

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

30 October 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

SUBJECT : Cuba/Central America Memorandum for the President: Update

1. Last week the Interagency Group met a number of times to work out an agreed draft memorandum for the President. On Saturday, 24 October, we met for many hours in McFarlane's office at State and reached nearly complete consensus. (S)

2. The following Tuesday, 27 October, a "Summary Memorandum for the President" drafted by Assistant Secretary Enders, was circulated for comment. To the surprise of most participants, that draft moved back toward vagueness and ambiguity on several of the key issues--perhaps because Enders had not participated in meetings of the previous week. At a rather intensive meeting of the Group on Tuesday evening, [redacted] said, for example, "I have read through 17 drafts of the interagency paper, and I find this 15-page Summary impossible to understand or follow." [redacted]

3. On 28 October another draft was circulated and led to the attached comments and response to State of 29 October, jointly agreed upon and signed by Messrs. [redacted]

Significant issues which must be resolved by the NSC meeting:

4. The CIA comment of 29 October informs State and Defense that we expect Cuba, Nicaragua, and Central American guerrilla groups to move quickly and preemptively in the next several months to strengthen Nicaragua and help the Salvadoran guerrillas and to prevent the March 1982 elections. [redacted]

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6. The State paper (28 October draft) failed to provide this assurance because it conditioned any US military action on a Nicaraguan challenge of a multinational ultimatum that would tell Nicaragua "not to import additional heavy weapons or Cuban forces".

7. This is a multinational ultimatum which would be hard to get, but it would, in any case, provide no basis for action for months to come because only after the passage of time could one decide whether or not Nicaragua had violated the ultimatum by importing, for example, an additional 2,000, 4,000, or 6,000 Cuban troops. [redacted] 25X1

8. Therefore, CIA has said that the ultimatum must also include the condition that Nicaragua "must terminate all help for destabilization of other countries", i.e., it must stop subverting subversion. This could be acted on within two to three weeks because we have the means to verify whether or not Nicaragua is continuing to export subversion, and this condition also provides a reasonable basis for other Latin American countries to take action against an aggressive government. [redacted] 25X1

9. Defense agrees with this in principle, though Secretary Weinberger must obtain clear-cut commitment about the operational implications of this from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Certainly Dr. Ikle and others at Defense share the above views. [redacted] 25X1

10. Second Issue -- Defense agrees that the US should give weapons and economic support to anti-Cuban guerrilla forces in Africa (Ethiopia, Mozambique, etc.). State continues to delete this obvious, risk-free pressure tactic. [redacted] 25X1

11. The third major difference with State--where Defense also agrees with us--is that we feel there must be a much more active political communications strategy here and abroad which emphasizes the moderate groups and reforms in El Salvador, tells the truth about repression in Nicaragua and its current export of subversion and which gives visibility to the cumulative number of victims caused by Cuban-backed terrorism and repressive regimes in Africa and Latin America. The Enders draft recommended a "low-key" approach on these themes. [redacted] 25X1

12. Also attached is the brief update paper on Nicaragua you wanted. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

29 October 1981

TO: <u>Defense via Dr. Ikle</u>	<u>State via Mr. McFarlane</u>
Dr. Ikle	Judge Clark
Gen. Gorman	Mr. McFarlane
Asst. Secy. West	Mr. Burt
Dep. Asst. Secy. Sanchez	Mr. Bremer
	Messrs. Wolfowitz/Roche

SUBJECT: Comments on "Cuba/Central America" Summary for the President
(Draft of 1200 noon, 28 October 1981)

CIA has a wide array of information suggesting that Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Central American guerrilla groups will move quickly and preemptively in the next months to:


- (1) reinforce the Nicaraguan Government with Cuban or other troops introduced in a deceptive way--such as approximately 225 Cuban "special troops" who arrived in recent weeks on airplanes along with teachers;
- (2) provide jet aircraft and additional amounts of other heavy weapons to Nicaragua which could permit it to intimidate or threaten Honduras and Costa Rica if they permit any "anti-Nicaraguan activities" on their soil;
- (3) strengthen guerrilla/terrorist groups in El Salvador (the Sandinistas have called for volunteers to fight there), Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica--for expanded military/terrorist assaults in January-March 1982; this might well occur simultaneously at different levels of violence in the various countries for both military and political purposes--such as convincing Mexico and the Socialist International (meeting in Caracas in February 1982) and the US Congress that the guerrillas will eventually win and further help to the threatened government is hopeless or too costly.

