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SOVIET SUCCESSION

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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
SOVIET SUCCESSION
SEPTEMBER 29, 1982

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

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(II)

PREFACE

On September 28 and 29, 1982, the Select Committee on Intelligence held a set of hearings on the topic of Soviet succession. The first day was devoted to receiving classified testimony from analysts from the Central Intelligence Agency. On the second day, we heard from four leading scholars in Soviet Studies: Prof. Jerry Hough, Prof. Myron Rush, Dr. Robert Conquest, and Mr. William Hyland. The testimony of these scholars, a summary thereof, and a declassified version of the closed proceeding with the CIA is printed in this volume. We have also included a short statement by the Vice Chairman on this subject.

Needless to say, recent events make this volume especially important. We commend its reading to our colleagues and to the American public.

BARRY GOLDWATER,
Chairman.
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN,
Vice Chairman.

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SOVIET SUCCESSION

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1982

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m., in room 6226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon Daniel Patrick Moynihan (vice chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF VICE CHAIRMAN MOYNIHAN

Senator MOYNIHAN. A very good morning to our guests, to the members of the press present, to the members of the committee staff.

This is the public half of a set of hearings that the Select Committee on Intelligence decided to hold on the subject of the Soviet succession. There is scarcely a more important international event that is now taking place. Whereas in the West we are used to regular and rather recurrent elections, the choice of Soviet leaders comes irregularly and at such great distances that practically represent political generations. The changes that come about are important, and it seemed important for us to think about them.

The chairman, Senator Goldwater, in these days of the last week of this session, is holding hearings downstairs and will not be up for a little bit. He asked me to make an opening statement for him at the beginning of the hearing.

OPENING STATEMENT OF COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN GOLDWATER

Chairman GOLDWATER. The purpose of today's hearing of the full committee is to receive testimony on the issue of Soviet succession. When the vice chairman wrote to me last month and suggested that this committee hold hearings on the topic of the Soviet succession, I was doubtful that they would be helpful. This is because I remembered Winston Churchill's radio broadcast on October 1, 1939, in which he stated: "I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."

Yesterday our committee heard from some intelligence analysts from the Central Intelligence Agency on the issue of Soviet succession, and I was pleasantly surprised with what they had to say. Now, it is certainly true that our intelligence analysts have a lot of trouble finding out what is going on inside the Soviet Union today, and I do not want to say that they were able to predict with 100 percent of certainty what the Soviet succession is going to look like in the future. This is a very difficult issue to deal with. But I was pleased with their grasp of the issue and with their understanding of its complexity.

Today we will be hearing from four experts on the Soviet Union who are selected from the academic community as opposed to from the intelligence community. I want to welcome them here before this committee today. Because my colleague Senator Moynihan, called these hearings, I will leave it to him to introduce our witnesses. But I want to thank him for calling these hearings on the Soviet succession. Although questions on Soviet succession may be hard to answer, they are questions that American policymakers need to have answered if they are to make the right decisions for the future of our Nation.

Senator MOYNIHAN. And I will not add a thing to the chairman's remarks, save to express my personal appreciation to the gentlemen who are here. Mr. Hyland is coming. He is delayed en route and will speak fourth. So while you have all been very collegial and come forward as a group, we will begin the schedule by asking Prof. Jerry Hough to begin, if you would.

Dr. Hough is professor of political science at Duke University and is affiliated with the Brookings Institution.

Mr. HOUGH. Staff member at Brookings.

Senator MOYNIHAN. And he is the author of a major book entitled "How the Soviet Union is Governed." Such a book could not be written about our country because, as everybody knows, we are not governed. But the Soviets evidently are, and Dr. Hough, we welcome you, sir. And if you would proceed, then we will go to Dr. Rush and to Dr. Conquest.

STATEMENT OF JERRY F. HOUGH, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AT DUKE UNIVERSITY, STAFF MEMBER, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

Mr. HOUGH. Thank you very much, Senator.

Perhaps if one knew more about the Soviet Union one would discover that it was not governed either, but at least our ignorance helps us in that respect.

I have an article coming out in a week in the journal "Problems of Communism," which lays out at great length my views about the issues of the succession, the policy views of the various candidates and the likely outcome, and I would like to submit that to the committee as my basic statement.

Senator MOYNIHAN. It will be part of the record.

Mr. HOUGH. Essentially, that is my written statement.

[The article by Jerry F. Hough appears in the appendix, p. 49.]

Mr. HOUGH. In the little time that I have here—

Senator MOYNIHAN. You take what time you need, sir. This is an important matter to us. The record will be made available to the entire committee and will then be printed, so you can just do as you wish.

Mr. HOUGH. Well, it is still a relatively limited time for a relatively large subject. What I thought I would do is hit some high points, and particularly some high points that I think will be different from the views that the other witnesses are likely to present. That is, it seems to me if I tried to have a comprehensive and balanced position of all the scenarios, I would have to be relatively general. So let me be essentially provocative.

HISTORIC SUCCESSION

The first point that I make, which I admit is not very provocative, which is really quite conventional, is that we are facing an absolutely historic succession. The Brezhnev generation has been near the top for 40 years. Gromyko was Ambassador to the United States in World War II. Ustinov was a minister of the defense industry in 1941. Brezhnev was, if you will, a Governor of an important State at the time that Tom Dewey was Governor of New York.

We are talking about people who come from deep in the past, and I think the attitudes of these men reflect old realities. The new generation it seems to me is likely to be different. So we have an historic change of generations, coming at a time when Brezhnev has been putting off decisions for half a dozen years. The problems have piled up and so we are going to get a change of generation at a time when there are very important decisions, very important kinds of decisions to be made.

COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP

The second point I would like to make—and this is far more controversial—is that in my opinion the change in Soviet policy is likely to come quite quickly. At first there will surely be a collective leadership of some sort, but it seems to me a mistake to think that there's going to be a no-change collective leadership for 4 or 5 years, perhaps followed by an important change toward the end of the decade.

It seems to me that there are several types of collective leadership. If we go back to the succession after Stalin's death in 1953, we find a collective leadership with great divisions in it, divisions between the reformers, such as Khrushchev and Malenkov, but also divisions between that group and conservatives such as Molotov.

Yet the period from 1953 to 1957, when Khrushchev finally consolidated his power, featured enormous change, actually more change than in the period after 1957. My guess is that the coming succession will be of that type rather than the post-1964 succession, which was far more moderate in its results.

FOREIGN POLICY

The third point that I would like to make is that in my opinion change in foreign policy and defense policy, is easier than change in domestic policy, and for that reason is perhaps more likely to occur. Again, if you go back to 1953, the new regime had launched a peace offensive almost immediately and in 4 months it had ended the Korean war.

In 2 years the Soviet leadership had for the first time gone abroad to meet foreign leaders, that is, with Eisenhower in Geneva. They had left Austria, they had given territory back to Finland. They had reversed Third World policies toward countries such as Egypt and India. The size of the army had been reduced and substantial resources had been diverted from heavy industry to agriculture and consumer goods.

It seems to me this is a period that should always be kept in mind when one hears, as one sometimes does, that the role of the military is always particularly strong, inevitably strong, in a period of transition.

The military did not prevent the change in priorities from heavy industry to agriculture and consumer goods in 1953. If one goes back to the 1920's, the head of the military was Trotsky and he was the first to be defeated. Even when Stalin increased heavy industry investment in 1929, there was major opposition from the military, from Tukhachevsky, who wanted more for military. The military began being built up only after 1931, when Japan had seized Manchuria.

It is only in 1964 that the military did rather well, and that in large part in my opinion was because the new General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, had been the chief representative for the defense industry in the Politburo and because the American buildup in Vietnam and the growing tension with China were providing fuel for the hawkish position.

Thus the military can be strong or weak depending on circumstances.

The final point that I—the major point that I would like to make—is that I think that not only can change come quickly, but that there is an excellent chance that rather significant change will come fairly quickly.

ECONOMIC REFORM

I think there will be some effort at economic reform, with more emphasis on market mechanisms, as a halting step to try to move toward the Hungarian reform.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Did you say Hungarian, sir?

Mr. HOUGH. Hungarian. More in the direction of the Hungarian model.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Andropov was Ambassador to Hungary, was he not?

Mr. HOUGH. That is right, and then Secretary of the Central Committee handling bloc relations during the time of the changes.

I think there will probably be some more unleashing of private initiative on the farm. Now, both of these changes require very hard decisions. They almost surely require a major raising of meat prices, as occurred in Poland. And for that reason I am far less optimistic, if you will, that there is going to be any significant change for the better in the political realm.

That is, I think a new leadership that is taking hard decisions on economic reform will want to prevent any KOR-like organizations, and so any new leadership reforming economically is likely to be quite hard on the dissidents.

And finally, I think there is a real chance for a leveling off, perhaps even a cutback, in military expenditures, a reduction in the size of the conventional army, coupled with a real peace offensive. I think there are several reasons.

Senator MOYNIHAN. A peace offensive?

Mr. HOUGH. A peace offensive.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Which has not always been accompanied by reduction of the armed forces' size.

Mr. HOUGH. I mean a real peace offensive. I mean, I think they have been extremely wooden in the way they have conducted them in the past.

There are several reasons that I think that some change in Soviet defense and foreign policy is likely. The first is the logic of the situation. Internally, the labor shortage is going to reduce the number of

18-year-olds by 25 percent in 1985 in comparison with what it was in 1980, and this is creating shortages for the economy. If the number of draftees remained the same, maintenance of the present size of the army is likely to present particular difficulties.

With economic reform going to require a major rise in key food prices, the problem of compensatory wage increases and the like is going to be a serious one. They have just promised a huge new increase in the food budget, and they are already starving heavy industry investment. It is very difficult to see how they are going to meet all their requirements without cutting in the military.

Another part of the logic of the situation, it seems to me, is found in the foreign policy realm. We can talk about a Soviet drive for superiority—and heaven knows exactly what is in their mind—but if they think they can be militarily superior, they are crazy. They have got 60 percent of the GNP of the United States, maybe 25 percent of the GNP of the United States and Western Europe, let alone Japan, combined.

If they think they are going to be able to achieve convincing superiority, they are just wrong. If they are going to get in an arms race they are going to lose it, and that, it seems to me, is a compelling reason for them to change what they are doing to some extent.

CHINA

The other foreign policy situation which it seems to me has changed is the relationship with China, which has undergone a radical change since Mao's death. The increase in the size of the Soviet Army occurred in the late 1960's, the early 1970's—I speak not of the strategic buildup, but there was a substantial increase in the number of troops in that period—came at the time when there were the border incidents with China, when the Soviet Union was leaking semithreats that it might invade China or the like. The situation was very tense.

Whatever else one wants to say about the present relationship with China, the kind of border incidents, the kind of tension that existed in the late sixties, is not there. And it seems to me to be very easy for them to go back closer to the size of army of the mid-1960's.

So it seems to me in many ways the logic of the situation, the severity of the economic situation, the changing relationship with China, makes a change of defense policy a likelihood.

Second, the evidence is that the candidates who seem to be the reform candidates are doing rather well. The question, of course, of who is going to succeed is very difficult, all the more so since we do not know when the succession is going to take place, who is even going to be alive there, who is going to be in good health.

The fortunes of candidates fluctuate in the Soviet Union, as they do in the United States, over time. But the conservative Suslov has died. Kirilenko, who seemed to be the heir apparent 4 or 5 years ago, has been declining. Another moderate conservative, Grishin, seems to be making no progress, and some of his supporters seem to be declining.

SUCCESSING CANDIDATES

The two leading candidates seem to be Andropov and Chernenko. In fact, the evidence is very strong, I think, that they are the two leading candidates. What is unclear is whether they are a tandem who might

well work together for 4 or 5 years, or whether they are engaged in a struggle between them in which one will be defeated relatively quickly.

But the interesting fact, it seems to me, is that in their foreign policy statements, of course in highly censored speeches, both of them make speeches which are quite distinct from those of virtually all the other members of the Politburo. Since 1975 Andropov has been the contender who has been by far the more urgent in the pursuit of détente.

In 1975, which was still a good year in Soviet-American relations, Suslov was expressing worry about ultrareactionary forces in the West. The Ukrainian leader Shcherbitsky was emphasizing that the nature of imperialism had not changed. But at this time Andropov was insisting:

A relaxation of international tension does not occur by itself. It is necessary to actively struggle for it. There cannot be any pause or breathing space, since détente is a continuous process which demands constant movement forward.

In 1979 he asserted: "It is impossible to estimate the danger of retarding the course of détente." In 1980 he was the only Politburo member to suggest that détente was in serious danger.

Unlike other Politburo members, Andropov has coupled his support for peace and détente with a call for negotiations, even in 1980, in the wake of the American sanctions against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1976 he was very explicit in stating:

The policy of peaceful coexistence, as is well known, presupposes negotiations and the seeking of mutually acceptable decisions, sometimes of a compromise nature.

Chernenko in his speeches about détente has been somewhat more general, but he has also been fervent in the extreme in supporting détente. And indeed, in one of the most remarkable of his speeches in February 1980, a few months after Afghanistan and a time when everybody else was saying how wonderful the Afghan invasion was, how necessary it was, Chernenko only made an extremely small mention of Afghanistan and did not support this venture. He obviously didn't say it was bad, but he did not say it was good. In the version published in Pravda he did not even mention Afghanistan at all—a kind of behavior in the Soviet Union which usually connotes opposition.

So my impression is that the realm of foreign policy, while there may well be nuances of difference between the two, and of course when hard decisions come there may be major differences between the two, both of them seem to be strongly on the prodétente side. The fact that they are moving to the fore now suggests to me that the sociopolitical forces within the Central Committee, within the Politburo, are supporting that kind of action.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, as I said at the beginning of this brief talk, I have not presented a fully balanced set of scenarios, and clearly there are many scenarios that one could draft, some of them quite different. I have focused on the development I think most likely, and I have highlighted the most controversial and foreign policy-relevant of my predictions.

I do this partly because I assume you want to be presented with a range of views, but also I think because I think that the United States is really ill-prepared for a real Soviet peace offensive. We know what

we do not want the Soviet Union to do. We know we would like the Soviet Union to act in foreign policy like a Denmark. But we know that is not going to happen.

We have done relatively little, so far as I understand it, in preparing a real fallback position in the arms control realm. We have not really thought through what is a reasonable code of détente for great powers in the Third World or what it is, what the rules of the game should be.

It may well be that if the Soviet Union changes quickly that we are going to find ourselves really not having thought out our position, and we may find that the problems with our allies may not be reduced but even multiplied.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Well, that surely is a fine statement—not for nothing are you well regarded, sir. I gave a commencement address up in New York in June in which I took just the opposite view, which was to say that, given the pattern of Soviet succession—the collective leadership and the slow emergence of new persons—that there would be relatively little chance to get a major arms agreement, and that we must be prepared to live with this. If we are serious, we have got to be patient and enduring about it.

Can you stay for just a few more moments, because now you are going to see how the United States is governed. We are in the last 3 days of the fiscal year. It ends Friday. And we have not got any money to pay our Army as of Friday. So we are going to spend the day dealing with resolutions that have to do with public lands and things like that, and we still will not have provided for the Army to be paid by the end of the day.

I think that violates the first principle of prudent government, do you not all think, "Always pay the Army."

Mr. HOUGH. Since my son is in the Air Force—

Senator MOYNIHAN. And the Air Force.

I have to run and vote. The turnaround time is about 6 minutes and I will be right back, and I will try to bring the chairman with me.

[Recess.]

Senator MOYNIHAN. Professor Hough, now having heard your extraordinarily valuable opening statement, I would like to turn if I may to Myron Rush, who is a distinguished professor at Cornell University and one of the world's leading authorities on a thing we call high Soviet politics; is that not the term? Low goings on in high places.

We welcome you, sir. Proceed as you wish.

**STATEMENT OF DR. MYRON RUSH, PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT,
CORNELL UNIVERSITY**

Mr. RUSH. Thank you, Senator.

In the time allotted me, I will try to characterize the historical juncture at which the Soviet Union now stands, indicate the choices that will confront the successor leadership, and suggest what this implies for the U.S. policy in the years just ahead.

Beginning in the early 1970's, Brezhnev provided the Soviet Union with a decade of coherent and stable leadership. This has now ended. In recent months, Brezhnev's position has come under challenge. The present political instability will probably continue for a time and then worsen after Brezhnev leaves the scene.

BREZHNEV SUCCESSION

In the first phase of the succession, the contending leaders are likely to turn inward. While marking time in their conduct of difficult, ongoing negotiations, they will probably seek détente with the West, at least in the short term.

This might be an advantageous time for the United States to present proposals for negotiations on major questions at issue between the two sides, assuming that agreement could be reached within the American Government. The divided Soviet leadership would find it difficult to respond, however, and apart from complicating the succession the most to be hoped for from this ploy might be to establish an agenda for future negotiations on favorable terms.

The contending Soviet leaders are likely to reach an early consensus to reject or curtail major Brezhnev programs, as a means of freeing resources at a time when priority sectors, such as civilian heavy industry, have been experiencing severe shortages. Such ventures of the late Brezhnev period as the food program and perhaps even the Afghanistan war are possible targets for Brezhnev's heirs.

Resources taken from Brezhnev's favorite programs, however, will not go far to narrow the widening gap between a virtually stagnant economy and the rapidly increasing expenditures required for the Soviet welfare state and for the maintenance and extension of the troubled Soviet Empire.

This gap poses an overarching problem that will aggravate all the other questions that Brezhnev's heirs will have to deal with. They will find it necessary to curtail expenditures, fitting them to the resources available. Taking more and more from civilian investment to support the Soviet Empire, especially its massive military machine, as Brezhnev has been doing for the past half dozen years, cannot be continued indefinitely, for it deprives the Soviet Union of badly needed future national income. Brezhnev has favored guns over growth. He has postponed the reckoning, but it begins to draw near.

Besides the gap between economic resources and imperial requirements, the Soviet Empire suffers from a second gap—between the resources available to itself and the resources available to the states arrayed against it. This second gap, too, will probably widen in the 1980's, all the more so if the Soviet Union continues diverting funds from civilian investment to the military.

SOVIET POLICIES

If Soviet policies continue on their present course and the opposing coalition of industrial democracies is not gravely weakened by developments internal to it—for example, by a world depression or a split in the alliance—the Soviet Union seems headed for a crisis by the late 1980's. This crisis would not be a purely economic crisis, it would be an economic-political crisis brought on by the failure of the economy to provide the resources required to sustain the empire in competition with the West.

By its own efforts, the Soviet Union can avert such a crisis chiefly in two ways:

First, domestically, by reordering its economic priorities, shifting large funds from defense to civilian investment in order to improve

economic growth, thereby increasing the resources available in the late 1980's. A limited accommodation with the United States to abate the global competition will have an attraction for Brezhnev's heirs, particularly if they decide to transfer funds from defense to investment.

A second way to avert the impending imperial crisis is by sharply improving the Soviet geopolitical position at the expense of the United States, thereby enabling a reduction to be made in the burdens of empire. Such an improved strategic position might be sought by imperial expansion—for example, in the Persian Gulf region—although this might risk setting off a new arms race.

Alternatively, Brezhnev's heirs might try to improve the Soviet Union's geopolitical position by such major diplomatic maneuvers as: rapprochement with the Chinese People's Republic, a peace treaty with Japan, tempting offers to West Germany for confederation with East Germany, or a campaign of threats and inducements to split much of West Europe from alliance with the United States.

Success in imperial expansion or in major diplomatic maneuvers, by shifting the global balance in the Soviet Union's favor, might enable the U.S.S.R. subsequently to reduce military spending—for Soviet forces in the Far East, for example—even while maintaining or further strengthening its security position.

While changed domestic and foreign policy strategies could supplement each other, the successor leadership seems likely to concentrate its efforts chiefly on one or the other, on domestic reform or on improving the Soviet security position at the expense of the United States. Both ways of averting economic-political crisis in the 1980's would be facilitated by the massive Soviet defense military buildup of the past decade, which itself, of course, is an important cause of the impending crisis.

The Soviet Union might be able to freeze defense spending at the present level for several years without seriously impairing the favorable regional and strategic military balances that can be employed in diplomatic maneuver and imperial expansion.

CRISIS

Major initiatives to avert a crisis in this decade could, of course, best be accomplished by a strong and united leadership, but none is likely to emerge for some time after onset of the Brezhnev succession. Even a fractious leadership might feel obliged to seek solutions to the country's economic problems in order to avert the looming economic-political crisis, although divisions in the leadership would make it hard to hold a steady course. Just as in the Stalin succession, the U.S.S.R. may show the world the spectacle of a large empire attempting to change course in difficult circumstances, its politics unstable, its policies fluid.

Let me sum up my understanding of where the Soviet union now stands. At present it is not especially weak, certainly not as weak relative to the United States as it was in the Stalin succession or the Khrushchev succession. It is not now in crisis, although it is heading toward a crisis of empire by the late 1980's.

Incidentally, note that the term "crisis" means a turning point. It does not necessarily mean a turn for the worse; it can bring a favorable resolution, that is a turn for the better.

Granted that the successor leadership will be compelled to make fateful decisions, does the United States possess strong leverage to directly influence those decisions? I personally doubt this. Our experience since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan certainly raises questions about our capacity to inflict large costs on the Soviet Union in order to weaken it or compel restraint. Our experience during the heyday of détente in the early 1970's raises similar questions about our capacity to offer large economic inducements.

In the realm of arms control, we can offer not to deploy weapons that would impose additional costs on the U.S.S.R., but the contribution this could make to alleviating the Soviet economic situation would be limited. In the past, when the Soviet Union has decided to reduce defense spending, as after Stalin's death, it has done so unilaterally. This could well happen again in the 1980's.

KREMLINOLOGY

Our influence on Soviet decisionmaking is limited not only by inadequate leverage, but also by inadequate knowledge of what is going on in the Kremlin. As a long-time practitioner of Kremlinology, I do not want to depreciate my profession. But the fact is that our limited information about elite politics sometimes leaves us open to Soviet manipulation.

As part of the current power struggle in Moscow, Andropov's people for some months have propagated the notion that Brezhnev is finished politically and medically and that Andropov is an intelligent liberal whom the United States should welcome as he prepares to assume the leadership from Brezhnev. Now, the fact that Andropov headed the KGB for 15 years and brutally destroyed the dissident movement in the U.S.S.R. did not prevent elements of the Western media from publicizing this line.

Professional Kremlinologists are far more capable than the people responsible for the recent cover of Newsweek magazine that announced "Brezhnev's Last Days"; still, we strongly disagree among ourselves.

This is not an argument for spurning Kremlinology. On the contrary, it is essential that we devote more resources to Kremlinology so that we improve our understanding of what the Politburo is up to, especially as we enter the period of succession when Politburo politics will be unstable and its policies fluid.

In planning foreign policy the United States must try to anticipate possible developments in the succession and follow its course closely in efforts to understand the forces released by the succession. U.S. policies assuredly will affect developments in the Soviet succession, and we should try to anticipate what their effects will be.

Our policies and actions, however, should be determined by our directly perceived interests and those of our alliances, not by expectations of how they will influence the Soviet succession. Our knowledge at present and in the foreseeable future simply does not enable us to fine-tune U.S. policy according to a particular interpretation of what is going on in the Kremlin.

Rather than acting directly on the Soviet Union in order to exert a decisive influence on it—whether with the aim of moderating or weakening the Soviet regime—our greatest efforts should be directed to strengthening ourselves and our alliances, and to denying the U.S.S.R. opportunities for imperial aggrandizement or major diplomatic gains at our expense. Thank you.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Well, Professor Rush, it is we who thank you.

I found some important divergence, it seems to me, between what you and Professor Hough had to say. I think your point about knowing what one does not know is a mark of good discipline. Mr. Andropov's people could simply be presenting him, as you say, as an intelligent liberal and a leading proponent of détente, he who really was quite brutal about the dissidents and has chosen as his successor, Fedorchuk, a man of no squeamish persuasion. And it is Andropov's successor—chosen successor, we gather—who closed down the last of the Helsinki watch groups.

Well, you also have trouble figuring out what our Presidents would do from what they say during their campaigns.

But, if you can stay for a bit of general conversation before we are through, we would like now to turn to Dr. Robert Conquest, who we very much welcome to this hearing. There is not a more distinguished student of the subject in the Western World.

Dr. Conquest, of course, is the author of "The Great Terror" and many other books. He is a warrior as well as a scholar. And you are now a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institute, are you? You are welcome, sir, and would you please proceed.

**STATEMENT OF ROBERT CONQUEST, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW,
HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE, STANFORD UNIVERSITY**

Dr. CONQUEST. Well, thank you. But however distinguished any of us are, we first have to admit our ignorance, as both of my predecessors have done, and I hasten to do so too. We are not adequately informed and a lot of what we say must be general, as Professor Rush has particularly pointed out.

I would like to start off, if I may, by agreeing with both of them that in the near future during the long, as I imagine, succession crisis, the Soviet leaders will be turned inward. They will not, in my view, as is sometimes said, tend toward outward adventures. Historically, they have always turned inward during succession crises; that is how I would see it.

NEW FACES

I believe Professor Rush is right on the whole in seeing little change in the immediate future. I mean, during a phase which may last a couple of years, there will not be new faces. Anything can happen, but there is no sign there will be these new faces.

One or two of the present leadership will take over, and the first man to take over may not hold it. He will concentrate enmity against himself. But in any case, we will have the present Stalin generation for at least some time.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Could I just interject to say that I think what you say puts you at some divergence from Professor Hough. Maybe you can take that up.

Dr. CONQUEST. It certainly does as far as the timing is concerned. But after all, they are not as old as all that, and we can tell from the Chinese example that in Communist countries, there is always an older generation knocking at the door. It is not impossible for the present leadership to sustain itself for quite a long time.

And, as Dr. Hough pointed out, they are very much from the Stalin generation. Every one of them—I think all but 1 of the top 30—got well into their political careers in Stalin's time, and indeed 8 of the present leadership were actually personally selected members of Stalin's Central Committee.

Therefore, in my view, they are not going to make any important changes. And the question, a slight side issue, of what policies they now put forward, is not very, very relevant, as you suggested about campaign speeches in this country. In the Soviet Union, in the previous succession crises, both Stalin and Khrushchev put forward policies which they reversed when they got into power. Stalin attacked the left, got into power, and attacked the right. Khrushchev put himself forward as a hardliner against Malenkov in internal affairs. As soon as he got in, he switched to attack the other side.

So how they appear now does not necessarily reflect how they will act when they get in.

I think where we go wrong very often is when we use such words as "reasonable expectation," "the logic of the situation is that they must" improve their agriculture, that they "cannot" spend so much on armaments, and so forth. That is our logic; it is not their logic necessarily.

I am sure the central problem of the whole of Western understanding of the Soviet Union is that we do not make the effort—it is not so much an effort of the intellect as of the imagination—to see these people as they are, as a different political species. They are as different from us as the Ayatollah is, and we do not make that mistake about him because he wears clothes which differentiate him from us a good deal and he uses words like "great satan" instead of "imperialism."

But when a Soviet leader says "imperialism," the tone of it, the whole feel of it, is not a nice little political science word, as we may think. It is "great satan" that he is saying to the United States. And the fact that he wears a Western suit and uses Western political dialect does not really make much difference.

POLITICS

I do not think it is a matter of belief. We talk about "believing in" Marxism-Leninism. But you can be argued out of an intellectual conviction. They have it soaked into their bones. And when one says Marxism-Leninism, I am not thinking so much in terms of the whole formal structure, of Marxism, but the central points of Leninism, which I suppose could be briefly summarized as: First, politics comes first, above everything; second, you are in possession of a closed set of ideas which is correct and cannot be argued about; third, which

of course follows, this applies on a world scale: All other regimes, including Communist regimes of a different type, are illegitimate, as we have seen in Czechoslovakia and of course in the attacks on China. And more important still is the Leninist principle: "Kto Kogo" "Who-whom?" There is always a winner and a loser. Everything is struggle.

Their whole attitude is of a different species of political animal from ourselves, and every time we assume that they are going to do what we think is the logical thing, we must cross that out and start again. They are not necessarily going to do that sort of thing.

And that is the present generation. I would foresee a longish, as I say, period of adjustment during a struggle between the various leaders who are now putting themselves forward. And if one goes into detail, I would agree with Professor Rush that a lot of the running for Andropov is leaks by friends of his. I do not mean his policies, but the notion that he is now in a commanding position. Everything is possible in the Soviet Union and it is perfectly possible that Andropov will emerge as the next General Secretary or First Secretary.

But we must remember at least one point of weakness in his case; the Politburo consists of people who want to continue what they are doing and in their posts. So you would imagine a majority does not want to vote for the new man who offers change. And that at least is one argument against an immediate Andropov victory, one which I do not think has been put forward very much.

NEXT GENERATION

We then go on to the question of the next generation. Now, this is an awkward one, it seems to me, because unlike both Stalin and Khrushchev, they have simply not built up a next generation. Both Stalin and Khrushchev had men who were clearly intended as their successors, 10, 12, and in fact in one case 25 years younger than themselves.

Every young man who has come forward since Brezhnev got into power has been purged pretty rapidly. And that they have not been able to agree, I think, is the answer. Everybody, every young man who has been nominated, has had objections from others of the leadership.

So they are in an awkward position for renewing the leadership from newer people. But on the question of what the newer people will be like—I would argue that the next generation, the people who are now perhaps 55 or 60, are very much the same. I can see practically no difference.

When we get to the people of 45 or 50, then I think a difference does seem to emerge. I would like to quote Academician Sakharov, and the impression given is that they are more cynical—

Senator MOYNIHAN. I am sorry, sir. You were quoting?

Dr. CONQUEST. Academician Sakharov.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Sakharov, yes.

Dr. CONQUEST. And he is a very close observer, and I may say his views are, roughly speaking, the same as those expressed by all wings of the dissidence, including Roy Medvedev, the Leninist; Nadezhda Mandelstam; Andrei Sinyavski; Ginsburg. They all have roughly the same view.

What he says is:

I like this new layer of leaders coming to the top even less than its predecessors. The people of Brezhnev's generation laid the basis for their careers in the worst years of the Stalinist terror. That put the mark of Cain on them. . . . The new generation is coming without that mark. It is more flexible, but there is a dreadful cynicism, careerism, and complete indifference to ideals in international affairs. As far as internal matters go, they only care about the trough they swill from, and what matters is that the trough be full.

And elsewhere he speaks of "total unaccountability toward their own people and to the whole world, this dual irresponsibility being interrelated."

