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May 25, 1982

The Hon. William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:

I thought you might like a few copies of the transcript of your 15 October 1981 address at Brown.

Kirk is now fully recuperated and sends his very best regards. In June or July, we are planning a surprise retirement party for Kirk, to which we will send you an invitation. We hope that if you are in the area you will be able to attend. If not, however, we trust you will send special greetings on the occasion.

Cordially,

Ronald D. Vanden Dorpel
Ronald D. Vanden Dorpel
Associate Director,
Corporate & Foundation Relations

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
**The John M. Olin
Distinguished Lecture Series
at Brown University**

"The U.S. Intelligence Community Today"

The Second Lecture in the John M. Olin Distinguished
Lecture Series at Brown University

October 15, 1981

William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence



Introduction by Dr. Newell M. Stultz, Professor of Political Science
and Director of the Council for International Studies

Newell Stultz: Good evening. My name is Newell Stultz and I am the moderator of this evening's meeting. I will shortly introduce Mr. Casey, but before that, let me make a few preliminary remarks. First of all, we are sitting down here, rather than standing up, because Mr. Casey has recently broken his leg and it is more comfortable for him, particularly after a long day, to remain seated. Second, Mr. Casey must leave for Washington at 9:30, and so we will try to finish as close to that time as possible. He has assured me that his remarks should take no more than half an hour, leaving, we hope, ample time for questions and comments from the floor. It seems obvious from the documents that were put in my hands as I came in that there are those among you who may share ideas different from those that Mr. Casey may shortly announce. I assume there may be others who do share Mr. Casey's views and perhaps some in between. This university has a long tradition of respect and adherence to free and civil speech, and with your help we will continue that tradition this evening. With that end in view, Dean John Robinson is prepared to take the names of persons who would like to address a question or a brief comment to the speaker when he has finished his remarks. And alternating between recognizing

Box 1893
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- 2 -

persons on the floor and names that John will later give me, we will try as fairly as we can to accommodate those of you who would like to say something.

Having said that, I will not delay introducing our speaker, for I doubt that any of you are unaware of the high position Mr. Casey holds in the present Administration. However, you may not know that he is the first Director of Central Intelligence since the founding of this position to have been designated by the President as a Cabinet Officer. And he is thus the first sitting Cabinet Officer to have visited our campus since at least 1964 when President Johnson came to Brown to help celebrate our 200th anniversary.

You may also not know that before his present assignment, Mr. Casey was, at various times, at age 31 Chief of all American Secret Intelligence Operations in Europe before the fall of Hitler, Associate General Counsel at the European headquarters of the Marshall Plan, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, President of the Export-Import Bank, and recently Manager of both Primary and General Election Campaigns for President Reagan. In addition to this, he has, at various times, won the Bronze Star, run for Congress, practiced law in New York, served as a Trustee of his own Alma Mater, Fordham University, and (as if that weren't enough), written several books, the most recent being entitled Where and How the War Was Fought: An Armchair Tour of the American Revolution. Quite obviously, due to this wealth of experience over four decades, Mr. Casey is superbly qualified to be the speaker on tonight's topic, "The U.S. Intelligence Community Today." Ladies and gentlemen, I give you the Honorable William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence.

William J. Casey: Thank you. I'm pleased to have such an interested audience with such diverse views, and I will try to hold your interest. I plan tonight to tell you something about American intelligence yesterday, today and tomorrow. There