In the light of this information, years of Cuban success in exporting subversion, Castro's well-established understanding of propaganda and the US political process and his tendency toward the fait accompli, the following suggestions are made concerning the latest State draft (28 October 1981).



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
Att: Proposed Text Changes



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NICARAGUA--THE CURRENT SITUATION AND PROBABLE TRENDS*

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*This analytic paper was written at the request of the DCI by the NIO/LA with A/NIO/LA input and benefited from information provided by ALA/MCD staff. It has not yet been formally coordinated with NFAC/ALA/MCD, but that step is now being taken. It is intended as background for a forthcoming NSC meeting.

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28 October 1981

NICARAGUA--THE CURRENT SITUATION AND PROBABLE TRENDSSummary

The Marxist-Leninist Directorate is in virtually complete control of Nicaragua. It leads a Cuban/Soviet Bloc-trained secret police, a new army of 19,000-24,000 with ever increasing amounts of tanks, other heavy weapons, and a variety of political mass organizations.

Moderate groups still exist. Despite a recent upsurge in the repression which began in 1979 and the recent arrest of democratic party and business leaders, the five democratic parties, two non-communist trade union federations (35,000 members), business associations (COSEP has 75,000 members), organized Indian communities, and the popular Catholic Church could--with outside help--become even more effective as a political opposition and source of support for anti-Sandinista liberation groups.

Presently about 2,000 Cuban military and police personnel are in Nicaragua among a total Cuban presence of about 6,400. The recent introduction of 250 or more Cuban Ministry of Interior "special troops", in a deceptive way aboard airplanes carrying the well-publicized groups of Cuban teachers to Nicaragua, is an ominous portent of likely additional Cuban troops and deployment. This is especially true when combined with indications that Cuba or some other entity may provide jet fighter aircraft in the near future. Nicaraguan jet fighter pilots are due back this month; air fields are being prepared; 22 MIG-21s arrived in Cuba, the crates then moved to Holguin Airfield (PHOTINT 27 Oct.) to which 114 new special Soviet advisers are also being sent (SIGINT 24 Sept.). There is also a high level of Cuban military activity at key airfields, testing of SAM sites and the like which could suggest testing, concern about US reaction to Soviet moves in Poland or concern about US reaction to a Cuban donation of jet fighter planes to Nicaragua in the near future.

A variety of information suggests that Cuba, Nicaragua, and the guerrilla force will move in the next months to increase their strength and accelerate violence in the target countries. Therefore, unless the US prevents the deployment of additional Cuban troops and/or jet fighter aircraft, it may not be possible to obtain Honduran and Costa Rican cooperation for special activities needed to turn back the Nicaraguan export of subversion and increase the prospects for the moderate groups to take power in Nicaragua. Failure to act soon will mean a considerably increased probability of communist success in all of Central America within 2-3 years.

I. The Sandinista Directorate and its External Activities and Support

The main institutional elements of the coercive apparatus already built by the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista Directorate since July 1979 are: the new secret police, a strong new army, political mass organizations of the usual totalitarian kind, and a significant Cuban and other foreign communist and radical Arab presence (see Appendix A for an overview). The steady buildup of the Sandinista military-security forces is evident from these facts:

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- current strength of the security forces, 19,000-24,000
- about 25 tanks there. . . Nicaragua claims 40 and expects 80 more for a total of 105-120 in 1982
- massive Cuban/Soviet air-sea shipment of weapons included more than 435 flights and more than 40 shiploads in about 12 months
- 16 new military installations have been built and the 9 from Somoza days have been expanded
- runways to accommodate jet fighters are being expanded at three airfields while Bulgaria provides pilot training and new MIGs arrive in Cuba
- Soviet tank ferries have been practicing as has a new Nicaraguan airborne unit

