

22 October 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Staff Meeting Minutes of 22 October 1979

25X1

The Director chaired the meeting. []

Lehman reported no further intelligence re the recent report of Soviet strategic forces alert; []
Lehman opined the reported alert could conceivably relate to reports of Brezhnev's illness. Lehman also reported on Soviet military activity along the Afghanistan border, specifically Soviet divisions at Kushka and Fergana; he noted activity could simply be an effort by the Soviets to catch up on its troop-training cycle. []

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McMahon cited a report of 17 October, in sharp contrast with an earlier report of the same day, that Brezhnev had suffered a stroke--that his speech is impaired and other body functions are difficult. McMahon suggested that Brezhnev's fate--recovery or death--would probably be evident within a few days. []

25X1

McMahon reported the Saudis are "agonizing" over how to keep OPEC prices from rising again; he said it appears likely the Saudis will be forced to yield. In this regard, the Director reflected on his and Clarke's recent meeting with the President in which the President asked that we assess meaningful impacts on lesser developed countries stemming from oil pricing. Clarke said, despite its heavy workload, OER is preparing a paper on this. []

25X1

Hetu commented favorably on a book review which appeared in yesterday's Washington Post: "The Man Who Kept the Secrets" by Thomas Powers (attached). Hetu said this book on Richard Helms and the CIA points up that the Agency has been a "good and faithful servant" of the U.S. Government. []

25X1

Clarke announced a change in the cover color (brown to gray) of intelligence assessment publications. He commented briefly on Kampuchea's Prime Minister Pol Pot and reports of a second invasion by Vietnam. He said he would brief the Director on details; the Director requested we keep Administration officials appropriately advised. []

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SECRET

Hitz reported a successful SAC budget markup last week; he credited Mr. Carlucci's phone calls to several Subcommittee members as instrumental to success. He said all of the Director's appeal items had been approved; he added that the Subcommittee will report to the full Committee this week, followed by conference with the House next week. [redacted] 25X1

25X1

25X1

Hitz reported briefly on [redacted] (accompanied by [redacted]) 19 October briefing to Congressional Staffers Battista and Perle on COCOM violations. He said Congressional members were appreciative of our initiating the briefings and that the interests of Senator Jackson and Representative Ichord were satisfied. [redacted] 25X1

25X1

Hitz gave a brief report on his meeting last Friday with Cutler re "killer amendments" to SALT. He said discussions will resume today and noted Cutler's expressed interest in our having [redacted] available. Both Hitz and the Director expressed their reluctance on the latter because of difficulties which could arise, e.g., a direct debate between [redacted] and Senator Glenn on technicalities. [redacted] 25X1

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Hitz reported the HAC Subcommittee (Representative Chappell) has requested the Subcommittee be briefed on 31 October re Soviet and Cuban activities in Central and South America. Hitz noted this poses a problem with Mr. Carlucci's current schedule and will get with him to work it out. [redacted] 25X1

25X1

Hitz reported that, according to HPSCI's Mike O'Neil, further hearings on Identities Legislation are unlikely until early next year. [redacted] 25X1

25X1

Noting he has been in touch with Senator Bentsen, Hitz briefly described the current situation re "Hostage to Charters Legislation." Lastly, Hitz gave a summary by major category, i.e., budget, SALT and other special subjects, on the number of Congressional appearances by the Director for this year. [redacted] 25X1

25X1

Silver, referring to Hitz's earlier comment re COCOM violations, said he received a request (too late) last Friday from the Justice Department that we not brief the Hill until the FBI had investigated one of the cases of alleged violation. [redacted] 25X1

25X1

May said Harry Fitzwater has reported HPSCI interest in the Agency's Senior Intelligence Service and its implications re legislation. May said he believes the Committee would like to examine how we have shaped our Service as an aid in their review of NSA's proposal. [redacted] 25X1

