

DD/A Registry  
81-2199

22 October 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee Members  
FROM: Robert M. Gates  
Director, DCI/DDCI Executive Staff  
SUBJECT: Agenda for Executive Committee Meeting,  
30 October 1981

1. The Executive Committee will meet on Friday, 30 October 1981, at 1000 hours in the DCI Conference Room on two items: Proposed Agency History Program and the Long-Range Planning Process.

2. History Program. Ken McDonald, the Agency's new Chief Historian, will briefly highlight and request your concurrence in his proposed program, which is summarized in Tab 1. The annexes at Tabs A and B contain sample histories for your perusal.

3. Long-Range Planning Process. [redacted] Chief of the Planning Staff, will outline a proposed long-range planning process that builds on the experience gained from last year's effort. The proposed process has been designed to be compatible with the Community 1985 Intelligence Capabilities exercise and to adapt and provide input to the revised Agency budget process. You should be prepared to provide the DDCI your views on this topic.

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Robert M. Gates

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Attachments:  
As stated

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OPP/PRS  (22 Oct 81)



## HISTORY STAFF PROGRAM

### Executive Summary

1. Goals: To serve CIA by helping preserve its institutional memory and historical records, by providing a specialized reference service, and by writing its history.
2. Products: Classified histories for use by CIA managers and other Agency employees. The new program will build on, but differ from, a previous program that produced mainly component histories by writers assigned from the offices or divisions. We intend to use professionally trained historians to research and write Agency history at a level of generality that will minimize reference to sources and methods, and in a governmental context that will reveal the Agency's place in the conduct of United States policy. We propose four categories of histories:
  - A. a short survey history of the Agency
  - B. studies of the leadership of the individual DCIs
  - C. a series of topical monographs
  - D. a multi-volume general history of CIA

We have attached prospectuses for the short survey history and for a Raborn period general history volume.

3. Other activities: The History Staff is CIA's point of contact with other U.S. government history programs that use CIA-originated documents. It also provides an internal reference service on matters of a historical nature, and proposes to conduct an oral history program in conjunction with its other research.
4. Staffing: The History Staff currently consists of a Chief, Deputy Chief, and two support personnel. Two additional historians are being recruited. Each of the staff historians will undertake one writing project--ranging in duration from six months to several years--at a time.

## HISTORY STAFF PROGRAM

I shall not begin with a long argument for the utility of historical studies for CIA, because I think that this is self-evident. The CIA cannot plan or act without being influenced by its historical experience. It is therefore not a question of whether the Agency uses history, but rather of what kind of history it uses, and how well. "History is simply recorded memory," a distinguished historian has written. "People without memory are mentally sick. So too are nations or societies or institutions that reject or deny the relevance of their collective past."

In this paper I shall propose a program for the CIA History Staff, which was re-established in November 1980, and which I joined as Chief Historian in August 1981. Since the History Staff's work will call for support from all parts of the Agency, we need the Executive Committee's approval and suggestions before we embark on a new program.

With this program the History Staff expects to serve the Agency in three ways: by helping to preserve its institutional memory and historical records; by providing a specialized reference service for it and other government agencies; and, most importantly, by writing its history. The histories we shall write fall into four main categories:

- A. a short survey history of the Agency
- B. studies of the leadership of the individual DCIs
- C. a series of topical monographs
- D. a multi-volume general history of CIA.

After a brief account of the History Staff's development 1952-1979 and of its restoration in the past year, this paper will explain how the History Staff plans to carry out its records and reference functions, and how it will organize its four history-writing projects.

### Background

Since Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith appointed Dr. Arthur Darling as CIA's first historian in 1952 the role and size of the History Staff have varied greatly. Until the late 1960s the office remained small, and professional historians produced well-written and carefully documented studies of the origins and early years of the Agency, and of

the development of its organizational structure. In 1968, however, on the initiative of Col. L.K. White, then Executive Director/Comptroller, a large staff of over 20 was organized to supervise an ambitious program of "component histories," which eventually involved hundreds of people throughout the Agency. After 352 of these monographs-- of the much larger number originally projected--had been written, this program was abruptly halted and the History Staff cut back sharply at the end of the 1973 fiscal year. By mid-1974, when only one historian and two support staff remained, they were transferred from the Office of the DCI to DDA. By the end of 1979 this vestigial History Staff had been dissolved altogether.

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In 1979, even as the History Staff expired, new studies were under way to determine what kind of history program CIA needed. By mid-1980 the DCI decided to re-establish a history office on a new and more solid footing. Based on the advice of an internal History Advisory Committee, [redacted] and of an eminent outside historian, [redacted] the Agency in October 1980 began the search for a new Chief Historian. Shortly thereafter a History Staff was set up in the Office of the DCI with [redacted] history Ph.D. from NFAC, as Acting Chief and permanent Deputy.

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The History Staff, which is housed in the Ames Building, has in addition to its Chief and Deputy, one History Assistant (GS-9), and one Secretary (GS-6). Its T/O authorizes two additional Historians (GS-13), whom we are now trying to recruit. Dr. Jack Pfeiffer, Chief Historian 1974-79, has also been assigned to this office for the current year, to complete his history of the Bay of Pigs operation .

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[redacted] report of June 1980 and [redacted] of July 1980 both generally agreed on how a new History Staff should be set up, and the Agency has fairly closely followed these reports' suggestions in restoring the History Staff. Both reports also agreed that a comprehensive program should not be organized until a new Chief Historian had taken charge, and this suggestion has given impetus since August to the inquiries and consultations needed to plan a new program. I have looked into the work of the History Staff before its demise in 1979 and consulted with people who were associated with it then. I have talked at least briefly with the DCI, DDCI and all the Deputy Directors (except Mr. Dirks), and others in the Agency about the direction that a new program should take. Outside of the Agency I have had especially useful discussions with the Chief Historians of the Department of State, the National Security Agency, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the four military services.

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These inquiries were aimed at identifying not only the most useful purposes that a CIA History Staff can serve, but also the

principal problems that we can expect to face in pursuing these objectives. Writing history for the Central Intelligence Agency is not like writing history for any other organization. The benefits of an accurate record and systematic historical analysis must be kept in constant balance with the requirements of security. The measures necessary to protect secret information and the sources and methods used to obtain it, must be rigorously observed as the History Staff carries out its several functions.

### Program

The History Staff has three principal functions, which center around records, reference and writing. Since the writing of history is the most prominent of these, let us first deal briefly with records and reference.

### Records and Reference

The records of the CIA are the raw material needed both to provide a useful reference service and to write accurate and systematic history. Although the History Staff maintains some records of its own--mainly the histories and monographs already produced, and some of the documents and reference files to support past and future studies--its role with respect to the Agency's records is essentially advisory. The DDA runs an efficient records management system, which follows general guidance from the National Archives and Records Service on what records to preserve. Our function is to complement the administrative and managerial criteria used in collecting records with our professional advice as CIA historians, to see that important historical documentation is not lost. We also plan to improve the History Staff's ability to offer informed advice on what to preserve of the important new kinds of audio, visual and computer records. In the 1970s the History Staff made a small beginning in an oral history program, and we now hope to do much more. By capturing the institutional memory of that rapidly retiring first generation of CIA officers, an oral history program can provide an invaluable resource for writing the Agency's history. We therefore plan to organize a modest but systematic oral history interview program, especially as we press on with our projected general history and studies of the DCIs.

In dealing with the Agency's records the History Staff also responds to the requests from other Government offices (e.g. the Department of State and NSA historians' offices, and the Army's Center for Military History) for access to CIA documents. (DDA's IPD handles such requests from private researchers.) Agency-originated documents in the

several presidential libraries account for a large part of these official requests, and we act as broker in referring such documents to the Agency components who decide whether or not they can be released and declassified. This work is the most obvious and frequent in our liaison role with the historical profession in government, universities, learned societies and elsewhere.

The History Staff's reference service is at the intersection of its records and writing roles. To respond to Agency and outside official requests to find specific information or to review material for historical accuracy, we use essentially the same historical records and research skills that we use to write histories. For Agency-wide use the History Staff has published several classified chronologies and lists of key personnel that now need up-dating. The large file of component studies, which covers most aspects of the Agency's activities up to the mid-1960s, has been especially useful in answering a wide variety of internal requests for historical information to use in training and litigation, and to reveal how recurring problems have been handled in the past. We expect that our reference capability will be used more as the Agency becomes aware that we are in business again.

### Histories

Clearly the History Staff's central function is to write history. As far as I can discover the only real controversy about this role has centered on the massive "component histories" program carried out from 1968 to 1973. It may be useful to look for a moment at this old program before presenting a new program of historical research and writing.

