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TERMS OF REFERENCE AND OUTLINE FOR NSSD 2/82 STUDY

Introduction: The Soviet intelligence services and their Warsaw Pact/Cuban allies continue to constitute a strategic threat to the United States, their principal target. That overall threat, including HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, has increased over the past year. The Soviet intelligence collection effort against the United States is concentrated on U.S. military information, national security policy and advanced technology. The Soviets utilize all collection techniques with built-in redundancy and central direction; they command very large resource levels to accomplish their goals; and they take full advantage of the U.S. open society for acquisition of information. The details of this and other threats are presented and discussed in the "Hostile Intelligence Services Multidisciplinary Threat and US Countermeasures" national assessment issued by the DCI in March 1982.

Purpose: To establish the objectives, policies, required capabilities, organizational relationships, and resource priorities which in turn will guide the future efforts of departments and agencies in countering the wide range of intelligence collection techniques and activities by which hostile intelligence services threaten our security.

Issues: The intelligence threat facing the United States from the Soviet Union and its surrogates is broadly based, coordinated and encompasses all collection disciplines. The most effective means of countering this centrally directed multidisciplinary threat is with a broadly based total protection concept. Inasmuch as such a concept cuts across many organizational, functional, programmatic and budgetary lines, attention must be given to the strengthening of the current collegial management to optimize its ability to provide national direction and coordination. One solution would be the creation of a single, central organization, but this alternative has been rejected as inconsistent with constitutional and statutory authorities and our basic democratic principles. In short, total protection needs to be devised and practiced as a coordinated but decentralized program rather than by central dictation.

Background: NSSD 2/82 directs the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake a study of U.S. capabilities and requirements to meet the total threat to our security. He is directed to chair an interagency group to conduct this review. The group will include the Secretary of Defense; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Director, FBI; the Director, NSA; the Director, DIA; and the Chairman, JCS. Participation will also include the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and others that the DCI may invite. The review is directed to be accomplished by 15 June 1982.

Definitions:

See Attachment A.

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Scope: This study will develop U.S. objectives and policies for dealing with the multidisciplinary hostile intelligence threat to the United States and will assess the effectiveness of our ability to respond to this threat. Paramount consideration will be given to our capabilities, resource priorities and programmatic development throughout the Government for detecting, analyzing and countering the multiple hostile threats in their totality. The study will not include the international terrorist threat and its countermeasures.

Further details of the study scope, as derived from the National Security Study Directive (NSSD) are contained in the Attachment ~~E~~ outline.

Charge: Prepare a 1985 Counterintelligence Capabilities Plan to be utilized as guidance for development of programs and budgets over the period from 1985 to 1990. This will include National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) activities as well as non-NFIP activities insofar as hostile intelligence countermeasure capabilities are concerned.

Concurrently, identify and study objectives, policies, organizational relationships and associated matters to serve as the basis for development of a draft National Security Decision Directive. Present a draft NSDD on "Detecting and Countering the Foreign Intelligence Threat to the United States" for NSC consideration and Presidential decision.

Study Procedure: The SIG-I will constitute the steering group for the conduct of these tasks, and will use the IG/CI and possible ad hoc IG(s) as working groups for conduct of the studies. The SIG-I will be chaired by the DCI. The IG/CI will be co-chaired by designated representatives of the DCI and the Director, FBI.

All departments or agencies represented on the SIG-I will provide representative membership on the IG/CI and possible ad hoc IG(s). The Chairman of the SIG-I, the Co-Chairmen of the IG/CI or the Chairman of an ad hoc IG may invite participation by others as may be desirable.

Each participating department or agency will provide from its own staff such support as is needed to accomplish assigned study tasks.

Methodology and Schedule: Intelligence Community agencies are requested to provide input to the study in accordance with the notations in parentheses on the outline. These individual inputs will be consolidated by the Study Director and his staff and a draft submitted to the Community for coordination. The schedule, aimed at the mandated 15 June completion date, is as follows:

28 April	Receive Community inputs to study.
13 May	Distribute initial draft
21 May	Receive comments on draft.
26 May	Distribute coordination draft.
2 June	Receive comments on coordination draft.
6 June	Complete final draft with provision for divergent views if required.
7 June	Start publication of study.
15 June	Distribute study.

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