One needs to make an effort of the imagination to envisage these Soviet leaders. A suggestion I made to a State Department conference the other day, making it vivid, was to envisage J. R. Ewing or rather worse as typical of this generation. You can, if you think of the Soviet leaders as mere names, mere people called General Secretary and Minister, get a false impression.

You are faced with the problem of negotiating. If you were negotiating with J. R. Ewing, you would not think he would necessarily do the thing that you would regard as reasonable and good. And after all he was brought up in a society which to some extent disapproves of him, whereas theirs does not. They are brought up in a society, the society they move in, which thoroughly approves of them, and the more like Ewing the better, you might say.

So I see a generation coming up—this is, as I say, perhaps in 10 or 15 years—which is not very promising. One sometimes hears it said that there is a new elite in the Soviet Union—you get this from Western diplomats and others—a new elite which is smooth, educated, westernized. But that is not the political elite, nor the forthcoming political elite.

The political elite, if we go back to the 55- to 60-year-olds, are traditionally the secretaries, the present secretaries of the Provincial Committees of the Communist Party, in the Russian Republic generally, but not entirely. Two-thirds of them started their careers in Stalin's time.

And I think if we get on to foreign policy, we are going to face a difficulty in that they have no experience whatever. They get weekly or whatever it is—I am not sure how often these papers go out—the Central Committee issues, as you can imagine, a foreign policy guidance newsletter, a couple of pages, once or twice a week, and it is pretty misinformative anyway.

But these provincial secretaries do not have time to read it. They are ignorant even of the misinformation. You may think that is perhaps to the good, if they do not know, they could all come in fresh. But there is a danger in this isolation into which they are stuck.

DÉTENTE

The question of détente and peace offensives is a very interesting one. I would be inclined to say that a really complete, what we would call a logical peace offensive—I would agree Professor Rush—this does not really sound likely. The West is always thinking the Soviet Union is going to be liberal and peaceful, if not now some other time soon. That has been going on for a very long time these predictions of a more peaceful Soviet Union.

But I think more important is that détente was officially defined by the U.S.S.R., as you know, as a method of struggle, and it was never incompatible at its height with the most expansionist foreign policy and a heavy armaments policy. In fact, détente came in at precisely the time they were building up.

One can argue about some intercontinental ballistic missiles and say they need them for a balance with the West and so on, but building up the blue-water fleet, which got really started just at that period, was pure expansionism. It was Kaiser William the Second come again. They did not need it for any defensive purpose whatever. It is entirely an expansionist weapon.

So I do not see these hard and soft, pro and anti détente attitudes, in the Politburo, because it is difficult to understand what advantage the hardliner could claim that the Soviet Union has lost by practicing détente. It has gained everything a hardliner could possibly want.

It is perfectly true, as Professor Hough has rightly said, that we do underestimate—or people are inclined to underestimate—the differences between the Khrushchev regime and its predecessors. But Khrushchev was in a rather special position. He has made himself not quite dictator, but he was in a much stronger position than Brezhnev ever quite managed to get, except toward the last year or two of his career.

So Khrushchev was in a position to do things contrary to the wishes of the apparat, until they got tired of him and threw him out. So he had a certain amount of more freedom, if more in internal affairs than external.

I do not think one wants to coordinate this knowing something is wrong internally, this very limited sense of “liberalization.”

I mean, it was Khrushchev who provoked the Cuban crisis, and a “hardliner” internally, or in principle, like Molotov, would not have done so. A reformer at home may be an adventurer abroad as well.

It is very difficult to see what the next man can do, assuming he does not make himself dictator, which I would say is almost impossible, because they are all watching each other like hawks and will go on doing so. . . . Yet Russia has had all its reforms through dictators, through despots ordering their apparats to do the opposite of what they want in Peter the Great's time, Alexander the Second's time—to some extent Stolypin's and Khrushchev's time.

So we have a rather indeterminate future, but one in which no serious change, in my view, is likely to take place, in spite of the immense pressures. On the face of it some changes they must make, even in their agricultural system. But only when we see them actually beginning to decollectivize, we may say to ourselves, their minds are gradually opening a little crack toward reality. Until then, no.

Senator MOYNIHAN. That's extraordinary. I think we are going to have the makings of some exchanges here.

But am I not correct that—I think it was Brezhnev who at one point propounded a kind of second law of thermodynamics about détente? He said any lessening of tension in one area automatically increases it in another area; sort of a constant level of conflict at all times, and if you diminish it here you just have more resources to increase it somewhere else. Détente was described in terms of struggle. We fought differently than they, I think.

Dr. CONQUEST. He made two speeches in 1965 saying that—the balance of forces has changed, we are going over to the offensive against

imperialism. You can go over to the offensive against imperialism and still have "détente."

Senator MOYNIHAN. It is useful to read their speeches.

You are agreeing, I think, with your two colleagues who have said that—the term I guess is Professor Bialer's, but you have all used it—a stable oligarchy is likely—or not so stable but nonetheless an oligarchy—as against a dictatorship.

Mr. RUSH. I would have some reservations.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Well, why do we not hear from Mr. Hyland, and then we can hear what you think about each other's comments.

There is not a more distinguished American public official in this field. I do not know what it is you have not done. But Mr. Hyland has been adviser, of course, in the Central Intelligence Agency. He has been on the National Security Council. He has been Deputy Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security. He is now a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment and an adjunct professor at the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University.

It is a distinction for this committee to have you back in your once-familiar role. But you did not have to testify when you were in the White House. You may wish you were back, though I am not entirely sure.

We welcome you, sir.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM HYLAND, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, AND ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE

Mr. HYLAND. Thank you, Senator.

I defer to my colleagues on their knowledge of the Soviet leadership. I have not for some years tried to follow it in the detail they have. I have somewhat of a different viewpoint, because I have seen the Soviet leaders on a more operational level when I was in the NSC and the White House during the Nixon and Ford period, when we had what was called détente. And we had many negotiations with Brezhnev and Kosygin and the other leaders.

My prejudices about the leadership are fairly easy to list. First of all, I hold the view that men make history, that it is important who rules in the Soviet Union, that institutions, as strong as they are in totalitarian countries, have inevitably been overcome by the leaders, both by Stalin and Khrushchev and to a lesser extent by Brezhnev, certainly by Mao Tse-tung and even Tito.

It is important for all of us, including congressional committees, to know more about these new people. We heard this morning that there was a certain viewpoint about Andropov. There are certainly other views, radically different ones, about Andropov. But once we get down from that somewhat Olympian level of Politburo members, it is rather difficult to know about some of the candidate members or some of the secretaries who inevitably in the next decade will be important people.

The Brezhnevs of the nineties are around and are undoubtedly identifiable. No Soviet leader has been a dark horse emerging suddenly from the galleries. This is not the age of Wendell Wilkie. No one sets up a chant in the Soviet Union, "We want Andropov." They come to power, I think as Robert Conquest has demonstrated in his many writings, through a struggle for power.

SOVIET POLITICS—POWER

The second point therefore is that Soviet politics remains a struggle for power—if you understand that you have a better notion of how the system works.

Senator MOYNIHAN. If I could interject, we do not always understand the degree to which it is a struggle for personal power or at some point an ideological struggle, do we?

Mr. HYLAND. It is very difficult to disentangle the various elements of the struggle. As someone just said, Stalin began by being a leftist and he then became a rightist, or was it the other way around?

Senator MOYNIHAN. The other way around.

Mr. HYLAND. I remember Khrushchev after Stalin's death was a great loyal Stalinist, complaining about how people were abandoning Stalinism. Within 3 years he had made the secret speech denouncing Stalin.

So it is very tricky to say that so and so has a certain position, but we also forget that what matters in the Soviet Union first of all is to get power, once you have power you can adopt the policies that you prefer. And I think that has been the history of the Soviet leadership. It is well to keep that in mind when we think about "liberals and conservatives." We also should recognize that personal power is still very important.

I do not think a collective leadership can work for long in the Soviet Union. The system requires a central point of decision, which inevitably comes down to one very strong man. Collective leadership might work in a country like Yugoslavia, where there are problems of reconciling nationalities and various classes.

This is true in the Soviet Union to some extent, but the whole history of Russia and of the Soviet Union points to one man emerging from the field. I do not know how long it will take, but I am fairly confident that there will be another Khrushchev, Brezhnev, or Stalin.

The degree of power that they have is interesting to compare, but the power is there. We are witnessing it even today, when Brezhnev in his old age, near the end of his career, has been able to pack the whole government and many of the upper reaches of the power structure with old cronies from the 1930's, with friends, with former aides, and to do it with relative ease. He must have a great deal of power, it seems to me, in order to accomplish that.

SUCCESSION PERIOD

My third point is that, on the succession period itself, is that it will be a period of great turmoil and change. It is bound to be. You cannot go from one leadership that has occupied 18 years to another without a great deal of upheaval.

How serious it will be is very hard to say. I come down on the side that change will be greater than continuity. I understand those who argue that there is a basic continuity in the Leninist system, there is a basic continuity even within Soviet policy. But I think the eighties are going to be a period of much greater change in Soviet policy than almost any period thus far.

Myron Rush has listed some of the reasons. They cannot simply do business as usual. The tactic of what is now called "muddling down"

does not work very well in a major great power as the Soviet Union. They have to make some more serious decisions.

Therefore, I am inclined to think the eighties are a period of great opportunity for the United States, perhaps the greatest period we have had since the death of Stalin. At that time, you may remember, Churchill advocated a very active policy. He sensed, I think, that the Soviet Union was nervous, upset, weakened, even afraid, and he advocated a vigorous effort to meet with them and to put new proposals to them and so forth.

Our administration under Eisenhower and Dulles were very cautious. Dulles had the view that we should build up our strength and then we could negotiate. I think that happened to be a mistake, but that is for the historians to decide.

But I think we should be aware that we may be entering a parallel period. There is a tendency in Washington to wait for Brezhnev's successor, to wait until we are stronger. History suggests that our relative strength is not going to grow that greatly, there will not be a decisive change in the balance of power, though I think later we will be stronger than the Soviet Union.

But I think we should take advantage of the eighties to aggressively pursue our policies in negotiation with the Soviet Union, as well as in unilateral action. Building up our defense budget and building up our defense forces is I think a prerequisite, and I certainly think that impresses any leadership, whether it is Brezhnev or his successor.

But I do think this other track should not be neglected, that is a rather active diplomacy, even if it is exploratory and experimental in nature. I think putting certain proposals before the present leadership so they are on the table when Brezhnev leaves is a very good idea. Waiting to size up the situation is probably not a good idea, because we will be back at this table, or some of us will be back at this table, some years hence, saying we really do not know whether Andropov is slightly stronger than Chernenko, whether Gorbachëv has moved up three notches or down, or whether he is really a liberal, et cetera.

We will never be able to sort out totally this mystery of the Soviet leadership. But by the time they sort themselves out it could be rather late for the United States, and it may be that they will get through this "time of troubles" by keeping us at arm's length. So I favor a rather active policy for the United States during this succession period, and even now.

Finally, let me just add one thing from my own experience. I think it is worthwhile doing whatever we can to improve the analytical capabilities of our own Government, especially the intelligence agencies and the Department of State, in the field of Soviet affairs. I think it has been weakened over the years, partly by neglect, partly because it was not as interesting as other areas of the world, and partly because intelligence as such grew to have a bad reputation and therefore it was more difficult to recruit.

My own experience in the Department of State is that there still are very strong assets in the analytical capabilities of the intelligence community, but that they are wearing thin. They need to be renewed, just as any other institution. And anything, I think, that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence can do in that direction would pay off as we move into this period where the demand for knowledge and the demand for analysis about the Soviet situation is bound to grow.

Thank you.

[The article of Mr. William G. Hyland appears in the appendix, p. 69.]

Senator MOYNIHAN. Thank you, sir. And concerning your last point may I say on the committee's behalf that this is one of the reasons we are having you and the other witnesses, that is to understand our current intelligence analytical capabilities.

After our beginning, in which there was a sense of an adversarial relationship between this committee and the intelligence community (and that may have been warranted), I think it has settled down to one that is supportive of just the sort of thing you talked about. Starting in 1979, the resources of the intelligence community again began to grow. We are very interested in the whole analytic side, the intelligent side of intelligence, the kind of thing in which Dr. Rush, as a scholar in residence, has participated; that is, an effort to make an assessment of what do we know about this huge question.

Mind you, no one knows—here we are in the United States and we have been studying these things for a long time—how many seats the Democrats are going to win or lose in the House of Representatives in 4 weeks' time. So we do not expect miracles out of you. But there is a range of information, and knowing something is a lot better than knowing nothing.

Now, may I raise just three questions and then ask you gentlemen to take a few minutes to comment on one another's remarks. One thing Professor Hough said was that he thought there would really be a new generation of leaders, an historical succession coming up. Yet, sir, if I am not mistaken, Mr. Conquest would not hold to that.

There are only two people in the Politburo that are under 60, and Mr. Conquest says there is a large number of people who go back to Stalin's regime who will be around for some years. That is one point you might want to talk about.

A second point—one of the things that this committee is interested in, can we seriously look forward to something successful in the way of arms negotiations with a Soviet government in transition, given that phenomenon of the weakness of individuals when they first come to office? It is the opposite of our system. Our Presidents come to office at the peak of their power and leave just ahead of the sheriff in most circumstances. And it usually is just the other way in the experiences we have had, with three significant transitions in the Soviet Union.

I would also like to say something concerning U.S. policy with respect to the succession. I have heard you say that our ability to influence Soviet behavior is limited and in this context, note the importance of maintaining our alliances. That is something which we can do and since it is something we can do, it ought to be of a higher priority.

I wonder what your comments about the Trans-Siberian gas pipeline and what our policy might be, if you want to offer them and then anything else that you would want to say.

I will start out by asking Professor Hough if he discerns a disagreement with his colleagues on the question of the nature of the succession—why will this be an historic succession if it is another 70-year-old?

HISTORICAL SUCCESSION

Mr. HOUGH. Well, to start with, I suspect I do disagree with Dr. Conquest, maybe not so much with the others. When I began I was talking in the longer term, that at some time in the eighties an historical succession would take place. I think there is general agreement on that.

The question is where the important breaking line is—that is at 60 years old, at 50, or 40. That you might have disagreement on. But the historic generation is passing is the generation which came to power in the purge, and which rose to extremely high levels in the thirties, like Ustinov, who has been a minister since 1941.

That is very different than if you had a low level job in 1941.

Senator MOYNIHAN. You have people like Ponomarev still there.

Mr. HOUGH. Yes; he is a man who had a leading post in the Comintern in 1935. Now, his First Deputy, Zagladin, was born in 1928.

So I think the fact that the generation which benefited enormously in the purge is passing, and that that is important, even leaving aside the age question. I agree totally with Professor Rush that, of course, it is also a historic change because they are facing a differing set of circumstances. If you quote Brezhnev from 1965, remember that 1965 was a different kind of period. They were not under the kind of economic pressures. They then had the baby boom coming of age, and had a huge labor surplus. And if you read even the Brezhnev speech of 1976 at the Party Congress and then 1980, there is a night and day's difference between the optimism of the first and the pessimism of the second.

Let me say one thing about the 55-year-olds. It seems to me that this is a very different generation than the others. That is, whether the 68-year-olds are different from the 77-year-olds is perhaps more controversial. But when you get down to the 55-year-olds, these are people with very differing experience.

You can say that some of them worked in the Stalin era, but they worked as very young men, and basically this is the generation which came of age during the denunciation of Stalin. As young men they had learned the Stalin rhetoric in school and then suddenly in their early twenties, suddenly they are told that all of this was a lie to them. It happened at an early enough age that I think that it had a real impact.

It is wrong to speak of these men as people who have a fanatic acceptance of a closed set of ideas, who are like the Ayatollah. The evidence is that there is a major generational change on that. I, of course, have not talked with Central Committee members, but I have talked with maybe 150 scholars who are policy intellectuals, men who are advising these people and know them. I read their debates on the third world, on Europe, on the United States, I talk with them.

When you read a 70-year-old, I mean, he often reads like an old dogmatist. But when you read a 50-year-old, they write in different terms. You meet them and they talk in different terms.

It seems to me that it is dangerous to assume a priori that that which existed in the early stages of the revolution is going to last forever. The people who are rising now are people who, as Professor Brzezinski has rightly recognized, have risen through bureaucracies. They have been able to meet a plan, they have been able to function in bureaucratic committee politics. That is a hard environment to thrive

in if you are a total ideologue. If you are a total J. R. Ewing, somebody is going to cut your throat before you get to the top.

The disagreement is on whether the historic change occurs in 1982 or 1986. We should maintain an open mind on that.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Mr. Conquest, you would not agree?

NEW GENERATION

Dr. CONQUEST. I think I was meaning that the present generation will go on for a few years. I do not think we are in any disagreement about that. Eventually it will be replaced. I was of course saying that the next generation were different. But I do not think that the difference is necessarily a favorable one.

I was quoting Sakharov and others who are extremely well informed on this matter. Nadezhda Mandelstam, who died a year or two ago and who knew a great deal of what went on in Moscow, takes the view that they might be worse internally for, in a sense, the opposite reason: That Brezhnev and his generation do not want, have shown that they do not want, a big purge of the old type, because they remember, she points out, that the party leadership got purged, too.

But she says the younger generation, as usual, have not learned from history. People do not learn from the history they have not been through. She regards them as perfectly capable of starting a new Stalinist terror.

So the fact that they are different and that they speak more smoothly, does not necessarily mean they are greater humanists. The leading man described as the greatest English humanist in the late 15th century. Tiptoft, Earl of Worcester, was also the man who introduced impaling and the killing of babies.

So I do not think language is quite what matters. It is what we know, or what people who know them know, of what their general attitudes and intentions are. I am not sure that they will or necessarily will be as tough, perhaps, as Mrs. Mandelstam thought, but I do not think we can judge—just on our hopes—that they will be better.

But the other point is I think that it is true that things are different now from what they were before the agricultural question got worse and worse. But the solution, the traditional solution of the party, the *raison d'être* of the whole apparatus, is to contain the social-economic forces. It was built in order to force the country, if necessary, to suffer starvation.

High officials have said—and you have probably had this said to you by other people—have said to American officials: We are going to maintain the arms race even if we have to reintroduce a tough dictatorship and starve our people. Now, that is putting it very crudely and far out, but I think one wants to keep those possibilities in mind and, let us say, not be too optimistic.

The other thing is—I think that I would agree with Professor Hough that anything can happen in the Soviet Union. If we were sitting here in 1952, I do not think that we would have predicted anything that was to happen in the Communist world. Far stranger things and more unpredictable things happened than in the West: the split with China, the Hungarian revolution, de-Stalinization.

I agree that anything is possible. We are only discussing what seems to us, on the limited data we have, probably the tendencies.

Senator MOYNIHAN. On the other hand, in 1952 you would have forecast a continuation of the Soviet state in much the manner that it is—recognizably the same institution?

Dr. CONQUEST. Yes, sir.

Senator MOYNIHAN. What about the other question about a new generation? It is incorrect to fancy that the leaders of the Stalin era, whatever else their qualities, nonetheless know that war can be a devastating experience in the Soviet Union. One had the feeling that there was a sense that arms control at some level was important to them, because it was personally important to them, as opposed to important in a bureaucratic sense?

That might well vanish. The urgency of it would not be present in the wholly bureaucratized leadership that is coming on, with no experience in the world except the experience of the party, an elite more cut off from people than any czarist aristocracy ever was.

Does that make any sense to you?

Mr. HOUGH. Well, if you are asking me, it seems to me you have to ask what generation you are talking about. Brezhnev and his generation was born in 1906. That meant they were 35 years old at the time of the beginning of the war. While Brezhnev was at the front, the normal thing that a 35 or a 40-year-old does in a war is to have bureaucratic jobs, as Gromyko, Ustinov, and Conomarev did.

The people who really get bloodied in a war are those who are 20, and the people who were 20 were those who were born around 1920 or 1925. That is why if you look at the demographics you suddenly see a huge drop in the number of men born from 1918 to 1926.

The one person who in the Politburo was too young to fight was Gorbachëv, born in 1931. But his home area, Stavropol, was occupied by the Germans. I do not know what he did in the war and my guess is he was evacuated, like most children were. Still, he came back after the war to a homeland that had been devastated.

There may be people who were born in 1940 or so who do not know the war, but that is a generation that is not going to come to power until the nineties.

Senator MOYNIHAN. So that would not have any bearing on arms negotiations?

Mr. HOUGH. I would not have thought that was a factor.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Is there likely to be a Soviet leader, whether a dictator or simply the General Secretary, who has enough authority to agree to a significant reduction in Soviet nuclear weaponry and have that accepted by the military?

LEADERSHIP, DÉTENTE

Mr. RUSH. If I could speak to that and to the point you raised earlier about a collective leadership, I would want to emphasize that there is very unlikely to be a stable oligarchy, and I would agree with Bill Hyland that the system calls for a one-man leadership. I think there is a great difference between Stalin's power and Brezhnev's, but Brezhnev has had a great deal of power and it has been underestimated, and his power—

Senator MOYNIHAN. Oligarchic in the sense that his power is not unlimited?

Mr. RUSH. It is not unlimited, but there is a great difference between his power in 1965 and 1966 and his power in 1980, for example. I would say he more than anyone else, and certainly more than the military as an institution, is responsible for the fact that the Soviets have sacrificed growth and investment to defense.

The defense buildup is a terrible problem that we should confront, not simply in terms of the military power that their spending has created, but also the question of the motive. That tends to be disregarded. It is a tough question, but we have to ask ourselves, it seems to me, why have they done it. Why have they sacrificed the growth of the economy, which is creating this crisis that lies ahead, in order to keep building up power, military power, when there were opportunities in the early and mid-seventies to slow the growth of military spending.

We are cutting back on real spending on defense. There was détente. There were all these good things happening, Helsinki and so forth. Nevertheless, the spending went relentlessly forward. When they found they could not do that simultaneously with big increases in civilian investment, they sharply reduced civilian investment growth.

This has had a lot to do with the slowing of the economy.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Mr. Hyland, what do you think that they built up all those armed forces for?

MILITARY POWER

Mr. HYLAND. Well, I think they did it for a variety of reasons. One was, do not forget, they were catching up. They wanted equality at least, if not superiority. So for much of this period, even into the late seventies, they were still behind the United States in raw strategic weaponry.

In addition, I think these Soviet leaders, and all previous Soviet leaders, and probably all to come believe greatly in the value of military power. Military power has saved this country from total devastation in defeat in the 1940's and in previous centuries, and I think they believe that those problems that are solved by military power, such as the defeat of Germany or Japan, tend to stay solved: those that are solved politically can always be reversed and come unravelled.

So they believe greatly in having an enormous amount of military power. No leader is likely to come to power in the Soviet Union advocating unilateral disarmament and pacifism. I think we can be fairly confident of that.

I would like to add, however, I think the chances of getting an agreement with the Soviet Union on arms control are fairly good. They do not look so good right now, but I think they are improving, because if the United States carries out the programs it now envisages, by around 1986 the balance of power is going to begin to change. It is going to begin to change radically in the favor of the United States.

There is not much the Soviet Union can do about this because of the lead times on weapons and so forth. I think that is already clear to Brezhnev, who has begun to worry about this. I think it will be crystal clear to his successors that to maintain this equilibrium or to maintain whatever edges they have will be an enormous strain on the Soviet economy at a time when they cannot really afford it.

After all, Brezhnev's buildup came at a time when the economy was still growing around 4 and 5 percent, so that the two curves were

about the same. It has only been in the last 5 years that the gap has come up, and that is going to increase. If we play our cards correctly, and especially because of the problem of China, which I think is the predominant problem for the next generation of Soviet leaders, I think we can get a relatively favorable agreement.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Could I just ask the panel to comment. Mr. Hyland has put a proposition.

ARMS AGREEMENT

Mr. HOUGH. Well, obviously the question is what kind of arms agreement you are talking about. There is already an arms agreement in place in SALT II. Getting such an agreement with a few baubles added poses no problems whatsoever, I would think, with almost any leadership.

If one is talking about a more significant agreement, there is clearly the problem of the cruise missile. As both sides get a large number of unverifiable cruise missiles, it is unclear what almost any arms control agreement means. So I think some of the crucial questions are what we are willing to do, not the Soviets.

I guess in conclusion, though, I would say that we focus too much on arms control agreements. The striking thing about the major Reagan buildup, and indeed the buildup of the last couple of years of the Carter administration, is that it all takes place within SALT II. What it suggests is that the agreements we are talking about now would have very little economic impact.

The real question of economic savings takes place within the category of arms control: Is one going to go ahead with Trident, or the Soviet equivalent; is one going to have two new bombers, et cetera.

In many cases it is within the existing arms control framework, rather than in signing new arms control agreements, that I think the important decisions are going to have to be taken on both sides.

Senator MOYNIHAN. You make the point that we can offer them, in arms control, certain relief from their economic problems.

Mr. HOUGH. All I am saying is, SALT II did not limit our military expenditures. It does not, by the same token, limit their military expenditures significantly. So the decisions are, what you spend within the limits.

Senator MOYNIHAN. But you could process an arms control agreement that would limit expenditures?

Mr. HOUGH. They are not on the table. I am just suggesting that the big economic decisions involve level of military expenditures, rather than this or that agreement. I think agreements and negotiations are important in order to maintain good relations with our allies. I can see where they can solve certain types of insecurity with respect to first strike fears on both sides.

But it seems to me the thing that is radicalizing the third world now is high American interest rates and their inability to pay them on their loans and the low level of commodity prices, SALT II will not solve that. There are other decisions that have to be made that deal with what seem to be more crucial questions.

Senator MOYNIHAN. I wish I could get some of my colleagues to hear you say that what is radicalizing the third world is the high American interest rates.

Professor Rush?

Mr. RUSH. I think there are good possibilities for arms control agreements, but I do not think they will go far to alleviate the particular Soviet problems that I emphasized in my talk. I think there is some agreement on this around the table. The point is that there has been such a massive military buildup.

I would disagree with Bill Hyland that in the next 4 or 5 years there is going to be a major shift in the overall military balance. I think that is unlikely.

The big question for them, and it is an urgent question is, can they begin cutting back on military spending unilaterally? I did not say unilateral disarmament. I said unilateral cutbacks in spending. They have this massive military machine they have created. They are in a good position to cut back. I am not predicting they will. I think the odds are against it, but I think this is a live option.

Freezing military spending does not solve this crisis that they are heading for. Substantial cutbacks, particularly if made in order to influence American military policy or possibly an agreement with us, could make a beginning in solving the economic growth.

If I could say one further thing, I think there might be very rapid movement toward a concentration of power in the next couple of years if Andropov is able to succeed. I think he is already using the KGB to try to grab power. I think he would try to use it more extensively. I think there might be military encouragement for establishing a commander in chief for the armed forces, which would mean a Politburo leader with a great deal of power.

I think it is quite possible that the generational change could come more quickly; considerable turnover in the Politburo and possibly substantial concentration of power in one man within 2 or 3 years.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Now to you, sir.

Dr. CONQUEST. On the last point, I am not sure that Fedorchuk is a protégé of Andropov. He seems to be much more closely associated with the Brezhnev machine, the Shcherbitsky regime in the Ukraine.

I agree with my colleagues that the immediate solution of Soviet economic problems by even a fair measure of disarmament is not going to happen tomorrow. It is very difficult to beat intercontinental missiles into plowshares in less than 10 or 15 years. It is not going to solve their immediate problems very quickly.

But I do also think that there is a very good case for us to build up our strength and alliances and so forth for what has been described as an activist policy in attempting to get arms control. Not, as Professor Hough rightly said, not limited to the SALT type of thing, but all around the board.

That is regardless of whether a single ruler comes in or there is a temporary oligarchy for a short period of time or a longer period of time. Obviously there will be a number one eventually. But whoever is at the top—we need to exert a pressure. It adds to their own economic pressures. It gives them the carrot as well as the stick, and an extremely active policy of suggesting disarmament is certainly essential.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Well, this is a lot for us to absorb. We are going to have to produce a summary of your views for the committee.

Are there any questions which the staff has?

Mr. SIMMONS. I have one question on behalf of Senator Goldwater.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Senator Goldwater asked this question:

SOVIET STUDIES ENDOWMENT

On September 16, Senator Richard Lugar, who is a member of our Committee, introduced a bill to help ensure the nation's independent analysis of Soviet bloc countries. The bill, entitled "A Soviet Bloc Research and Training Act" is designed to help maintain a national capability to advance research and training on Soviet bloc countries and provide partial financial support for national programs.

The bill would set aside a \$50 million endowment to support advanced Soviet studies in this country, and would improve our capacity to analyze our views of the Soviet Union.

I wonder if I could ask our witnesses what they think of this approach, to basically set up an endowment which would provide funds to institutions and centers of that kind.

Mr. Hyland, I think you anticipated the question.

Mr. HYLAND. I favor it greatly. I think it is a fine idea. I would be a little uneasy about Government controls over such an endowment as the years go by. This is a very controversial field, Soviet studies. Some people have quite different views than others, and I would hope that the bill or the provisions would come out in a way that would provide for a wide variety of views.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Well, exactly. You would like to see it go to universities on terms such that universities could accept it?

Mr. HYLAND. Not only to universities.

Senator MOYNIHAN. But to other institutions.

Mr. HYLAND. To other institutions.

Senator MOYNIHAN. But with peer review. And I take it we would all be in favor.

Mr. HOUGH. You are asking members of the interest group whether Congress should give them money.

One thing that might be said is that there are alternatives here. The present funding for Soviet studies is provided by the National Council, which is financed directly out of Defense Department, and Central Intelligence money. This is far from ideal. To the extent that one could get the funds out of a congressional appropriation that ends the danger of Defense Department control over who is getting the money and reduces the danger that we look to the outside world as CIA agents. For these reasons, congressional appropriation have certain advantages.

Senator MOYNIHAN. I take your point. I never got a word out of any of you on the subject of the pipeline. Let it be noted that you can keep your confidences or your viewpoints very closely. Maybe it is that long life of watching the Soviets be very careful. They are very careful about what they say. I gather you all are as well.

I thank you very much, and Senator Goldwater asked me on the floor to express his regret that he wasn't able to join us. Normally all of us would be here. But we are going to report a summary of your views to the committee, and the transcripts will be printed.

We are very much in your debt. This is one of the most interesting and important hearings that we have had in a long time. We thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene upon the call of the Chair.]