- 3 -

was a time, only forty years ago, when a New York lawyer named William J. Donovan was a one-man CIA for Franklin Roosevelt. His World War I Congressional Medal of Honor and his nickname, "Wild Bill," implanted on him the image of a swashbuckling adventurer. In reality, he was a mild, soft-spoken, gentle man whose deepest interest was intelligence. As the outstanding investigative lawyer of his time, Donovan had learned how to gather a huge array of facts, sift and analyze them, assess their meaning, arrive at a conclusion, and present it vividly. And he persuaded President Roosevelt that it would be critical in fighting a global war and preserving the peace, to develop and apply this talent and ability on a worldwide scale. By the time Pearl Harbor came, Donovan had gathered hundreds of the finest scholars in America and had them processing geographic, scientific, political, and military information in the Library of Congress. Two years later, he had scoured our campuses and mobilized thousands of the finest scholars in America. He also assembled what had to be the most diverse aggregation ever assembled of tycoons and scientists, bankers and foreign correspondents, psychologists and football stars, circus managers and circus freaks, safe crackers, lock pickers and pick-pockets, playwrights and journalists, novelists and professors of literature, advertising and broadcasting talents. He drew on the great American melting pot to create small teams of Italo-Americans, Franco-Americans, Norwegian-Americans, Slavic-Americans, and Greek-Americans. What was done with this array of talent? It was used to create intelligence networks behind German lines, to support the resistance forces which oppression always creates, to bring defected enemy officers over to our side, and to manipulate the mind of the enemy through deception and psychological warfare.

But above all and beyond all of this, he created a machinery to evaluate, sift, and analyze. And it's important to understand what intelligence is, and that it has many facets. It is a very uncertain, fragile and complex commodity. First, you have to get a report which has some facts. Then you have to decide whether

- 4 -

it is real or fake. Then, whether it's true or false as you find out what other intelligence supports or contradicts it. Then you have to fit it into a broad mosaic, and figure out what it all means. You then have to get the attention of someone who can make a decision, and then you have to get that person to act. That's the way it was at the inception of modern American intelligence, when Professor Lyman Kirkpatrick and I were in the O.S.S. together, and that, at bottom, is the way it is today.

I had the privilege of working together with Professor Kirkpatrick, whom I know many of you know, about forty years ago, and I regret that I am unable to see him on this occasion (in fact, this is the only time that I have gone out of Washington to make a speech, and I did it because Kirk twisted my arm, and I'm glad I'm here, so far). Kirk is a remarkable fellow. He very quickly, upon arriving in London, came to know more about the German order-of-battle than anybody else. He was a leader in building the O.S.S. analytical capability, and then General Bradley took him as his briefing officer. Then he spent a great many years building and developing the organizational structure which today is the CIA, all before he went on to his distinguished academic career. Over the years, Kirk and my predecessors, the Directors of Central Intelligence, have changed intelligence and made it much more than a simple spy service. They developed a great center of scholarship and research, with as many doctors and masters in every kind of art and science as any university campus. They have produced a triumph of technology stretching from the depths of the oceans to the very limits of outer space. Using photography, electronics, acoustics and other technological marvels, we learn things totally hidden on the other side of the world. In the SALT debate, for example, Americans openly discuss the details of Soviet missiles which are held secret in the Soviet Union, but are thoroughly revealed by the intelligence capabilities we have developed over the years.

- 5 -

The highest duty of a Director of Central Intelligence is to produce solid and perceptive national intelligence estimates which are relevant to the issues with which the President and the National Security Council need to concern themselves. When General Walter Bedell Smith, a long time ago, took office as Director of Central Intelligence, he was told that President Truman was leaving in twenty hours to consult General MacArthur at Wake Island about the Korean War. Truman wanted seven separate intelligence estimates to study on the plane as he went to his meeting. Smith assembled the chiefs of the intelligence community in the Pentagon at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, divided them and their staff into seven groups, told them they would work all night, and have their assigned estimate ready for delivery at eight a.m. President Truman had his estimates as he took off for his discussion with General MacArthur.

Now, we do it a little differently these days, but this all-night session can be said to have given the American intelligence community its baptism of fire. Today, we have a National Foreign Intelligence Board that we call the NFIB. Every week, seated around the table are the chiefs of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force intelligence services, the FBI, the CIA, the State Department's intelligence and research division, and the Departments of Energy and Treasury intelligence services. These men sit as a board of estimates.

(At this point, Mr. Casey's address was disrupted by approximately 20 radical students and ex-students who recited the nonsensical Lewis Carroll poem, "Jabberwocky." This disruption, in turn, was loudly booed by other students in the audience.)

