


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MSGNO 45 (STXX) Q5A #30/03/82# *00:42*
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State Dept. review completed.

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DE RUEHKO #5229/01 0890322
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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9451
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 5599
RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS IMMEDIATE
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUADJNA/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7420
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 6668
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8542
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6353
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1180
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 5424
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 0991
RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC 1613
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4867
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2924
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 3371
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1411
RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 3982
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 2800

BT
EZ1:
SECRET TOKYO 05229 COMBINED SECTION

EZ2:
SEOUL PASS SECDEF PARTY
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 (BARRACLOUGH, WILLIAM G.) OR-M
TAGS: MPOL, MARR, OVIP (WEINBERGER, CASPAR W.)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY WEINBERGER VISIT TO JAPAN
REF: A) TOKYO 0446; B) TOKYO 04821

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR W.

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 WEINBERGER AND PARTY VISITED JAPAN MARCH 26-28 FOR PERIODIC CONSULTATIONS WITH HIS JAPANESE COUNTERPART. WHILE HERE, HE MET WITH PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI AND FOREIGN MINISTER SAKURAUCHI AS WELL AS JDA DIRECTOR GENERAL ITO. SECDEF TOLD JAPANESE LEADERSHIP THAT GOJ BUDGET DECISION LAST YEAR WAS IMPORTANT STEP IN RIGHT DIRECTION, BUT THAT BOTH JAPAN AND US NEEDED TO DO MUCH MORE IN VIEW OF MAGNITUDE OF SOVIET THREAT. SPECIFICALLY, HE EMPHASIZED THAT CONSIDERABLE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR JAPAN TO FULFILL DEFENSE ROLES OUTLINED LAST MAY BY PM SUZUKI. SECDEF'S FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO JAPAN ENABLED JSG TO UNDERLINE TO HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOJ OUR INTEREST IN JAPAN'S DEFENSE EFFORTS AT CRUCIAL TIME -- BEFORE NEXT FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PLAN IS COMPLETED AND PRIOR TO NEGOTIATIONS FOR NEXT YEAR-S BUDGET CEILINGS. SECRETARY'S FORCEFUL AND FRANK PRESENTATIONS SHOULD MOVE JAPANESE THINKING AWAY FROM NEBULOUS GOALS (SUCH AS THOSE SET FORTH IN NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM OUTLINE) AND FINANCIAL BALANCING TOWARDS MORE RATIONAL AND REALISTIC MATCHING OF RESOURCCE OUTLAY WITH MISSION. WHILE IT IS STILL EARLY TO ASSESS IMPACT OF HIS EFFORTS, WE SEE VISIT AS DEFINITE PLUS FOR OUR EFFORTS HERE TO MOVE JAPAN IN RIGHT DIRECTION. END SUMMARY.

3. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WEINBERGER VISITED JAPAN FROM 25-28 MARCH FOR PERIODIC CONSULTATIONS WITH HIS JAPANESE COUNTERPART, MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENSE SOICHIRO ITO. DURING VISIT SECDEF PAID COURTESY CALL ON PM SUZUKI AND FORMIN SAKURAUCHI, HELD CONSULTATIONS WITH JDA DIRECTOR GENERAL ITO, VISITED US AND JAPANESE DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS AND CONFERRED WITH AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD, COMMANDER SEVENTH FLT VADM M. STASER HOLCOMB, COMUSJAPAN LT. GEN CHARLES L. DONNELLY, JR. AND OTHER US COMMANDERS. HE ALSO MADE MAJOR SPEECH AT JAPAN PRESS CENTER, MET WITH LDP DEFENSE LEADERS AND GROUP OF INTELLECTUALS WHO SPECIALIZE IN SECURITY AFFAIRS. DETAILS OF PARTY AND ITINERARY CONTAINED IN REF A.

4. IN PRELIMINARY COURTESY CALL ON ITO, SECDEF EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR INVITATION TO VISIT JAPAN AND FOR EFFORTS FOR DEFENSE GOJ IS MAKING IN FY 1982 AND OFFERED CONFIDENTIAL US ESTIMATE ON LEVELS OF JAPANESE DEFENSE SPENDING REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE CAPABILITIES JAPAN IS NOW STRIVING REFTEL C).

CALL ON PM SUZUKI AND FOREIGN MINISTER SAKURAUCHI

5. FOLLOWING EXCHANGE OF COURTESIES, PM NOTED THAT US-JAPAN RELATIONS LATELY HAVE BEEN UNPRECEDENTEDLY STRONG AND GOOD. HE ALLUDED TO HIS OWN EXCELLENT PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, NOTED THE CONSTANT CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN CABINET MINISTERS OF BOTH COUNTRIES (INCLUDING FM SAKURAUCHI'S VERY GOOD MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND OTHERS IN WASHINGTON

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 RECENTLY), AND CONCLUDED THAT AS A RESULT,
 MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN DEEPENED. ON
 DEFENSE COOPERATION, HE SAID THAT LAST YEAR'S
 SSC MEETING IN HONOLULU AND FORMER MINISTER
 OMURA'S MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON CONTRIBUTED
 IMMENSELY TO THE FORMULATION OF JAPANESE DEFENSE
 POLICY. THE PM NOTED THAT HE HAS ASKED ITO TO
 VISIT WASHINGTON AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO
 CONTINUE THESE DISCUSSIONS.

