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NIO/LA
21 December 1982

NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR

FROM: NIO/LA

SUBJECT: Possible subjects for your meeting with Judge Clark,
22 December 1982Suriname:

In my view, the current Administration has experienced the first new communist success with the 8 December actions of the Suriname military dictator, Bouterse, in murdering the democratic labor, political and other opposition leaders. Right now the US Government and media seem to be deceived about what has occurred just as following the April 1978 communist coup in Afghanistan, the New York Times dismissed it as a "Cabal in Kabul."

You will recall my August 1982 Memorandum which summarized the intelligence on Cuban plotting with the military dictator Bouterse as follows:

- Bouterse made a secret visit to Cuba in May 1982;
- Bouterse, however, did likely receive a small number of arms during his Cuban visit and checked on four military personnel then receiving training in Cuba.
- Narendorp, the Foreign Minister, visited Cuba in June 1982;
- Intelligence reports on 50+ Cubans arriving in July 1982.

Now the process of deceptive power consolidation will be underway, and the issue for action is finding the means to reverse the pro-Cuban elements creating an irreversible hold on power. As I said to you [redacted] on 16 December, time is short. Every week will make the Cuban hold tighter (see NID

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25X1NSC/Central America Assessment

You will recall that Judge Clark wrote a memorandum on 25 October calling for a Central America Assessment to be completed by 15 November 1982. My EYES ONLY chronology of how this assessment and a previous effort by Judge Clark in March 1982 became sidetracked is attached. The question now is will Judge Clark pursue this much-needed assessment of: (1) what has actually been done to implement the President's NSDD decisions; (2) is enough being done to defeat the extreme left in Central America? This last question was not explicitly stated in the Clark assessment tasking, and in my view needs to be addressed as soon as possible.

*last tab for
description of Stalinist
techniques.*

TAB A

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NSC review completed

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Nicaragua:

The attached 7 December 1982 tasking memorandum from Judge Clark to Secretary Schultz on US policy toward Nicaragua has, I am told, been cancelled. Nevertheless, note that Item 3 asks: "what plans do we have if the present policies falter - an important timely question." In my view, this suggests Judge Clark is far too confident about the outcome of events in Nicaragua, as seen in the concluding paragraph which captures the tone of his 7 December memorandum: "These thoughts are prompted by what may appear to be an anomalous concern over 'what do we do if we win'." I repeat my regrettably pessimistic judgment that the current level of anti-Sandinista forces is highly unlikely to be able to threaten seriously the current regime or even stop its export of subversion. In my view, despite some positive efforts, most trends in the region and the international political arena are negative. This last is partly true because U.S. in public communications efforts have been too few and unsystematic.

TAB B

Public Diplomacy about Central America Since since November 1981:

I attach my short evaluation written for you last week in case you want to bring this up. Note, that on 17 December 1982, State sent its preliminary plan for an improved public communications effort to Judge Clark. It is a useful start (though 13 months late), but it still lacks specific implementation ideas with respect to Mexico and the Socialist International (which holds its World Congress in Sydney, Australia on 8 April 1983).

TAB C

Argentina:

The demonstration by 100,000 people and ensuing violence on 14 December crystalizes the enormous difficulty facing Argentina as the military regime tries to make an orderly transition to constitutional government. It is my judgment that the Soviet bloc and Cuba will be active to simultaneously improve state-to-state relations and use subversion to create problems for the transition, hoping to either provoke massive military repression or accomplish some degree of penetration of a "left nationalist" civilian government. In my judgement, now is the time for the US and other democratic countries to become more active to: (1) prevent Soviet bloc/Cuban subversion and (2) in behalf of democratic institution building in labor, the parties and moderate civic groups. This could be the subject of an NSPG. Note that I have initiated a SNIE to be titled: ARGENTINA: A TROUBLED TRANSITION, which State will draft to be completed in February 1983.

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Attachments: as stated

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22 November 1982

EYES ONLY

NOTE FOR: DCI

FROM: NIO/LA

SUBJECT: Chronology of NSC Reviews on Central America --
as you requested todayLatest NSC Cuba/Central America Review

Early August 1982

--Mr. Fontaine of the NSC Staff informs NIO/LA and others that he is trying to organize a Review to begin in mid-September 1982.