The Sandinista repression of the democratic groups, including those who joined to overthrow Somoza, began in August 1979 and has continued at an increasing pace since then (see Appendix B for a chronology of repression since 1979). The Directorate has tried to walk the path of deceptive commitment to "pluralism" in order to disarm its potential domestic opponents and mislead the international community--especially the US--long enough to consolidate power and obtain large amounts of international economic assistance. This strategem has been used by most new communist movements (Hitler called it Gleichshaltung) and was precisely the technique used by Castro in Cuba from 1959-1961 when he shifted from saying he was for "Jeffersonian Democracy" and revealed that he had "always been a Marxist-Leninist". The current continuation of the deception strategy is the Directorate's denial that it provides help to armed guerrillas in the region.

In fact, a recent, excellent NFAC report summarized a wide array of Nicaraguan actions on behalf of the violent left in Central America including*:

- transshipment of arms, funds, guerrilla command and control, communications-sending and intercepting
- training of terrorists/guerrillas from El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, etc.
- covert action, including attempts to target terrorist operations and Nicaraguan incursions in Honduras and attempts to penetrate Honduran/Costa Rican political parties and other groups through bribery and persuasion
- calls for "volunteers" to fight in El Salvador and apparent preparations to send additional Nicaraguan or other Latin American guerrillas into nearby countries.

Despite the Enders ultimatum of mid-August 1981, there has been no decrease in the level or pace of these subversive and aggressive actions by Nicaragua. Nor has there been any positive response to the US request that Nicaragua

*NFAC, Nicaraguan Support for Central American Revolutionaries, 20 October 1981

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"re-export" some of its new tanks or the US proposal that both sides refrain for some weeks from hostile public statements. In fact, shortly after the August 1981 Enders mission and the subsequent trip of a Sandinista leader to Libya, an ever-increasing torrent of anti-US statements and propaganda began. This included the visit of Philip Agee in mid-October, his public call for "the Nicaraguan people" to burn the US Embassy and take the US diplomats hostage "as in Iran" and reported rehearsals for just such a possible embassy takeover by a special Cuban police unit which works with the Nicaraguan police. Among recent hostile statements by Sandinista Directorate members are the following:

- Daniel Ortega at the UN blamed the US for most of the world's problems, accused the US of 200 instances of "interventionism" in Central America and the Caribbean, and hinted at possible repudiation of the Nicaraguan (and other LDC) debt to US banks (US-UN mission cable, 8 Oct. 81)
- Daniel Ortega also alleged the "reemergence of a warlike policy in the US" (FBIS, 23 Oct. 81).
- Bayardo Arce on 16 September said to a US Embassy official, "When will you Americans ever understand that nothing and no one will prevent us from helping our fellow guerrillas in Central America?" (Managua Embassy cable, 17 Sept. 81)
- Bayardo Arce replied to US charges about the Nicaraguan export of subversion that Washington "lies" and that Nicaragua's fate is sealed and its rifles must be cocked" (FBIS, 14 Oct. 81).

In addition to the military/secret police type of help from Cuba and other Soviet partners, the Sandinista Directorate also has obtained other important international support:

- from the Soviet Bloc--funds (\$110M), diplomatic and propaganda support
- from Libya and various Palestinian terrorist formations--military training, funds (\$100M+), weapons
- from Mexico (\$260 M) and the Socialist International--funds, training, immensely important propaganda help
- from many democratic nations funds (\$50M+) and diplomatic support
- from international financial institutions to which the US is a heavy contributor--major financial support (\$120M+)

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Sources of Financial Support for Nicaragua Since the Sandinista Victory, July 1979
(\$ Million)

	Current ^a	Cumulative to Date ^b
<u>Democratic Nations</u>	\$52	\$500
<u>International Financial Institutions (IADB, IBRD)</u>	\$120	\$320+
<u>Mexico</u>	\$260	\$350
<u>OPEC</u>	\$18	?
<u>Soviet Bloc</u>	\$110	\$110
<u>Radical Arabs (Libya +)</u>	\$100+	\$100+
Totals	\$660	\$1,390