6. SECRETARY WEINBERGER SAID THAT HIS VISIT
 TO JAPAN HAS HELPED LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR
 CLOSER RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES
 AND THE TWO DEFENSE MINISTRIES IN PARTICULAR,
 THAT HE WAS ANXIOUS TO CONTINUE USEFUL
 DISCUSSIONS, AND THAT HE HOPED ITO WOULD VISIT
 US IN EARLY FALL. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED HIS
APPRECIATION FOR THE FINE EFFORTS MADE BY THE
GOJ TO SECURE AN INCREASE IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET.

HE RECALLED SUZUKI'S TELLING PRESIDENT REAGAN
 THAT HE WAS A FISHERMAN, NOTED THAT PM HAD
 CAUGHT A "BIG FISH" THIS YEAR, AND SAID THAT ALL *Yuk.*
 FISHERMEN APPRECIATE CATCHING ONE THAT IS 7.8
 PERCENT BIGGER THAN THE ONE CAUGHT LAST YEAR.

7. PM SAID THAT HE WISHED TO REITERATE TO SECRETARY
 WEINBERGER WHAT HE HAD TOLD PRESIDENT REAGAN LAST
YEAR ABOUT JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEFENSE. PM
 NOTED THAT JAPANESE PEOPLE RECENTLY HAD COME TO
UNDERSTAND SEVERE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE
NEED FOR GREATER DEFENSE EFFORTS. THESE PERCEPTIONS
 WERE IMPORTANT, HE NOTED, AND IN ORDER TO NURTURE
THEM FURTHER, WE MUST NOT PULL THE FISHING LINE TOO
HARD AND THUS LOSE THE CATCH. IN ALLUSION TO JAPANESE
 MILITARY ADVENTURISM WHICH LED TO WORLD WAR II, HE
 EXPLAINED THAT JAPAN HAD MADE A HUGE MISTAKE IN THE
 PAST, AND PEOPLE HAD BEEN HURT. AS A RESULT, THEY
 WERE CAUTIOUS ABOUT JUMPING UP TWICE TO THE SAME
BAIT. THUS THERE WAS A NEED FOR NATIONAL CONSENSUS
ON DEFENSE EFFORTS, ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE GOJ INTENDED
TO INCREASE STEADILY ITS DEFENSE SPENDING. PM
 INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF JAPANESE PEOPLE REALIZING
 THAT THEY MUST MAKE EFFORTS TO DEFEND THEIR COUNTRY.
 TO THIS END, GOJ WOULD ACHIEVE THE LEVEL OUTLINED IN
THE DEFENSE PLAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. PM ADDED THAT
 BILATERAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ARE IMPORTANT NOT
 ONLY FOR THE US AND JAPAN BUT FOR ASIA AS A WHOLE,
 AND SAID THAT TO SECURE EFFECTIVE AND SMOOTH
 OPERATION OF THE MST, THE GOJ WAS NOW ENGAGED IN
 SHARING THE COSTS OF THE US MILITARY IN JAPAN.

8. FOLLOWING THE CONVERSATION REPORTED ABOVE, THE
 PRIME MIN INVITED ONLY SECDEF AND AMBASSADOR TO
 JOIN HIM, FOREIGN MIN AND CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY
 IN A MORE RESTRICTED MEETING WITHOUT AIDES. SUBSTANCE
 OF THIS MEETING WILL BE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE REPORT.

9. SECRETARY WEINBERGER HELD CONSULTATIONS WITH
 MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENSE ITO AT JDA FROM
 0930-1130 MARCH 27. IN COURSE OF WELCOMING SECDEF
 TO PERIODIC CONSULTATIONS, ITO MENTIONED THAT
US-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WAS IMPORTANT PILLAR

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OF FAR EAST PEACE AND STABILITY AND THAT HE APPRE-
CATED SECDEF'S EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN OUR BILATERAL
TIES. SECDEF AGREED WITH ITO AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT
HE COULD REPAY HIS HOSPITALITY BY WELCOMING HIM
TO WASHINGTON IN FALL, PERHAPS IN SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER
TIME FRAME. SUMMARY OF TOPIC OF DISCUSSIONS FOLLOWS:

A. GENEVA TALKS:

SECDEF ASSESSED GENEVA TALKS ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES AS "PROGRESSING WELL" BUT NOW IN RECESS UNTIL MAY (FORMAT IS TO ALTERNATE TWO MONTHS TALKS WITH TWO MONTHS RECESS). US HAS PLACED A DRAFT TREATY BEFORE SOVIETS WHICH INCLUDES PRESIDENT'S SUGGESTION PROPOSING REMOVAL OF ALL (SOME 300) IRBM SS-20S (WHICH ARE VERY MOBILE AND THEREBY PROTECTIBLE) AS WELL AS OLDER SS4S AND SS5S IN RETURN FOR NATO DECISION TO REFRAIN FROM DEPLOYING PERSHING II'S AND CRUISE MISSILES. ALL OF THESE SOVIET MISSILES ARE CAPABLE OF HITTING ANY EUROPEAN TARGET FROM EAST OF URALS. THEREFORE, THE RECENT SOVIET SUGGESTION THAT WE FREEZE DEPLOYMENTS NOW OFFERS NOTHING EXCEPT SOVIET RETENTION OF HIGH DEGREE OF SUPERIORITY IN THIS AREA. SOVIETS HAVE MADE COUNTER-PROPOSAL CONTEMPLATING LEAVING 300 SS-20S IN PLACE BUT NOT PROMISING BAN ON DEPLOYMENT EAST OF URALS FROM WHICH THESE MISSILES COULD REACH ANY ASIAN TARGET. SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS NOT MADE IN TREATY FORM AND THEY HAVE NOT FORMALLY REJECTED US PROPOSAL. MINISTER ITO ASKED WHETHER US POSITION REMAINED TO SEEK TNF DISMANTLING, NOT ONLY FOR EUROPE, BUT FOR ASIA AS WELL. SECDEF CONFIRMED THAT THIS REMAINED PRESIDENT'S POSITION. WITH REGARD TO STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATION (START), PRESIDENT'S GOAL REMAINS ACHIEVEMENT OF SUBSTANTIAL, VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN ORDER TO PERMIT MUTUAL DETERRENCE AT LOWER LEVELS. WHILE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE TO PROCEED WITH SUCH STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS, IT WILL DEPEND ON INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND REQUIRE PRIOR CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR NATO ALLIES. IN ANY CASE, NO DEFINITIVE DATE FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAS BEEN SET.

(B) US-PRC RELATIONS:

SECDEF EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT GOOD US-PRC RELATIONS WERE VERY IMPORTANT TO ASIAN PEACE AND STABILITY. AT SAME TIME, US HAD STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS TO TAIWAN WHICH WE MUST CAREFULLY FULFILL. HE EXPRESSED VIEW THAT PRC, EVEN IF BOTHERED BY IT, UNDERSTOOD THE US POSITION. US HAD CONCLUDED THAT ITS OBLIGATIONS TO TAIWAN ENTAILED CONTINUATION OF F5E CO-PRODUCTION BUT IT HAD TURNED DOWN PROVISION OF MORE ADVANCED F5G OR F-16/79 FIGHTERS. US WILL CONTINUE TO PRESENT THESE POINTS TO CHINESE AND HOPE FOR BROADER CONTACTS ON MANY FRONTS, INCLUDING DEFENSE, EVEN THOUGH WE DO NOT HAVE AN ALLIANCE. SECDEF SAID HE NOTED JDA STAFFER NISHIRO'S TRIP TO PRC WITH INTEREST AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT DOD AND JDA WOULD KEEP EACH OTHER INFORMED OF THEIR CONTACTS WITH PRC. MINISTER ITO OFFERED VIEW THAT STRONG US-PRC RELATION-

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 SHIP WAS IMPORTANT IN COPING WITH SOVIET THREAT,
 BUT THE RELATIONSHIP NOW SEEMED TO BE DETERIORATING
 OVER THE ISSUE OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN AND BREZHNEV
 WAS TRYING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT BY OFFERING OLIVE
 BRANCH OF SORTS TO PRC. HE ASKED SECDEF TO EVALUATE
 THIS SITUATION IN STRATEGIC CONTEXT. SECDEF SAID
 THAT WHILE HE WOULD DEFER TO SECRETARY OF STATE ON
 SUCH AN ISSUE, HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED THAT THE
 PRC EVALUATED THE BREZHNEV APPROACH IN THE SAME WAY
 AS WE DID--A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
 PERCEIVED COOLING IN US-PRC RELATIONS. US POLICY OF
 IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH PRC WAS A FIRM ONE, WITH
 THE USA INTERESTED IN CONTINUING TO DISCUSS WITH THE
 CHINESE WAYS TO ASSIST THEIR DEFENSE EFFORTS AND
 IN FOSTERING OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONS. HOWEVER,
 THE JS WILL CONTINUE TO FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS TO
 TAIWAN. BELIEVES THE PRC WILL RECOGNIZE THIS, AND
 DOES NOT THINK THIS SHOULD WEAKEN US-PRC TIES.
 THE PROBLEM SHOULD BECOME LESS ACUTE AS PRC PURSUES
 EFFORTS TO REUNIFY TAIWAN WITH THE MAINLAND.

(C) US-JAPAN DEFENSE ROLES:

(1) SECDEF REGARDED HIGHLY OUTCOME OF US-JAPAN
 SUMMIT MEETING LAST MAY IN COURSE OF WHICH PM
 SUZUKI MADE STATEMENT AT NATIONAL PRESS CLUB
 OUTLINING DEFENSE ROLES JAPAN COULD CONSTITUTIONALLY
 FULFILL:

- DEFENSE OF NATIONAL TERRITORY
- DEFENSE OF SURROUNDING SEAS, SKIES
- DEFENSE OF SEA LANES TO 1000 MILES.

