

SECRET

File
Threat World

22 April 1982

SOVIET PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE, 1982

Throughout the world there are currently nearly 50 countries in which the Soviets have some degree of actual or potential leverage. Out of this group:

- There are eight countries now under total Soviet domination.
- Six countries actively act as Soviet proxies.
- Eighteen countries are under a significant degree of Soviet presence and/or influence.
- Twelve countries are facing insurgency supported by the Soviets and/or one or more of their proxies in one degree or another.
- Three countries (Iran, Madagascar, and Ghana) are rated as highly unstable and vulnerable to Soviet influence.
- Ten countries, in addition to being in one of the above categories, have a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviets.

These thumbnail evaluations indicate how our analysts evaluate the state of play in these countries.

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA

Soviet Domination

Afghanistan: Soviet domination of the country is enforced by the presence of about 105,000 Soviet troops, who are essential to the survival of the Babrak government. The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in December 1978, was used to help legalize the Soviet invasion and continuing occupation of the country. The devastated Afghan economy depends heavily on Soviet assistance. Afghanistan is used as a base to destabilize Pakistan.

25X1

25X1

Soviet Supported Aggressor/Proxy

Libya: The Soviet Union is the primary source of Libyan military hardware. In 1981 Libyan military purchases from the USSR amounted to an estimated \$1 billion. There are at least 1,400 Soviet military advisers in Libya, as well as some 1,000 civilian workers. This military capability and Libyan money are active in subversion and backing insurgencies throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Central America. The Soviet Union probably has little direct influence over Libyan policies, although it possesses some leverage by supplying sophisticated weaponry. Moscow tacitly consents to the uses to which these weapons are put. [redacted] 25X1

South Yemen: Since the formation of the Marxist government in 1976, the Soviets have supplied arms valued at over \$1 billion, practically all of South Yemen's military equipment, and have been a substantial donor of economic assistance amounting to \$200 million. The Soviets have access to air and naval facilities as well as storage and communications installations.

Through South Yemen, the Soviets provide indirect support for the National Democratic Forces (NDF) operating in North Yemen attempting to promote a pro-Soviet government in Sana. Similarly, the Soviets sponsor the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) seeking to overthrow Sultan Qaboos.

Currently there are 1,000 Soviet military advisors and technicians in South Yemen, and an additional 500 Cubans and 100 East Europeans. Although the government of South Yemen appears firmly entrenched, the Soviets probably would resist any threat to its control there.

The Soviets consider the October 1979 Soviet-Yemeni Friendship Treaty a significant foreign policy success that expands their interests in the Arabian Peninsula. It also represents for the Soviets evidence of progress in the worldwide ideological struggle.

From South Yemen insurgents are supported in North Yemen, Oman, and Somalia.

In August 1981 South Yemen concluded a Soviet-blessed tripartite alliance with Libya and Ethiopia aimed at Sudan, Somalia, and North Yemen. [redacted] 25X1

Soviet Presence and/or Influence

Syria: The Soviet Union is the primary supplier of military equipment to Syria. In both 1980 and 1981 Syria purchased some \$1.5 to \$2 billion worth of military hardware from the USSR. There are from 3000 to 3,500 Soviet military advisers in Syria, as well as 3000

civilian technicians. In 1980 about 16 percent of Syria's total foreign trade, or \$1 billion, was with Soviet Bloc countries. Syria and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in October 1980. Syria would like to interpret the treaty as one element of a strategic alliance between the two countries, but Moscow is wary of committing itself to Syria's defense. [REDACTED]

25X1

Algeria: In the past the USSR was almost the sole supplier of military equipment to Algeria. More recently, Algeria has begun to move toward a more nonaligned posture and is seeking to diversify sources of military supplies. There are some 1,500 Soviet military advisers in Algeria, but that number may be slowly diminishing. The Soviet Union has been heavily involved in a variety of Algerian economic development projects for a number of years, and provides technical expertise and limited financial assistance. Algerian officials traditionally have resisted Soviet efforts to influence Algerian policy. [REDACTED]

25X1

Iraq: There are currently 500 Soviet military advisers and 5,000 civilian advisers in Iraq spread throughout the economy. Despite political differences, Soviet military deliveries in 1981 to Iraq were nearly \$1 billion. The only nations that received more Soviet military supplies in 1981 were Syria and Libya.

In April 1972 Iraq signed a 15-year renewable friendship treaty with the Soviets which calls for a consultation if Iraq is threatened. Soviet relations with Iraq have been on a decline, however, due to Soviet expansion in the region, the Soviet's neutral position on the Iran/Iraq war, and Iraqi suspicions that the Soviets are working with Iraqi communists to subvert the regime.

