean War, was asked by the Senate investigating committee in 1951 to explain why the North Korean invasion caught the Americans by surprise, he gave a classic reply from which many an intelligence chief could take his cue. He said:

I don't see how it would have been humanly possible for any man or group of men to predict such an attack as that. . . . *There is nothing, no means or*

methods, except the accidental spy methods—if you can get somebody to betray the enemy's highest circles, that can get such information as that. It is guarded with a secrecy that you cannot overestimate.

Thus, under the fire of the investigation, General MacArthur who was not an expert in intelligence, arrived with excellent logic at an idea which touches the very heart of the intelligence problem. "There is nothing, no means or methods, except . . . spy methods . . . that can get information as that." This is the essence of the Soviet doctrine of intelligence.

Political Intelligence

While The Main Intelligence Department (GRU) of the Soviet Ministry of Defense does only military intelligence, the Foreign Directorate of the Committee of State Security (KGB), successor to the NKVD, is actively engaged in at least seven lines of intelligence and related work, not counting sabotage and guerrilla warfare.

The first line, which is considered the most important, is the so-called diplomatic intelligence, the purpose of which is to keep the Soviet government informed of the secret deals between the governments of capitalistic countries and of the true intentions and contemplated moves of each of these governments toward the Soviet Union. This information is to be procured from primary sources within the secret councils of the foreign governments. The principal sources are the following: foreign diplomats, including ambassadors; the staffs of foreign ministries, including code clerks, secretaries, etc.; private secretaries to members of the cabinet; members of parliaments; and ambitious politicians seeking financial aid and left wing support. The life history of such officials is studied beginning with their school years, and their character traits, weaknesses and vices, and intimate lives and friendships are analyzed with the purpose of finding the Achilles' heel of each and securing the right approach to him through the right person, say a former classmate, intimate friend, or relative.

These well-prepared approaches have often paid off. Some politicians have been lured into the Soviet network by promises that the Soviet Union would use its secret levers of influence in their countries to further their political fortunes. Such promises have often been accompanied by "subsidies," ostensibly to promote good will toward Russia but in reality a bribe. A number of high officials have succumbed to outright offers of money. Others, especially those who in their youth had belonged to Fabian and other idealistic circles, were influenced by humanitarian arguments and persuaded that they must help the Soviet Union stop the march of fascism. Considerable success was achieved among foreign diplomats tinted with homosexual perversions; it is no secret that the biggest concentration of homosexuals can be found in the diplomatic services of Western countries. Those of these who agreed to work for the Russian network were instructed to approach other homosexual members of the diplomatic corps, a strategy which was remarkably successful. Even when those approached declined the offer to collaborate, they would not denounce the recruiter to the authorities. Soviet intelligence officers were amazed at the mutual consideration and true loyalty which prevailed among homosexuals.

It is usually supposed easier to lure into the Soviet network a code clerk or secretary than a diplomat or statesman; a man in an important government position is expected to know better than to take the road to treachery, and he has much more to lose if caught doing so. The experience of Soviet intelligence has in many instances, however, not borne out this view. Honesty and loyalty may often be more deeply ingrained in simple and humble people than in men of high position. A man who took bribes when he was a patrolman does not turn honest when he becomes the chief of

police; the only thing that changes is the size of the bribe. Weakness of character, inability to withstand temptation, lightmindedness, wishful thinking, and bad judgment are also traits that accompany a man to the highest rungs of his career.

The consensus of Soviet intelligence chiefs has been that departmental and private secretaries in a foreign ministry are often more valuable as sources of information than an ambassador, because a well-placed secretary can supply documentary data on a wide scale, covering the policies of the foreign government toward a number of countries. An ambassador is considered a much bigger prize, however, because he can be used not only as a source of information but also as a competent consultant for the Russian Foreign Office and even as an agent who can influence to a certain extent the foreign policy of his government.

Military Intelligence

The second line of Soviet intelligence activity is to procure data on the military posture of Western and other countries, the quality and strength of their armies, navies, and air forces, their degree of mechanization, mobility, fire power, technological advancement, and modernization, and the productive capacity of the armament industries and the mobilization plans of the big powers. Soviet intelligence watches with a jealous eye every new invention in the field of arms and tries to steal it while it is still in the blueprint stage or on the drawing board so that Soviet inventors and engineers can be the first to apply it. With the advent of the nuclear and rocketry age, which has completely revolutionized the material base, strategy, and very concept of warfare, Soviet intelligence strains all its efforts to obtain immediate information on the progress being made by the leading Western countries in these advanced fields and to gauge the striking and retaliatory power of the Western world.

As we have said, the KGB does not look for this information in public documents. Neither is it interested in monitoring foreign radio transmissions and distilling from them crumbs of random information. It procures the military secrets of foreign governments from the classified files of the general staffs of those countries, from the secret reports of foreign defense ministries, from military research laboratories and proving grounds, and so it knows that what it gets represents, even if incompletely, the true facts on which Soviet policy makers can confidently base their decisions.

In wartime, military intelligence becomes the principal function of every branch of the Intelligence Directorate of the KGB. The main task of its field posts, its underground *residenturas* abroad, is then to inform the Soviet government by radio and other means about the war plans of the enemy, his troop concentrations and movements, the size of his uncommitted reserves in men and materiel, and the extent of the damage inflicted on the enemy by the air forces of the Soviet Union and its allies. Diplomatic intelligence concentrates the efforts of its informants and secret agents on watching the relations among the governments of the enemy coalition, with special emphasis on frictions among them. The *residenturas* must keep a sharp eye also on Russia's allies in the war, immediately signaling to the Soviet government if an ally puts out peace feelers and is gravitating toward a separate peace with the enemy. It may be recalled that during World War II the Kremlin sounded an alarm when it intercepted rumors that British representatives were about to meet in Franco's Spain with emissaries of Hitler. During the worst days of the last war, when Russia's defenses were crumbling and the Western allies were slow in opening a second front, there were moments when the Western leaders were jittery at the thought that Stalin might try to save what was left of the country by making a separate peace with Germany.

While the *residenturas* abroad keep the government informed of the enemy's grand strategy and his capabilities and vulnerabilities, day-to-day tactical or combat

intelligence is taken care of by the intelligence sections of the Soviet armed forces and by the special detachments (*Osoby Otdel*) of the KGB attached to all army units down to the regimental level. It is their duty to supply the Soviet commander with data on the size, disposition, and fighting strength of the enemy force with which the troops under his command will soon be locked in battle. The standard sources of military intelligence are supplemented by material obtained in raids the KGB guerrilla detachments make on enemy headquarters, by ground and aerial photo reconnaissance, and by the interrogation of prisoners, refugees, and spies who pose as refugees.

Economic Warfare

The third line of Soviet intelligence is called economic intelligence, which contrary to what might be supposed has little to do with studying the economy of foreign countries. It was created for the purposes of exercising State control over Soviet export and import operations and of protecting Soviet foreign trade from the pressures and abuses of international cartels and other organizations of monopolistic capital.

In the 1930s, for instance, the Division of Economic Intelligence discovered that the biggest electric concerns of the world had entered into a "gentlemen's agreement" according to which they would not compete with each other in their dealings with Soviet Russia and would overcharge her on purchase up to 75% over current world prices. I myself saw a letter signed by the vice president of General Electric Co. addressed to the presidents of the German AEG and the Swiss Brown Boveri Co. which contained a list of prices made up especially for the Soviet Union 60 to 75% higher than the regular market prices. General Electric tried to justify this extortion by pointing out that Russia's credit standing was "not too good." The gentlemen's agreement was finally broken up by the Soviet government, but not before Soviet trade had suffered losses totaling tens of millions of dollars.

Plants

The fourth line of Soviet intelligence is misinformation. The Soviet government is interested not only in obtaining information about the policies and impending moves of other countries but also in misinforming and misleading the foreign governments concerning its own position and intentions. But whereas in procuring secret information from abroad the intelligence officer is given free rein to steal whatever he considers valuable, the task of misinforming the outer world about the Soviet Union cannot be left to the discretion of the individual officer or even of the intelligence service as a whole. What false information or rumors should be deviously placed within earshot of some foreign government is a question of high policy, since the purpose is to induce this government to do what the Kremlin wants it to do, perhaps to bluff it into inaction or into making a concession. In this area, therefore, Soviet intelligence cannot act without specific directives as to the substance of the misinformation and the way it should be planted.

When in the 1930s, for instance, the Soviet government wanted to obtain a mutual defense treaty with France in order to counteract the growing menace of Hitler's Germany, Soviet intelligence was given instructions to introduce into French General Staff channels certain pages from a German army report which showed that Germany was planning to occupy the Rhineland at the beginning of 1936 and invade France within eighteen months after that. Similarly, at about this same time, an effort was made to shake England out of her complacency by slipping into British intelligence channels (through a German double agent) inflated figures concerning German aircraft production; these created quite a stir in the highest councils of the British government. Here the task of the misinformation desk of the NKVD had been to fabricate

ostensible photocopies of the German documents with such skill that they would seem genuine even to trained military experts.

During the Spanish civil war, in which a Russian tank brigade fought against the forces of General Franco and Russian pilots flew the newest and best Soviet fighter planes (I-15 and I-16) and medium bombers (CB) against the German air squadrons supporting him, the misinformation desk was ordered to introduce into German military intelligence channels the information that these Soviet planes were not of the latest design, that Russia had in her arsenal thousands of planes of second and third succeeding generations possessing much greater speed and higher ceiling. In August 1937 German experts had examined and tested two Soviet I-16 fighters when they landed by mistake on an enemy air strip in the Madrid sector, and they had been amazed at the quality and performance of the planes, which in some respects surpassed German fighters. Now the false information that the Russians had on the production line still better and more modern models served Stalin's evident aim of impressing upon Hitler that the Soviet Union was better armed than he thought and that it would be wise for Germany to have Russia as a partner than as an opponent.

Penetration

The fifth line of Soviet intelligence is infiltration into the security agencies and intelligence services of foreign countries. This activity holds a special challenge and a peculiar fascination for Soviet intelligence officers. Although they regard foreign intelligence officers as mercenary spies (while thinking of themselves as devoted revolutionaries carrying out dangerous assignments for the Party), the Soviet officers do have a feeling of kinship with them and react to an encounter with one of them with the same thrill and curiosity that enemy fighter pilots feel on sighting each other across a space of sky. Their hostile attitude toward their foreign counterparts becomes sincerely friendly the moment the latter begin to cooperate as informants.

The principal aims pursued in infiltrating foreign *security* agencies are the following: to find out what these agencies know about Soviet intelligence operations in the country in question; to determine whether they have succeeded in planting counterspies in the Soviet network or in recruiting anyone connected with the residentura. to learn in good time of any intended arrests of network personnel; and to use their facilities to check up on persons in whom the Soviet residentura happens to be interested. The penetration of foreign *intelligence* services is done to find out whether they have succeeded in creating a spy network in Soviet Russia, and if so who their spies are, what secret information they have transmitted, and what lines of communication they use.

In some of the Western countries, furthermore, the intelligence services have access to the confidential papers of other departments of the government, including defense and foreign affairs. This practice is justified on the ground that it helps them evaluate the information from their own secret sources abroad and render more accurate estimates of the intentions and capabilities of other countries. Whatever the merits of this argument, the NKVD was quick to take advantage of the resulting convenient concentration in one place of secret documents from several government departments; it instructed its residenturas abroad to try to procure from the intelligence services not only their own information but also that which they receive from other government departments, for example military attaché reports and the political analyses and estimates of ambassadors.

Although the intelligence services of different capitalistic countries do not always have harmonious relations with one another, thanks to national rivalry and personal jealousies, they do cooperate with one another to a certain extent in combatting Soviet

espionage and subversion. Some of them exchange information in this field, forwarding to each other photographs of known or suspected Soviet spies. Soviet acquisition of this correspondence reveals what they know about Russian intelligence activities and may sometimes warn of an impending exposure and arrest of an agent. In my time, however, the secret information procured from foreign intelligence services rarely gave us cause for alarm. Much of it was incompetent and out of date. As a rule the strength of the Soviet armed forces was ridiculously belittled. The reports on Soviet espionage activities were based more on hindsight than foresight, and they frequently contained outright fantasies concocted by unscrupulous doubles and falsifiers. But though much of the information collected by the foreign intelligence services about Russia was found to be worthless, it was by no means worthless to Soviet intelligence to know about this.

It is generally said that knowledge of two things is indispensable to the charting of foreign policy in a time of crisis—the real power of one's own country and the power of the potential enemy. But to these a third must be added; one must also know what image one's own power creates in the eyes of the adversary. This is very important, because however distorted that image, it is what he is going to act upon. By infiltrating the intelligence services of foreign countries Soviet intelligence can learn and report to policy makers how each country assesses the capabilities and deficiencies of the Soviet Union. It is then up to the policy makers to figure out what mistakes the potential enemy will be likely to make when the chips are down as a result of the distortions in his view of the Soviet Union as a world power.

The infiltration of a foreign intelligence service is a much more hazardous operation than the acquisition of informants in other government departments, because the foreign intelligence officers are wise to such practices and may maneuver the recruiting officer into a trap or grab him outright before he can get away. The KGB therefore advises its residenturas not to rush things but to approach and cultivate first a friend or relative of the target officer and use him as a go-between. Then the actual recruiting and all meetings until the recruited officer has proved his sincerity (by turning over important information) should take place on territory outside the jurisdiction of the target country.

The safest way to infiltrate a foreign intelligence service without fear of being trapped is to transplant a completely reliable agent into that organization, for example to induce an old and trusted informant in some other branch of the government to seek employment with the intelligence service. Sometimes it may be necessary for him first to cultivate socially for this purpose a senior officer of the intelligence service. Agents planted in a foreign intelligence service can be used not only to procure secret information but also as a channel through which misinformation about the Soviet Union and other countries can be introduced.

The intelligence and security services of none of the big world powers have escaped infiltration by Soviet agents. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, as head of the CIA, was aware of Soviet successes in this field, and in September 1953 he expressed his apprehension in the following words: "I believe the communists are so adroit and adept that they have infiltrated practically every security agency of the government."

Political Action

The sixth line of Soviet intelligence is to influence the decisions of foreign governments through secret agents occupying important positions within them. In the last two decades there have been quite a few instances in which highly placed Soviet secret agents were able to tip the scales of policy in favor of the Soviet Union. Some of these

agents started out as junior diplomats in the foreign offices of the West and climbed with the help of their socially prominent families to high government positions. Others were already mature politicians and statesmen when they were seduced by money and other base considerations. One of the leading members of Mussolini's cabinet and the Fascist Grand Council succumbed to an offer of money and agreed to collaborate with Soviet Russia.

A leading member of the parliament of a mid-European country, who was not thought to be a friend of the Soviet Union, would meet secretly with the Soviet ambassador and take his instructions concerning the position he should assume in certain matters affecting Soviet interests. In another European country an inspector of the national secret police, who had become a Soviet informant, reported the police had documentary proof that an influential member of the cabinet was a partner in a big narcotics ring and owned, together with a famous racketeer, a luxury brothel a few blocks away from the presidential palace in the center of the capital. This minister was so powerful in the councils of the government, as well as in the underworld, that the head of the secret police was afraid to tangle with him. Moscow ordered the residentura to steal all the incriminating documents, and photographs of them were shown to the minister at the Soviet embassy, as a "friendly gesture," by the Soviet ambassador himself, who happened to be a former chief of the Foreign Department of the OGPU, i.e., of Soviet intelligence. The friendly gesture was well understood, and it inaugurated a period of close collaboration between the minister and Soviet intelligence. His task was not merely to provide information but to influence the policies of his government as directed by the Soviet Foreign Commissariat.

Another type of KGB political action is to pave the way in ticklish international matters for later negotiations between the Soviet Foreign Office and other governments. If exploratory talks conducted, directly or through go-betweens, by Soviet intelligence agents with representatives of a foreign government produce results satisfactory to both sides, the official diplomats of both countries can then take over. If not, the Kremlin remains free to disclaim any knowledge of them. A Russian intelligence officer by the name of Ostrovsky who had secretly negotiated the establishment of diplomatic relations with Roumania became the first Soviet ambassador to that country.

Another activity along this line consists of clandestine attempts to induce leaders of a political opposition to stage a coup d'état and take over the government. The inducement would be a promise of political and financial support and, if the state happened to border on Soviet territory, military aid as well. In 1937, for instance, one of the chiefs of intelligence was commissioned by Stalin personally to enter into secret negotiations with former Roumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Titulesku, who lived at that time in Menton, on the Franco-Italian border, and persuade him to overthrow the reactionary regime of Prime Minister Maniu. Stalin offered financial and military aid against a promise by Titulesku that upon assumption of power he would sign a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union.

Industrial Intelligence

Although intelligence activity is as old as society, this seventh line of Soviet operation is something new, first begun in 1929. Its purpose was to assist in the industrialization of the Soviet Union by stealing production secrets—new inventions, secret technological processes, etc.—from the advanced countries of Europe and America. Soviet intelligence organizations abroad began to recruit engineers, scientists, and inventors working in the laboratories and plants of the big industrial concerns of the world.

At this time the Soviet Union, besides buying big quantities of machinery and even whole plants from the industrial companies of the West, negotiated with them for the purchase of patents and the know-how for production processes. A number of such purchases were made and foreign engineers came to instruct the Russians in the application of the new methods. But often, when the price demanded by foreign concerns for their "technical aid" was too high—it always ran into many millions of dollars—the head of the Soviet government would challenge the Foreign Department of the NKVD to steal the secrets in question from them. The response of these challenges was invariably enthusiastic, and after a number of them had been successfully met the new Division for Industrial Intelligence was created within the NKVD Foreign Department.

Sometimes the theft of all the necessary formulas, blueprints, and instructions would still not enable Soviet engineers and inventors to construct a complicated mechanism or duplicate a production process. They would need the human component, the special skill or engineering know-how. In such cases officers of the Division for Industrial Intelligence would, with offers of additional rewards, persuade the appropriate foreign engineers to make a secret trip to Russia to instruct the Russian engineers or supervise the laboratory experiments on the spot. Precautions were taken to insure that the traveler's passport should not bear any border stamps or other traces of his visit to the Soviet Union: the engineer would travel with his own passport only to the capital of an adjacent country, where he would turn it over for safekeeping to the local Soviet agent and get from him a false one on which he would proceed to Russia; then on the return trip he would turn this in and pick up the genuine passport where he had left it. The fees paid by the Russians for such trips ran sometimes as high as ten thousand dollars for a few days, but the savings realized amounted to millions of dollars. The following is a typical such operation.

A Worm Turns

In view of the fact that the Soviet government was spending huge sums of money on industrial diamonds needed for the expanding oil industry, metallurgy, and various geological projects, it was naturally interested in an offer made by the German Krupp concern to supply newly invented artificial diamonds almost as hard and good as natural ones. The new product was named "vidi," from the German *wie Diamant*, "like diamond." The Commissariat of Heavy Industry bought some of the vidi, tested them in drilling operations, and was amazed at their high quality. It decided to buy the patent from Krupp and have German engineers build a plant to produce them in the Soviet Union.

Soon a delegation of German experts headed by two Krupp directors arrived in Moscow. Knowing how badly the Russians needed industrial diamonds for the five-year plan, they demanded a staggering price for this technical aid. When the deal was being discussed at the Politburo Stalin turned to the head of the NKVD and said: "The bastards want too much money. Try to steal it from them. Show what the NKVD can do!" This challenge was taken up eagerly, and one of the chiefs of the Foreign Department was charged with the operation.

The first step was to find out the location of the vidi factory and the names of the inventor and the engineers in charge of production. This task was assigned to a German agent, scientist Dr. B. In the Berlin Technische Hochschule, with which he was associated, Dr. B. looked up all the available treatises on achieving hard metal alloys and then approached a noted professor who had written some of them. From him he learned that a Krupp inventor had succeeded in attaining the hardest alloy known and that this was being produced in a plant on the outskirts of Berlin.

Dr. B. now went to the site of the plant and dropped in at a beer hall frequented by its technical personnel. After visiting the place a few times, he engaged some of the technicians in conversation. He represented himself as a scientist who was writing a book on hard metal alloys. "Oh, then you are working with our Cornelius," said one technician. Dr. B. said no, but he had known a Professor Cornelius. "No," said the technician, "he is not a professor, he is only a foreman in our plant, but he is a man who could teach the professors how to make industrial diamonds."

Through an inspector of the Berlin Polizei Presidium, another secret Soviet informant, the Russian residentura obtained information on Cornelius, including his home address and the next day Dr. B. rang the doorbell there. He was admitted by Cornelius' wife, who told him that her husband had not yet returned from the plant. This Dr. B. knew; he had come early on purpose, hoping to learn something about Cornelius from his wife. He told her that he was a Doctor of Science and was writing a treatise on hard metal alloys and that his colleagues at the Technische Hochschule advised him to see Herr Cornelius, who might be helpful to him. He added that if Herr Cornelius was really an expert in that field and if he was willing to contribute to the research he might earn some money on the side.

Frau Cornelius, flattered that a scientist from the famous Technische Hochschule should come to seek advice from her husband and stimulated by the prospect of earning extra money, began to praise her husband's abilities and high reputation at the plant. She said that the engineer who had invented the process for producing artificial diamonds had trusted only her husband, because he alone knew how to handle the specially built electric oven, and now that the inventor had fallen out with Krupp and quit her husband was practically in charge of the whole thing. He could demand from Krupp any salary he wanted, and they would have to give it to him; but he was not that kind of man. For him devotion to the company came first.

When Cornelius returned home Dr. B. restated the purpose of his visit and, in order to underscore his purely scientific interest in the matter and allay any possible suspicion, invited him to his personal room at the Technische Hochschule for the following Saturday. On Saturday, after a talk at the Hochschule, he took him for dinner to his luxurious ten-room flat in the eight-story apartment house which he had inherited from his father. He had seen at once that Cornelius was too illiterate technologically to be able to explain in scientific terms the secrets of production, even if he wanted to. He was only a foreman trained by the inventor to operate the oven. What Dr. B. wanted was to find out the name of the inventor, his whereabouts, and the history of his break with the Krupp concern. After an excellent dinner and a few glasses of brandy, Cornelius enjoyed telling the story to his genial host.

The inventor's name was Worm. When he saw what fabulous prices Krupp was getting for the industrial diamonds which he had created and which cost the company so little, he decided to build secretly a plant of his own and realize some of these profits for himself. He borrowed money from the bank, rented a little shop, made an oven like the one he had constructed for Krupp, installed the minimum equipment needed, and made a few profitable sales of vidi to foreign customers. With the proceeds of these he was able to pay off part of the loan, and it looked as though he was on the way to becoming a rich man. But at this point the Krupp concern learned about his disloyal competition and swooped down on him with all the fury of an industrial giant. He was summarily fired. Customers were warned that if they bought a single ounce of vidi from him Krupp would never sell them anything. The bank suddenly became rigid and demanded prompt repayment. In spite of his talents as an engineer and inventor Worm could not find work. All doors were politely but firmly closed in his face.

Dr. B. hurried to see Herr Worm. Here too, he contrived to ring the doorbell when the man was not at home; he had found that women are more talkative than men, especially when they have an opportunity to do a bit of advertising for their husbands. Frau Worm was overjoyed that someone was interesting himself in her husband. The Krupps were brutes, she said; they ruled the country. Her husband was a martyr. They had driven him to desperation. All his savings had gone into the enterprise, and it was ruined with one blow.

Dr. B. listened to her story with unfeigned sympathy. He said he had an interesting proposition for her husband which might get him out of his difficulties. From that moment he became her trusted friend, the man who was going to save her husband from strangulation by the Krupps. He left his telephone number for Worm to call.

The next day they met at the Technische Hochschule and from there went to Dr. B.'s apartment. Dr. B. suggested that in order to escape from the Krupp stranglehold Worm would have to offer his talents to a foreign concern. He said he knew a big Scandinavian company which might be interested in acquiring the secret process of vidi production and entering the field in competition with Krupp; he would check. A few days later he informed Worm that the company was definitely interested; it had authorized him to advance the inventor up to ten thousand German marks. He asked Worm to submit a description of the vidi production process and furnish data on equipment needed, cost, etc.

For the time being, Dr. B. declined to name the company. This did not necessarily look suspicious, because as a go-between he was entitled to a commission and would need to protect his own interests. But Worm got a strange hunch. "I want to warn you," he said, "that if my invention is needed for the Russians I will have nothing to do with them!" Dr. B., taken aback, hastened to reassure him that it was a Scandinavian concern all right. It turned out that Worm was a fanatical Nazi and Russian-hater.

Something had to be done to overcome that burning hatred if Worm was to be maneuvered into giving his vidi invention to Russia. While he was writing up his process Dr. B. would supplement the advance, giving him another thousand marks every week or so, which delighted Frau Worm. He also had the Worms several times for dinner at his home. When Frau Worm wanted to buy things which she had been denying to herself for so long, but her husband kept too wary an eye on his dwindling advances, Dr. B. sensed this and immediately came to her assistance. He privately gave her money for herself with the understanding that she would repay it when her husband struck it rich; he was convinced that a prosperous future was just around the corner for them.

Worm's description of his process was sent to Moscow. After a close study, the Russian engineers declared that without the personal guidance of the inventor they would have trouble constructing and operating the special oven required; it was supposed to make several thousand revolutions a minute under an enormously high temperature. Moscow wanted to have the inventor at any cost. Now the friendship Dr. B. had cultivated with Frau Worm paid off. She cajoled her husband and wrangled with him for a whole week and at last brought him to the realization that they had no choice, that this was their last and only chance.

The Soviet trade delegation in Berlin signed an official two-year contract with Worm, under which he received a flat sum in German currency, a monthly allowance in marks for his wife—who preferred to remain in Germany—and a salary for himself in Russian rubles. He was entitled to a suite in a first-class Moscow hotel with restaurant and other services and to a chauffeured automobile and two vacations in

Germany per year at Russia's expense. He took with him to Moscow a German engineer by the name of Mente who had been his assistant at the Krupp plant.