SECDEF SAID THAT SUCH A DIVISION OF ROLES WOULD BE
 SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO OUR MUTUAL SECURITY
 BY PROVIDING ADDITIONAL PROTECTION AROUND JAPAN,
 WHICH WOULD ENABLE US TO INCREASE OUR PRESENCE IN
 AND SUPPLY ADDITIONAL PROTECTION TO THE IMPORTANT
 SEA LANES OF INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTHWEST ASIA.

SECDEF SUGGESTED THAT WORKING OUT DETAILS OF SUCH
 A DIVISION OF LABOR WOULD REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT
 BY BOTH SIDES AND MIGHT SUITABLY BE DISCUSSED AT
 NEXT SECURITY SUB-COMMITTEE MEETING IN HAWAII.

(2) MINISTER ITO ASKED WHETHER SECDEF WOULD OFFER
 ANY ADVICE TO JAPAN AS TO THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND
 EFFICIENT TYPE OF DEFENSE, GIVEN JAPAN'S STATUS
 AS MARITIME NATION AND ITS GEO-POLITICAL CIRCUM-

STANCES. SECDEF RESPONDED THAT, IN HIS VIEW, JAPAN
 WAS MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION. IMPROVED AIR DEFENSE,
 ANTI-SUBMARINE CAPABILITY, AND GROUND EQUIPMENT WERE
 ESSENTIAL AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE GIVEN PRIORITY.
 IN ADDITION, ACQUISITION OF A CAPABILITY OF DEFENDING
 SEA LANES UP TO 1,000 MILES FROM JAPAN WILL REQUIRE
 SOME ADDITIONAL EFFORT IN DIRECTIONS DIFFERENT FROM
 THOSE NOW BEING UNDERTAKEN. VMIN HARA OFFERED VIEW
 THAT JDA VIEWED DEFENSE OF SEAS UP TO 1,000 MILES
 AS INVOLVING PRIMARILY INCREASED ASW CAPABILITIES,
 SUCH AS MORE P3CS AND MISSILE-ARMED SHIPS, AND SAID
 JDA WAS DETERMINED TO PROCEED IN THAT DIRECTION.
 SECDEF SAID THAT AS ASW WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO
 UNDERTAKE WITHOUT CONTROL OF SKIES, IT WOULD BE
 NECESSARY TO CONSIDER FIGHTER COVER AND THAT US

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 SIDE HAD DEVELOPED DETAILED PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT
 WHICH IT COULD MAKE AVAILABLE TO GOJ.

(D) BUDGET:

TERMING IT THE MORE DIFFICULT PART OF MEETING, SECDEF SAID HE WISHED TO STATE FRANKLY AND PRIVATELY US CONCLUSIONS AS TO WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR JAPAN TO FULFILL DEFENSE ROLE OUTLINED BY PM. HE SAID US ANALYSIS DISCLOSED THAT AN APPROXIMATE 11-12 PERCENT IN REAL GROWTH IN DEFENSE BUDGET WOULD BE REQUIRED BETWEEN 1983-90 IN ORDER TO FURNISH JAPAN'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCES WITH THE STRENGTH NEEDED TO CARRY OUT THESE ROLES. ASSUMING THAT JAPAN'S ECONOMY HAD A REAL GROWTH RATE OF 4 1/2 PERCENT PER ANNUM, THE REQUIRED INCREASE IN THE JAPANESE DEFENSE EFFORT WOULD AMOUNT TO APPROXIMATELY 1.8 PERCENT OF GNP (AS OPPOSED TO TODAY'S 0.93 PERCENT). SECDEF RECOGNIZED FISCAL, ECONOMIC AND BUREAUCRATIC PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH AN INCREASE, BUT SAID SHOULD GOJ CONCLUDE THAT JAPAN'S FORCES REQUIRED THESE CAPABILITIES, JAPAN WOULD NOT BE ALONE IN MAKING SUCH A MAJOR BOOST IN SPENDING FOR DEFENSE. THE USG HAD INCREASED DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN REAL TERMS BY 11 PERCENT IN 1981; 12.7 PERCENT IN 1982; AND EXPECTED TO ACHIEVE 7.5 PERCENT PER ANNUM FROM 1983 TO 1987. SECDEF SUGGESTED THAT WHILE THE SSC WAS THE MOST SUITABLE FORUM FOR DISCUSSION OF SUCH PLANS, IF JDA SO DESIRED WE COULD FURNISH IT AT SUCH TIME WITH THE DOD ANALYSIS. USG WOULD CONTINUE TO AVOID COMMENTING PUBLICLY ON THE AMOUNT OF JAPANESE DEFENSE BUDGET IT DESIRED AND TO LIMIT ITSELF TO EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR DIFFICULT BUT ENCOURAGING STEP IN RIGHT DIRECTION TAKEN BY GOJ IN COMPILING JFY 1982 DEFENSE BUDGET. BOTH SIDES KNEW THAT WE NEEDED TO DO MORE TO SECURE THE BLESSINGS OF PEACE AND SECURITY FOR OUR PEOPLES.