--NIO/LA informs DCI/DDCI by memo.

Mid-September 1982

--NSC Staff tells NIO/LA the Review has been delayed for "unknown reasons."

25 October 1982

--Judge Clark's memorandum initiates a "Cuba Policy Review" with materials due to Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam by 10 November 1982

--Judge Clark's memorandum indicates that: (1) Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam will convene an Interagency Group to review the materials, and (2) the President will consider them at an NSPG, "no later than 15 November."

10 November 1982

--Acting DCI McMahon sends NFIB-coordinated Interagency Intelligence Assessment to Deputy Secretary Dam.

Week of 15 November 1982

[redacted] informs NIO/LA that the Interagency Group meeting has been delayed until Undersecretary Eagleburger returns to preside rather than Deputy Secretary Dam.

18 November 1982

--State official tells NIO/LA NSC Review likely to be delayed "indefinitely"

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22 November 1982

- NSC meeting of 23 November to focus on President Reagan's trip from 29 November to 6 December 1982.
- Secretary of State Schultz scheduled to be in Europe from 6 - 19 December 1982.
- NSC Cuba Review likely delayed for some weeks (January 1983 usually is taken with State of the Union, the national budget and the opening of the new Congress).

Chronology of Last NSC Review on Central America

15 March 1982

- Judge Clark orders a post-Salvadoran election review with 30 March 1982 deadlines for papers.

30 March 1982

- CIA submits its Intelligence Assessment

2 April 1982

- Falklands War begins. Period of intense diplomacy lasts through 22 April.

Early May 1982

- Various Executive Branch officials (including the NIO/LA) press for NSC review of Central America.

Late May 1982

- NSDDs 37 and 37A issued without any NSC meeting.

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WASHINGTON

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SECRETSENSITIVE

December 7, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua (S)

As we enter the third year of the Administration's involvement in Central America, I believe it appropriate to examine the progress we have made; what further involvement we should consider; what adjustments can or should be made in our policy; and what options are available to us. (S)

Accordingly, the President has asked that you undertake a series of studies that examine the following subjects:

- (1) Generally speaking, the trends in Nicaragua may be viewed as favorable to the extent that opposition to the government is growing and becoming more effective. It is appropriate to ask what changes might conceivably take place if these trends continue. For example, could opposition elements effect a change in the government? If that appeared likely, what would be the reaction of the GON; of Cuba? Would Nicaragua seek to increase subversion in neighboring countries? How should we react to alternative Nicaraguan shifts in policy with or without Cuban support? (S)
- (2) What is the status of the Nicaraguan civilian opposition? Is it now able to provide effective leadership for Nicaragua should that become necessary? If not, what are we doing to improve this situation? Are there remnants of the National Guard leadership which could pose problems to the civilian opposition? (S)
- (3) What plans do we have if the present policies falter? What plans do we have to buttress opposition elements within Nicaragua? At what point does it become too costly, politically, for us to continue to support these groups? By what date do you expect this to become a problem? What plans have we made for this eventuality? (S)

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- (4) What measures ought to be taken to sustain and broaden where possible our support internationally?

These thoughts are prompted by what may appear to be an anomalous concern over "what do we do if we win?" No doubt you have already given this some thought, but I believe it would be useful for you to provide your assessment to the President near the commencement of the new year together with any recommendations you may have for altering current policies and programs.



William P. Clark

cc The Secretary of Defense
~~The~~ Director of Central Intelligence

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17 December 1982

Public diplomacy concerning Cuba/Central America - since November 1981

In November 1981, President Reagan decided that a major component of the strategy to contain Cuban subversion and help the governments of Central America should be a domestic and international public diplomacy effort (NSDD 17). This decision was repeated in subsequent NSDDs and the shortcomings of implementation were suggested by the repetition in the May 1982 NSDD .