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1982

(Declassified version of closed committee hearing—testimony of
Central Intelligence Agency)

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:56 a.m., in room S-407, the Capitol, Hon. Barry Goldwater (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Goldwater (presiding) and Moynihan (vice chairman).

Also present: Gary Schmitt, minority staff director; Victoria Toensing, majority counsel; Peter Sullivan, minority counsel; Dorthea Roberson, clerk of the committee; and Sam Bouchard, Jean Evans, Lot Cooke, Stephen Flanagan, John Elliff, Ben Marshall, and Ed Levine, staff members.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order now. We will not have many members in attendance this morning. This is the final week before the recess of the Senate and those who are here are busy with different projects on the floor. So we will start and hope that others get here shortly.

The purpose of today's closed hearing is to receive classified testimony on the issue of Soviet succession. When the vice chairman wrote to me last month and suggested this committee hold hearings on the topic of Soviet succession, I was doubtful that they would be helpful, and this is because I remembered Winston Churchill's radio broadcast back in 1939 in which he stated: "I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."

It seems to me that our intelligence analysts have enough trouble finding out what is going on inside the Soviet Union on a current basis without having to speculate on what might take place in that country in the future. And yet, this is exactly the type of difficult question that our intelligence community must attempt. These are the hard questions. These are the questions that the American policymaker needs to have answered.

I want to thank my colleague, Senator Moynihan, for calling for these hearings. The fact is, we need to know about the Soviet succession. If we do not know what is going to happen in the Soviet Union in the future, we cannot make intelligent decisions about our relations with that country. So intelligence analysis in the area is vitally important.

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STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS B. DIAMOND, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SOVIET ANALYSIS; BARRY STEVENSON, CHIEF, CURRENT SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SOVIET ANALYSIS; KAY OLIVER, OFFICE OF SOVIET ANALYSIS; JAMES BARRY, CHIEF, POLICY ANALYSIS DIVISION, OFFICE OF SOVIET ANALYSIS; ACCOMPANIED BY MARY BROWN, LEGISLATIVE LIAISON

Mr. DIAMOND. Thank you, Senator.

It is a pleasure to appear before this committee on the subject of Soviet succession. I am Douglas Diamond, the Office of Soviet Analysis, and I have with me several colleagues who are expert on various related topics to the succession issues.

Mr. Barry Stevenson will lead off with a presentation that will run close to probably a half hour. Of course, he and others stand ready to respond to questions at any time.

Mr. STEVENSON. Before I begin, I will just drop a copy of the Politburo apparatus in front of people since at times it is hard to tell the players without a program.

A quick glance at the top of the list will give you the rundown of the current Politburo, although I think it still has Suslov on it. He died recently, so it hasn't been changed since.

We understand that there is some interest in how a succession actually takes place in the Soviet Union and who plays the major role. I will therefore begin with an assessment of Mr. Brezhnev's political fortunes as we see them at the moment, and the informal rules that govern the succession process. From there, I will touch on the role of the various institutions in a succession environment, the attitudes of a couple of men who we see as the likely successors to Brezhnev, and conclude with a few comments on what we see as the major policy issues confronting the new Soviet leaders and what we know about their attitudes.

On the surface, Brezhnev is still the preeminent party and state leader, and it would probably still be very risky for anyone to mount an open challenge against him. But for the first time since he consolidated his power, well over a decade ago, we believe there are indications of a substantial disparity between his formal authority and power and the amount of power he really wields behind the scenes. We believe his health is deteriorating over time, that he is more vulnerable politically than ever before, and that his Politburo colleagues have begun individually and probably even collectively to prepare for a future without him.

We believe, in short, that the political succession is underway in the Soviet Union, even if Brezhnev is still in power, and we would not have said that 1 year ago.

We believe there are several reasons for this. The first is the state of his health. When he was alert and active, his consensual style of leadership provided a piece of the political action and job security for the colleagues he came into power with. With his stamina failing and his mortality increasingly evident, it becomes prudent for these same colleagues to begin to make preparations for their futures without him. Available evidence indicates that this is exactly what they are doing.

Second, the passing of the old guard has begun to crack the facade of leadership unity that we have seen for a long time. If you think back to the past decade of the senior Soviet leaders, you tend to think of Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorniy, Suslov. The only one of these that is left is Brezhnev.

The most important recent event was the passing of the senior party ideologist—in some senses the conscience of the Soviet party—Mikhail Suslov, last January. His removal took a pivotal figure out of the core of the Soviet leadership and it necessitated personnel moves to take over his duties that opened up political maneuvering that we see continuing today.

Brezhnev's role in decisionmaking has apparently lessened to some extent recently. The roles of several other of his Politburo colleagues have expanded. We now have derogatory rumors floating around the Soviet Union and getting to foreigners about Brezhnev's children, about corruption in Brezhnev's family. There is indirect public criticism of Brezhnev himself. And all of these things suggest some breakdown in party discipline, and particularly, an erosion of Brezhnev's image within the country.

More importantly—and this is where this sort of thing translates into action—we believe that Brezhnev has been unable to dictate some very key personnel decisions lately. Some examples: Yuriy Andropov, the former head of the KGB, has moved out of the KGB into the powerful Party Secretariat where he is able to challenge Brezhnev's very close ally and protegee, Konstantin Chernenko. His replacement as head of the KGB could easily have been the First Deputy Chairman of the KGB, whom we know to have been a longtime Brezhnev ally, but it wasn't. They pulled a regional official out of the Ukraine who, we are getting increasing reporting, has career ties to Andropov, and made him the KGB chief. His name is Fedorchuk.

As a consequence of these and other personnel changes, we believe that Brezhnev's control of the KGB, which is essential to any Soviet leader's security, no longer seems to be assured. There have been indications, as well, of opposition to some of Brezhnev's domestic policies recently, and perhaps of leadership conflict or indecision on several areas of foreign policy as well.

Now, in recounting this, I don't mean to imply that Brezhnev is now only a figurehead or even that he is a negligible factor in Soviet policy. This is clearly not so.

What we are seeing is that, for the first time, Brezhnev's political vulnerability is on the increase, and his influence is waning, and we do not expect either of these trends to change.

Now, regarding the succession itself, as you are undoubtedly aware, when the time comes for a change at the top in the Soviet Union, one of the basic flaws and weaknesses of their system is a lack of any constitutional procedure for the transfer of power. In effect, once you get power in the Soviet Union, you hold onto it until you can't anymore and someone takes it away from you. That can create a lot of problems at the time that taking away occurs.

It doesn't mean, however, that anything can happen. There are limits to what can happen. There are a number of collectively shared understandings that govern the behavior of Soviet leaders in a succession environment and define the limits of politically possible succession outcomes.

In the first place, the Politburo will choose the new leader from among its own. No member can seize power and make himself the leader as such although, of course, by adroit political maneuvering, he can help shape the outcome. In their selection of a successor, the top leadership is influenced by various organizations and institutional groups, including their own party and government constituencies and the military hierarchy.

The potential consequences of backing a loser are no longer what they once were in the Soviet environment. If you back a loser, you can lose your perquisites of office, but you are not going to lose your life in the current environment, which does create a bit more order to the process.

Competition among contenders, therefore, takes place among a certain amount of self-imposed constraints. The leaders have a collective interest in seeing that the arena for debate is confined to the Politburo, I mean, just for sheer self-interest and for increasing their own political advantage and in keeping the process from seeping out into the public or among other elite groups.

So while there are no constitutional procedures for changing, there still are informal agreements that will be in effect and will influence what happens.

Now, if Brezhnev should die in office, an inner core of leaders on the Politburo will meet immediately and it will be shortly followed by a meeting of the whole 13-member Politburo. The chart you have has 14 members because we haven't put a new chart out since Suslov died.

Brezhnev's death, arrangements for his funeral would be publicly announced, probably by the Central Committee, which would meet a few days to ratify the Politburo's choice of a successor.

The Stalin precedent, which was near-panic among the remaining leaders, is simply not relevant today. The suddenness of Stalin's death, his dictatorial style, made the event much more traumatic than it will be today. Brezhnev's consensual approach to decisionmaking and his long-deteriorating health have given his colleagues plenty of time to prepare.

If Brezhnev were to be—yes, sir.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Mr. Stevenson, the Politburo doesn't have a Chairman as such, but it does have a General Secretary.

Mr. STEVENSON. That's correct. He acts as Chairman.

Senator MOYNIHAN. So the real choice is for General Secretary.

Mr. STEVENSON. That's right. That's what they are choosing.

Senator MOYNIHAN. But in effect, the Politburo will make that choice as the Secretariat is subsidiary to it.

Mr. STEVENSON. As the Secretariat is the administrative arm, so the Politburo indeed will make that choice.

Senator MOYNIHAN. And the General Secretary presides at the Politburo.

Mr. STEVENSON. That's correct, that's correct. And as in any organization, if you can chair it, you can certainly go a long way in affecting what it does, as witness—if his colleagues decided to remove Brezhnev, if he did not die in office, any maneuvering to build support for this action would have to be done covertly. The party rules prohibit factionalism, which gives the leader the advantage of moving

against anyone who tries to put a cabal together against him. Premature exposure of any such maneuvering would enable Brezhnev, using his powers as Chairman, in all likelihood to defeat it.

But once the Politburo reached a decision as a whole, covertly, to remove Brezhnev, it would be too late for him to reverse the verdict, providing his opponents had made some arrangement to control his ability or his ability to communicate with others.

They failed to do that in 1957 when they tried to remove Khrushchev. Even though there was a majority on the Politburo to remove him, he was able to appeal to the Central Committee as a whole where he had greater support, where he had majority support, and he succeeded and saved himself. That's the only time that has ever occurred, and I am sure the lesson was well learned by any who are on the Politburo today and would want to remove Brezhnev.

But it is just such a situation that makes firm control of the KGB and its warning apparatus essential. And as I noted a couple minutes ago, we have reason to believe that Brezhnev's control of this organization is not as tight as it once was. And that is one of the reasons why we feel he is more politically vulnerable today than previously.

Now, it is unlikely that Brezhnev would step down of his own volition. In over 20 successions in the Communist regime since 1917, there has not been a single one that was—a single case in which a party head had relinquished power on his own, and we are quite doubtful that they would begin with Brezhnev.

It is possible, though, that his colleagues, if he became so infirm that he couldn't carry on, would choose to remove him, and would give him the option of stepping down with honors and making it look like it was his own retirement. There is a chance he would acquiesce in this. He is a very vain and proud man and very conscious of his place in history. So we could have a situation that looked as though he retired voluntarily. We doubt that he would do so.

As far as the institutions that have an influence in the succession period, the Secretariat, which you have just made reference to, Mr. Senator, does not play a direct role in the process, as you had suggested, but the succession contenders on the Politburo who are secretaries have a significant advantage, and that is that the Secretariat is responsible for the appointment and removal of party regional and central officials, and therefore, the members who are on the Secretariat have a strong power base and a lot of patronage, and it is for this reason that we think that the secretaries on the Politburo have the signal advantage over the others, and this has proven to be the case in past Soviet successions.

Senator MOYNIHAN. And yet when Andropov moved up, he dropped out.

Mr. STEVENSON. No; he dropped his chairmanship of the KGB, which is a state organization, and became a secretary.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Became a secretary. I see. We don't have this.

Mr. STEVENSON. I'm sorry. This is a chart that has not been brought up to date.

Ms. OLIVER. Senators, the way it usually works—not to get too much into detail—is that there are three, four, or five senior secretaries who hold membership on the Politburo as well. They supervise the work

of a group of junior secretaries who have more specific responsibilities, so that Suslov, for example, supervised several junior secretaries, one of whom dealt with domestic ideology and propaganda. Another dealt with relations with foreign Communist parties in countries outside of Eastern Europe, non-ruling Communist parties, in other words. That is Ponomarev. Another who dealt with relations with Communist parties in Eastern Europe.

Mr. STEVENSON. As for nonparty institutions in the succession, in differing ways, the government, the KGB, and the military all have influence in the succession outcome. But none of these three groups pose any credible alternative to party rule at this time.

There are strong limitations on the KGB's influence, for instance.

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned military and KGB. May I ask you, is there any indication which of those two groups have the most power?

Mr. STEVENSON. I guess, without putting too fine an edge on it, one would almost have to say how you would define power. The military certainly has—well, to give a simple answer, my answer would be the military, and I could go into a number of different reasons for giving that answer, and one or another of my colleagues might even disagree with me, but I would say the military, for a lot of different reasons.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the fact that their old military leaders have been dying off, and they haven't been engaged in military actions enough to develop new ones, had any effect on this?

Mr. STEVENSON. I will pass that question to my colleague here who can speak very well to that.

Mr. BARRY. Thank you.

Senator, the military has done a somewhat better job than the party hierarchy of rejuvenating its own ranks. There are a number of younger and very vigorous military officers who seem to have gotten themselves into good positions, not only in terms of upholding their own professional interests, but in terms of good relations with the Politburo and party rulers.

The Minister of Defense, Dmitriy Ustinov, who is about a year younger than Brezhnev, is not a professional military man. He is a former party secretary, and he came up through the supervision of defense industries. Below Ustinov, there are a number of senior officials in the Ministry of Defense itself that have moved into their positions relatively recently. There are a number of hangers-on, people who have hung on for some time, but there are a few more recent entrants.

I suppose that the most prominent of these has been Ogarkov, the Chief of the General Staff, who has been a rather vocal proponent of Soviet military power, rather prolific writer, and we think continues to enjoy high level political support as well as staunch support from the military establishment.

Mr. STEVENSON. And was a member of the first Soviet SALT delegation, too, I might add.

Excuse me.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Just a question. Does the military command in the Soviet Union begin with the Minister of Defense?

Mr. BARRY. We usually define the military high command to begin with the Minister of Defense. Unlike the organization for military

it was in part reaction to that, that we have seen Andropov moving ahead.

We believe that Andropov and Chernenko are the two prime contenders right now. They are both secretaries, central secretaries. They are both on the Politburo. Romanov suffers from the problem that he is still out of town. He is still over in Leningrad. He is not at the center where he can elbow and jockey and gouge and fight his own interests better.

I will finish up with a few comments on that, just as far as the roles of the organizations in the succession. I think Kay put her finger on the KGB's primary role. Its influence expands at the time of a succession because of what it does control. That doesn't necessarily hold. Soviet leaders learned their lesson from Beria's use of the KGB in 1953, and after they executed him, they moved an awful lot of Komsomol and party officials into the KGB and put them in positions of power and not just KGB official career operatives, and they have been very careful to maintain that situation since.

The new head of the KGB is out of the Ukraine. He is not a Politburo member. He is not even a member of the Central Committee.

SENATOR MOYNIHAN. What is his name?

MR. STEVENSON. His name is Fedorchuk. It is F-e-d-o-r-c-h-u-k.

We cannot see him playing an independent role in the succession.

As for the military, it is not likely to act unilaterally in a succession environment. It has no tradition of Bonapartism in the Soviet Union. Marshall Zhukov's flirtation with power in 1957 was an exception, not at all the rule, but it can play an important facilitating role in a transition period, either if Brezhnev is ousted or if he dies. In 1957, when the cabal against Khrushchev almost succeeded, Khrushchev was able to get Zhukov to have the military to fly Central Committee members in from all over the Soviet Union and assemble them for the vote which saved him.

Now, certainly everyone remembers that precedent, and that would be guarded against in any attempt to remove Brezhnev now.

But the military's influence is largely due, I would say, to the substantial congruence of outlooks and objectives between it and the top political leaders in the Soviet Union. Ustinov is held in very high regard by his Politburo peers, and he is also, of course, the Minister of Defense.

As Kay mentioned, by defining national security interests—with access to information that allows him to do that—the military, it is not hard to imagine at all putting up an objection to one of the contenders' platforms.

So it has grown in prestige under Brezhnev. I mean, it has grown in funding under Brezhnev. The heightened Soviet international role and so on, we would expect, would give the military considerable influence in a succession environment, but not control and not as a challenger to the party for power.

Now, regarding the players which I just mentioned a little earlier on, there are a couple of interesting things about the current cast of characters. For one thing, there is no one to play the role of senior executive and statesman that Suslov apparently played in 1964. That removes a bit of a moderating influence on the struggle for succession. There is also no really well qualified candidate to replace Brezhnev.

operations in this country, I believe the Minister of Defense generally is considered to be an integral part of the high command.

I think basically in response to your earlier question, the Soviet military does indeed face a challenge of rejuvenating its leadership. There is a prospect of impending generational change, but the military establishment itself seems to have been somewhat better rejuvenated in recent years than the political establishment.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me inject a thought here. It has been my feeling for some time that the younger element in the Soviet Union are beginning to move up, and to me that is encouraging. Are you encouraged in any way to think that a new leader, whoever that might be, would be a younger man? I am speaking of someone below 70, someone in his 50's, possibly.

Mr. STEVENSON. We do not see a new leader right now in his 50's. Almost certainly, the new leader to replace Brezhnev is going to come out of the inner core of older men now in the Politburo.

Now, it is conceivable you could get into a real deadlock in the fighting for the job and there could be a younger, compromise candidate somewhere. But we would feel that at this point, that is a long shot, a very long shot. Brezhnev was very cautious in his personnel policies. He regulated Soviet cadre policy very carefully, in reaction, in part, to the wild swings in policy under Khrushchev, which made an awful lot of party officials very nervous about their security, and for the most part you could say that in the hard-core cadre, Soviet party jobs, right down through the party, for the last 15 years or so, no one has been leapfrogging anyone else. Someone who is a party secretary, when he dies, his first subordinate moves up one notch, and his subordinate moves up one notch. The result is that the age of the Soviet elite organs—the Central Committee, the Central Auditing Commission, and so on—are far the highest they have ever been.

Senator MOYNIHAN. The only member of the Politburo under 60 is Romanov.

Mr. STEVENSON. Gorbachev now, since Gorbachev has moved up. Gorbachev is in his 50's.

Senator MOYNIHAN. I want to claim right now my candidate for General Secretary is Romanov. The fact that his first name happens to be Aleksandr is—

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, people have opined that having a Romanov back in charge of the Soviet Union would be a refreshing thing, but he has got some powerful hurdles in front of him.

In a couple of minutes, we pretty much have believed that at the moment there are two clear front runners, and these two are Andropov and Chernenko. For the last decade, Andre Kirilenko, who, you will note on your chart, is the secretary in charge of heavy industry, has acted as Brezhnev's deputy in effect.

For the last year or so, we have seen a lot of indications, in fact, over a year, that Kirilenko's political stature has been slipping. He has had severe health problems for the first time. Politically, it has become pretty apparent that Brezhnev has been moving Chernenko, who has been close to him for a long, long time, into the fore, and Kirilenko has been slipping out of sight.

At the time that Suslov died, there was a lot of evidence that Brezhnev attempted to move Chernenko forward very quickly. We feel that

If we look at previous Soviet leaders, they have been rich in party organizational experience. They have run—they have had line party duties. They have run significant party organizations. They have had experience in the economic area as well. Nobody on the scene now in the Politburo has the breadth of experience that Khrushchev had in 1953 or that Brezhnev had in 1964, not the kind of experience that traditionally we feel makes for a Soviet leader.

Precedent nevertheless suggests that the successor will be one of the senior secretaries in the center, and at this particular time, that is Andropov, Chernenko, Kirilenko, Gorbachev, and each of these men has significant liabilities.

As I mentioned earlier, evidence indicates that at the moment, only Andropov and Chernenko are the really serious contenders, so I will just discuss the two of them specifically at the moment. If you have any questions about any of the others, we will be happy to try to answer them.

Andropov's KGB background could work either for or against him. Nothing is ever neat and clean in politics, as we all know. It depends on how he is able to play it.

In past years, we said that Andropov could not be a serious contender for power until he left the KGB role, in effect, until he had been laundered out of his KGB role. Well, that of course has now happened. He has left it; he is on the Secretariat. But memories of the purge years still run strong in the Soviet Union. You know the age of the senior people. We all know about the violence of the purge eras, and there is no question that they remember this. Some might remember it enough to make Andropov's ascendancy distasteful.

On the other hand, right now we have a situation in the Soviet Union when there is a heightened concern over popular discontent, over lack of ideological preparation. You hear a lot of Soviets saying, "what this country needs is another good boss, you know, good old Joe Stalin. By God, when we had him, we had someone in charge."

Well, Andropov's KGB background could benefit him in that kind of an environment. So on balance, I think we come down believing that his KGB background probably won't really hurt him, and it could help him.

Chernenko originally was seen by a lot of people, and apparently is still seen by a lot of Soviets as just Brezhnev's creature. He has provided him his staff support throughout his chairmanship, but he has also been involved in a pretty wide range of party activities in recent years which have necessitated a good deal of responsibility. All the other contenders, we think, have more serious handicaps.

Now, whoever does take over after Brezhnev, and at some future time, if Brezhnev lives longer, some other contender might move further forward than he is now, we doubt that—he won't come in with all the power that Brezhnev has acquired himself over a period of time.

Senator MOYNIHAN. None does.

Mr. STEVENSON. That's right, that's right. It just isn't going to be that way. The fact that none of them has a really strong, clear claim to succeed him probably also is going to work against him. They might have to strike a lot of compromises.

Senator MOYNIHAN. None of them does. It is a characteristic of the system.

Ms. OLIVER. But we think this successor will have less power than any previous successor at the time he succeeded.

Mr. STEVENSON. Both Brezhnev and Khrushchev had a lot more experience and a lot more patronage and people accountable to them out there on which they could build support than we see any of the people right now who are positioned to replace Brezhnev having.

We figure it takes at least 5 years, and it has been in every case for any leader to really pull it all together. But in addition, it might be tougher for any leader to freewheel than previously. Brezhnev, as I indicated earlier, institutionalized an awful lot of cadre policies. Debate and handling of issues was much more formalized under Brezhnev than under any other leader. By putting restraints on the most blatant kinds of patronage, he probably made it more difficult for a new leader quickly to hand out a lot of plums and build support.

So we think that the contender probably has a tougher row for this variety of reasons to build his support fast and take charge quickly than either Brezhnev or Khrushchev did.

Now, there's a number of problems that Brezhnev is leaving behind that are probably going to make it pretty tough for him to handle without being able to accrue a lot of power pretty quickly. Brezhnev's chief legacy, I would say, certainly as we see it from the West, and I think probably as they see it from the Soviet Union, is an ambitious policy of military spending that made the Soviet Union a genuine world power and world factor but which is increasingly difficult for the Soviet Union to support economically.

With the removal of the terror and the waning of the influence of ideology domestically, he also tried to buy popular quiescence and support through incremental improvements in the population's well-being, and when we look at the Soviet Union's economic problems today, we have got to remember that for most of his period in power—and this goes back to 1964—Brezhnev succeeded in providing a Soviet version of guns for the state and butter for the populace. The standard of living in the Soviet Union increased significantly in Brezhnev's era, along with that significant buildup that we are all so well aware of.

The problem is that with the slowing in economic growth over the last several years and the consequent near stagnation of per capita income and consumption has translated into what we see as a general malaise in Soviet society, and one that shows.

It is manifest in a lot of ways, the growing consumption of alcohol, the severe alcohol problem in the country, increasing labor turnover. We are getting reports of sporadic strike activity, I mean, nothing like Poland. We can't jump to that, but nevertheless, in flourishing black-market corruption and cynicism. You talk to Soviets, and it is amazing how consistent the reports are that, well, things were getting better for a long time, but they sure don't seem to have gotten better recently. And many, in fact, think that they have slipped.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you a question at this point.

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any indications that the depressed state of their economy could have an effect on what we are discussing?

Could it give any increased power to the younger element who always are the least happy group in any society when the economy is bad?

Mr. STEVENSON. My answer to that—and I will then pass the response over to Kay, who is more of an expert in that area than I am—is that given the current power structure, in the immediate term, and the concentration of power in the hands of the older cadre, I doubt that the attitudes of the younger people could make themselves felt in this environment we are talking about right now—but I don't know, Kay, if you have got any different view on that.

Ms. OLIVER. Well, two points. One, an extension of what Barry was saying. I think that the cadre policies of not removing officials for political reasons but only if they violate party discipline or in cases of just gross incompetence, this creates or makes it more difficult to bring in large numbers of young people.

On the other hand, as a result of these very cadre policies and the near stagnation of turnover, there are a lot of officials that are going to die or retire in the next few years. There is a bulge at the top. And as this happens, of course, younger people will be coming in.

The other point is that I am not sure that—well, I gather, Senator Goldwater, that you feel that the younger generation is sort of the hope of the future, and I guess we hope that it is the hope of the future, but we are not entirely confident that that generation's outlook will be significantly different from the generation they will be replacing, or at least that the outlook, although somewhat different, may not be particularly better from a U.S. national interest point of view.

The generation that will be moving into some of these jobs certainly is more sophisticated; it knows more about the outside world. Officials at that level or at that age group have traveled more to the West. They know a lot more. Whether or not this makes them more liberal or more interested in accommodation with the West is, I think, an open question. There are some indications that some of these people, who are below age 60, actually have a keener feeling of resentment to the West than some of the older people.

Another thing is, you don't know exactly how to weigh the fact that these people have not gone through World War II. There may be a tendency on the part of many younger officials who came of age in a period when the Soviet Union was building its international power, to have a great deal more, a greater feeling of confidence and a desire to cut a figure on the world stage and assert Soviet power globally than some of the older generation who went through all of the horrors of World War II and saw what war can do. And although we certainly don't think that Brezhnev is incapable of—well, even Brezhnev probably had some sort of, or has some sort of, emotional response and revulsion to the experiences of World War II and a desire, a strong desire, to prevent that sort of thing from happening to his country again. The younger generation might not have those same views.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am prompted to ask the question, because I worked with the younger Russians during part of World War II. Now, of course, that was 40 years ago. I found them to be very knowledgeable about the Communist Party, about the Politburo and about

how their government operated. They always maintained the historic Russian attitude that they would protect the homeland.

Now, since that time, I have sensed a change in the thinking of the younger generation of the Soviets, as we are sensing a change in our own. I do not like to use the word "revolution," but I think it has been the world's experience that if you don't change an economic system to satisfy the majority of people so they can live better, you will have problems.

Ms. OLIVER. One thing to remember is that the group of people in the younger generation who will be in important positions are not at all typical of their generation. I mean, the party grows its own. They have come up in an environment and have been imbued and indoctrinated, if you will—not to put too fine a point on it—with an outlook that is much more akin to that of the generation they will be replacing than it is to that of their peers in the broader population.

Mr. STEVENSON. I might add, though, Senator, the concern you have just expressed—I wouldn't say concern, but the situation you have just sketched out that if you don't meet, if you don't change the system somehow or other to meet aspirations, you are going to have trouble is an issue that is worrying, that is on the mind of the Soviet leadership today. The Soviet leadership is worried about the political implications, I mean, as any Marxist would be; he is worried about the political implications of any event, is concerned about the growth of cynicism and a lowering of the growth of labor productivity and so on which are in part reactions to a growing unhappiness with well-being.

Certainly we would estimate that it has a long way to go before it could come out into open, blatant political pressure on the leadership, but it is an issue that is concerning to the Soviet leadership today. I mean, the vigilance campaigns that they are running, commentary and warning against religious influence in the wake of what happened in Poland, anticorruption campaigns on a vast scale, run right out of the Politburo, all suggest that these things are bothering them. They are worried about the implications.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, there is a great difference between the political thinking of the Soviets and the political thinking of the United States. We want it to happen yesterday. They don't give a damn when it happens. Someday it could. That is what I am looking at, the long-range implication of the younger people knowing and increasingly knowing that their hard work will not produce for them what lesser work in our country produces for our people.

Mr. STEVENSON. And that is on their minds.

The CHAIRMAN. How long will they stand still for it?

Mr. STEVENSON. The ability of the Soviets to hunker down and put up with something that is pretty bad for a long, long time is something that is just no part of the Western experience.

The CHAIRMAN. I'll grant you that.

Ms. OLIVER. Although, of course, the Soviet Union is not made up merely of Russians; there are a lot of non-Russian groups who don't identify with the regime, and where consumer problems or economic grievances coincide with nationality grievances, the resentment of Russian domination, then there is a much greater potential for problems that could be viewed as very serious in terms of societal demands.

The CHAIRMAN. The Russian is actually in the minority.

Ms. OLIVER. Well, their statistics still indicate they are slightly in the majority, but of course, you know, we don't want to get too hung up with majority and minority because the Russian empire throughout most of the 19th century contained a minority of Russians. You know, as long as we are not talking about a democratic country, the numerical majority may not matter that much, but it is true that the demographic trends overall pose a major problem.

Mr. STEVENSON. However, the Slavs are still considerably in the majority, if you are talking Ukrainians and Byelorussians, and so on.

Let me—I'll just say a few words about what we know about the positions of the two major contenders on some of these policy issues which I have just laid out. For the present, Chernenko appears to champion increased spending in the consumer sector in an effort to raise worker productivity, while most of the rest of the inner core of the leadership seems to advocate continued concentration in heavy industry investment.

Chernenko, as I mentioned earlier, has espoused a somewhat populist image, stressing the need to keep in touch with the masses and be sensitive to worker concerns and well-being. In fact, Chernenko has in part explained the problems in Poland to the fact that the regime got out of touch with the masses.

Other leaders, however, are stressing the need for increased ideological and propaganda work to counteract worker malaise and dissatisfaction.

Andropov, not surprisingly, has been concerned with Western ideological penetration and the question of internal discipline. In fact, as I have just noted, the harshest domestic crackdown on dissidents that we have seen in a long time is now underway and while you cannot prove anything conclusively by this, it appears to coincide with Andropov's rise in prominence.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Mr. Stevenson, our problem is that each of us has party caucuses. The chairman had to go, but my party caucus is of much less consequence than his.

Mr. STEVENSON. I have about 5 more minutes of prepared presentation, so we can do what ever you will.

I would mention, as I think the last point may have gotten lost, that we do believe this crackdown seems to have coincided with Andropov's rise in prominence. We can't say it is therefore because of it, but some Soviet dissidents tend to say to themselves, well, it is all because of the head of the KGB, but he would not be acting on his own.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Yes, yes, that is—we have assumed that Andropov put his own man in to succeed him.

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, not certain, but it is looking that way.

Senator MOYNIHAN. What do you mean by the crackdown? Do you mean the closing down of the Helsinki Watch?

Mr. STEVENSON. That's right, and much rougher tactics than we have seen in a long time, physical beating up of people, not just Soviet citizens but foreigners. I mean, there was the Canadian group who were roughed up and beaten by what were almost certainly KGB thugs several weeks ago, much harsher intimidation of the Jewish refuseniks, just simply the squeezing down almost completely of Jewish emigration right now.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Jewish emigration has just about trickled off?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, it is down. It is peanuts now.