MINISTEE ITO ACCEPTED SECDEF OFFER TO PROVIDE DETAILED ANALYSES AND VMIN HARA COMMENTED THAT DOCUMENT TO WHICH SECDEF REFERRED MAY HAVE BEEN BASIS OF DOD PRESENTATION AT LAST SUMMER'S SSC XIII. HARA REITERATED GOJ POLICY OF WORKING STEADILY TOWARDS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NDPO GOALS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND OF MAKING AN EVEN GREATER EFFORT IN THE FUTURE THAN UP TO NOW. HE NOTED THAT UNLIKE THE US, IN JAPAN A MAJORITY STILL DID NOT SUPPORT INCREASED DEFENSE SPENDING. ONLY ABOUT 20 PERCENT OF THOSE POLLED BACKED SUCH INCREASES, WHILE OVER 50 PERCENT FAVORED STATUS QUO, A FIGURE THAT COULD WELL GROW IF JAPAN'S FINANCIAL SITUATION WORSENER. HARA HEARD THAT WHAT THE US WAS PROPOSING COULD LEAD TO A COLLAPSE OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR GREATER DEFENSE SPENDING WHICH OPPOSITION PARTIES WOULD BE QUICK TO TURN TO THEIR ADVANTAGE AND WHICH COULD RESULT IN THE GROWTH OF ANTI-DEFENSE AND EVEN ANTI-JS FEELINGS. SECDEF RESPONDED THAT USG UNDERSTOOD DIFFICULTY OF EDUCATING PUBLIC OPINION AND THE DANGER OF MOVING FORWARD WITHOUT PUBLIC SUPPORT AND WAS PREPARED TO HELP INFORM THE PUBLIC ON WHY SUCH EFFORTS WERE NECESSARY. THE NATURE AND

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SIZE OF SOVIET THREAT IMPELLED US TO BOOST OUR DEFENSE SPENDING AND MERELY ACCEPTING THOSE SPENDING LEVELS SUPPORTED BY PUBLIC OPINION WOULD LEAD TO FORCES INCAPABLE OF COPING EFFECTIVELY WITH THE THREAT. AS CONSIDERABLE TIME WAS REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THESE ADDITIONAL CAPABILITIES, OUR ADVERSARIES WERE ABLE TO TO MAINTAIN AN IMBALANCE IN THEIR FAVOR, THEREBY CREATING AN EVEN MORE DANGEROUS SITUATION BECAUSE SOVIETS MIGHT BE LED TO THINK THEY COULD ACHIEVE THEIR AIMS AT AN ACCEPTABLE COST. IT WILL LIKELY TAKE UNTIL 1990 TO ACHIEVE CAPABILITIES WE BOTH NEED. THE LONGER WE DELAY, THE GREATER THE DANGER. SECDEF SAID HE WAS MAKING THESE POINTS NOT BECAUSE MINISTER ITO WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THEM, BUT IN ORDER TO PROVIDE HIM WITH AMMUNITION IN DEALING WITH PUBLIC.

SECDEF ASKED WHETHER JDA HAD REACHED ANY PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS ON THE 1983-1987 MID-TERM OPERATIONS ESTIMATE. VMIN HARA RESPONDED THAT THE JDA WAS STILL MAKING AN INTERNAL STUDY OF THE 1983-87 MTOE, IT HAD NOT YET COMPLETED ITS REVIEW, AND IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DIVULGE CONTENTS AT THIS POINT. NEXT STEP IN THE REVIEW WOULD BE FOR JDA TO SUBMIT MTOE DOCUMENT TO NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL AND DEFEND IT THERE AGAINST ANY CALLS FOR REVISION OR CHANGE. IN ANY CASE, GOJ HAD NO PLANS TO CHANGE ITS NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM OUTLINE AT THIS TIME.

(E) US-JAPAN DEFENSE COOPERATION:

- (1) JOINT PLANNING. MINISTER ITO NOTED THAT INITIAL DRAFT PLAN FOR DEFENSE OF JAPAN WAS COMPLETED LAST SUMMER AND WORK TO IMPROVE THIS PLAN WAS NOW PROGRESSING SMOOTHLY. HE EXPRESSED COMPLETE SATISFACTION WITH PROGRESS SO FAR, SAYING THAT JDA WOULD PROMOTE STUDY OF ADDITIONAL MEASURES (ESTABLISHMENT OF BILATERAL COORDINATION CENTER, COMMON OPERATIONAL PREPARATIONS, INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGES, ETC.) TO FURTHER US-JAPAN COMBINED OPERATIONS.
- (2) COMBINED EXERCISES. MINISTER ITO NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT US-JAPAN COMBINED EXERCISES HAD INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY IN RECENT YEARS DESPITE DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS. SINCE THESE EXERCISES ENABLED OUR FORCES TO OPERATE TOGETHER, ENHANCED CONFIDENCE AND SKILLS, IMPROVED SDF CAPABILITIES AND CONTRIBUTED TO MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, JDA WOULD ENCOURAGE THESE TO GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE.
- (3) FACILITATIVE ASSISTANCE. MINISTER ITO RECALLED THAT SCC XVIII HAD FORMALLY ENDORSED INAUGURATION OF STUDIES ON ASSISTANCE JAPAN MIGHT PROVIDE TO US IN CASE OF FAR EAST EMERGENCY, NOTED THAT THESE STUDIES WERE NOW UNDERWAY AND PROCEEDING SATISFACTORILY, AND SAID THEY CONSTITUTED A NEW ELEMENT IN THE STRENGTHENING OF OUR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.
- (4) DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. RECALLING DEFENSE MINISTER OMURA'S COMMENTS TO SECDEF LAST SUMMER, ITO SAID THAT JDA BASICALLY AGREED WITH US ABOUT THE NEED FOR MAKING DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY FLOW IN BOTH DIRECTIONS BUT THAT THE GOJ HAD A POLICY BANNING THE EXPORT OF WEAPONS OR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY. ITO SAID THAT, GIVEN THE SECURITY TREATY RELATIONSHIP, JDA

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 AND MOFA HAD BEEN STUDYING HOW TO DEAL WITH THIS
 ISSUE AND WHILE IT STILL REMAINED UNSOLVED AT THIS
 POINT, JDA WOULD DO ITS UTMOST TO REACH A POSITIVE
 CONCLUSION AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE.

(F) TECHNOLOGY LEAKAGE TO USSR:

SECDEF SAID THAT DOD FELT THAT VALUABLE DEFENSE
 RELATED TECHNOLOGY HAD FLOWED TO USSR BECAUSE US
 AND ALLIES IN THEIR COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS WITH
 THE USSR HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY CAREFUL WHEN
 AUTHORIZING SALES OF EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY TO
 MAKE SURE THAT SUCH ITEMS HAD NO MILITARY APPLICATION
 WHATSOEVER. SUCH TECHNOLOGY IS ACQUIRED DEVIOSLY AND
 ILLEGALLY BY THE USSR; IT IS FAIR TO POINT OUT THAT
 MANY WESTERN NATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN CAREFUL EITHER.
 IN TOKYO, FOR INSTANCE, SOVIETS MAINTAIN THEIR LARGEST
 OVERSEAS KGB STAFF, AND ARE USING IT TO ACQUIRE
 JAPANESE TECHNOLOGY AS WELL AS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERRED
 TO JAPAN BY OTHER WESTERN NATIONS. (FOR EXAMPLE, THE
 DRYDOCK WHICH THE SOVIETS PURCHASED A FEW YEARS AGO
 FROM THE ISHIKAWAJIMA-NARIMA SHIPBUILDING COMPANY
 SUPPOSEDLY FOR NON-MILITARY PURPOSES, IS NOW BEING PUT TO
 MILITARY USE. (SECDEF SHOWED TO ITO PHOTO OF SOVIET
 AIRCRAFT CARRIER MINSK IN DRYDOCK.)

10. MEDIA REACTION:

(A) WIDESPREAD AND PROMINENT MEDIA COVERAGE OF WEINBERGER
 VISIT BEGAN MARCH 26 WITH GENERALLY FACTUAL ACCOUNTS
 OF SECDEF COURTESY CALL ON JDA DIRGEN EARLIER SAME
 DAY. YOMIURI (3/26) PARTICULARLY NOTED SECDEF'S
 LINKING OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE EFFORTS WITH OVERALL
 WESTERN DETERRENT. EXTENSIVE REPORTING 3/26 AND 3/27
 ON JAPAN NATIONAL PRESS CLUB SPEECH EMPHASIZED SECDEF'S
 CALL FOR JAPAN TO INCREASE ITS DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
 TO POINT IT COULD FULFILL MISSION OF DEFENDING ITSELF
 AND ITS SEA LANES OUT TO 1000 MILES, AS STATED BY PM
 SUZUKI IN WASHINGTON LAST MAY, AND ALSO NOTED SECDEF'S
 ASSURANCE THAT US WOULD REMAIN A PACIFIC POWER AND DO
 AS MUCH AS IT COULD TO DEFEND PACIFIC-INDIAN OCEAN
 SEALANES. MARCH 27 JDA CONSULTATIONS WERE FULLY AND
 ACCURATELY REPORTED SAME DAY, PRESUMABLY ON BASIS
 OF JDA PRESS BRIEFINGS.