A number of useful steps were taken. However, far too little has been done and the result is that we have lost the positive shifts in domestic and international opinion in the US, Europe and Latin America which began following the September 1981 Latin American repudiation of the pro-guerrilla Mexican French initiative and briefly after the March 1982 El Salvador elections. Right now the international coalitions supporting the extreme left and those supporting moderates and the threatened governments are as follows:

Supporting the Extreme Left

Soviet Bloc and Cuba
 PLO and Libya
 Mexico

Many social democratic parties
 Many church/liberal groups

Supporting Moderates/Target Governments

US
 Most Latin American countries
 (but with a shift away by
 Venezuela/Colombia
 International Christian Democrats
 AFL-CIO and much of international
 democratic labor
 (though this is eroding)

Positive Steps to Date

Most important were the President's speech to the OAS (February 1982), his trip to Latin America and the consistently good testimony of the Administration before Congress. In addition, State has produced several good unclassified background papers (see list below) and a number of one page GISTs which describe US policy in Central America. There also has been a concerted effort to meet with leaders of the print and electronic media by the State leadership (though NSC/Defense has been excluded despite their interest in helping) and a program of sending speakers to a number of college campuses.

This effort has been coordinated by a State public diplomacy group under the overall direction of Assistant Secretary Enders which has met about once every three weeks during the last year. At these meetings, the critical comments made below were consistently voiced by my representative.

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Problems with Implementation

The level of effort has been far below the requirements of the task and the national security stakes (keeping Central America and Mexico from becoming communist). Probably not more than 10% of the effort allocated to the AWACS issue in the fall of 1981 has gone into this public diplomacy effort and most of what has been done has been focused on the Caribbean Basin Initiative rather than the facts of Cuban/Nicaraguan subversion and terrorism.

Secondly there has been no systematic and thoughtful advanced planning to use international communications opportunities such as upcoming meetings of the Socialist International, the ICFTU international free trade unions, COPPAL the Mexican international political action organization nor to defend against predictable communist propaganda/disinformation activities linked to the six-month certification cycle and other known events. My staff prepared the outline of a comprehensive communications strategy along these lines in November 1981, shared them with State, found no interest and on other occasions we have made written and other proposals for more effective international communications which have been ignored.

As a tangible example of the desultory and unsystematic quality of the efforts to date, in June 1982 [redacted] a senior State official to brief Socialist International leaders in Europe and found that the US Embassies in Paris, The Hague, Bonn and Vienna had virtually none of the State and intelligence briefing materials which had already been made public between December 1981 and April 1982 (including the dramatic U-2 photos of the Nicaraguan military buildup and the 42 intact and then destroyed Indian villages along with the two new detention camps in Nicaragua).

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Specific shortcomings include the following:

Cuba - virtually no effort has been made to expose the internal repression of the Cuban regime (political prisoners, executions over the last twenty years, etc.) or to bring out the human consequences of the international subversion undertaken by Cuba during the last 22 years (meaning the numbers of victims in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East of Cuban-supported terrorism and of the brutal Marxist-Leninist regimes propped up with Cuban troops and secret police, eg., Ethiopia, etc.)

Social democratic parties and governments:

The Socialist International include 43 social democratic parties which involve most of our major allies (the German SPD . . . etc). The US has failed to systematically provide information about Central America to the moderate social democratic leaders and factions within the parties of Latin America (eg., Costa Rica) and Europe (eg., Portugal) and then work well in advance of the known Socialist International meeting dates to forge a moderate coalition which would rescind the endorsements of the extreme left guerrilla groups.

The same needs to be done with the international democratic trade unions which are mostly associated with the social democratic parties.

Mexico

Despite the fact that de la Madrid was selected as the next President of Mexico in October 1981, elected in July 1982 and inaugurated in December 1982 -- virtually no effort has been made to brief him or his key moderate advisors. His current Foreign Minister was Mexico's Ambassador in Washington, D.C. during most of 1982 and to my knowledge, received no briefing.

Christian democrats/AFL-CIO/international labor

The democratic transnational groups which condemn the communist guerrillas as well as the extreme right have met and passed positive resolutions on many occasions during the last two years. This virtually never gets into the regular media coverage and the US has done almost nothing to spread and amplify the positive actions and statements of those organizations which share our perspective.

Examples of useful background literature

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|---|------------------------|
| --Nicaragua: The Stolen Revolution | ICA - November 1982 |
| --Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence
in Latin America | State - December 1982 |
| --US/Soviet Cuban military aid/
presence in Latin America
1962 - 1981 -- charts | Dr. Ikle, March 1982 |
| --Communist Interference in El Salvador | State - February 1981. |
- This is good information, but far too little has been done to distribute it here or abroad to key leadership groups.