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SECRET

[redacted] reported SR-71 65 percent cloud-free coverage of Cuba on 20 October; he said this take will provide us with a good data base. The Director advised that a memo to Dr. Brzezinski be prepared on the value of this coverage including a rationale for when it would be necessary to overfly the SR-71 again. (Action: CTS) [redacted]

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The Director briefly reviewed important activities for this week:

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-- APEX--the Director said he hopes for progress this week, and he has asked [redacted] to have Walsh see him (Director) today to work out ways to facilitate the decision process. [redacted]

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-- The Director said that, in a meeting with the President last Friday re the situation in Central America and the Caribbean, he noted opposing views expressed on whether or not Jamaica's Prime Minister Manley is retrievable from Soviet influence. He said NFAC should prepare a paper on Jamaica's future using DDO inputs and, because of the opposing views, we may want to go on record.


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
-- The Director said a SCC meeting to be chaired by Dr. Brzezinski will be held on Thursday re interrelationships between the energy problem, future of the dollar, and national security. Clarke said Maurice Ernst, D/OER, is preparing a paper for the meeting. [redacted]

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- The Director commented on his work this past Saturday with Mr. Carlucci in addressing advanced work plans to be used for individuals in the SIS and said that we should keep moving to get this program in place and functioning as soon as possible. 25X1
- The Director asked for comments and suggestions which might be used for discussion during the Community retreat scheduled for 16-17 November 25X1
- The Director questioned Secretary Brown's public comment this weekend that the Soviets have a new submarine which is better than anything in the U.S. fleet, but that the submarine is not yet operational. 25X1
- The Director commented briefly on a public report of the number of Communists and Communist advisers in the developing world and asked if we had published anything on this. In a brief conversation which followed, Clarke speculated that it may be based on our report to the NSC. 25X1
- The Director commented on Richard Burt's New York Times article of 19 October: "Missile Bid to Dutch is Denied by Bonn" (attached), noting this reporter's quick and continuing access to sensitive information. 25X1



Attachments (2)

ARTICLE APPEARS
ON PAGE 100h WORLD

THE WASHINGTON POST
21 October 1979

Our Good and Faithful Servants

THE MAN WHO KEPT THE SECRETS: Richard Helms and the CIA. By Thomas Powers. Knopf. 393 pp. \$12.95

By RICHARD HARWOOD

IN THE PROCESS OF SHEDDING illusions over the past decade or so, we Americans have fallen into an unattractive habit of scapegoating.

I quote from a recent book review by John Kenneth Galbraith:

"In the space of a few months in 1959 and 1960, [Allen] Dulles, as head of the CIA, showed himself to be a master of disastrous ineptitude. In those months he sent Gary Powers over the Paris Summit, helped overthrow the neutralist government of Souvanna Phouma in Laos. . . and was the man in charge of the organization that was responsible for perhaps the greatest foul-up in our history, the Bay of Pigs."

Dulles did it. Or J. Edgar Hoover. Or some other wretch who must suffer for our sins. It is the devil theory of history or, as someone has said of the CIA, the notion that rogue elephants unaccountably appear in our happy land to bring shame to us all. It is hard for us to accept the possibility that such men and institutions have, in fact, been our good and faithful servants and that we have been their witting sponsors.

This impressive book by Thomas Powers addresses that possibility. It persuades me, beyond reasonable doubt, that the Central Intelligence Agency, by and large, has been a most careful servant of the American government and, by extension, the servant of us all.

In 1948, as the agency was being put together, its covert action unit was given a charter by the National Security Council. It authorized "propaganda, economic warfare, preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements

in threatened countries of the free world." There was another stipulation. These activities should be carried out in such a way "that any U.S. government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them."

This was a charter for dirty tricks. I suspect that if it had been put to a national referendum at the time, it would have met with the overwhelming approval of the American people.

It is clear, in any event, what Harry Truman and his Security Council expected of the agency, and it is clear from the evidence Powers assembles that those expectations were shared by every subsequent president of the United States. The covert interventions in Iran, Guatemala, the Congo, Chile, Cuba, Laos and elsewhere were not impulsive cowboy operations by mad agents. They were the deliberate policies of the American government.