The component histories program was launched in 1968 as a "catch-up" program, to produce historical studies of virtually all of the Agency's activities, operations and components from its beginning to around 1965. Over 500 separate "histories" were projected, mostly to be done not by the History Staff, but by people in the components. Although the History Staff expanded substantially, it served mainly in a supervisory, editing and review role. Thus most of these studies were neither researched nor written by trained historians, but rather by officers detached from their regular duties for this work. The length of these studies ranges from a few pages to several volumes and their quality also varies enormously. Some are excellent; most are mediocre and pedestrian; some are very bad. Very few qualify as completed histories; they are narrowly focused preliminary studies designed principally to capture valuable data and experience that might otherwise have been lost. Intended for only limited circulation inside the



Agency, most exist in but one or two copies. They have proved highly useful for internal Agency reference purposes, and they will be important sources for later more professional and comprehensive historical studies. Yet they must be used with caution and discrimination. Mostly descriptive rather than analytical and often lacking context and perspective, they can be misleading. The faults in both design and execution of this "components histories" program became evident to everyone once some of these studies were released to the Senate Select Committee in the mid-1970s. I should therefore emphasize at the outset that we propose no studies along these lines in the program we shall outline here.

What I do propose is a writing program that will be both of obvious and immediate usefulness to the Agency, and within the capabilities of the professional historians allotted to this office. This program includes four principal projects:

- A. a short but comprehensive survey history of the Agency from its OSS origins to the recent past
- B. a continuation of the series of histories of the DCIs, which now ends with Allen Dulles's tenure
- C. a series of historical monographs on subjects of continuing interest and importance to the Agency
- D. a multi-volume general history of the Agency.

Let us look a little more closely at what will be involved in each of these projects.

#### A Short Survey History

For a long time the Agency has needed a readable and reliable survey of itself for its own people. What we now propose is a succinct classified one-volume history, to be widely available in the Agency for training, reference and critical perspective. A corporate history is essential for any profession, including the profession of intelligence. Members of CIA now have only outside histories--of wildly differing quality and accuracy--to turn to for an account of how the Agency got to where it is today. The only US government history of CIA is a brief unclassified annex to the Senate Select Committee hearings, published in 1976. There is no single work that any Agency employee, whether a new Career Trainee or a senior executive, can rely on for an accurate, authoritative and concise survey of the Agency's history since its origins in World War II. Dr. Knapp's prospectus of what our survey

history would cover, and of how it might be organized, is attached as Annex A.

### DCI Histories

STAT In the History Staff's series of studies of the Directors of Central Intelligence two first-rate histories, each in five typescript volumes, have been completed, in 1971 and 1973. The first is on Walter Bedell Smith as DCI, by Ludwell Montague, and the second is on Allen Dulles as DCI, [redacted] Beyond this, Walter Elder has done some work on John McCone as DCI.

STAT We propose to continue this series. The present DCI has already enlisted the cooperation of Messrs. Schlesinger and Helms in this enterprise, and has arranged for two distinguished retired officers, [redacted] and John Bross, to help them in organizing their recollections. These DCI histories, by emphasizing the impact of the man on the Agency, offer a unique view of CIA's work from the top.

### Historical Monographs

Monographic studies will allow us to assure priority treatment of topics that we find of current importance to the Agency, and to pull together in one account the related efforts of a variety of components. Moreover, these studies will consider these topics in the larger context of the government as a whole. This kind of study would treat such topics as CIA's relations with Congress, its role in the intelligence community, its part in the development of overhead reconnaissance, and its work in the Vietnam War. Another example on a large scale is Dr. Pfeiffer's history of the Bay of Pigs operation, whose fourth and final volume is nearing completion. In the History Staff files there are also several excellent draft studies begun in the early 1970s that should now be completed. Good examples are two studies, by [redacted] John Bross, on forerunners of the intelligence community. STAT

### A General History

The largest long-term project in the new history program is the proposed multi-volume general history. We need to begin a history of the Agency as a whole, both to describe its development since 1947 and to draw the main themes of its evolution into a broad synthesis. While a general history of CIA will be periodized by the tenures of successive DCIs, it will not focus (as the DCI histories will) on these men and

their impact, but rather on the growth of the entire institution and on its role in the American policy process. This kind of history must be carefully documented, but we shall try to overcome that tendency towards encyclopedic fullness of detail that typifies so many institutional histories. By avoiding elaborate detail a general history can explain how the Agency has changed and progressed over the years, without using the kind of particularistic evidence that is most likely to raise questions of sensitive sources and methods. Any large and complex organization can profit from this kind of institutional history. When the need for historical perspective and accurate background data arises, it is a question of whether it is met by relying on whatever old documents are in the files and the longest memories available, or by referring to a comprehensive professional history of the institution. A strong and effective History Staff will relieve Agency components of having to act as their own historians. A precedent and starting point for our work is the two-volume general history of CIA's progenitor, OSS, that the War Department prepared (with Kermit Roosevelt as Chief Historian) at the end of World War II. To give an idea of what one could expect to be covered in this kind of general history, Dr. Knapp has written a sketch account of the volume (or part of a volume) that would treat Admiral Raborn's period as DCI. This prospectus, attached as Annex B, illustrates how this large work would put a wide range of apparently unrelated events and activities into the context of both the Agency and the government taken as a whole.

### Conclusions

The program we have presented here will fully occupy the talents and efforts of the small History Staff. I should emphasize that we think it important that professionally trained historians write the projected histories. Dr. Knapp will undertake the survey volume and I shall start on the first of the DCI histories (probably the study of James Schlesinger as DCI). When the two new historians are in place we plan to put one to work on a volume in the general history (probably for the Raborn period), and to assign the other to the first study in the topical monograph series. As our history program evolves we may need to seek additional help in our research and writing projects. Should this be necessary, I would propose to arrange for qualified outside historians (good candidates might be Agency annuitants with historical training and experience) to undertake specific projects on fixed-term contracts.

I should also note that we need to build a network of interested and sympathetic officers in the upper echelons of the various directorates. The willingness of such people to broker arrangements in their components and serve on all-Agency boards to review completed manuscripts is essential to our work. As a formal base for such a network we hope to estab-

lish an internal History Advisory Board, with at least one senior representative from each directorate. Our work cannot prosper if we do not maintain open lines of communication with all parts of the Agency.

Having looked carefully at the history of the History Staff, I am confident that we can avoid the more obvious mistakes of the past. But this is not enough. Whether the new history program succeeds or fails will depend on how effectively it helps the Agency carry out its work and mission. With this in mind, we have tried to fashion a new program that will be useful, productive and worthy of your trust and support.

J. Kenneth McDonald

21 October 1981



Annex A


PROSPECTUS--CIA: THE FIRST THIRTY YEARS

Antecedents

CIA's institutional roots extend from Maj. Gen. William Donovan's efforts during World War II to provide the US with an intelligence service and a capability for unconventional warfare--the Office of Strategic Services. In the rush to demobilize, OSS was abolished in October 1945. Its research and analysis personnel were transferred to State and the remainder of its employees were put into the War Department as the Strategic Services Unit.

Advocates of a permanent intelligence organization won the creation by executive action on 1 January 1946 of a temporary Central Intelligence Group. Rear Adm. Sidney Souers, USNR, the first DCI, headed it and its related coordinating and advisory boards for six months, during which CIG accumulated pieces of former wartime organizations such as FBIS and began to put out the daily intelligence summary Pres. Truman requested.

Lt. Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, USA (AAF), became DCI in June 1946 and set about building a self-sufficient intelligence service. He brought in a group of colonels to run things and greatly expanded CIG's personnel and functions. During Vandenberg's one-year tenure, CIG began to produce intelligence estimates, won authorization to conduct its own research and analysis, and created a large Office of Reports and Estimates to do so. In addition, it acquired a collection and counterintelligence capability by annexing SSU (renamed Office of Special Operations), replaced the FBI as the intelligence unit for Latin America, established liaison with the




Planning for a post-war realignment of US security, defense, and intelligence institutions had begun as early as June 1945, with the Eberstadt Commission. Intense maneuvering continued for two years, as each service and department attempted to defend or expand its equities. The culmination came with passage--in the atmosphere of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan--of the National Security Act of 26 July 1947. In addition to creating an independent Central Intelligence Agency, it also established the National Security Council, the forerunner of the Department of Defense, and a separate Air Force. The new organizations came into being

on 18 September 1947. Roscoe Hillenkoetter, the Rear Admiral who had succeeded Vandenberg, was reconfirmed as DCI.