India: India's 1971 Friendship Treaty with the Soviets reflects Moscow's longstanding importance to New Delhi as a source of arms and technology for weapons production, economic assistance for key public sector industries, and diplomatic support on critical issues such as India's conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir. Soviet support for India's communist parties and the extensive Soviet propaganda program in India are points of friction between the two states. New Delhi is attempting to improve relations with the West in order to bolster its sagging credibility as a nonaligned state. The Soviets are seeking to utilize India as a military threat and base for sending insurgents into Pakistan as part of its effort to intimidate Pakistan for supplying Afghan rebels.

Threatened by Insurgency backed by Soviets or Proxy

Morocco/Western Sahara: Since 1975 Morocco has been involved in a war with the Polisario Front over control of the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara. The conflict threatens Morocco itself only as a destabilizing force together with dissidents in Casablanca and other

cities. In addition, Polisario guerrillas occasionally conduct raids against targets in southern Morocco. The Polisario Front has received the bulk of its Soviet-origin weapons and other material from Algeria and Libya.

Sudan [redacted] that a major Soviet goal in the region is the removal of the present regimes in Sudan and Egypt as steps toward domination of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf oil fields [redacted] conviction is buttressed by the fact that Libya, which he views as a Soviet surrogate, is financing and sponsoring cross-border terrorist and sabotage operations against Sudan from Ethiopia. Recently Ethiopia has begun cooperating more freely with Libya against Sudan and is allowing Libyan-backed Sudanese dissidents to operate from bases in Ethiopia. [redacted]

Pakistan: The Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, traditional enmity between Pakistan and India--Moscow's friend--and Soviet support of insurgents among the Baluch and other minority groups, threaten the long-term viability of the Pakistani state. The Soviets currently denounce Pakistan for aiding the resistance in Afghanistan and imply that they may take strong countermeasures against Pakistani interests. [redacted]

Oman: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) based in Soviet-backed South Yemen, operates in Oman's Southermost Dhofar Province. Oman's British-led troops required Iranian and Jordanian assistance to defeat a PFLO insurgency in 1975.

North Yemen: The South Yemeni-backed NDF occupies much of southeast North Yemen and threatens the political stability of North Yemen through guerrilla operations against government forces.

Highly Unstable and Vulnerable to Soviet Influence

Iran: The Iranian revolution is still unwinding and ultimate control of the government remains undecided. This inherent instability combines with some key Soviet advantages: geographic proximity, on-going economic and military aid, a very large diplomatic presence, and a local communist party, as well as Iran's unabated hostility to the U.S.

AFRICA

Soviet Supported Aggressor/Proxy

Ethiopia: Ethiopia is Moscow's most important client in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Mengistu regime has granted the Soviets access to certain naval and air facilities in return for military assistance. The Soviet navy uses Dahlak Island and Soviet aircraft stage naval reconnaissance flights from Asmara. Moscow has supplied Addis Ababa with more than

\$2 billion worth of military equipment, training, and other aid. The Soviet-equipped Ethiopian forces are employed against internal insurgencies; Ethiopia votes with the Soviets in international bodies, but does not now act militarily as a Soviet proxy elsewhere in Africa. Ethiopian efforts to destabilize the pro-Western regimes in neighboring Sudan and Somalia converge with Soviet interests, and are supported by Libya, Ethiopia's ally in the Soviet-encouraged Aden Pact of 1981 [redacted] 25X1

Soviet Presence and/or Influence

Angola: The Soviets and their allies are providing extensive military assistance to the government of Angola, which is fighting a war against Jonas Savimbi's UNITA insurgents and providing bases and logistics for SWAPO's insurgency in Namibia, while trying to defend against South African operations against SWAPO sanctuaries in southern Angola. There are some 20,000 to 25,000 Cuban military personnel in Angola as well as about 1,200 Soviet and 400 East European military advisers. The USSR is by far Angola's primary source of military equipment and training. The USSR and Angola signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in October 1976 [redacted] 25X1

Mozambique: The government of Mozambique is embroiled in a war against South African-backed insurgents and relies heavily on Soviet military aid. There are around 500 Soviet and 800 Cuban military advisers in Mozambique, and the USSR is Mozambique's main source of military equipment. The USSR and Mozambique signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in March 1977 [redacted] 25X1

Zambia: The USSR has been Zambia's principal military supplier since 1977, and the military relationship has deepened considerably over the past several years. An arms accord worth at least \$200 million was concluded in 1979. The Soviets have approximately 50 military advisers in Zambia. [redacted] 25X1

Tanzania: Tanzania relies on the USSR for the bulk of its military equipment, although it is trying to diversify its sources of military aid in order to reduce its dependence on the Soviets. There are approximately 125 Soviet military advisers in the country. [redacted] 25X1

Congo: Soviet influence is exerted primarily through military assistance. The USSR is Congo's largest military arms supplier and has provided 120 military advisers and 12 MIG-21 aircraft. The Congolese signed a watered down friendship treaty with the Soviets in May 1981. Moscow has long sought naval access and base rights in Pointe Noire. [redacted] 25X1