Mr. Casey: When that entertainment began, we were just concluding a meeting of the National Foreign Intelligence Board, as I remember. I was telling you that these men sit around the table and thrash out their views and their differences to arrive at an estimate. Each of these people has an apparatus which collects and analyzes information to see that his special perspective is reflected in what goes to the

- 6 -

President and the National Security Council. And each of them is in charge of a sizeable apparatus which is responsible for military intelligence, for political intelligence, for nuclear intelligence, for communication intelligence, and for photographic intelligence. All together, all these apparatuses--i.e., various organizations--make up what we know today as the American intelligence community.

Over the years and particularly during the last decade, a lot of criticism has been levied at the national intelligence estimates that are produced. Much of this is based on unrealistic expectations of what an intelligence service can do. It does not have powers of prophecy. It has no crystal ball that can peer into the future; it is dealing with probable developments. Now if we can't expect infallible prophecy from the nation's large investment in intelligence, what can we expect? We can expect foresight; we can expect a careful definition of possibilities; we can expect professional analysis which probes and weighs probabilities and assesses their implication. We can expect analyses that assist policymakers in devising ways to prepare for and cope with the full range of these probabilities. The President doesn't need a single best view, a guru, or a prophet. The Nation needs the best analysis and the full range of views it can get. And the process of analysis and arriving at estimates therefore needs to be as open and competitive as possible. We need to resist the bureaucratic urge for consensus. We don't need analysts spending their time finding a middle ground or weaseling words to conceal disagreement. Their time needs to go into evaluating information, searching for meaning and the implications of events and trends, and expressing both their conclusions and their disagreements clearly. A search to unify the intelligence community around a single estimate serves policymakers badly. It buries valid differences, forcing the intelligence product to the lowest and the blandest common denominator. Search for consensus also cultivates the myth of infallibility by implicitly promising a reliability that cannot really be delivered, and too frequently it deprives the intelligence product

- 7 -

of relevance and the policymaker of the range of possibilities for which prudence requires that he prepare. Above all, the policymaker needs to be protected from the conventional wisdom.

Let me give you a couple of horrible examples. Before there was a CIA, Senator Brian McMann of Connecticut and Louis Storrs, then a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, performed one of the most important intelligence missions in the history of our nation. Together they insisted that we had to develop a program to monitor and detect all large explosions anywhere on the globe. And the first chance to develop this kind of system was offered by atomic tests to be held in the Pacific in the spring of 1948. A detection system was devised by the end of 1948, but the Air Force found itself short of funds to procure the necessary instrumentation to do this monitoring job. About a million dollars would be needed to get it started. Contracts had to be readied at once so that the instruments would be ready in time. Louis Storrs, a great patriot and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, obligated himself personally for that million dollars so that the contract could be made firm in time. This effort was launched in the very nick of time, and in September it established that an atomic explosion had occurred somewhere in the Asiatic mainland and on some date between August 26th and August 29th in 1949. Now, had there been no monitoring system in operation in 1949, the Russian success in detonating an atomic weapon in that summer would have been unknown to us. In consequence, we would have made no attempt to develop a thermonuclear weapon. It was our positive intelligence that the Russians had exploded an atomic bomb which generated the recommendation to develop a qualitatively superior hydrogen bomb in order to maintain our military superiority. On January 30, 1950, Truman made a decision to build the H-Bomb, and we were able to test our first Hydrogen Bomb in November of 1952. The Russians tested their first weapon involving an H-Bomb the following August. Had we relied on the conventional wisdom that the Soviets just didn't have the nuclear

- 8 -

capability, their success in developing a hydrogen bomb capability in 1953 would have found the United States helplessly outdistanced. The Soviet military would have been in possession of weapons vastly more powerful and devastating than any we had. Another example, early in 1962: John Mc Cone, newly-arrived as Director of Central Intelligence, saw reports coming in about the arrival of anti-aircraft weapons in Cuba. What are they there to protect, he wondered. There are no targets there now--sugar--but nothing deserving that kind of protection. He concluded that there had to be an intention to bring something in which might be attacked by us, and hence, which would need to be defended. Thus, he was many months ahead of anyone in Washington in predicting the possibility that the Russians might base offensive missiles in Cuba. When Cuban refugees brought reports of large missiles being brought in and installed in Cuba, McCone took this as confirmation of his forecast, while everyone else in Washington dismissed him on the basis that the Soviets would never do anything so foolish---until the U2 photographs came in disclosing the missiles in a manner which could not be denied.