### Hillenkoetter

The transition from CIG to CIA did not cause major structural changes--ORE remained a collection of over-extended regional branches trying to service a wide range of customers and OSO divided its resources between Headquarters and overseas stations. The DCI added his own Inspection and Security Staff, as well as an Executive for Administration and Management.

In December 1947, NSCIDs 1 to 6 were issued, outlining the basic responsibilities of CIA, the Departments, and the relatively powerful Intelligence Advisory Committee. Under NSC 4/a, which assigned covert psychological operations to

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Shortly afterward, following the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade, NSC 10/2 called for a greatly increased range of covert actions to forestall Communist expansion.

As a further reaction to the mounting international tension, an Office of Policy Coordination was created in September 1948 at the initiative of State Department activists. Nominally a component of CIA, OPC's head (Frank Wisner) was named by State, its policy direction came from State and Defense, and it was directed by its charter to act as independently as possible in conducting covert "activities" other than intelligence collection. OPC grew rapidly and undertook countless projects. It engaged in paramilitary planning and material stock-piling, and purchased an airline--CAT--to keep the planes from falling into Chinese Communist hands. Interest in East European refugees prompted formation of the Agency-sponsored National Committee for a Free Europe, which backed anti-Soviet political warfare projects such as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. OPC opened its own overseas stations and competed with OSO for sources and agents.

In July 1948, a committee of private lawyers--Allen Dulles, William Jackson, and Mathias Correa--was appointed to evaluate intelligence performance under the National Security Act. Its report, issued in January 1949, was highly critical of CIA's weak leadership and of the heavy military emphasis in the Agency. Hillenkoetter became even

less assertive under criticism, and a period of managerial drift and unsupervised activities ensued pending his replacement.

The unanticipated outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 forced the dual issues of the need for a stronger DCI and Gen. Douglas MacArthur's virtual exclusion of the Agency from the Far East. During the summer of 1950, CIA began to provide large-scale paramilitary support to the US Forces in Korea. In August, Pres. Truman nominated Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, USA, to be DCI. 25X1

### Smith

Smith moved rapidly to effect reorganizations that gave CIA its basic structure for the next quarter century --major functional activities grouped into a small number of deputy directorates. He also established the DCI's role as intelligence advisor to the NSC and set up an office of the Inspector General to survey the overt components and monitor grievances.

Less than a week after taking office in October 1947, Smith announced that the DCI would assume administrative control of OPC and that policy guidance for covert activities would come through him, rather than direct to OPC. He secured the concurrence of State, Defense, and the JCS in this shift and in the related downgrading of the IAC. In January 1951, he created the Deputy Directorate of Plans to supervise both OPC and OSO, which otherwise remained quite distinct, and brought Dulles into the Agency as the DDP.

In November 1950, it was ORE's turn to be reorganized into a Deputy Directorate of Intelligence. In the first phase, Smith created an Office of National Estimates to take in hand the preparation and review of estimates and their coordination in the community. An Office of Research and Reports was set up and given the specific task of conducting economic research on the Soviet bloc. In a second phase, the Office of Current Intelligence was pulled out to produce the daily report. A new Office of Scientific Intelligence faced a period of jurisdictional disputes with the military before settling on a mission limited to the study of foreign programs in basic science and medicine.

Some major innovations resulted from these reorganizations. ORR set out to study the Soviet economy sector by sector, using a variety of intelligence sources to compen-



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sate for the denial of access. When OCI was formed, it acquired the small group that handled Communications Intelligence and began to include COMINT in its Current Intelligence Bulletin--a pioneer step toward all-source intelligence. The Office of Collection and Dissemination introduced the use of machine-assisted document retrieval.

Smith's attempts to clarify OPC's mission led to the creation in April 1951 of the Psychological Strategy Board as an NSC sub-committee. Its initial supervision of psychological operations expanded to overall planning and programming for the Cold War. Tentative steps toward the integration of OSO and OPC began in 1951, and a merger was finally announced in July 1952. The DCI kept some controls in his own hands, notably by moving communications into the Office of the DCI and by designating the area division chiefs as his "executives" in the DDP. The [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] units. In August 1952, Dulles moved up to become DDCI, with OPC's Wisner taking over as DDP and OSO's Richard Helms becoming Chief of Operations.

New undertakings during Smith's tenure included the [REDACTED], diverse roles in the control of strategic exports, [REDACTED] and an array of operations targeted against Communist international front organizations.

#### Dulles

Dulles became DCI in February 1953, a position he retained throughout and beyond the eight years of the Eisenhower administration. Gen. Charles Cabell, USAF, was DDCI during Dulles's entire tenure.

Another key appointment was that of Richard Bissell in 1954 to be Special Assistant to the DCI for planning and Cooperation. This was a period of administrative stability, with highly structured NSC and White House operations, close collaboration with State where Dulles's brother was Secretary, a cooperative Congress, and a general acceptance of the Agency's role in supporting policy. The most serious threat to the Agency's image--Sen. Joseph McCarthy's 1953 accusations that subversives were employed in CIA--was cut off promptly by Dulles's refusal to submit his people to the senator's grilling.

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Dulles maintained a deep interest in the details of clandestine operations, giving other aspects of the DCI position far less attention. In the 1950's CIA was allotted the mission of preventing further Communist advances in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. This work was carried on in a DDP that was a jumble of area divisions, functional staffs, and special groups intended to facilitate secrecy and flexibility but often fostering confusion and duplication. Projects--which could be initiated anywhere in the system--were the units of activity.

Paramilitary activity flourished, then declined. Early efforts to parachute agents into Communist-controlled areas were given up as fruitless and the Korean truce in July 1953 reduced the need for field support. Successful efforts against the Huk rebellion in the Philippines were followed by inability to move Indonesian anti-Communists to fight in their own cause. War-planning in such fields as  generated little response in the target countries.

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clearest successes in political warfare. Strictures against operating within Soviet-bloc countries, however, limited the Agency to working with the refugees who streamed out of Hungary after the 1956 uprising.

In 1955, Congress appointed a commission headed by former President Herbert Hoover to survey the Executive Branch. It had a Task Force under Gen. Mark Clark assigned to study the intelligence community and a sub-unit to investigate CIA. Pres. Eisenhower named a separate special committee under Gen. James Doolittle to prepare a classified report on the DDP for the President and barred Clark's group from duplicating its study, effectively excluding it from DDP. Doolittle recommended a cut-back to remove "dead-wood" and some organizational changes that remained a dead-letter. Under its curtailed charter, the Clark Committee found in CIA an over-emphasis on covert activities, along with inadequate collection and analysis on the Soviet Union. As a follow-up to these investigations, CIA sub-committees were created in Congress, formalizing the practice of

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making a small number of legislators privy to CIA activity; an additional DDCI, Lt. Gen. Lucian Truscott, USA, was named to oversee community affairs; and President Eisenhower named his own oversight group, later known as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. A more significant change was made in 1958 with the creation of the United States Intelligence Board and its network of specialized interdepartmental sub-committees.

Several important innovations were made at the working level. For example, ORR analysts developed new techniques for determining Soviet military preparedness on the basis of economic capability. In the first instance, this pitted Agency estimates of Soviet bomber production against the much higher figures of the Defense Department. OCI took the lead in introducing a new method of delivering intelligence to the President. In June 1961, it inaugurated the President's Intelligence Check List, a short, pithy document designed specifically for President Kennedy and delivered to him every morning.

Other analysts revived the war-time art of photo-interpretation, and were ready to apply it in 1956 when the U-2 went into operation. The U-2 was a unique high-altitude plane equipped with special high-resolution cameras--both developed in great secrecy under CIA auspices--that permitted photographic missions over the Soviet Union and other denied or sensitive areas such as Cuba and the Middle East. Periodic missions that filled an enormous number of intelligence gaps were flown before the system was exposed when Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960. By that time, developmental work was in progress on an improved plane and on reconnaissance satellites.

Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba on 1 January 1959, successfully concluding his guerrilla war against the Batista regime. He alarmed Washington with his increasingly close identification with Communism and, in early 1960, CIA was instructed to work on the problem. This instruction snowballed into plans for an invasion by anti-Castro Cuban exiles, armed, trained, and assisted by CIA with the anticipation that dissidents within Cuba would help assure its success. The result was the disastrous Bay of Pigs operation of 17-19 April 1961.

The Bay of Pigs was President Kennedy's introduction to the Agency, and colored his impression of it and its leadership. He remained keenly interested in the Cuban

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problem, but kept on-going efforts against Castro under the supervision of a small group of close advisors. He also decided that Dulles would have to go. In November 1961, one of Dulles's last official acts as DCI was to escort President Kennedy on a visit to CIA's new headquarters building in Langley that was just being occupied by both covert and overt employees.