Worm's letters to his wife breathed hatred toward everything Russian. He contracted rheumatic fever during his stay and returned to Germany a broken and embittered man. But he had fulfilled his contract with the Soviets to the letter, turning over to them his cherished brainchild, the priceless vidi process.

(From Volume 7 Number 2, p. 41; 1963; Unclassified)

This true story of an exceptional spy has been reconstructed from records of the postwar debriefings of participants and witnesses to his adventures

THE SHORTHAND OF EXPERIENCE

Thomas F. Elzweig

This is the story of two men who broke nearly every rule in the spy's handbook, and were right. One was a German. The other was one of the top drawer Czechoslovak military intelligence officers. As a young man, long before World War II, he had studied intensively the unchanging axioms of espionage, and was thoroughly versed in these fundamentals:

Identify the agent. Don't do clandestine work with parties unknown.

Study the agent. Know as much about him as possible before asking him to work for you.

Recruit the agent. If it is he that selects you, beware of provocation. *You* choose *him*—for access, reliability, motivation, stability, etc.

Train the agent. Untutored, he is a menace to himself, to you, and to your service.

Test the agent. Be skeptical not only of his capability but also of his loyalty. Establish all possible independent checks on all his contacts.

Control the agent. You ask all the questions; he provides the answer. You order; he obeys.

The man who breaks these rules in ignorance is likely to die young, at least professionally. But General Z, the Czech, and Major L, the German, broke them wittingly and for good reasons. The result was a brilliantly successful operation that began before World War II, provided Czechoslovakia and the Western Allies with invaluable intelligence, and survived to the end of the war. It was like the other great espionage coups of history, which are almost all full of deviations and exceptions to the rules. But in all of them the controlling service planned the rule-breaking before the operation began. It did not begin by the book and then stumble into anarchy.

The story begins on 4 March 1937, four years after der Korporal became der Fuehrer. The wind from the north, Dr. Goebbels, howled around the ears of the Czechs. But their houses were snug, their stores full; they were prosperous and free. The Nazi occupation of Austria was still six months away. A year and a half would pass before Chamberlain would go to Munich with his symbolic umbrella and return in a figurative barrel.

In Prague the Agrarian Party was in power. It saw keenly the full national granary but only dimly the shaking of Sudeten German fists. And this myopia spread throughout the country. Only a handful of people, among them the Czech intelligence officers, saw the growing danger clearly. Intelligence was busier than it had ever been before. On the positive side, it was straining to learn everything possible about German political and military intentions, while counterintelligence struggled to prevent or

manipulate the activities of the Abwehr. This small group of men knew that war was coming.

The Agent Recruits a Case Officer

General Z reached his office in the General Staff building punctually at eight. He hung up coat and cap, sat at his desk, read his correspondence. In other offices administrators and analysts, code clerks and comptrollers, were also starting the day. The machinery began to move. The general sorted his correspondence swiftly. Policy, promotions, pyroelectric techniques. And then he stopped. He had opened an envelope typewritten in Czech and addressed to him by full name, rank, and function. It had been mailed in Chomutov, a town in northwestern Bohemia. It held a three-page letter, also typewritten, but in German, with only the initial L for signature. This is what it said:

Dear Sir:

I offer you my collaboration. After we have had a personal meeting and you have been given the first samples, and after mutual agreement on the terms of further cooperation, I shall be paid one hundred thousand Reichsmarks.¹ I need this money urgently.

Here is what I can do in return. I can provide you with information, partially documentary, on German preparations for mobilization; detailed order of battle; documentary material on Wehrmacht developments and current dispositions; documentary material on German defences along the Saxony border; information concerning German armament, tanks, planes, and airfields; Sudeten-German underground activities and the support provided for these by the government of the Third Reich. I can also provide information about German espionage in Czechoslovakia.

Our interview will take place in the restaurant at the Chemnitz railway station. The time and date are for you to select. Please send your reply, general delivery, to [a code name], Chomutov, main post office.

L.

General Z read the letter several times. Never in his wide experience had a peddler made quite so crassly commercial an offer. You couldn't take it at face value: even worse than the possibility of fabrication was the probability of provocation. Chemnitz was well inside Germany, and the specification of the meeting place would make it simple for the German police to arrest a Czech officer there. And what an array of information the writer claimed—not only military, but political and clandestine as well. Surely no one German could have access to so much. The language, too, had a faintly technical flavor, as though formulated by a military intelligence service. General Z had recently conducted a successful provocation against the Abwehr; sweet is revenge. No doubt the technical examination of letter and envelope would prove only that both were sterile. Chomutov was in Sudeten territory; a check at the post office there would probably draw a blank.

But while the general's mind pondered everything that was wrong with the letter, his nose was telling him something different. Somehow the distinctive odor of the phony was missing. His mind, intrigued, began to consider what was right about the letter. Well, it was *too* suspicious; the Abwehr had demonstrated that its provocations were professional. Again, it dangled too many kinds of bait. A provocation is built like

¹ \$40,000 at that time.

a tunnel; he who enters may go deeper and deeper, seeing more and more; but he cannot turn to left or right. He is confined to that area which the provoking service can control and exploit. Then too, that sentence about needing the money urgently—a personal consideration, of no concern to the Czechs, somehow not the sort of thing that an enticer would hit upon.

The general summoned the chiefs of his espionage and counterintelligence sections. Both read the letter attentively. Both looked a bit blankly at the general, as though to inquire why he asked advice in so elementary a matter. Both had the same opinion: swindle or provocation.

The letter was subjected to technical examination. Nothing. The Chomutov postmark was genuine. The general decided not to risk a check at the post office, because it would not reveal a hoax and might ruin a possibility. What next? If he dropped the matter, he could not be wrong.

Instead a letter went to Chomutov. It expressed interest in L's offer but flatly rejected a meeting on German soil. L could select any Czech site he found convenient. He was to send his reply to the Chomutov post office, box 83. The general particularly liked this last touch. It did not matter if every postal employee in Chomutov were a Nazi: his own men would watch. They would find out who picked up the letter to L; or, if anything went wrong, they would at least see who slipped L's reply into box 83.

But they didn't. They could not determine who picked up the Czech reply, in its distinctive off-blue envelope. And the postal clerk who put L's response in box 83 was sorting his mail in normal fashion. The letter was stamped.

L proposed that General Z meet him in Linz, Austria. Technical examination revealed only that his second letter was like the first, written on the same German machine. Perhaps it was just a diversion operation. If so, it had already succeeded in tying up a surveillance team and some technical experts, not to mention one of the key men in Czech intelligence.

Linz, of course, was as unacceptable as Chemnitz. By this time the Nazis were already on the march in Austria. The *Anschluss* was coming, and everyone knew it. So L received another rejection and another proposal to meet on Czech soil.

Finally he agreed. As the place he chose Kraslitz, a little town situated directly on the Saxony-Bohemia border and lying partly in Germany, partly in the CSR. He set the time at midnight on 6 April 1937. His letter said that he could be recognized—in the unlikely event that anyone else should be standing in the square of the sleepy town at such an hour—because he would set his watch by the clock in the tower.

General Z was decidedly unecstatic about this proposal. The border town could not be controlled as tightly as a wholly Czech village. The dark forest which came marching to the outskirts on one side was on German territory. Ninety-nine percent of the 8,000 villagers were Sudeten Germans, the most fanatical of Nazis. Available for protection in this situation was a six-man patrol of local gendarmes with doubtful loyalties. Recently there had been several kidnappings along the German border. Not long ago, in fact, an intelligence officer of the East Bohemian 4th Division had been taken by force.

The general nevertheless decided that he too would be in the town square at midnight. He knew perfectly well, of course, that by simple logic he should be anywhere in Czechoslovakia except Kraslitz that night. But his initial decision to pursue this matter had been intuitive, and it was not to be expected that later decisions could be based entirely on reason. General Z knew his subordinates agreed unanimously that L's offer was a piece of cheese poised neatly on an especially vicious trap. Therefore,

he did not feel justified in forcing them to run a risk which he evaded. But at least preparations could be made. His own trusted men, heavily armed, would form a hidden ring around the square. The most loyal of the gendarmes (or least disloyal, thought the general) would serve as outer circle. Signals for the inner ring were established: one to indicate the approach of L, or anyone else; the other to warn of danger. Finally, the general would remain in Kraslitz only long enough to identify L. Within minutes he and L, with selected subordinates, would be in a car and on their way to Chomutov, some thirty miles away, where a villa had been fully equipped for just such a purpose.

The night was black. There was no moon, and an oppressive blanket of black clouds shut away the stars. There was no wind either. Standing at one side of the seemingly empty square, the general heard all the unreal noises created by the ears of a waiting man. Now and then he glanced at his luminescent watch. The unlighted clock was as invisible as the tower in which it was ensconced. Darkness blotted out everything. The hands on the general's watch moved to berate himself silently. It was obvious now. The cat had spotted the mouse in the town square, but it had also spotted the waiting dogs. No one would come.

Then, 25 minutes past 12, the general saw a figure standing motionless in the center of the empty space, near the fountain. Neither the approach signal nor the danger signal had been sounded. The stranger had apparently not walked into the square. He just stood there. Then he turned toward the town clock that he could not see, raised an arm, and made an indistinct motion with the other hand. Immediately a young Czech officer emerged from a doorway, walked over to the man, and spoke a few words. The two approached the general, who now could see that the stranger was carrying a suitcase in either hand and a long roll of white paper under one arm. No greetings were exchanged. The three men walked swiftly to the car, parked in a nearby street. There a staff officer, drawn aside to report, said that neither the outer nor the inner ring had spotted anyone entering the square. The general ordered that the outer ring stay in place for three more hours.

The villa in Chomutov was comfortably furnished and warm. Among its facilities was an excellently equipped photographic laboratory. The experts and technicians were waiting.

In the living room L put down his suitcases and turned to the general. "This one," he said in fluent, accented Czech, "holds what you may keep. You'll have to photograph the contents of the other, which I must take back with me. I have to be over the border before dawn."

"We'll help you return," offered the general.

"Thank you, but I prefer that the car drop me near Kraslitz; I'll make my own way back. I know the border well."

The general heard the faint click of the shutter as a concealed camera photographed L while he spoke. He hoped that L had not heard it. Two Czech officers, both blown to the Abwehr, came into the room. One left with the suitcases and the roll of paper. The other, a colonel, remained. The three men sat down.

Identification, Study, and Control

The general leaned forward slightly. The time had come, clearly, to get this operation on the tracks. "Would you mind telling me your name?" he asked pleasantly.

"Yes," L said.

"Oh. Well, in that case, would you please state your occupation?"

"No."

"But this information is necessary, so that I can determine what possibilities exist, what you can do for us."

"You have my suitcases. They speak for themselves."

"Why do you need 100,000 Reichsmarks?"

"For personal reasons."

"Is the money your only reason for offering to work for us?"

"No," said L, and now for the first time he looked less guarded and withdrawn. "My fiancée, who comes from Lausitz, is of Slavic origin. I do not like the things that our beloved Fuehrer and his buddies have been saying about Slavs. In fact, there are several things that I do not like about our heroic leader and his little group of trained animals."

"Money and ideology do not usually go hand in hand this way," the general observed bluntly.

L smiled. "If it were not for the devil," he said, "who would believe in God?"

They fell silent, waiting for the analysts to report whether the stuff was jewels or junk. No one said anything until, on signal from a sergeant, the general excused himself and left the room. In the hallway the first analyst reported, and then the second. They were enthusiastic. The report on the defenses along the Saxony border tallied with information from other sources.

It was hard to believe that Czech intelligence now had in its possession a true copy of the German *Grenzschutz* plan in all its meticulous detail. The plan for border protection was in all the countries of Europe one of the most closely guarded secrets. The Germans had ordered a state of border alert in order to proceed with their mobilizations on schedule and without detection; knowledge of the preparations for war would reveal to the Czechs the areas of main concentration of force, and therefore their intentions, not to mention other logical deductions. Yet the information on border defenses checked out.

The general re-entered the living-room, the border plan still in his hand. "This document is a hand-made copy, I presume?"

"Yes," said L. "I did it myself. Took me two months."

"It will require further study," said the general.

L grinned. "It's all there. And now that you have it, you may be interested to know that we have yours too." From his pocket he drew several sheets of paper and passed them to the general. The briefest of inspections was sufficient to reveal that it was the Czech border plan for Northeastern Bohemia and that it was wholly accurate.

"Where did you get this?" the general asked.

"I am sorry, but I shall not be safe unless you figure it out for yourself. I do assure you that this plan, like everything else I've brought, is genuine."

(Subsequent investigation led finally to the arrest of a captain of the Czech General Staff. He was hanged for treason.)

The general turned to other documents. Two contained original orders from Abwehrstelle Chemnitz concerning certain subversive activities of Sudeten Germans.

The nature of the orders made it clear that the underground work was directed entirely from inside Germany, by the Abwehr. Moreover, it had been instigated by German intelligence and was financed by Abwehr funds. (These documentary proofs were shown to the Czech government, which in turn passed their contents to its Western allies, but the evidence was largely ignored in the prevailing atmosphere of appeasement.)

After four hours of talking with L and examining his materials, General Z had formed several conclusions about the German. First, he had a military background; it was apparent in his speech, in his bearing, and in the documents he had submitted. Next, he was an Abwehr officer or at least was closely associated with the German service. He knew Saxony well and specialized operationally in this border area. He was particularly knowledgeable in security matters. Apparently he had direct access to secret documents. He was intelligent.

Mentally General Z reviewed the standard data form for agents: true name(s) in full, with variants; aliases; exact place of birth; etc., etc., etc. Not one of the required blanks could be filled. There were only these deductions and conjectures.

So the general hired L. He paid him his 100,000 Reichsmarks. And feeling rather like a man who props up one splintered door at the entrance of a building wracked by war or revolution, he asked a little weakly, "I wonder if you would mind signing a receipt? The administrative people . . ." His voice trailed off.

L grinned companionably. "I know," he said. "Sure, I'll sign it."

He picked up the receipt, made a motion, and returned it to the general. It now bore a block L in the lower right-hand corner.

Well, there was one consolation. In General Z's shop the auditors had no jurisdiction over operational expenses. Otherwise this first meeting with L would have been the last. And maybe it should be, the general thought.

"Naturally," he said in firm tones, "our work is beginning in unorthodox fashion. I quite understand that it had to begin this way, or not at all. But I'm sure you'll agree with me that it would be best to—ah—regularize the circumstances in the future. We shall need one or two rules."

"Naturally," L agreed. "Three, in fact. The first is that you will not pass any requirement to me but will be content to review what I provide. If I were to try to carry out assigned tasks, I'd be practically certain to make mistakes. If I bring apples and peaches, and you want apples and pears, throw the peaches away. You needn't pay a groschen for them. But if I try to steal pears for you, I'm likely to lose my neck."

"Agreed," said the general. He did not even wince.

"The second rule," L continued, "is that you will not attempt to ascertain my identity or my vocation. If you do so, you are likely to direct the attention of German counterintelligence toward me."

Again General Z agreed.

"The last rule is that there will be no other rules."

"Unless mutually agreeable."

"All right."

It was near dawn now. There was time for only two more questions. "Tell me," said the general, "how did you manage to mail your letters from Chomutov?"

"I have my ways," said L.

"Well, what about coming across the border, then? Rather risky for someone who stresses security as much as you do."

"I know the area," said L. He smiled at the general, not in the least insolently or tauntingly, but understandingly, as a friendly fencer might smile at a highly-trained opponent who looks clumsy against an unorthodox attack.

Arrangements were made, of course, for continued contact, personal and postal. The next meeting was set. Two Czech officers took L by car to the outskirts of Kraslitz. He walked away from the road, into the last of the darkness.

But he reappeared on schedule, not once or a few times but through the years. His value remained extremely high. In fact, General Z and his staff, both in Prague and later in London, had no source of greater worth or reliability. The Allies, too, discovered that L was a pearl beyond price. One British general said, "When L reports, armies move."

Episode in a Partnership

The value and validity of L's information clearly reduced, or even eliminated, the normal need to establish a source's identity and obtain as much personal data as possible. Unless that is, the entire operation were aimed at one master stroke of deception. What if all this accurate reporting which clearly hurt the Nazi cause were intended solely to insure that when the big lie came, at the critical moment, it would be accepted unquestioningly? But in that event any prying at L's secrets would be certain to establish only that he was exactly what he seemed to be, an Abwehr officer.

Of course, as the contacts continued, the Czechs learned more about L. For one thing, the general and the agent began to discuss their respective needs and capabilities with growing frankness. And L became less guarded about himself as time went on. Gradually it was learned that he was indeed an Abwehr officer, stationed in Chemnitz and assigned to Abwehrstelle IV, in Dresden. He mentioned his age, 35, quite casually one day. But not until 1940, three years after the operation started, was his identity established by name, and then only because he chose to reveal it.

The major unsolved mystery remained his motivation. At the outset he had claimed an antifascist idealism while demanding at the same time large sums. He was in fact paid handsomely: he had received more than 800,000 RM up to the German occupation of Czechoslovakia. General Z was well aware that the swindler (especially the wartime swindler) customarily professes the highest motives while lifting your wallet; but L was no swindler. A mercenary, then, a salesman of secrets without loyalties. Strictly cash-and-carry. Or was he truly antifascist? Perhaps he belonged to a small clique that was deliberately leaking information as one means of hastening der Fuehrer's defeat?

Whatever else he might be, he was engaging. Once in 1938, in the safehouse at Chomutov, L was smiling a little, as usual. "How about doing me a favor?" he asked.

General Z was painfully conscious that a significant raise or bonus for L, already better paid than any other source, might place the G-2 budget squarely in the red. "What is it?" he asked cautiously.

"I have orders to establish four new W/T sets inside the CSR. Two go to Slovakia. The other two are supposed to be placed in Moravska Ostrava, in Moravia. I don't have any operators in the towns chosen by the brass for these four sets. I could recruit them, of course, and let you know who they are. I'd like to do it that way, the natural way. But the brass have put one of those blasted 'urgent' stamps on this one. The sets

aren't supposed to go on the air now, you understand. They come up when you begin emergency mobilization. So how about giving me a hand?"

"You realize the problems?"

"Well, I'll read them from our side, and you read them from yours."

The problems were indeed horrendous. The four radio sets could not be faked or quietly forgotten; the Abwehr might check at any time. The four operators—

"Let's say three," said the general. "Better to fail on one; nothing more suspicious than infallibility."

"No," said L. "I want all four. After all, my professional reputation is involved."

"All right; maybe they do think you're infallible. But these four men must be completely loyal to us and yet acceptable to you. And they must be skilled already or else they will have to be trained. They can't be trained because I don't want to tell them the story, and your people would have to do the training. And you're going to want test runs, I suppose, which my people are likely to pick up."

But L remained cheerful and helpful. One by one the knotty problems were solved. Finally the four sets were all in place, and Czech intelligence gained a thorough knowledge of German methods and tactics in radio operations, German equipment, German codes and signals. Exploitation of the information led to the discovery of seven really German-controlled sets in the CSR. L's four sets could be used by the Czechs at will, to remain silent or to furnish deception. Finally, the severe pressure exerted upon L for speedy placement of the sets had been an unmistakable warning that the war was near.

This success seemed to make L even happier. By 1938, in fact, there was a genuine and mutual cordiality in the relationship. In the summer of that year occurred another episode which is worth describing because it reveals how constantly danger threatened the operation and also provides an added insight into L's character. At that time serious public disturbances, nearing the proportions of armed revolt, occurred in the Sudeten German area of the CSR. Units of the Czech Army had to be dispatched to the border regions to put down the rebellion. L continued to appear for scheduled meetings, punctual and serene. One night two Czech intelligence officers were returning him, as usual, to the outskirts of Krasnitz. The car was stopped by a barricade; armed men appeared; their leader, in guttural Czech, ordered the occupants to get out of the car and hand over their identity papers. There was no doubt that this was an insurgent group, and the lives of the two Czech officers would be in serious danger if they were searched and exposed as intelligence personnel.

In sharp German L ordered the leader of the group to step aside with him. At a distance he showed the leader a paper of some kind. The Sudeten German listened respectfully to L, saluted, and then shook hands, as though he could not decide whether civilian or military courtesy was required of him. L and his two associates got back into the car, armed now with the password for the return trip.

At the next meeting L laughed over the incident. "Nothing could be simpler," he said. "I showed him an official Abwehr document—without a name on it—and told him that your chaps were two of my best agents who had just supplied me with excellent material and now were guiding me back to the border."

"You thought quickly. I want to thank you on behalf of my subordinates as well as myself. You save their necks."

"Mine was on the same block," said L.

Being human, L was not an ideal agent. It was obvious, for example, that he knew a great deal about Czechs who were spying for the Abwehr. In fact, he had promised at the outset to deliver precisely such information. But when General Z pressed him for it, he became evasive. "Do you remember hanging that General Staff captain because he was an Abwehr agent?" L asked sharply, "Every one of your arrests is thoroughly investigated by the III-boys [Abwehr counterintelligence]." L grimaced at the memory. "And not only the Abwehr, but the Gestapo and the Sicherheitsdienst as well."

"But you did not identify that man," the general protested.

"Exactly. That's why I'm still wearing a head."

Yet once, inexplicably, he volunteered the information that someone in Artillery Regiment No. 305 in Ctry Dvory (Southern Bohemia) was a German agent. A lieutenant colonel of German parentage was arrested and confessed. "This time it was safe," said L.

He was proud and sensitive. At the time of one scheduled meeting other business had called General Z away for three days, and his deputy filled in. The deputy was a scholarly man, precise of habit.

L was coldly angry at his next meeting with the general. "Keep your good little boy away from me from now on," he snapped. "I do not risk my hide this way to talk with fools and pedants."

"I am sure that he meant no offense."

"Of course not," said L, unmollified. "But he is forever saying, 'In such a case, one does thus and so. The rule to follow is this or that.' He doesn't appreciate our nice little operation, he isn't interested; he only wants to know what *type* of operation it is, so he can decide which of the three sets of rules he has memorized ought to apply here."

"Perhaps he is right," General Z argued. "Rules are the shorthand of experience."

"Rules of this kind are the crutches of feeble minds," retorted L. "The simple truth is that the world we live in is in a chaos. And most minds are uncomfortable when confronted by chaos. Scatter blocks in front of a baby, and it makes patterns. Any child can do it, and does. So we impose on this whirling formlessness all kinds of imaginary structures, each different from the next. Confusion is too much for us; we create an arbitrary order. That's all right; but then we confuse our subjective patterns with reality and say that these structures are inherent, that they belong to the nature of reality."

The general drew the correct conclusion from this discourse. He decided that his deputy had somehow offended L's sensibilities.

Munich and After

The work of Major (later Colonel) L for the Czechoslovak G-2 falls into two periods: from March 1937 to the German invasion of the CSR in March 1939, and from then to the end of the war. Through both periods he was an invaluable source. The Czech army and government were kept steadily apprised, up to the time of the Munich conference, of German intentions and capabilities affecting Czechoslovakia. Moreover, this flood of reliable information served to reveal new gaps in Czech knowledge and thus to stimulate new efforts, both in positive collection and in counterintelligence. During the Munich crisis L appeared only once. Obviously he was very busy

in connection with the German mobilization and final preparations for the forthcoming campaign; it was surprising that he could get away at all. Moreover, the increased tension had tightened the border controls on both sides. L looked completely relaxed, however, as he sat in his favorite armchair at the safehouse and calmly reported that unless the Czech government surrendered the Sudeten territory, the Germans would open fire.

"Der Fuehrer and his foot-kissers are convinced that there is not a country in Europe, including your ally France, that will come to your aid if Germany attacks. The main thrust will come from Lower Austria, where your fortifications are weakest."

L continued, explaining the German plan in detail. On the basis of his information the Czechs were able to inform the French High Command that all but two of the first-class German divisions would be employed against the Czechoslovak army. The rest of the divisions along the border of France would be second and even third class, incompletely equipped. The entire length of the Polish border would be guarded by only two divisions. This concentration of force upon the CSR left the German flanks obviously exposed, although the Czechs were under no illusion that the Allies would counter a thrust against the CSR by an attack elsewhere. The solution, instead, was "peace in our time," and some months later the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia.

L did not appear during this interim. General Z assumed that Munich's elimination of Czechoslovakia as a military power had caused him to lose interest in any further collaboration. Moreover, the changing times had wrought collaborative changes in the Czech G-2; L now had increased reason to fear betrayal to German counterintelligence if he persisted. Perhaps, too, he suspected that there was little cash left in the Czech coffers. General Z reasoned that L either would cease to work against the Hitler government or would now seek support from a stronger, wealthier power.

General Z was wrong. L came, hurried but unagitated, to the safehouse on 2 March 1939 and told the houseman to arrange an immediate meeting with the general. The latter left an important conference and sped to Chomutov. Without preliminaries L reported that the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia would take place on 15 March 1939. He identified the German armies scheduled for participation, the commanding generals, the directions of advance, and the objectives. Armored and mechanized units were to reach Prague and Brno as fast as possible. Only token resistance, or none at all, was anticipated from the demobilized and demoralized Czech army. Slovakia would become an independent German protectorate. L provided a copy of a document which ordered police units advancing with the German armies to arrest all Czechoslovak intelligence officers and subject them to immediate interrogation. Of key interest were the identities of all Czech sources in Germany or reporting about Germany.

Thirteen days! And so much to do.

L was not smiling now. His face showed plainly his sympathy and deep concern. "Look here," he said, "what are your plans?"

"Oh, we have something cooked up, of course."

"Well, it's plain that you've got to clear out, unless you want to invite the Gestapo for tea. I don't advise France. Wherever you go, you'll be able to set up a safe meeting place or two, nicht?"