I tell you these stories to emphasize that protection against the conventional wisdom is essential and the CIA, military intelligence, and every other element of the intelligence community should not only be allowed to compete and surface differences, but should be encouraged to do so. The time has come to recognize that the policymakers can easily sort through a wide range of opinions, but they cannot consider views that they do not receive. The time has also come to recognize that the intelligence community has no monopoly on truth, on insight and on initiative in foreseeing what will be relevant to policy. For that reason, we are in the process of reconstituting a President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, made up of strong and experienced individuals with a wide range of relevant backgrounds. To get all of the intelligence we need, we must reach out beyond the formal intelligence organizations. We have got to tap the scholarly resources of the nation

- 9 -

and the perspectives and insights developed from business and other activities around the world. We are geared to do that in open and direct contact with the campuses, the think tanks, and the business organizations around the country. We will need to do this even more in the future to cope with the intelligence requirements of our increasingly complex and dangerous world as it generates new threats. Back at the O.S.S., we were lucky. We were doing pretty well if we knew where the enemy was and how he was really deploying his forces. That was the extent of the task. For the first twenty years of peace-time intelligence, most of the efforts went into understanding the production and capabilities of weapons. It is only in the last decade that it has dawned upon us that we have been threatened and damaged more by coups, by subversion, and by economic aggression, than by military force. So, while we still devote a large slice of effort to military estimates--we rely heavily on them in formulating defense budgets, weapons development of force structures--they have to be supplemented by increased efforts to assess economic vulnerabilities, search for technological breakthroughs, and increasing the priority attention that will go to the need to identify social and political instabilities and how they can or are being exploited by propaganda, by subversion, or by terrorism.

Now let me say a few words about what we face. Our first priority is still the Soviet Union. It's been the number one adversary for 35 years; it's the only country in the world with major weapons systems directly targeted at the United States which could destroy it in half-an-hour. For that reason alone, it remains the number one target. Less lethal, but perhaps more dangerous, is the threat of worldwide subversion and insurrection and tiny wars of so-called national liberation. Over the last five years, we have seen the combination of Cuban manpower, Libyan money, and Soviet arms and transport substantially seize and thoroughly threaten the African continent from Angola to Ethiopia and across the Sudan and Chad and to the western Sahara. We have seen the same forces take over Nicaragua and threaten

- 10 -

to infiltrate all of Central America. We have seen the crossroads and the oil resources of the Middle East threatened from Iran and Afghanistan in the east, Syria from the north, Yemen from the south, and Libya from the west.

There are many levels at which the Soviet Union challenges us today. First, there is the strategic arena, in which the increasing accuracy and the power of Soviet missiles thoroughly threatens the survival ability of our own land-based missiles, and this has led to a Presidential decision to accelerate the strengthening of our air and sea capability and to basically defer the decision on the basing of the more powerful land-based missiles until the role that anti-missile defense and cruise missiles can play in maintaining our current capability can be more thoroughly reviewed and assessed. Secondly, on the Central European front, Soviet and Warsaw pact forces vastly outnumber by four- and three-to-one NATO forces in tanks, planes, and troops. Thirdly, in the ability to project military power over long distances, the Soviets, together with their Cuban proxies, have demonstrated a capability in Angola and in Ethiopia, while the rapid deployment force we have recently created remains untested. In numbers and experience and freedom to act, the ability of the Soviets to survey other governments and propagandize in other countries is unrivaled. A few years ago, the United States was providing twice as much military equipment to Third World countries as the Soviet Union. Today the Soviet Union is providing 50% more equipment to a larger number of Third World countries; military advice and influence go along with these relationships. The Soviets, along with East European satellites, Libya, Cuba, and the P.L.O., engage in the widespread training of guerrilla fighters and terrorists, and sometimes use them with de-stabilized governments, thus laying the ground for their support of revolutionary violence. Large and specialized segments of the KGB and the Soviet military intelligence known as the GRU, together with trained and scientific delegations roaming the advanced world, are acquiring western technology and using it to build

- 11 -

a military threat which we will have to defend against and to reduce the drain which that process imposes on the Soviet economy at a rate which we have only recently come to realize. Only recently have we come to realize the enormous advantage and enormous cost that the theft and illegal acquisition of our own technology imposes on us as we have to defend against the things that we created ourselves.