Sources: a - CIA, OER report of 25 September 1981 and another report on Soviet Bloc aid

b - Estimate by Amb. Middendorf [redacted] (summer 1981)

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Since Libya is now experiencing cash flow problems due to low oil prices and the Soviet Bloc aid is mostly in the form of credits (as is some of the other), the above data makes it clear that the US could try to persuade other democratic nations, the international financial institutions, and Mexico to cut off all further economic aid until Nicaragua fulfills two conditions-- ends the export of subversion and removes all Cuban military/police forces.

II. The Moderate Groups

Despite the recent increase in Sandinista repression and the arrest of key leaders from the democratic parties and business federations, it is clear that the moderate groups still exist and encompass (see Appendix C):

- five political parties, including the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN) with a good popular base, led by Robelo who just had his passport taken;
- two trade union federations with about 35,000 members--one is supported by Venezuela and the International Christian Democratic Trade Union movement and the other (CUS) by the AFL-CIO through the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD);
- six business/professional organizations united in one group--COSEP-- with about 75,000 members (up from 10,000 in 1978) with support from private sector groups in Venezuela, Mexico, and other countries along with some of the US AID funds for projects which they administer such as producer cooperatives;

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- the Catholic Church with strong popular support--growing since the revolution due to its functioning as a symbol of opposition to communist dictatorship and the strength of the leader, Archbishop Obando y Bravo;
- the 150,000 protestant, English-speaking, Atlantic Coast Indians whose strong family and religious orientation has produced opposition to the emerging communist state, as already expressed by massive civil disobedience in the summer of 1980;
- the free media--one newspaper and 19 radio stations which have a large and growing audience.

Political influence is hard to measure in any context, but especially in dictatorships where the usual indicators such as public opinion polls, popular votes, or legislative outcomes are missing or likely to be misleading. What is the possible current role of these moderate groups which since June 1981 have more and more established an informal network of shared views, information and tactical action? At present they cannot accomplish the following:

- overthrow the Directorate without major external help;
- prevent the Directorate from exporting subversion;
- prevent the Directorate from bringing in ever larger numbers of Cuban/Soviet Bloc/anti-Western-troops, teachers, advisers, aircraft, weapons, etc.;
- redirect the foreign policy of the Directorate toward real cooperation with its neighbors and away from the Soviet/Cuban axis.

However, the moderate groups can accomplish the following:

- they can provide a favorable environment and a wide variety of support for external and internally-based anti-Sandinista and anti-Somoza liberation groups, both political and paramilitary;
- they can act in economic, political, and symbolic ways to distract and weaken the Sandinista regime and partially prevent it from doing more to export subversion and crush any future paramilitary or liberation movements;
- their continued existence and opposition to communism provides the most dramatic contrast to the lies and propaganda of the Sandinistas in the international arenas--especially among the Latin American and European democracies where the fate of the moderate groups will make visible what awaits other democratic forces if Central America becomes communist.

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There are two quite different immediate dangers facing these groups. One is the mounting of a large scale, violent campaign of repression (probably backed and directed by Cuban troops and secret police much as the Soviet/Cuban apparatus worked in Ethiopia in 1977-78). This could so terrorize and decimate the party, union, business groups and Church moderates that their institutions fall apart. This is possible but not probable until after a revolutionary victory in El Salvador because such a terror campaign in Nicaragua might turn Mexico and other non-communist supporters of the guerrillas into advocates for the threatened governments.

The other more proximate threat to the remaining effectiveness of the moderate groups is that the anti-Sandinista struggle outside Nicaragua falls under the control of Somocista elements backed by Argentina and that this prevents the emergence of a visible, effective anti-communist and anti-Somocista Third Force movement. The impact of a Somocista/Argentina led external movement as the dominant or apparently dominant element in a US-backed or approved anti-Sandinista coalition could well be the massive demoralization of the moderate leaders and groups who would simply not be willing to take the immense personal risks to help such a movement and who would see Somocista dominance as a return to a situation that they opposed for 20 years. Their response might well be to simply give up any hope for a democratic future and either leave Nicaragua or simply accommodate to the Sandinistas in silence.