"Yes, I can give you an address in Holland, and another in Switzerland."

"Good." L wrote them down. "I promise to get word to you as soon as I can. And I want you to promise me something."

"Whatever I can."

"See to it personally that any file material which identifies me, or even points toward me, is destroyed."

"It has already been taken care of," said the general.

The two men stood then, and shook hands. "God protect you," said L in German. "This is not goodbye. I'll be in touch with you soon. Just get out in time to save your skin."

"Yes. Thank you."

"Not necessary. If you're stabbed, I bleed." But L's eyes, usually full of inquisitiveness or amusement, now showed his anxiety for his associate.

The general sat down again after L had gone. There was much to do. But L was, as always, a teasing enigma. Why did he risk his life to appear at such a time? And why did he volunteer to continue serving the Czechs even after his own people had driven them from their homeland? He could withdraw now. Even if the Czechs were so unscrupulous as to betray him, they would not profit thereby. He had been paid so well that he could now live comfortably throughout the war and for years thereafter. Or if he were greedy, he could seek out a major power and reap far handsomer rewards than could be offered by an impoverished government in exile. Perhaps the promise was empty, a gesture intended to console an associate in distress, offered without any intention of carrying it out. Yet his manner had not been one of pious sympathy; it was too sincere and friendly.

Still baffled, the general was driven back to Prague, where he reported his latest information to the Chief of Staff. But the report was met with governmental skepticism. Collaborators had already infiltrated the government, and many of those free of this taint seemed half paralyzed by the headlong rush of events and the ominous clouds gathering. L's information was labelled incredible, and the general was forbidden to disseminate it. Under these circumstances he concentrated on plans for the security of his own staff. At 6 p.m. on 14 March 1939, six hours before the German armies crossed the border and twelve hours before they entered Prague, the general and twelve of his staff members left the capital in a plane made available by the British.

Intelligence-in-Exile, Impoverished

Czech operations were resumed from London through offices in Switzerland, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, and Poland. The ranks of Czech intelligence officers were augmented by a number of military attachés abroad who refused to serve a Hitler-dominated government.

The spring passed, and the summer, without word from L. Despite the refutation of his earlier doubts, General Z was by now convinced that he would never again see the Abwehr major, or hear from him. Undoubtedly, he thought one day as he attacked his morning mail, L had worried in the spring about the possibility that Czech documents or arrested Czech intelligence officers would reveal his identity and the story of his silent battle against the Nazis. Now that nothing had happened for nearly half a year, he probably felt safe. And freedom from this anxiety would be such a welcome relief that he would not be likely to put his neck into the same noose a second time.

Thus theorizing, General Z opened a letter from Switzerland. It came from L. He would soon arrive in the Hague, where he would like to meet General Z or even the

once-hated deputy. He would reach the Hotel des Indes at 2 p.m. on the afternoon of 4 September and would register there under the name of Braun.

On the appointed day L received the deputy cordially. "Please tell General Z," he said quietly, "that if he is interested, I am prepared to resume our association."

"I am sure he will be delighted."

"I've been transferred to Berlin, to the OKW Abwehr Abteilung [General Staff G-2]. I shall have plenty of opportunities to travel and can easily meet you. And I'll have some first-rate information for you."

The deputy looked a shade uncomfortable. "This is wonderful news, of course," he said, "but—"

"But what?"

"It's the money. You'll understand that things are not the same for us now. I do not mean that we cannot pay anything, but in comparison with the old days we —"

"I don't want pay," said L. "General Z has done very well by me; my only money problem now is to keep your generosity from endangering my security. So don't give it another thought."

The general's deputy was tempted to ask what caused this remarkable about-face on the part of an agent who had required about one million Reichsmarks for two years' work. But his earlier encounter with L had made him cautious.

L turned over valuable and detailed information about German armored and mechanized divisions. The deputy agreed to his proposed arrangements for the next meeting, and returned to London to report.

General Z listened to the story with surprised delight. Was nothing that L did ever to conform to expected patterns of behavior? Now he did not want money, and was willing to serve an emigré organization that had lost much of its power along with its funds. Why? His fondness for a Slavic fiancée seemed a far from sufficient answer. If he were a burning anti-Nazi, was he operating all alone? Or did he perhaps tie in to some German underground group dedicated to Hitler's overthrow? Was he part of the dissident Canaris group? Was this group seeking a liaison channel to the Allies? But probably, in that event, it would have sought contact with the English, or another power, rather than the exiled Czechs.

Now that contact had been reestablished, reporting flowed smoothly. Correspondence embroidered with secret writing went to cover addresses in neutral countries, usually Switzerland or Portugal. Personal meetings were also held in these countries and in Holland. One meeting was held in Constantinople. It is no exaggeration to say that L's reports, submitted on both military and intelligence subjects from 1937 to 1945, were of momentous significance. Here are a few examples:

- Accurate advance information about the German attack on Poland and plans for the subsequent campaign. This information included the now familiar fact that German SS units garbed in Polish uniforms would simulate an attack on German positions to furnish a pretext for war.
- The concentration of German armies for the invasion of Denmark and Norway.
- Prior warning of the German attacks upon Belgium and France, together with clear indications of the main lines of thrust.
- The opening of hostilities against the U.S.S.R.

- Plans for the German offensive in the Kharkov area in the spring of 1942.
- A series of reports on German order of battle.
- Reports on the movements of major German headquarters from one battlefield to another.
- Some information on preparations for the V-1 and V-2.
- Hitler's plans for Spain, which did not materialize.

L's written reports were almost always brief. Sometimes the secret text consisted of a single sentence. His oral reports were somewhat lengthier, but they too were pithy. During these personal meetings the friendship which had grown between General Z and the agent never led L into confidences or irrelevancies. In time the Czechs managed to organize from London a respectable agent network, but L's value continued to outweigh the combined work of the others.

At one meeting in Lisbon he eyed the general reproachfully. "It looks as though your British friends pried my name out of you," he said.

The observation was accurate. For quite a long time General Z had withstood the pressure of British questions about L's identity, but finally things had reached the point where withholding it was no longer possible.

"Some very smooth customer dropped in on me right after our last meeting and with an air of engaging frankness explained all the practical reasons why I should work for his firm directly instead of through an intermediary."

"Oh?" said the general. "And what did you tell him?"

"I told him that I didn't know him and that he had obviously made a mistake. You know, you might tell them to check with you before they come calling, and get your blessing."

"Perhaps you should agree to cooperate with our friends," said General Z. "They can pay you better than I."

"I've told you I don't want money. Look here: I've worked with you for about three years now, and I'm still alive."

General Z said nothing more. It was typical of L to profess the purest self-interest as his sole motive. He would have blushed at the mention of loyalty. In fact, the general reflected, the idea of fealty has been out of fashion for a long time.

In January 1944 L wrote to ask for a meeting in Constantinople. He reported that he had been promoted to the rank of colonel and transferred to the Prague military command. His new assignment precluded frequent travel.

General Z discussed this change with his deputy. It had serious disadvantages. The transfer from Berlin took L away from the brain of the German Army. It also posed delicate problems of communication, for secret writing mailed from Prague would obviously be too risky. There were some advantages. The Protectorate had grown increasingly important to German military operations as the result of developments on both fronts. The war industry there was virtually unmolested by Allied bombing, so that the railroad network served the German High Command efficiently. Moreover, it had become clear by 1944 that the Allies were going to win the war. The exiled Czech government therefore needed information from Prague. Communications were the hardest problem. There was good radio contact between the Prague underground and London, but General Z felt that placing L in touch with the under-

ground so that he could use its facilities was too risky. He anticipated, in fact, that L would reject such a proposal.

The deputy met L in Constantinople. The new Abwehr colonel proposed that communications be maintained by radio; he was willing to use the Czech underground if his contacts with it were restricted to a single reliable man. General Z had previously selected such a man, a Colonel Studeny. It was decided that a separate code would be employed for L's reports. The time and place for future meetings with Studeny were chosen by L, and arrangements for dead drops were worked out in detail.

And so L began a new life. His assignment as chief of the counterintelligence section of the Prague military command, under General Toussaint, provided him a measure of protection. He usually knew in advance which persons were suspect to the Germans and which were slated for arrest. This knowledge was not infallible; the Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst were often—and increasingly—on unfriendly terms with the Abwehr. And sometimes Gestapo arrests were not only unannounced but seemingly capricious, made for precautionary reasons, on suspicion rather than evidence.

But at least the operation was now conducted in accordance with the rules. Colonel Studeny had dropped all other underground activity and functioned solely as L's cut-out. There were no more chancy meetings in neutral countries. L had received no money for years, so the danger which an added and inexplicable income always brings had now evaporated. L and Studeny never met; they used a number of cleverly concealed drops. Perhaps it was a miracle that the operation had survived its cowboy years, but now L had for protection an intelligence application of the rules.

His reports continued to be very valuable, fulfilling also the new function of providing warning about forthcoming Gestapo arrests. The months rolled by, months in which the German armies met a series of major defeats. The end was in sight.

Mission Fulfilled

In October 1944 Colonel Studeny was arrested. It seems that he had been under surveillance for some time. And yet, surprisingly, the Gestapo had not found his dead drops; for if they had they would have arrested L as well. What they did find, when they searched Studeny, was a piece of paper bearing questions obviously addressed to someone in the German headquarters at Prague. Colonel Studeny was interrogated under relentless torture. He died a hero, without revealing anything about the radio station or the identity of the German collaborator. L even participated, on behalf of the Abwehr, in the investigation of the case.

L's own arrest came in December. Its causes remained as obscure as those that had led to Studeny's apprehension. Perhaps an analysis of the requirements on Studeny's person had led, in turn, to investigation of the past activities of all logical suspects. Such a review would presumably have revealed L's presence near the Czech border before the war started, his specialization as intelligence officer in Czech matters, his extensive travels, and a number of other significant indicators. Or perhaps, after the attempt on Hitler's life in June 1944, L was one of the large number of Abwehr officers who fell under suspicion of complicity. Whatever the reasons for the arrest, the Gestapo used much the same barbarous methods on him as it had previously employed on Colonel Studeny.

There was one difference. L must have sometime read *The Arabian Nights*. At any rate he emulated Queen Scheherezade by prolonging his story, relating only one

episode at a time, and ensuring that much additional investigation would be required before the next chapter could be drawn from him.

In this way Colonel L sought to remain alive until the dying war reached its end and he, along with the other prisoners at Terezin, was set free. He nearly succeeded. In fact, this rational plan would almost certainly have worked except that fate is notoriously irrational. The SS guards at Terezin, growing more frightened daily as the Russians stormed closer and closer, got thoroughly drunk on their last afternoon as masters of the concentration camps. They decided to shoot forty prisoners in a final Teutonic orgy of death. By chance a sodden sergeant chose L as one of the forty.

As he was led from his barracks, he managed to exchange a few words with a Czech inmate not marked for execution. He told him to seek out General Z and tell him what had happened.

"Tell him it was a wonderful time. I'm sorry it stops here. And tell him—he always wanted to know *why*, so tell him that my reasons in life were just as logical as the reasons for my death."

And there you have it, thought General Z, pondering the story. Maybe no one can proceed by logic or rules alone; maybe nobody knows enough. I don't know why he was the best spy I ever knew. I don't know why he was a spy at all. I don't even know why I broke all the rules at the outset. One of my English friends once said that the prerequisite for intelligence is intelligence. He's wrong. The indispensable organ in this business is not the brain. It's the nose.

(From Volume 3 Number 2, p. 105, 1959; Confidential)

*This article is for those who wonder
what problems the China analyst
has, what tools, techniques, and as-
sets he can bring to bear, and how
confident he may be in the end
product*

THE ART OF CHINA-WATCHING

Gail Solin

Most knowledgeable observers agree that information on, and analysis of, events within the People's Republic of China has advanced now to the level of "Kremlinology" about 15 years ago. It is no semantic accident that observers of the Chinese political scene are more often called "China-watchers" than "Sinologists," while analysts of the Soviet Union are frequently referred to as "Kremlinologists." The art of China-watching is imprecise at best, and hardly deserves yet to be called Sinology.

The explanation, or blame, for this often frustrating situation lies mainly with the way the Chinese conduct their affairs. To say the Chinese have a penchant for secrecy is almost an understatement. Some Chinese have said privately that they deliberately try to hide important domestic events from their northern enemy, the Soviet Union. While there is certainly an element of truth in this, the Chinese are also anxious to conceal information from the Chinese populace and from the outside world in general. The secrecy syndrome applies more often to domestic than to foreign affairs. By its very nature, Chinese foreign policy inevitably makes itself known. With a second country involved, Peking has had less success in hiding its foreign policy.

On the domestic front, however, there have been for the past several years serious policy differences and genuine personal animosity among the Chinese leaders. It is these schisms that Peking seems most anxious to hide—from the Chinese populace, in order to promote confidence in the leadership and relative stability at the grassroots; from the Soviet Union, because Peking believes Moscow has tried and will try again to exploit differences in the Chinese leadership; and from the rest of the world, perhaps for similar reasons and also because the Chinese seem to believe that their internal affairs are none of our business. They complained bitterly about Western press coverage of Chinese domestic politics last year. They did not like the interpretation presented in the articles, but neither did they say anything to clarify the situation.

The Aging Leadership

By most standards, China is a peculiar country. It has perhaps the most aged leadership in the world. Four of the five vice-chairmen of the party are in their seventies. The chairman, Mao, is 81. In the government bureaucracy, which exists alongside the party structure, there is no head of state. In fact, as with most major decisions, it took the Chinese several years of debating the issue to decide whether to abolish the job. Until January, when the post was officially dropped, it was filled on a temporary basis by an 88-year-old party veteran. Without a head of state, the highest ranking government official is the chairman of China's legislature. He, too, is 88.

Since the Communists came to power in 1949, China has been run by essentially the same small group of aging revolutionaries. As a rule, they do not retire. They tend

to remain in office until they die or are purged. Thus far, very few have died. Because they are roughly the same age—that is to say, old indeed—there is the danger that they will all die nearly at once, leaving a relatively inexperienced group of younger officials to take over the world's most populous country. Only in the past two years has this old leadership made a concerted effort to bring younger people into the top ranks of the party and government hierarchies. By Chinese standards, “younger” generally means men in their sixties.

Being elevated so recently, these younger officials will probably not have much time to show their administrative and political talents, especially the ability to survive the political maneuvering, backbiting, and rivalries that are likely to emerge when the old leadership finally passes from the scene. Because the leadership has been relatively tardy in beginning to put together a succession arrangement, China watchers have little information to go by in trying to predict the outcome of a possible succession struggle and the directions Chinese policy will take in the coming years. Why the leadership was so slow in recognizing the obvious need to groom younger officials remains a mystery, but no firm steps were taken until party congress in August, 1973, 24 years after coming to power.

Vacancies and Unannounced Appointments

There are, of course, many mysteries on the Chinese political scene. For more than three years there was no officially designated defense minister, although it was fairly obvious who was acting in that capacity. The man was finally given the job publicly in January, but why he wasn't named earlier is yet another unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable, question. The man is 76, which means the Chinese will have to go through this same apparently arduous process of choosing a defense minister again in a few years.

The previous defense minister was Lin Piao, Mao's designated heir who allegedly died in a plane crash fleeing to the Soviet Union after an abortive coup attempt. All the events surrounding Lin's political demise and death will probably never become known, but the incident has had a profound effect on the Chinese leadership. It has fed their fears of possible Soviet meddling in China's domestic affairs and has transformed the once glorified army into an institution now viewed with considerable distrust. In typical Chinese fashion, Lin was privately vilified by name in documents circulated within China, but for the public record he was just an unidentified “political swindler.” Everyone in China and outside knew that the “swindler” was Lin, and the Chinese probably were aware that they were fooling no one with their attempts to conceal his identity by not using his name publicly. Nevertheless, it was not until nearly two years after his death that the Chinese propaganda machine started to attack Lin by name.

The defense portfolio was just one of many jobs that remained vacant for years on end. For several years there was no army chief of staff, no finance minister, no one in charge of health, no one in charge of public security, and, despite the growing importance of China's oil industry, no minister of petroleum. At no time since 1971 have all of China's provinces had an officially designated top man. Each time a new job opens up in China, it evidently becomes a political nightmare just to get a small group of people to agree on who should fill it. Most Chinese, even those in officialdom, can at best take only wild guesses as to who sits in what job until the appointments are announced by the Chinese press.

Because the Chinese people, and even many officials, are often kept in the dark about domestic politics, the usual problems of obtaining clandestine information about

denied areas are magnified in the case of China. Officials abroad are often as confused about domestic developments as western observers are. An amusing exchange ensued last year when the Peking press began to attack the Italian film maker Antonioni. One official abroad asked another what the attacks were all about, and the reply was that there had been no explanation from Peking. Meanwhile, China watchers in Washington and elsewhere were frantically poring over the articles, certain that they were of enormous significance but not at all united about *why* they were.

Propaganda Analysis

Over the years, China watchers have developed some analytical tools, much the same as those used by Kremlinologists, to help break through the fog. The Chinese, for their part, as their perceived need for secrecy has increased, have devised a number of schemes to render these tools less useful than they might once have been. One rule of thumb is that in their propaganda the Chinese do not say things by accident and rarely say anything directly. They did not, for example, attack Antonioni for nothing, and they probably were trying to convey other messages beside their distaste for the film he made about China. One theory was that the attacks were directed at someone in the Chinese leadership who was known to be an Antonioni fan, another that they reflected a hardening of Chinese views toward cultural exchanges with the West. While the various theories arrived at through propaganda analysis usually lead to lively debates among China watchers, rarely can any single theory be proved conclusively.

Complicating the process of analyzing propaganda is a relatively "free" press in recent years, at least for those in the highest levels of the bureaucracy. The party's official newspaper has been known to carry two articles on the same subject in the same issue, expressing diametrically opposed views. Because no one "faction" in the leadership has exclusive access to the press and because even signed articles are usually in pseudonym, China watchers can never be absolutely certain whose views are being expressed in a given article.

Imprecise though it may be, propaganda analysis is often the only way to keep track of an important political development as it evolves. Last year the Chinese waged a major political campaign, almost exclusively through propaganda, that attacked two corpses—the fallen defense minister, Lin Piao, who died in 1971, and the ancient sage Confucius, who died some 2500 years ago. The propaganda articles discussed major figures and events from the Chinese past, but the historical figures seemed to be surrogates for people in the current leadership, and the events often resembled current problems.

Accepting the premise that the historical figures did in fact represent current leaders, the problem of course was to determine which ones. With little more than propaganda to go on, China watchers came up with widely differing interpretations. Adding to the confusion, some historical figures who had been consistently praised for implementing progressive policies suddenly were attacked in other articles. The reverse took place. All this suggested that different people in the leadership were promoting their own favorite historical figures, i.e., those who stood for themselves, and denigrating the other stand-ins.

Confucius, of course, was consistently attacked, sometimes for very specific and detailed misdeeds. For example, he was criticized for being finicky about food and insisting that his meat be sliced just so. This accusation, though obscure to China watchers, probably was very revealing to the small group of leaders at the top who know one another's habits thoroughly. No information has ever turned up as to who in

the current leadership is noticeably picky about food, but undoubtedly the individual in question and his colleagues recognized the target immediately.

When Chinese leaders attack one another through the use of information known only to themselves, it not only leaves China watchers overseas baffled, but makes it impossible for most Chinese officials to understand who is being attacked. In fact, officials, and the Chinese populace in general were all instructed to study the same propaganda articles, without explanation, that the outside world was puzzling over. They, too, had to be China watchers, and their speculation as to who was under attack covered the entire political spectrum in the Chinese leadership. A Chinese official even guessed that the target was the 88-year-old acting head of state, who was extremely frail and died a year later. One Chinese, expressing his frustration over the obscure criticism of Confucius, posted a notice on a public building that read "why are we attacking someone who has been dead more than two thousand years?" To their credit, China watchers were generally quicker to recognize the importance of the anti-Confucius campaign than were many Chinese officials.

One of the pitfalls of propaganda analysis is that certain catch phrases used repeatedly over the years can mean different things at different times. The term "three-in-one combination," for example—the organizational principle for the formation of local administrative organs—meant at its inception a combination of experienced officials, military men, and "the masses," i.e., ordinary workers or peasants. In recent years, however, as the military has fallen into disfavor and many workers and peasants have shown themselves to be incompetent administrators, the phrase has now come to mean a combination of old, middle-aged, and young officials. Failure to recognize the change in meaning would leave a China watcher several years behind the times, leading him to believe that the Chinese were still interested in having soldiers, workers, and peasants share the management of the local administrative units.

Subtle changes in the propaganda line are often extremely significant, and a China watcher can be left high and dry if he misses the changes. In its heyday, the army was the model for all of China. Everyone was exhorted to learn from the army. When in recent years the Chinese added that the army must learn from the people, this was the Chinese way of telling the outside world that the army was falling out of favor with the leadership in Peking.

Propaganda analysis would be incomplete without a careful study of the propaganda line coming from each of the provinces and comparisons between them. Sometimes, differing lines from various provinces mean only that the local leadership is confused about what to do. In some cases, however, the differences are very meaningful. When ex-defense minister Lin Piao was still in power, many provinces said the army was founded by Mao and commanded by Lin; others said the army was founded and commanded by Mao. With the advantage of hindsight, it is clear that even well before his fall, Lin's authority had begun to erode. What is not clear is whether those provinces that failed to mention Lin in this context were merely expressing their own dissatisfaction with him or whether they were acting on instructions from leaders in Peking who were working to oust him. In this case, as in many other, China watchers will probably never know the answer. They can probably make an educated guess, however, that those provinces which say the army should "obey" the party contain military men more willing to submit to party authority than those provinces which say the army should merely "respect" the party.

The Pecking Order

Another favorite tool of the analytical trade is the scrutiny of leadership appearances. The order in which Chinese leaders are listed can be a reliable gauge of their

relative standing in the leadership. The Chinese have often circumvented this system by listing their leaders in the Chinese equivalent of alphabetical order. On major holidays, the Chinese used to hold mass rallies in Peking with the entire leadership standing before the assembled crowds. Who stood next to whom was another clue to the importance of individual leaders, but in recent years the rallies have been abandoned. Instead, several small groups of leaders appear in different parks in Peking, thus avoiding a public display of the entire pecking order.

When several important officials fail to appear over an extended period of time, it often means that a leadership meeting is in session. When at the same time the top officials in many of China's 29 provinces do not appear at home, the betting is that Peking has called in leaders from the provinces for a large meeting. In August, 1973, as China watchers awaited a party congress, Peking threw the intelligence community off the track: the national leadership attended a table tennis match, and, on the same day, a provincial leader gave a speech at home, several thousand miles from Peking. As it turned out, the party congress was in session during the time. In what was an obvious effort to hide the fact, the meeting was adjourned in midstream to allow national leaders to appear in public; the provincial leader, who obviously did not attend the congress, was elected in absentia to the party's ruling Politburo.

When all else fails, Peking resorts to outright deceit. In January, a secret party meeting elected a new party vice chairman from the ranks of ordinary Politburo members. After the meeting, in order not to tip the public, the new vice chairman was listed not among the other vice chairmen but among ordinary members of the Politburo. Thus the meeting and the new appointment remained a secret until Peking chose to reveal it.

In the hands of the wrong people, the game of appearance watching can result in widely speculative and highly sensational conclusions. When a national leader does not appear in public over an extended period of time—say a month or more—the Chinese people themselves, who watch appearances just as analysts do, invariably begin rumors about their political demise or death. On one occasion, after Madame Mao had not appeared in public for a couple of months, some Chinese devised a wild story to explain her absence: they concluded that she had had a fight, including fisticuffs, with her husband, and he had killed her. She reappeared a few days later, however, with no black eyes.

In the case of Mao, who has often withdrawn from public view for long periods, rumors of his death have plagued analysts for years. If accounts from Chinese officials and ordinary people over the years were compiled, it would appear the man has died at least 20 times since the mid-1950s. Today, he remains alive and relatively well, considering his advanced age. Reports of Mao's death naturally send shock waves throughout Washington officialdom. Because there is no way to verify or discredit these reports until he appears again in public, some China watchers have more than once been forced to conclude tentatively, and even sometimes in writing, that he was dying. With the Chinese tendency toward secrecy, it is impossible to predict how soon after Mao's actual death the Chinese will announce it. There are, of course, a few who still maintain Mao has been dead for years, and the man seen greeting foreign visitors is actually a double.

Does Logic Help?

Logic, or common sense, is sometimes the China watcher's only tool for assessing the veracity of a piece of new information. The problem is that the Chinese, who are not without common sense themselves, can often disregard it when they choose to. In

July 1973, when the first report of preparations for a party congress appeared in China watchers' in-boxes, many tended to reject it. The party's anniversary had passed a few days earlier without so much as a major article in the Peking press extolling the virtues of the party. If a party congress was in fact in the offing, it was reasoned, surely the Chinese press would have made more of the party's anniversary. Additionally, the leadership was still sharply divided over a number of serious issues and showed no signs of resolving differences; the party apparatus in several provinces was still a shambles. Under these conditions, there seemed no point—indeed, it could be disastrous—to convene a party congress.

The Chinese, who were obviously as aware of their problems as China watchers were, held the congress away. To be sure, the congress was something of a disappointment. Many important issues remained unresolved, and the congress seemed to raise more questions than it answered. When, in December, a secret party meeting took some major steps toward resolving some of the problems, the question was raised again as to why the congress had been held in August; it obviously would have made more sense to wait until December, when the political climate was apparently more suitable for major decisions.

