

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020009-4

TS-204227/73

Copy / of 3 copies

9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes on Eighth Meeting, NSCIC Working Group, 9 May 1973, 1430 Hours, DCI Conference Room

1. Present were:

Members:
Chairman
NSC Staff
State Department

Defense Department

CIA

Executive Secretary

Observers:
NSC Staff
State Department
Defense Department
JCS

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] DCI/IC
Mr. Andrew Marshall
Mr. Seymour Weiss
Mr. George Denny
(representing Dr. Cline)
Dr. Albert Hall, ASD(I)
Maj. Gen. H. P. Smith, DIA
(representing Vice Adm. de Poix)
Rear Adm. S. D. Cramer, Jr., J-5
(representing Lt. Gen. Seith)
Dr. Edward Proctor, DDI
Mr. John Huizenga, D/NE
Mr. Donald H. Steininger, A/DDS&T

25X1A9a

(The Justice Department was not represented)

2. In opening the meeting, the Chairman said that Item c. of the agenda (Involvement of the Working Group in the NIE process) would not be discussed in detail since the DCI wishes to discuss the matter further before it is considered by the Working Group. The Chairman asked members to give the subject thought since it would be a topic at a later meeting.

3. Minutes of the 4 April meeting

Two changes proposed by Dr. Cline for Agenda Items 4 and 7, as set forth in a handout, were approved without change.

Mr. Marshall requested deletion in Item 3 of the phrase "who is Deputy Chairman of the NSCIC," since the DCI has not formally been so appointed as yet. The group agreed.

NSC Declassification/Release Instructions on File

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020009-4

~~TOP SECRET~~

E(2) IMP DET CL BY 246821

*LVS 1973
of ASD*

?

RET -

Reference Item 6 on Yugoslavia, Mr. Marshall said it would be optimistic to expect completion by June since contributors are missing deadlines. He said a first draft had not been completed and his experience was that two or three drafts would be needed. Mr. Huizenga asked what the study was about, pointing out that the DCI was interested in Yugoslavia as the likely locale of a contingency problem and had requested an ONE study. Mr. Marshall explained that the project involved examination of intelligence production on Yugoslavia for two periods --1966 and the past 12-18 months with emphasis on political coverage. Panelists from both in and out of the government are making critical reviews of the product quality.

Mr. Huizenga said such a report would be of value to those preparing the study on Yugoslavia desired by the DCI, and if the Working Group paper could be available early, it would help. "This is what product review should be about," said Mr. Huizenga.

Mr. Marshall said a first draft would be ready by early June and Mr. Huizenga pointed out that rough drafts would help. Dr. Hall asked if "we could push this up" and in response to a question from the chairman, Mr. Huizenga said his deadline was "about June" but timing was indefinite, shifting as reports came in concerning whether Tito was ailing or improving.

25X1A5a1 [REDACTED] Mr. Weiss said State had done some work on this subject with Mr. Huizenga asked if this was the Ross Johnson work, and Mr. Weiss agreed it was. Mr. Marshall said Johnson was one of the panelists being used on the Working Group study.

The chairman asked Mr. Marshall to check what was holding up the study and what could be done to speed it along, and Mr. Huizenga added that anything bearing on Yugoslavia would be useful to ONE.

The group decided to reflect this discussion in today's minutes and not amend the 4 April minutes which had noted "completion is expected by June."

3. Case studies of political/military crisis situations

Dr. Proctor opened the discussion by citing proposed editorial changes to several paragraphs and a substitute Paragraph 14, all of which were accepted. Re Paragraph 13 he proposed deletion of everything after "or" in the sentence, "To prepare this product the DCI could constitute a task force or request other agencies to provide inputs to his CIA staff."

Mr. Weiss objected, noting it was very difficult in crisis situations to assemble people to "fit words together." If the situation is moving slowly and there is time to assemble a group, he admitted the product would be better but "the time push may make this difficult." He said he would much prefer to get a DCI view that is timely and get it in a hurry to the policy group rather than to wait for a task force to assemble to scrub over words. He noted that getting people together can prove difficult, to which Dr. Proctor replied: "Then it's not much of a crisis."

The Chairman pointed out that the paper describes possibilities without "gluing us to a procedure" and that the IC staff actually would be seized with the problem.

Mr. Denny favored leaving the paragraph as it is, suggesting that whatever the actual process turned out to be he hoped it would be something like the daily CIB review and clearance action. "When an agency doesn't like a paragraph, it can footnote." To which Dr. Proctor commented that in a crisis situation "a footnote is not enough."