Although historic analogies are never completely appropriate, the emotional impact of the Somocista-Argentina coalition might be compared with the impact on the democratic internal French resistance in World War II if the allies had chosen not DeGaulle but, rather, some former Vichy collaborators as the external leaders and Francoist Spain as the preferred or only source of paramilitary training and support.

Moderate leaders from Nicaragua have stated that there are 3,000 to 8,000 able-bodied persons who could be available in a short time to carry out political and paramilitary functions from external bases provided that the leadership and authority clearly rested with genuinely democratic individuals who were not compromised by extensive collaboration with Somoza or the Sandinistas. To date, the political action and paramilitary potential of the moderate groups has not really been tested or examined because the US Government has apparently kept a distance from all the paramilitary groups--whether democratic-led or pro-Somoza. As a result, it appears that only the pro-Somoza elements have the will and capacity to take paramilitary steps because so far they have been the most active and have received financial support from friends and other governments. This supposedly greater potential of the pro-Somoza groups may, however, be far more apparent than real once the US were to actively work to build up moderate-led organizations.

III. Groups Associated with the Somoza Regime

Quite clearly it would be misleading to label every member of Somoza's army and government as a "Somocista" in the current situation and thereby exclude them from participation or cooperation with the moderate groups. Since the Sandinista

victory, press reports estimate that about 100,000-150,000 Nicaraguans have left the country. Among these, NFAC currently identifies about 6,000 as "Somocista exiles", meaning they actively seek a restoration of the Somoza-type network and governing system.

These Somocista exiles are described as mostly unorganized, but they do contribute funds and political support to the Somocista paramilitary groups which are estimated to have a total membership of about 1,100 based in Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. Among these, NFAC estimates that 500 in Honduras are receiving support and training from Argentina while the rest have not yet obtained foreign support.

There may be a useful role for these Somocista paramilitary groups in the entire range of possible future operations to liberate Nicaragua. Nevertheless, it is clear that the more visible and prominent they become, the less support will be available from the moderate groups in the region and from democratic governments, trade unions, political parties, media in Europe and Latin America. It is highly likely that the Sandinistas could even turn the defeat of a Somocista-led paramilitary operation into further political and economic gains in the US, Latin America and Europe.

IV. Conclusion: Probable Trends

Cuba seems confident that barring an open US invasion of Nicaragua or Cuba, its current political-paramilitary strategy can be successful in bringing Central America under communist governments. Cuba also wants to assure demoralizing setbacks for the US which would help their Soviet partners in the Persian Gulf and Europe.

Therefore, until US policy leads to countermeasures, Cuba will probably increase its support to all the extreme left groups in Central America. This is likely to occur at a faster rate in order to give the Nicaraguan regime more time to consolidate its position and to take advantage of the current momentum favoring the guerrillas on the ground and in the international and Western public opinion arenas.

In addition, it is highly probable that Panama and Belize will be the focus for a Cuban-led subversion effort which might employ Nicaragua or Grenada as agents. Cuban military help will be given to the Sandinistas at whatever level needed--including the use of troops--unless this poses a serious risk of confrontation with US forces. Neither Cuba nor Nicaragua will be deterred by US rhetoric--only by effective actions taken by the US and friendly governments.