So this is the range of the threat. So much of it new and beyond the traditional range of capabilities of western intelligence which we are now called upon to deal with. To meet it, we need to develop economic, psychological, and scientific capabilities, as well as political and military research facilities. Having the ability to exercise influence in the world requires a strong industrial base. And there are tough questions to ask ourselves about what's happening to that base: where is our economy really headed? For example, what will the increasing globalization of the automobile industry do to the industrial base on which we must depend for national defense? How will the attrition of our computer and semiconductor industries, under the impact of the drive the Japanese have mounted to capture this market, undermine our defense capability? And how will it affect our ability to make our way in the world, through the manufacture of machinery and equipment which will be increasingly controlled and guided by microprocessors and which the Japanese may soon outdistance us in producing? And if the French, Germans, and Japanese, and less developed countries, like Korea and Brazil, convert more rapidly than the United States from fossil fuels to other kinds of energy, how rapidly will lower power costs in those countries be converted into important competitive advantages in manufacturing costs?

Now, let me sum up briefly; what do we see if we look around at the world? We see a Soviet Union, rapidly building its military strength, as ours has been permitted to decline. We see the United States falling behind in economic competitiveness, as the Japanese and Germans save, invest, and innovate more, and Koreans,

- 12 -

Singaporeans, Taiwanese, Brazilians, and Mexicans all increase their share of the world market as our share diminishes. We see political and economic instability in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, where we get the fuel and the minerals to keep our economy going. And the Soviet Union, with its Cuban, East German, Libyan, and Syrian proxies, demonstrates a remarkable ability to exploit these instabilities by well-orchestrated subversion and paramilitary operations, conducted with guerrilla fighters they train, equip and direct. And we see large numbers of tanks and guns, stockpiled in Syria, Libya and Yemen, on the fringe of the Arab Peninsula, and transported to Cuba, Angola and Ethiopia, and used in Chad, Lebanon, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Now, I'm not here to frighten you, but to say that the world is full of economic, political, and military dangers which need to be taken seriously and watched closely, and to say, finally, that the outlook is not all black. Russia has fallen into a hornet's nest in Afghanistan, where after 18 months, freedom fighters are able to contain Soviet troops to half-a-dozen cities and to their barracks at night; they dare not walk out in the streets at night. And in Poland, the Soviet Union has been caught in a dilemma between concern that developments there could unravel the Communist system, while on the other hand, brutal suppression would entail heavy economic and political costs and bring bloodshed and prolonged resistance from militant Poles. In addition, the Soviet Union's economy gasps under its inherent inefficiencies and the burden of enormous military expenditures; and the many billions each year given to Cuba and Viet Nam, to providing cut-rate oil to East European satellites, and to paying for its huge, worldwide propaganda and troublemaking machines for sprinkling guns around Africa, the Middle East, and Central America. What will count here and around the world is a renewal of confidence, among our people and among other nations, in the strength of purpose and the reliability of the United States to do what needs to be done to make our

- 13 -

own society stronger and more efficient, and to work efficiently with our friends and allies in support of freedom and justice around the world.

Thank you.

Stultz: In the interest of having as many people as possible have a chance to say what's on their mind, either in the form of a question, or, please, a brief statement, would you make your question or remarks as brief a period as possible.