Logic does not fail in every case, however, and it sometimes allows the China watcher to second-guess even top Chinese officials correctly. At the August 1973 party congress, Premier Chou En-lai announced that the National People's Congress, China's legislature, would convene "soon." At the time, the anti-Confucius campaign had just begun and was likely to cause further divisiveness among the leadership and have major repercussions throughout the country. With a major political campaign just getting under way, many China watchers believed that chances of holding the National People's Congress under these circumstances were very slim. Nevertheless, no China analyst worth his salt is going to contradict Chou En-lai and say in writing that the premier has either taken leave of his senses or does not have a firm grip on the political scene in China. Chou, as it turned out, had indeed miscalculated: the National People's Congress was not held until a year and a half later.

This was not the first time Chou had "misspoken." Earlier, he told a western reporter that China's harvest would show an increase over the previous year. A month later, he had to retract that statement; the harvest had in fact shown a four percent drop. China analysts seldom ignore statements coming directly from Chou with good reason. The occasional slips, however, can cause confusion.

Statements by high-level Chinese officials on the internal conditions in the country are so rare that the China watching community must pay particular attention to them, but there is cause for some caution on this score. A member of the party's ruling Politburo, in response to a question about the anti-Confucius campaign, calmly answered, "We know what we are doing." At the time, the campaign had already caused major disturbances in several provinces and was beginning to affect the economic sector. In fact, shortly after that statement was made, the campaign was all but turned off. Its only visible result had been a decline in production, clearly not the intent of the leadership, and China watchers have a right to question whether the Chinese did in fact know what they were doing or whether they merely knew what they wanted to do but were not sure they would be successful. It is also possible that the Politburo member was lying through his teeth or that, while others in the leadership did indeed know what they were doing, this person, who most observers would conclude was ultimately a loser in the political sweepstakes of 1974, did not.

Leadership Speeches

While statements by Chinese officials are frequent and relatively easy to come by, China's leaders stopped making public speeches about domestic political affairs

several years ago. One Politburo member tours the provinces giving addresses on agriculture, but save for these and two general wrap-up speeches by Premier Chou En-lai at major leadership meetings in the past two years, no Chinese leader had gone on public record regarding internal affairs since the mid-1960s.

This situation contrasts sharply with that of the Soviet Union. In recent years Moscow had held party congresses on a fairly regular basis; the congresses hear a major address that usually drags on for hours, in which party leader Brezhnev reports on party affairs, and another long speech by the Soviet Premier on the economy. These speeches and many others delivered on less ceremonial occasions are made public. At China's last party congress—only the third since the Communists came to power—Mao was said to have made a few brief opening remarks, which were not made public. In fact, Mao has not made a public speech since 1949. While Soviet analysts chew on marathon speeches by Brezhnev, China watchers must content themselves with the brief, usually enigmatic, quotations that Mao issues periodically.

Chou En-lai's two speeches were a mixed bag of political, economic, and foreign affairs. Even at the National People's Congress, China's vehicle for reporting on and ratifying government policies, there was no separate report on the economy—at least no report that was made public.

Precedents and Past Performance

One analytical tool that has been all but rejected by China watchers is the use of precedents. The Chinese have broken with past practice on several occasions in the last two years, and China watchers have frequently been led astray by trying to predict events on the basis of past patterns. The party congress is a good example. Congresses have usually been preceded by a plenary session of the party Central Committee. The plenum, held in secret but revealed after it is over, usually issues a call to convene the congress. On its first day, Peking announces the opening of the congress and issues periodic reports during the session. The congress is usually held in Peking's grandly named building, the Great Hall of the People. Lights burning late at night in the building, and large numbers of cars, buses, and limousines parked outside are visible signs to Peking residents that a major meeting is in session.

In August 1973, however, there was no Central Committee plenum, no sign of activity at the Great Hall of the People, and presumably no congress. As China analysts watched and waited for the usual signs, Peking surprised everyone by announcing that the congress was over.

The National People's Congress of 1975, held in January, revealed another break with precedent. This meeting has usually been a public affair: banners in Peking greet the delegates as they arrive, foreign visitors have attended, and the press builds up the event with frequent references to it. On several earlier (and abortive) attempts to hold the conclave, the press did indeed refer to it, and more than once the New Year's Day pronouncement from Peking indicated it would be held within the year. This year, the New Year editorial ignored it, but the meeting was secretly held two weeks later.

In an important departure from the standard way of doing business, widespread personal attacks on high ranking party and military officials throughout 1974 have thus far had no visible effect on their political health. During the Cultural Revolution, if an official was publicly criticized in wall posters, this spelled the end of his political career—in most cases he was either about to fall or had already been stripped of his power. Officials attacked in wall posters last year, however, adopted a very casual attitude toward the process; some even went out of their way to point out the posters to foreign visitors. None of those attacked last year, including some who came under

extremely heavy fire in several different provinces, have been purged. Today, wall posters are apparently not as damaging as they were a decade ago, but China watchers were misled into thinking one of the party vice-chairmen was purged because he was widely criticized in posters.

Peking Directives

Directives from Peking, in essence the laws of the land, are usually a good way to gauge the intentions of the leadership. Ironically, as knowledge of the contents of these directives has increased, thanks to clandestine collection efforts, the number of directives issued each year has steadily declined. From some 90 in 1971, to perhaps 60 in 1972, to 44 in 1973, the number hit an alltime low of approximately 27 last year. With such a large country to manage, presumably there are a number of issues demanding the attention of the leadership and requiring specific and authoritative instructions from Peking.

Disagreements in the leadership over a number of questions may have contributed to the declining number of Peking directives. In some instances, these differences manifest themselves in contradictory directives. The occasional reversals are usually short-lived and have not affected the general trend of events, but they raise important—and puzzling—analytical questions. How can one faction in the leadership be strong enough to push through a directive one day but be unable to get it enforced the next? How can they block a personnel appointment for months but suddenly be powerless to stop it? And who, in fact, are “they”?

Last year, most directives from Peking set strict limitations on the conduct of the anti-Confucius campaign: officials could not be criticized by name; wall posters, written by the general populace to expose the “crimes” of unnamed officials, could not be posted outside public buildings where foreign visitors could see them; and people were not to bring their complaints to Peking but were to stay in their provinces and resolve their differences at home. Suddenly a new directive was issued which said just the opposite: it was all right to attack officials by name, posters could be put up anywhere, no effort was to be made to prevent foreign visitors from reading them, and the people were invited to come to Peking to express their grievances.

Taking Peking at its word and acting in accordance with the latest official directive, a number of people descended on Peking, mounting posters throughout the city attacking several important officials by name. The poster writers were quickly suppressed: they were harassed, and sometimes jailed, by the security forces, and their posters were often torn down as soon as they were put up. The poster writers were then sent home to their provinces, and from then on the campaign proceeded as though the latest directive had never been issued. If the new directive came as a surprise to China watchers, it must have been an even greater surprise to the unfortunate people who acted on it and got themselves arrested for following Peking's latest instructions.

There are times in the China business when having solid information about a particular event is more confusing than it is enlightening. If the event is reported in the western press, it can even be a nuisance. For example, a large meeting was held in Peking in the summer of 1973, as China watchers were looking for signs of a party congress. Because the meeting was public, reporters got wind of it and accounts of the meeting appeared in the western press. China watchers knew the meeting was not a party congress—it was too large—but do not know even today what that meeting was all about and some wish they had never known of its existence.

Despite the vicissitudes of China watching, analysts in some cases are better informed about the situation in China's provinces than China's own national leaders are. As early as 1970, for example, it became obvious to China watchers, through intelligence reports and provincial radio broadcasts, that urban youth sent to live and work in the countryside were being consciously discriminated against with the acquiescence of local authorities. The situation seemed to come as something of a shock to Mao, when he first learned of it in 1973. A school teacher, with a son out in the country and apparently with contacts who could see that messages got to the leadership, sent a letter to Mao describing the living conditions of urban youth in the rural areas. Mao was outraged and ordered that steps be taken immediately to end discrimination against these young people. Not until 1974, however, after Peking had long since issued yet another directive on the subject, did local authorities begin to move on this question.

Cases of major disruptions or flagrant disobedience in the provinces, of course, eventually come to Peking's attention. In such cases, national leaders acting as trouble shooters often visit the province in question to help solve the problems. In this context, discrimination against urban youth is a relatively minor problem and one that is not likely to reach the ears of China's leaders on its own. Local officials, after all, are not going to report to Peking that they are deliberately giving urban young people a hard time, but this is exactly the kind of information that refugees are best qualified, and most likely, to report to China watchers. Paradoxically, the intelligence community can beat the Chinese leaders on this issue, not one of especially high priority, while the Chinese can consistently outfox us on the major issues that we watch so closely.

Disinformation

In addition to the usual analytical problems, Peking has two enemies—Moscow and Taipei—who insist on inundating the world with disinformation. China watchers can usually quickly discern and discard the more obvious fabrications, but the press is less discriminating. Lies often become accepted as facts simply because they appear in a number of western newspapers. The heavyhanded disinformation tactics have often led China watchers to disregard any information coming from either Moscow or Taipei. This is unfortunate, because on several occasions they have both come up with sound, accurate, and important information. The Chinese Nationals somehow manage to get the full texts of a number of Peking directives, and these are not hard to distinguish from those that they fabricate. The Soviets, for their part, scooped everyone on the election of a new member of the Chinese Politburo and also correctly predicted the precise dates during which the National People's Congress would be in session. China watchers must be careful not to throw out the baby with the bath water.

With all the ins and outs of China watching—the layers of secrecy, the shifting political winds, the analysis of obscure propaganda articles, the scrutiny of leadership appearances—those less close to the China scene are tempted to view the China problem as insoluble and to write the Chinese off as “inscrutable.” China watchers, of course, do not have that luxury, and most of them would disagree that the Chinese are impossible to understand. It may seem ridiculous to others that China watchers learned to distinguish military officers from enlisted men, when ranks were abolished and insignia removed, by the number of pockets on their tunics, or that some China watchers have noticed a remarkable correlation between those Chinese leaders who wear sunglasses in public and those who eventually lose their jobs. That is, after all, the unique feature of the China watching business: there are almost no clues that are not worth following up. On those rare occasions when there is solid information about a

major development, the often divided China watching community can usually agree on its implications and on Chinese motivations. It is not hard to understand the Chinese; it is just hard to get information about them.

(From Volume 19 Number 1, p. 23, 1975; Secret)

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN

*Targeting the first U-2 coverage
of Soviet Nuclear facilities*

MISSION TO BIRCH WOODS Via Seven Tents and New Siberia

Henry S. Lowenhaupt

I suppose I remember so distinctly working on nuclear targets for the U-2 missions of late August 1957 because this was my first direct experience with reconnaissance operations, and first impressions are lasting. Besides, it was a striking reminder of my 1944 mission from a basic training camp in Alabama to a telephone number in Knoxville, Tennessee, which turned out to be the secret atomic city of Oak Ridge. Here in 1957 my prime target was a secret atomic city known as the Post Box, Tomsk, in central Siberia.

There was also at the time an anticipatory feeling of self-vindication. In 1945 I had been impressed with the accuracy of a wartime estimate of the output from the famous Joachimsthal uranium mines of Czechoslovakia, an estimate based on aerial photographs taken a year apart. So in 1949, after the first Soviet nuclear test, I had advocated photoreconnaissance of the nuclear production sites in the Urals. I actually persuaded the Air Force member of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee to submit a formal proposal for flying the Urals in a B-25 which would take off from Iran and afterwards be ditched beside an aircraft carrier in the Barrents Sea off Novaya Zemlya. We still have in the files Secretary of State Dean Acheson's reply, through the DCI to the Chairman of JAEIC, denying as of 30 December 1949 permission to implement the scheme.

U-2 Against the Atom

I was convinced that satisfactory photographic coverage of a U-235 separation plant, or of a plutonium production reactor, would be worth the proverbial thousand words, giving information "on electric power consumption, cooling water consumption, plant arrangement and size, new construction, and the physical details which, when analyzed, should enable us to make a much better estimate of Soviet critical material production."¹ I would have been shocked at the suggestion that it might take months of steady work by competent photointerpreters aided by the best procurable consultants to work out the real intelligence meaning of a picture. Yet this was to be the case. The Russians, not being able to copy our atomic facilities, had had to engineer and design their own from scratch. We were thus to face a real cryptographic problem in trying to interpret the totally foreign engineering shown in the U-2 photography.

The atomic sites near Tomsk, those to the east near Krasnoyarsk, and the nuclear weapon proving ground known through seismic measurements to be near Semipalatinsk had been selected on 27 May 1957 by interagency agreement in the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee as three prime objectives for flights over central Asia and Siberia. Other major objectives than the atomic ones included what is now the Tyura Tam missile test range east of the Aral Sea, the aircraft industry in Omsk and Novo-

¹ Briefing of Joint Chiefs of Staff by General Charles P. Cabell, DDCI, 28 August 1957.

sibirsk, and beyond the latter all of Stalin's second industrial bastion, the Kuznetsk Basin. It was the conjunction of all these targets with immediate bearing on weapon systems that had persuaded first the ARC, and then eventually U-2 Project Director Richard M. Bissel and DCI Allen Dulles to cash in the blue chips necessary to procure take-off bases along the southern periphery of the USSR and China.

As an analyst in CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence, I was therefore directed in July 1957 to work up target briefs, by priority, for all atomic targets in the enormous geographical area of central Asia and Siberia. The U-2 program was still being kept under extraordinary security measures, and I did my targeting in the Blue Room, a small centrally located secure area away from my normal desk. Psychologically, we were prepared to be not only secure but devious: the Blue Room was in fact painted light green.

The targets thus identified were to be used by the operational side of the program in planning the actual flights or missions. The procedure was to plan each specific mission around one or two of the ARC's highest-priority targets but to cover as many lower-priority targets as possible along the way. As targeteer, I became involved in selecting the flight path because the best photography, that from the vertical angle, covered a band only five miles wide: it was desirable to orient this band lengthwise over an oblong target and adjust it in other respects so as to counteract possible errors in target location or in navigation.

Seven Tents

Semipalatinsk had been so named because seven trading companies had maintained residencies there when it was an important crossroads on the caravan trails to China and the fabled cities of Samarkand and Bukhara to the south. Twenty-odd nuclear tests had occurred near there in the last eight years, but the exact location of any test was not known closer than within thirty miles. I had no idea how big the test area was. Our own atomic test site at Frenchman's Flats in Nevada, measured against a five-mile-wide camera swath, was of astronomical size.

I finally asked Doctor Donald Rock of the Air Force Technical Applications Center (then AFOAT-1)² to average for me the seismic epicenters of the five largest nuclear detonations at Semipalatinsk. The geographic coordinates for this "centroid" turned out to designate a spot in the featureless desert some seventy miles due west of Semipalatinsk, about one-third of the way to Karaganda. It was south of the old caravan trail, and the only names on the map in the vicinity were those of seasonally dry salt lakes. This was an arbitrary pin-point for a highest-priority target whose location was so poorly known that it ought to be represented as a hand-sized blur on a standard aeronautical chart—a hardly realistic target in operational terms.

This difficulty in locating the Semipalatinsk nuclear proving ground pointed up the essence of our dilemma: we needed and wanted U-2 flights in central Asia and Siberia because we knew so little about what was going on there; yet unless we had precise knowledge of an activity and where it was located, we would stand little chance of photographing it. General Philip C. Strong, director of scientific collection in CIA, who had had much World War II reconnaissance experience, was on the side of precision in targeting and of detailed justification for the collection priority given each target. He questioned the accuracy of maps and suggested that targets be located relative to major features that could be identified visually rather than by coordinate systems of longitude and latitude. That we could not do in this case.

² For the early history of AFOAT-1 see Northrup and Rock's "The Detection of Joe 1" in *Studies* X 4, p. 23 ff.

Nearer Targets

Thus it was with renewed care that I assembled data on other atomic targets in this area. I reviewed the atomic sites which had been listed in 1955 for the Genetrix program, in which free balloons bearing cameras were allowed to drift across the USSR on predetermined paths. Lower-priority targets included the uranium concentration plants of Combine 6 in the Fergana Valley, notably one just south of Leninabad at Ispisar, one north of Leninabad near Taboshar, and one a good many miles to the east near Andizhan. These had already been located as well as possible: a 1947 Jewish refugee who has driven a bread truck to each of them had been interrogated exhaustively and then resettled with appreciation in Brazil. Incidentally, there had been a curious problem with the maps he drew: east of where the Syr Darya river turns north on its way to the Aral Sea he had swapped north and south, but west of there his maps were right side up. In several instances his reporting had been confirmed by returned prisoners of war.

Other uranium concentration plants which belonged to Combine 8 lay east of these toward the Pamir Knot and south of Alma Ata, but their locations were at best poorly known and targeting was considered doubtful.

Krasnoyarsk

Ever since we had learned that Novosibirsk, Tomsk, and Krasnoyarsk, deep in Siberia north and east from Semipalatinsk, were the location of the second generation of Russian atomic sites fathered by those in the Urals³ we had maintained a special watch on these cities and the countryside nearby. Krasnoyarsk had been made off limits to foreigners by 1948, and information about the atomic site on the east bank of the Yenisey river some 35 miles downstream (north) from the city had been especially hard to come by. The defector Icarus reported in early 1951 that many trainloads of mining equipment had been sent there the year before from Wismut, A.G., the vast Russian uranium mining enterprise in East Germany, so he believed the purpose of the new enterprise at Krasnoyarsk to be the mining of uranium. By 1952 all administrative centers in the peninsula of land south of the confluence of the Kan and Yenisey rivers and north of the Trans-Siberian Railroad had disappeared from the annual editions of "Deleniye," the published MVD listing of administrative centers in the USSR.

Then a German prisoner of war had been returned to West Germany, who, despite all the Russian rules and regulations, had actually spent several years as a construction worker at the Krasnoyarsk atomic site. He reported hearsay information about many kilometers of tunnels all lined with concrete. His name for the associated town was Komsomolsk na Yenisey. In early 1957 a Genetrix balloon was recovered from the Aleutian Islands with a number of aerial photographs of Dodonovo, as the Krasnoyarsk site came to be known after an old village there. These photographs showed an enormous construction effort—a new city of apartment houses, laboratories, warehouses, and machine shops—and a vast mining enterprise. There was every reason to believe that higher-resolution photography would clarify the functions of the large, complex, and possibly underground installation.

New Siberia

The uranium metal plant northeast of Novosibirsk had also first been identified by the defector Icarus. In 1956 Doctor Nikolaus Riehl and other German scientists formerly engaged at Elektrostal, near Moscow, in research on uranium metal manu-

³ For the Ural plants see the author's "The Decryption of a Picture" in *Studies* XI 3, p. 41 ff.

facture⁴ confirmed and updated Icarus' testimony. Attachés had photographed it from the Trans-Siberian Railroad in 1952 and 1954 because of its evident size and importance, and George Monk, now State Department representative on JAEIC, had identified it by comparing these photographs with material filed in the old Industrial Register under the name "Stalin Auto Works," apparently the local cover name for the enterprise. It could be located within half a mile of permanent map features.

A uranium metal manufacturing facility was basically of second priority as a U-2 mission objective, but across the Trans-Siberian Railroad was the Novosibirsk Airframe Plant, an additional reason for the U-2 to visit this northeast suburb of Novosibirsk.

Post Box, Tomsk

The atomic site near Tomsk was a matter of more concern, though the amount of information on its function and location was woefully sparse. Furthermore, it was at extreme range so that the aircraft could not, in fact, spend time hunting for it even though we felt we could justify such an effort as against a prime target. Our collection effort against this site had been especially impeded by the 15 January 1952 Soviet order closing Tomsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, and other specific areas to foreigners because Tomsk was not accessible, like Novosibirsk, to attaché photography from the Trans-Siberian Railway.

There had been a number of remarks in reporting about something atomic or about a special post box in connection with Tomsk. These had led to the location and interrogation of a few prisoners of war who had at one time or other been in the area before returning to West Germany in 1954 and of a few ethnic Germans who had been returned in 1956. By now in 1957, however, the resulting evidence of a kind one could put one's finger on was all contained in just three reports and the analysis of a fur hat.

The latest of these reports was from an ethnic German who claimed to have been employed in Tomsk in 1955 as a blacksmith. He told his Army interrogator that local inhabitants had facetiously suggested "Atomsk" would be a better name for the town. He knew of no clearly atomic installation in particular but had heard of an underground secret plant and settlement called "Kolonne [Labor Brigade] 5" located northeast of the Tomsk II railroad station.

Another returned ethnic German told his British interrogator he had heard of an industrial enterprise engaged "in manufacturing fillings for atomic weapons locally known as the Post Box." In Tomsk II he had seen a large building with barred windows on all floors and a large sign saying "Information Office, Personnel Department, Post Box." He knew of two relatively small sites belonging to the enterprise, one east and the other northeast of Tomsk.

On reinterrogation this man mentioned traveling north from Tomsk II on a bus belonging to the Post Box when going to visit a friend of his in a lunatic asylum located on the southern fringe of a prohibited area. He reported seeing railway trains running into the prohibited area carrying coal, wood, and building materials. He had also heard that persons employed there were well paid and received preferential treatment in the distribution of foodstuffs, etc. He mentioned seeing at a distance of six to eight kilometers north of Tomsk II three large chimneys which emitted black smoke.

The interrogator noted that the source had a very poor memory, seemed to be suffering from some kind of mental disorder, and was preoccupied with his plans to emigrate to Canada. Clearly, neither of these two reports tended to inspire confidence

⁴ See the author's "On the Soviet Nuclear Scent" in *Studies* XI 4, p. 13 ff.

in the existence of a major atomic installation in the Tomsk area, let alone its precise location.

The story of a returned German prisoner of war who had been employed in 1949 as a tailor in a small factory northwest of Beloborodovo, some twelve kilometers north of Tomsk city, seemed much more persuasive. Interrogated by the Air Force, he reported that within eight days in April or May 1949 some 12,000 penal workers passed through the bathing and delousing facilities of the Beloborodovo penal camp and were put to work in a secure area fenced off between his factory and the village of Iglakovo, several kilometers north and west down the Tom river. The tailor, clearly proud of his professional ability and reputation, said that many military officers of the construction staff in charge of this project came to his tailor shop to get their uniforms fitted properly.

This military construction outfit had arrived, complete with families, from Tallin where they had just completed another large job. In charge was a Soviet general who had arrived in April with his staff. Interestingly, from the point of view of MVD responsibility for nuclear facilities, the guard force was of a different subordination and neither lived nor mingled with the construction staff officers. The tailor's Russian supervisor had told him that the fenced-off area was to be an atomic energy plant.

In an application of environmental sampling, CIA scientific officer John R. Craig had obtained in the summer of 1956 a fur hat from one of the ethnic Germans who had recently lived in Tomsk. Its analysis, done by AFTAC with the aid of AEC laboratories, was at last conclusive: its exterior surface contained 50 parts per billion of uranium that was slightly, but definitely, enriched in the U-235 isotope. Since no U-236 was detectable, the uranium was not from fall-out, nor had it been through a reactor. Additional analyses for plutonium, radio-iodine, and separated lithium isotopes were all negative.

The U-235 enrichment was evidence of U-235 separation in the Tomsk area. The fabrication of nuclear warhead components was an alternative possibility, but the size of this atomic operation seemed much too great for that. The evidence was against its being a reactor with associated chemical plant or a lithium isotope separator. I made my target a U-235 separation plant and centered it on the spot where the German tailor had seen 12,000 prisoners go to work. The die was cast.

Luck at the Proving Ground

In late August 1957 the missions were flown—rapidly to minimize possible counteraction, and many of them to cover as much useful area as possible. Here we cannot review all the results but will cite some of the outstanding ones.

One flight was planned around Stalinsk in the Kuznetsk Basin and Alma Ata in the Kirgiz SSR as prime targets. In between, the Semipalatinsk proving ground was a prime target, but confidence in its location was so low that the cities of Semipalatinsk and Karaganda were made way-stations and the flight path between them adjusted to hit the latitude and longitude of my seismic centroid. Mention of the proving ground was dropped from the flight plan for security reasons ("Why give away knowledge if you don't have to?"). I doubt that anyone thought seriously about the danger of flying into a nuclear test.

The coordinates turned out to be good. The U-2 passed directly over the proving ground on 22 August 1957, and the pilot got a *thrill*. He had many times flown over our Frenchman's Flats, and he recognized what he saw. Moreover, he saw that the shot-zone had been cleared and they were ready to fire.

It was actually four hours later that Joe 36 was detonated; it was airdropped and went half a megaton. The pilot had photographed it and its carrier aircraft on the ground when he had flown over the Semipalatinsk airfield and associated nuclear weapon facility. The nuclear weapon "cab" he apprehensively spotted on the shot-tower at the proving ground was for a low-yield device that was not to be detonated until 13 September.

Other Findings

The same mission photographed a well-planned, modern community of 20,000 people not previously known of on the north shore of Lake Balkhash. This turned out to be the headquarters of the Sary Shagan antimissile test range, a real find. It also covered the uranium mill at Kadzhi-Say near the west end (not the east end as I had thought) of Lake Issyk Kul⁵ south of Alma Ata, proving that the Russians had large modern uranium mills. The uranium mines of Bystrovka were covered but not found in the film for another year.

The flight that was to cover the Dodonovo mining site near Krasnoyarsk failed with respect to this target because of heavy cloud cover, an all too familiar occurrence in the reconnaissance business.

The uranium metal plant at Novosibirsk turned out to be quite a large installation, including what is probably a large lithium isotope separation plant then under construction between its raw uranium ore facility and its thermal power plant.

Birch Woods

The outstanding target, the Tomsk atomic site, was covered on 21 August in clear vertical photography. The tailor's location for it proved correct. Allen Dulles is said to have exclaimed jubilantly, when he heard the news, "You mean you really did know that something atomic was going on 'way out there in the wilds of Siberia!"