Senator MOYNIHAN. If I could ask, what does that mean? I have never quite understood why they don't want to allow emigration of people whom they perceive to be a problem. What does it mean when they close down Jewish migration? What do they think we are doing?

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, Jewish emigration, I mean, one of the principles of Soviet control, odd as this may sound because what you said is completely logical, is the fact that you just can't get up and leave when you like it. This is true for every group. It suggests to the leadership some loss of real control of the population at large. You have got—once you allow people to start to leave, among other things, it means that more and more are encouraged to agitate to leave, and that agitation in what is essentially a totalitarian regime—

Senator MOYNIHAN. This policy is pointed toward the masses as opposed to the odd troublemaker.

Mr. STEVENSON. The odd troublemaker, throwing out the odd troublemaker, that's right. So I mean this has implications, and of course, once the Jews started to leave, the Germans and the Armenians also wanted to leave.

Ms. OLIVER. Fundamentalist Christians.

Mr. STEVENSON. Fundamentalist Christians wanted to leave. And to that kind of society, it is disturbing, and of course, with all the rest of this, of course, there is also the cutting down of the telephone communication links to the West. I mean, the main weapon of the refuse-niks and those who wanted to emigrate and so on was publicity in the West that could come to their aid, but if you could cut down their links, you could cut down their publicity. So we see it pretty much as all of a piece.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Has that continued?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, yes.

Senator MOYNIHAN. So that looks like a policy in place.

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, sir.

Ms. OLIVER. They are saying it is a technical problem, but it may take several years to straighten it out.

Mr. STEVENSON. We are dubious.

Senator MOYNIHAN. How would you quantify what happened?

Mr. STEVENSON. What they have done is cut down the ability for Soviet citizens to direct-dial to the West or for anybody to direct-dial from the West into the Soviet Union, except in a few cases. Our Embassy can still direct-dial in and out. So, into certain organizations, you can still direct-dial, but that is it. Naturally, that closes down a terrific means of communication.

In the area of foreign policy, certainly to be another place of intense concern the Soviets have not gotten the payoff from Brezhnev's policies of relaxation of tensions of the West and arms control that they clearly hoped would be the case a decade ago. Chernenko, right now, stands out as the main spokesman for these aspects of Brezhnev's foreign policies. He is significantly publicly ahead of the rest of his colleagues.

Andropov speaks out far less on foreign policy issues, although when he has spoken, he has strongly supported the intervention in Afghanistan, and not surprisingly, because of his KGB connection,

spoken out strongly for firm ideological control of foreign Communist parties and the general world Communist movement.

The final point I would note, and that is prospects for policy change in a succession environment. We think the complexity of problems that they now face are going to make this pretty difficult to unify on a common approach to significant departures. In previous successions, we have had a lot of significant changes, even during the succession years. After Stalin's death, the new leadership did a lot. It purged the KGB, it ended the political terror—remember the virgin lands' efforts in Kazakhstan? It ended the Korean war. It mended things with the Yugoslavs. All of this you would say was before Khrushchev really had fully consolidated his power.

Brezhnev did a number of things. Khrushchev had made an enormous change in party domestic policy, bifurcated the party, in effect, into a portion responsible for industry and a portion responsible for agriculture. Brezhnev swept all of this aside, put the party back together, sharply raised investment in agriculture, began the heavy military buildup opposite China, which we tend to lose sight of here in the West but which was a significant undertaking, and actively supported North Vietnam's effort to take over the South which Khrushchev had just washed his hands of.

This time we believe the policy choices are more difficult and the options somewhat more limited. With the economic slowdown in large part due to past low rates of capital renewal, and due to resource and manpower shortages, it is uncertain that a significant economic reform, even if wholeheartedly implemented, could really move gross national product growth ahead. This lack of slack in the economy reduces the leadership's leeway in dealing with the various distress sectors of the economy, transportation, agriculture, and so on. It is difficult to have the real capital for tradeoffs without severely hurting someone else in the current environment.

Cuts in the military budget, of course, would probably be seen as jeopardizing two decades of terrible effort to become a legitimate world actor and pull even with the United States, and cuts in consumption would further lower the growth in labor productivity and thus threaten to erode the regime's legitimacy, as Brezhnev tried to make it.

I think both as Kay has mentioned, military and civilian leaders have growing confidence in the U.S.S.R.'s ability to compete in the world in at least selected areas. I think they will find it hard to forgo opportunities. They have built themselves a very sophisticated foreign policy apparatus that will provide continuity between the group that leaves and the group that takes over.

If they really would try to pour a lot more into the military, they would, of course; have to cut consumer sectors even more.

We cannot exclude the possibility that a mover and shaker like Khrushchev would enter the stage. No one expected him to do what he did. At the moment, I would say that we find it unlikely. We think that the interlocking nature of a lot of their problems makes really bold initiatives difficult, particularly for someone who won't have Brezhnev's amount of power for probably the next 5 years or so.

We also should remember that economic reform doesn't automatically mean political reform or political liberalism, even if it were

undertaken. There are a lot of efforts at economic reform that could in fact require the leadership to tighten political screws in that country. As they started to squeeze out excess labor and poor performers and all of this sort of thing, you could have political repression increase as economic measures, reforms, take place.

Precedent might hold, but in previous successions, the contender with the most conservative policy or program has triumphed over the one with more liberal tendencies. But as I mentioned before, he then has tended to modify his program once in power. Khrushchev took over a number of liberal elements of Malenkov's program. Brezhnev coopted a number of the things that Kosygin tended to speak out for when they first took power.

So, in a succession environment, it will be necessary to avoid any hasty judgments as the new political leadership takes hold, or over what we think we hear they saying when they initially take office.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Well, this has been informative. One other question—and this is almost a personal question, but I thought the committee would be interested in an answer for the record. I have been arguing—and either everybody agrees with me or no one has noticed—that, with the succession process underway in the Soviet Union and the 5-year period of adjustment and consolidation that is likely, it will probably not be possible to reach a serious arms reduction agreement during this period. Am I right that Brezhnev did not move into Stalin's office until 1972?

Ms. OLIVER. That's right.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Well, that's like waiting 8 years to go into the Oval Office.

Does this leave any prospect for a serious arms reduction agreement? It would have to be well into the end of this decade. I mean, what newly emerged, confirmed General Secretary is going to go off to Geneva and sign an agreement with President Bush to dismantle all of the SS-18's and come back and tell that to the Minister of Defense?

Mr. STEVENSON. I will let my colleague have the first crack.

Mr. BARRY. This is, as you said, largely personal.

First of all, I think that the Soviets are very tough negotiators on these issues. They are hanging tough now, and that there is little prospect that this leadership or any immediate successor leadership will feel enough economic pressure or political pressure internally to want to make major concessions in arms negotiations beyond what they are already putting forward. I think there will be an increasing squeeze on them—

Senator MOYNIHAN. But suppose they wanted to? There is an additional problem that a person newly come to leadership has less ability to do that.

Mr. BARRY. Certainly has less ability to drive through any kind of unpopular decision. So it would be necessary that there be a general consensus which could conceivably rise out of economic pressure.

Senator MOYNIHAN. And then my second point is: the generation of the Second World War has genuinely feared war, and at some level wanted arms limitation, nuclear arms limitation, and this has certainly not been a marginal ideological thing. It is possible that the new Romanovs will not have that fear. They never knew Stalingrad—it is

not a real memory for them. I am saying that the next generation, that new generation might be more difficult to negotiate arms agreements with than the present one.

Mr. BARRY. Well, there certainly is a lot of room to speculate on the attitudes of succeeding generations. I have heard that argument run both ways. I have heard it both ways. There is certainly no intelligence information that helps you decide between them.

Mr. STEVENSON. I would make one other comment, and that is, there is no question but what they are very tough negotiators. They know how to negotiate. There is no question about that, that it would be tough, as Jim said, for a new leader to ram through an unpopular agreement. On the other hand, they do have an incentive now they didn't have a dozen years ago, and that is an economy that is making it more difficult.

Senator MOYNIHAN. This might be—

Mr. STEVENSON. That's right, and also I would say it depends on what kind of a deal they think they can strike. I mean, after all, Marshal Ogarkov helped negotiate the SALT I agreement, and that sure didn't hurt his career. He became Chief of Staff afterward.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Well, I just make the point that the Russians don't know how to negotiate. I don't think they have ever negotiated anything.

Mr. STEVENSON. You mean they have sat tight until they got what they wanted.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Yes. SALT I was their 5-year plan, wasn't it, except for the ABM?

Mr. STEVENSON. I was going to say the ABM Treaty, I think, was a legitimate arms control treaty.

Certainly people would argue that neither side ever gave up anything they didn't intend to do anyhow with the interim agreement on offensive weapons.

Senator MOYNIHAN. I don't see that the Soviets have negotiated a damned thing.

Well, now, that is a long and a different subject altogether, but in any event, a newly arrived leader is not likely to negotiate something different.

Ms. OLIVER. Well, let me make one point here. The long laundry list of changes that Barry mentioned, there have been fairly major policy changes during the last two successions before the leadership question was fully resolved. That does indicate that consensus can develop for a policy, a major policy initiative. It is not inconceivable, and they may agree, and there has been postponement of some major decisions, domestically particularly, and we might see some real new policy directions.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Thank you very much. We appreciate this very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.]

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
OF
SENATOR DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN

INTRODUCTION

In December of 1981, the Leningrad literary journal "Avrora" (Aurora) dedicated an issue to commemorating the 75th birthday of Leonid Brezhnev. Yet there appeared within its pages (on page 75 no less) a one page satiric piece aimed directly at Brezhnev.

In the voice of a young writer musing about the seeming immortality of a famous old author, the satirist wrote:

"It is hard to imagine that this wonderful writer is still living. . . . It seems as though he should have died. He has written so many books! Any other person who had written so many books would have been in the grave long ago. . . . Yet here he sits in front of me, red-cheeked and stout. It is hard to believe that he will die. And he himself probably doesn't believe it. . . . The day before yesterday I heard that he had passed away. My daughter, fond of a joke, informed me of this. I will not conceal the fact that I felt joy and pride for our friend and comrade. . . . 'At last,' I exclaimed, 'he will find his place in the literature.' My joy was premature. But I don't think we will have to wait long. He won't disappoint us."

And indeed he didn't; on November 10, Brezhnev died.

There is scarcely a more important international event than a change in power in the Soviet Union. Whereas in the West we are used to regular elections, the choice of a Soviet leader comes irregularly and so seldom that we accurately refer to this event as a "succession crisis." As with any crisis, danger is inherent. But opportunities may also exist. We must be clear, as far as it is possible, about what those dangers and opportunities may be.

So it seemed important to think about these issues and to encourage general discussion about them. In particular, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence recognized that these matters represent a major challenge for our intelligence analysts, as well as scholars outside of the government. Early this fall seemed an auspicious time to consider their views on the implications of the Soviet succession crisis. The Committee did so.

On September 28, the Committee, in a closed session, received classified testimony from Central Intelligence Agency analysts. On the following day, four distinguished scholars testified in a public session.

SOVIET STUDIES

It is important to emphasize the difficulties of making accurate predictions in these matters. Results of elections in democracies are difficult enough to predict, but at least the procedural rules are fixed by law and trends are discernible from history and public opinion polls. Not so in the Soviet Union. The only rule of real consequence is that there is no fixed rule.

The inner workings of the selection process and the formulation of domestic and foreign policies are known to few outside the circle of the Politburo. Thus, those in Soviet Studies are left to draw their inferences from such indicators as vague precedents, rumors, censored and esoteric public speeches and, above all, that most exacting of scientific exercises, studying where Politburo members stand during the annual Bolshevik Revolution parade.

New leaders struggle to power, and the struggle appears at times to have as much a personal character as it does an ideological one. Moreover, things can change rapidly in these struggles. Today's front runner can be replaced overnight, just as Khrushchev replaced Malenkov as General Secretary within a few days after the latter's appointment. Similarly, a policy position taken by the new leadership may come as a complete surprise. Who would have predicted that the Stalinist Khrushchev would denounce Stalinism three years after the death of his mentor?

Thus, judgments in these matters must bear the label, *caveat emptor*. As little is known, the need for sound judgment is all the greater. In this connection, the witnesses before the Committee displayed such a capacity. That they did so in spite of the limited resources and information available to them is no small credit to their profession. If the succession crisis does nothing else it should point up the need in this country to monitor and support Soviet Studies in an even more concerted fashion.¹

As it turned out, Brezhnev passed from the scene sooner than some might have expected in September. On November 12, two days after his death, Yuri Andropov was selected to fill the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, de facto head of State. However, this is only the formal point of departure for the succession process. This process, it is clear now, had been underway for several months and will likely continue for several years. So the major questions remain. Who will lead? Will major changes in domestic and foreign policies occur? And what are the implications for United States policy toward the Soviet Union?

A NEW LEADERSHIP

The selection of former KGB Chief Yuri Andropov to succeed Brezhnev could not be considered a surprise, for at the time of our hearings it was evident that he was one of the two persons most likely to succeed. Nevertheless, this was a most unusual event in Soviet political history.

No director or former director of the KGB has ever been appointed General Secretary. The only previous secret police chief to come close was Lavrenti Beria, who was arrested and shot during the power struggle that followed Stalin's death. Similar fates befell Beria's two predecessors. Andropov's unprecedented tenure as the head of the KGB and his ascendancy to the position of General Secretary indicate that he is a most extraordinary man.² He has demonstrated exceptional Machiavellian skill in having risen to the top and now is apparently proceeding with dispatch to consolidate power.³ It took Stalin some seven years before he rid himself of the Trotskyite and other factions. It took Khrushchev about five years to neutralize his opposition. Brezhnev did not feel confident enough to move into Stalin's former office for eight years. So far, Andropov has succeeded in having his major competitor, Chernenko, nominate him to be General Secretary, as well as denying Chernenko the not so symbolic honor of delivering one of the eulogies at Brezhnev's funeral.

Yet one wonders how long Andropov can last. (No sooner had he been named head of the Communist Party then rumors impugning his Russian blood—suggesting a possible Jewish forebear—began to surface.) Even if he is not feared by the political elite because of the "special knowledge," hence power, his association with the KGB apparently affords him, he suffers at least the liability of age. Stalin became General Secretary in his early forties, while Brezhnev and Khrushchev were under 60. In contrast, Andropov will be 69 in June of next year and there is some question about his health.

It is virtually impossible for his tenure to approach Brezhnev's 18 years. He would be extremely fortunate to match even Khrushchev's ten. Andropov will be presiding over the passing of a generation of leaders. Indeed, most of his comrades on the Politburo are older than he, and few members or candidate members are much younger. If he is lucky, he will attend their funerals.

At the hearings, there was some discussion of this phenomenon. The sense was that little is known about who will move into the Politburo in the near term or what views they will hold. Assuming the seniority system now in effect continues, it is likely that they will be sexagenarians whose politics probably will not be materially different from those they replace.

Looking a bit further down the road, one school of thought sees a new generation moving into the ranks of the Soviet ruling elite, a group less ideological and more pragmatic than its elders. Those who hold this opinion tend to look

¹ To this effect, Senator Lugar, a Member of our Committee as well as the Committee on Foreign Relations, has introduced a bill (S. 2919) which would provide financial support for advanced research and training in Soviet and East European affairs. I have joined Senators Jackson and Biden of our Committee, along with several other colleagues in the Senate, in sponsoring this bill.

² Beria was officially head of the state security apparatus in its various manifestations and forms from 1938 to 1946. However, from 1946 to his death in 1953 he continued to dominate security matters from his position in the Politburo.

³ During the hearings Professor Myron Rush made the rather prescient remark that, in contrast to past successions, "there might be very rapid movement toward a concentration of power in the next couple of years if Andropov is able to succeed." However, Professor Rush also has indicated that such a move on Andropov's part will not go unchallenged.

favorably upon this development. Others, however, offer a considerably less sanguine assessment. They suggest that this group's pragmatism is better labelled cynicism, a view expressed by Andrei Sakharov:

"I like this new layer of leaders coming to the top even less than its predecessors. The people of Brezhnev's generation laid the basis for their careers in the worst years of the Stalinist terror. That put the mark of Cain on them. . . . The new generation is coming without that mark. It is more flexible, but there is a dreadful cynicism, careerism, and complete indifference to ideals in international affairs. As far as internal matters go, they only care about the trough they swirl from and what matters is that the trough is full."

This is a problem for the future. For the present, we have Andropov to deal with.

ANDROPOV

It seems as though Mr. Andropov would like us to view him as an understanding and conciliatory, if not liberal, man who is fluent in English and speaks well of detente. His record, however, belies this.

Perhaps the most carefully guarded secret in the Soviet Union at the moment is how well Mr. Andropov speaks and understands English, if at all. No one has as yet stepped forward to claim that he has had a significant conversation with him in recent years. While in Moscow for the Brezhnev funeral, Vice President Bush and Secretary of State Shultz met Andropov. However, the new General Secretary spoke in Russian through a translator to Mr. Bush. But, we are told, Andropov seemed to have given a nod in response to a comment by Mr. Shultz, thereby lending continuing credence to the belief held by some that he comprehends our native tongue after all. Not for nothing did Andropov earn his reputation as a master of disinformation.

To say Mr. Andropov is "understanding" is ironic; as head of the KGB for over a decade he had spies in every country and understands more about some of them than do their heads of state.

To say Mr. Andropov is "conciliatory" is not based on any known facts. He was head of the Soviet delegation in Budapest when the Hungarian revolt of 1956 was crushed by Soviet tanks. In recent years, it was Andropov's KGB which so efficiently and brutally repressed the dissident movement in the Soviet Union and which culminated this year in the destruction of the Helsinki Watch Committee. It was Andropov who exiled to Gorki the Soviet Union's most eminent citizen, Andrei Sakharov. And it was Andropov who apparently named Vitaly Fedorchuk, a reputed thug, to take his place as head of the KGB.

If this analysis of Andropov is accurate, his appointment is indeed ominous for the West.

However, we should also remember that the problems facing the Soviet empire are such that excesses of personality may be held in check by political and economic necessities. Troubles in Afghanistan and Poland, a stagnant economy and unpromising demographic trends all point to a nation under great stress.

This state of affairs indicates that major changes in Soviet domestic and/or foreign policy are likely to occur. Brezhnev has left a legacy of deferred decisions.

In the short term, major policy changes may not come rapidly because of the need for the new Soviet leadership to consolidate its power. This undoubtedly will be compounded by a failure of imagination existing in the gerontocracy that makes up the current Politburo. Yet the decisions cannot be postponed forever, and our response to their policy changes should be based as much on the hard necessities of the Soviet situation as on our apprehensions regarding the person of the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party.

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of our hearings, our distinguished Chairman, Senator Goldwater, recalled Churchill's classic comment in 1939 about the Soviet Union: "I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia: It is a riddle wrapped inside a mystery inside an enigma."

This is an apt description 43 years later. There is little that we can confidently predict about the new leadership of the Soviet Union. We are given to understand—correctly I think—that the Soviets are now experiencing grave problems, which could become a full fledged crisis of empire. We can hope that the Soviets will make dramatic reductions in military spending in order to alleviate these problems, but it is equally possible that Moscow will embark upon a bellicose

course involving an expansion of its empire. Fateful decisions will be made as to who will govern, and how.

The leaders of the Western democracies, therefore, confront great uncertainty in matters where misjudgments can have profound consequences for the security of their nations. The times call for neither pessimism nor optimism. Rather, they demand prudence. We must keep a watchful eye on the evolving succession so that we may come to a better understanding of the new Soviet leaders and their policies. We must strengthen ourselves and our alliances in order to respond promptly and effectively to signs of danger. But we also must be alert to opportunities for improvement in relations with the Soviet Union.

This is essentially the advice offered by Churchill on how to deal with the Soviet Union. In 1946, in what has become known as the "Iron Curtain Speech," he spoke of the need of the Western democracies to stand together, warning that there is nothing that the Soviets admire so much as strength and nothing for which they have less respect than weakness. But Churchill said more in that address, which he himself called "The Sinews of Peace." He affirmed his belief that Soviet Russia does not desire war, but the fruits of war and indefinite expansion of its power and doctrines. But to prevent war, as the speech's title implies, a resilient strength is required—not merely strength of arms, but a prudent flexibility to seek an understanding with the Russians on all points at issue. He affirmed the urgency of the situation in characteristically simple, but eloquent, words:

"Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them. They will not be removed by a mere waiting to see what happens, nor will they be removed by a policy of appeasement. What is needed is a settlement, and the longer this is delayed, the more difficult it will be and the greater our dangers will become."

U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated in the years that followed. Not one to give up easily, Churchill saw hope after Stalin died and, in a speech to the House of Commons in May 1953, proposed that the leading Western powers launch a new initiative, to begin with a conference of the leading powers. He stated:

"If there is not at the summit of the Nations the will to win the greatest prize and the greatest honor ever offered to mankind, doom-laden responsibility will fall upon those who now possess the power to decide. At the worst the participants in the meeting would have established more intimate contacts. At the best we might have a generation of peace."

Now more than ever is the time to give effect to Churchill's advice. Now is the time to say to the Soviets "We understand who you are, but more importantly, we understand your problems and we can offer you a way to solve them. Reduce your arsenals and we will do the same."

APPENDIX

[This article appeared in *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1982.]

SOVIET SUCCESSION—ISSUES AND PERSONALITIES

(By Jerry F. Hough)

EDITOR'S NOTE.—The important question of who will succeed Leonid Brezhnev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union remains an open one. Mr. Hough traces the personal background and policy stances of his "candidates" in the context of the complex policy agenda facing any successor leadership.

Once again, Leonid Brezhnev's health seems to have deteriorated, and speculation about the Soviet succession is rising. This time, however, the situation is substantially different from what it was several years ago. Two of the inner core of the Politburo, Aleksey Kosygin and Mikhail Suslov, have died, and the position of a third, Andrey Kirilenko, appears to have slipped badly. Brezhnev's long-time personal assistant, Konstantin Chernenko, has continued to gain greater status and now seems to be the number two man in the political system. Most recently, the long-time chairman of the KGB, Yuriy Andropov, has been moved into the Central Committee (CC) Secretariat and into the inner leadership core.

In a recent article in *Problems of Communism*,¹ William Hyland lamented the decline of Kremlinology in the West, and with good reason. There have been only four leaders in Soviet history (five, if one includes Georgiy Malenkov's short interregnum), and each has been associated with major changes in policy and even in the way the political system functions. The succession to Brezhnev will come at a time of critical policy choices. It will probably involve the disappearance of a historic generation from the scene. If not immediately, then over three or four years, it will almost surely produce substantial change of some kind. Yet, clues about leadership politics have been much scarcer over the last 15 years than in the past.

Despite the uncertainty of the evidence, Hyland is correct in insisting that we give attention to this important subject. This article will attempt to assemble the bits of information that are available about the leading contenders and about the issues that will lie at the heart of the struggle for power. Even if events prove our current thinking wrong, our mistakes may nonetheless indicate where we have to rethink our underlying assumptions about the Soviet political system.

THE ISSUES

Issues have always been important in Soviet successions. In the past, even if the emerging leader rose to power primarily through control of personnel selection, he was careful to identify himself with strong currents of opinion within the party. In this succession, issues will very likely be even more important. There is today no logical successor in the sense of a man of the right age and background serving as the general secretary's chief assistant for personnel selection. Indeed, since personnel turnover in recent years has been slow, it is not clear that anyone has had an opportunity to build a political machine at all. In addition, since the mid-1970's, Brezhnev has steadfastly refused to face up to a growing number of problems, and his successors will not be able to avoid them. The problems are so contentious that there are certain to be leadership differences of opinion about them, and the struggle for power in the succession will surely involve a struggle over issues as well.

The policy issues in this succession will not, however, be simple and clear-cut.

¹ "Kto Kogo in the Kremlin," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January–February 1982, pp. 17–26, appears on page 47.

Westerners often define the political struggle in the Soviet Union in terms of "reform" or "liberalization" versus "conservatism" or even "neo-Stalinism."² There is a strong element of truth in this view, but the situation should not be oversimplified. Issues that are important for most reformers at one time can become unimportant only a short time later. Reforms that are instituted can provide the basis for a new conservative consensus and become in turn the target of a new reform movement. Key values held by reformers (or conservatives) can come into conflict with each other and force difficult choices on specific issues. This last question is particularly crucial now, for the reforms introduced under Khrushchev and Brezhnev have become the essence of the status quo that needs to be attacked if the programs of the contemporary economic reformers are to be realized.

There are many significant issues confronting the Soviet Union. First, the Soviet Union is, of course, a multinational state, with some 20 major peoples with their own language, culture, and territorial base. In particular, the growing number of those with a Muslim background raises new problems. The question of what to do with the Central Asians, which has been the center of great, and probably exaggerated, attention in the West, may not be urgent, but it must be faced sometime in the decade. Moreover, the nationality factor is never far beneath the surface on any policy question that arises—for example, the distribution of investment, demographic policy, economic decentralization, or political liberalization.

Second, a series of questions concerning political reform are on the agenda of discussion. Brezhnev has essentially continued Khrushchev's social reforms that favored workers and peasants. But he has moved away from Khrushchev's more extreme antibureaucratic tendencies and populist notions of mass participation. The key phrases of the Brezhnev era have been "scientific decision-making," "the administration of society," and "the scientific-technical revolution," all of which connote the flow of influence in decision-making to those with specialized knowledge—administrators, scholars, and educated people in general. As a present-day critic, Anatoliy Butenko, has expressed it, "one of the widespread prejudices is that 'power by the workers' is unrealizable and utopian, since the administration of public affairs has become extremely complex and demands deep specialized knowledge, as a result of which the time will never come when 'each cook will rule.'"³

Criticism of this Brezhnev policy, however muted, is not difficult to discern in the Soviet media and among Soviet officials and scholars. On the one hand, a number of leading intellectuals inside the party establishment have appealed with increasing frequency for greater democratization. Butenko has published a forceful call for workers' self-management and has suggested—without being specific—substantial changes in the representative institutions as well.⁴ Fëdor Burlatskiy, head of the philosophy department of the Institute of Social Sciences of the Central Committee, has made a similar appeal, speaking out for a withering away of the state in the form of a transfer of more functions to the public organs.⁵ Together with Georgiy Shakhnazarov, a deputy head of the Central Committee's Socialist Countries Department, he has also called for the establishment of political science and of a political science institute, one of whose purposes would be to work toward the improvement of the political system.⁶ Shakhnazarov himself is more cautious in speaking about any withering away of the state but has advocated a democratization of the process by which candidates are nominated as well as a loosening of information policy.⁷

On the other hand, there have been indirect cautions against democratization. No one in the Soviet Union can come out publicly against further democratization. It is quite possible, however, to discuss the importance of professionalization or to hint about the need for continuing repression by speaking of the dictatorship of

² Stephen F. Cohen, "The Friends and Foes of Change: Reformism and Conservatism in the Soviet Union," *Slavic Review* (Urbana, Ill.), June 1979, pp. 197-202.

³ A. P. Butenko, "Politicheskaya organizatsiya obshchestva pri sotsializme" (The Political Organization of Society Under Socialism), Moscow, Mysl', 1981, p. 178.

⁴ *Ibid.*, esp. pp. 160-90. Butenko is head of the Department of Political and Ideological Problems of the Economy of the World Socialist System Institute (IEMSS)—the leading Soviet Institute on Eastern Europe.

⁵ F. Burlatskiy, "The Political System of Developed Socialism," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 12, August 1979, pp. 62-73.

⁶ G. Kh. Shakhnazarov and F. M. Burlatskiy, "On the Development of Marxist-Leninist Political Science," *Voprosy Filosofii* (Moscow), No. 12, 1980, pp. 10-23.

⁷ G. Kh. Shakhnazarov, "Sotsialisticheskaya sud'ba chelovechestva" (The Socialist Fate of Mankind), Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, pp. 187, 191, 197, 212-13.

the proletariat in contemporary conditions.⁸ Moreover, there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of Chernenko's report that "at times one hears the question—don't we have too much democracy? Doesn't it lead to a weakening of discipline?"⁹

Third, the relationship of the Soviet Union with the outside world and the level of military spending have become the subjects of intense public debate. The world situation has changed radically in recent years; military parity has been achieved with the West; the relationship with the United States has become confrontational; NATO is under severe strain; the internal changes in China since the death of Mao Zedong raise the possibility of a change in Chinese foreign policy; and the Soviet involvement in the Third World has had little payoff, and none of the major Third World countries have proved revolutionary. Major differences of opinion on how the Soviet Union should respond to each of these changes can be found in Soviet books, journals, and newspapers, and increasingly even on Soviet television.¹⁰

On the basic question of relations with the West, for example, Vadim Zagladin, the first deputy head of the Central Committee's International Department, has testified that there are two "extreme views":

There are people who say that the situation is so complex and difficult that there is no way out, that only the worst can be expected, that we are on the very threshold of war. . . . On the other hand, there are some people who say that there have been all kinds of crises, this will pass too. We are strong, we have the strength of the Soviet Union; it will all pass of its own accord.¹¹

Although he does not spell out the alternative to these two "mistaken" views, it clearly involves an active diplomatic effort to improve the situation.

Nevertheless, it is the fourth issue—that of economic reform—that will surely be the central issue of the succession, in part because everyone recognizes that the economy is not functioning well. The rate of increase in Soviet industrial growth is declining, and the reduction in the share of GNP allocated to industrial investment in recent years does not bode well for the future. Agriculture is such a concern that three times in the last four years Brezhnev has told the Central Committee that the food shortage is a political problem as well as an economic one. The refusal of the leadership even to publish the size of the 1981 harvest is dramatic evidence of the sensitivity of the question. And the poor performance of the service sector is universally conceded. In all these spheres, East European countries have developed a number of reforms, and the question before the Soviet leadership is which, if any, of these innovations to adopt.

Westerners often treat economic reform in the Soviet Union as an obvious good, which has been thwarted only by ideological rigidity and bureaucratic self-interest. Without any question, there are people in the Soviet Union who see the introduction of market mechanisms as an ideological abomination,¹² and many officials in Gosplan, the ministries, and even the provincial apparatus (notably its agricultural components fear reform as a threat to their power or even to their jobs. Nevertheless, the rigid ideologues are found mainly in the older generation that is passing from the scene. Moreover, Khrushchev was able to scatter the ministerial personnel to new regional economic councils (*sovmarkhozy*) in 1957. If it wanted, the party leadership could hit just as hard at bureaucratic privilege today.