(B) PRESS 3/28 AND 29 REPORTED IN GENERALLY ACCURATE
 DETAIL GIST OF DISCUSSIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER
 DESCRIBED ABOVE. IN ADDITION, PAPERS NOTED PM'S
 CHARACTERIZATION OF SECDEF AS PERSON MOST TRUSTED BY
 PRESIDENT, AND PM'S REQUEST (SEPTEL) THAT SECDEF
 CONVEY FOUR POINTS TO PRESIDENT: 1) HIS AGREEMENT
 THAT WEST'S MILITARY SUPERIORITY VIS-A-VIS THE USSR
 WILL DETER WAR AND HELP DISARMAMENT TALKS, AND HIS
 ENCOJAGEMENT OF THE US TO EXERCISE LEADERSHIP TO
 MAINTAIN WESTERN SOLIDARITY; 2) HIS POSITION THAT IN
 THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND ITS
 PROBLEMS IN POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN, JAPAN IS PREPARED
 TO STRENGTHEN ITS ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST THE USSR
 IF NEED BE; 3) THE NEED TO KEEP CHINA CLOSE TO THE
 WESTERN CAMP AND NOT DRIVE IT BACK TOWARD THE USSR;
 AND 4) THE NEED FOR JAPAN-US AND JAPAN-EC TRADE PROBLEMS
 TO BE RESOLVED THROUGH TALKS AND NOT BE ALLOWED TO

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 BECOME POLITICAL PROBLEMS WHICH COULD THREATEN THE WEST'S SOLIDARITY. IN RESPONSE SECRETARY WEINBERGER REPORTEDLY STATED HIS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE PM'S POINTS; EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT HE TOOK TO BE THE PM'S CONCERNS REGARDING US RELATIONS WITH CHINA, NOTED THE DIFFICULTY OF THE ISSUE, AND MENTIONED THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT AS BASIS FOR US RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN. SECDEF ALSO REPORTEDLY ADDRESSED TRADE ISSUE, SAYING US WAS NOT TRYING TO ACHIEVE BALANCE ALL AT ONCE, AND, REGARDING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, EXPRESSED HOPE THAT TWO-WAY EXCHANGE COULD BE ESTABLISHED. PRIME MINISTER REPORTEDLY REPLIED THAT GOJ WAS STUDYING TECHNOLOGY ISSUE IN CONTEXT OF BILATERAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND THAT HE HOPED CONCLUSION WOULD SOON BE REACHED. PRESS ALSO REPORTED SECDEF DELIVERED PERSONAL LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PRIME MINISTER, GIST OF WHICH WAS THAT PRESIDENT GREATLY APPRECIATED JFY 82 DEFENSE BUDGET INCREASE, BUT THAT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION REQUIRED EVEN GREATER DEFENSE EFFORTS BY US AND JAPAN.

(C) EDITORIALS AND COMMENTARY MARCH 27, 28 AND 29 GENERALLY FOCUSED ON SECDEF REQUESTS REGARDING JAPANESE DEFENSE OF 1000 MILE SEA LANES, A SUBJECT WHICH PROMISES TO ATTRACT CONTINUING MEDIA ATTENTION. SANKEI (3/28) EDITORIAL NOTED SUCH REQUESTS HAD BEEN MADE BY USG BEFORE, BUT NOT AS AUTHORITATIVELY. NIHON KEIZAI (3/27) NOTED POSSIBLE DIFFERENCE OF INTERPRETATION BETWEEN US AND JAPAN ON NATURE OF JAPANESE COMMITMENT TO DEFEND SEA LANES: PAPER CLAIMED US REGARDS IT AS A "PUBLIC PROMISE" WHILE GOJ HAS SAID IT WAS NOT. SANKEI NOTED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR JAPAN TO TAKE ON SEALANE ROLE WITH EQUIPMENT PROVIDED FOR BY NPDO, BUT THAT SUCH A ROLE WAS APPROPRIATE GIVEN JAPAN'S STRONG ECONOMIC POWER AND NEED TO MAINTAIN GOOD JAPAN-US RELATIONS AND SAID THAT ACHIEVEMENT OF NDPO LEVELS SHOULD BE FURTHER ACCELERATED. IN SEPARATE COMMENTARY, PAPER SUGGESTED BILATERAL POLITICAL PROBLEM WOULD DEVELOP OVER HOW TO ACHIEVE SEA LANES ROLE UNDER 1981 MTDE. ASAHI CAUTIONED THAT DEFENSE OF SEA LANES WAS ORIGINALLY UNIFORMED SDF PLAN AND THAT, ALTHOUGH IT WAS ADVANCED BY PM IN WASHINGTON LAST MAY, IT HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL AND DID NOT REFLECT A CONSENSUS OF VIEWS IN JAPAN: THIS IT WAS NOT CORRECT TO CONSIDER PM'S SEALANES STATEMENT A PUBLIC PROMISE. EDITORIAL EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ACTING AS SUPPLEMENT TO US STRATEGT IN NORTHWEST ASIA WOULD RUN COUNTER TO JAPAN'S "EXCLUSIVELY DEFENSIVE" POLICY WHICH PM SHOULD REAFFIRM.