### McCone

John McCone, a businessman and engineer, was sworn in as DCI on 29 November 1961. He expected to function as a sort of senior intelligence officer to the President, with whom he had regular meetings in lieu of the former elaborate NSC schedule. A new high-level group was appointed to review the feasibility and relative risk of proposed covert

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McCone meticulously followed all aspects of the reconnaissance program, laying on exhaustive studies of the state of the art--both in terms of hardware and of missions--to try to determine what was needed and how much was enough. He was an active participant in the long negotiations to set up a National Reconnaissance Program, put a National Reconnaissance Office in charge of it, and distribute the equities between CIA and the Air Force. When the first efforts brought unsatisfactory results, he pushed the re-opening of the negotiations.

He was also convinced of the importance of technical collection programs and of collaborative research on military problems. With Soviet technological accomplishments frequently in the headlines, he felt that CIA should have a separate technical directorate. One attempt failed, but in 1963 he established the Deputy Directorate of Science and Technology under Albert Wheelon. It absorbed the pertinent units from other directorates, except for the Technical Services Division which remained in DDP to support operations.

McCone was the first DCI to move assertively into the field of coordinating intelligence community activities. He had to some degree an ally in Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who was trying to establish the Defense Intelligence Agency and cut back the independent role of the services. McCone's most significant step was to set up within CIA a small, high-level staff known as National Intelligence Programs Evaluation with authority to evaluate community programs, inventory community activities, and assess their implementation.

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The Agency's performance relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, during which CIA spotted the arrival of the Soviet material, confirmed that it included long-range missiles, and verified their removal, re-established CIA's stature in the administration. McCone's own standing benefitted from his having insisted on repeated studies in the face of initial reassurances.

CIA became involved in Southeast Asia on a large scale about 1962. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] support for police and paramilitary units in South Vietnam grew by 1965 into full-scale paramilitary assistance and pacification programs with their own air support. These were backed by intelligence collection in the field and by an analytical working group at Headquarters. Overall, CIA was not as optimistic as other departments about prospects for the area.

When Lyndon Johnson became President after Kennedy's assassination, McCone's influence began to decline, partly because of personality differences. Instead of getting his intelligence in private meetings with the DCI, Johnson preferred to use larger luncheons which increasingly focused on Vietnam. After the 1964 election, OCI redesigned its special publication to suit Johnson's work-style and renamed it the President's Daily Brief. In the spring of 1965, McCone's impending return to private business was announced.

#### Raborn

Vice Adm. William Raborn, Jr. USN (ret), was sworn in as DCI on 28 April 1965, the day US forces intervened in the Dominican Republic in the face of a perceived leftist threat against the government there. His first acquaintance with the Agency, thus, was as it responded to a crisis situation with a wide range of involvement both in Washington and in the field. The Dominican problem eventually faded after a moderate president was installed following new elections in 1966.

The US also began its deep commitment in Vietnam shortly before Raborn arrived at CIA. Bombing raids against North Vietnam started in February 1965, and the large influx of troops commenced in April. CIA expanded its efforts in Vietnam--building up staff and diversifying programs--to match those of the rest of the government. At Headquarters, the DCI named a Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs to supervise an elite group of analysts dealing with all aspects of the problem.

There was a heightened interest in China, mainly because of uneasiness over its intentions in Southeast Asia and its recent nuclear tests. High-level reminders of the importance of China led to innovative efforts to focus all kinds of expertise on this one target. Meanwhile, concern with the Soviets was unabated, particularly regarding their rapid development in the missile, space, and nuclear fields.

Satisfactory organization of the national overhead reconnaissance effort was achieved during the summer of 1965 under a new agreement that interlarded CIA personnel into policy-making positions and continued both CIA and Air Force satellite projects. Although satellite collection was coming increasingly to the fore, manned aircraft were still the normal platforms for reconnaissance. CIA's new and vastly superior super-sonic high-altitude plane, the AN-12 or OXCART, became operational in 1965. Arguments over the risks involved in its deployment and use kept it under wraps for several years, though it eventually flew some missions in Vietnam and an Air Force version went into regular use.

Raborn was responsive to Pres. Johnson's desire to establish better CIA rapport with Congress. Substantive briefings --especially on Vietnam--were given with increasing frequency, and the Agency's budget presentation was expanded and embellished. Oversight of the Agency's operations, however, remained with the designated sub-committees and was not much affected.

Raborn made only a few changes in the functioning of the Agency, mainly related to improving efficiency in crisis-management. Improvements were made in Operations Center procedures and equipment, rosters of high-ranking duty officers were initiated, and advanced communications facilities were introduced overseas.

New problems from outside became manifest during Raborn's tenure. The New York Times ran a series of articles that made unauthorized disclosures about the Agency, and anti-government sentiment in the universities began to impede recruitment and research contracts.

Morale also declined inside the Agency, where Raborn's unfamiliarity with foreign affairs and bureaucratic naivete were openly criticized. When he was replaced in June 1966, employees expressed satisfaction that for the first time a professional intelligence officer, Helms, was to be made DCI.

Helms

Richard Helms was sworn in on 1966. His interest lay in the operational side of the Agency and this facilitated his working with Presidents Johnson and Nixon, who wanted an Agency management that could get things done.

The late years of the Johnson administration brought a contraction in covert activity because of US balance of payment problems and a resulting general cut-back in overseas positions. The real water-shed, however, followed a Ram-parts Magazine expose in early 1967 of the Agency's [redacted] funding system for covert action. In response, a presidential committee headed by Nicholas Katzenbach recommended a re-alignment of DDP's funding [redacted] and a general review [redacted]. In September, another committee proposed cutting RFE and Radio Liberty free from the Agency support. When the reorganizations were completed, many marginal covert action projects were abolished, the radios were turned over to public sponsorship, and more secure funding was arranged for the remaining covert action program.

Vietnam was the prime concern of the Agency in the late 1960's, though this was punctuated by the Six-Day War in the Middle East, the Pueblo affair, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia--each of which prompted a crisis-management response. In Southeast Asia, CIA's multi-faceted efforts (intelligence collection and collation, briefings, training programs, paramilitary support, and development of technical devices) continued. After the Paris Peace Talks opened in 1968, CIA provided analytical support to the US negotiators. At home, 1968 was a year of riots and anti-war demonstrations, with CIA frequently included among the targets. In response to a White House request, the Agency attempted to determine what foreign backing the dissidents might have. When the initial results were disappointing, the effort to trace subversive connections was expanded under the [redacted] program.

President Nixon took office in 1969, bringing with him an acquaintance with the Agency from his vice-presidential days and an apparent distrust of it. He arranged for Henry Kissinger, his Advisor for National Security Affairs, to be the DCI's contact on substantive intelligence matters, and he utilized special groups for oversight and covert action review.

In December 1970, Nixon asked James Schlesinger of the Bureau of the Budget to do a study of the intelligence community. Schlesinger's report raised the issue of as-

signing community budget review to the DCI and otherwise enhancing his status in the community. Because of Defense Department objections, Helms did not proceed immediately with community reorganization. In March 1972, however, he created an Intelligence Community Staff as a replacement for NIPE. It was a small group, made up exclusively of CIA employees, and designed to work with the various USIB committee chairmen.

The foreign affairs preoccupation of the first Nixon administration was with Vietnam--a preoccupation heightened by the leak of the Pentagon Papers in June 1971. This led to the burglary of the office of the leaker's psychiatrist, to which CIA later became linked through assistance given to former-employee Howard Hunt. Lt. Gen. Robert Cushman, Jr., USMC, was pulled from the DDCI position and eventually replaced by Nixon's former aide, Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, USA, in May 1972.

By January 1973 a peace-treaty had been achieved for Vietnam, a reconciliation with China effected, and the SALT I and ABM treaties signed with the USSR. CIA's large paramilitary program in Southeast Asia was abolished and new tasks were assigned to the Agency--notably verification of the observance of the arms limitations agreements and assistance in controlling international narcotics traffic.

On 17 June 1972, a break-in was detected at the Democratic National Headquarters in the Watergate complex, and among those arrested were Cubans with Agency associations and James McCord, a former CIA security official. From that date on, CIA was enmeshed in the scandal as various efforts were made to implicate or, ultimately, to exonerate it. Much of Helms' time was taken up trying to distance the Agency from Watergate and its participants.

After his landslide re-election in 1972, Nixon promised to revitalize his administration for his second term. Helms was retired as DCI and went to Iran as ambassador. James Schlesinger was named as his successor.