Those with dogmatic ideological views and bureaucratic self-interest certainly oppose reform, but the reasons why reforms have not been instituted

⁸ See, e.g., M. I. Sushchnost' i osnovnyye funktsii sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva (The Essence and Basic Functions of the Socialist State), Saratov, Izdatel'stvo Saratovskogo Universiteta, 1979; and Yu. A. Krasin, "Worker Participation in Management and Professionalism," *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 4, 1982, pp. 3-14. Krasin is prorector of the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee.

⁹ K. Chernenko, "The Vanguard Role of the Party of Communists: An Important Condition of Growth," *Kommunist*, No. 6, April 1982, p. 41.

¹⁰ For a survey of the major published debates related to foreign policy, see Jerry F. Hough, "The World as Viewed from Moscow," *International Journal* (Toronto), Spring 1982, pp. 183-97. For debates related to Latin America, see idem, "The Evolving Soviet Debate on Latin America," *Latin American Research Review* (Chapel Hill, NC), No. 1, 1981, pp. 124-41.

¹¹ Interview on Prague radio. Translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Aug. 4, 1982, CC/11.

¹² Sometimes views of this type can be expressed more easily in discussions about China than in those about the USSR. See, for example, V. I. Lazarev, *Kassovaya bor'ba v KNR* (Class Struggle in the PRC). Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, pp. 12, 20, 311-16; and Ye. A. Kononov, "On the Evolution of Socioeconomic Structures in the PRC," *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* (Moscow), No. 2, 1980, p. 10.

so far lie elsewhere. In recent years, one overwhelming obstacle to reform has been Brezhnev himself. As his health has declined, he seems not to have been well enough to run the government on a day-to-day basis, and power in that sense has flowed to others. Although the same can be said of Mao in his last years, it is absolutely clear in retrospect that Mao retained the power to block actions that a majority of the leadership wanted to undertake. Similarly, Brezhnev's ability in the last few years to advance two old cronies, Chernenko and Nikolay Tikhonov, as key men in the political system demonstrates that his position in this respect is not unlike Mao's.

There are also major conceptual and political obstacles to economic reform that will surely outlive Brezhnev. There is no precise blueprint for a successful economic reform in the Soviet Union. The evidence suggests that the various parts of a meaningful reform are interrelated and, therefore, difficult to introduce in a piecemeal manner.¹³ While it is easy enough to say that more power should be delegated to local levels, the question of controls is crucial. One of the primary sources of the rapid expansion in inflationary purchasing power in Poland in the 1970's, for example, was a relaxation of centralized controls over managers before strict market controls were introduced.¹⁴ It is also easy to say that the profit criterion should be used to judge managers. But if prices are determined essentially on the basis of costs, managers have an incentive to keep their costs high. Cost-plus contracts are scarcely regarded as the key to efficiency in the United States, and the situation is little different in a socialist system. The logic of using the profit criterion is that prices should be controlled by the market.

On a more theoretical level, it is easy to say that the Soviets should move toward a more market-oriented economy. However, it is no simple matter to establish a system that yields prices close to market prices while maintaining its planned character and avoiding the more serious types of unemployment and inflation found in the West. After all, some prices—particularly commodity prices—fluctuate widely in the West.¹⁵ Is market socialism to have the same fluctuation in prices? Is it to feature the same increases and decreases in production associated with such fluctuation in the West, with marginal producers operating only at times of high prices and eventually closing down?

The task of finding an acceptable model of economic reform is complicated, also, by the fact that even educated persons in the Soviet Union often have great difficulty thinking in market or even economic terms.

In the labor sphere, for example, Soviet economists seem torn between the contradictory desires of reducing labor turnover and of giving managers the incentive to economize on labor. The enormous attention devoted by Soviet officials and scholars to the problem of labor turnover comes at a time when Soviet turnover rates are well below those in the West.¹⁶

Similarly, in Soviet agriculture, a strong case can be made that the long-term secret to agricultural abundance is to turn the terms of trade against the peasant and create structural conditions in which the more productive can mechanize and increase efficiency.¹⁷ Otherwise, marginal producers will never be forced off the farm. Yet the Brezhnev regime has raised the subsidy to agriculture—from about 2 billion rubles in 1965 to 35 billion in 1980—by raising procurement prices paid to the peasants while holding consumer food prices and the prices of industrial goods sold to agriculture essentially steady.¹⁸ Brezhnev

¹³ An East European joke hints at the problem by reporting the result of a dispute over whether to change to the British practice of driving on the left side of the road; they decided to do so incrementally, with trucks adopting it first and the cars only some months later.

¹⁴ Jerry F. Hough, *The Polish Crisis: American Policy Options*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1982, pp. 13-14.

¹⁵ For example, the January 1 market price for copper rose from 59 cents a pound in 1978 to 69 cents in 1979 to \$1.03 in 1980 and then fell to 85 cents in 1981 and 73 cents in 1982. These prices are the January futures price for bulk contracts. They are printed in any major newspaper with a major financial section, including *The New York Times*.

¹⁶ The question of labor turnover is discussed in a soon-to-be completed dissertation for the University of Michigan by Peter A. Hauslohner, "Managing the Soviet Labor Market: Policy-making and Political Learning Under Brezhnev." Professor Hauslohner, now at Yale University, emphasizes the conceptual barriers to reform.

¹⁷ See the discussion by James R. Millar in James R. Millar and Alex Nove, "A Debate on Collectivization: Was Stalin Really Necessary?" *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1976, pp. 52-53.

¹⁸ Vladimir G. Tremi, "Subsidies in Soviet Agriculture: Record and Prospects," prepared for the forthcoming compendium of the US Congress Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in the 1980's: Problems and Prospects*.

has announced that the subsidy will be raised another 16 billion rubles in 1983.¹⁹ Although the consumer price policy can be explained by political considerations, the continual raising of procurement prices seems motivated by a general belief that this is the key to more production.

Even if the Soviet leaders resolve the conceptual problem and decide what kind of reform they want, they still face a political problem. Some of the prerequisites for a thoroughgoing reform are already quite clear, and they are politically unpalatable.

First, while the precise point of price equilibrium may be difficult to ascertain, it is absolutely certain that many key prices are now far from that point. As in Poland, the price of meat is politically the most serious problem. The retail price for meat is about one half the price paid to peasants for it, resulting in continual shortage in the stores, even though per capita meat consumption is not far from the British level.²⁰ Poland had a per capita meat production well above the British level before the strikes of 1980,²¹ and nevertheless had severe shortages. The new Soviet food program projects a rise in annual per capita meat consumption to 70 kilograms in 1990—the level the Poles had achieved in the late 1970's. This strongly suggests that even if the Soviet Union fulfills its ambitious plan for meat production, it still will have severe shortages so long as present meat prices are maintained.

Many other politically sensitive prices are also set well below market levels. Some, such as those for mass transportation, pose no problem, for the demand for these items is finite. Where the demand is high, however, the problems can be severe. The price of bread is lower than the procurement price of grain, and it is economically rational for farmers to feed their livestock bread instead of grain. Books are priced so low that a best seller is one that sells out in a single day. Tickets to good plays are unobtainable through regular channels. The number of hospital beds per 100,000 population is double the American level (1,249 vs. 630 in 1980), and the Soviet figure is still going up, although American health economists consider even the American number excessive.²²

Second, apart from some rationalization in prices, economic reform also requires some change in policy regarding labor and wages. The existing incentive system tends to reward managers who hoard labor, and the major new performance indicator now being introduced ("normed value-added production"—*normativnaya chistaya produktsiya*) encourages managers to produce more labor-intensive goods than the old gross output target did.²³ As a result, there is an overutilization of labor, and labor productivity has increased more slowly than it should. Moreover, even if a manager wants to get rid of a worker, the existing trade union and legal protections make it difficult for him to do so.

¹⁹ *Pravda* (Moscow), May 25, 1982, p. 2.

²⁰ In 1980, the annual per capita consumption of meat in the USSR was stated to be 58 kilograms. The per capita British meat consumption was 46.2 kilograms in 1975, down from 50.4 kilograms in 1970. *Ibid.*, p. 2; and P. G. Hare and P. T. Wanless, "Polish and Hungarian Economic Reforms—A Comparison," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), October 1981, p. 492. The precise Soviet statistics need to be treated with great caution, but the exaggerations are surely not enough to drop Soviet consumption significantly below the 1975 British level.

There are several reasons why such a level of consumption is not inconsistent with shortages in the state stores. First, of course, some meat is sold through the collective farm markets. Second, if goods are priced too low, they may sell out very quickly, but the actual quantity sold in a brief period may be quite substantial—even more so than if prices are so high that the goods do not move and remain on the shelves. Third, Soviet citizens eat their main meal (*obed*) in the middle of the day. Hence they eat most of their meat at the cafeterias at work. In recent years, when I have often observed an absence of meat in Moscow stores, I have always found it in street cafeterias, as well as at those in the Lenin Library and the Academy of Sciences Institutes, and it has been priced very reasonably. (On one day a week, fish is offered instead of meat.) In light of other preferences given to industrial workers, the same situation must prevail in factory cafeterias.

²¹ Polish per capita consumption of meat rose from 49.2 kilograms in 1965 to 53.0 kilograms in 1970, to 70.3 kilograms in 1975, and remained roughly at the last level through 1979. See Hare and Wanless, *loc. cit.*, p. 492. The authors state that the British and Polish definitions of meat and meat products are identical.

²² *The World Almanac and Book of Facts of 1982*, New York, NY, Newspaper Enterprise Association, 1981, p. 592; and *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1980 g.* (National Economy of the USSR in 1980), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1981, p. 499. To be sure, the problem is not all one of demand unrestrained by cost. For example, the figure for the United Kingdom, which has a comprehensive state medical program, was 894 in 1977 (*World Almanac*, p. 588). In the Soviet Union, the hospital bed figure is the basis for budget decisions, and the Ministry of Health deliberately prolongs hospital stays in order to increase its budget. For example, a woman giving birth without complications is forced to stay in the hospital for 13 days before returning home, even though the possibility of contagion there probably increases the dangers for the new-born and may even be a factor in Soviet infant mortality figures.

²³ The validity of this charge is acknowledged by A. Bachurin, deputy chairman of Gosplan in charge of labor questions. *Pravda*, July 16, 1982, p. 3.

In addition, virtually all Soviet economists contend that wage policy does not provide sufficient incentive to encourage economic growth.²⁴ During most of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods, a marked tendency toward egalitarianism was observable in wage policy.²⁵ For all wage-earners, the gap between the top tenth and bottom tenth widened a bit in the early 1970's, but those at the bottom of the scale are largely service personnel.²⁶ In economic terms, the crucial wage differential is that between blue-collar workers and engineering-technical personnel (ITR), for it determines whether workers have the incentive to become foremen and engineers and reflects the extent to which managers are rewarded for performance. Table 1 shows trends in this differential for industry, construction, and agriculture throughout the Brezhnev years. The figures for the second half of the 1970's are little short of astonishing, especially given the countervailing consensus among Soviet economists. In industry, engineering-technical personnel received a average monthly wage increase of 13.3 rubles, while workers received 24.6 rubles. In construction, the respective figures were 5.9 rubles and 27.6 rubles. In agriculture, the wages of the technical personnel rose by only 5.5 rubles (they actually declined between 1977 and 1980), and those of farm workers by 23.7 rubles.

TABLE 1.—AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGES IN SOVIET INDUSTRY, CONSTRUCTION, AND STATE AGRICULTURE, 1965-80

	[In rubles]			
	1965	1970	1975	1980
Industry:				
Engineering-technical workers (ITR) ¹	148.4	178.0	199.2	212.5
Workers	101.7	130.6	160.9	185.5
Ratio of ITR wages to worker wages	1.46:1.00	1.36:1.00	1.24:1.00	1.15:1.00
Construction:				
ITR ¹	160.7	200.0	207.0	212.9
Workers	108.4	148.5	180.3	207.9
Ratio of ITR wages to worker wages	1.48:1.00	1.35:1.00	1.15:1.00	1.02:1.00
State agriculture:				
Agricultural-technical personnel ²	136.3	162.5	180.2	185.7
Workers	72.5	98.8	125.3	149.0
Ratio of agricultural-technical worker wages to worker wages	1.88:1.00	1.64:1.00	1.44:1.00	1.25:1.00

¹ This category includes line managers as well as rank-and-file engineers and technicians.

² This category includes agricultural specialists (such as agronomists and veterinarians) as well as engineers and technicians involved with equipment and repair.

Source: Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1980 g. (The U.S.S.R. National Economy in 1980), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1981, pp. 364-65.

As a result, the fifth issue of the succession must be the nature of Soviet social policy. The policy pursued by Khrushchev and especially Brezhnev has, in a way, represented a gesture toward the Marxist ideal, "To each according to his needs." Everyone has a guarantee to a job—which is secured by giving managers an incentive to retain excess labor force. Everyone can afford the basic necessities (subsidies keep prices low, sometimes below cost), and if only corruption and the black market could be eliminated, these necessities would be rationed by willingness to stand in line rather than by amount of income. Income differentials between managers on the one hand, and workers and peasants on the other, have been reduced.²⁷

²⁴ See the discussion in Jerry F. Hough, "Policy-Making and the Worker," in Arcadius Kahan and Blair Ruble, Eds., *Industrial Labor in the U.S.S.R.*, New York, N.Y., Pergamon Press, 1979, pp. 380, 390-91.

²⁵ Janet G. Chapman, "Recent Trends in the Soviet Industrial Wage Structure," in *ibid.*, pp. 151-83; Alistar McAuley, *Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union*, London, George Tlien & Unwin, 1979; and David Lane, *The End of Social Inequality: Class, Status, and Power Under State Socialism*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1982, pp. 54-66.

²⁶ Michael Ellman, "A Note on the Distribution of Earnings in the USSR Under Brezhnev," *Slavic Review*, December 1970, pp. 669-71. Professor Ellman concludes that the trend toward egalitarianism ended in 1968. But his evidence does not go beyond 1974. Moreover, the particular indicator used is very sensitive to changes in the minimum wage, and the introduction of a large increase in the minimum wage in 1968 makes that a very atypical year for comparison.

²⁷ As Hedrick Smith has documented in *The Russians* (New York, N.Y., Quadrangle, 1976), the topmost elite has been given a number of nonmonetary privileges, but these are provided only to a very narrow sector of the managerial elite. Moreover, even the scale of the privileges to the high officials can be exaggerated in comparative terms. For a case in which one of the country's top 25 publishing officials was unable, despite the support of two Central Committee members, to get his three-room apartment enlarged to four, see Vladimir Volnovich, *The Ivankiad or The Tale of the Writer Volnovich's Installation in His New Apartment*, New York, N.Y., Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1976.

The egalitarian ideal has, of course, not been reached by any stretch of the imagination. Many—including many scholars—argue that the policy of egalitarianism should be pushed still further: the minimum wage, the earnings of collective farmers, and pensions should be increased; the income supplements for children of poor families should be raised; more money should be pumped into the countryside to reduce migration to the city; privileges for the well-to-do and powerful should be reduced; more of the country's resources should go into "collective income" (e.g., free day-care centers, subsidized resorts, better free hospital care, and so forth).²⁸

Market-oriented reforms, on the other hand, would move away from the egalitarian ideals. If more money were to go to the productive and the innovative, income differentiation would widen. If meat, theater tickets, books, and the like were priced at the supply-and-demand equilibrium point, then low-income people would not be able to afford as much as they can today. If the peasants were unfettered, the old bugaboo of the kulak would reappear, for some peasants would be more productive than others and would have to be encouraged to increase their investment and acreage.

Hence, as new Soviet leaders enter the succession period, they will face many dilemmas. Chernenko has called for a "radical (*korennyy*) improvement of the economic mechanism, a removal of class differentiation, and a further widening of participation,"²⁹ and it is highly likely that the new leadership will enunciate some such program. Ultimately, however, choices will have to be made. In addition to the trade-off between economic growth and social justice as traditionally defined in the Soviet Union, there can be a conflict between workers' self-management or increased trade union power on the one hand and economic reform on the other. A stronger role for the trade unions could limit the regime's ability to widen wage differentials. More workers' self-management could affect both the level of workers' wages and the ability of managers to fire unproductive workers or to reduce the work force.

These dilemmas facing the Soviet leaders involve conflicts between central values that all contenders ostensibly hold dear and judgments about the stability of the political system. Throughout the 1970's, the Polish leadership feared—and with good reason—what they knew had to be done. Is there a similar fear among the Soviet leadership? Those major American specialists who privately predict a military dictatorship in the Soviet Union believe that there is. If Soviet leaders were to go ahead with price increases, the resulting political explosion would require martial law in their view.³⁰ And it is certainly possible that there are Soviet leaders who say or think that, ultimately, martial law is the only way to institute economic reform (or who at least believe that "after me, the deluge"). Otherwise, the inaction to date is inexplicable. There are likely to be other leaders who think that action must be taken soon or the situation will get out of hand.

These dilemmas also involve foreign and defense policy. Economic reform is likely to be expensive in the short run. The artificially low prices are, of course, reflected in subsidies in the state budget. If prices were raised, this money could be saved and transferred to the wage fund. Gross wages could be raised roughly as much as food prices without any other financial consequences. The problem however, is that those who need the compensatory wage increases are those with lower and middle incomes (or pensioners), not those who can already afford the prices on the collective farm market. If economic reform requires more incentives for the most productive and a widening of the income gap between engineering-technical personnel and workers, the upper-income sector will need to receive even greater increases than will the middle and lower sectors. If the consumer sector is going to function better, it will require some capital expenditures. Moreover, the enormous new budgetary commitments for the food program will be difficult to repudiate. When these various types of expenditures are added together, they do produce a financial strain.

²⁸ Given the finite amount of funds available, every appeal for a collective good, income supplements, increases in pensions and minimum wages, etc.—and such appeals are innumerable—is, in practice, an appeal that funds be diverted from other goals. In addition, many scholars write articles and books that advocate movement to greater egalitarianism in more general terms. For example, see A. A. Amvrosov, *Ot klassovoy differentsiatsii k sotsial'nov odnorodnosti obshchestva* (From Class Differentiation to Social Homogeneity), 2nd ed., Moscow, Mysl', 1978; and T. P. Butenko, *Sotsialisticheskiy obraz zhizni; problemy i suzhdeniya* (The Socialist Way of Life: Problems and Judgments), Moscow, Nauka, 1978.

²⁹ Chernenko, loc. cit., p. 29.

³⁰ For a surfacing of this argument in print, see L. H. Gann and M. S. Bernstam, "Soviet Vulnerabilities," *National Review* (New York, N.Y.), Aug. 20, 1982, p. 1021.

Some of the strain of economic reform could conceivably be relieved by concentrating on price reform, by shifting some of the burden of improving services to an enlarged private sector, and by postponing the increase of rewards to the most productive. Nevertheless, since industrial investment is already being severely restricted and needs to be expanded,³¹ the only reasonable source of money to reduce the problems caused by price increases is the defense sphere. While some Soviet leaders do speak about the need both to strengthen defense further and to institute some kind of economic reform—notably, Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, the Ukrainian party leader³²—significant economic reform is generally dependent on political and military détente, and advocacy of the two tends to go together.

With the politics of internal reform thus intertwined with the politics of foreign and defense policy, the problems for contenders trying to build a winning coalition are complicated even more. It is almost certain that different contenders will choose different trade-offs and will therefore have to base themselves on different social and bureaucratic forces.

THE CANDIDATES

Leonid Brezhnev undoubtedly remembers well that when Nikita Khrushchev placed a man of the right age and experience in a post that positioned him to become the successor, that man took advantage of the situation to succeed “prematurely.” Determined to prevent anyone from doing to him what he did to Khrushchev, Brezhnev has consistently avoided appointing someone with the proper qualifications to a post that would make him the obvious heir apparent. For this reason, the question of who will succeed Brezhnev has always remained quite difficult to answer, perhaps even for members of the Politburo itself.

Today, there are at least five men who have or have had at least a reasonable chance to become general secretary, and several others with at least an outside chance. The five are Andrey Kirilenko, Konstantin Chernenko, Yuriy Andropov, Viktor Grishin, and Mikhail Gorbachyev.

Andrey Kirilenko. For years, Western Sovietologists have pointed to Kirilenko as the likely heir apparent.³³ They have assumed that he has been de facto second secretary (that is, the secretary providing overall supervision of personnel selection and economic management) of the CPSU Central Committee (CC) and that he has therefore been in a good position to build a winning political machine. In addition, his background is as extensive as that of any of the other candidates, not only because of the breadth of his responsibilities in the Brezhnev period, but because of his years of experience as an obkom (oblast party committee) first secretary both in the Ukraine and in the RSFSR.

One thing is certain—Kirilenko has been associated with Brezhnev for a long time. Born several months before Brezhnev in 1906, Kirilenko actually rose faster than Brezhnev in the wake of the purges of the 1930's. He was named second secretary of the Zaporozh'ye obkom in 1939, when Brezhnev was only one of the junior obkom secretaries in Dnepropetrovsk. The two men first crossed paths early in the war, when Kirilenko served as the (political) member of the Military Council of the 18th Army of the Southern Front (from November 1941 until April 1942), and Brezhnev was deputy head of the Political Administration of the Southern Front (which supervised the 18th Army) or perhaps head of the Political Department of the 18th Army (a post which would have been subordinate to the member of the Military Council).³⁴

The two men's association has continued almost uninterrupted since the close of the war. Kirilenko returned to civilian work, resuming his post of obkom

³¹ Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors*, New York, N.Y., Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 300. See Boris Rumer, “Soviet Investment Policy: Unresolved Problems,” *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1982, pp. 53-68, for a fuller discussion of this problem.

³² For example, see his speech in *Pravda*, June 7, 1975, p. 2. See also Christian Duevel, “Similarities and Differences in the Soviet Leaders' Recent Report Approach to Some Issues of Foreign Policy,” *Radio Liberty Research Reports* (Munich), RL 211/78, Sept. 28, 1978, which compares Andropov and Shcherbitskiy.

³³ See, e.g., Richard Coffman and Michael Klecheski, “The 26th Party Congress: The Soviet Union in a Time of Uncertainty,” in Seweryn Bialer and Thane Gustafson, Eds., *Russia at the Crossroads: The 26th Congress of the CPSU*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1982, pp. 200-01.

³⁴ *Sovetskaya voennaya entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopedia), 8 vols., Moscow, Voenizdat, 1976-80, Vol. 4, p. 182. This source provides a good comprehensive biography of Kirilenko. Brezhnev's biographies do not make clear when Brezhnev moved from the Southern Front to the 18th Army, but since he held the latter post for “more than two years,” it is likely to have been after Kirilenko left. *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 586, and Vol. 2, p. 367. The first post also was lower in status than Kirilenko's.

second secretary in Zaporozh'ye when it was liberated in 1944. In August 1946, Brezhnev became obkom first secretary in Zaporozh'ye and, consequently, Kirilenko's boss. In November 1947, Brezhnev was named obkom first secretary in Dnepropetrovsk. When he moved on to Moldavia in 1950, Kirilenko succeeded him in Dnepropetrovsk, most likely on Brezhnev's recommendation. From 1955 to 1961, Kirilenko served as obkom first secretary in Sverdlovsk, and from 1961 to 1966 as deputy chairman of the Bureau of the Central Committee for the RSFSR. When the Bureau was abolished in 1966, Kirilenko became, together with Suslov, one of the two CC senior secretaries under Brezhnev. In 1976, when Kirilenko received a medal on his 70th birthday, President Nikolay Podgornyy presented the award, but Kirilenko directed his answer primarily to Brezhnev, using the familiar form of "you" (*ty*) to emphasize the closeness of the relationship. Kirilenko is the only Politburo member to have used this form of address in such a public forum.³⁵

The exact nature of Kirilenko's responsibilities during the Brezhnev era should be considered more of an open question than it usually is. For most of the Khrushchev period, there was a senior CC secretary—Aleksey Kirichenko from 1957 to 1960, Frol Kozlov from 1960 to 1963, and Brezhnev from 1963 to 1964—who provided overall supervision of the central state apparatus and personnel selection in at least the non-Russian republics. (It is probable that none of the three had authority over the Bureau of the Central Committee for the RSFSR.) Although it is generally assumed that Kirilenko stepped into this role for Brezhnev, this interpretation should not be accepted without reservations, especially for the period since 1976.

There are, it should be understood, ways of dividing the work of the senior CC secretaries other than the Khrushchev pattern. In the last years of the Stalin period (1950-53), for example, the responsibility of supervising the lower party apparatus and the central state machinery was split between Khrushchev and Malenkov. It is quite possible that something similar happened in the Brezhnev period, probably at the time of Chernenko's elevation to the Politburo. At least until very recently, Kirilenko clearly has fulfilled much of the Malenkov role of supervising central governmental policy and economic planning, although he seems not to have Malenkov's responsibility for foreign policy and agriculture.³⁶ What is lacking is evidence that Kirilenko has continued to have responsibility for the party organs at lower levels.

The crucial question in this respect is the subordination of Ivan Kapitonov, the head of the Organizational Party Work Department of the Central Committee. Kapitonov has direct supervision over personnel selection, and he has placed long-time associates in several posts in this realm. Thus, the first deputy head of the Organizational Party Work Department, Nikolay Petrovichev, worked as head of the propaganda-agitation department of the Moscow obkom under Kapitonov in the late 1950's, and the editor of *Partiyaya Zhizn'*, Mikhail Khaldeyev, was Komsomol secretary under Kapitonov in the early 1950's.³⁷ The assumption has been that Kapitonov, who is not a member of the Politburo, must be subordinate to one of the CC secretaries, namely Kirilenko. It is, however, within the realm of possibility that Kapitonov always reported to Brezhnev directly, and within the realm of high probability that sometime in recent years—probably in October 1977, when Chernenko became a candidate member of the Politburo—Kapitonov began reporting to Chernenko. Since the mid-1970's, all of Kirilenko's articles have dealt solely with the economy, while Chernenkos' have often centered on questions that

³⁵ *Pravda*, Oct. 15, 1976, p. 1. Even men as close to Brezhnev as Suslov and Chernenko, both of whom Brezhnev addressed in public as "*ty*" spoke to him in the polite form "*vy*." Ibid., Sept. 25, 1982, p. 1; and Dec. 20, 1981, p. 1.

³⁶ In practical terms, Kirilenko supervised Boris Gostev, head of the Planning and Financial Organs Department of the Central Committee (and himself was almost certainly head of the department until September 1975) as well as the heads of the various industrial, construction, transportation, and trade departments of the Central Committee (some indirectly, through Vladimir Dolgikh and Yakov Ryabov). However, Dolgikh's election to candidate membership in the Politburo in May 1982 seems to have been accompanied by his assumption of responsibility for the Planning and Financial Organs Department. On July 2, 1982, *Pravda* reported two July 1 meetings: a perfunctory one honoring the day of the rural cooperative workers and a CC conference on economic planning. Kirilenko attended the former, but not the latter, (although both Gostev and a high Gosplan official were there). Mikhail Gorbachev and Dolgikh represented the Politburo.

³⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Directory of Soviet Officials*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1960, Vol. 1, p. 154; 1981 *Yezhegodnik bol'shoy sovetskoy entsiklopedii* (Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, *Sovetskaya entsiklopediya*, 1981, p. 594, 607.

are the responsibility of the personnel secretary.³⁸ In 1982, it was Chernenko and Kapitonov who attended the trade union session that removed Aleksey Shibayev as chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions, while in 1976 it had been Kirilenko and Kapitonov at the session that had installed him.³⁹

The height of Kirilenko's power seems to have come in September 1976, when an apparent protégé, Yakov Ryabov, the first secretary of the Sverdlovsk obkom, became the CC secretary in charge of the security forces, the military, and the defense industry. In February 1979, however, Ryabov was removed (he was named first deputy chairman of Gosplan, with responsibilities largely for labor planning). At the same time, a number of signs began suggesting that Kirilenko's status was falling.⁴⁰ In 1982, there have been rumors that his health is failing, but his political health is surely worse. (While Suslov's health had been poor for years, his status in the press never fell.)

In the unlikely event that Kirilenko does become general secretary, it is probable that relatively little would change. In his speeches, he comes across as a rather traditional bread-and-butter Communist, who emphasizes industrial growth and the increase in living standards that comes from it. He says little about shortcomings and little about changes in the planning process that he has supervised. Some of his articles can be incredibly detailed and narrow in their focus on industrial problems.⁴¹ Except in 1974 when he showed enthusiasm about Soviet-American summit meetings,⁴² he manifests relatively little interest in international relations. He certainly expresses more support of détente and less alarm about the Western threat than some of his colleagues, but he seems to take the ebbs and flows of détente for granted, as if on the assumption that relations cannot get too bad.⁴³ Perhaps he was the target of Zagladin's earlier-mentioned jibe about extreme views in this respect.

Konstantin Chernenko. The great mystery man among the contenders is 71-year-old Chernenko. Most indicators of status place him in the number two position in the Soviet political system, even after Andropov was elected CC secretary in May 1982. It is quite possible that on a day-to-day basis Chernenko has already been serving as the transitional general secretary.

One can argue that Chernenko has accumulated an extraordinary number of levers of power in his hands. Since 1965, he has been head of the Central Committee's General Department, which handles the flow of classified documents within the party apparatus and until recently supervised the disposition of letters sent by the public to the Central Committee.⁴⁴ According to Arkadiy Shevchenko, a former assistant to Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, Chernenko has used this role to serve in effect as secretary to the Politburo.⁴⁵ In addition, his attendance at recent army and border guard meetings indicates that he, rather than Andropov, supervises the Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department,

³⁸ For example, see A. Kirilenko, "The CPSU's Economic Policy in Action," *Kommunist*, No. 4, April 1975, pp. 15-32; idem, "Comprehensive Program of Planning and Management Improvement," *Partynaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 18, September 1979, pp. 6-16; and K. Chernenko, "The Great Unity of Party and Nation," *Kommunist*, No. 17, November 1980, pp. 10-26.

³⁹ *Pravda*, Mar. 6, 1982, p. 2, and Nov. 24, 1976, p. 2. Moreover, Shibayev was a man out of the Kirilenko mold—an aviation industry engineer who had become a plant manager before becoming an obkom first secretary in the RSFSR; the new trade union chief, Steban Shalaye, despite a managerial background, also had worked for 17 years in the central trade unions. 1981 *Yezhegodnik*, pp. 609-10.