Mr. Huizenga said that in a prolonged crisis it is normal to constitute a task force but he found the phrase "inputs to CIA staffs" anomalous. Mr. Denny said he read "inputs" as persons. Mr. Weiss considered the next sentence indicated that what was meant was "paper." To Mr. Huizenga, "inputs" sounded like contributions but not real participation. Admiral Cramer questioned whether the DCI shouldn't be the one to come up with the format of what he wanted. Mr. Denny felt the present wording was "ambiguous enough" as it is. The Chairman asked Dr. Proctor if he would "withdraw" and Dr. Proctor so agreed.

Dr. Hall raised a question as to the management approach described in Page 6. He saw the paper as calling for two DCI representatives, one seeing that the substantive intelligence was put together, and the other looking to the basic support for the process. He wondered whether the same man should not do both.

Mr. Marshall said the group which drafted the paper thought there should be two men, one for a liaison with the NSC staff, to keep tab on what was needed, and a separate person working for the DCI, making sure things move. "Minding the store," Dr. Proctor added. Dr. Proctor thought that in a leisurely process one man could handle both tasks.

Dr. Hall said there were other ways of handling this. He noted that confusion is natural in a crisis, and he saw problems in having two senior men with divided responsibility. He thought one man should be responsible and the other should work for him, although both would need to be intimately involved in the action.

Dr. Proctor said that on "hot items," with several meetings being held per day, one man couldn't handle it.

Mr. Weiss said that Dr. Hall was not suggesting use of only one man, but a liaison man and a manager, with the liaison representative being responsible to the manager. Mr. Weiss said he was "indifferent."

The Chairman said both men would be "out of the same box in the organization."

Dr. Hall said he had merely made a suggestion, but Mr. Marshall felt that something should be inserted to clarify the wording of the paper. Mr. Denny and the Chairman each suggested some phraseology, and the Chairman said that in a crisis he would want both men to be fully familiar with the particular area involved. Mr. Marshall said the liaison officer should be someone familiar with the area, but the other man need not be "substantive." Both Dr. Proctor and Mr. Huizenga thought it "more likely he would be substantive."

Dr. Hall said he would leave it to Mr. Marshall to work out the necessary word changes. The Chairman agreed, but asked that the words "not be too restrictive." Mr. Marshall said that this paper "is advice to the DCI, and some variance will occur in actual practice."

The group agreed to send the amended paper forward to the NSCIC Chairman.

(A reworded Paragraph 16 was provided by Mr. Marshall's office, after coordination with Dr. Hall, on 10 May.)

4. Questions to be answered on Soviet ICBMs

The Chairman referred to the paper which had been disseminated for comment, noting that his staff had identified products published on Soviet ICBMs and attempted an evaluation. He emphasized that this was "not the end of the line" and a member of his staff was contacting users of intelligence on Soviet ICBMs to get answers to a series of questions. The Chairman cited a number of the questions being asked and said he hoped to have a compilation by the next meeting.

Mr. Weiss asked: "When the process is completed, what is the end objective? What will be done with the information?"

The Chairman said that part of the motive was "selfish"-- "to take the product evaluation through the IC apparatus, identify the products which are most useful, identify where products are not meeting the needs of the user." He conceded that the effort may be more useful to the IC staff than to the Working Group.

Dr. Proctor said there were at least two more dimensions to the rating system. The first was "quality and how is it measured." He felt expert consensus should be reached for judgments on such aspects as the method of presentation, clarity, does the analysis support the conclusions, is the estimate really needed. The second factor had to do with "redundancy." He noted that some of the products marked as redundant are of a different classification. He said that a sketch might be useless to policy levels, but would be invaluable to contractors. In dealing with foreigners, he said there is need for something which can be said on a sanitized basis. Operational uses also have different levels.

Dr. Proctor criticized the definition of Topic D, "Policy and Strategy" since he felt inclusion of the phrase "of the need for multiple purpose missiles" was not proper. He thought that most of the ratings on Topic D were based on this phrase, and that without it in the definition there would be far fewer publications considered to be "policy and strategy oriented."

25X1D0a Dr. Hall said he "hardly read anything" dealing with ICBM policy and strategy, yet some products got high marks on this topic and he wondered why. He noted the FTD item [REDACTED] 25X1D0a
[REDACTED] a "4" for "policy and strategy" and he wondered "How could this be included?" He said that whoever had made the evaluation "must have had a tentative idea as to how it would come out, and I would like to hear it."

25X1D0a The Chairman said the criteria were applied uniformly, "right or wrong." He noted the evaluation had found there was considerable redundancy on "weaponry," but that consideration of the compartmentalization factor might cause a change in this. He also said that coverage on "policy and strategy" was more deficient than that on any other topic.