Q: Mr. Casey, there was an article in the London Times over the summer; it was talking about relative strengths, and usefulness of the armed forces. What it was saying was that the three services, meaning the Navy, the Army and the Air Force, are no longer necessary--they're obsolete at this moment. With the new regard to the threat in the Third World and feeling that in Europe they are no longer necessary, what the author was talking about, instead, was that he said a new force is necessary; something that's designed on two levels, one, a conventional level, one a strategic level. As far as the conventional level goes, it should be organized not on divisions or armies or corps or anything else; instead, on a brigade level, and it should be very fluid so it can be organized to be moved to the Third World...

Casey: Could you sum it up in a question, please?

Q: The question is: they're talking about brigade levels and being fluid enough so that they can be used in the Third World or in Europe whenever it's necessary. What are your feelings on this, is this a realistic thing; are you looking at this, or what?

Casey: I don't understand your question.

Q: The question is: what are your views on this? Do you think the three forces are obsolete and should be replaced by a conventional and a strategic force which would be fluid enough to be used in the Third World, as well as in Europe when necessary?

- 14 -

Casey: I think you're saying that--what are my views as to whether we should put more effort into conventional arms which can be used anywhere, Third World or elsewhere, instead of only in Europe. Is that right?

Q: No, I was talking more about whether or not the three forces are obsolete or not.

Casey: Obsolete?

Q: Obsolete and instead should be replaced by these two forces, one being strategic, one being conventional?

A: Of course, weapons systems are always getting obsolete. I don't think I have any comment on that.

Q: First of all, I'd like to thank you for coming and speaking to us. I thought that it was very important. My concern is with CIA activity within the United States, and I have a question about that. President Reagan is speaking of cutting back on federally-funded programs to aid education; for example, tuition tax credit and student loans for college students. I feel that programs such as these are far more valuable to the institution of democracy than internal workings of the CIA within the United States.

Casey: I agree with you.

Q (cont.): How do you explain the reason for the fact that the CIA, according to these articles, wishes to expand their program, whereas other programs that I feel, and I'm sure all of us as members of the University, feel are more important?

A: Well, I can assure you that the CIA has no intention and no desire to operate within the United States. The sole purpose of the CIA is to acquire foreign intelligence for the purpose of guiding federal policy and national security policy of the United States. Those articles are way out of focus. There is an interest in modifying the executive order and releasing some restrictions, in order to facili-

- 15 -

tate Americans in the United States who want to support this foreign activity.

But there is no intention, and there will be no spying or activity on the part of the CIA in the United States.

Q (cont.): This was given to me before: it's the New York Times, Tuesday, October 6, 1981, and the headline reads: "Reagan Draft Order Said to Allow Wider Intelligence Activity in the United States"--it appears to me that there are two conflicting stories; one is from the New York Times---

Casey: Well, the New York Times does not have a 100% record of infallibility in understanding what it says.

Questioner: Thank you very much.

Q: Mr. Casey, according to the new Reagan order, the Central Intelligence Agency will no longer have to "reasonably believe that the United States citizens and corporations living abroad are agents of foreign power involved in terrorism or involved in drug traffic to be put under surveillance"--does this provision not violate civil liberties of Americans living abroad?

A: No, I don't think it does. I think it's necessary if we're going to really follow up and investigate and learn about terrorism or terroristic espionage activities on the part of Americans abroad.

Q (cont.): So you justify violating the civil liberties?

A: No, I justify authorized self-defense where it's necessary. If you have to know that a person is engaged in espionage before you can find out, you are at a dead end. All we're saying here is if it's done in the course of a legitimate, authorized foreign intelligence investigation, you can follow and investigate the activities of Americans abroad. It is not an established civil liberty to do anything you want abroad, without constitutional authority trying to find out what you're doing.

- 16 -

Q: The problem of Soviet-U.S. conflict has been a lot more popular in the news in the last few years during the Reagan Administration's tenure, and I'm concerned about the use of Mr. Reagan's propaganda that most of our foreign policy problems can be reduced to this U.S.-Soviet conflict. I'd like you to address problems in Latin America and especially our support for Nicaragua and some of the other--well, you can choose your own country. I'd like to think that the United States can have a constructive role in South America, one in which we don't necessarily decide who's in power, or supply military weapons, or other types of support for governments that we may not find morally acceptable, but which may be our friends. What kind of a role do you think the United States has to play in South America, Latin America, and what kind of role does the CIA have to play there?