⁴⁰ In May 1979, Kirilenko was cut out of a Politburo picture in a Moscow newspaper, and even if the omission was accidental, the editor was not removed. In October, East German Communist party leader Erich Honecker called Chernenko Brezhnev's nearest comrade-in-arms. Through 1981, Kirilenko received a number of slights in comparison with Chernenko. In January 1982, he suffered the most remarkable snub of all. In the listing of the members of Suslov's funeral commission, Kirilenko was listed out of alphabetical order behind two other Politburo members. *The New York Times*, May 28, 1979, p. 2; Terry McNeill, "The Brezhnev Succession: Taking Stock of the Candidates," *Radio Liberty Research Reports*, RL 323/79, Oct. 29, 1974; Boris Meissner, "The 26th Party Congress and Soviet Domestic Politics," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1981, p. 5; Elizabeth Teague, "Kirilenko at 75, Chernenko at 70: What Chances Does Either Have of Succeeding Brezhnev?" *Radio Liberty Research Reports*, RL 356/81, Sept. 9, 1981; *Pravda*, Jan. 27, 1982, p. 1.

⁴¹ See, for example, A. Kirilenko, "An Important Factor in Raising the Effectiveness of the Economy," *Kommunist*, No. 7, May 1978, pp. 23-37.

⁴² *Pravda*, June 12, 1974, p. 3.

⁴³ For example, in 1975 he treated détente as something that the changing correlation of forces required the West to adapt. *Leningradskaya Pravda* (Leningrad), June 11, 1975, p. 2. This line was not included in the shortened version in *Pravda*.

⁴⁴ In the past, the department was called the *spetsotdel* (Special Department). For a discussion of its work, see Leonard Schapiro, "The General Department of the CC of the CPSU," *Survey* (London), Summer 1975, pp. 55-65.

⁴⁵ *The Washington Post*, June 6, 1982, p. 29.

which in turn oversees the police and the military.⁴⁶ And finally, as has just been discussed, Chernenko has by all indications come to oversee the Organizational Party Work Department and personnel selection.

Nevertheless, despite the enormous apparent strength of Chernenko's position, he is difficult to visualize as a general secretary. Since 1960, his main role has been head of Brezhnev's personal secretariat—his Aleksandr Poskrëbyshev—and such people rarely are chosen to succeed their masters in any system. They find it difficult to establish an independent image, and their proximity to power and their service as the leader's "no man" have usually made them many enemies.

Chernenko's background is also most unimpressive. After three years in the border guards from 1930 to 1933, Chernenko spent eight years in low-level ideological work in his native Krasnoyarsk Krai, where, at the age of 31, he became a kraykom secretary (presumably the secretary for ideological work).⁴⁷ His performance must not have been distinguished, however, for in 1943, at the height of the war, he was sent for two years to college—the Higher School of Party Organizers. In 1945, he was again made an obkom secretary for ideology, but in a less important oblast, Penza.⁴⁸ In 1948, he was moved to a still lower job, head of the propaganda agitation department of the Moldavian Central Committee, although as a Russian outsider he, rather than the Moldavian who held the title, may have been serving as the real ideological secretary.

The major event in Chernenko's life occurred in 1950, when Brezhnev arrived in Kishinëv to become the first secretary of the Moldavian Central Committee. Brezhnev worked in Moldavia only until 1952, and Chernenko until 1956. But when Brezhnev became CC secretary for heavy industry and the defense industry in 1956, Chernenko was named head of the mass political work section of the Central Committee's Propaganda-Agitation Department. (It is fairly common for the associates of one CC secretary to be named as the subordinates of others; the practice seems to serve the functions either of political control or of solidifying alliances among secretaries—in the Chernenko case, the alliance between Brezhnev and Suslov.) When Brezhnev became chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1960, and again when he became first (and then general) secretary of the CPSU in 1964, he selected Chernenko to head his personal secretariat.

Thus, Chernenko has been exposed to a wide range of decisions as a personal assistant but has no significant experience of his own outside the ideological sphere. He has not run a major economic unit or party organization, he has had almost no direct responsibility in the foreign policy realm, and he has not even been one of Brezhnev's policy assistants. His education—even if one counts a correspondence degree he received at Kishinëv Pedagogical Institute—is not the sort usually considered appropriate for top posts in the Soviet Union. And, finally, he is not even a good public speaker.

Even today, it is possible that Chernenko's seeming power may be largely illusory. He first came to prominence in 1975 at a time when Brezhnev's health was quite poor, appearing in foreign policy settings (e.g., the Helsinki Conference of Chiefs of State), in which he served largely as an aide-de-camp.⁴⁹ The following year, when Brezhnev's health was much improved,⁵⁰ Chernenko did not figure as a member of Soviet delegations. But he publicly returned to Brezhnev's side when the latter's health deteriorated once more. Conceivably, Chernenko has been functioning more as Brezhnev's eyes and ears—and even as his memory—than as a real policymaker.⁵¹ If he is serving as personnel secretary, he has not built much of a local machine—only 15 of 71 RSFSR obkom first secretaries have

⁴⁶ *Pravda*, May 12, 1982, p. 2, and May 28, 1982, p. 2. In January, the obituary of Semën Tsvigan, the first deputy chairman of the KGB, was signed by only two Politburo members—Chernenko and Gorbachëv. Since Chernenko worked with Tsvigan in Moldavia, Gorbachëv's name would seem to imply his responsibility for the Administrative Organs Department at that time, *ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1982, p. 2.

⁴⁷ Most of Chernenko's biographies give little information about his early career. It is described, however, in *Sovetskaya roennaya entsiklopediya*, Vol. 8, pp. 452–53.

⁴⁸ *Kultura i Zhizn'* (Moscow), Mar. 11, 1948, p. 1. While Chernenko was in Penza, the head of the agriculture department of the obkom and later the head of the agriculture administration of the oblast government executive committee was Fëdor Kulakov, the CC secretary for agriculture during most of the Brezhnev era. Kulakov in turn was Gorbachëv's patron in Stavropol'. It would be fascinating to know whether this combination of circumstances created a political link between Chernenko and Gorbachëv.

⁴⁹ For Brezhnev's health, see *The New York Times*, June 14, 1975, p. 1; July 31, 1975, p. 2; Aug. 1, 1975, p. 2; and Jan 25, 1976, p. 1. For Chernenko, see *Pravda*, June 11, 1975, p. 1, and July 29 1975 p. 1.

⁵⁰ *The New York Times*, Jan. 25, 1976, p. 1, and Sept. 23, 1976, p. 7.

⁵¹ Arkadiy Shevchenko, the former Soviet diplomat, says that when he attended meetings in 1977 at which Brezhnev was present, the latter's memory functioned very badly. *The Washington Post*, June 6, 1982, p. 28.

been changed in the last five years, and some give every appearance of being allied with other contenders.⁵²

Chernenko's best chance would seem to be as a transitional leader with relatively little power. But it is dangerous to judge a new leader by his background. Who could have predicted that President Harry Truman, President Anwar Sadat, or Pope John XXIII would turn out to be historic figures?

If Chernenko is purely a transitional leader, his policy preferences might not be very important. Nevertheless, if he does become general secretary the coalition that he has put together (this will be discussed in the conclusion) and the content of his speeches and articles suggest that he is a strong supporter of détente and of some kinds of reform.⁵³ When Brezhnev presented Chernenko with awards on his 70th birthday, he praised his assistant for being "restless" in the good sense of the term, a man with "a creative, daring approach." In response, Chernenko acknowledged that he sometimes makes "nonstandard decisions."⁵⁴

Sometimes Chernenko's words seem extraordinarily bold. In his 1980 election speech he did not speak out in support of the recent invasion of Afghanistan (nor did the slightly abbreviated version published in *Pravda* even mention the subject).⁵⁵ In a recent article in *Kommunist*, he explicitly indicated that discussion of the balance between the organizational and ideological roles of the party could indicate the extent to which the party should dominate society (with the revisionist position being that the party should limit itself to ideological work). He then went on to say that, of course, the balance between organizational and ideological work was not fixed once and for all, discussing the issue in a manner which indicated a commitment to a less obtrusive involvement.⁵⁶

Yet, Chernenko's speeches often combine formulations that have been advanced by strong reformers with examples from the past that suggest little change. Hence, they give the impression of skillful efforts to reassure both his boss and a prospective reform coalition. It is not clear who would be disappointed if Chernenko became the new leader.

Judging by his speeches, Chernenko seems to fall more within the Khrushchev tradition than into the camp of economic modernizers. He has written often of the need for "further perfection of the political system"⁵⁷ and frequently expresses what sound like antibureaucratic, and proparticipatory views. (Indeed, when he spoke at a conference on rural ideological work in 1948, he, unlike the other speakers, is reported to have attacked the Ministry of Agriculture and the Committee for Radio for insufficient installation of radios in the countryside).⁵⁸ He has stated that "some forms and methods of economic administration which arose in preceding stages of socialist construction and which were progressive and effective in their own time cease to be such,"⁵⁹ and it is easy to imagine him leading an attack on Gosplan and the ministries. Nevertheless, his language suggests a greater attraction to popular participation than to the use of economic levers, and it is hard to imagine him pushing for a change in social policy in order to provide greater economic rewards to managers.

Yuriy Andropov. If the Central Committee selects the best-qualified major contender as Brezhnev's successor, then it surely will select Andropov. The most urgent problems of the Soviet leadership are handling relations with the United States and China, maintaining control over Eastern Europe, and deciding which, if any, of the East European reforms to adopt in the Soviet Union. Andropov is the only man in the leadership with real expertise on all these questions.

Andropov was born in 1914 and graduated from the Rybinsk Water Transportation Technicum in 1936.⁶⁰ (He apparently overlapped for a year in Rybinsk with Kirilenko, who graduated in 1935 from the city's premier institute, the Rybinsk Aviation Institute.) From 1938 until 1951, Andropov served in Komsomol and party posts in Yaroslavl' and the Karelo-Finnish Republic, working under the present Minister of Foreign Trade, Nikolay Patolichev, who was obkom first secretary in Yaroslavl'. He worked under (or at least with) Otto Kuusinen, who was

⁵² For example, P. A. Leonov, shifted from Sakhalin to Kalinin, had been head of the party organs department under Grishin and Kapitonov; B. F. Murav'yev, the new first secretary in Kuibyshev, graduated in 1952 from Karelo-Finnish University, i.e., an institution in an area where Andropov had been active from 1940 to 1951.

⁵³ See Hyland, loc. cit., p. 23.

⁵⁴ *Pravda*, Sept. 25, 1981, p. 1.

⁵⁵ *Moskovskaya Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 16, 1980, p. 2, and *Pravda*, Feb. 16, 1980, p. 2.

⁵⁶ Chernenko, "Vanguard Role of the Party," loc. cit., p. 26.

⁵⁷ See, for example, *Pravda*, Feb. 27, 1979, p. 3.

⁵⁸ *Kultura i Zhizn'*, Mar. 11, 1948, p. 1.

⁵⁹ K. U. Chernenko, *Voprosy raboty partiynogo i gosudarstvennogo apparata* (Questions of the Work of the Party and State Apparatus), Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, p. 317.

⁶⁰ Andropov's biography can be found in *Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), 3rd ed., Moscow, Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, Vol. 2, p. 23.

chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in the Karelo-Finnish Republic. By the time that Andropov was made head of a CC subdepartment (*podotdel*) in 1951, he had accumulated five years of college education at Petrozavodsk University and the Higher Party School, through part-time study.

Andropov then moved into the foreign policy sphere, in 1953 becoming counselor and *chargé d'affaires* in Hungary and in 1954 moving up to be ambassador.⁶¹ He was stationed in Budapest both during the evolutionary process that led to the 1956 revolution and during the Soviet invasion itself. In May 1957—just before Khrushchev elevated Kuusinen into the party Secretariat and Presidium (as the Politburo was then called)—Andropov was named head of the newly created Socialist Countries Department of the Central Committee. He retained this position until May 1967. In 1961, he was given the title of CC secretary.

Although little direct evidence is available on Andropov's policy orientation during this period, his personal connections were extremely suggestive. He almost surely was a protégé of Kuusinen, who as CC secretary acted as a progressive counterweight to Suslov in the ideological-foreign policy realm. (Kuusinen's propensities were indicated in his selection of Fedar Burlatskiy, probably the most vocal proponent of de-Stalinization in the Soviet media between 1954 and 1957, to head his full-time "group of consultants"—his main staff.⁶² When Kuusinen died in 1964, Andropov inherited his group of consultants. He soon chose a new leader for it—Georgiy Arbatov, who had been writing pro-détente articles since the mid-1950's.⁶³

In May 1967, Andropov was appointed chairman of the KGB. While the KGB is best known for its secret police activities, it also performs foreign intelligence functions, and Andropov was the first secret police head in Soviet history with substantial preparation for these latter responsibilities. The KGB's three major deputy chairmen for internal security—Semën Tsvigun, Georgiy Tsinev, and Viktor Chebrikov—had been associated with Brezhnev in Dnepropetrovsk or Moldavia,⁶⁴ and one suspects that Andropov had only partial control over them at best. For both these reasons, it is likely that Andropov gave considerable attention to the foreign policy responsibilities of the KGB. In fact, he was promoted to full membership in the Politburo at a 1973 CC plenary session that ratified détente and simultaneously named the ministers of foreign affairs (Gromkyo) and defense (Dmitriy Ustinov) to the Politburo.

In May 1982, only three months after the death of Suslov, Andropov was elected a CC secretary.⁶⁵ All the evidence suggests that Andropov assumed Suslov's responsibility for supervising two CC secretaries in the ideological-foreign policy realm—Boris Ponomarev and Mikhail Zimyanin.⁶⁶ It is not clear, however, whether Andropov also supervises Konstantin Rusakov, head of the Socialist Countries Department of the Central Committee. In general, he has maintained a fairly low profile. However, in one ceremonial meeting, Andropov did speak for the Politburo, and he was the Central Committee secretary to walk with Brezhnev from the plane when the latter returned from vacation in late August, even though Chernenko was also present both times.⁶⁷

Since 1975, Andropov has been much more urgent in his support for détente than any of the other major contenders. In 1975, when Suslov was expressing worry about ultrareactionary forces in the West and Shcherbitskiy was emphasizing that the nature of imperialism had not changed,⁶⁸ Andropov was insisting that the "relaxation of international tension does not occur by itself. . . . It is necessary to actively struggle for it. There cannot be any pause or breathing space since détente is a continuous process which demands constant movement forward."⁶⁹ In 1979, he asserted that "it is impossible to underestimate the danger of a course

⁶¹ This assumes that he was not already in this sphere in the CC apparatus from 1951 to 1953. His post is an extremely unusual one. I have seen only several references to a *podotdel* (subdepartment). One turned out to be the group of consultants under Kuusinen in the early 1960's (*Pravda*, Mar. 3, 1964, p. 2). Another was headed by V. M. Churayev in the early 1950's and apparently was in the Party Organs Department (*ibid.*, Mar. 2, 1982, p. 6). Andropov is likely to have been in the same department.

⁶² For a description of Burlatskiy's meeting with Kuusinen, see F. M. Burlatskiy, "O. V. Kuusinen—Marxist-Leninist Scholar and Theorist," *Rabochiy klass i sovremennyy mir* (Moscow), No. 6, 1979, pp. 99-104.

⁶³ For Arbatov's relationship to Kuusinen, see Georgiy Arbatov, "Otto Kuusinen: Marxist Theoretician," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 42, October 1981, pp. 18-20.

⁶⁴ Their biographies can be found in the 1981 *Yezhegodnik*, p. 608.

⁶⁵ *Pravda*, May 25, 1982, p. 1.

⁶⁶ He has attended many sessions with visiting foreign Communists from the Communist world (but not the non-Communist world), and he has signed the one obituary of a cultural figure where the ideological secretary's signature was appropriate. *Ibid.*, June 29, 1982, p. 6.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, June 25, 1982, p. 2; FBIS, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, Sept. 1, 1982, p. R/1.

⁶⁸ *Pravda*, June 7, 1975, p. 2, and June 10, 1975, p. 2.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, June 10, 1975, p. 2.

of retarding détente,"⁷⁰ and in 1980, he was the only Politburo member to warn that détente was in serious danger.⁷¹ Unlike many other Politburo members, Andropov has coupled his support for peace and détente with a call for negotiations, even in 1980 in the wake of the US sanctions after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As early as 1976, he was quite explicit in stating that "the policy of peaceful coexistence, as is well known, presupposes negotiations and the seeking of mutually acceptable decisions, sometimes of a compromise nature."⁷²

Andropov has not expressed his domestic views as clearly as his foreign policy views. As chairman of the KGB, he naturally has spoken out against ideological subversion (although not in his two most recent speeches, one during the 1980 RSFSR Supreme Soviet elections and the other on the 1982 anniversary of Lenin's birthday).⁷³ But he has also alluded repeatedly to "unsolved problems" and, especially this last April, to the need to solve them through internal resources.⁷⁴ Andropov is likely to favor making the hard choices that economic reform requires (that probably is the meaning of his call to solve problems by internal means). The first ideological decrees issued after he became CC secretary called for a major expansion of economic education and for a fuller discussion in literary journals of contemporary socioeconomic problems.⁷⁵ And since he is the Politburo's specialist on Hungary, it is difficult to believe that the Soviet Union would have been as tolerant of Hungarian economic reform—indeed, quite favorable toward it in the last few years—had Andropov not supported it.

Viktor Grishin. Like Andropov born in 1914, Grishin has spent his entire career in Moscow and in Serpukhov, 60 miles to the south. He graduated from two Moscow technicums—one for soil analysis and the other for locomotive service and repair—and worked for several years at a locomotive depot. He then entered party work in Serpukhov, where he became gorkom first secretary in 1948.⁷⁶ Soon after Khrushchev became Moscow obkom first secretary in late 1949, he named Grishin to head the machine-building department (which in large part was apparently also the defense industry department). In 1952, less than four years after he had been a mere gorkom second secretary in Serpukhov, Grishin was named second secretary of the Moscow obkom. In those years, the Moscow obkom supervised the city of Moscow in addition to the outlying region (it does not do so now). With Moscow first secretary Khrushchev simultaneously serving as CC secretary in charge of personnel selection, the second secretary was an important figure. Grishin served in this capacity until 1956, when he was named chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions. In 1967, he became first secretary of the Moscow gorkom, by now a post independent of the obkom.

From a contemporary perspective, the crucial question about Grishin's early years in Moscow is his relationship with two other men who worked in the city in the early 1950's—Kapitonov and Gorbachëv. Kapitonov preceded Grishin as obkom second secretary; and from 1954 to 1956, as obkom first secretary, he supervised Grishin directly. Gorbachëv, as Komsomol secretary of Moscow University in 1954–55, was ultimately subordinated, although at several levels removed, to Grishin's obkom. If the two are Grishin supporters, Kapitonov has been in a position to build a political machine for him, and Gorbachëv, to gain support among the younger obkom secretaries. The connections could be crucial—if they are friendly.⁷⁷

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, Feb. 23, 1979, p. 2.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, Feb. 18, 1980, p. 2.

⁷² *Ibid.*, Apr. 23, 1976, p. 2. For further analysis of Andropov's earlier pro-détente speeches, see Christian Duevel, "Andropov's Lenin Anniversary Speech," *Radio Liberty Research Reports*, RL 262/76, May 19, 1976; *idem.* "Some Aspects and Implications of Honecker's Revision of 'The Dictatorship of the Proletariat,'" *ibid.*, RL 295/76, June 4, 1976; and *idem.* "Similarities and Differences in the Soviet Leaders' Recent Approach to Some Issues of Foreign Policy," *ibid.*, RL 211/78, Sept. 28, 1978.

⁷³ *Pravda*, Feb. 12, 1980, p. 2, and Apr. 23, 1982, pp. 1–2.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, June 10, 1975, p. 2, and Apr. 23, 1982, p. 2.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, June 27, 1982, p. 1, and July 30, 1982, p. 1.

⁷⁶ The exact date is not known. He was not first secretary in November 1947 but was in the post as of February 1949. He probably assumed the job in December 1948, when the former first secretary was named deputy chairman of the Moscow oblast trade union organization. See *Moskovskiy Bol'shevik* (Moscow), Nov. 28, 1947, p. 2, Dec. 28, 1948, p. 1, Feb. 2, 1949, p. 1, and Aug. 3 1949 p. 2. For further biographical information about Grishin, see *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya*, Vol. 3, pp. 53–54.

⁷⁷ One should never forget that familiarity sometimes breeds contempt and enmity instead of friendship, and the Moscow party organization clearly has had fissures. Kapitonov himself was demoted as Moscow obkom first secretary in 1959 and sent to Ivanovo, reportedly because he could not get along with the chairman of the oblast government executive committee, Nikolay Ignatov. See "To Educate Cadres in the Spirit of Excellence," *Partynaya Zhizn'*, No. 8, April 1959, pp. 10–11. From the late 1950's to the mid-1960's, three obkom and gorkom first secretaries—G. G. Abramov, N. G. Yegorichev, and V. I. Ustinov—quickly fell into disrepute.

Because of Grishin's long tenure in Moscow, many in the city claim to have some sense of him as a person. The popular impression seems to be quite uniform. He is usually described as cautious, moderate, and judicious, as a man who is inclined to serve more as a chairman of the board and less as an innovator. Some say that he is of only average intelligence.

Judging by his speeches, Grishin holds rather old-fashioned views. Indeed, while Kirilenko in 1976 spoke of himself, at age 70, as "middle-aged," Grishin in 1975 spoke of himself, at age 61, as part of the "older generation."⁷⁸ To the extent that he ventures beyond discussions of Moscow, he tends to raise traditional themes: the working class, collectivism, and the evils of the private-property psychology. The most striking feature of his speeches is the great emphasis he gives to ideological work, especially in contexts in which it would not necessarily be expected.⁷⁹ Unlike many of Chernenko's speeches, Grishin's speeches give no hint that he is speaking about this subject in Aesopian fashion. The foreign policy sections of his election speeches are little more than an endorsement of Brezhnev and his policies, and he supports the existing level of military expenditures.⁸⁰ While Grishin might be willing to be a neutral general secretary who presides over change initiated by his colleagues, it is difficult to imagine him leading an attack on Brezhnev's social policy and on the prerogatives of the Moscow ministries. He seems more disposed toward ideological exhortation of the worker than toward radical change in the incentive system, let alone toward a widening of the private sector.

Mikhail Gorbachëv. Gorbachëv is by eight years the youngest man in the Politburo. Born in 1931, he is part of an important new generation moving toward the top in the Soviet Union. Too young to have fought in World War II and to have its college education disrupted by the war (although not too young to have been affected by it),⁸¹ this "postwar generation" went through Soviet colleges when the standards of admission and instruction were at their highest, and went to work as the Stalin period ended.⁸² Gorbachëv attended Moscow University, where, as noted, he was Komsomol secretary. He graduated with a law degree in 1955. Although his biographers depict him as a combine operator in his youth, a local newspaper reports that this was a summer job.⁸³

Gorbachëv has spent most of his career in his native region of Stavropol'. After graduation, he returned home as a Komsomol official, soon becoming the first secretary of the Komsomol kraykom. In 1961, after several years as second secretary of the Komsomol kraykom, he was named first secretary. Judging by the local press, he concentrated his attention at this time on such questions as agriculture and rural youth rather than education.⁸⁴ In March 1962, he was transferred to party work as party organizer of the kraykom in the kolkhozsovkhoz administration in the district surrounding the city of Stavropol'. In December 1962, when the party apparatus was bifurcated by Khrushchev, Gorbachëv was named head of the party organs department of the rural kraykom. From 1960 to 1964, he worked under Fëdor Kulakov, the first secretary of the party kraykom and then the rural party kraykom, and later to become the CC secretary for agriculture (1965) and a Politburo member (1971).⁸⁵ In 1966, Gorbachëv was named the first secretary of the Stavropol' party gorkom. While working in this capacity, he also completed a second college degree—this time through part-time work at the Stavropol' Agricultural Institute. In 1968, he became second secretary of the party kraykom, and in 1970, first secretary, a job he held until 1978.

As kraykom first secretary, Gorbachëv had a major responsibility for the development of irrigation in the Stavropol' region, historically one of the Soviet Union's major grain producers. The Central Committee and Council of Ministers

⁷⁸ *Pravda*, Oct. 15, 1976, p. 1, and June 7, 1975, p. 2.

⁷⁹ See V. V. Grishin, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i* (Selected Speeches and Writings), Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, pp. 488, 590, and 641.

⁸⁰ *Pravda*, June 7, 1975, p. 2, Feb. 15, 1969, p. 2, and Feb. 6, 1980, p. 2.

⁸¹ For example, Stavropol' Kray, where Gorbachëv grew up, was occupied by the Germans. Suslov served as head of the partisans there.

⁸² For a discussion of this generation, see Jerry P. Hough, "The Generation Gap and the Brezhnev Succession," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1979, pp. 1-16; and idem, *Soviet Leadership in Transition*, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1980.

⁸³ *Stavropol'skaya Pravda* (Stavropol'), Feb. 1979, p. 1. For further biographical information on Gorbachëv, see *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Desyaty sozyv* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet: Tenth Convocation), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo sovetov narodnykh deputatov, 1979, p. 119.

⁸⁴ *Stavropol'skaya Pravda*, May 12, 1961, p. 1, June 24, 1961, p. 2, Sept. 26, 1961, pp. 2; and Jan. 19, 1962, p. 2.

⁸⁵ The association was quite close, for Gorbachëv was a candidate member of the kray party committee's bureau while Komsomol first secretary and subsequently a full member of the bureau of the rural kraykom. Ibid., Sept. 26, 1961, p. 1, and Dec. 28, 1962, p. 1.

decided in 1971 to speed construction of the Great Stavropol' Canal and to bring a second link into operation by November 1, 1974. Despite an unexpected encountering of sand instead of clay in the construction of the tunnels, the canal was completed on schedule. The total number of irrigated hectares in the region rose from 192,000 in 1970 to 370,000 in 1977.⁸⁶

When Kulakov died in 1978, Gorbachëv was selected to replace him. In October 1980, he was elected a full member of the Politburo. His current responsibilities seem to extend well beyond agriculture to include the entire agro-industrial complex—a sector of the economy reported to contribute 46 percent of the country's added value.⁸⁷ Since the organization of the CC apparatus links the food industry with light industry, Gorbachëv's supervision of the relevant department also makes him the leading Politburo member for consumer goods.⁸⁸ Finally, undoubtedly because of his law degree, Gorbachëv was also elected chairman of the Legislative Proposals Commission of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet. This committee takes part in the drafting of all Supreme Soviet legislation and exercises special oversight over law-and-order questions.

Gorbachëv is young enough and new enough to the leadership that his policy views remain largely unknown. On some questions, such as foreign policy, those views may not even be completely firm. His 1979 election speech expressed fervent support for détente, while his 1981 speech was just as fervent in its support for the Soviet right to intervene in Afghanistan.⁸⁹ His published speeches and articles naturally concentrate on agriculture, on which he takes a generally pro-reform position.⁹⁰ If the May 1982 CC decision on agriculture is any indication, he is an extremely timid reformer indeed, but it is likely that that decision reflected the judgment of older colleagues. A man of Gorbachëv's age and responsibilities would almost surely adopt a strong position in favor of economic reform as a way of gaining support from the younger obkom secretaries against the central government and of giving himself an excuse to remove old officials and build his own machine.

If the succession takes place quickly, Gorbachëv's youth and relative inexperience with the non-Russian nationalities and with foreign policy will count against him. It should be noted, however, that he has a most striking range of political connections. As already discussed, his patron, Kulakov, was associated with Chernenko in Penza. Kulakov's election as CC secretary in 1965 was quite likely on Chernenko's recommendation. The head of the organizational party work department, and subsequently the organizational secretary of the Stavropol' kraykom under Gorbachëv, A. K. Vedernikov, has since served as the head of the section of the Central Committee's Organizational Party Work Department in charge of Moldavia and the western Ukraine.⁹¹ This, too, may have solidified the tie with Chernenko. In addition, Gorbachëv's post as Komsomol secretary in Moscow University placed him under the supervision of Grishin and Kapitonov. His work in Stavropol' was in a kray where Suslov had once been first secretary, and at Suslov's funeral, he was the only Politburo member to stop and talk with each member of Suslov's family.⁹² Finally, Richard Kosolapov, the chief editor of *Kommunist*, was in Komsomol work with Gorbachëv at Moscow University.⁹³

THE SUCCESSION

Speculation about the outcome of the struggle for power is fraught with danger. We tend simply to focus on the question of who will be the general secretary, but it should not be forgotten that the real leader—the real strongman—may hold a different post. In the Soviet Union, both Lenin and Malenkov were head of government (rather than head of the party), and in China, Deng Xiaoping chose to rule

⁸⁶ *Stavropol'skaya Pravda*, Mar. 26, 1971, p. 1; Jan. 22, 1972, p. 2; Oct. 7, 1972, p. 1; Oct. 10, 1972, p. 2; Dec. 31, 1973, p. 1; Nov. 1, 1974, p. 1, and Jan. 27, 1978, p. 3. The number of hectares of mechanized irrigation which is reported in the statistical handbooks, is much less, but also showed considerable growth.

⁸⁷ *Pravda*, June 17, 1982, p. 2.

⁸⁸ For example, he has been the Politburo member who attends light industry meetings. *Ibid.*, June 13, 1981, p. 1, and July 3, 1981, p. 2.

⁸⁹ *Stavropol'skaya Pravda*, Feb. 3, 1979, p. 2; and *Altayskaya Pravda* (Barnaul') Feb. 1, 1980, p. 2. These long foreign policy discussions were not included in the versions of the speeches printed in *Pravda*.

⁹⁰ For example, M. Gorbachëv, "Current Questions of Agriculture and Its Effectiveness," *Kommunist*, No. 11, July 1980, pp. 10-26.

⁹¹ *Stavropol'skaya Pravda*, Feb. 21, 1971, p. 1, and Feb. 23, 1974, p. 1; *Sovetskaya Moldaviya* (Kishinëv), Jan. 30, 1976, p. 1; and *L'vovskaya Pravda* (Lvov), Dec. 23, 1978, p. 1.

⁹² I am indebted to Mark Zlotnik for this point.

⁹³ Kosolapov's biography states only that he entered Komsomol work immediately after graduation in 1955 (1981 *Yezhegodnik*, p. 584). That would not have occurred, however, if he had not been active in it in the university, 1981 *Yezhegodnik*, p. 584.

from a less lofty post. Moreover, the arrangements made immediately after the succession may fall apart quickly. Malenkov was removed as party secretary in a week, the "gang of four" lasted a month, and Lavrenty Beria was arrested in four months. These events, in turn, were only the first steps in a political struggle that lasted for some years.