### Schlesinger

A week after he was sworn in as DCI on 2 February 1973, Schlesinger told his staff that he found the Agency smug and complacent and that he was skeptical that it was providing the best possible intelligence. He moved quickly--a number of top officials, some of whom had held key position for years, were "retired" and replaced without delay. Further down the



ranks, which he called overstaffed for existing activities and effective response, he suggested about a 7 percent cut to permit supervisors to eliminate poor performers. To shake up internal administration, he abolished the powerful Office of Executive Director/Comptroller and established in its place a small Management Committee with an executive secretary, William Colby, who served concurrently as the Deputy Director for Operations (the new name for DDP).

By early 1973, accusations against CIA had begun to find an audience in Congress, and during Schlesinger's confirmation hearings there were some questions about possible illegal activities. In the early spring, Helms testified



Schlesinger tried to clean up whatever problems emerged and, as press stories surfaced, he ordered an internal inquiry into Agency links to Hunt's presumably illegal activities. On May 9, this became a standing memo from the DCI to all CIA employees to report anything done outside the legislative charter of the Agency.

A government reshuffle the next day sent Schlesinger to the Defense Department and elevated Colby to DCI. The change brought jubilation to CIA employees, and left to Colby the handling of the responses to the disclosure memo.

### Colby

Colby was confirmed by a vote of 83-13 on 1 August 1973, with Walters serving as Acting DCI in the interim. During the summer, after Colby had privately informed the intelligence subcommittee chairmen about the existence of the list of reported illegalities--the "Family Jewels"--there were unofficial hints that the Agency should expect legislation restricting its freedom of action and protecting it from political pressures.

Though most of his career had been in the clandestine services, Colby saw himself as a manager rather than an operator. As DCI, he particularly wanted to get the DDO to interact with other elements of the Agency and to break down DDO's staffs, which he felt had become virtual "duchies".

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The Counterintelligence Staff was the toughest, and it was not until December 1974 that Colby finally ousted its legendary Chief, James Angleton.

Another major change consolidated still more of the Agency's technical and military intelligence work in the DDS&T. The DDO's technical services support, the National Photo Intelligence Center, and analytical groups specializing in missiles and other weapons systems were transferred in this reorganization.

In the fall of 1973, Colby dissolved the Board of National Estimates which had been at the pinnacle of the intelligence process during the Dulles years but had become ingrown and isolated. Its place was taken by the Office of the Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Officers, headed by George Carver. The first group of about a dozen NIOs were each responsible for establishing information needs and managing community research and estimates on a specific geographic area or functional subject. To accommodate the former ONE staff and the remnants of Carver's SAVA, the Office of Political Research was set up to do in-depth studies.

Colby made a major change in the way CIA presented intelligence when, in January 1974, he introduced the National Intelligence Digest. This was a newspaper-format document that replaced the Current Intelligence Bulletin. Published overnight, it was up-dated through the early morning hours with the latest information on fast-breaking developments. As another innovation, it was sent to CIA's congressional committees on a restricted basis.

Other bits of unfinished business were tidied up--a new comptroller's office was set up, some of the Agency's proprietary airlines were sold, and [redacted] was terminated. On 8 August 1974, the [redacted] raised [redacted]

Nixon's resignation and Ford's accession to the presidency caused little change at CIA, and the Agency handled its share of the practical aspects of the transition smoothly. There was no respite, however, from outside critics, such as former-employee Philip Agee who began to publish his disclosures in October 1974 and Seymour Hersh who charged in the New York Times in December that CIA was involved in massive illegal domestic operations.

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Colby's time and energy were taken up during most of 1975 by a series of investigations. By executive order, Pres. Ford in January created a commission under Vice President Rockefeller to investigate CIA's domestic activities. The Senate organized the Church Select Committee and the House set up the Pike Select Committee to conduct hearings on CIA. By far the most substantial of these was the Senate Select Committee, which published an exhaustive report in April 1976.

On 3 November 1975, Pres. Ford announced Colby's dismissal as DCI and the appointment of George Bush to replace him. Apparently reminded of the impression this change might have on the continuing Congressional hearings, Ford a few days later asked Colby to return to the job until Bush was confirmed, which he did. The confirmation was delayed until a concession was extracted from Ford that he would not invite Bush to be his running-mate in the upcoming presidential election.

### Bush

When George Bush was sworn in as DCI 30 January 1976 he faced the task of restoring public confidence in the intelligence community without compromising its effectiveness. He quickly appointed Vice Adm. Daniel Murphy, USN, as Deputy Director for the Intelligence Community and on April 23 he named Enno Knoche, a CIA careerist, as DDCI to replace Walters. A new executive order in February clarified policy guidelines and established new oversight mechanisms. In March, President Ford expanded and revamped PFIAB as part of his general overhaul of the intelligence-gathering function.

Although the sensationalized report of the House Intelligence Committee had been leaked shortly before Bush became DCI, the bulk of the administrative reforms were already in place when the Senate Select Committee issued its final report. Bush took a few additional steps--such as banning CIA use of reporters for intelligence purposes--and the Senate performed its own follow-up with the establishment of a Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Few new covert undertakings--except for starting up --were begun during Bush's tenure. Instead, there was renewed attention to the problems in intelligence production.

Earlier studies had pointed out an over-emphasis on current intelligence, with resulting duplication in

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community current publications and weakness in longer, more thorough research. In 1976, CIA hired an outside consultant to re-evaluate the situation and prescribe a remedy. When its report, was hastily implemented in December, the Deputy Directorate of Intelligence was abolished and the National Foreign Assessments Center created in its place. While most of the component offices remained intact, OCI and OPR were eliminated and two new units, the Office of Regional and Political Analysis (it later dropped the "Regional") and the Office of Current Operations, took their place. ORPA was to concentrate on interdisciplinary research on regional topics, while a small staff of substantive experts assigned to OCO was to write, edit, and publish current intelligence.

When Bush resigned just before Pres. Carter's inauguration, he left an Agency that was recovering from the traumas of exposure and investigation. It was ready to resume its concentration on the collection and production of high-quality intelligence of a type suited to the maintenance of global detente which had superseded the waging a Cold War.



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Annex B

PROSPECTUS - THE RABORN PERIOD


On 12 April 1965, President Johnson announced the appointment of a new DCI, Vice Adm. William F. Raborn Jr., USN (Ret). He was sworn in on 28 April. The new DDCI was Richard Helms, a CIA veteran who replaced Lt. Gen. Marshall Carter, USA.

Raborn's predecessor as DCI, John McCone, had been highly regarded by President Kennedy because of his correct calls on the Cuban Missile Crisis and the first Chinese nuclear test. President Johnson, however, found him less compatible and increasingly excluded him from the inner circle of presidential advisers. In addition to their personality differences, Johnson found McCone lukewarm toward the US build-up in Vietnam and reluctant to expand the Agency's relations with Congress. Raborn was a total change. Although he was without experience in foreign affairs, he was an enthusiastic, expansive team-player who wanted CIA to make an independent contribution to the administration and who was accustomed to keeping in close touch with the military and with Congress.

The heavy build-up of US military forces in Vietnam was getting underway in the spring of 1965, but it was the sudden intervention of US troops in the Dominican Republic that dominated Raborn's first weeks as DCI.



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[Redacted]

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On 28 April, the day Raborn was sworn in, the Dominican rebels consolidated their downtown stronghold. Ambassador Bennett requested the dispatch of US troops to protect American citizens, and President Johnson immediately ordered the Marines to land. References on the 28th to "leftists" and a few known Communists in the rebel leadership became by the next day a list of 50-some Communists associated with the rebellion and concern about "another Cuba." On the 29th, the number of US troops in Santo Domingo increased--eventually there were 30,000--and the first delivery of communications gear and food supplies was made to the loyalists.

During the period of US military activity, CIA greatly increased its efforts on the Dominican Republic. At Headquarters, desk officers coped with a flood of intelligence and operational messages, analysts produced frequent Situation Reports, together with memos and briefings of a more comprehensive nature, and Raborn was a regular participant in the high level group under McGeorge Bundy (later William Moyers) that formulated US policy on the Dominican situation.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

President Johnson, having publicly explained the US intervention as needed to prevent a Communist take-over,

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25X1 wanted CIA to identify the Communists and leftist sympathizers leading the rebels. [redacted]

US forces on 30 April secured the area that became the International Security Zone and by 3 May they had opened a corridor across the rebel line. Following these actions, there was an interval devoted to truce negotiation and political consolidation by both the rebel government and the loyalist junta. Before the end of May a loyalist offensive won control of most of Santo Domingo except for the rebels' downtown stronghold and produced a new stand-off between the two rival Dominican governments.