As summarized in the mission report, the installation

covers an irregular shaped area of about 40 square miles on the right bank of the Tom River. No single atomic energy complex in the western world includes the range of processes taking place here. The villages of Iglakovo and Beloborodovo are encompassed in the housing and administration area along the river. On the west edge of the area, a large thermal power plant with an estimated capacity of 400 megawatts is undergoing further expansion. Further power is provided by Gres II in Tomsk and by tie-ins to the Kuzbas Grid. East of this plant is located the feed and processing section and gaseous diffusion plants. One gaseous diffusion building is uncompleted. On the east edge is located the reactor area. One of the two reactors appears to be in the final stage of construction. A maintenance and construction area is just north of these areas. On the northeast edge, a plutonium chemical separation area is uncompleted. A mud lake dump area is on the north edge of the complex outside of the fence which encompasses the whole installation. It is rail served by a spur line from Tomsk.

Actually, one reactor was already in operation, and two more were under construction. These latter would eventually turn out by-product electric power. The gaseous diffusion U-235 separation facility, with its four operating buildings and a fifth under construction, was about one-sixth the size of that at Oak Ridge, which drew about 2000 megawatts of electric power.

⁵ "Warm Water," so named because its salinity kept it from freezing.

The photograph could not tell us, of course, for the purpose of production estimates just how long each installation had been operating or would begin, nor what the Russians called them. Fortunately, we were able in the spring of 1958 to talk to a defector who had been a soldier in a military construction brigade working there from July 1955 to February 1956. He solved many of our time schedule problems and supplied names and identities. The general address of the whole installation was Post Box 5, Tomsk. The new city was named Berezki, Birch Woods, and the birch forest was still preserved around the city then, for the Russians love such forests. Beloborodovo had apparently been expanded to become the construction workers' town of Chekist (Tomsk 19), presumably in honor of their connection with the MVD, and Iglakovo had become Kuzminka (Tomsk 17). The man in charge was Major General Tzarevskiy, who had built the steel town of Nizhniy Tagil in the Urals in the 1930's.

This was the important atomic installation that now took shape out of mere indications and the vague rumors given substance by a fur hat and location by a tailor.

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A review of legal precedents for protecting sensitive information from disclosure in the courts and Congress, with particular reference to Central Intelligence privileges

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN THE FIELD OF INTELLIGENCE

Lawrence R. Houston

Recent agitation in congressional and newspaper circles against "secrecy in government" has focused attention on information security measures in the Executive Branch. The courts, too, have declared in recent months that information used by the government in preparing criminal prosecutions and even some administrative proceedings must be divulged, at least in part, as "one of the fundamentals of fair play."¹ In this atmosphere, the intelligence officer may reflect on the risk he runs of being caught between the upper and nether millstones of congressional or court demands on the one hand and the intelligence organization's requirement for secrecy on the other.

Actually, the problem of demands for the disclosure of information which the government considers confidential is not a new one, as can be seen from the history of the Executive Branch's struggles to withhold information from the courts and Congress. The Executive had based itself in these struggles on the doctrine of the separation of powers among the three branches of government, which holds that no one of the branches shall encroach upon the others.

The Separation of Powers

Demands for the disclosure of information held by the Executive have been made by the courts and by the Congress since the early days of the republic. On the other hand, the very First Congress recognized, more than a year prior to the ratification of the Bill of Rights, that some of the information held by the Executive ought not to be divulged. An act passed on 1 July 1790 concerning "the means of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations" provided for the settlement of certain expenditures which in the judgment of the President should not be made public.² During his first term of office President Washington, anxious to maintain close relations with Congress, on several occasions passed information to the Congress with the warning that it not be publicized. In a special message dated 12 January 1790, for example, he wrote:

I conceive that an unreserved but a confidential communication of all the papers relative to the recent negotiation with some of the Southern

¹ *Communist Party v Subversive Activities Control Board*; U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, decided 9 January 1958.

² Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 2283.

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Tribes of Indians is indispensably requisite for the information of Congress. I am persuaded that they will effectually prevent either transcripts or publications of all such circumstances as might be injurious to the public interests.³

Two years later, in March 1792, a House resolution empowered a committee "to call for such persons, papers, and records as may be necessary to assist their inquiries" into Executive Branch actions with respect to a military expedition under Major General St. Clair. The president did not question the authority of the House, but wished to be careful in the matter because of the precedent it might set. He discussed the problem with his cabinet, and they came to the conclusion:

First, that the House was an inquest and therefore might institute inquiries. Second, that it might call for papers generally. Third, that the Executive ought to communicate such papers as the public good would permit and ought to refuse those the disclosure of which would injure the public: Consequently were to exercise a discretion. Fourth, that neither the committee nor the House had a right to call on the Head of a Department, who and whose papers were under the President alone; but that the committee should instruct their chairman to move the House to address the President.⁴

By 1794 President Washington, then in his second term, began to show less liberality in divulging information to Congress, for on 26 February of that year he sent a message to the Senate stating that "after an examination of [certain correspondence] I directed copies and translations to be made *except* in those particulars which, in my judgment, for public consideration, ought not be communicated."⁵ Two years later, on 30 March 1796, he transmitted to the House his famous refusal to divulge certain information requested by the House in connection with the Jay Treaty. In this treaty, many people believed, the young republic did not get enough concessions from the British, and the Federalists who supported it had become the target of popular resentment. Washington replied as follows to a House resolution:

I trust that no part of my conduct has ever indicated a disposition to withhold any information which the Constitution has enjoined upon the President as a duty to give, or which could be required of him by either House of Congress as a right . . . The matter of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy; and even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic.

Pointing out that he had been a member of the general convention and therefore "knew the principles on which the Constitution was formed," Washington concluded that since "it is essential to the due administration of the government that the boundaries fixed by the Constitution between the different Departments should be preserved, a just regard to the Constitution and to the duty of my office under all circumstances of this case forbids the compliance with your request."⁶

Thus, during Washington's administration the doctrine of the separation of powers came to provide the basis for executive privilege in withholding information. This

³ *Id.* 63.

⁴ Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 303-305.

⁵ Richardson, *op. cit. supra*, note 2, 144. Italics supplied.

⁶ *Id.* 186.

doctrine, not specifically enunciated in the Constitution, emerged from decisions taken on specific political situations which arose during the first years of the republic, as the same men who wrote the Constitution interpreted it in such ways as they thought promoted its intended ends. In this way it was established that the Executive Branch of the Government has within its control certain types of executive documents which the Legislature cannot dislodge no matter how great the demand. The Executive Branch can be asked for documents, but should exercise discretion as to whether their release would serve a public good or be contrary to the public interest.

The Judiciary also recognized, as early as 1803, the independence of the Executive Branch and its ability to control its own affairs. Chief Justice Marshall wrote: "The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the Executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions in this nature political, or which are, by the Constitution and laws, submitted to the Executive, can never be made in this court."⁷

It is notable that this executive privilege was applied in the congressional cases cited above to the President's responsibility for foreign affairs. Under the Continental Congress, the Department of Foreign Affairs had been almost completely subject to congressional direction. Every member of the Congress was entitled to see all records of the Department, including secret matters. But after the Constitution was written, and pursuant to its grand design based on the separation of powers, Congress in 1789 subordinated the Department of Foreign Affairs to the Executive Branch and provided that its Secretary should have custody and charge of all records and papers in the Department. In 1816 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee declared that the "President is the Constitutional representative of the United States with regard to foreign matters" and that the nature of transactions with foreign nations "requires caution and success frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch."

Precedent in Intelligence Cases

Intelligence activities, intimately linked with foreign policy, played their part in the evolution of the Executive Branch's position on disclosure of information. In 1801 Congress interested itself in the expenditures of various Executive Departments and instituted an inquiry "as to the unauthorized disbursement of public funds." In reply to charges that the War Department expended funds for secret service not authorized by law, Oliver Wolcott (Comptroller of the United States 1791-1795; Secretary of the Treasury 1795-1800) gave a clear exposition of the accounting requirements of intelligence which is applicable today:

I never doubted for one instant that such expenditures were lawful, and that the principle should now be questioned has excited a degree of astonishment in my mind at least equal to the "surprise" of the Committee.

Is it then seriously asserted that in the War and Navy Departments—establishments which from their nature presuppose an actual or probable state of *war*, which are designed to protect our country against *enemies*—that the precise *object* of every expenditure must be *published*? Upon what principle are our Generals and Commanders to be deprived of powers which are sanctioned by universal usage and expressly recognized as lawful by all writers of the Law of Nations? If one of our Naval Commanders now in the Mediterranean should expend a few hundred dollars for intelligence respecting the force of his enemy or the measures meditated by him, ought the present Administration to disallow the charge, or publish the source from

⁷ *Marbury v Madison*, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).

which the intelligence was derived? Is it not equivalent to a publication to leave in a public office of accounts a document explaining all circumstances relating to a payment? Ought the truth be concealed by allowing fictitious accounts? Could a more effectual mode of preventing abuses be devised than to establish it as a rule that all confidential expenditures should be ascertained to the satisfaction of the Chief Magistrate of our country, that his express sanction should be obtained, and that the amount of all such expenditures should be referred to a *distinct account* in the Public Records?⁸

The statute referred to in the debates was an Act of Congress passed on 9 February 1793 which gave the President authority, if the public interest required, to account for money drawn from the Treasury for the purpose of "intercourse with foreign nations" simply by his own certification or that of the Secretary of State. Actually, this statute reaffirmed the similar legislation of 1790 providing for the settlement of certain expenditures which, in the judgment of the President, ought not be made public.⁹ The substance of these Acts was revived and continued in later legislation, and President Polk utilized it in 1846 in refusing to accede to a House resolution requesting an accounting of Daniel Webster's expenses as Secretary of State in the previous administration.

In 1842 Webster had negotiated an agreement with the British representative, Lord Ashburton, on the long-disputed boundary of Maine. To make the treaty more palatable to the public and enhance its chances of ratification in the Senate, Webster had spent money out of "secret service funds" to carry on favorable propaganda in the religious press of Maine. Senator Benton termed this practice a "shame and an injury . . . a solemn bamboozlement." A Congressional investigation followed, during the course of which the request was levied upon President Polk.

President Polk based his refusal to comply on the statutes which gave the President discretionary authority to withhold details on how money was spent. He supported his predecessor's determination that the expenditure should not be made public, asserting that if not "a matter of strict duty, it would certainly be a safe general rule that this should not be done." In his message to Congress he acknowledged the "strong and correct public feeling throughout the country against secrecy of any kind in the administration of the Government" but argued that "emergencies may arise in which it becomes absolutely necessary for the public safety or public good to make expenditures the very object of which would be defeated by publicity." He pointed out as an example that in time of war or impending danger it may be necessary to "employ individuals for the purpose of obtaining information or rendering other important services who could never be prevailed upon to act if they had the least apprehension that their names or their agency would in any contingency be divulged."¹⁰

The non-disclosure of information relating to intelligence was tested rather vigorously in several instances during the Civil War, and these tests established a strong precedent in favor of the inviolability of intelligence activities. Brigadier General G. M. Dodge, who conducted a number of intelligence activities in the West with considerable results, became the object of relentless criticism for his financing methods. He refused obdurately to break the confidence of his agents by revealing names and amounts paid, and when he was denied the funds necessary for these activities, he had to raise the money for his agents by confiscating cotton crops in the South and

⁸ *Control of Federal Expenditures*, A Documentary History 1775-1894, Institute for Government Record of the Brookings Institution, pp. 329-330. Punctuation modernized.

⁹ Richardson, *supra*, note 2.

¹⁰ Richardson, *op. cit. supra*, note 2, 2281.

selling them at public auction. Three years after the end of the War, when War Department auditors discovered that General Dodge had paid spies for Grant's and Sherman's armies, they peremptorily ordered him to make an accounting of the exact sums. Receipts and vouchers signed by spies who lived in the South were obviously difficult to obtain, and furthermore the names of the agents, for their own security, could not be disclosed. As a result, when the War Department closed Dodge's secret service accounts 21 years after the war, they were apparently still without a receipt for every dollar spent.¹¹

A leading legal decision governing the privilege of the Executive Branch to withhold intelligence also had its genesis in the Civil War. In July 1861 William A. Loyd entered into a contract with President Lincoln under which he proceeded "within the rebel lines and remained during the entire war." He collected intelligence information all during the war and transmitted it directly to the President. At the end of the war he was reimbursed his expenses, but did not get any of the \$200-per-month salary for which the contract called. After Loyd's death a suit was brought by his administrator against the Government to collect the salary Lincoln had contracted to pay him.

The case was finally decided by the Supreme Court in 1876, and the claim was denied. Mr. Justice Field set forth in his opinion a position on secrecy in intelligence matters which is still being followed today. He wrote that Loyd was engaged in secret service, "the information sought was to be obtained clandestinely," and "the employment and the service were to be equally concealed." The Government and the employee "must have understood that the lips of the other were to be forever sealed respecting the relation of either to the matter." Were the conditions of such secret contracts to be divulged, embarrassment and compromise of the Government in its public duties and consequent injury to the public would result, or furthermore the person or the character of the agent might be injured or endangered. The secrecy which such contracts impose "is implied in all secret employments of the Government in time of war, or upon matters affecting foreign relations," and precludes any action for their enforcement. "The publicity produced by an action would itself be a breach of a contract of that kind and thus defeat a recovery."¹²

The pattern of executive privilege as applied to withholding information on intelligence activities was determined by the resolution of these situations which occurred from the first years of the Republic through the Civil War. Decisions in later cases utilized the precedents which had here been established. In 1948 the Supreme Court, deciding a case concerning an application for an overseas air route, reaffirmed that "the President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not be published to the world," and defined its own position on cases involving secret information:

It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret. Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be taken into executive confidences. . . . The very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial.¹³

Intelligence information is recognized by the three branches of Government as of special importance because of its connection with foreign affairs and military security.

¹¹ Perkins, J. R., *Trails, Rails and War*, Bobbs-Merrill (1929).

¹² *Trotten Adm'r v United States*; 92 US 105 (1876).

¹³ *Chicago and Southern Airlines, Inc. v Waterman Steamship Corporation*; 33 US 103 (1948).

Authorities for CIA Information Controls

As an Executive agency CIA partakes of the privileges accorded generally to the Executive Branch with respect to withholding information, privileges ultimately dependent on the separation of powers doctrine. In addition, Congress has specifically recognized the secrecy essential in the operation of Central Intelligence by providing in the National Security Act of 1947 that the Director "shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." In the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, noting again this responsibility of the Director, Congress exempted the Agency from any law which requires the disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed. Other statutes exempt the Agency from requirements to file certain information reports.

Pursuant to the Director's task of safeguarding intelligence information, Agency regulations governing the release of information serve notice upon employees that unauthorized disclosure is a criminal and an administrative offense. A criminal prosecution for unauthorized disclosure can be instituted against an employee under several statutes, including the Espionage Laws, or administrative sanctions including discharge can be applied against him.

Central Intelligence is also subject to the provision of Executive Order 10501 that "classified defense information shall not be disseminated outside the Executive Branch except under conditions and through channels authorized by the head of the disseminating department or agency." This provision, although it has never been tested in the courts, gives the Director added support in controlling the release of information to the courts and Congress as well as to the public. He can and will upon request release information of no security significance to the courts or Congress; he can exercise discretion in the release of information produced by and concerning the CIA; but there are limitations on his authority over information originating in other departments, joint interagency documents, and personnel security information. If the decision whether to comply with a demand for information cannot be made at the Director's level, it is referred to the National Security Council.

CIA's position vis-a-vis the courts and Congress is unique beside that of other agencies, because of the recognized secrecy and sensitivity and the connection with foreign affairs possessed by the information with which the Agency deals. This position has been tested on several occasions.

Intelligence and the Courts

The secrecy of intelligence employment which the Supreme Court recognized in the Totten case on the Loyd-Lincoln contract over eight years ago is basically unchanged today. The difficulties encountered in the courts by a person claiming pay for secret work allegedly performed for the Government were illustrated in the Gratton Booth Tucker case in 1954. Tucker alleged that he had performed services "under conditions of utmost secrecy, in line of duty, under the supervision of agents of the United States Secret Service and of the C.I.D. of the Armed Services and Department of Justice, FBI and of the Central Intelligence Agency." He claimed that from 1942 to 1947 he contributed his services voluntarily and "without thought of compensation in anticriminal and counterespionage activities in Mexico and behind the lines in Germany," and that in 1950 he was assigned to Korea. For all this he brought suit against the United States in the Court of Claims, seeking payment of \$50,000 annually for the years he worked and of \$10,000 as expenses. On the very basis of these allegations, and without going into the matter any further, the court refused recovery, citing the Totten case as authority.¹⁴

¹⁴ *Gratton Booth Tucker v United States*; 127 Ct. Cl. 477 (1954).

Another aspect of the Government's privilege not to disclose state secrets in open court was decided several years ago by the Supreme Court in the Reynolds case. This was a suit for damages brought against the Government by the widows of three civilian observers who were killed in the crash of a military plane on which they were testing secret electronic equipment. The Air Force refused to divulge certain information which the widows thought necessary to their case, stating that the matter was privileged against disclosure pursuant to Air Force regulations prohibiting that reports be made available to persons "outside the authorized chain of command." The Air Force then made a formal claim of privilege, affirming that "the aircraft in question, together with the personnel on board, were engaged in a highly secret mission of the Air Force." An affidavit by the Air Force Judge Advocate General asserted further that the material could not be furnished "without seriously hampering national security." The Supreme Court accepted the Air Force argument, saying that "even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake." And these Air Force statements had been sufficient to satisfy the court of the military secret involved.¹⁵

The privilege of withholding national security information from the courts had been subject to some limitation. One case, *U.S. v Jarvinen*,¹⁶ illustrates that this executive privilege is not judicially inviolable. Jarvinen was a casual informant in the United States who gave information in 1952 to CIA and later to the FBI that Owen Lattimore had booked passage to the USSR. He later informed CIA that he had fabricated the whole story. Soon thereafter Jarvinen was indicted for making false statements to government agencies. At the trial a CIA employee called to testify by the Department of Justice prosecutor was directed by CIA not to answer. The witness' claim of privilege was not accepted, however, and when he refused the court's order to answer he was held in contempt and sentenced to fifteen days in jail. He was pardoned by the President.

The CIA argument had been based on the provision of the CIA Act of 1949 that the Director "shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure" and on Executive Order 10290, then in effect, which limited dissemination of classified security information. The court had reservations about the substantive merits of the privilege, and the widespread publicity emanating from the case apparently vitiated the claim of need to protect sources and methods. It was the further opinion of the court that in a criminal prosecution the Government must choose either to present all the pertinent information, regardless of its sensitivity, or to risk dismissal of the case by not presenting any sensitive information at all.

There have been several instances of indirect Agency participation in court cases, usually when employees have been requested to furnish documents or testify on behalf of the Government or private parties. In recent cases in which other Government agencies have participated there has been a cooperation between them and Central Intelligence representatives which was lacking in the Jarvinen case, and little difficulty has been encountered with respect to the privilege of withholding classified information. A good example is the Justice Department's prosecution of the case against Petersen,¹⁷ an employee of the National Security Agency who had passed NSA documents to the Dutch. The Justice Department needed to present classified information to the court in order to substantiate its case, but the Director of Central Intelligence advised, in the interest of security, that a particular document not be used. The Justice Department accepted this recommendation and succeeded in convicting Petersen on other evidence.

¹⁵ *United States v Reynolds*; 345 US 1 (1952).

¹⁶ *United States v Jarvinen*; Dist. Ct. Western District of Washington, Northern Div. (1952).

¹⁷ *United States v Petersen* (E. D. Va. Criminal No. 3049, January 4, 1955).

CIA and Congress

CIA's record of cooperation with congressional committees has on the whole been satisfactory. The Agency certainly recognizes that Congress has a legitimate interest in some intelligence information and obviously a better claim on it than say the private citizen who needs it for purposes of litigation. Although, under the separation of powers doctrine, intelligence gathering and production is an executive function and the responsibility of the Executive Branch, the Congress does have responsibilities in the foreign affairs field. It is, moreover, the appropriating authority for Agency funds, and indiscriminate withholding of information could not only result in a poorly informed Congress but also jeopardize the good will the Agency enjoys with it. Within the bounds of security, therefore, CIA has attempted conscientiously to fulfill requests from Congress proper to the legislative function. And Congress, for its part, has so far respected CIA's decision to withhold information or produce it only in closed session with the understanding that it is not to be released.

If summoned by a subpoena to testify before a Congressional Committee, all CIA employees, including the Director, are required to appear or be held in contempt of Congress. There are few instances, however, in which an employee has been subpoenaed to testify involuntarily, and no documents have ever been released to Congress without the Director's approval. In most cases it has been as a matter of form or at Agency request that an employee's testimony has been called for and a subpoena served. In only two instances situations have arisen which led to strained relations between the Agency and congressional committees. When Agency testimony was desired by the Senate Internal Security Committee concerning the security status of John Paton Davies, CIA successfully requested several delays in the hearings on security grounds. And in 1954, while the Senate Committee on Government Operations was considering inquiring as to certain facts relating to the security status of an Agency employee, counsel for the Committee and the General Counsel of CIA agreed on the legitimate interests of the Agency and the Committee. The employee was never questioned by the Committee.

No court cases have defined an employee's rights to withhold from Congress information which has been classified and the divulgence of which could work harm to this country's intelligence program. Such a case could theoretically arise through testing a Congressional contempt citation in a habeas corpus proceeding, but it is unlikely that such a test will be made. The employee could use an order from the Director as a basis for not testifying, and the Director's judgment has always been respected by the Congress when he has decided he cannot reveal certain information. Because the information which CIA has is so clearly within the purview of the Executive Branch, this Agency has a much stronger legal basis for refusal than other departments have.

If Congress should persist, there would of course have to be eventual Presidential support for continued refusal to give information. Such support was tendered, outside the intelligence and foreign fields, in 1909 when Theodore Roosevelt withstood a Senate resolution calling for certain papers in the Bureau of Corporations concerned with the absorption by U.S. Steel of another corporation. Roosevelt informed the Senate that he had obtained personal possession of the papers it desired but that the Senate could get them only by impeachment. "Some of these facts which they [the Senate] want," he declared, "for what purpose I hardly know, were given to the Government under the Seal of Secrecy and cannot be divulged, and I will see to it that the word of this Government to the individual is kept sacred."¹⁸

¹⁸ *The Letters of Archie Butt, Personal Aide to President Roosevelt*; by Abbott, pp. 305-06.

Generally, there has been a spirit of cooperation between the Legislative and Executive Branches. In those cases where a conflict has occurred, and the Executive has refused to divulge information requested even in the strongest terms by the Legislature, the decision of the Executive has prevailed. The Constitution has been in existence for over 170 years and under it 34 Presidents and 85 Congresses have forged a strong interpretation of the separation of powers. In the field of foreign affairs intelligence, the Director of Central Intelligence, acting under the constitutional powers of the Executive Branch of Government together with powers granted by statute, can withhold such information as he believes is in the best interests of the United States. If a showdown were to occur, however, the issue is between the President and Congress as to whether classified information should be divulged against the wishes of the Director, who is responsible for the protection of sources and methods. Historical precedent in similar situations appears to favor the President.

(From Volume 2 Number 4, p. 61, 1958; For Official Use Only)

*In which it appears things
aren't getting any better*

ELEGANT WRITING IN THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES

Richard T. Puderbaugh

How I came to be designated CWH/WW (Chief Word Watcher, Western Hemisphere) was that a certain Senior Officer called me into his office the other day and showed me a paper from one of the stations, which spoke of giving an operation "short shift." * My God, he said, who ever heard of a short shift? I knew what he meant, so I didn't make the mistake of mentioning Volkswagens, 1970 petticoats or the Redskins. The Senior Officer went on with his denunciation, and ended up by asking me "Don't they know what 'shrift' means?"

It is a good question. How many people do know? It is one of those terms everybody knows about and thinks he can define, and one which should really lead people inexorably to the dictionary. But it doesn't, not even those people who know how to spell it. I didn't say these things to the Senior Officer, because he is more senior than I am, and has a quick temper.

Anyway, in that conversation, the Senior Officer appointed me Official Word Watcher for the Division, by I don't know what authority, and charged me with the following duties:

To collect from all CS communications outstanding examples of elegant writing, and to report upon my research at opportune times so that our writers may be edified and instructed thereby.

As soon as my appointment became known, I had a great deal of help from other headquarters personnel, but I will acknowledge that help specifically only if the danger of lynching becomes clear, and I need help (or company).

Here, then, is my first report. I should like to begin it by listing some of the most elegant words we have in our correspondence, words which I urge one and all to use at every opportunity. I should like to see the day when not a single page of our prose escapes the use of at least one of these words. I especially urge our writers to try new uses for all these words, and not be bound by such things as tense, gender, number or mode. *Caveat*, for example, is in the Latin imperative mode, but that is much too restrictive, and we have quite properly used this word as a noun for some time now. Imagine my delight when I observed recently the first attempt that I know of to use it, as is, in the present indicative. When you consider that we have long since expanded its original sense of "warning" to include the sense of "conditions" or "provisos," you can understand why the word is so important to us. I can right here remark that I should caveat some of the remarks I am about to make in this essay, and you will not

* Author's Note: In this essay, examples of elegant writing have been taken from official CS communications. The names of originating stations and officers, as well as cryptonyms and other indicators, have been changed to protect the guilty.

have the slightest idea what I mean, but it sounds distinguished and important, and that is what matters.

Here is the list:

- caveat
- rational
- thrust
- interface (used as a noun and a verb)
- dichotomy
- lacuna*
- forthcoming (in the sense of "candid")
- profile (can be either high or low)
- silhouette (can be either high or low)
- options
- life-style
- posture
- rapport

Rapport is an especially fine word, but so far we have used it only as a noun. Perhaps we should offer a prize to the officer who first devises a successful sentence using rapport as a verb, although we may have been beaten to the punch on this one by the folk-rock expression "to rap." Even employing "rapport" as a noun, nevertheless, we can do great things. Note the following excerpt from a field report:

"We hope it does not reach the extreme where the agent fails to establish a working rapport, or worse, and thus destroys . . ."