We also do not know the time of the succession, the health of the various contenders at that time (or even which ones will be alive), the personal relationships among the Politburo members, and their opinions of each other's abilities and judgment. Are, for example, Chernenko and Andropov major adversaries, or have they reached an agreement on the succession? Is Andropov, who looks frail on television, willing to accept the less demanding Suslov portfolio? Is Grishin ill enough that he would be satisfied with Arvid Pel'she's post of chairman of the Party Control Committee (a post for which he would seem well suited by temperament and reputation)? How antagonistic are the Moldavian and Dnepropetrovsk factions of the Brezhnev group? We should not pretend that we have the answers to these and many similar questions.

Events will also affect the succession in ways difficult to foresee. The performance of the economy may absolutely require reform or may permit reform to be postponed. There may be foreign policy crises. The Polish crisis, for example, has no doubt already affected the Soviet succession. It dramatically pointed up the dangers of Soviet pricing policy and of excessive reliance on foreign credits. It surely posed severe dilemmas for Soviet policymakers; some Politburo members probably panicked and counseled invasion, and others advised patience. In the process, the position of some contenders must have been strengthened, and the position of others weakened. Even the Middle East crisis may have had an impact.

Besides events, the process of "cabinet-building" may have a major effect on the final outcome. One of the striking facts about this succession is the number of key posts that it is likely to open. If Andropov, Grishin, or Gorbachëv became general secretary, it is highly likely that Tikhonov, Kirilenko, and Chernenko would soon be replaced or moved into more ceremonial positions. Gromyko and Ustinov are also candidates for retirement in the relatively near future, and the new chairman of the KGB, Vitaliy Fedorchuk, could easily be a transitional figure. All these jobs, as well as the former job of the new general secretary, could become open.

Other key posts could be created or strengthened. The post of chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet could be filled again by a man other than the general secretary. The chairmanship of Gosplan might well be upgraded in a time of economic reform, perhaps even to the level it had under Nikolay Voznesenskiy or Mikhail Saburov. Normally, of course, the post of first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers has been a highly important one, with several such officials represented on the Politburo. (Today there is only one first deputy chairman, the 75-year-old Ivan Arkhipov, an old Brezhnev crony who is not even a candidate member of the Politburo and who almost certainly will disappear with Brezhnev.) And the system badly needs a national security adviser to coordinate foreign and defense policy.

A key to the struggle for power, then, will be the ability to distribute these posts to powerful figures within the Central Committee in a way that will build a winning coalition. Any such exercise now is deeply threatening to Brezhnev, unless he has decided to retire, for a coalition in place has little incentive to wait until his death. Unless Brezhnev has permitted Chernenko to build a coalition, the contenders may be avoiding cabinet-building lest Brezhnev get wind of it and move against them. If so, the succession would have to take place in a great hurry under difficult circumstances.

Even if past experience did not point in such a direction,⁹⁴ the present situation within the Politburo suggests that the immediate post-Brezhnev leadership will be a collective one. The crucial question, however, is what type of collective leadership will it be? Will it be a status quo collective leadership in which, as has been the case in recent years, the major interests are able to prevent policies that would do them serious harm? Or will it be a collective leadership on the 1953-57 model—a leadership that, while beset with conflict, permits and even encourages individual members to carry out major policy initiatives in their own spheres of responsibility?

It is easy to make a strong case for either of these options. Even excluding Brezhnev, 7 of the 12 Politburo voting members are 70 years of age or older. Forty percent of the voting members of the Central Committee will be 65 or older by the

⁹⁴ For the argument that successions tend to follow the same pattern, including early collective leadership, see George W. Breslauer, "Political Succession and the Soviet Policy Agenda," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1980, pp. 34-52.

end of 1982 (more than half of them 70 or older, and one fifth 75 or older). Seventy percent of the Council of Ministers members who are voting members of the Central Committee will be 65 or older.⁹⁵ Most of these older men must sense that reform means retirement in the relatively near future and would surely prefer a leader such as Grishin (at least if he is described correctly here), who would not challenge the status quo seriously and who might not retire them too quickly.

It seems to me, however, that while this scenario is quite possible, it underestimates the probabilities of near-term reform. Domestically, there is a pressure for change, a frustration at the weakness and indecision of Brezhnev, a desire for a strong leader and some action, and an impatience on the part of younger (really middle-aged) leaders to have their chance. Abroad, there is the threat of an all-out arms race and the disarray in the Western alliance, which give the Soviet leadership an added incentive to go beyond their usual peace offensive and take really meaningful steps toward arms control. Finally, there is the shock over the events in Poland, whose year-and-a-half of turmoil is likely to make the other peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union more willing to forego radical action in favor of evolution and more willing to accept price rises in the framework of the promise of reform.⁹⁶

A reformist collective leadership is also politically quite possible. The Politburo has been changed significantly in the last few years through the deaths of Kosygin and Suslov, the decline of Kirilenko, and the selection of a basically nonpolitical transition figure (Tikhonov) as chairman of the Council of Ministers. As a result, the Politburo members who will most likely be the key figures in the brokering—Andropov, Chernenko, Gorbachëv, Grishin, Gromyko, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, Grigoriy Romanov, Shcherbitskiy, and Ustinov—average only 66 years of age, a situation quite different from what it would have been three years ago. In the Central Committee, 60 percent are younger than 65, and a coalition needs only 51 percent for victory. In addition, at least a few of the older CC members are either anticipating retirement in any case or hoping to be one of those who will benefit from the succession.

If there is to be a reformist collective leadership, it may not matter too much who will occupy precisely which posts. Regardless of his exact position, Gorbachëv would probably concentrate on agriculture and the services sector (that is, on a partial return to the New Economic Policy). Andropov would probably have major responsibility for foreign policy and ideology. Vladimir Dolgikh, the new member of the Politburo, would very likely handle industrial reorganization. Chernenko (if he is included) would concentrate on political reforms.

If one is to speculate about actual posts, I have had the sense that Andropov has the best chance to be general secretary or at least the strongman behind a weak general secretary. As chairman of the KGB, Andropov has been ruthless enough to reassure the conservatives that he would not let reform get out of hand (in fact, he probably would be quite harsh on dissident activity even as he loosened some of the controls on acceptable political activity). That same ruthlessness might reassure the reformers that he has the strength to handle the ministries. I suspect that Andropov has excellent relations with the Army Chief of Staff Nikolay Ogarkov, who fought on the Karelian front in World War II near the area where Andropov was associated with the partisans.⁹⁷ Ogarkov's appointment as minister of defense might complete the needed coalition.

As I read the Soviet media of the last few months, however, my instinct suggests that the coalition may already be in place. In April, the most sophisticated of the Soviet political observers, Fëdor Burlatskiy, wrote about the "interregnum" (*mezhdutsarstviye*) and "time of troubles" (*smutnoye vremya*) in China and included some generalizations that had obvious relevance for the Soviet Union:

In the history of interregnums it often turns out this way: after the death of a sovereign, emperor, or leader who did not leave a successor, a time of trouble ensues, in which different groups compete in a struggle for power until a new leader appears who is capable of ending the political confusion and reestablishing a firm order. Moreover, in the first stage, as a rule, a completely inconspicuous person is advanced. He succeeds in using the favorable situation while the basic rivals have a mortal grip on each other.

⁹⁵ These and later statistics on Soviet officials are drawn from the biographies of Central Committee members, all of which were published at the end of the 1981 *Yezhegodnik*.

⁹⁶ For the opposite case, see Seweryn Bialer, "The International and Internal Contexts of the 26th Party Congress," in Bialer and Gustafson, op. cit., esp. pp. 33-38.

⁹⁷ In a 1942 article that Andropov chose to have republished in his 1979 selected works, he emphasized the closeness to the front and the help that the Komsomol was giving it through the making and collecting of supplies. Yu. V. Andropov, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i* (Selected Speeches and Writings), Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, pp. 24-25. For a discussion of Andropov's work at this time, see Za Ilniyey Karelskogo (Behind the Lines of the Karelian Front), 2nd ed., Petrozavodsk, Kareliya, 1979, pp. 62, 78-79, 214, and 289.

Perhaps Mao Zedong calculated on establishing collective leadership after his death? Then he should have stated this and worried about the creation of political mechanisms inside the party and the state which would have made this possible. . . . And, thus, as has often happened in periods of interregnums, the successor at first turned out to be one of the least-known figures—the man on whom no one had turned any attention beforehand, Hua Guofeng.⁹⁸

Whether by coincidence or not, the weeks after this article was published saw a series of events that suggested the major rivals—or perhaps Brezhnev himself—were introducing some order into the situation. In the wake of Kirilenko's two-month disappearance from public view, Dolgikh was elevated to candidate membership in the Politburo, apparently with Kirilenko's long-time responsibility for the Planning and Financial Organs Department.⁹⁹ Kapitonov suffered a significant reduction of status.¹⁰⁰ While this may have been part of a campaign against Kirilenko, it was also a sign that one of Grishin's main hopes was not going to be of any help and that he, Grishin, was one of the "inconspicuous" candidates who was not likely to make it.

If the immediate succession is more or less in place, and enjoys Brezhnev's approval, then Chernenko must be a big part of it—most likely, either as the general secretary or chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (if the two jobs are to be separated). Indeed, if Gorbachëv is linked to Chernenko through Kulakov and if Dolgikh is likewise linked to Chernenko through his long years of work in Chernenko's home region of Krasnoyarsk, it is easy to put together hypothetical "cabinets," with Chernenko as general secretary. If Gorbachëv is politically trustworthy, he would make an excellent personnel secretary, both because of his experience with organizational work and because of his supervision of agriculture. Dolgikh could assume either Kirilenko's post in the CC Secretariat or a high post in the Council of Ministers. Andropov is a natural occupant of the Suslov slot, perhaps even expanded to become "national security adviser." The chairmanship of the Council of Ministers is a problem, because the other men are Russians (although Chernenko's name is Ukrainian) and because it usually has had foreign policy responsibilities (if the general secretary has not assumed them). As a Ukrainian, Tikhonov might well be kept on for a while, despite his age; however, non-Russians such as Shcherbitskiy and Eduard Shevardnadze are obvious candidates for promotion.

To repeat, however, the critical question—especially for the outside world—is the basic policy orientation of the majority in any new collective leadership. The Brezhnev regime has lasted for nearly 20 years, and the Brezhnev generation has been near the top for more than 40 years. As a consequence, it has become very difficult for us to judge which features of Soviet politics and policies are inherent in the system and which really reflect more the values of this historic generation. There are enormous differences between Communist systems such as North Korea and Yugoslavia—or even Hungary and Romania—and it is at least conceivable that many aspects of the Soviet Union which we have ascribed either to the essence of the system or the Russian national character will turn out to be less permanent than we have assumed.

It seems to me that a new collective leadership is likely to make significant changes—perhaps even quite significant changes—fairly quickly. The Khrushchev-Brezhnev social policy has come to a political dead end. By basing their legitimacy so heavily on egalitarianism, the leaders have set an impossible goal for themselves and will always be judged by their failures rather than their achievements. Indeed, by overrewarding the industrial proletariat, they do not even serve the cause of social justice, for they neglect the truly underprivileged in Soviet society—the lower white-collar and service personnel. By permitting the gap between prices and the supply-and-demand equilibrium point to widen, they create inexorable pressures for the broadening of a black market that strikes at the moral fiber of the system, and they create a growing privileged group among those willing to function outside the law. The leading theorists who speak

⁹⁸ Fëdor Burlatskiy, "Interregnum, or Chronicle of the Years of Deng Xiaoping," *Novyyi Mir* (Moscow), No. 4, 1982, pp. 210–11.

⁹⁹ See fn. 36.

¹⁰⁰ In recent years, Kapitonov always signed obituaries out of alphabetical order as the first of the CC secretaries not on the Politburo. That is, he signed in front of Dolgikh and Mikhail Zimyanin ("Z" comes before "K" in the Russian alphabet). In addition, he almost always signed minor cultural obituaries with Zimyanin in cases where only the latter seemed appropriate. However, beginning with an obituary published in *Pravda*, Apr. 28, 1982, p. 6, Kapitonov no longer signed the obituaries of minor cultural figures; and beginning with an obituary printed in *ibid.*, June 9, 1982, p. 3, Kapitonov's name was listed in alphabetical order after Zimyanin. Cf. *ibid.*, June 1, 1982, p. 3, the last obituary signed in the old way.

out on this subject say that all means should be used to liquidate this problem, and this seems to indicate—and certainly should indicate—price reform and a partial legalization of private activity in trade and the services.¹⁰¹ For these reasons the social policy is likely to be modified in the interests of economic growth.

To be sure, policy changes may be halting and uneven, especially if Brezhnev retires with honor rather than dies or is removed. The Soviet Union would certainly not move quickly toward anything approaching Yugoslavia's market socialism, and even movement toward the Hungarian model would be slow. Near-term reforms would conceivably be movement toward meaningful price adjustments, legalization of parts of the second economy, and greater independence for the farms and individual peasants. As in Hungary, a selective importation by key Western consumer goods would symbolize change and absorb excess purchasing power (an importation of 100 million hand calculators would cost only US\$500 million—far less than is spent on grain). As in 1953 and 1954, some of the simplest changes are in the foreign and defense policy realms. If there is to be reform, it may come there first. The most severe conflicts between economic growth and social policy are likely to be the center of the second phase of the succession, several years hence.

If, of course, no change takes place in the wake of succession, if the new Soviet leadership pushes forward as blindly as the Polish leadership did in the 1970's, then serious thought has to be given to the question of the stability of the system. Because of the identification of communism with Russian nationalism, one would anticipate that the first riots would be directed against the leadership rather than against the system as a whole. If so, the disturbances could be quieted by reform. However, if troops refuse to fire on rioters—as occurred in March 1917—there will be no threat of outside intervention (as in the Polish case) to save the system. It is precisely the recognition of this fact that is likely to persuade the new Soviet leaders that they cannot wait until later in the decade to begin reform.

¹⁰¹ R. Kosolapov, "Contribution of the 24th, 25th, and 26th CPSU Congresses Toward the Solution of Theoretical and Political Problems of Developed Socialism and the Transition to Communism," *Kommunist*, No. 5, March 1982, pp. 66-67; and V. Pechenov, "On the Firm Ground of Socioeconomic Policy," *ibid.*, No. 11, July 1982, pp. 41-42.

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KTO KOGO IN THE KREMLIN*

(By William G. Hyland)

One of the casualties of the prolongation of the Brezhnev era has been a decline in the art of Kremlinology. Faced with what seemed to be a fairly stable Soviet leadership, students of the Soviet scene have gradually strayed off into the more alluring fields of behavioral sciences, generational change, nationality problems, military doctrine, etc. The game of Kremlin politics has increasingly been ignored.

Yet the deaths of two major Soviet leaders—Aleksey Kosygin in December 1980 and Mikhail Suslov in January 1982—are sharp reminders not only that personalities are important elements of Soviet politics but that the constellation of political power is an increasingly fragile one. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a Soviet leadership without Suslov, who seemed a permanent fixture bridging the Stalin period and the present. His presence somehow conferred a legitimacy on both Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. The succession to Brezhnev has to be quite a different process without the participation of Kosygin and Suslov. Who replaces Suslov—not merely in name or title, but who performs the function of guardian of orthodoxy, who becomes the senior arbiter of high-level disputes? How will domestic policy be affected? Has Brezhnev become suddenly more vulnerable?

Speculation about political personalities in the Soviet system is difficult and too often fruitless, and speculation about the relationship between personalities and policy questions is even more hazardous. But Western governments simply want to know: (1) who will rule the USSR in the 1980's, and (2) what will Soviet policy be?

These questions are not as shallow as they may sound. Sovietologists surely know that there is a revisionist school of history which views the course of East-West relations as a record of missed opportunities. While revisionist theories are always greeted with skepticism, it is nevertheless true that there have been turning points when one side or the other has made a crucial decision based on a guess about the other's intentions (e.g., NCS-68).¹ Sovietologists would do well to bear this fact in mind.

What follows is a deliberately semi-provocative review of some of the issues which need to be addressed in this context. Let us begin with the question of the Soviet leadership.

THE MEN IN THE KREMLIN

The Marxists are wrong. Individuals and their personalities do matter. They do shape history. And they certainly have shaped Soviet history.

It is unfortunate that Western Sovietology has come under the sway of a school of analysis that has subconsciously accepted some key premises of Marxist determinism. These analysts argue that only the system counts. It has a massive momentum and its own laws, institutions, and dynamics. Since Stalin's death, leaders come and go; it does not matter who is on top. Soviet policy will turn out to be about the same.

This is nonsense. Leonid Brezhnev is not Nikita Khrushchev, nor was Khrushchev Iosif Stalin. It is inconceivable, for example, that Brezhnev could carry out the ruthless bloody purges of the 1930's, even if he had the power and opportunity. Or, to look at things from a different standpoint, let us suppose that Khrushchev had started the coup of October 1964 and had remained in office until his death. How would he have handled the Vietnam war, the Czechoslovak crisis, or *Ostpolitik*? The same as Brezhnev? Would Khrushchev have invaded Czechoslovakia on the eve of a summit meeting with President Lyndon John-

*"Kto kogo?" is colloquial Russian for "Who wins? Who loses?"—Eds.

¹NCS-68 was a document delineating a U.S. policy response to the perceived Soviet threat in 1950 in light of the U.S.S.R.'s new nuclear capabilities and its presumed intentions. See, for example, Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Sounding the Tocsin. NCS 68 and the Soviet Threat." *International Security* (Cambridge MA), Fall 1979, pp. 116-58.

son? Suppose Brezhnev had not survived when he was ill in 1975. Would Andrey Kirilenko have prevailed? Would Cuban troops now be in Angola or Ethiopia? Would there be a strategic arms limitation treaty?

True, analysis of personalities from afar is a dubious art. It inevitably lapses into an analysis of career patterns. Thus, so and so is a "survivor," because he has, in fact, survived. The "formative experience" of so and so was his rapid rise during the purges, or during Stalin's last days, or under Khrushchev, or even under Brezhnev. This is useful but limited, and for a policymaker it is normally frustrating.

Every recent American president has asked, "What is Brezhnev really like?" Before the first Nixon-Brezhnev summit in 1972, a large package of papers was prepared, drawing on mountains of public sources. But probably the most valuable briefing paper was that by Henry Kissinger, who had seen Brezhnev at close quarters for several days just a month before. Since then, a growing number of officials have dealt with Brezhnev, and he is no longer such a mystery. But what about the other Soviet leaders?

There is the rub. The Soviet system conspires to shield a large number of officials from non-Communist observers. How many diplomats or other observers have had much contact with, let us say, Viktor Grishin, who could conceivably become the next General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)? Or, if you prefer, Kirilenko or Konstantin Chernenko? Yet, some day President Reagan or his successor is certain to ask the same question: What is X really like?

All of this is to suggest that the succession needs to be analyzed and discussed in terms of leading personalities, rather than sociological groups or institutions. It is important to distinguish between a Grishin and, say, a Yuriy Andropov. It must take a peculiar personality to preside over the grisly work of the Committee for State Security, the KGB. Picture a man who moves from the Central Committee apparatus to the Foreign Ministry, ultimately receiving an ambassadorial assignment (Hungary, 1954-57); subsequently returns to the Central Committee; and then, suddenly, at age 52, becomes the Chairman of the KGB. On the one hand, the Politburo members must have regarded him as sufficiently manageable to pose no threat to the collective; on the other hand, they must have deemed him to be sufficiently ruthless to perform the dreaded work of the KGB. Surely, if Andropov were to become General Secretary of the CPSU, he would be a different leader from Grishin, who has spent his entire career in the environs of Moscow on economic and party assignments.

Beyond the idiosyncrasies of this or that individual, there is the question of interaction. No guarantee exists that several men thrown together by politics will automatically be supportive. Nevertheless, over time cliques do form, and friendships as well. Moreover, even in more calculating relationships there is a certain supportiveness in common decisions. For instance, one finds it plausible that when Brezhnev, Aleksey Kosygin, and Nikolay Podgorny—once the heads of party, government, and state—were in agreement, this was a powerful bloc, and few would have dared to challenge it.

It thus may be of some interest that in recent years Brezhnev has stood more and more alone, surrounded more by cronies than by equals. Only a few Politburo members who were active at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 are still on Brezhnev's Politburo.² One can only wonder how this state of affairs has affected his decisions, let us say, in the Afghanistan and Polish crises.

POWER POLITICS

In any case, Brezhnev does now stand apart from most of his colleagues. Indeed, the story of Soviet politics over the last five years is largely narrative of Brezhnev's accumulation of ever greater power.

He began in 1977 by focusing on two institutions, the Secretariat of the CPSU's Central Committee and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The first step was the removal of K. F. Katushev from the Secretariat in March 1977 and his eventual replacement by one of Brezhnev's close personal aides, Konstantin Rusakov. It really does not matter why this shift was made; the net result is that Brezhnev placed a close protégé in an important position in the central party apparatus, to work with foreign Communist parties (and thus constitute a potential replacement for Boris Ponomarev as head of the International Department). Of related interest was the promotion of Vasily Kuznetsov

² Of the 13 full members of the Politburo in February 1982, only Brezhnev, Kirilenko, and A. Pel'she held this position in 1968.

to First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium, thus weakening somewhat the Foreign Ministry apparatus. Kuznetsov's replacement as First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs was Georgiy Korniyenko, a man of undoubted ability, but without the prestige of Kuznetsov. Another of Brezhnev's close personal protégés, Ye. M. Tyazhelnikov, left the post of head of the Komsomol to take over the Central Committee's Propaganda Department. Most important, of course, Brezhnev forced out his longtime comrade Podgorny from the chairmanship of the Presidium and himself assumed the post of head of state. At first, it seemed somewhat surprising that he would want this largely ceremonial office, but, on reflection, it made sense. Why not take the ceremonial office, so as to represent the Soviet state as well as the party? To strengthen Brezhnev's hold on foreign policy, the foreign Ministry press spokesman, Leonid Zamyatin, was transferred to head a newly created Central Committee Department of International Information. Gradually, this department has begun to overshadow the conventional Foreign Ministry apparatus. Finally, Brezhnev's hold on the party apparatus was further enhanced by the promotion to candidate membership in the Politburo of Chernenko, one of his oldest cronies.

The next major target was the governmental apparatus, the USSR Council of Ministers and Prime Minister Kosygin himself. In November-December 1978, Konstantin Mazurov was removed from the Politburo and as first Deputy Prime Minister, although he had served for more than a decade in the latter position. Obviously, in light of Kosygin's health and age, the post of First Deputy Prime Minister was a crucial one, so the installation of Nikolay Tikhonov, Brezhnev's old friend,³ in this job and his promotion to candidate membership in the Politburo was another sign of the times. The implications of the promotion were further underlined by the fact that Chernenko at the same time attained full membership in the Politburo, after only 19 months as a candidate. Soon Kosygin became ill. Although he reappeared for a while, his retirement was announced in the fall of 1980,⁴ and his replacement was, of course, Tikhonov, who also became a full Politburo member. Tikhonov's new first deputy is still another Brezhnev protégé from Dnepropetrovsk, Ivan Arkhipov. In December 1980, Ivan Bodyul, an old associate of Brezhnev from the 1950's in Moldavia, was appointed a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.

In the space of three years, then, the Brezhnevites have greatly strengthened their hold on the Secretariat, the Politburo, and the government, including the KGB. The importance of this fact lies not in Brezhnev's decision to take such a step. His decision is quite understandable if one bears in mind that Soviet politics remains fundamentally a struggle for power. Why should Brezhnev not surround himself with old and trusted friends, protégés, and cronies? Given what happened to Khrushchev, it is simple prudence.

Rather, the significance of these developments stems from the degree to which it increases the probability that once Brezhnev disappears, the upheaval at the top will be severe. After all, why would Brezhnev's successors want to remain dependent on the coterie of his old political friends, even if these successors do share a common background with them, from the old days in Dnepropetrovsk or Moldavia?

The result of these shifts, therefore, has been a sort of political paralysis. At the 26th CPSU Congress, for example, no change whatsoever was made in leading personnel. Probably no one other than Brezhnev was prepared to propose even a minor shift in the correlation of political forces lest the entire situation come apart. Replacement of any leader because of age would open some sensitive political questions.

In such circumstances, the outlook is for a struggle for power among Brezhnev's epigones. Although the Brezhnevites have a lock on certain key positions, their hold has to be only tentative, for it is derivative of Brezhnev's power. By promoting protégés who have no special base of their own, except perhaps for Chernenko,⁵ Brezhnev has deprived them of the chance to survive the bloody politics of the succession. Meanwhile, it is worth keeping in mind, as Myron Rush has wisely pointed out,⁶ that Brezhnev remains a dominant figure, still

³ N. Tikhonov, who is a year and a half older than Brezhnev, has known the General Secretary since their student days in 1920's.

⁴ Kosygin died in December 1980.

⁵ Chernenko might have some base in the Central Committee apparatus, where he served for many years.

⁶ Myron Rush, "Understanding Brezhnev's Political Strength," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), Aug. 20, 1981.

capable of rearranging the Soviet power structure and even of engaging in some daring forays abroad at a time of supposed political stagnation.

POWER AND POLICY

This brings us to the most important issues. What are the foreign and defense policies of the USSR likely to be (keeping in mind that there will be a struggle for Brezhnev's mantle)?

It is tempting to draw on previous succession periods—1953–57 and 1964–66—as analogues. In both periods, there was a tendency toward relieving foreign pressures by conciliatory policies while the internal power situation was sorted out.

But two things are lacking now that were present then. First, the successors in the 1950's and 1960's were younger. Second, in both cases, the successors were initially intent on some internal change—halting the Stalinist terror after 1953 and rebuilding a divided party after 1964.

One can envisage a post-Brezhnev Politburo of more sharply differing factions: the Brezhnevites, deeply entrenched but without the ultimate power of the patron, will undoubtedly want to preserve the status quo; some of the old guard—such as Andrey Gromyko or Dmitriy Ustinov—could still be powerful and prestigious figures to be reckoned with; and a somewhat amorphous group of younger men in the Secretariat and on the Politburo may be building pressure against the old guard. It will be tempting to inject into this situation the professional military and the KGB as decisive factors. Indeed, their influence in partisan politics could be significant, as perhaps it may have been in the past when towering heroes such as Marshal Georgiy Zhukov were engaged in politics.

But some skepticism is in order on this score. Nikolay Ogarkov, the present Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, does not strike one as much of a political actor, and certainly neither does Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the head of the Warsaw Pact forces. The KGB under Andropov, of course, is a different matter, because of his political status and because the KGB has technical capabilities—security, and leadership transportation and communication. Nevertheless, the possibility of a threat of force by the KGB seems remote. Furthermore, some of the old antagonism between the professional officer corps and the KGB must still exist.

To be sure, the military certainly will not gracefully accept a cut in its forces or resources, and the KGB presumably will resist any liberalization of the internal order. Thus, they are both likely to be strong forces favoring the status quo. At the same time, they will in all probability also be political targets. A new General Secretary will eventually want control over the KGB and the General Staff. Brezhnev's record in this regard is a case in point.

Despite a strong inclination toward conservative policies, the new leaders will be under pressure to innovate. It is the consensus among outside observers that the objective situation requires new directions, especially in internal economic policy.⁷

But crucial questions remain. Who, precisely, will be in the vanguard of those arguing for new directions? Certainly not the older men who have comfortably settled in for the duration. Nor the General Staff, nor the KGB. Probably not the Central Committee apparatus. Who, then? Perhaps the provincial secretaries, in Leningrad, Kiev, and elsewhere. Or it is possible that earlier patterns will be repeated. That is, one major figure may fight for power on one platform—almost certainly a conservative one—but after eliminating his rivals and securing his position, he may then adopt a different, more effective and realistic program. Again, such speculation cries out for names and faces.

One reason why names and faces are important is that few in the Soviet Union are qualified to take over the conduct of foreign policy. The bulk of the Soviet leadership concern themselves with internal policies. Even though Brezhnev had served as chief of state before the anti-Khrushchev coup, he had not been involved in the operation of Soviet global policy. That was largely Kosygin's preserve, on which Brezhnev encroached only gradually. But since taking over the reins of Soviet foreign policy in the early 1970's, Brezhnev has dominated it—so much so that no one else has had much experience. Except for Gromyko, only those in the Secretariat of the Central Committee who deal with foreign Communists have much background in foreign affairs. In this context, the emergence of Zamyatin's new department is of some significance.

⁷ Seweryn Blaler, "The Harsh Decade: Soviet Policies in the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), Summer 1981, pp. 999 ff.

If Gromyko survives, then, he will be the major voice in mundane foreign affairs, but the strategic line will still have to be set by the General Secretary. Recall the struggles in 1953-57 between Khrushchev, the neophyte, and Vyacheslav Molotov, the old professional.⁸

For Western observers there are two areas of greatest concern: (1) whether the buildup in Soviet military forces will continue, and (2) whether Soviet foreign policy will have an aggressive character, or begin to moderate.

DEFENSE POLICIES

It is likely that several members of the present Politburo aside from Brezhnev have been involved in defense policy: obviously Ustinov, as Defense Minister; Gromyko, because of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; probably Kirilenko, because he is the "second" Secretary; Chernenko, who has some responsibilities in the defense field; probably some in the Secretariat who are involved with defense industries; and the head of the KGB. Moreover, in contrast to foreign policy, defense policy—because of its widespread repercussions in the economy—must be generally familiar to all in the Politburo (not in terms of a knowledge of esoteric weapons, but in terms of the number of workers, the amount of steel, etc., required).

By background and by inclination, Brezhnev is promilitary. Indeed, no one would argue that he has not been more than kind to the defense establishment. But, except for Ustinov, the others have no such long background or emotional attachment. Thus, it is very unlikely that a new leader would have the wherewithal to challenge the military immediately.

But can this situation last? If the military proves to be untouchable and keeps its share of the national economy, and if the economy slows down as much as Western observers predict,⁹ then the military share of the national product will grow absolutely and relatively and become a tempting target for reductions. All of this probably means that after the first phase of the struggle in which the successor enlists the tacit support of the military, he will eventually turn on his supporters, if he wants to pursue a successful economic policy.