A: Well, the CIA's role is one of evaluating what's going on in those countries, and what's happening. The United States' policy is to work with those countries in South America to have positive political and economic relations with them. Where some of them are under attack, where weapons and intervention from outside is occurring, as it is occurring in some countries in Central America, we have been helping those governments build up the ability to defend themselves and maintain order in their country.

Q: But do you consider that many of those governments are not reflective of the wishes of the people that live in those countries?

A: Well, we're encouraging elections in those countries in order to find that out.

Q (cont.): I don't find that the situation in El Salvador has been conducive to elections.

A: Well, they do have a government, which like most governments, seeks a renewal of its mandate by having an election. There's nothing extraordinary about it.

Questioner: Well, our government doesn't eliminate those opposed to it, we hope. Thank you, sir.

- 17 -

Q: Hello, Mr. Casey. I've really enjoyed our talk tonight, and I have a couple of questions for you. You, tonight, mentioned that the Soviets have 3-4 times the number of tanks and planes in eastern Europe and the Pentagon study recently released gives similar figures, but I'm more interested in comparative figures. For instance, can you tell me the number of tanks the United States has, and our capability in anti-tank weapons?

A: Oh, I haven't got the numbers, exactly, but I think it's something like 12,000 tanks on the NATO side and 50,000 on the Soviet Warsaw pact side.

Q (cont.): Can you indicate whether the United States is superior, inferior, or comparable in its technological anti-tank warfare capabilities? And would this offset the Soviet advantage in tank numbers?

A: Well, we hope it does. We do our best to make it. We do worry about this. We have a superior technological capability; we have superior research and development capability; but, the Soviets are very good at somehow acquiring the advantages that we build into our weaponry. They get it very quickly and they develop counter-measures, so it's a continuing race. I agree that numbers are not everything. Quality is important, and in some respects we're ahead qualitatively, and in some respects they are.

Q: I'm wondering how the United States intelligence community, with its nuclear task force, makes its estimates on Soviet submarine capabilities and United States ICBM vulnerabilities, because your statement tonight indicated that the United States was quite vulnerable in the ICBM leg of the triad. I'd like to know where you get your estimates of Soviet circular area of probability, and their capability of knocking out our ICMBs, and how you make these estimates as accurate as possible?

A: Well, I really can't go into that. It's very technical; we have experts who spend all of their time doing it, and there are methodologies which we don't talk

- 18 -

about publicly. So I can only give you the conclusion on that, and I think it's generally agreed. I see no dispute about the contention that the Soviet missiles are getting increasingly accurate and increasingly have the capability of striking and knocking out most of our missiles in the first strike.

Q: Mr. Casey, in a Washington Post article of October 13th, the most recent proposal from the Reagan Administration to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was discussed. Whereas the first draft included a provision insuring that the CIA's investigation would guard against violations of civil liberties, the most recent eliminates this provision altogether, replacing it with a call for a more "aggressive" CIA, which will "protect basic American principles." Please give us a specific explanation as to why the clause protecting civil liberties was eliminated, and also if you wouldn't mind, explain what your agency means by basic American values.

A: Well, anybody can quarrel with the way that order is designed. It seeks to simplify the requirements and simplify the operation, so that the people who are working under it will not be deterred by complex legalities that they may not understand, and it provides that all activities are to be conducted under the law and the Constitution. It provides that the Attorney General will have to authorize many areas of activity. Those are the precautions to see that the activity is conducted under the law. The purpose of the law and the Constitution is to protect civil liberties.

Q (cont.): But, Mr. Casey, why have civil liberties at all if they are not going to be enforced?

A: Who said they're not going to be enforced?

Q: If there's not a provision in the proposal, there's a good chance that they won't be.

A: It does so by reference to the law which is enacted to protect civil liber-

- 19 -

ties, and the Constitution with its Bill of Rights, which establishes those civil liberties.