The mind boggles at the thought of anything being worse than a working rapport, and yet here is an officer who does *not* want the agent to *fail* to establish exactly that. Like the character in the play who suddenly discovered that he had been speaking prose all his life, this writer is probably unaware that he has constructed a litotes there. A litotes affirms something by denying the contrary, as in "he is not without charm." The device can also be stretched to refute something by negating the denial of the contrary, as in "he denied that he was not unwilling to go," . . . and so on, into total opacity. It is one way to make a reader really study your prose. Still with me:

Try this one:

"Subject: Refutal of rumors regarding a coup."

To take words from other languages or disciplines, and use them in new and clever ways to confound the pedestrian mind, is a noble thing, but how much more magnificent it is to take a legitimate word from our own language and by the change of one phoneme devise a new word, which nobody ever heard of before, but whose meaning everybody will immediately perceive! The roots of this particular treasure seem to be in the words *refuse* and *refute*, but I noted that the inventor did not arrange a reciprocal loan of suffixes and speak of such things as "Hanoi's *refusation* to make peace." There is something not quite right about that one. Sort of low class, perhaps. It is possible, of course, that the word *rebut* was bobbing around in the crucible which produced *refutal*, but in that direction lies paranoia, and we will venture no farther.

It seems to me that *refutal* deserves at least as high a place in our lexicon as *normalcy*, which, as you may know, was invented by Warren G. Harding, who didn't

* Plural is *lacunae*. This is really a keen word, which has only recently appeared. Used judiciously, it should be OK at least through 1973.

realize he was inventing anything. He would have made a good operations officer. Indeed, I think that the authenticity of these inventions has to be based to a great extent upon the fact that when they are first uttered their inventors are unconscious of bringing something new into the world.

I don't know whether the innocence of the inventors has any bearing on the acceptability of words to modern dictionaries. I doubt it. Modern dictionaries will accept anything anybody says, because if somebody says something it become usage, and usage is *king*! There is one grumpy headquarters officer who dislikes this modern trend, and says that the Oxford of 1912 is the only authoritative dictionary of the English language. He is a troublemaker, who will one day be dealt with by Division Authorities. He is the one who brought to me the following:

“Subject: Easement of the Threat of a Coup.”

I had to point out to him that Webster's New World Dictionary says there *is* such a meaning to easement, in addition to the legal use pertaining to land titles, so that settles that. He also has to accept the fact, for instance, that *chaise longue* has now become *chaise lounge* in this country, by authority of Sears, Roebuck and Company, and the *lingerie* means ladies' drawers and shifts and things of that nature, and if he and the French don't like it then they can damn well lump it.

What should we do about the shall/will problem? My own inclination is to let it lie, because the shall/will rule was an artificial thing, anyway, set up in a very elegant epoch of the English language, to tone up the speech of His Majesty's subjects. It is a difficult thing to master, and I think we are doing well enough without it, although you have to admit that nothing dresses up a sentence quite so much as an unexpected “shall” where a “will” really belongs. That is to say that we should pay no attention to the rule, but should just put in a shall at any time a sentence needs to be toned up a bit.

Another problem which I'm inclined to de-emphasize is the one which the *New Yorker* calls “The Omnipotent Whom.” There is no doubt about it, *whom* sounds much more literate and polished than plain old everyday *who*, but I think we have this factor under good control. In fact, I have ceased collecting samples, after nearly filling a notebook, because everyone is doing so well. I shall cite just two fairly typical examples:

“ZPDRUM, whom we note is currently in Paris . . .”

“Forward the document to whomever may have an interest in the matter.”

If there is anything that dresses up our prose even more than the shall/will or who/whom pilasters, it is the mixed metaphor. If your metaphor gives a clear picture, you should be ashamed of yourself. We don't do as well as we should on metaphors, in fact, and we must work on them a bit harder. We have much to learn from the State Department in this respect, as witness the following sample from State traffic:

“If the government of Graustark does not box itself in by wrapping the national flag around the training area . . .”

Try to construct a mental picture from the Ozymandian blueprint, and despair! The same State Department expert also spoke of “a certain rustling of sabers,” which shows that he is made of championship material. I would quarrel mildly in one sense, however. If the sabers are, in truth, made of something that rustles, he should correct and extend his borrowing from Poe, and make the rustling *uncertain*, as well as sad, and perhaps silken. Unless, of course, the writer meant to imply that there was a kind of military Bad Bart who was going around stealing great numbers of sabers from the corrals of nice folks in white hats.

But a fig for the State Department! We have our own experts, and I defy any other agency to produce anything to equal the following:

“The result of the medical checkup was that the agent has diabetes.”

“His bank allottee is forwarded under separate cover.”

“The negative reaction to this device was its (attaboy!) lack of sufficient range. It was tested singularly and in pairs.”

“He is not temperamentally geared to write in subtilities, but does produce good hardhitting yellow journalism in the style of a poor man’s Westbrook Pegler.”

The last sentence may be one of the decade. I don’t say that because of his reference to “hardhitting” journalism, either, even though that term does limn a picture of an energetic, up-and-at-’em CIA officer playing Wagnerian themes on the mighty Wurlitzer he has constructed from his local (sob) *stable of assets*. It’s good, but you can’t give very high marks for it, because when you come right down to it, our operations have never to my knowledge produced a single paragraph that *wasn’t* hardhitting. Where that sentence achieves greatness is in calling attention to one of the characteristics of the late columnist which has been too long overlooked—that is, the fact that only the rich could afford the real Westbrook Pegler.

But there is more. If one lifts the phrase “temperamentally geared” out of the stream and contemplates it carefully, one cannot help but be impressed with the subtlety of the thing. I know a number of people in this agency who I think are temperamentally geared. I steer clear of them. They can’t do you any good.

“In view of the serious flap potential, which, if discovered by the host government, could have lead to a worsening of relations . . .”

We need not dwell upon the construction which hypothesizes the damage that might be done if the government discovers the flap potential of an operation. We all know that, surely. Who among us would ever want a host government to find out how risky an operation he was mounting? We must always keep our host government reassured that our clandestine operations in their countries have also no flap potential at all. But let us press on to the rest of that sentence, whose enigmatic wording led my mind into an almost psychedelic whirl, with images of “some lead is red, and some reds are led,” and when the machinery finally clanked to a halt, here is what came out of the printer:

Wherever your writing may lead, Sir,
You may rest assured I shall read, Sir;
But if, when I’ve read,
You insist I’ve been lead,
Then I surely shall sea read, indeed, Sir.

You can have that, if you want it.

Perhaps there is something about lead that attracts the man—Freudian associations with bullets or poison or pollution. It would not be the first time our prose implied more than it said. Notice the gothic scene evoked by the following:

“ . . . we will continue to keep this asset tabled, and will call on him for spot reporting when necessary.”

If all our Operations Officers were as skilled at writing as this man, the Green Beret case would never have hit the headlines. There is no “terminated with extreme prejudice” blooper here to provoke the news media into soaring flights of fancy. No,

the untutored mind would receive that sentence as meaning that the matter was being held in abeyance, as in the parliamentary term "to table a motion," whereas those of us in the know immediately perceive that this officer is describing a bit of standard tradecraft, whereby we strap a man to a deal table and belabor him with interfaces and rapports and dichotomies until he by god comes up with a spot report.

"So successful was Fulano's re-immersion as a crusading journalist that . . ."

A number of our stations have in the past produced or supported underground newspapers, but this must be the first one of record whose clandestine journalism was done under water. Eat your heart out, MI-6!

"Fulano appears to be in excellent financial straits."

"Subject and his wife, Josephine, nee unknown . . ."

"He did it in a fit of peak." *

"He easily loses his head."

"He attempted to illicit the information."

"The rightist candidate, who won a plurality of votes . . ."

"The agent demonstrated an excellent operational posture." **

". . . like operating in a vacuum tube."

"The national liberation movement . . ."

"Incendiary fires will be set."

"Several methods of modus operandi are being contemplated."

The author of that last sentence could have added immeasurably to its charm by pointing out that incendiary fires can be put out with wet water; but he did at least clarify things a bit the following week by explaining "By large incendiary fires, the agent may be referring to one of the petroleum storage areas . . ."

One of the prize words in my collection is the invention of a State Department officer, whom we really ought to try to identify and recruit. The word is fragile and beautiful, and it is with some hesitation that I offer it up on our rather brutal altar, for I fear that we will over-use it and cause it to wilt and fade before its time. I have no right to keep it, however, and present it herewith with a fervent exhortation to one and all to use it tenderly so that it will last for at least six months to a year. Here it is:

dichotomization

If that doesn't bring a lump to your throat, nothing will. There is more, but I cannot go on. I trust you will all keep your passive voice active. It must never be allowed to be wondered why our communications are not being written with more thrust and rationale. Go forth and write, and may the Lord have rapport upon you.

(From Volume 16 Number 1, p.1, 1972; Unclassified)

* *Fit of peak* is known to the medical profession as "Pike's Syndrome." In Asia, it is called "Noriky's Complaint."

** The OK operational posture for 1970-72, in case you didn't know, if *forward-leaning*. We have in the past been through postures of defense, agonizing re-appraisal, benevolent neutrality and the like, but then came that luminous moment when an unknown genius suggested that we should all be forward-leaning. Thousands of our patriotic, conscientious headquarters staff members were thereupon transformed into human gnomons, who can be observed every morning shortly before 8:30, inclined dutifully in the direction of Langley, and at about 5:00 p.m. pointed just as dutifully toward home.

The work of one veteran intelligence chief evokes reflections from another

ON "THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE"

Frank G. Wisner

Allen Dulles's book, aptly entitled *The Craft of Intelligence*,¹ has been so extensively and variously reviewed by the professionals of the press and so much wisdom has been reflected in the more thoughtful of these reviews that it was with the greatest reluctance and diffidence on the part of the undersigned that he was prevailed upon to undertake the task of addressing a further commentary to the readership of this publication. The evident presumption of attempting to provide any useful commentary upon a work so cogently and concisely written, and more particularly of venturing views of possible value to such a uniquely sophisticated audience, would have sufficed to deter this effort but for the opportunity thus afforded of grinding certain special axes and getting in some plugs for a number of strongly-held convictions. (Incidentally, it may be of interest to note in passing that the preponderance of the book reviews have ranged from favorable to enthusiastic, with only a small proportion registering significant dissatisfaction or hostility.)

Mr. Dulles has written a most valuable book, one which, in the judgment of this reviewer, should be read and if possible possessed by all persons having a serious professional interest in the subject of intelligence, and hopefully also by a wide segment of the general public. It is essentially an encyclopedia of the terminology, concepts, and craft of the trade, abundantly illustrated by cases and anecdotes drawn from the author's own treasure-house of experience, and highly readable in form.

Intelligence Terminology

One of the chief merits of the book from the standpoint of the public in general is its clarification, through definition and painstaking exposition, of the argot of the trade, which has sprouted and proliferated in such lush profusion as to have become highly confusing and dangerously misleading—largely as the result of loose usage on the part of the considerable and still growing number of amateurish exploiters of this rich vein of literary ore. Newspapermen, the authors of popular fiction, and, I fear, even a small number of would-be practitioners of the profession of intelligence have all made their contribution to the chaos, to the point that it was well overdue for one of the leading and most revered experts in the field to hack a clear track through the tangled undergrowth. In fact, if it were possible for the intelligence community in general to accept and conform to Mr. Dulles's definitions and supporting explanations for such variously used expressions as "deception," "defector," "double agent," and "counterintelligence," to mention but a few, much difficulty would be avoided in future; and if as an extra dividend the interested representatives of the fourth estate could be persuaded or influenced in the direction of adopting these definitions, there would be in time a constructive clarification of the public mind and a more understanding appreciation of the problems of intelligence. The repeated references in the

¹ New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 277 pp.

Western press to both H. A. R. ("Kim") Philby (who recently skipped to Moscow to join his old cronies Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean) and George Blake (now serving in England a heavy sentence for espionage) as "British double agents," when in point of fact they were highly important long-term *Soviet penetration agents*, may serve to illuminate the reasons for concern on this score.

In sharp contrast with the large and ever-mounting stacks of books and articles purporting to divulge the inside story of U.S. intelligence and to "tell all" about our espionage system and activities, Mr. Dulles does not reveal secrets which are still sensitive (and many of which must always remain so) but rather has confined himself to a serious discussion of the principles and methods of sound intelligence operations. Whereas the omission of such succulent tidbits has disappointed many of the reviewers and also tends to circumscribe the appeal of the book to the public, it is taken for granted that the members of the intelligence community will understand and applaud its wisdom and will value this example of security-mindedness and restraint. It is in fact an excellent illustration of the general rule that persons having the deepest and most legitimate insights into intelligence matters are most scrupulous in their trusteeship of such knowledge and that the penchant for sensational revelations is the near monopoly of the charlatans and pretenders who scavenge along the flanks of the intelligence enterprise.*

Classical Espionage

In his introductory recitation of the long historical background and the more recent evolution of modern intelligence, counterintelligence, and other forms of clandestine operations, Mr. Dulles has provided some much-needed perspectives on matters which will be alluded to later in this review. Having thus set the stage for his examination and analysis of current practices and procedures of the leading intelligence services of the world, both friendly and opposed, he launches into an admirably complete discussion of our intelligence requirements and collection methods.

Here he places well-merited emphasis upon the progress resulting from the invention and adaptation to the uses of intelligence of sophisticated scientific devices, but he does not permit the glitter of these technological marvels to obscure the perduring value of the classical methods of procurement. Though the high-flying Mata Haris of today may with their glass eyes be able to discern the most minute of man-made molehills from untold miles of altitude, and though their acoustical siblings of equivalent acuteness may be able to hear across continents the rustle of a mounting missile, these are not and will never become any substitute for the older and less "exotic" measures which are essential to the discovery and frustration of subversive intent. This point is made manifest by Mr. Dulles in his numerous allusions to recent successes of the covert intelligence and security agencies of the United States. He has also called attention to many of the detections of Soviet secret operatives which have been the fruit of close cooperation as between the American services and their allied opposite numbers.

Counterintelligence and the Adversary

The chapter on "Counterintelligence," taken together with relevant and related portions of two or three other chapters, *viz.* "The Main Opponent, etc." and "Volunteers," makes an unusually valuable contribution toward a better comprehension of the true significance and vital importance of this weapon in our own arsenal of defense. For one thing, Mr. Dulles disposes of the popular misconception that counter-

* See note at end of story on p. 89.

intelligence is essentially a negative and responsive activity, that it moves only or chiefly in reaction to situations thrust upon it and in counter to initiatives mounted by the opposition. He shows that counterintelligence produces its most valuable results by subtle but aggressive attacks upon its chief target—the structure and personnel of hostile intelligence services. These chapters also bring out the fact that counterintelligence generates and delivers highly valuable by-products in the form of positive intelligence and the detection and exposure of enemy deception, including their so-called “disinformation” activities.

Lastly, but by no means of lesser importance, there are the frequently significant indicators of Soviet policy and intentions which are provided by our successful operations in this field. In this way our counterintelligence has been sounding a much-needed warning that in spite of the ostensible shifts of Soviet policy from warm to cold and *vice versa*, the fundamental and consistent aims thereof are essentially hostile, and that we must therefore at all times react most warily to Soviet and other Communist overtures packaged in the attractive wrappings of “peaceful coexistence,” “the new Spirit of Moscow,” or whatever may be the sales slogan of the moment. For example, during the peak of the euphoria which broke out in certain Western capitals as the result of and in the wake of the August treaty for a limited nuclear test ban, and long before this premature and uncritical enthusiasm was beclouded by such recent Soviet actions² as their renewed interference with the Berlin access routes and their handling of the Barghoorn affair, the best available counterintelligence sources are understood never to have ceased signaling that the thrust of Soviet policy continued to be aggressively antagonistic and that despite all of the fair words at the top there was not the slightest diminution in the vigor and intensity of the Soviet effort at the level of the secret and subversive.

This may perhaps be another way of saying that the French seem to have had something on their side of the argument in maintaining that it would be a mistake quite capable of leading us into mortal danger to believe the test ban treaty to signify any substantial easing of tensions and that the behavior into which the Russians have relapsed most recently² is in accordance with their normal pattern—the other being both abnormal and highly transitory. Be that as it may, of such magnitude are the power, position, and prestige of the intelligence and security empire within the Soviet scheme of things as to suggest that it will be soon enough for us to begin believing in the sincerity of Soviet protestations of peaceful intent when we have received satisfactory evidence that they are muzzling their subversive bloodhounds and dismantling their apparatus of clandestine conquest—covert as well as open evidence, for example in such matters as the Soviet position, both proclaimed and clandestine, toward so-called “wars of liberation.”

Overt Aspects

It was obviously impossible for Mr. Dulles to cover in adequate depth, in even such a comprehensive work as this, all of the multiple and complex phases of the subject which are currently included in the craft of intelligence. Doubtless each member of the intelligence community reading the book would desire a fuller treatment of his own pet subject, and this reviewer, in full recognition of the unfairness of criticizing a work which covers so much ground, finds himself in basic agreement with certain observations in the most excellent review written by Professor Robert R. Bowie and published in the *New York Herald Tribune*, edition of Sunday, October 13, 1953.³

² Written as of 20 November 1963, just before the assassination of President Kennedy.

³ In *Book Week*, distributed also with the Sunday Washington Post.

It is believed that the author might himself be willing to acknowledge the existence of an imbalance in favor of intelligence tradecraft, i.e., clandestine techniques and operations, and to the disadvantage of certain of the most important functions and problems of the research and analysis and estimative processes.

Regrettably the experience and background of this reviewer are not such as to permit him—nor would it otherwise be either appropriate or possible in this short space to attempt—to comment in detail upon these apparent deficiencies. However, in the hope that Mr. Dulles himself will soon find time to give us the benefit of his wisdom and close knowledge pertaining to these areas, it is suggested that more emphasis should be devoted to the very great reliance which our system places upon the open and above-board techniques of scholarly research and analysis and to bringing home more forcibly the weight accorded to the product of these efforts in the scientific and technical fields, for example. It is further recommended that Mr. Bowie's review be read by those interested in these spheres of activity and their attendant difficulties. Mr. Dulles had been both wise and just in the distribution of his commendations among the personnel concerned in the various departments and agencies of the Government which collectively comprise our intelligence community. In so doing he has singled out for special praise numerous non-CIA personnel and functions and he has attributed to "the men and women of the CIA," to whom the book is dedicated, no more than their fair share of the honors. Even so, some larger measure of recognition for the contribution of the researchers and analysts would be in order.

In this same general connection it may be worth noting at this point what has long seemed to this reviewer to represent one of the most notable distinctions between the West (the U.S. and U.K. in particular) and the Russians in over-all approach and philosophy of intelligence operation. The relatively greater emphasis and reliance placed by the leading Western intelligence services upon the results obtainable from extensive overt collection and expert analysis stand out in marked contrast to the Soviet attitude and credo, in which these measures and methods have heretofore and at least until very recently been regarded as distinctly secondary to, and as valuable chiefly in so far as they served to confirm or interpret, the intelligence produced by clandestine means—most notably stolen *documentary* materials. This fundamental difference in approach may be explainable in part by the origins and character of the two opposing civilizations, Soviet intelligence having developed and at all times functioned within a highly secret and conspiratorial political atmosphere in which intense suspicion of the freely spoken or written word of the antagonist has been a major hallmark.

Although he has been out of Russia long enough to have perhaps fallen behind the times, the former NKVD general Alexander Orlov has provided a most incisive commentary upon this significant distinction in his provocative and edifying little book entitled *Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare*.⁴ According to Orlov, who was certainly in a position to know the facts, the Russians regard as true intelligence only that which is produced by secret informants and undercover agents, and they relegate to a category of far lesser importance and credibility material coming from overt and legitimate sources. He explains that in the Russian view the secrets of foreign states having the most vital interest for them can be procured only from the classified governmental files of those states or from cooperative foreign officials and civil servants having access thereto.

Although it is understood from other sources that the Russians have of late been paying more attention to the values of overt collection and analysis than they did

⁴ An adaptation was carried in Intelligence Articles VII 2, and appears elsewhere in this issue.

during the period with which Orlov was so intimately familiar, it is nevertheless evident from the very massiveness of their clandestine collection effort—to say nothing of the rich rewards which they have to our knowledge been reaping from such sources—that their main emphasis is still centered upon espionage and the procurement of secret documentary materials. It is thus a fair assumption that these activities and functions have not been downgraded in the Soviet system and that they are not likely to be at any time in the foreseeable future.

Deception

In commenting upon the techniques and the art of deception Mr. Dulles has made some very accurate observations concerning the difficulties of mounting significant deception operations from the base of “open societies” such as ours in peacetime and the relative ease of such operations on the part of the Russians, who have all the advantages of the secrecy and discipline of their police state society going for them. If anything, he has understated the obstacles confronting Western intelligence authorities in this area of activity; and he might well have placed more stress than he has upon the free assists which the opposition receives from a certain class of representatives of the Western press who, it would appear, have been seeking to elevate to the level of a national sport the ferreting out and public exposure of the clandestine operations of their own governments.

Given the intimacy of our journalists with almost all echelons of the Government, executive as well as legislative, and taking into account the extensive coordination as between all of the governmental arms which is essential to the success of a significant deception operation, the opportunities and possibilities for some leak or revelation fatal to the operation are very great indeed; and frequently the sleuthing is done for the Russians on a volunteer though doubtless unwitting basis by those representatives of our own competitive and “scoop-minded” information media who justify even the most reprehensible forms of “keyhole journalism” on the ground that they are acting as the chief guardians of our most cherished institutions. The freedom of the press and the asserted right of the public to know all are used indiscriminately to either justify or condone actions which are damaging to our national security and the principal beneficiary of which cannot fail to be our mortal enemy. Thus the fruit that is available to our side only as the result of our most diligent and successful professional operations may be expected by the Russians to fall *gratis* into their lap, and if in any particular case the branches should appear to require a little agitation, this is easy enough to arrange by the simple device of planting a few provocative questions about any policy or program of ours, either real or apparent, that may be obscure or perplexing to them.

Sharpshooting

Although the roster of Communist methods of subversion in the cold war provided by Mr. Dulles is very extensive, it seems to this reviewer that he omitted adequate treatment of one of the most insidious and effective of their techniques. Reference is here made to the evidence of skillful and increasingly successful attacks upon individual personalities by the Chinese Communists as well as the Russians. These are specialized operations targeted against key political and military leaders in various parts of the world—not limited to the softer areas of the so-called uncommitted nations. This method of subversion embraces the widest variety of approaches and is designed to capitalize on the vanity, cupidity, prurience, ill health, hypochondria, superstition, or other special susceptibility of the target individual. It is hand-tailored for each particular case on the basis of the most intimate knowledge and study of the

individual, and it depends for its success upon great skill and perseverance on the part of the operatives employed.

This pinpoint, not to say needle-point, attack on selected individuals in positions of power obviously provides tremendous leverage if successful, and its workings are most difficult to perceive and to combat. Even though strongly suspected of being under way in a particular case, the proof to and even more so the persuasion of the subject of this mental massage that he is being victimized or duped is well-nigh impossible, once the infection has spread to the bloodstream. It is accordingly all the more important for those having the responsibility for guarding against and countering Communist subversive activities to be on a special alert against this insidious form of activity.

One of the most readily recognizable telltales of such an operation is the sudden and otherwise inexplicable souring of a leading political or military personality previously regarded as pro-Western or at least dependably neutral in his views and policies. Another indicator is the falling from grace and departure or removal from office of a number of subordinate officials known for their pro-Western and anti-Communist attitudes—for this may be the result of subtle and effective “well-poisoning” against such personages, accomplished through repeated insinuations and suggestions to their superior that they are secretly hostile to him or are otherwise unreliable instrumentalities of his will. The Russians may be less skillful in their application of this ancient technique than the Chinese, who possess all of the subtlety and sensitivity that comes to them from centuries of familiarity with its traditional use.

To accept as valid and treat with full seriousness the necessity for remedial measures against this form of subversive threat does not require disagreement with Mr. Dulles’s proposition that the Chinese have not yet achieved the full panoply of subversive tactics which have been developed and assembled by the Russians. They, the Chinese, are clearly making rapid strides and may well already have perfected certain specialized techniques for which they have a greater natural aptitude than their Communist competition.

The havoc that was wrought in Britain by the Profumo scandal has been widely interpreted in the Western press as a triumph of Soviet disruptive design, and even in Lord Denning’s fascinating analysis he poses (at page 8 of his Report) the suggestion that Captain Eugene Ivanov’s mission may have been directed more toward the creation of a crisis of confidence as between the Western allies than to the procurement of intelligence information. Yet it seems as though Ivanov was a fairly overt and heavy-handed operative, and that if disruption was his objective, his success was due more to lucky coincidence than to the cunning of his own contrivances. At one critical Cliveden weekend in October of 1962 Ivanov is reliably reported to have been going so flat out in his attempts to enlist high-level British sympathy and support for the Soviet position over Cuba as to render himself both objectionable and conspicuous; and it was just *lagniappe* that on the earlier occasion Jack met Christine by chance encounter at the pool and so swiftly succumbed to her charms. Moreover, if such was his mission, Ivanov was also the beneficiary of the most extraordinary series of failures of coordination on the part of British authorities concerned, the security services having been well aware of his significance and the game that he was playing with the wretched Dr. Ward as his tool nearly two years before the final explosion.

Psywar

From what may be a particularly subjective point of view, it is regretted that Mr. Dulles did not give us more in his chapter entitled “Intelligence in the Cold War,” for example by pointing up more clearly the essential differences in the Communist and

Western approaches to propaganda and other forms of psychological warfare. The standard Soviet practice of constant and continuing reiteration of a theme or thesis stands out in sharp contrast to the generally relevant practice among Western propagandists, which seems to have its origins in and to take its main inspiration from press attitudes toward "news." Even the most productive themes and theses are quickly abandoned or allowed to sink soon into disuse once the headlines have been made and the story has been told.

