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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

6580-12

National Intelligence Council

12 August 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : Chairman, National Intelligence Council  
SUBJECT : NSC Staffers' Comments on Proposed NIC  
Production Schedule

1. We have now reviewed [ ] compilation of NSC staffers' comments on our provisional production schedule for the rest of 1982. We think that getting such views is a most useful exercise. Many of the specific comments made are well-taken, and it is particularly helpful to know the interests of some of our primary customers. We agree [ ] that a similar review of the schedule by State would be equally useful. (INR does routinely receive and has an opportunity to comment on NIC production plans, through the regular quarterly review by NFIB of the schedule of estimates for the ensuing twelve-month period).

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2. The following is an item-by-item response (NIC/DDI) to the specific suggestions raised by [ ] memorandum to you. We have coordinated these responses with Dick Kerr.

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New Subjects

[ ]

B. Western Europe-GLCMs: C/NIC has previously discussed these questions with certain senior consumers, and NIO/USSR-EE convened a meeting of European and Soviet specialists yesterday to discuss this topic. We agree in principle that a paper on this theme needs doing and will be done, although it may turn out to be a DDI rather than an interagency paper.

C. Western Europe-United States: We are in the process of putting together a broad examination of the many problems troubling the Europe-US alliance. The paper, a definitive NIE called The Atlantic Bridge: Diagnosis and Prognosis, and chaired by Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, is scheduled for completion by the end of the year.

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D. Sino-Soviet Relations: There are several single-agency papers of recent vintage on this subject that appear to us to cover it adequately, and a DDI paper that includes a couple of alternative scenarios on this subject should be completed within the next few days. The subject will also be treated more fully in a DDI assessment now scheduled for publication in November.

E. Soviet Drive for Ports and Airfields in Africa: A DDI/SOVA study, "The Impact of the Soviet Naval Presence in Third World Countries," is nearing completion and covers part of this subject, as do (1) NIE 11-4-82, The Soviet Challenge to US Security Interests (just approved at NFIB), and (2) NIE 11-10, The USSR and the Third World (scheduled for completion by the end of September).

F. Future of World Trading System: DDI/OGI plans a report in October detailing the country positions that probably will be taken on key issues at the GATT ministerial. Although its paper will identify key frictions among GATT members, we believe these questions do not readily lend themselves to estimative treatment, and we feel unable to take on the broad issue of the world trading system in a formal DDI paper or NIE.

G. Western Sahara: This subject was covered fairly thoroughly in a NIC-prepared IIM on Prospects for Morocco that was disseminated in mid-May. We do not see as yet any major new messages that need to be conveyed on the subject.

H. Lebanon: We agree that a post-Israeli invasion paper on Lebanon is very much in order and we plan to do one, possibly a SNIE, in the relatively near future. The effects of the Lebanon crisis on US arms sales will, by the way, be included in SNIE 4-2-82, The High Technology Arms Market: Implications for the US, which is now under way and scheduled for completion in the fourth quarter of 1982.

I. Soviet Nuclear Weapons Design: DDI/OSWR has for some time been preparing a definitive study of Soviet nuclear weapons technology. That study (1) treats the question of nuclear weapons design in detail; and (2) is almost completed. There is a draft in hand; it will be polished and completed in coming weeks.

#### Timing Suggestions

A. Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense IIM: The draft is nearly complete (eight of nine chapters done), and final coordination meetings will get under way in late August. The paper should be published sometime in September.

B. Caribbean IIM: A rough draft is in, but the paper needs a good deal of work. We estimate it will be ready for publication in late September or possibly October.

C. Mexico-Central America IIM: The building block for this paper, a DDI/ALA assessment, is nearly completed, but it will be difficult to do much to expedite the interagency treatment of the subject. We will do our best to adhere to the planned third quarter production target, however.

D. US Monitoring Capabilities NIE: Again, we can appreciate the desirability of moving briskly along with this paper, but it is a most complex undertaking requiring inputs from many elements around the Community. To date only about 25 percent of the raw inputs have been received, and it is going to be very difficult to meet the planned target date of late September. We will nonetheless do our darndest.

E. Soviet Approach to Arms Control: DIA is producing the draft of this NIE, but we see little opportunity to expedite its completion earlier than the end of September target date.

F. Philippines NIE: The agency representatives have completed this paper. It now awaits only NFIB review. We anticipate that it will be published within a week or so.

G. ASEAN-Kampuchea: Our NIE on ASEAN is under way, but it will not focus primarily on the Kampuchean problem. Rather, it examines ASEAN's inner workings and the viability of the association, in terms of the policies and inclinations of the five member states themselves. A SNIE entitled Conflict in Kampuchea: Prospects for the Resistance and Implications for US Relations in Asia was published last February, and we are now working on a NIC Memorandum -- not a formal interagency paper -- on Vietnam's domination of Indochina (Walt's paragraph I).

H. Indonesia IIM: We are off to a rather slow start on this paper but plan to push ahead and complete it well before President Suharto's visit materializes.



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