When it comes to the assassination plots against foreign leaders, such as Lumumba and Castro, the question is a bit stickier. The Church Committee investigated those matters four years ago and came in with a verdict of case not proved. But the circumstantial evidence Powers assembles persuades me that the CIA was not acting on its own.

As Powers writes, "talk about killing was commonplace" in Washington in the 1950s and 1960s. A West German general came to Allen Dulles, Richard Helms and others in 1952 with a proposal (which was rejected) for the assassination of Walter Ulbricht, the East German leader. At a State Department meeting in the mid-'50s, the subject was Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt, of whom Dulles said: "If that colonel of yours pushes us too far, we will break him in half." In November 1960, Undersecretary of State Livingston Merchant asked his colleagues of the Special Group overseeing covert operations if "any real planning had been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel; Raul and Che-Guevara." Their demise, he suggested, would leave Cuba "leaderless and probably brainless." Later in that decade, Robert Murphy of the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, asked why the CIA hadn't killed Ho Chi Minh as a solution in Vietnam: "Ho is the problem, isn't he? Can't you fellows do something to get rid of him?"

CONTINUED

THE WASHINGTON POST
21 October 1979

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The most damning illustration of White House involvement in affairs of this kind was the Kennedy Administration's determination to get Castro. The common view is that Richard Bissell, who directed the CIA operation at the Bay of Pigs, was fired because that ill-conceived adventure failed.

"But this was only part of the explanation," Powers writes, "the public part, in fact, while the private part had to do with Bissell's continued failure to make progress in getting rid of Castro."

Bissell and others in the CIA were under constant and extreme pressure from the president and the attorney general, Robert Kennedy, to "get off their ass" and "do something" about Castro. That was the whole point of Operation Mongoose, in which Robert Kennedy was a prime mover. The details Powers assembles about this operation are fascinating; the reader can decide for himself who knew what.

The subtitle of this book is "Richard Helms and the CIA." But it is only incidentally about Helms and his fellow secret-keepers. Mostly it is a masterful portrait of an agency and its managers and of their relationships to the governments they served. Powers, who won a Pulitzer Prize as a wire-service reporter, spent hours with Helms and other celebrated CIA figures. Why they talked to him at such length and with such candor is hard to say. But they did, and they have given Powers the materials for the finest book I have yet read on the CIA. The agency's managers do not always or even frequently appear in a flattering light. They were often amoral and servile. But, I think, more often than not they represented in thought and action the purposes of the governments that employed them. They found it hard to say, "No," to presidents and cabinet secretaries.

In a sense, they were bootlickers, fascinated and intimidated by the presidency, like other bureaucrats of the federal establishment. "The primacy of presidents," Powers writes, "is the great fact in the CIA's daily round. If the president does not trust or value the Agency's product, then the paper it produces ceases to have weight in government councils and it might as well unplug its copiers, because it is only talking to itself. The first duty of the [director of Central Intelligence], then, not by statute but as a matter of practical reality, is to win the trust, the confidence, and the ear of the president."

And to keep the secrets. Above all, to keep the secrets: "On May 10, 1967, Helms went to the White House to give Lyndon Johnson the answers to the questions he'd been asked seven weeks earlier. The only account of that meeting is Helms' own. He says he described the [inspector general's] conclusions and that Johnson said:

"Then you were not responsible for Trujillo." "No." Correct answer. "Dien?" "No." Correct answer. "Castro, he's still alive, okay." At the same meeting Helms also told Johnson about the mail interception program and some other things that were going on. Johnson's response to that was equally laconic; he just nodded and said something along the lines of, "But be careful, don't get caught." □

MISSILE BID TO DUTCH IS DENIED BY BONN

Germans Declare They Don't Link
Basing Rights for Weapon to
Accord With Netherlands

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

Washington, Oct. 18 — The West German Government has informed the Carter Administration that the support of the Netherlands for stationing new American medium-range missiles on Dutch soil is not a prerequisite for a decision by Bonn to allow the rockets on its territory, Government officials said today.