Consider the contrary Soviet practice, which is well illustrated by their treatment of what must have been for their propagandists the extremely difficult and discouraging subject of the brash betrayal and brutal suppression of the Hungarian freedom fighters in November 1956. Throughout the non-Communist world and in many areas behind the iron curtain there was at the beginning an almost universal revulsion of feeling and condemnation for this act of naked Soviet imperialism. Thus the Soviet propaganda machine was forced to begin from far behind scratch and invent and fabricate a whole series of justifications and rationalizations which few Western propagandists would have believed likely to command any significant degree of credence and acceptance. Yet in a remarkably short space of time, by continuing to hammer away at their bald-faced distortions, the Soviet mouthpieces had succeeded at the least in beclouding the issues and at the most in creating widespread belief that the Soviet action had been justified in the interests of rescuing the Hungarian people from slipping back into a state of "reactionary feudalism." In getting off to their start they enjoyed a windfall in the form of a strong assist from that self-proclaimed prophet of neutralism, Krishna Menon, who seemed only too happy to serve as the Soviet stalking-horse in the United Nations debate on intervention in Hungary and who was able to completely confuse the discussion by his strident exploitation of the Suez incident.

Neither the consistency nor the truth of Soviet representations has ever appeared to be of much concern to their propagandists. They seem to proceed on the assumption that they can get away with any amount of enlargement and tergiversation and to operate on the theory that the memory of man for words spoken and deeds done is very short. Moreover, they are not unduly concerned about being caught at and called to account for even the most transparent of their canards. The Philby case offers a good illustration of this thick-skinned attitude and approach. Those who followed the unfolding chapters of that case during the spring and summer months of 1963 will doubtless recall that many assets of the Soviet propaganda mechanism were marshaled to plant and cultivate the version that Philby's mysterious disappearance from Beirut earlier in the year was in fact no mystery at all. He was simply denounced as a British secret agent and said to be operating in the deserts and mountains of the Yemen to overthrow the "glorious new revolutionary regime" there. In less than a month's time following the propagation of this wholly fabricated story, which incidentally had picked up widespread belief and following in the West, circumstances forced upon the Russians the acknowledgment of Philby's defection to them, and they blandly announced the awarding to him of Soviet citizenship. In so doing they gave no slight indication of dismay, and there has never been any attempt on their part to explain or correct their previous account of the disappearance. And they seem, unfortunately, to have been permitted to slip off this hook with little difficulty.

Exchanges

The still current incident arising from the imprisonment by the Russians of Yale professor Frederick C. Barghoorn, taken together with the mid-October event of the exchange of two American prisoners—Walter Ciszek and Marvin Makinen—for two Soviet espionage agents picked up last August by the FBI, provides timely corroboration for Mr. Dulles' reservations concerning the wisdom of establishing a pattern of

this type of prisoner exchange. At page 119 Mr. Dulles observes—and without the benefit of these two late developments—many of the risks which are inherent in such trafficking in the persons of real or alleged espionage agents. If our Government is going to play at this game it should at least do so with eyes wide open to the hazards which are involved, including the possibility that the Russians, who are very old hands at this form of enterprise, will be the gainers in the preponderance of any such swaps as may be engineered or acceded to by them.

It would certainly appear that in the Ciszek-Makinen exchange the Russians gave up nothing of value to themselves in releasing a middle-aged priest held since 1940 and a youthful student, whereas they realized a very significant gain in recovering two well-trained and experienced operatives—who, had they been held and subjected to the pressures and uncertainties which are the inevitable concomitants of conviction and heavy sentences, could very conceivably have ended by providing information and leads of the greatest value to the security services of the United States and presumably other Western allies. Irrespective of what may have been the controlling reason for the arrest of Professor Barghoorn, and it is anybody's guess whether the Russians were mainly motivated by a desire to retaliate for the immediately preceding arrest of their own agents—or to discourage the further development of cultural contacts of this order—or simply to put out of action a scholar who has long been a cinder in Khrushchev's eye because of his expert knowledge of the Soviet system and record of exposing the myth of "Soviet legality," it is evident that he was quite innocent of the charge of espionage for which he was claimed to have been arrested and imprisoned. Moreover, if this incident had not backfired with unforeseen violence in the faces of the Soviet policy makers, Barghoorn could have become "very large wampum" as a bargaining counter, to be held in reserve for coaxing out of us the release of one or several of their intelligence officers or agents caught *in flagrante* by the FBI.

Actually, as previously suggested, the Russians have been playing at this game of "exchanges" for many years and have on numerous earlier occasions shown themselves to be completely brazen and unscrupulous in their connected tactics. The Kindermann-Wolscht affair, which in 1924-26 resulted in an impasse in Russo-German relations so serious as to have threatened to sever diplomatic relations between the two countries, furnishes an excellent example and a most rewarding case study of the underlying Soviet motivation and methods employed in arresting foreign persons innocent of espionage and holding them for ultimate exchange in return for their own professional spies and saboteurs.

That case began with the arrest in Russia on patently trumped-up charges of espionage of two young German students (Kindermann and Wolscht) as an offsetting deterrent to the trial which was about to commence in Germany of a number of Chekist terrorist agents for planning and attempting to promote in 1923 a revolution to overthrow the then very unstable German government. It did not conclude before the highly reputable German diplomat, Gustav Hilger (who was attached to the staff of the German Ambassador in Moscow), had been charged with aiding and abetting the students, and until after most of the ranking governmental officials on both sides had become deeply embroiled in the controversy.

In the end, the Russians got back their boy (Skoblevsky), a personal pal of Stalin who had been dispatched by Trotsky on his revolutionary mission, in return for the two obscure German students who had been guilty of no crime in the first place. For the fuller details of this highly illuminating study in Soviet motives and methods the attention of readers is invited to an article prepared by Professor Lamar Cecil, until recently of Johns Hopkins University, and published in the *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Volume XXI No. 2, July 1961.

The Trumpeting of Casualties

Early in his first chapter Mr. Dulles observes that "intelligence is probably the least understood and the most misrepresented of the professions," and in the concluding chapters he advances the most persuasive arguments in support of his appeal-- which he clearly appears to be making on behalf of our intelligence community as a whole--for a better understanding of the difficulties and for a more sympathetic acceptance of the inevitable percentage of reverses which must be expected in intelligence operations. The point is especially well taken at this time in view of certain quite recent and wholly unwarranted scapegoating for which the CIA in particular has been required to stand still.

But there has been a long-standing need for both official and public opinion in the United States and in the West more generally to adopt a more sensible and realistic attitude toward what might be termed the *casualties* of intelligence operations in the cold war. The fact that our freedoms and liberties and those of our friends and allies are being subjected to the ubiquitous and relentless campaign of Communist espionage and subversion on a front as wide as the world should entitle the Western intelligence and security services which are courageously and effectively striving against this unprecedented assault to a better break from their own press and public opinion. Most thinking people have long since digested and, however reluctantly, accepted the necessity of combatting the Communist threat by the expenditure of vast treasure and much blood. Why is it, then, that the occasional intelligence casualties which are incurred in the form of personnel losses and "blown" operations are the subject of so much soul-searching self-criticism and anguished cries of *mea culpa*, to say nothing of having become the standard butt of deliberate distortions and sharp ridicule?

The passages in the book which attempt to deal with this problem include numerous historical references from which it should be clear to any fair-minded reader that clandestine political warfare has been going on from time immemorial and has long been a recognized arm of statecraft. It has affected the destinies of nations and in innumerable cases has served to protect the lives of people. At the worst, its execution involves relatively few casualties, and for the most part none at all. There is simply no rationality in the fact that people, certainly including Americans, will cheer the spectacle of massed military forces exterminating one another, as well as innocent bystanders, by the millions, and when so-called "peace" comes they will deplore as somehow unnatural and immoral the kind of activity on our part which can contribute so much to forestalling the necessity for armed conflict.

To be sure, such programs involve secrecy as an essential ingredient, and there appears to be a well-developed national myth that secrecy in Government operations is bad *per se*. At the same time and again quite illogically, we all practice secrecy of one sort or another in our personal lives and business dealings and have a constitutional distaste for people who do not observe discretion in their private affairs.

No one should construe this as an appeal for a *carte blanche* to conduct covert operations without the fullest coordination with the policy levels of government or otherwise than in the most meticulously careful and professional manner that it may be possible to devise. But when these and all of the other requisite tests are met, and when a top-level decision has been taken to entrust an operation to agencies that include some of the most able and dedicated persons to be found anywhere in the service of our Government, there should be a greater public willingness to give those

* One such scavenger (as cited on p. 82) recently received his long overdue comeuppance when Kenneth Hugh DeCourcy, editor and publisher of the *Intelligence Digest*, was convicted on 13 December last in the Old Bailey of fraud, forgery, and perjury and sentenced to seven years.

brethren who are "serving the rice" some benefit of the doubt. When on November 28, 1961, President Kennedy declared in commenting upon the difficulties of the intelligence profession that "its successes are unheralded and its failures are trumpeted" it was surely farthest from his intention to grant to critics an unlimited shooting license to hunt within this sensitive preserve.

(From Volume 8 Number 1, p. A1, 1964; Unclassified)

INTELLIGENCE IN PUBLIC LITERATURE

THE CODEBREAKERS: The story of Secret Writing. By *David Kahn*. (New York: Macmillan. 1967. 1164 pp. \$14.95.)

The journalist-author of this massive, richly informative, and eminently readable book has been an amateur cryptologist since 1943, when he was thirteen, and for many years President of the American Cryptogram Association. He has largely succeeded in the undertaking set forth in his preface, to write a serious history of cryptology—the development of the various methods of making and breaking codes and ciphers and how these have affected human events—using primary sources wherever possible and not fictionalizing or exaggerating the influence of cryptologic successes, although “codebreaking is the most important form of secret intelligence in the world today.” Certain deficiencies from an unqualified success of the work will be noted at the end of the review.

The preface is followed by a helpful few pages on the vocabulary of cryptology, and then the reader is launched into 965 pages of main text.

The opening chapter, “One Day of Magic,” is a dramatic presentation of the role of cryptology in connection with the attack on Pearl Harbor. The story begins with Herbert O. Yardley’s cryptologic section of military intelligence in World War I and “Black Chamber” of the 1920s. The events of the period between the wars are woven into a coherent narrative leading to the American success in breaking Japanese codes as war came closer. Kahn tells what was done, how it was done, and what the effect of those achievements was on the “day of infamy.” The lengthy cast of people cited in these 67 pages is widely varied and generally pertinent. The standout star is William F. Friedman, “the world’s greatest cryptologist,” in his role in the attack on the Purple crypto-system of the Japanese.

The real conclusion to this chapter appears early in “Notes to Text,” which occupy 156 pages at the back of the book. In the first few of these pages Kahn gives a cogent summary of his views on the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster, paralleling closely such authoritative and well-reasoned opinions as those of the congressional investigative committee, Roberta Wohlstetter, and Samuel E. Morison.

After this dramatic opening the reader is treated to a pageant of cryptography through the centuries, beginning with the earliest known deliberate transformation of a writing about 1900 B.C., found in the tomb of Khnumhotep II. Cryptographic developments of the ensuing 3,000 years are traced through India, Mesopotamia, Babylonia, and Assyria, in Greek and Roman writings, in Persia, Egypt, Anglo-Saxon Britain, and Scandinavia.

To this point the story is simply of cryptography, the rendering of a message unintelligible by some transformation of the plain text. The cyptanalysis side of cryptology begins with the Arabs, who in the seventh century were the first to discover and record methods of analyzing the frequency and juxtaposition of letters. The author describes with examples and anecdotes the developments from this beginning to the sudden rise of secret writing with the Renaissance in western civilization and the work of Geoffrey Chaucer and Roger Bacon. Thirty centuries is a long period to cover in some thirty pages of text, but seven pages of notes on this chapter indicate that Kahn has rather thoroughly plowed the field.

Next the spread of political cryptography is pursued from rudimentary beginnings in the early 13th century through Venice, Rome, the Vatican, the secular principalities of Italy, and throughout Europe. The growth of cryptology paces evenly the flowering of modern diplomacy. Kahn's examples range from the well to the little known and from the simple to the recondite in each period and stage of development.

The development of the modern system of polyalphabetic substitution, described in a chapter called "On the Origin of a Species," began in the 17th century with the work of four amateurs who adopted a mixed alphabet, the principle of letter-by-letter encipherment, and an easily changed key. A further improvement came in the use of grilles and tableaux to govern the enciphered sequence. These successes were not achieved without pitfalls and pratfalls, which Kahn recounts with clarity and gaiety, including an example of Casanova's use of cryptanalysis as a key to seduction.

In spite of the advance to polyalphabetic substitution, the nomenclators system of cryptography first developed for Pope Clement II in the late 14th century continued to flourish in Europe. Kahn attributes its continued use to a legend of unbreakability nourished by writings of inferior cryptologists, whose books

... have a certain air of unreality about them. There is good reason for this. The authors borrowed their knowledge from earlier volumes and puffed it out with their own hypothesizing, which seems never to have been deflated by contact with the bruising actuality of solving cryptograms that they themselves had not made up. The literature of cryptology was all theory and no practice.

"The Era of the Black Chambers" begins with the work of "France's first full-time cryptologist: the great Antoine Rossignol," under Richelieu, Louis XIII and XIV, and Mazarin. Kahn goes on to describe the almost unbelievably efficient *Geheime Kabinets-Kanzlei* of Vienna in the 18th century, and in England the work of John Wallis for William and Mary and later of Edward Willes and his descendants, who dominated the English field for nearly a century.

Across the Atlantic cryptology was making its way informally into the life of the American colonies. In 1775 the solution of a monoalphabetic substitution cipher showed George Washington that a Boston Tory was sending military information to British commander Gage. James Lovell, of the Continental Congress, may be called the father of American cryptanalysis for his prompt solutions of some intercepted redcoat cryptograms. There was cryptographic involvement in the case of Benedict Arnold and later that of Aaron Burr. Thomas Jefferson invented a "wheel cypher," far and away the most advanced of its day, but he seems to have filed and forgotten it. It was rediscovered among his papers in the Library of Congress in 1922, the year the U.S. Army adopted an almost identical device invented independently.

Kahn stresses how telegraphy made cryptography what it is today, principally by creating a new instrument for war—the signal communications that enabled commanders for the first time in history to exert instantaneous and continuous control over great masses of men spread over large areas. The telegraph broke the 450-year reign of the nomenclator and brought acceptance of the need for polyalphabetic substitution—the adoption of which was, however, followed shortly by its solution. The role of ciphers in the Civil War and postwar politics is described in a brief chapter called "Crisis of the Union."

Of cryptologic events before World War I perhaps the most sensational involvement occurred in the Dryfus case, which was not finally closed until 1906. Less than a decade later the war engulfed most of the principal nations of the world, and communications—now by radio as well as cable—took on a new importance. British and French cryptology had an early lead; Germany had no cryptanalysts on the Western Front for the first two years of the war. In the United States, Hitt's *Manual for the*

Solution of Military Ciphers, selling for thirty-five cents, served as the textbook to train cryptanalysts of the American Expeditionary Forces.

In "A War of Intercepts" Kahn covers the episodes of the war in which cryptology was involved, that of the Zimmermann telegram being the outstanding one. This war "marks the great turning point on the history of cryptology." From an infant science it had become big business. Radio made all the difference, but cryptanalysis had matured, too.

"Two Americans" are introduced in chapter 12—Herbert O. Yardley, who "owes his fame less to what he did than to what he said—and to the sensational way in which he said it," and William Frederick Friedman, "uncontestably the greatest," whose eminence is due "most emphatically to what he did." Of the latter:

His theoretical studies, which revolutionized the science, were matched by his actual solutions, which astounded it. Both are complemented by his peripheral contributions. He straightened out the tangled web of cipher systems and introduced a clarifying terminology for his arrangement. Words he coined gleam upon more than one page of today's dictionaries. His textbooks have trained thousands. His historical articles have shed light in little-known corners of the study, and the Shakespeare book has done much to quash one major area of a perennial literary nuisance. Singlehandedly, he made his country preeminent in his field.

The work of private individuals and corporations in developing new machines and new aspects of cryptology in the period between the wars is told in convincing and sometimes intimate detail in the chapter entitled "Secrecy for Sale." The principal names are Vernam, Hebern, and Hagelin. Kahn seems to have something of an obsession for his belief that "the armed forces had adopted the rotor principle from Hebern and used it without just compensation in hundreds of thousands of high-security machines in World War II and the cold war."

Kahn missed, incidentally, an interesting anecdote about the testing of the Hebern machine at the Navy building. There were continuing electrical problems—fuses blowing and solenoids burning out—although other tests which the Director of Naval Communications had suggested be carried out at his home on Kalorama Road gave no such trouble. It was finally discovered that the Navy building was still using direct current in 1926, while the Kalorama Road neighborhood was provided with AC power.

The cryptography of World War II is delineated in four chapters covering 136 pages. Numerous anecdotes and episodes and some epic stories are interestingly told, many in good perspective. It is clear that Kahn found several ready European sources of information about allied, enemy, and neutral cryptology in the war. The detail sometimes appears exhaustive. The sources he names are never the top experts, for the most part entirely unknown; and his narratives consequently depend upon surface and low-level detail. But the stories are well told.

The one great exception to his European coverage is Britain, and the gap shows. Probably British cryptologists, under the constraints of their Official Secrets Acts, are less likely to talk than those from countries with less severe protective laws. In any case, Kahn has stated that he excised from his text at the request of the Defense Department the material he had on British cryptologic activities.

In narrating events of the Pacific war Kahn sometimes violates his prefatory promise not to credit cryptanalysis unduly, or at least he fails to credit other factors. After telling, dramatically and in detail, the story of the interception and death of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, for example, he concludes, "Cryptanalysis had given

America the equivalent of a major victory," thus ignoring his own reminder that "Knowledge alone is not power. To have any effect in must be linked to physical force."

A chapter of 62 pages devoted to the history and structure of the National Security Agency tells of publicized successes and failures in which it has been involved. Descriptions of scandals and defections, most notably that of Martin and Mitchell, are derived from the news accounts and lead to an endorsement for Congressional surveillance of intelligence agencies. This chapter reports on military communications generally, along with those of the Department of State and other parts of the government, including the hot line to Moscow. Most of the material is based upon news releases, news accounts, and speculation. Kahn seeks to validate the latter by a sedate notice in his "Notes to Text" that he has used "the word 'probably' or the verb 'may' to indicate that the statement is my own supposition"—rather too inconspicuous flags of warning, it seems to this reviewer.

The book's last section is a collection of heterogeneous addenda that can be taken or left. There is a psychoanalytic treatment of cryptology in which cryptanalysis is equated with voyeurism and it is implied "that cryptography may come ultimately from the infantile sexual pleasure that Freud says children obtain from the muscle tension of retaining the feces." There is a catch-all chapter discussing miscellaneous motives, purposes, and media for cryptologic activity. "Rumrunners, Businessmen, and Makers of Nonsecret Codes" offers well-told stories about these subjects and introduces a lady code expert of the war against rumrunners in the prohibition era—Mrs. William F. Friedman. There is a collection of historical oddities, the most intriguing of which is probably the still unsolved Voynich manuscript. The problem of Roger Bacon and the Shakespeare writings is treated not uninterestingly. Finally we go way out with paracryptology to "Ancestral Voices" and "Messages from Outer Space."

In sum, this reviewer learned a lot from *The Codebreakers*, found many parts and sections to be of great interest, and considers it a monumental work. The shortcomings I mentioned above derive from a careless and somewhat cavalier attitude toward factual detail in matters not strictly cryptologic. One detail is the meaning of the word interview. A number of the people whom the author "interviewed" told me they had no idea their conversations with him were related to the writing or publication of a book. One man assured me that his "interview" consisted of a 15-minute telephone conversation devoted mostly to reasons why Kahn should not try to write about this subject.

As to historical detail: there are anachronisms in military rank; a 5'8" commander is called "tall"; Ellis M. Zacharias is mistakenly treated as a cryptanalyst; the "Manchu laws" requiring the rotation of Army officers to the field are foolishly applied to the Navy; Vladivostok is cited as having a U.S. legation when there was never more than a consulate there; the distance from Navy building to State is called 8 or 10 blocks; the United States is said to have had in World War II 1,350 days of conflict, three to many; Yamamoto is said to have lost two fingers of his right, rather than left, hand; Magic is given as the source of a report on Japanese shipping which actually came from ONI agents along the Chinese coast; a Japanese ship misnamed; it is claimed that the creation of the USAFFE command was a "direct" result of intercept information about German pressures on the Japanese.

As this review was nearing completion I had occasion to talk with Kahn and mentioned some of these errors; he brushed them aside as too minute to be concerned about. It is more understandable that his lack of experience in any kind of wartime

office leads to some gaucheries and misinterpretations of the relationships among offices, functions, people, and intelligence reports; nowhere were organizational arrangements so precise and neat as he describes them.

Roger Pineau

(From Volume 12, Number 3, p. 99, 1968; UNCLASSIFIED)

THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT. By *David Wise* and *Thomas B. Ross*. (New York: Random. 1964. 375 pp. \$5.95.)

The journalist-authors of this best seller admit that Communist subversion and espionage pose a unique threat to the American people and their government, and they accept the necessity under certain circumstances for secret American efforts to prevent Moscow and Peking from gaining new allegiances. But they profess to believe that our secret attempts to meet the Communist challenge constitute so real a threat to our own freedoms that they must be exposed in as detailed and dramatic a way as possible. If the Soviets are profiting from these revelations, as they are, Wise and Ross apparently think that such self-inflicted wounds must be endured in the battle against excessive secrecy.

Broadly stated, their thesis is that the U.S. intelligence community with the CIA at its heart, has grown so big and powerful that it threatens the democracy it was designed to defend. The CIA, they say, conducts its own clandestine foreign policy, and even the President has been unable to control it. The State Department is powerless to exert policy direction because its ambassadors are kept uniformed and are habitually by-passed by CIA operatives. The Congress has abdicated its legislative role and votes huge secret funds without adequate knowledge of how the money is spent

If all this were true, American democracy would certainly be in serious trouble, and the alarm professed about the "invisible government" would be justified. But is it true? Strangely enough, the authors themselves provide, ambiguously, a negative answer to this question which is so central to their major thesis. They concede the existence of institutional arrangements designed to give the President and his principal foreign policy advisors the very kind of close policy control over secret operations that they ought to have. Early in the book, they mention the existence of a "Special Group" which makes the major decisions regarding clandestine operations, though they say it is so secret that it is "unknown outside the innermost circle of the Invisible Government." The reader must wait through 255 pages to learn that the members of this policy group are no sinister shadows but McGeorge Bundy in the White House, Secretary of Defense, McNamara, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and the Director of Central Intelligence. These are just the officials that one would expect the President to have chosen to advise him on matters of high clandestine policy, and they are far from invisible.

The authors, in order to prove their thesis, do not try to show that the Special Group is ineffective: they claim it meets in a "highly informal way without the elaborate records and procedures of other high Government committees"; there is no "outside analysis" and "little detached criticism"; the members are too busy with their other duties to perform their supervisory function adequately. The impression is left that the President and the Secretary of State are not even informed of the Group's decisions. One must have a very low opinion of the sense of responsibility and competence of the men in these key government positions to believe so cavalierly. And yet if one does not believe this, the authors' whole portrayal of an irresponsible and invisible government becomes inherently incredible.

Similar treatment is accorded the President's Board of intelligence activities formed under the Eisenhower administration and reconstituted by President Kennedy. This is dismissed as a superficial façade with the remark that "both committees were composed of part-time consultants who met only occasionally during the year,"

and it is implied by use of the past tense that the Board is now extinct. Actually it is very much alive and its membership is no secret, having been announced in a White House release of April 23, 1963. It includes Clark Clifford, William O. Baker, Gordon Gray, Edwin H. Land, William L. Langer, Robert D. Murphy, and Frank Pace. These are able, experienced men who discharge conscientiously their duty of advising the President on the workings of the intelligence community, and it wouldn't have taken much journalistic initiative to find this out. They have a right to resent being dismissed as "vener."

In his last public reference to the CIA, at the time of the Diem crisis in Vietnam, President Kennedy declared, "... I can find nothing, and I have looked through the record very carefully over the last nine months, and I could go back further, to indicate that the CIA has done anything but support policy. It does not create policy; it attempts to execute it in those areas where it has competence and responsibility. ... I can just assure you flatly that the CIA has not carried out independent activities but has operated under close control of the Director of Central Intelligence, operating with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under my instructions. ..."

The impression grows that Wise and Ross felt obligated to ignore or at least belittle any evidence that the supervision of American intelligence activity is in responsible hands.

This impression is strengthened by their description of the role of Congress. They grant that the CIA budget and program is subject to review and approval by special subcommittees of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees of both Houses, but they reject this congressional scrutiny as inadequate. They charge that the subcommittees "are controlled by the most conservative elements in Congress, men who are close personally and philosophically to those who run the 'Invisible Government.'" Then they state the case for a joint congressional watchdog committee, the one specific institutional reform they argue for. So far the watchdog committee idea has been opposed not only by successive administrations but also by the congressional leadership.

If this book is widely accepted at its face value within the United States, it can only reduce public confidence in the intelligence services and make it more difficult for them to recruit the able men and women we shall need in the difficult days that lie ahead. Although incomparably better research than its forerunner by Andrew Tully,¹ it too tends to portray the American on the clandestine fronts of the cold war as typically a reactionary, unscrupulous blunderer. One chapter purports to describe the desperate efforts of the Peace Corps to prevent itself from being infiltrated by the CIA. Leaders of the Corps are represented as being so fearful that CIA will disobey presidential directives and attempt to infiltrate that they take the most elaborate precautions. The implication is clear that CIA's irresponsibility made such precautions necessary. Only at the end of the chapter will the reader find a brief sentence admitting that no single case of attempted infiltration was ever discovered.