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new Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, William Broe, and withdrawn some of the TDYers. Short-range efforts to deal with a crisis situation gave way to longer-term programs designed to restore law and order, to find an acceptable form of government for the country, and to devise a new solution to the problem of leftist former president Juan Bosch.

25X1 Three months of mediation efforts by high-level US officials, sent from Washington and provided with intelligence support by the Agency, and by the OAS finally produced an agreement. There was to be an inter-American Peacekeeping Force, a single moderate provisional government headed by Hector Garcia-Godoy, and new national elections in 1966. Another provision--not much honored in practice--called for Garcia-Godoy to have appointments [redacted]

25X1 In the fall, the [redacted] turned to efforts to identify and list leftists returning to the country and to trace the disposition of arms distributed by the rebels. 25X1

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The agreed arrangements for the Dominican Republic called for the US, under the nominal auspices of AID, to assist the provisional government to expand and develop its capability to control the subversion and insur-



Toward the end of the year, Helms reminded DDP that



The crisis in the Dominican Republic gradually petered out. There was no "new Cuba", but there was considerable sentiment, especially on Capitol Hill, that the Administration had overreacted. Though CIA was not a specific target in this case, some of the bad feelings generated spilled over onto the Agency in other contexts later on.

#### The Vietnam Build-up

Throughout Raborn's tenure, the Agency became increasingly caught up with Vietnam. The bombing raids over North Vietnam had begun in February 1965 and the large influx of US troops had commenced in April; the new DCI worried that he might not be fully informed about the

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impetus for escalation coming from other parts of the Administration. As soon as he had a break from the Dominican crisis, Raborn asked CIA's various analytical offices to produce studies on indications of Viet Cong willingness to negotiate, on war trends and battle statistics, and on the consequences of escalation. On the operational side, the Agency maintained its interest in Cambodia and Laos and its involvement in political action in South Vietnamese villages.

To consolidate and give a focus to these diverse activities, in early July Raborn created a Vietnam Task Force under Peer de Silva, former COS in Saigon. The Office of Current Intelligence was realigned to provide space and people--the DCI said he wanted only "spark plugs" assigned to this group--and the other components were told to cooperate. According to Raborn's directive, the Task Force was to have no formal T/O or ceiling, and all of its personnel were to be on loan. De Silva was expected to maintain daily contact with Chief/Far East Division. When it was fully operational, the Task Force's concerns included Viet Cong organization and morale, Chinese support for North Vietnam, and population control in rural South Vietnam. Raborn hoped to use its product to support the Agency's representative (George Carver) on the National Planning Task Force for Vietnam and to make independent recommendations to the President. On 1 August 1965, de Silva was given full status as Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs and the Task Force was renamed SAVA.

A major flap occurred in late July following the shootdown of a US aircraft and a drone by surface-to-air missiles fired from North Vietnam. A study of the locations and capabilities of SAM sites was demanded, together with an inquiry into the reasons the field read-out of overhead photography had missed the sites. Concurrently, there was a failure to distribute promptly within the Agency a cable from Amb. Taylor in Saigon recommending a US attack on the North Vietnamese SAMs. A post-mortem called for an overhaul of Operations Center procedures and for additional urgent study of the SAM problem. Papers on infiltration routes, transportation systems, Soviet and Chinese intentions, and other SAM-related topics proliferated for the rest of the summer. In addition, a special interagency Task Force Lookout chaired by a DDI representative conducted systematic searches for evidence--without finding any--of surface-to-surface missiles in North Vietnam.

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The military build-up brought with it an increase in Southeast Asian activity by a number of other government agencies, including CIA. There were instances of highly successful interdepartmental collaboration, such as the system of combining reports of CIA-sponsored road-watch teams in Laos with field read-outs from reconnaissance missions to target attacks on enemy supply routes.

Interdepartmental jockeying for control of individual activities was common, however. For example, CIA continued to operate the training center for Vietnamese participants

25X1 [redacted] and to supervise the more sophisticated Census Grievance Teams. Members of the military forces began serving, despite CIA reluctance, in the US advisory role in many of the participating villages and urged rapid expansion of the program. The question of control and funding of the PATs eventually was referred to the 303 Committee. CIA and DIA were jointly tasked with assessing the effectiveness of the various bombing programs against North Vietnam, with CIA insisting on an input from the Office of Reports and Research's economic analysts to produce more realistic appraisals. The Agency and the military also shared and disputed responsibilities for overhead reconnaissance and photo interpretation and for prisoner interrogation. There was periodic friction with JCS and MACV over whether the Agency was producing adequate intelligence on Vietnam and whether the military was sensationalizing reports to justify operations.

25X1 Relations with the US Embassy in Saigon were generally better, though ambassadors occasionally objected that the Agency had overstepped its bounds. The most sensitive

25X1 [redacted] The number of CIA personnel stationed in Vietnam grew steadily during this period, with the Saigon Station nearing [redacted] employees by early 1966. At Headquarters there were requests for supplemental funds and calls for volunteers to go to Vietnam. In October 1965, SAVA, the Office of Training, and FE Division jointly introduced a 5-day training course, repeated monthly, for personnel assigned to Vietnam. As the war stepped up, CIA joined State in recommending increased benefits for employees and dependents in Vietnam.

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The Vietnam involvement spawned a number of special serial publications in addition to regular briefings, memos, estimates, and current reports. In all of them, Raborn insisted on an emphasis on graphic presentation. The new serials included a weekly report on Communist statements on Vietnam, monthly shipping reports, monthly CIA-DIA all-source damage assessments, and SAVA's Vietnam Weekly. Some individual publications, such as a map portfolio and memos on the organization and objectives of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, the number of Chinese forces in North Vietnam, and Viet Cong morale attracted fairly wide attention. An ORR paper disseminated in December 1965 concluded that there was not much Communist use of the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville; it later came in for considerable criticism.

The war in Vietnam stimulated a number of major Technical Services Division projects. One of these--chemical patch tests to detect evidence through metal traces that someone had recently fired a weapon--came into the testing stage in mid-1965. The first field tests in Vietnam were not very successful, but results improved with experience and further chemical research. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] took patch test kits to Vietnam in April 1966 for use by US medical personnel, and by mid-May the program was declared operational. When the test team departed, there were 150 kits in use and the Army was clamoring for more.


TSD was also developing other tests for establishing the identity of Viet Cong agents. In addition, there was on-going work on small bombs for jungle use, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] delayed fuses, and beacons to direct aircraft. Raborn also kept urging studies to determine and develop an "ideal weapon" for Vietnam-type combat.

CIA's efforts were affected by an increase in local tension in the spring of 1966. In March, the Viet Cong attacked the [REDACTED] inflicting considerable damage. Shortly afterwards, local Buddhists caused serious disorders in Danang and Hue, [REDACTED] and prompting the evacuation of Americans from the latter city. South Vietnamese troops eventually restored order and the problems caused for US operations were not lasting.

Emphasis on China

The US intelligence community was well seized with the problem of Communist China by the time Raborn became DCI, with interest centering on China's nuclear program, its intentions toward Southeast Asia, and early indications of a split in its alliance with the Soviet Union. A Quadripartite Conference on China took place in May 1965, and there were intermittent high-level reminders of the importance of keeping a close watch on China. From September 1965 on, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board regularly pushed for intensified work on China, to which it assigned priority equal to the USSR.

The first requirement was for information on conditions affecting the overhead reconnaissance program, the most productive source for intelligence on China. In addition to identifying targets, it was important to find and evaluate threats to the planes themselves and to be



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In addition, the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence produced studies on China's internal political situation, its overall economic outlook, its productive capabilities (in part to determine whether the increased numbers of military aircraft present in China could have been made there), and its deployment of military units to North Vietnam. The Deputy Directorate for Plans did a study of the Chinese mentality and investigated the political reliability of Chinese scientists. A major point of pride was an accurate prediction of China's third nuclear test.

Raborn made a serious effort to respond to the pressures for better intelligence on China. In July 1965, he named Gen. John Reynolds, then Chairman of the US Intelligence Board's Critical Collection Problems Committee, to serve simultaneously as the DCI's representative for Chinese matters. His role as program coordinator was eventually confirmed by PFIAB. Within the Agency, Raborn expressed a desire to "cross fertilize" components working on China. In August, therefore, the DDI set up a China Intelligence Study Group and later laid on preparation of a current Handbook on China and allocated new slots for Chinese coverage. By March 1966, the Study Group was re-

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25X1 established as the China Task Force under [redacted] of OCI. [redacted] was designated coordinator of relations regarding Chinese studies with academic institutions and charged with seeking out scholars and sources. Regardless of these efforts, President Johnson continued to harp on the lack of specific and detailed information on Communist China.