The officials said that the Administration, reacting to a report in The New York Times today, asked West German diplomats here to clarify Bonn's position on accepting a new generation of American missiles on its soil. The report quoted a Dutch parliamentarian as saying that West German officials had recently told a group of Dutch politicians that unless the Netherlands agreed to accept the new missiles, Bonn would be unable to go along with plans to place the rockets in West Germany.

However, West German diplomats informed the Administration today that while their Government wants NATO participation in the plan to put missiles in Western Europe, Bonn is not tying its actions to what the Netherlands decides to do.

Sensitive Issue Within Alliance

The question of whether Bonn would accept American missiles on its soil has emerged as one of the most sensitive issues in the Western alliance. The Administration has staked its prestige on gaining European support for deploying new missiles and a last-minute decision by West Germany to reject the American plan would create deep strains between Bonn and Washington.

Late last year, when the Administration first raised the idea of deploying new missiles, Helmut Schmidt, the West German Chancellor, announced that Bonn would accept the weapons as long as at least one other allied country on the Continent allowed the American system on its soil. At present, the Administration hopes that the Netherlands, Belgium, Britain and Italy will join with West Germany in accepting the missiles on their territories.

In an interview today, Max Van der Stoep, a former Dutch Foreign Minister, said that senior West German officials, including Defense Minister Hans Apel, recently discussed Bonn's position on the missiles with leaders of the Dutch Socialist Party. Mr. Van der Stoep, who was present at the meeting, said that "what the West Germans told us was nothing more than what they have said many times before, that is, Bonn was not prepared to be the only country to accept the American mi

New Arms Control Proposal

Meanwhile, White House aides disclosed today that the Administration and allied governments were close to agreement on the outlines of an arms control offer that would ask Moscow to reduce existing numbers of medium-range missiles directed against Western Europe.

The officials said the plan for seeking a reduction in the Soviet inventory of some 700 medium-range rockets was one of several aspects of a new American arms control proposal that could be presented to the Soviet Union next year. They said a high-level Government delegation, headed by David L. Aaron, the White House's Deputy Assistant for National Security, left for Europe today to consult with allied governments on the offer and the Administration's drive to achieve support for the stationing of nearly 600 American missiles in West Germany and other countries in the early 1980's.

The arms control proposal, which would be raised at the next round of the Soviet-American strategic arms talks, was described by officials as critical to the success of the Administration's effort to gain the approval of governments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for a new generation of American missiles.

Some American officials doubt that Moscow would be willing to reduce the overall size of its medium-range missile force. However, the White House believes that without an arms control offer, it would not be possible to gain European support for deploying new nuclear systems in Europe.

Talks to Proceed Concurrently

Although some allied governments, particularly the Dutch, have suggested that the Administration should first attempt to gain an arms control agreement with Moscow before starting the deployment of new missiles, officials said that the alliance had recently agreed to follow an approach that calls for new arms talks to proceed concurrently with the stationing of American missiles in Europe.

This approach is said by officials to reflect the strongly held view within the Administration that whatever the outcome of any new arms control talks with Moscow, the United States should proceed quickly to modernize its nuclear capabilities in Europe by deploying 572 ballistic and cruise missiles in West Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy.

Under the arms control offer now being discussed in NATO circles, the Administration, officials said, would attempt to achieve overall reductions in older Soviet medium-range missiles as well as such newer systems as the SS-20 rocket and the bomber known in the West as the Backfire. At present, Moscow has 590 older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, 150 Backfire bombers and nearly 100 SS-20 mobile rockets directed against Europe.

The officials, noting that the SS-20 is equipped with three separate nuclear charges said there was general agreement within the alliance that future arms control talks should focus on putting a ceiling on nuclear warheads rather than numbers of missiles or bombers.