It may be somewhat easier for Brezhnev's successor to confront the military problem because, strangely enough, Brezhnev seems to be laying the groundwork to reduce the military's claims to priority in national policy. He has done so by assailing one of its sacred preserves: military doctrine. For years, the Soviet military were permitted to write that nuclear war was winnable. They did not do so in crude terms, but this was certainly the import of their writings. Just when it seemed to Westerners that they had a firm fix on Soviet military doctrine and policy, however, Brezhnev has confused the issue. To appreciate what has happened, one needs to trace his statements over time.

In the early 1970's, with the advent of parity, Brezhnev declared: "We have created strategic forces which constitute a reliable means of deferring aggressors." Nevertheless, a reliable Soviet deterrent was still considered precarious and subject to Western attempts to regain strategic superiority. Thus, Brezhnev repeatedly warned that the USSR would "respond to any and all attempts from any quarter to obtain military superiority over the USSR. . . ."¹⁰

By 1975, however, Brezhnev had concluded that the new strategic balance was firmly enough entrenched so that a return to Western strategic dominance was increasingly unlikely and hence the West had accepted détente. As he put things: "International détente has become possible because a new relation of forces has been established in the world arena. Now the leaders of the bourgeois world can no longer entertain serious intentions of resolving the historic dispute between socialism and capitalism, by force of arms. . . ."¹¹

Less than two years later, the General Secretary deemed that the increase in all levels of Soviet forces had reached a point where it was no longer effective politics (or policy) to trumpet this new balance of power, for it was creating a backlash in the West, where Soviet statements about "superiority" or "victory" were cited in support of Western rearmament.¹² In January 1977, he began to insist that the USSR did not seek strategic superiority and to rebut the allegation that the USSR was intent on a first strike, which he dismissed as "absurd

⁸ Robert Conquest, "Power and Policy in the USSR," London, Macmillan, 1962, pp. 263 ff.

⁹ Blaker, loc. cit., pp. 1004-05.

¹⁰ Quoted in Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security*, Summer 1978, p. 137.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary* (New York, NY), July 1977, p. 21.

and utterly unfounded."¹³ These denials, of course, were intended to counter American apprehensions that the new Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) would eventually achieve a capability of neutralizing the US Minuteman ICBM force. By the end of 1974, Brezhnev had gone even further and was insisting that the USSR "will not seek military superiority over the other side. We do not want to upset the approximate equilibrium of military strength existing at present . . . between the USSR and the United States."¹⁴

This new line was echoed rather consistently until, in 1981, Brezhnev took another step. He denounced aspiration for victory in nuclear war as "dangerous madness."¹⁵

It may be significant that one of the more vigorous assaults on nuclear confrontation was carried out by Chernenko in April 1981 at the Lenin birthday celebration. He introduced the Malenkov heresy—that nuclear war posed a threat to "all civilization." Later in the same speech, he said that nuclear weapons placed the "future of mankind in doubt." "Chernenko has a unique record in this area. On several occasions, he has seemed to be well ahead of others in warnings about the consequences of nuclear war: for example, when he stated in November 1976 that "mankind might be totally destroyed."¹⁶ Since he was promoted during this very period, we have to assume his attack was endorsed, if not encouraged, by Brezhnev. Indeed, as noted, Brezhnev finally entered the arena with more graphic language—"madness"—and a Central Committee pamphlet repeated the Malenkov deviation.¹⁸

All of this occurred at a time when the military itself was engaging in a spirited and rather amazing defense of itself, primarily through a July 1981 *Kommunist* article by Marshal Ogarkov.¹⁹ In this article, Ogarkov vigorously defended the legitimacy of Soviet military doctrine, duly cited Brezhnev on the doctrine's "defensive" character, and repeated Brezhnev's formulation that the use of nuclear weapons would mean that the "future of all mankind would be at stake." But this obeisance was minor compared to some of Ogarkov's startling claims.

First, the Chief of Staff bemoaned the fact that Soviet youth did not understand that some wars are "good" and some are "bad," and he maintained that they needed to be educated by the party. In this connection, he urged the party to explain to all of the people "in a more profound and better reasoned form the truth about the existing threat of the danger of war. It should not be overdramatized, but it is obligatory to show the seriousness of the contemporary international situation." Such remarks seem to be a rather blatant pitch to protect his budget.

But perhaps more important than this special pleading (which suggested that he still feared that economic stringencies would impinge on defense's share of the country's resources), Ogarkov laid out a claim to even more resources. In modern operations, he argued, the "system of rear and technical support should acquire new content." Particular importance, he wrote, should be attached to the country's rear services, which "must make good in a shorter space of time the loss of high quantities of combat hardware and weapons, without which it is virtually impossible to maintain the armed forces' combat capability at the necessary level." This statement cannot be read except as a demand that the economy supply not only operational equipment but more for stockpiles as well. Indeed, he also reminded his readers that modern weapons change "every 10-12 years." In other words, cuts in defense in later years would also be dangerous.

This military claim is even more significant when we consider that for most of 1979 and 1980, Brezhnev was warning the heavy industry clique that they had to make a greater contribution to consumer goods production, and that defense industries in particular had to help out.²⁰ Hence, Ogarkov may have been answering Brezhnev.

In any case, the stage is set for a struggle over defense policy after Brezhnev.

¹³ Quoted in Gartnoff, loc. cit., pp. 139-40.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 141. Emphasis added.

¹⁵ Dusko Doder, "Nuclear Flap," *The Washington Post*, Oct. 23, 1981, p. A26.

¹⁶ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Trends in Communist Media" (Washington, D.C.) May 6, 1981, pp. 6-9.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, "The Soviet Threat to Europe," Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1981.

¹⁹ N. Ogarkov "Defending Peaceful Endeavor" *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 10, July 1981, pp. 80-91.

²⁰ Speeches to Central Committee plenum, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Daily Report: Soviet Union" (Washington, DC—hereafter FBIS-SOV), Oct. 22, 1980, p. R/1, and Nov. 29, 1979, p. R/1.

It could not really be otherwise if we consider that defense claims 12-15 percent of the Soviet national economic product.²¹

While there is an idea in the West that the Soviet military buildup is sacrosanct, it of course is not. What matters is how it fits into the internal struggle. Khrushchev called in Zhukov to defeat Georgiy Melenkov and Molotov (who incidentally had reputations as Stalinists but actually favored some soft policies).²² But Khrushchev then threw out Zhukov and conducted a long attack on the military, even though he also laid the groundwork for much of the strategic buildup carried out by Brezhnev. So nothing is preordained in Soviet politics.

FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy is also in flux. Throughout the past two years, Soviet policy has been trying to come to grips with the shifts in the West: the uproar over Afghanistan and the sanctions against the USSR imposed by the Carter administration, the collapse of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and the election of President Ronald Reagan, followed by plans for major increases in American defense spending.

All of these developments, of course, could be laid at Brezhnev's door. His defense has been interesting. At the Central Committee plenum in June 1980, he took the position that the USSR had to act with restraint and should not let itself be provoked by the West. He became almost nostalgic about the 1970's: "We should continue to spare no effort to preserve détente, all the good things that the seventies brought us. . . ."²³ Moreover, the plenum formally registered approval of Brezhnev's performance. According to the plenum resolution, the 1970's had been an improvement in the international situation, and there was an "obvious decline in the cold war." The CPSU, the plenum document went on, was displaying "a truly Leninist restraint." In essence, thus, the resolution was a holding operation. It called for strengthening defense, on the one hand, and for mobilizing forces to prevent a "sliding down to a new cold war," on the other.²⁴

By the time of the 26th Congress of the CPSU in February 1981, however, hopes that the cold war was not returning were fading. Before the congress, for example, Ustinov maintained that the threat of war had increased; Ogarkov claimed that the forces of imperialism were striving to wreck the process of relaxation and that therefore there were increased demands on "combat readiness."²⁵

Nonetheless, there was still an inclination to try to retrieve the situation. Dinmukhamed Kunayev contended that the USSR had to show firmness and not permit the "torpedoing of détente."²⁶ Vladimir Shcherbitskiy warned against permitting events to turn the world back to the "worst times of the cold war."²⁷ Grishin called for "preserving détente."²⁸ Even Ustinov said that the Soviet Union had enough self-control not to yield to provocations.²⁹ At the congress, Grigoriy Romanov expressed the same theme: that despite the severe test, the USSR was not being "driven from the course of normalization" of the situation.³⁰

But after the congress the tone of comments became more ominous. Although *Pravda* claimed that the struggle for peace was the leitmotif of the congress, it then went on to mention strengthening defense three times.³¹ *Izvestiya* held that implementation of the congress plans "depends directly on the country's defense might."³² In April, Chernenko warned that the "war danger, which somewhat diminished in the middle of the last decade, has increased again."³³

The situation, however, remains rather confused. At the Central Committee plenum finally called in late 1981 to adopt the five-year plan announced in February, Brezhnev claimed: "In working out the plans we naturally also had

²¹ Abraham S. Beker, "The Burden of Soviet Defense," Report 2752-AF. Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, October 1981.

²² Conquest, op. cit., pp. 329 ff.

²³ FBIS-SOV, June 24, p. R/1. Emphasis added.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. R/4-6.

²⁵ Ustinov, as translated in *ibid.*, Dec. 11, 1980, p. V/1; Ogarkov, in *ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1981, p. V/1.

²⁶ Report to the 15th Kazakh Communist Party Congress, *ibid.*, Feb. 18, 1981, p. R/3.

²⁷ Report at the 26th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress on Feb. 10, 1981, *ibid.*, Feb. 25, 1981, p. R/1.

²⁸ "Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress, Vol. III," translated in FBIS-SOV, Feb. 26, 1981, Supplement, p. 44.

²⁹ FBIS-SOV, Feb. 23, 1981, p. V/5.

³⁰ "Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress, Vol. IV," FBIS-SOV, Feb. 27, 1981, Supplement, p. 33.

³¹ FBIS-SOV, Mar. 11, 1981, p. P/1.

³² *Ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1981, p. P/1.

³³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 23, 1981, p. R/1.

to take into account the worsening of the international situation." And in going over the main features of the plan, he noted that "reliable" provision was being made for the needs of defense.³⁴ In presenting the 1982 budget, moreover, Minister of Finance Vasily Garbuzov said that while struggling for peace, "our party and state evaluate soberly the international situation."³⁵ Thus, Brezhnev seems to have positioned the party to move either toward conciliation, thus justifying "Leninist restraint," or toward confrontation. The ultimate decision may well be made by his successors.

KTO KOGO?

In conclusion, let me reiterate a basic theme. An eminent Sovietologist, Jerry F. Hough, has written: "... even if Westerners knew who the next general secretary would be, the information would be of little use. There is almost no Politburo figure of the Brezhnev period whose position in the Soviet political spectrum has been agreed upon by Western specialists. . . .

The most useful contribution that can be made beforehand to an understanding of the succession is to analyze the problems and the most likely possible variants—both 'healthy' and 'pathological.'³⁶

Such an approach, in my opinion, concedes the field too easily. A diligent effort, which Hough himself has often demonstrated, should yield a great deal more about Soviet power politics.

But it is not simply a question of analyzing changing generations. Rather, it is a question of determining the principal actors and where they stand on major policy issues. While it is true that the previous track record of Kremlinologists is not enviable, the main rules continue to be valid. Soviet politics, at bottom, is a struggle for power. And there is absolutely no basis to believe that it will not continue to be so. What we have to do is to identify the players and their policies.

CPSU POLITBURO AND SECRETARIAT

Name and age	Position	Responsibilities (D-domestic, F-foreign)
Full Politburo members:		
Yuriy Andropov (68)	General Secretary ¹	General Supervision (D and F), Defense, security (D), General foreign relations (F).
Geydar Aliyev (59)	USSR First Deputy Premier	Economic administration (D).
Konstantin Chernenko (71)	Party Secretary ¹	Politburo staff work (D).
Mikhail Gorbachev (51)	Party Secretary ¹	Agriculture (D).
Viktor Grishin (68)	Moscow City 1st Secretary	Moscow Party supervision.
Andrey Gromyko (73)	Minister of Foreign Affairs	General foreign relations (F).
Dinmukhamed Kunayev (70)	Kazakh First Secretary	Kazakh Party supervision (D).
Arvid Pelshe (83)	Chairman, Party Control Committee.	Party discipline (D).
Gregoriy Romanov (59)	Leningrad Oblast First Secretary.	Leningrad Oblast Party supervision (D).
Vladimir Shcherbitsky (64)	Ukrainian First Secretary	Ukrainian Party supervision (D).
Nikolay Tikhonov (77)	USSR Premier	Economic administration, industry (D).
Dmitriy Ustinov (74)	Minister of Defense	Defense, space (D), Military aid, foreign military support (F).
Candidate members:		
Petr Demichev (64)	Minister of Culture	Culture (D).
Vladimir Dolgikh (58)	Party Secretary ¹	Industrial management (D).
T. Ya. Kiselev (65)	Belorussian First Secretary	Belorussian Party supervision (D).
Vasily Kuznetsov (81)	First Deputy Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.	Legislative agencies (D), General state relations (F).
Boris Ponomarev (77)	Party Secretary ¹	Relations with non-ruling Communist parties (F).
Sharaf Rashidov (65)	Uzbek First Secretary	Uzbek Party supervision (D).
Eduard Shevardnadze (54)	Georgian First Secretary	Georgian Party supervision (D).
Mikhail Solomenstev (69)	RSFSR Premier	RSFSR Economic administration, Finance (D).
Secretaries who are not in Politburo:		
Ivan Kapitonov (67)	Party Secretary	Party staffing (D).
Konstantin Ruskov (73)	Party Secretary	Communist Bloc liaison (F).
Nikolay Ryzhkov (53)	Party Secretary	Heavy Industry (D).
Mikhail Zimyanin (68)	Party Secretary	Culture (D).

¹ Also member of Secretariat.

Source: CIA.

³⁴ Pravda (Moscow), Nov. 17, 1981; FBIS-SOV, Nov. 17, 1981, p. R/1.

³⁵ FBIS-SOV, Nov. 17, 1981, pp. R/16-17.

³⁶ Jerry F. Hough, "The Soviet Leadership in Transition," Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1980, p. 151.

BIOGRAPHY OF YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV

June 14, 1914—Date of birth.
1940-44—First Secretary, Komsomol, Karelia; worked behind German lines organizing partisan bands.
1944-47—Second Secretary, Petrozavodsk City Party Committee (Karelia).
1947-51—Second Secretary, Central Committee, Communist Party of Karelia.
1953—Chief, Fourth European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
October 1953-57—Charge d'Affaires, Counselor of Embassy, and then Ambassador, Budapest.
July 1957-62—Chief, Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, CPSU Central Committee.
November 1962-67; May 24, 1982—Secretary, CPSU Central Committee.
May 1967 to May 26, 1982—Chairman, KGB.
June 1967-73—Candidate member, Politburo.
April 1973 to date—Member, Politburo.
November 12, 1982 to date—General Secretary, CPSU Central Committee.

SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY

The staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence prepared the following summary of the major points made by each of the witnesses during the hearing on Soviet Succession held by the Committee on September 29, 1982:

PROF. JERRY HOUGH

Nature of succession

Professor Hough believes we are facing an "absolutely historic succession," the passing of a political generation which has ruled in the Soviet Union for 40 years.¹

The attitudes of these men reflect old realities. Although the immediate successor will likely be from the current Politburo membership, this will initiate only a larger succession process, the full impact of which will be felt in the late 80s. According to Professor Hough, the emerging political generation will be less ideological and more pragmatic, having risen through the bureaucracy and functioned in a committee political setting. This change will occur at a time when important decisions—decisions Brezhnev put off for years—must be made.

Professor Hough believes that there is an "excellent chance that rather significant change in [Soviet policy] will come fairly quickly," including some effort at economic reform, with more emphasis on market mechanisms similar to those of the Hungarian model.² These changes require difficult and unpopular decisions, including almost surely a major increase in prices. Thus, he is "far less optimistic" that there is going to be any significant change for the better in the political realm.

There is also a "real chance" for a leveling, perhaps even a cut, in military expenditures coupled with a "real peace offensive." Professor Hough believes this is suggested by the "logic of the situation." He cites the following factors:

Demographics indicate a future labor shortage, including a substantial reduction in the next few years of draftable 18-year-olds.

Economic reform will require increased food prices and increased heavy industry investment.

The Soviet Union cannot realistically expect to achieve military superiority since they have only 60 percent of the GNP of the United States and about 25 percent of the combined GNP of the United States, Western Europe and Japan.

Border incidents and tensions with the Chinese during the later 1960's and early 1970's, which prompted an increase in troops on the border, have abated.

The leading contenders to succeed Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko, seem "reform" minded.

¹ As Professor Hough notes, even excluding Brezhnev, 7 of the 12 Politburo voting members are 40 years of age or older. Forty percent of the voting members of the Central Committee will be 65 or older by the end of 1982 (more than half of them 70 or older, and one fifth 75 or older). Seventy percent of the Council of Ministers members who are voting members of the Central Committee will be 65 or older.

² Professor Hough points out that Yuri Andropov was Ambassador to Hungary and then Secretary to Central Committee in charge of East Bloc relations during which time substantial reforms were made in the Hungarian economy.

Professor Hough sees a collective leadership emerging in the first stages of the succession, but not one dedicated to the status quo. What is likely is a succession similar to that which followed Stalin, which featured substantial change in the period 1953 to 1957. Professor Hough points out that despite divisions in the collective leadership in the 1953-57 period, there were more policy initiatives of interest during these years than during the period after Khrushchev reached the height of his power. Among these were the following: An agreement to withdraw the Red Army from Austria (May 1955), a meeting between the Soviet leadership and President Eisenhower and other Western leaders in Geneva (July 1955), the return by the Soviet Union of some territory to Finland (September 1955), and finally, a reduction in the size of the Red Army.

While predicting a genuine "peace offensive," Professor Hough nevertheless observed that the extent of the military's influence in the Brezhnev succession is an "extremely open question." He believes that this influence can be strong or weak depending on circumstances, but that circumstances now appear ripe for some significant constraints on military spending.

The candidates

At the time of the hearing, Professor Hough believed the evidence was strong that Chernenko and Andropov were the leading candidates to succeed Brezhnev. He thought it was unclear whether they might work well together during the transition or whether a struggle between them was inevitable.

He believes foreign policy statements made by Andropov are noteworthy in that they have been quite distinct from those of virtually all other members of the Politburo. Since 1975, Andropov has been quite vocal in support of the policy of détente, noting that even in 1980, in the wake of U.S. sanctions following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he supported détente and called for negotiations with the United States.

Chernenko's speeches have been somewhat more general, but also fervent in supporting détente. Professor Hough noted that in 1980, while other Soviet officials praised the invasion of Afghanistan, Chernenko was virtually silent—the kind of behavior which "usually connotes opposition."

While there may be differences between the two, both Andropov and Chernenko seem to support détente. The fact that they are moving to the fore suggests, in Professor Hough's view, that the forces within the Soviet Union in general and the Central Committee and Politburo in particular are supportive of that kind of action.

U.S. Policy

Professor Hough believes that the United States is "ill-prepared for a real Soviet peace offensive." The United States does not have a "fall back position in the arms control realm," nor has it thought through what a "reasonable code of détente for great powers in the Third World or otherwise" might be.

Outlook for an arms control agreement

Of the prospects for an arms control agreement, Professor Hough said they depend upon the kind of proposal put forward. SALT II or some variation thereof would be acceptable to almost any new Soviet leadership, but any reductions beyond that would be more difficult to negotiate.

Professor Hough also suggested that the Soviets might even be inclined to forego modernization of their strategic forces. While he believes arms control agreements are important in maintaining good relations with our allies and can limit tensions between Washington and Moscow, the level of Soviet military expenditures will be influenced as much by the economic situation facing the Soviet leadership as by any other considerations.

PROF. MYRON RUSH

Nature of succession

Professor Rush said that the U.S.S.R. now stands at an historic juncture. A decade of "coherent and stable leadership" under Brezhnev has now ended. In Professor Rush's view, the Soviet Union is in a stronger position relative to the United States than it was during the succession periods following Stalin and Khrushchev, but it is heading toward a "crisis of empire" in the late 1980s. The new leadership will be compelled to make fateful decisions, decisions which Brezhnev postponed.

In contrast to Professor Hough's prediction that major policy changes—including important economic reforms—will come quickly, Professor Rush sees a phased succession. In the early stages the contending factions are "likely to turn inward" and "will probably seek détente with the West, at least in the short term." He believes that contending Soviet leaders are "likely" to reach an early consensus to reject or curtail major Brezhnev programs as a means of freeing resources for sectors which have experienced severe shortages.

However, Professor Rush does not think the new leadership will be able to address the "overarching problem" of the Soviet Union which is the widening gap between a stagnant economy and the rapidly increasing expenditures required for the Soviet welfare state and the maintenance and extension of the troubled Soviet empire. Professor Rush's major thesis is that, if Soviet policies continue on the present course and the Western coalition is not gravely weakened, the Soviet Union seems headed for a crisis by the late 1980's. This would be an economic and political crisis brought on by a failure of the economy to provide the resources required to sustain the Soviet empire. He believes the U.S.S.R. could avert such a crisis in one or more of the following ways:

First, domestically, by reordering its economic priorities, transferring funds from the military to the civilian sector in order to improve economic growth. In this connection, a "limited accommodation with the United States to abate global competition" will have an attraction for Brezhnev's heirs.

Second, externally, by sharply improving Soviet geopolitical position at the expense of the United States. This might be accomplished by imperial expansion (e.g., in the Persian Gulf). Or the new leadership might employ diplomatic maneuvers, such as rapprochement with China, a peace treaty with Japan, or threats and inducement to split Western Europe, or parts of it, from alliance with the United States.

While the new leadership could pursue domestic and foreign policy strategies at the same time, Professor Rush believes they are likely to concentrate efforts on one or the other. He adds that the Soviet Union might be able to freeze defense spending at the current level for several years given the massive military build-up of the last decade, without seriously impairing existing favorable regional and strategic military balances.

Major initiatives to avert a crisis in this decade could best be accomplished by a strong and united leadership, but Professor Rush considers this unlikely for some time after Brezhnev's death. However, he added an important qualification: if Andropov succeeds there could be a concentration of power in a relatively short period of time. He thinks that Andropov had already been using the KGB to consolidate his position and would use it more extensively. This process might be further fueled by a more rapid turnover in the Politburo, likely, in view of the current members' ages. Such a turnover could facilitate the concentration of power in one man in a relatively short period of time.

Candidates and disinformation

Professor Rush did not discuss in any detail who the leading contenders to succeed Brezhnev might be other than to say, as noted above, that one leading candidate, Andropov, might be able to bring about a rapid concentration of power if he succeeds Brezhnev. In this connection, he cautioned that the United States had "inadequate knowledge of what is going on in the Kremlin," and this "sometimes leaves us open to Soviet manipulation." For example, he noted that there had been circulating in the press a view of Andropov as a "closet" liberal, this despite the fact that Andropov headed the KGB for 15 years and "brutally destroyed the dissident movement."

U.S. policy

Professor Rush suggested that the first phase of the succession might be an advantageous time for the United States to present proposals for negotiations at issue between the two countries. However, he also believes that a divided Soviet leadership would have difficulty responding to such proposals.

As to the larger decisions the new leadership must make, Professor Rush doubts that the United States possesses sufficient leverage to decisively influence those decisions. It is his judgment that our experience during the era of détente raises questions about our capacity to offer sufficient economic inducements to modify Soviet behavior. Similarly, events since the invasion of Afghanistan raise questions about our ability to inflict large enough costs on the Soviets to restrain their actions.

Professor Rush would advise U.S. policymakers that American policies should be determined by our directly perceived interests and those of our allies, not by our expectations of how they will influence the Soviet succession. While it is important to try to anticipate and understand developments in the succession and the impact of our policies on Soviet decisions, our knowledge at present and in the foreseeable future simply does not enable us to orchestrate U.S. policy according to a particular interpretation of what is going on in the Kremlin. Therefore, he concludes, our greatest efforts should be directed to strengthening ourselves and our alliances and to denying the USSR opportunities for imperial aggrandizement or major diplomatic gains at our expense.

Motive for Soviet military buildup

In addition, Professor Rush believes it is important for the United States to address not only the fact of the Soviet military buildup, but the underlying motive. The question has to be asked why the Soviet Union has sacrificed its economy and precipitated the impending domestic crisis for a military buildup beyond, according to Professor Rush, any reasonable need.

Outlook for an arms control agreement

Professor Rush thinks there are good possibilities for arms control agreements, but that they will not be very far-reaching. In order for the Soviets to deal effectively with their long term economic problems, a freeze on military spending will not be sufficient. More substantial cuts than a mere freeze would be needed—and the odds of such cuts taking place are, in his view, small.

DR. ROBERT CONQUEST

Nature of succession

Dr. Conquest foresees a long succession crisis, in which the Soviet leadership will follow tradition and turn inward.

In addition, he anticipates no important change in policy in the immediate future. He expects that in the first couple of years of the succession the new General Secretary will be someone from the ranks of the Stalinist generation.

On the whole, he agrees with Professor Rush that there will be little change in the short term, but that fateful policy issues will have to be addressed certainly by the latter part of the decade.

Dr. Conquest does not consider the policies that contenders for Brezhnev's position have advanced in the past to be very good predictors of what they might do while in power, noting that, following their ascendancy, both Stalin and Khrushchev reversed earlier positions they had taken.

He disagrees with Professor Rush's contention that the "logic of the situation" relating to the Soviet's domestic problems gives basis for any reasonable expectations as to the policies they will adopt. This judgment, he believes, is based on Western, not Soviet, values, stressing that an effort should be made "to see these people as they are, as a different political species."³ He suggested that U.S. policymakers should think of a member of the Soviet leadership as a "J. R. Ewing and rather worse."

Dr. Conquest referred to a colloquial Russian expression, "Kto, kgo?" (Who wins? Who loses?) to illustrate another Leninist principle—everything is a struggle. He said he foresees a long period of adjustment, of struggle among the various succession contenders which will inevitably result in one person emerging on top.

Next generation

The question of the character of the next generation of leaders is a difficult one, said Dr. Conquest, because unlike Stalin and Khrushchev, Brezhnev did not groom a younger group of people for leadership. However, he argued that the generation of people who are now 55 or 60 are very much like the current leaders. Additionally, he expressed concern that most of the presumed future leaders in this age group have had little foreign policy experience.

³ In an August 1978 article titled, "The Role of the Intellectual in International Misunderstanding," Conquest wrote:

"My central point is not so much that people misunderstand other people, or that cultures misunderstand other cultures, but that they do not realize this to be the case. They assume that the light of their own parochial common sense is enough. And they frame policies based on illusions. Yet, how profound is this difference between political cultures and between the motivations of different political traditions; and how deep-set and how persistent these attitudes are!"

He believes that a difference does emerge in the 45 to 50 age group and his impression is that they are more cynical, a view he says is shared by most dissidents. One of these, Andrei Sakharov, he quotes as saying:

"I like this new layer of leaders coming to the top even less than its predecessors. The people of Brezhnev's generation laid the basis for their careers in the worst years of the Stalinist terror. That put the mark of Cain on them. . . . The new generation is coming without that mark. It is more flexible, but there is a dreadful cynicism, careerism, and complete indifference to ideals in international affairs. As far as internal matters go, they only care about the trough they swill from and what matters is that the trough be full."⁴

As to the question of a "peace offensive" by the new Soviet leadership, Dr. Conquest believes that a genuine initiative is unlikely. He noted that détente was officially defined by the Soviets as a method of struggle and was never incompatible at its height with its foreign and military policies. He sees no anti-détente attitudes in the Politburo because no one could claim that the Soviet Union lost anything by practicing détente. In this respect, he differs from Professor Hough who attached some importance to statements by Andropov and Chernenko in support of détente.

In sum, Dr. Conquest sees a rather indeterminate future, but one in which no serious change is likely, despite immense internal forces. He noted in this connection that the Soviet system is designed to contain social and economic pressures.

Dr. Conquest cautioned that this judgment reflects what seem, on the basis of the limited data available, the probable tendencies. He agreed with Professor Hough that "anything can happen" in the Soviet Union, acknowledging that he would not have predicted the changes that occurred after Stalin's death such as de-Stalinization, the split with China, and the Hungarian revolution.

Outlook for an arms control agreement

Regarding arms control, Dr. Conquest did not think it likely that the Soviets would agree to the "fair measure of disarmament" that might alleviate some of their economic problems. He concurred with Mr. Hyland's view that the U.S. should build its strength and alliances while pursuing an activist policy of negotiations on arms control.

MR. WILLIAM HYLAND

Nature of succession

Mr. Hyland believes that the succession period will be a period of great turmoil and change.

While uncertain how serious the change will be, he thinks that change in Soviet policy will be greater than continuity. He agreed with Professor Rush's view that the Soviets cannot continue for long doing business as usual. "Muddling down" will not be a sufficient answer to their problems.

Mr. Hyland stressed his belief that men make history and that it is important who rules the Soviet Union and for the United States to know about these people. In this connection, he agrees with Dr. Conquest that Soviet leaders come to power through a struggle. He added, however, that the personal aspects of this struggle are as important as the ideological ones, but noted that it is difficult at times to determine which of the two is more determinative.

Mr. Hyland does not believe that collective leadership can work in the Soviet Union, that the system requires a rule of one. Professor Rush agreed. Mr. Hyland predicted that another Khrushchev, Brezhnev or Stalin is likely to emerge, although he was unable to suggest how long this will take.

U.S. policy

Mr. Hyland thinks that the 1980's are a period of "great opportunity" for the United States, perhaps the greatest since the death of Stalin. He recalled that, at that time, Churchill advocated every active policy of putting new proposals to the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower and Dulles were cautious preferring to build up our strength before negotiating. This policy Hyland considered to have been a mistake.

Mr. Hyland recommended that the United States pursue a policy of "active diplomacy" immediately. Waiting to size up the Soviet succession situation is

⁴In a similar vein in 1976, Mr. Sakharov told an interviewer that he saw little hope that the next generation of Soviet political leaders might allow more freedom. "In a bureaucratic system," Sakharov observed, "every generation simply reproduces itself." *Christian Science Monitor*, August 10, 1976.

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not, Hyland thinks, likely to result in any insight into the ways of the Soviet leadership.

Outlook for an arms control agreement

As to the prospects for an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union, Mr. Hyland thinks they are "fairly good," especially if the United States carries out the defense programs it now envisions. These, he said, are a "prerequisite" to any successful negotiations since they will significantly change the balance of power in favor of the United States. He believes that Brezhnev's successor will realize that to maintain the current strategic balance in the face of the American buildup will impose an enormous strain on the Soviet economy.

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