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Intelligence on the Soviet Union

Concern about the Soviet Union continued without respite. In 1965-66 it focused on missile, space, and reconnaissance activities, all of which appeared to be keeping pace with US developments. Discovery of the Henhouse radars in August 1965 added strategic defenses to CIA's list of active targets, after analysis showed they greatly enhanced Soviet anti-ballistic missile capability.

CIA faced a heavy demand for briefings on the elusive "mobile solid-propellant missile" and for studies regarding the probable use of new small silos. (CIA argued they were to house long-range SS-11s.) The Agency also made major efforts to respond to policy-makers' queries about Soviet ABM missiles, ICBM testing, space probes, and reconnaissance satellites and planes. These efforts also

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Interest in other aspects of Soviet affairs was less urgent, but they were not neglected. Agency studies on the weakening Soviet economy, Brezhnev's consolidation of his political leadership, internal dissidence, and the early signs of a split with China were among the important products of the analytical offices. In addition, the massive National Intelligence Survey's General Survey on the USSR came out in January 1966.

Some Agency information on the Soviet Union was released to the public during the autumn of 1965. White House officials wanted material on the faltering Soviet economy and its diminishing growth rate made available, and the DDI concurred provided there was no attribution to the Agency. The material was ultimately used in a public address by the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. In addition, a CIA memo on Soviet use of disinformation was circulated on the Hill and generated a number of press stories.

### Crisis Reaction

Raborn's tenure was punctuated with a number of international crises. A few, which had special impact on CIA operations, are noted here.


A sudden crisis blew up in mid-August 1965 when India and Pakistan went to war over the disputed province of Kashmir. Tension was increased when China threatened to retaliate against India for allegedly setting up defenses on Chinese territory. India withdrew and China dropped its threats, but only after the US had initiated moves to help India stand up to possible Chinese aggression. A detachment of U-2s was sent to Asia to fly reconnaissance missions over the border area if needed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] US military assistance to both India and Pakistan was suspended when fighting began and the Pakistanis, perceiving a pro-Indian tilt, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] All these developments in the sub-continent were closely followed by a Task Force set up in CIA Headquarters. By late September, the UN had started the efforts which finally led to a peace agreement signed in Tashkent, USSR, in January 1966. The pull-back of Indian and Pakistani troops proceeded on schedule and the US resumed its former relations with both countries.

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Elsewhere in Africa, Ghana's radical leader Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown by a military coup in February 1966. In the aftermath of the coup, an elaborate Soviet and East German TSD-type lab was discovered in Accra.

Overhead Reconnaissance

The immensely complicated and highly expensive matter of overhead reconnaissance was the most bitterly contested issue in the US intelligence community in the mid-1960s. One of Raborn's first requests as DCI was for information on the reasons CIA felt it should stay in the reconnaissance business.

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An initial effort to coordinate programs through a single National Reconnaissance Officer had gone sour. The first NRO was an arbitrary and parochial official who operated the whole National Reconnaissance Program as if it were a branch of the Air Force. The negotiation, with presidential involvement, of a new National Reconnaissance Program agreement was finally concluded in August 1965, and everything was more or less put on hold until it went into effect on 1 October. Raborn followed the last stages of the negotiations with interest, but was not an active participant as McCone had been.

The new NRO was a civilian attached to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. [redacted] a long-time CIA official, became Executive Secretary of NRP Executive Committee and [redacted] Special Assistant to the DCI, was named to be the CIA official responsible to the NRO. CIA's [redacted] succeeded [redacted] as Chairman of USIB's Committee on Reconnaissance. Under these arrangements, community cooperation on technical and operational matters and on reconnaissance requirements improved appreciably.

In 1965 and 1966 the use of satellites as collection platforms was the frontier technology in the reconnaissance field. CIA's Corona (K-H 4) and the [redacted] [redacted] competed in meeting launch schedules (Corona established a much better early record) and in establishing the value of their product--wide-swath, low-resolution search-type photography and narrow-swath, high resolution targeting photography, respectively. Corona was also used to experiment with collecting mapping information and with repetitive coverage of high-priority targets. For both systems, the take was recovered by air and taken to Eastman Kodak for processing.

Initial discussion of another satellite program utilizing [redacted] were also taking place during 1965. CIA was one of the key participants because of its technological expertise and its role as potential consumer of the product. When Raborn left, the NRP organization was moving toward approval for the project, [redacted]

While satellite collection was coming increasingly to the fore, manned aircraft were still the normal platforms for overhead reconnaissance. As Raborn took office,

a new and vastly superior plane under development since 1957 in a highly secret program was just becoming available. A super-sonic, high altitude, single-seat plane specifically designed to avoid radar detection and equipped with high-resolution cameras--the A-12 or OXCART--had been designed, built, and tested under Agency auspices. The fleet of 12 planes was declared operational in November 1965, and the next step was the decision, at the highest levels, as to when and where to use them.

Because of the earlier U-2 incident, the OXCART was never intended for use over the USSR, and early plans to use it over Cuba had been dropped as unnecessary. That left the issue of overseas [redacted] for use over China or Vietnam. Such a proposal was made in the fall of 1965 to the 303 Committee. It was not approved, though the Agency was instructed to maintain a quick-reaction capability.

The arguments for deployment--coming mainly from CIA, the JCS, and PFIAB--focused on the need for better intelligence on a possible Chinese build-up for intervention in Vietnam. The arguments against--by State and Defense--insisted that such intelligence was not so urgently needed as to justify the risks of exposing the aircraft by basing it [redacted]. The issue remained on dead center throughout the rest of Raborn's tenure, despite numerous attempts by the Agency to move it forward.

In the meantime, U-2s remained in use for both regular and crisis reconnaissance. Most missions were flown by the Air Force, but CIA managed those for which deniability was important. An Agency U-2 detachment was deployed to [redacted] for possible use along the China border during the 1965 India-Pakistan crisis. Overflights in that area were never authorized, [redacted] before the planes were redeployed to the US in November.

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One remaining aspect of the reconnaissance business was the read-out and analysis of the photography acquired. Under existing agreements, responsibility for this was shared between the Department of Defense, which serviced departmental needs, and the National Photographic Interpretation Center, housed in CIA and staffed by both Agency and Defense personnel, which serviced national requirements.

In 1965, NPIC was empire-building. For instance, it arranged to get all post-strike photos from Vietnam and attempted to freeze out the Air Force's field read-out station in Japan in favor of its own read-out facilities in [redacted]. By September, a concerned Bureau of the Budget asked for a joint CIA/Defense review of PI facilities and activities to determine which were departmental and which national.

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At the turn of the year, NPIC was acquiring large amounts of new high-performance equipment while disputing Department of Defense attempts to participate in funding research and development for photo interpretation. It was also loading up with vast new projects--comprehensive studies of North Vietnam's SAM system, of damage done by US bombing in South Vietnam, and of the USSR's military order of battle--which overlapped research being done elsewhere in the intelligence community. These self-initiated projects caused huge back-logs and manpower shortages,

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which were cited to justify a large and aggressive recruitment campaign. When the Bureau of the Budget indicated that it required a better justification of NPIC's money and manpower needs, NPIC's leadership took its pleas for expansion to its friends in Congress. By the time Raborn departed, the nature of the NPIC problem was clear, but its resolution was still in the future.

### Counterinsurgency Programs

General Maxwell Taylor was appointed to PFIAB in August 1965. He brought with him a strong interest in counterinsurgency, which was soon institutionalized in the interdepartmental Special Group-CI and four subcommittees to coordinate work on aspects of counterinsurgency, of which CIA chaired the one on intelligence. The Army already had a large external research program on counterinsurgency and



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### Administrative, Budgeting, and Personnel Changes

A number of administrative changes were made during Raborn's tenure, pulling the Agency more tightly into a single organization and bringing it into closer conformity with practices elsewhere in the federal government. The existing organizational structure was kept, but throughout the Agency there was heightened attention to management and more concern with planning how things were to be done. Automated data systems began to come into regular use in

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support of management.

Raborn's first changes addressed the needs he perceived personally--a roster of senior duty officers to handle tactical situations and sudden emergencies, top executives made generally aware of one another's activities, and clearer channels between the DCI's office and the operating components.