~~TOP SECRET~~

He said that if redundancy was being scored on the basis of the content of the reports, that was fine, but if the redundancy was merely on the basis of "topics" then he felt "we have a problem." He noted that two reports on the same topic, one in January and another in July need not be redundant because "we may know more in July."

The Chairman said the ratings were based on the reading of the documents (not merely an examination of titles).

Mr. Weiss said he shared Dr. Hall's concern, since he felt "policy and strategy" is actually covered very lightly. He noted that "Key Soviet statements on SALT" was given high scores, but what is needed is an evaluation as to whether these statements tell something relevant, or need to be critically evaluated.

Dr. Proctor said these statements are compilations. "They shouldn't be listed because they are tools and references."

Mr. Weiss said he questioned whether they are good sources for policymakers.

Mr. Huizenga said the statements did not represent "an analytical paper," but Dr. Proctor added that "many people dealing in SALT matters want this sort of thing for their own analysis."

Mr. Weiss said he had no objection to that, but such compilations "are not finished intelligence on Soviet ICBMs."

Mr. Proctor said he thought a grade of "4,1" was suitable to the document as a compendium.

The Chairman said that "one thing percolating to the top" is the question as to who the writers of some products "were talking to, except for some other intelligence officer." He mentioned the report: [REDACTED] He said that for the first time, he was having analysts look at "why did anyone produce this paper?"

25X1D0a

Mr. Denny asked if the Chairman was satisfied with exclusion of papers which "were not strictly intelligence but which were produced for the Verification Panel?" The Chairman said he was not, but that "it was a matter of access until today."

Mr. Huizenga noted the ratings did not indicate the intent of the publication.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Dr. Proctor agreed, but added that the question, "Did it meet the needs?" could be handled in the interview process.

The Chairman said he was wrestling with how to go about asking a person how a particular product met his needs. He favored a "simple-minded way," and was thinking of starting with the distribution list, and asking recipients: "Have you seen this?"

Mr. Huizenga said that "could be discouraging."

The Chairman said that a check with SAC indicated that the "consumer" of national intelligence documents there was a captain, who was responsible for presenting briefings and answering questions. To which Mr. Huizenga added: "And we still have to hope that he says the right things in the briefings."

Admiral Cramer said he would "bet that captain wouldn't want to give up anything," because that had been his experience with some surveys which had been made on naval vessels.

Mr. Denny said those interviewed might be asked "if they read to page 10."

Mr. Steininger said that "what we are not producing is the key question. Most of these documents are produced for other analysts. We must do this, though, to keep ourselves ready to answer the key questions, to keep our hands in."

Dr. Proctor said there was "more to it than that," and Mr. Steininger commented that there was a need for mechanisms by which supervisors can keep track of what their analysts are doing.

Dr. Proctor said there is an important problem of communicating ideas laterally as well as upward, "and the best way to do this is to make your ideas explicit in a paper," and thereby be required to identify the basis for the ideas you are developing.

Dr. Proctor offered "another warning,"--"this should not be a numbers game." As he saw it, whether there were 5 or 20 consumers didn't mean anything. "If the one most important customer is happy, that is the key."

The Chairman said "we need to identify when we are deluding ourselves about consumer interest, and be careful about writing for each other on problems that could be handled by conversation."

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mr. Huizenga felt that analysts "must exercise to be in a condition of readiness--they are not working at all times for the consumer."

Mr. Denny asked if it was intended that consumers be divided: policymakers, etc. The Chairman replied that the first question would be to determine whether the respondent was or was not an intelligence officer.

Dr. Hall said that experience of his office with questionnaires had not been good, and Dr. Proctor agreed.

Dr. Proctor reported that what worked as a rule for the DDI is to advise that the distribution list was being revised, "and if you want to stay on the list, check the box and return."

Mr. Huizenga added: "Or justify your requirement."

The Chairman commented that paid subscriptions might be requested, and Dr. Proctor said that FBIS had done this on its "white book." It advised recipients that what had been a free distribution hereafter would cost \$100 a year, which was the mailing cost. "Many did not think it worth it," Dr. Proctor said, "but a lot did."

Dr. Hall said "there is something here we can do better. There are many cases of duplication, in many cases the reports are too voluminous. Recommendations as to how to improve the process would be beneficial."

The Chairman said "we need to come up with a set of guidelines which expresses what we need to put out to answer the mail, and what consumers don't need to have."

Admiral Cramer asked if the end product of the study would redirect priorities, such as those for DIA. The Chairman said he doubted such would be the case. "This group couldn't redirect priorities," he said, "but the producers might" on the basis of the study.