Another effect of the book is to expose for the first time certain individuals and organizations as having intelligence connections and thus sharply increase their vulnerability to Soviet attack. A spokesman for Random House has been quoted as claiming that the book contains nothing that had not already appeared in public print, but in the first chapter the authors boast that "much of the material has never been printed anywhere else before." They insist that they have stayed "within the bounds of national security" but appear to have reserved to themselves the right to decide what those limits are. Such an attitude raises serious questions as to the responsibility of the journalist in a free society in a time of cold war. In Great Britain, which is

¹ CIA: *The Inside Story* (New York, 1962).

second to none in its devotion to liberty, there exists an Official Secrets Act under which the authors would have been tried and sentenced to prison. Such a law in this country is not feasible, but in its absence the American journalist carries an even heavier responsibility than his British counterpart.

By far the most damaging consequence of this book will have been its exploitation by the propaganda apparatus of the Soviet and Chinese regimes. The CIA has understandably been for a long time a primary target of the Soviet KGB, and everything from forgeries to full-length books have been inspired by the Soviet propagandists in their efforts to destroy the reputation of American intelligence organizations and undermine their effectiveness. The KGB technicians must find it hard to believe their good luck in being donated so much useful ammunition by a reputable American publisher and two certifiably non-Communist journalists. The book is being reprinted and replayed in press and radio from one end of the world to the other. That much of this material has been printed before does not reduce the value to the Soviets of having it gathered in one volume under such genuine American auspices.

The problem of balancing freedom with security has been an ancient dilemma for democratic states in their long struggle to survive against aggressive totalitarianisms. This book may serve to dramatize the problem, but it does not provide any deep insight or new solutions. It was written not to enlighten but to shock and to sell.

Charles E. Valpey

(From Volume 8, Number 4, p. 106, 1964; Unclassified.)

ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.

By *Graham T. Allison*. (Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1971.)

VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK. By *Irving L. Janis*. (Houghton, Mifflin Company, Boston, 1972.)

Both of these books are about "decision making," a trend of contemporary social and political science that, in Stanley Hoffman's acerbic regard, involves digging around in other people's waste baskets to see who did or said what to whom. Both treat, from different vantage points, the problem of how governments make decisions or shape their behavior on the gravest matters of national security. One is exclusively on the Cuban missile crisis; the other devotes much attention to it. Both have vital lessons for intelligence. Allison's book is about how to understand the decisions and actions of governments; its main aim is to present tools that can improve that understanding. Allison thus speaks directly to the tasks of analysis in most of the intelligence community's production components. Janis, although in search of understanding and better analysis, is really after improvements in policy decision making itself; but his insights into policy decision making have a useful bearing on what we may call intelligence decision making.

Reviewing Allison's book at this time presents the reviewer with a dilemma. Those who have not come into contact with it, now some three years after its publication, must either be little interested in its subject or have no time for reading. They would best be served by a fairly extensive survey of its contents. Those in the intelligence community most directly interested in its message, however, have in all likelihood read it carefully and have been influenced professionally by it. What they need would be more in the nature of a status report. Neither task can be adequately met in a short review. The dilemma is sharpened by the fact that this reviewer has a strong stake in the popularity of the Allisonian view but remains at heart somewhat ambivalent as to its value.

The Essence of Allison lies in three approaches to understanding government behavior, three conceptual models, as he calls them. The models are composed of the assumptions we use, the questions we ask, the information we seek, the vocabulary we employ; and they shape the answers we get.

Model I is the Rational Actor. It states or, more correctly, implicitly assumes that governments are akin to rational individuals who have values (or cost-benefit calculations), purposes, and an instrumental command of tactics. They establish aims, gather and assess information, weigh risks, then choose and implement a plan of action as an exceedingly sensible man would buy a car or play a hand of poker. If the Rational Actor fails or gets in trouble, it is because he lacked the necessary information, miscalculated, or was lacking in rationality. The noun-verb combinations of this Model are straightforward and familiar: "The USSR seeks . . . ," "Moscow has apparently decided . . . ," "The Politburo believes . . . ," "The Russians are now going to" The subject may be plural, but the notion is singular and the action conscious and purposeful. Most important, the all-pervasive assumption is that of a fully reasoned correlation of ends and means, and complete self-control on the part of the actor, the government in question.

Allison's purpose is to challenge the Rational Actor Model "on its home ground"—that of deep international crisis where reason and self-control are at a premium—and trim it down to size as a tool for understanding government behavior. He

starts essentially from the realization of any attentive newspaper reader that governments are not really Rational Actors. A government is an assortment of disparate institutions, each with its own preoccupations and habits. Further, a government is an arena in which groups and individuals compete for power and influence. These characteristics of government are as important in shaping government behavior as are rational calculation and purpose, perhaps more so. From them he derives two alternative models to complement the perspective of the Rational Actor.

Model II is called the Organizational Process Model. It is concerned with the role of standard operating procedure of governmental entities in the aggregate behavior of the government they make up. Any member of any organization can understand the power of Model II. Many actions of the organization take place, not because they are sensible or some powerful influence wants it that way, but because that is just the way things are done. Large organizations have to have standard operating procedures to handle important and complex matters or they will lapse into complete paralysis. Moreover, government organizations are created to handle enduring, repetitive missions; they cannot develop new strategies or operational repertoires from scratch in each new instance. Thus, they are usually called into action to do something more or less as they've always done it, and you get the standard operating procedure with minor variations.

Model III is also quite congenial to a layman's view of reality; it is the Governmental or Bureaucratic Politics Model. When you put people into an organization, or little organizations into bigger organizations, you have Politics. People and organizations—"players" in Allisonian terms—compete for status or influence, or perhaps to avoid influence and the risks that go with it. This means struggle, factionalism, even duplicity on the part of the players, the antithesis of what the Rational Actor is supposed to stand for.

The backbone of Allison's book is a series of chapters in which he first introduces the logical or theoretical machinery of his three models along with a précis of their academic antecedents, and then methodically applies them to the history of the Cuban missile crisis to see what they explain about the behavior of the Soviet and American governments in that harrowing event. Both the theoretical and applied chapters are rich in value and thoroughly worth reading. Because he is supplied with an abundance of data, it is the American side of the story, not surprisingly, that shows Models II and III to best effect. In a familiar and poignant episode we see a human confrontation between Model I in the form of Secretary McNamara and CNO Admiral Anderson representing Models II and III. The Secretary wants to know how the CNO will implement the quarantine to see that it will conform with the carefully calculated strategy of the Administration (Model I). The CNO cites the Manual of Naval Regulations (Model II) and suggests that the matter be left to the Navy (Model III). To Model I's way of thinking, Model II or "how John Paul Jones would have handled it," much less Model III or "leave it to the Navy," just wasn't good enough.

Unfortunately for us, Dr. Allison's *tour de force* falls short precisely where we are most interested—in explaining Soviet behavior. At the outset, Allison poses several key questions about the crisis that he feels have not been satisfactorily answered, two of them about Soviet behavior: Why did the Soviets try the Cuban missile gambit? Why did they pull out of it? In the end, his effort to apply Models II and III are forced and contrived, despite a treatment that is factually largely accurate and carefully done. The main problem, of course, is data. As has been argued persuasively by Messrs. Johnson, Steinbrunner, and Horelick in a study commissioned by CIA (*The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy: A Review of Decision-Theory Related Approaches*, the Rand Corporation, forthcoming), Models II and III, along with other approaches focused on

the inner workings of governments, are voracious consumers of detailed information. When that information is lacking, the models do not work well. They turn into largely speculative excursions, worthy of pursuit and inspiring to the imagination, but devoid of reliable explanatory, much less predictive, power. In applying Model III to Soviet behavior in the crisis, Allison explores the role of Khrushchev, his conflicts with other members of the leaderships, and the possible impact of those conflicts on Soviet decisions. Incidentally, while he treats these matters fairly well, he is largely dependent on the research of academic and official analysts who, without the aid of his models, were hot on the scent of Kremlin conflict even during the crisis. But in the end, the theoretical apparatus of Model III does not fill the gaps of absent information.

Allison's efforts to apply Model II to Soviet behavior focus on asserted conflicts between what the Soviets may be presumed to have been seeking in putting the missiles in Cuba and the way they actually went about it. In essence, Allison claims that the Soviets "blew it" because their standard operating procedures for deploying the missiles and associated defenses revealed the move either too early, before the missiles were operational, or too late, when it was very difficult to pull back. In Allison's view, the Soviet authorities in charge, namely the Soviet Rocket Forces (SRF), set about deploying missiles as they always had, in nice identifiable sites, mindless of the need to orchestrate with Soviet diplomacy what the Americans learned and when they learned it.

If "A" for effort is ever warranted, surely it is here. But the result is not quite convincing. As we all know, the SRF can be quite secretive when it wants to be. But Soviet military and political decision makers alike were surely aware that they could start the Cuban move in secret, but they could not keep it a secret from the U.S. Government very long. Why did they think they could go ahead with it when it was discovered in the face of the kind of political pressure that Senator Keating and others were placing on the Kennedy Administration? The reviewer is indebted to Mr. W. P. Southard of CIA and Mr. Anatoliy Gromyko, currently of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and son of the Soviet Foreign Minister, for a plausible answer to this riddle. Mr. Southard suggests that the Soviets, knowing they could not keep the secret long into actual deployment, believed that they could count on the U.S. Government to keep it a secret from the public and its political opponents, a not uncharacteristic Soviet expectation repeatedly disappointed, and that the Kennedy Administration was in fact signalling its willingness to let the missiles be deployed. In the weeks preceding the outbreak of the crisis, Kennedy was saying in effect that he knew what was going on in Cuba, that offensive missiles were not there, and "were it otherwise, the gravest issues would arise"—this when it was already "otherwise" and the Soviets thought we knew it. From this they may have concluded that the U.S. would acquiesce in the missile move as long as the Soviets kept it from public view, as would the U.S.

The foregoing may seem farfetched but essentially no more so than Allison's assumption that the Soviet government, not particularly given to light-handed management, would allow the trickiest undertaking since Alamogordo to run on unexamined standard operating procedures. The Southard thesis has gained novel support from the junior Gromyko who, in an article for a Soviet book on international crises, argued that prior to the crisis, Kennedy did not directly challenge the Soviets as to what was going on, and that they were as surprised as the U.S. public when Kennedy threw down the gauntlet in his TV address. Admittedly there must be in this an element of *post hoc* rationalization on behalf of Gromyko senior; but it is not therefore a false view of Soviet perceptions. Which of the two theses fares best under Occam's razor may be left to the reader and future historians. The point is that Model II facts can be made to work just as nicely in a Model I explanation.

In fact, although Allison sets out to challenge him on his own ground, the Rational Actor remains standing astride the history of the Cuban missile crisis like the Jolly Green Giant. Allison has a clear polemical interest in deprecating the power of the Rational Actor Model. Among its offshoots, he accounts the various sub-models called deterrence theory, strategic calculus, or missile power. These he finds inadequate to explain Soviet behavior. But to this reviewer the strategic power approach offers about as good an explanation of Allison's key questions—why they started and stopped the missile gambit—as any available.

Despite the cruciality of strategic issues in the crisis, the Soviet view of these issues preceding and during the crisis has never been fully sorted out in public discussions. From the position of Moscow, or Khrushchev, or the Soviet General Staff, the strategic situation in early 1962 must have appeared positively horrendous. After much ballyhoo, the missile gap had collapsed in one speech by Roswell Gilpatrick; the Soviets had only a few dozen soft and very slow-reacting ICBMs; a small, very vulnerable bomber force; and a rag-tag assortment of missile submarines that the U.S. Navy had under constant trail. Meanwhile, the U.S. had about 100 Atlas and Titan ICBMs by mid-year 1962, a formidable force of 1,500 heavy and medium bombers, and 96 operational Polaris SLBMs. Moreover, it had been toying since McNamara came into the Pentagon with a counterforce doctrine that looked fearfully like a theory of preventive war to the Soviets. This was enunciated in McNamara's Ann Arbor address which not only pronounced counterforce, but implied a U.S. expectation that Soviet retaliation with any small surviving strategic force could be deterred. And finally, Minuteman was coming into the force at what the Soviets must have found a mind-boggling rate; Penkovsky's contribution from the SRF *Bulletin* of summer 1961 indicates that the Soviets saw this with chilling clarity. In short, the Soviets faced a near future of woeful strategic vulnerability; they knew it and knew we knew it.

What could they do? They could try to change the political relationship. This is what they did after the missile crisis convinced them they had no choice. But in the summer of 1962 Khrushchev, both for Model I and Model III reasons, was not yet willing to scuttle his past tactics of confrontation. The Cuban missile gambit was a cheap and daring way to fix the problem temporarily. Much is made of the probable political value that successful deployment of missiles to Cuba would have had. But it would also have had direct and tangible value in enhancing Soviet deterrence against a surprise attack. For it could have created the kind of synergistic relationship not unlike that existing between U.S. Minuteman ICBMs and bombers today. Facing deployed missiles in Cuba, U.S. strike planners would have to choose between launching a missile attack against the USSR simultaneously and an attack on the Cuban bases or timing a missile attack on the USSR and an attack on Cuba such that they arrived at the same time. In the first tactic, the strike on Cuba would arrive first, and rudimentary communications would allow the Soviets to launch USSR-based systems on warning. In the second, warning of a ballistic missile attack on the USSR might allow some of the Cuban missiles to get off before they were destroyed. In practice, none of this would have worked very well, but simply complicating U.S. operational problems was a plus. And the Cuban missiles could have substantially increased the megatonnage targeted on the U.S. in a preemptive strike.

When the U.S. finally made it clear it would not stand for this, the Soviets had no choice but to back off, for the very same reasons they initiated the missile venture: they were too vulnerable. The sole remaining mystery in this line of reasoning is this: If Khrushchev was so impressed by actual and impending U.S. strength that he would try such a desperate move, how could he believe the U.S. would let him get away with it? Again, the simplest explanation may be the best. After the Bay of Pigs and the

Vienna summit, Khrushchev thought he could psych Kennedy out. By inference from the Gromyko essay, he continued to think so until very late in the game. Nobody said the Rational Actor of Model I couldn't make mistakes.

Now where does all this leave us? Several useful lessons emerge from facing the analytical challenges that Allison presents to intelligence analysis:

—A deliberate quest for different perspectives and approaches to explain government behavior is definitely useful, because of the questions raised if not for the answers found.

—Almost all "Facts" can be treated in several different ways; and a corollary, there can be facts without intelligence, but not intelligence without facts.

—It is extremely important to be explicit about assumptions and the distinction between logical inference and speculation. Speculation should be promoted but not confused with inference.

—Finally, on really important matters, its unfortunately the charge of official intelligence to be more than insightful; it must be right. This requires carrying the methodological excursions of scholars forward to a synthesis that they rarely achieve. When faced with an urgent intelligence problem, it will not do to report that we see a bit of Models I, II, and III plus a few others we might invent. They all have to be put together and the best explanation with the most predictive power derived.

How this is done is indirectly a concern of Janis' *Victims of Groupthink*, provocatively subtitled "A psychological study of foreign policy decisions and fiascoes." The message of this book is simply conveyed: Why do individually wise, able, informed, and dedicated foreign policy decision makers sometimes make some absolutely disastrous decisions and at other times do fairly well? Part of the answer, according to Janis, lies in the pernicious influence of Groupthink. When this syndrome is present and strong, there is bound to be trouble; when absent or controlled, things will turn out better. Groupthink is the purely internal pressure for consensus that is generated by the social dynamics of small, cohesive, deliberative groups of people. It includes the pressure to "get along and go along," the tendency of action groups to idealize their image of themselves and demonize their image of adversaries, the incentives to get difficult things over with, and resistance to scrutiny of biases and assumptions that will challenge the group's cohesion and self-image.

Janis traces the deleterious effect of Groupthink through four modern episodes of national security policy: the Bay of Pigs, U.S. operations in North Korea, Pearl Harbor, and Vietnam. By way of counterpoint to these fiascoes, in his view, he offers examples in which success attended the control or suppression of Groupthink: the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the formulation of the Marshall Plan. The author is particularly attentive to the lessons of the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis because they were such starkly contrasting performances by essentially the same group of decision makers.

The Bay of Pigs episode stands for Janis as "a perfect fiasco," a failure of collective reason so dramatic as to stagger the imagination. Why did it happen? Why did sensible people drift so uncritically into so wrong-headed an operation? In reviewing the published histories, he finds that key figures in the Kennedy Administration went along even though they felt and expressed reservations which on their face were profound but still were glossed over or ignored. A whole set of wrong assumptions was bought, from the military viability of the plan to the prospects for an anti-Castro revolt. Janis cites four so-called official explanations for this episode employed after the fact by analysts and participants: The Administration had to act on the plan for

political reasons; the Administration was new and inexperienced; operational secrecy kept needed expertise out of the deliberations; doubting decision makers did not want to damage their reputations by casting doubt. The author finds all of these wanting for various reasons and goes on to assay how the real villain was Groupthink, the pressure for consensus. It took the guise of an "illusion of invulnerability," and "illusion of unanimity," "suppression of personal doubts," "self-appointed mindguards" and other forms. Few who read Janis' book will attend their next meeting without sensing the demonic presence of Groupthink.

Top level decision making during the Cuban Missile Crisis was a success because it consciously fought the Groupthink phenomenon. It encouraged dissent and repeated review of judgments. It took place in a changing organizational context that obstructed the establishment of set patterns of authority and influence. The President kept out of group deliberations so as not to intimidate subordinates. Fatiguing as it was, decisions were allowed to be reopened. Janis offers in his historical and concluding chapters some interesting views on where and why Groupthink arises. He is not very successful in telling us why in a few happy instances it does *not* arise. With regard to Cuba in 1962, he suggests, almost as an aside, that the threat of nuclear war might have had something to do with it.

From Janis' perspective there are some similarities between policy decision making and intelligence analysis, also a kind of decision making in that it involves a weighing of evidence and then a decision on what judgment to put forward. The lessons derived are also similar: The most important one is to make sure that assumptions are made as explicit as possible and scrutinized with the same rigor as the evidence. The value of this lesson stands out in official reviews of the intelligence community's performance prior to the outbreak of the October Middle East War.

Unfortunately, there are a great variety of "think" syndromes that impair intelligence analysis. Perhaps worst of all is Nothink when the day-to-day hassle prevents recognition of impending problems and thought about them until they are blazing hot. Then there are Bosstink and Bureauthink, hierarchical derivatives of Groupthink, whereby analysts almost unconsciously assimilate the views of superiors and their organizations and drive evidence to fit them. One encounters "I've-seen-it-all-before"-think, a peculiar peril of the experienced analyst in a profession that is obliged to appear, if not be, omniscient. Another one could be called Lobbythink. This occurs when some preferred policy position is being pushed in the guise of intelligence analysis. When the intelligence is clearly linked organizationally with a policy making institution, this syndrome is readily detectable. But it may appear in the most pristine garb of "objectivity" or in a determination to see some objectionable point of view counterbalanced.

Finding a remedy for all these potential maladies is happily not the objective of a book review. But if they are genuine problems, surely part of the solution lies in reflection, an enterprise for which the intelligence profession must allot a good deal of time. A few hours with Allison and Janis couldn't hurt.

Fritz W. Ermarth

(From Volume 18, Number 1, p. 61, 1974; Unclassified)

AN INSTANCE OF TREASON: Ozaki Hotsumi and the Sorge Spy Ring.
By *Chalmers Johnson*. (Stanford University Press. 1964. 278 pp. \$6.50)

Popular spy anthologies have long paraded a strange combination of fact and fantasy about Richard Sorge's espionage operation on behalf of the Soviet Union twenty and more years ago in the Far East. The first English-language work on the case was the heavily documented but somewhat inadequately researched *Shanghai Conspiracy: the Sorge Spy Ring* by Major General Charles A. Willoughby, General MacArthur's intelligence chief.¹ General Willoughby and his staff, working with a large number of documents procured by the occupation forces upon entering Japan, assembled for the military establishment, a congressional committee, and the public an illuminating collection of facts about the espionage activities in China and Japan of Sorge, confessed member of the CPSU and agent of Department Four (Intelligence) of the Soviet Army General Staff, and his ring. It was this material which served as the basis for General Willoughby's book. Details copied indiscriminately from the Japanese documents available at the time, English transliterations from Japanese transliterations of Russian names, errors made by translators unfamiliar with the Soviet espionage establishment and its personalities, a tendency to accept colorful characterizations of members of the ring, and a concentration of interest on the angle of American involvement left the Willoughby study an interesting but not unflawed account of the activities of the net.

Later *The Man With Three Faces*, by Hans-Otto Meissner,² a former member of the German embassy staff in Tokyo, intermingled fact, near-fact, and completely erroneous information with the author's personal recollections. This uncritical work carried in an epilogue the oft-repeated legends that Sorge was not executed as reported and that the mysterious "Kiyomi," Sorge's mistress, had been machinegunned to death in a Shanghai cabaret in 1947 for having betrayed him. But the memoirs of the mistress, Miyake (Ishii) Hanako, very much alive and running a boarding house for students in Tokyo, were published the same year as Meissner's book.

It is from the Willoughby and Meissner English-language materials that most of what has appeared in various anthologies and I-knew-Richard-Sorge-when stories has been taken—and sometimes embroidered on to please the public taste.

In the meantime, however, some two hundred books and major articles were written in Japan about Sorge and his associates. One, we noted, was by his mistress, some came from minor members of the net, one was a collection of letters written by a central figure in the net, Ozaki Hotsumi, to his wife from prison, and yet another was written by Ozaki's half-brother, who had been 13 years old when Ozaki was arrested. With rare exception each of these many writings contributed a little something to improve later ones. The most important single work was the three-volume *Materials on Modern History: The Sorge Incident* published in Japanese by Misuzu Shobo, a leading publishing house.³ Devoted entirely to the police and court records of the case, it printed for the first time many documents unavailable at the time of the Willoughby study. These three volumes probably did more than any of the others to dispel myths which had grown up around the figures in the Sorge net.

¹ New York: E. P. Dutton, 1952.

² London: Evans, 1955. Meissner should not be confused with Joseph Meisinger, a colonel in the Gestapo, who was assigned to the German embassy in Tokyo as security officer at the time of Sorge's arrest.

³ *Gendat-shi Shiryō: Zoruge Jiken*. Tokyo, 1962.

In *An Instance of Treason* Chalmers Johnson now brings together and analyzes the most significant of these Japanese contributions to the history of Soviet espionage. His study is centered on the background and activities of Ozaki Hotsumi, probably the most effective member of the net. It gives also an excellent picture of the times which produced Ozaki and of the other members of the net, but we must wait for some future work to treat the many German-language documents publicly available which deal with Sorge's earlier life and German and Soviet associations.

Mr. Johnson corrects the several transliteration errors found in earlier books and correctly identifies and discusses in extensive footnotes the Soviet personalities mentioned by Sorge in his confessions. The professional student of the Sorge operation will be particularly grateful to him for having included a glossary of pertinent Japanese names in both romanized and ideograph form, a lengthy bibliography, and a complete index. For the more general reader he debunks many of the old myths; in only a few instances does he perpetuate previous irregularities, and these are minor, generally a matter of being misled by earlier writers' colorful inventions about personalities in the net.

The reader may not agree with Mr. Johnson's high evaluation of Ozaki as an individual or as a revolutionary, but he will most certainly be impressed by the chronicle of Ozaki's rise within Japanese circles of influence and consequent access to official opinion and secret information. As a revolutionary, a man such as Ozaki, it could be argued, would likely have been purged if he had been within the Soviet borders, for he was feudal in approach, supported the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as a means of encouraging a resurgence of nationalism throughout Asia, and dreamed of a revolution in Japan coming not from the lower strata of society but from the intellectual elite. However this may be, within the Japanese society existing at the time he served the Soviet intelligence services almost if not equally as well as Sorge himself.

Another point at which intelligence officers could possibly disagree is when Mr. Johnson attempts to distinguish between cooperators and real members of the net. His probings, however, of the status of cooperator vs. agent, Soviet agent vs. Comintern agent, and the like are more than semantic exercises. He explores in depth and accepts the hypothesis that Sorge and Max Clausen, the net's radio operator, were the only ones who knew that their superiors were officials of Red Army intelligence, the other members of the net, including Ozaki, believing themselves to be working for the Comintern. Then he makes one of the most interesting points of the entire book: he explains how the Japanese authorities found it legally advantageous to the prosecution to keep characterizing the net as a Comintern activity, as Sorge first called it, despite his later confession of the role of Department Four. Had this aspect of his confession been accepted, he might have been spared from execution under Japanese law. This seeming technicality is particularly intriguing in the light of the recent Soviet acknowledgment (Mayevsky article in Pravda, 4 Sept. 1964) that Sorge was indeed an agent of the USSR.

The Mayevsky article confirms another conclusion reached by Mr. Johnson, that the greatest achievement of the net was its report in the fall of 1941 that the Japanese would not attack the Soviet Far East but the Allied controlled territory to the south, a report that made it possible for Soviet forces to be moved west to save Moscow. It also confirms that the net's earlier reporting on the German plan to attack the USSR was highly accurate though ignored by Stalin. As Mr. Johnson points out, Sorge considered this one of his major achievements, and he claimed to have received a message of thanks and congratulation from Moscow after his advance warning proved to have been right.

The Soviet acknowledgement of Sorge, twenty three years after his arrest and twenty after his and Ozaki's execution, makes particularly timely the publication of *An Instance of Treason*, the most complete study in English to date of the operation of the net.

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