11. AT MARCH 28 PRIVATE BREAKFAST MEETING, LEADING LDP DIET MEMBERS IN DEFENSE (INCLUDING FORMER MINISTERS OF STATE FOR DEFENSE SAKATA, MIHARA AND HOSODA) HEARD DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SOVIET THREAT FROM SECDEF. CHAIRMAN OF LDP RESEARCH COUNCIL ON SECURITY ASAO MIHARA TOLD SECDEF THAT LDP WAS DOING ITS BEST TO PREVENT OPPOSITION PARTIES FROM CONVERTING ANTI-NUCLEAR PRO-ARMS CONTROL MOVEMENT IN JAPAN INTO ANTI-AMERICAN CAMPAIGN AND HOPED THAT USA, BY TAKING

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THE INITIATIVE, WOULD KEEP SOVIETS AND THEIR FRIENDS FROM EXPLOITING THE ISSUE. MIHARA ALSO NOTED THAT IN JAPAN, UNLIKE US, TWO OPPOSITION PARTIES (THE SOCIALISTS AND COMMUNISTS) AND THE LARGEST LABOR ORGANIZATION (SOHYO) WERE ABSOLUTELY OPPOSED TO ANY IMPROVEMENTS WHATSOEVER IN JAPAN'S DEFENSE POSTURE AND ADOPTED IN THE DIET A POLICY OF TOTAL CONFRONTATION WITH REGARD TO DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS. GIVEN FACT THAT JCP AND JSP CONTROLLED 130 OUT OF 510 SEATS IN LOWER HOUSE AND 50 OUT OF 252 SEATS IN UPPER HOUSE, THEY PREVENTED GOJ FROM MOVING AS FAST AS IT SHOULD ON DEFENSE BY BLOCKING A PUBLIC CONSENSUS ON THE NEED FOR AN EXPANDED INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ROLE FOR JAPAN. SECDEF

RECOGNIZED THAT ANTI-NUKE MOVEMENTS WERE SINCERELY MOTIVATED, BUT TERMED THEIR CALL FOR UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT DANGEROUS. HE REAFFIRMED PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE WEAPONS OF LAST NOVEMBER AND, WITH REGARD TO STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SAID USA WISHED TO LOWER LEVEL OF MUTUAL DETERRENCE THROUGH SUBSTANTIAL AND VERIFIABLE ARMS LIMITATIONS. ON NEED FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CONTROVERSIAL POLICIES, SECDEF OBSERVED THAT THIS HAD BEEN LONGSTANDING PROBLEM OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES, BUT SAID ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WAS MOULDING OF PUBLIC OPINION. HE SAID THAT IN VIEW OF TIME CONSTRAINTS AND THREAT FACING US, WE ALL, JAPAN INCLUDED, NEEDED TO DO MORE, EVEN IF IT HAD DIFFICULTIES WITH OPPOSITION PARTIES, AS US WAS SIMPLY UNABLE TO CARRY BURDEN ALONE. SECDEF

ALSO SPENT AN HOUR WITH LEADING JAPANESE DEFENSE COMMENTATORS ON MARCH 26 DURING WHICH HE ANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT US DEFENSE POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES IN ASIA (SEE TOKYO 5134 FOR DETAILS).

12. COMMENT: SECDEF'S FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO JAPAN ENABLED USG TO UNDERLINE TO GOJ OUR INTEREST IN JAPAN'S DEFENSE EFFORTS AT A CRUCIAL TIME--BEFORE NEXT DEFENSE PLAN (MTOE) IS COMPLETED AND WELL BEFORE INTER-MINISTERIAL NEGOTIATIONS FOR NEXT YEAR'S BUDGET LEVELS BEGIN. THIS SECRETARY WEINBERGER MANAGED TO DO AT HIGHEST LEVELS AND IN MANNER WHICH WILL MOVE JAPANESE THINKING AWAY FROM NEBULOUS GOALS (SUCH AS THOSE SET FORTH IN NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM OUTLINE) AND FINANCIAL BALANCING TOWARDS MORE RATIONAL AND REALISTIC MATCHING OF RESOURCE OUTLAY WITH MISSION. SECRETARY WAS BLUNT AND DIRECT IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH HIS COUNTERPART AND ALSO MADE PM AND FOREIGN MINISTER AWARE THAT USG WAS CAREFULLY WATCHING JAPAN'S PERFORMANCE. HIS PUBLIC SPEECH HERE WAS UPBEAT AND SERVED TO REASSURE HIS AUDIENCE ABOUT US COMMITMENTS IN ASIA. THE VISITS TO ASDF BASE AND MSDF SHIP BOOSTED MORALE OF THESE SERVICES AS DID HIS VISIT TO 5TH AF HQ AND USAF UNITS AT YOKOTA. WHILE WE CANNOT ASSESS AT THIS POINT HOW WIDELY HIS CONFIDENTIAL, PRIVATE REMARKS ON LEVEL OF DEFENSE SPENDING NEEDED BY JAPAN THROUGH DECADE OF 1980S MAY SPREAD AND BE MISUSED, WE SEE VISIT AS DEFINITE PLUS FOR OUR EFFORTS HERE TO MOVE JAPAN IN RIGHT DIRECTION.

13. THIS MESSAGE PREPARED BY EMBASSY AND USFJ.

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