Mr. Denny said that analysis was needed--not a Gallup poll technique. The producers might be asked what they consider might be eliminated, or to indicate what needs to be done.

~~TOP SECRET~~

The chairman returned to the priorities question and commented that "the NSCIC could do this".

Mr. Huizenga said that the "topical matter" is very difficult to grapple with. "Hardware is relatively easy," he thought, "but policy and strategy is difficult."

To which Mr. Weiss replied that "if you focus on what is easy you may neglect the more difficult."

Admiral Cramer said that "in our panel (which he did not identify - presumably the Verification Panel for SALT) we would like to know more about how technology is supporting Soviet policy and strategy."

Dr. Steininger felt it would be valuable for producers to know more about what other producers are doing. We might ask: "Who do you interchange with on a quarterly basis as on what you plan to produce?" He said this is done within DDS&T, and there is still some duplication but each of the offices knows what the others are working on.

Dr. Proctor said this leads to joint production efforts. He thought it might be worthwhile to ask FMSAC and FTD how often they exchanged production schedules. He was afraid polls of the type under consideration "could develop ambiguous information and data of limited use." Dr. Proctor said that committees such as GMAIC make possible the kind of exchange to which Dr. Steininger referred.

The chairman wondered what the reaction would be if producers were asked to indicate which products were meant for other intelligence officers and which for consumers. Mr. Huizenga said he saw no harm in such a question but we know "there is publication for publication's sake."

The chairman said that "we need to assure our masters that we are doing what we can with what we've got," and Mr. Huizenga said that it must be recognized that producers produce for "different customers."

Dr. Hall asked how many intelligence agencies have publication review boards such as those used by professional magazines. Dr. Proctor said there was no board for CIA as a whole, but individual offices had them. The chairman said that in DIA DE and DT had such boards.

Mr. Denny considered that "resources may be the key," since publications can be scheduled, but then other things come up and upset what had been planned.

Mr. Huizenga considered that use of "bibliographic tools" would enable identification of publications, but the chairman said this would only apply to what has been already published, not to what was being planned. He said that the list of the publications surveyed had come out of the CIA computer base.

Dr. Steininger said that "every office has a plan for the next quarter" but Dr. Proctor noted this doesn't indicate what is done for special customers.

Mr. Denny said the present survey did not include three products published by Mr. Perez' office in INR/State.

Mr. Marshall asked how the statistics in the survey paper should be read. He wondered whether it would be possible to take any sub-part of the material and "surface what is behind the duplication." He also thought one would want to look at the costs involved. "The duplication may not be costly, other than the cost of flooding communications channels," he said. He asked whether it might not be a manageable task to make a detailed examination of some portion of the materials covered by the survey.

Dr. Hall said that more than duplication was involved; the quality of analysis also is important.

Dr. Steininger commented that there is no mechanism in the community to measure quality, but a review of the detailed content for quality would be helpful.

Dr. Hall thought this would be more illuminating than any survey.

The chairman said that limiting the survey to Soviet ICBMs was meant to be a narrow cut at the problem, "but you can see how complex even the ICBM topic is."

Mr. Parker said that the survey might "be laid out in time phasing" to examine what "the information was" and "how a more efficient set of publications could better respond to the needs." Then, he added, experts could comment on the quality of the material. He felt there was need to do more than examine redundancy since the need is to get something more useful.

Dr. Steininger said that "redundancy to whom" is a key problem and "we must be sure in our own minds as to what we mean by redundancy."

The chairman said that one aspect is to determine what is redundant because of the need for sanitized materials. He felt the survey should examine what is gained by use of codeword materials that couldn't be available at a lesser classification.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Dr. Proctor noted that some users want to know what the evidence is and how good it is. SALT offers an example. You can't answer questions as to "how good is your coverage" without codeword materials. In some cases, he felt the evidence requires use of codeword materials.

The chairman conceded this but said he considered that the actual need is "smaller than those we now address in the codeword arena." He felt that some subjects do not require codeword treatment.

Dr. Hall asked which reports in the survey were codeword and which were not, and the chairman said he didn't know. He conceded, however, that there is a tendency among some consumers to believe they are not getting the whole story unless it is marked with codewords.

Dr. Hall said he supported Mr. Marshall's proposal "to take a fine cut at some segment of this study."

5. Future work program of the Working Group

The chairman asked if any member had proposals to submit concerning the possible future program of the group. There were no comments.

* * * * *

6. The chairman adjourned the meeting at 1600 hours and reported the date for the next meeting had not been set.

25X1A9a



Executive Secretary

Distribution: 25X1A9a

- orig - [redacted] then file NSCIC WG-2
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - PRG chrono

~~TOP SECRET~~