Improvements in the CIA Operations Center were Raborn's most lasting legacy. The Ops Center had been created from the old Watch Office in 1963 to enhance the ability to focus resources on a crisis situation and to provide a CIA counterpart to operations centers in the White House, State, Defense, and NSA. Arriving as he did just at the beginning of the US intervention in the Dominican Republic, Raborn virtually lived in the Ops Center for a couple of weeks and his suggested changes derived from first-hand experience. To accommodate a President who kept news tickers in his office, the DCI designated a special analyst to screen, evaluate, and pass to him significant press items as they came in. He also instituted a system of having senior officers, who could define CIA actions being taken, on duty on weekends. The various Task Forces worked in or near the Ops Center where they could use its facilities to get key information to key officials. Beginning in September 1965, a DDP officer was assigned full time to the Ops Center and participated in the Director's morning briefing. New and stricter operating procedures were adopted in October 1965. Finally, in February 1966, an interagency LDX system was installed, vastly improving the speed and security of communication among the various operations centers.

Another area of innovation was the budgeting process. CIA submitted its budget proposal for FY 1967 in a new expanded format that won high praise from House Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Mahon.

Raborn took President Johnson's cost-cutting directive to heart. He scheduled an auditorium meeting on the implications of the economy drive and he indicated his intention to spend two hours a day working on the budget. Though he was dissuaded from the latter plan on the grounds that the details wouldn't be available for some time, he did listen to the directorates' program briefings during

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September and he insisted that their budget figures be equated directly and meaningfully to the proposed programs.

Cost-cutting was the theme in the fall of 1965, and some re-evaluating of the Agency's work was done in the name of economy. The DCI issued a memo reiterating that the purpose of CIA was to collect and evaluate intelligence and indicating that funding would be available only for activities needed for intelligence. This was the first

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the scope of the cut-back was established at [REDACTED] apportioned among the major categories of Agency work but exempting the supplemental funds for Southeast Asia.

By late December, the reduced 1967 budget had been approved by the Bureau of the Budget and by the President. On the Hill, however, there was less sense of urgency and the Agency experienced long delays in getting a hearing for its expanded and graphic budget presentation. Beginning with FY 1968, CIA's budget submission returned to a cut-and-dried format.

In addition to economizing in general, the Johnson administration pushed specifically for a reduction in government employment. Congress completed in May 1965 legislation on early retirement, and sizable numbers of Agency personnel took advantage of it. Reduced personnel ceilings and mandatory fitness reports also encouraged

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opposite direction came from the burgeoning need for people in Vietnam and from federally sponsored Equal Employment Opportunity and Youth Opportunity hiring programs.

A number of long-time key officials retired, resigned, or were reassigned during this period, and they were replaced by men of different background and temperament. Among the most significant changes were Lyman Kirkpatrick's resignation in the spring of 1965 (he stayed on through the summer to work on a 15-year plan for the Agency) and the appointment of Col. Lawrence White as Executive Director-Comptroller. When Helms moved up to become DDCI, he was replaced as DDP by Desmond Fitzgerald. DDI Ray Cline was reassigned in January 1966 and replaced by R. Jack Smith. A third Deputy Director, DDS&T Albert Wheelon

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decided to leave while Raborn was still DCI, but did not actually do so until a few months after the DCI's departure. Two retirements at the end of 1965, Director of Training Matthew Baird and Chief/ORR Otto Guthe, presaged important changes. Baird was replaced by a DDP careerist, John Richardson, and geographer Guthe was replaced by economist William Morrell with another economist, Edward Allen, as his deputy--a team that drastically changed the research emphasis of ORR. The shifts in top personnel also facilitated two organizational changes in January 1966--letting the Board of National Estimates report directly to the DCI rather than through the DDI and splitting DDP's Eastern Europe Division into a European Division and a Soviet Bloc Division in order to give the latter responsibility for all operations aimed at Soviet or East European targets in any location.

Along with other planning exercises, a survey of the Agency's current and future space requirements was undertaken in September 1965. By the end of the year CIA was acquiring more space and new facilities. West parking lot and the helicopter pad were opened at Headquarters, and Agency staff moved into Magazine and Ames buildings in Rosslyn. Ground was broken for the new Printing Services Building--though its construction budget was reduced--and arrangements were proceeding for the purchase of a tract adjacent to Headquarters.

Several major advances in communications were introduced in this period, the most notable being voice links between Headquarters and selected Stations (first tested in Saigon), use of portable vans to provide communications support in emergencies (one was on stand-by in [redacted] during the Indo-Pakistan crisis), completion of joint

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[redacted] and the introduction of K-Y 3 secure phones in the Washington area.

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### External Criticism

It was when the Agency reached out into the academic community--where it had long maintained smooth relationships with selected schools and scholars--in response to a mandate to strengthen its competence in the social sciences

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25X1 that it began to encounter anti-CIA sentiment. By the fall of 1965, the Army's use of scholars for social research abroad [redacted] had been exposed and anti-war sentiment was growing as the Vietnam build-up progressed. Visiting high-level Agency officials noted the changed atmosphere at some Ivy League universities, and CIA campus recruiters in the midwest were picketed for the first time in January 1966. Though the recruiters were supplied with information on how to cope with the new antagonism, the Agency was slow to appreciate the seriousness of the academic hostility.

In April 1966, a newsman asked [redacted] for a list of its contacts with CIA, risking exposure of sensitive technical projects. This promoted a flurry of efforts at Headquarters to re-evaluate and revise CIA research contracts with universities. The studies were overtaken in June, when the [redacted] was dropped after a university official admitted its existence and the [redacted] terminated its research projects for the Agency.

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25X1 By the fall of 1965, Agency management had become aware that the New York Times was planning a series of articles on CIA's organization and operation and had served notice that there was to be no cooperation with the authors. When the articles were published in April 1966, DDP quickly prepared a damage assessment. The Times series opened the gates to a flood of newspaper and magazine articles on sensitive subjects involving the Agency. Problems stemming from this activity were compounded by the highly publicized Heine vs. Raus court case in which CIA identified one of its agents in order to aid his defense against a slander suit brought by a fellow [redacted] emigre whom he had accused of being a Soviet agent.

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#### Raborn's Departure

Raborn had come to the Agency with a reputation from his time with the Polaris program of being able and willing to work with Congress. His inexperience in foreign affairs proved a handicap, but he made a serious and continuing effort to keep relations good. Contacts with Congress were of two sorts: one, an active program of inviting Congressmen to Headquarters and providing country

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briefings for those going overseas, especially to Vietnam; the other, briefings on the Hill regarding substantive matters and the Agency's own affairs. With regard to the latter, the DCI continued to insist that only members of the four designated sub-committees were to be informed. In practice, it frequently proved difficult to get these to give much time or attention to CIA.

In the end, it apparently was a problem with Congress-- though not necessarily his own--that led to Raborn's replacement as DCI. During the spring of 1966, Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was feuding with President Johnson. Out of some murkey maneuvering came plans for a Senate hearing on Vietnam and proposals for revising CIA's oversight arrangements. Raborn had earlier irritated Fulbright by refusing to answer questions (on the grounds that the committee was not authorized to receive information on sources and methods)

On the basis of circumstantial evidence, Johnson's removal of Raborn got him peace with Fulbright and relief from the threatened Senate moves on Vietnam and oversight, as well as an end to complaints in the media that Raborn was ruining morale in CIA.

At a press conference on 18 June 1966, President Johnson announced Raborn's resignation, effective 30 June, and Helms' elevation to become DCI. Johnson praised Raborn's dedication and commented that he had originally agreed to serve for only a limited time before returning to private industry.

Raborn had been the subject of widespread criticism from professionals within the Agency who charged that he had no aptitude for intelligence work. His outsider's ignorance of the way things traditionally were done and his eagerness to please his masters in the White House and in Congress offended those accustomed to considering intelligence a closed society. Furthermore, his obvious desire to learn--which led him to schedule briefings by senior and junior officers alike--could not disguise his basic lack of knowledge of foreign affairs.

Raborn's habit of asking blunt questions did stimulate some overdue changes. For example, a query as to why special flights were needed in Vietnam to take post-strike photography disclosed that US bombers carried no cameras;

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another as to why there was no record of the comments of expensive consultants' panels led to a requirement that they make written as well as oral reports. He also insisted--for the first time--that the Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology and DDP units doing similar technological research should get in touch with each other and that there should be technical liaison with the military research and development programs.

Most of the changes inside the Agency during the Raborn period were small and many were impermanent. Outside, however, the country moved definitively away from the clear-cut issues of the Cold War era and into the contradictions and tensions that surrounded the Vietnam War. In addition, the immensely expensive overhead reconnaissance program forced a new evaluation of intelligence and its costs. The CIA management that succeeded Raborn had to cope with this new situation and with the realization that media criticism and morale problems stemmed from far deeper causes than an individual DCI.



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