Q: Mr. Casey, you've stated that you believe the CIA should be exempt from the Freedom of Information Act. The Act has been used to provide the public with information regarding many controversial CIA activities. Such information is crucial in a democracy, helping to keep government officials accountable to the people. As you know, there are already nine exemptions which allow agencies to avoid disclosing information, including both national defense and foreign policy. Given these exemptions, what is your rationale for desiring total exemption from the Act?

A: Simply because it's impossible to effectively command the cooperation of other governments and people who go out and undertake intelligence missions if they feel that their identity and information they provide us with is subject to demand on the part of any hostile force, or any hostile government. We have confidentiality of doctors, priests, tax returns, many other segments of our society protected by law, and if we are to have an effective intelligence apparatus as a first line of defense we have to have confidentiality with the information we get and with our relationships with people who work for us similarly protected.

Q (cont.): Again, if there are already two exemptions dealing with national security and foreign policy, why do you think you deserve total exemption which would basically make you above accountability from the people?

Casey: I thought I just explained that.

Q (cont.): I think what you mentioned comes under both national security and foreign policy, the two provisions, so I'd like to know why you think you need total exemption?

A: I suppose we have a disagreement on this.

Questioner: Yes, there is. Thank you.

- 20 -

Q: My question concerns nuclear capabilities; nuclear armaments. I hear increasingly in the last couple of years about the idea of a limited nuclear exchange. I'm sure you're familiar with it. My question is not your agency's predictions, but your considerations, Mr. Casey. Do you think that that is a possible occurrence? Do you see it as--I hate the word--viable?

Casey: Do I see what as a possible occurrence?

Q: A limited nuclear exchange, like between the United States and the Russians, there's talk about maybe killing ten or twenty or thirty million people on each side. Do you see this as a possible route? Do you see this as a feasible occurrence?

A: I hope not. It would be a devastating occurrence.

Q: Do you see, then, the possibility of a full-scale exchange?

A: It's certainly possible. I hope it doesn't occur; I don't think it will occur, but it's possible.

Q (cont.): And you don't think that it's possible that a limited exchange could take place?

A: As I said, it's possible that any exchange could take place. When you have two sets of weapons, it's possible. I don't think it's likely unless you have a madman on one side. The question is, would Adolf Hitler have fired a nuclear weapon if he had one?

Q: My question is one of interpretation, and I'll keep it simple. In your synopsis of world resistance movements, you mentioned the two movements now facing the Soviet Union: Afghanistan was composed of freedom fighters fighting the Soviet Union and the Polish resistance movement was brutally repressed. The resistance movements facing the United States were being manipulated by the Soviet Union and their agents. My question is this: do you think that in all the resistance move-

- 21 -

ments around the world the United States is always on the side of the people? Or do you think that the exact opposite is the case? Thank you.

A: Well, that's a rather sweeping question.

Q (cont.): Would you have us believe that the United States is genuinely on the side of people's resistance movements around the world? In South America, for example? In Europe?

A: I can't answer questions like that; you have to give me specifics.

Q: El Salvador? Guatemala? Colombia? (interrupting) South Africa?

A: I think--

Q (continuing to interrupt): Recently, Iran? Chile?

Casey: Do you want to make a speech or do you want to ask a question?

Q: No, I was being specific.

A: You talk about El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala; there's no question there that those resistance movements have been organized from the outside, and are being supplied from the outside.

Q: Do you believe that those resistance movements have no support from the people at all? Do you believe that we have the support of the people?

A: They have support of some people, certainly. Of course they do; there are some people in there fighting. But there is an established government and the insurgency wouldn't have the magnitude it has if there wasn't outside support and if weapons and trained people and leaders were not being sent in from other countries.

Q: Does the United States--

Casey continuing: We are helping these people defend themselves.

Q: Has the United States ever engaged in such activities?

A: Well, there was the American Revolution.

- 22 -

Stultz: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. This brings our meeting to a close. Great universities exhibit their greatness by how they deal with controversial ideas. With your help and Mr. Casey's help, I hope we have maintained Brown's tradition for greatness this evening. Thank you.

Casey: Thank you.

(Applause)