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28 October 1981

NICARAGUA

EXTREME LEFT

<u>Component</u>	<u>Resources/Strength</u>
Sandinista Directorate-the Marxist/Leninist Leadership	9 persons chosen in Havana, March 1979
Police/security forces	8,000
Army (active duty troops & militia reservists)	Estimated 19,000-24,000 and growing
Militia	40,000 (but many untrained)
Government bureaucracy	Est. 80% of <u>government</u> employees support Sandinistas
Media - 90% of print & electronic	However, circulation of free newspapers is highest
Sandinista Labor Confederation (CST)	Claims 160,000 +
∞ Other Sandinista mass organizations (Sandinista defense committees, youth groups)	Can put 50,000 in the streets
Communist-oriented Labor Federation (CGT-I)	15,000
3 FSLN-aligned political parties	Est. 10,000 members
Foreign communist assets in Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Major Cuban troop reinforcement capacity - Nearly 2,000 Cubans in military, secret police functions - Soviet helicopters (two or more) flown by Soviet military personnel - Special Cuban troops, perhaps 250 - Approximately 25 Soviet tanks - SA-7, other air defense weapons - We expect Nicaragua to receive MIGs in near future

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Examples of Sandinista Repression-1979 to Present

- 14 November 1979 - Interior Minister Borge, in press conference, admits abuses, including torture, under Sandinista rule.
- 25 January 1980 - Security forces close down newspaper "El Pueblo"; Bayardo Arce warns that other media could receive "same medicine".
- April 1980 - FSLN unilaterally changes composition of Council of State, giving itself a majority, moderates Robelo & Mrs. Pedro Chamorro resign in protest.
- 23 August 1980 - Violating an agreement with the OAS and private sector, Sandinistas unilaterally announce "elections to improve the revolutionary government" will not be held until 1985.
- 27 August 1980 - Sandinista-controlled Council of State issues three decrees that greatly constrain the media and proscribe activity relating to the promised 1985 elections.
- 7 November 1980 - Regime forbids opposition Democratic Movement Party political rally.
- 17 November 1980 - Sandinistas pull off sophisticated entrapment plan, kill prominent businessman and arrest others for anti-regime plotting.
- 10 February 1981 - Government occupies and closes down the offices of Human Rights Committee in Managua; subsequently allows it to reopen (after international outcry).
- 13 February 1981 - Sandinista mob attacks persons assembled at airport to greet returning human rights activist.
- 10 March 1981 - Sandinista mobs invade national headquarters of Democratic Movement Party; police refuse to intervene.
- 7 July 1981 - Managua Archbishop prohibited from delivering traditional Sunday sermons on TV. after he had said Nicaragua is moving toward totalitarianism.
- 10 July 1981 - Independent newspaper, LaPrensa, closed down for 48 hours.
- 19 July 1981 - FSLN issues a series of punitive decrees aimed at intimidating the opposition and extending state control over the economy.
- 9 September 1981 - Government declaration of "social and economic emergency" bans labor strikes and further restricts freedom of press and of expression.
- 21 October 1981 - Four business leaders and several extreme leftists arrested by security forces for criticizing the regime.
- 25 October 1981 - Sandinista mobs attack the home of major opposition leader.
- 26 October 1981 - Four democratic political leaders have their passports taken and are in detention (Washington Post, 10/27)

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NICARAGUA

MODERATES

<u>Component</u>	<u>Resources/Numbers</u>	<u>Comment</u>
Five democratic parties	Claim loyalty of many in FSLN bureaucracy. MDN has a major popular following.	MDN party would be a challenger in open election; leader arrested (10/26)
Two major non-communist union federations	Estimates 35,000 membership	Surviving but under harsh pressure
Most of the Catholic Church hierarchy	Strong leadership; spiritual leadership of 90+% of populace	Not yet pressured as much as other sectors
One newspaper, 19 radio stations	<u>La Prensa</u> editor Chamorro is one of society's most prestigious figures	Harassment increasing
Atlantic Coast Indian communities, English-speaking and Protestant	Total about 150,000; virtually all distrust regime; 2,000-3,000 have fled to Honduras	Have shown willingness to oppose Sandinistas, Cuban advisers
Virtually all business & professionals organized in COSEP	75,000+ members in four main federations & small business cooperatives (up from about 10,000 in 1978)	Nationalistic, generally well-disposed toward US
A few, small paramilitary forces based in Honduras & Costa Rica	Unknown at present	Denunciation of communist trends on 19 October followed by arrest of four main leaders on 21 October; other strong leaders exist

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