Mali: The USSR has been Mali's primary source of military equipment. From 1976 to 1980 Moscow reportedly delivered over \$105 million in military hardware to Bamako. Mali reportedly recently received two MIG-21s from the Soviets and expects more in the near term. There are 180 Soviet advisers in Mali [redacted] 25X1

Guinea: The Soviet Union is the chief supplier of the Guinean military, providing virtually all arms, training, and most technical and military advisers. The USSR continues to be Guinea's primary trading partner and furnishes the majority of foreign instructors in Guinean universities. There are some 50 Soviet military advisers in Conakry. [REDACTED]

25X1

Benin: The USSR is the principal supplier of arms to Marxist-oriented Benin and has some 90 military advisers and civilian technicians in the country. Several cabinet and military officers are considered to be under Soviet influence. Benin allows Libya a fairly free hand in the country which is a growing base for Libyan subversion in the region. President Kerekou recently ousted a number of far leftists from his government, fearing among other things alleged Soviet plans to replace him with a more malleable leader. [REDACTED]

25X1

Threatened by Insurgency backed by Soviets or Proxy

Namibia: The South-West Africa People's Organization has been fighting for the independence of Namibia since 1966. Operating out of Angola, SWAPO receives arms, money, and training from the Soviet Union and its surrogates, particularly Cuba and East Germany. [REDACTED]

25X1

Zaire: The main insurgent threat in Zaire comes from the Angola- and Zambia-based Front for the National Liberation of the Congo, which invaded Zaire's Shaba Region in 1977 and again in 1978. Members of the Front have received training from Cuban military advisers in Angola, and there are reports indicating that the USSR is providing material to the Front in preparation for another intrusion into the Shaba.

Chad: The USSR was never directly involved in Chad's 17-year-old civil war, but Moscow did eventually endorse Libya's military intervention in Chad in late 1980 and quietly sent a small number of military technicians there to help maintain Libya's Soviet-manufactured aircraft and armored vehicles. The Soviets recently have seemed concerned that a victory by rebel leader Habre will lead to a resurgence of Western influence. Moscow has moved to strengthen ties with beleaguered President Goukouni's regime, is considering reopening the Soviet embassy in N'Djamena, and is trying to arrange for the overland transport of limited arms to Goukouni via the Congo and Central African Republic. There is a continuing threat that Libya will resume occupation of portions of Chad. [REDACTED]

25X1

Somalia: The Siad regime, an important U.S. supporter in the Gulf of Aden area, is challenged by the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, a 3,000-man force controlled by Ethiopia and funded by Libya. The narrowly based Front would not pose a serious security threat in the absence of outside aid. Libyan aid in the form of training, cash grants, and equipment--including tanks and APCs--totalled about \$10 million last year. Moscow reportedly maintains close ties to political activists in the SSDF, is recruiting Somali exiles for the Front in Europe, and

SECRET

25X1

for a time last year provided the Front with a few advisers. But Moscow is reluctant to become directly identified with the Front, and for this reason favors Libyan and Ethiopian efforts to aid the SSDF [redacted]

25X1

Highly Unstable and Vulnerable to Soviet Influence

Ghana: Ghana's instability lies primarily in its mismanaged and deteriorating economy and, since the Rawlings coup, the destruction of its administrative and military infrastructure. The Rawlings government has blamed the country's ills on neo-colonialism and Western imperialism and has sought unsuccessfully to attract substantial new economic assistance from the Soviets, East Europeans, and the Libyans. The Soviets are dubious of Rawlings' survival, but their influence could grow if he becomes firmly entrenched or if a more socialist-oriented regime came to power. [redacted]

25X1

Madagascar: The instability of the Malagasy government results from the Island's desperate economic straits. The Ratsiraka regime, threatened by endemic urban unrest and alleged coup plotting in the army, has been further weakened recently by its inability to deal with the aftermath of several months of cyclones, torrential rains, and heavy flooding. The Soviets have attempted to exploit their position as Madagascar's main source of weapons and military training by pressing for access to naval and air facilities at Diego Suarez. President Ratsiraka, hoping for major economic aid from the West, continues to put them off, but he or a successor might grant the Soviets military access if the West does not respond. [redacted]

25X1

CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

Soviet Supported Aggressor/Proxy

Cuba: The Soviet Union has probably maintained ground force units in Cuba continuously in some form since 1962. The military presence performs multiple functions serving the Soviets as well as the Cubans. The Soviet advisory mission in Cuba is commanded by a Colonel-General, a recent upgrading of this position. The Soviet Military Advisory Group of about 2,000-2,500 is headquartered in the Havana area. About 1,500 Soviet military personnel are assigned to the Soviet communications intercept facility at Lourdes. The Soviet Brigade, which has a strength of 2,800-3,000 is headquartered near Santiago de las Vegas. The brigade consists of four maneuver battalions--one tank and three motorized rifle units--plus combat support elements. The brigade provides a symbol of Soviet commitment to the Castro regime, some portion of it provides security at Lourdes, and may participate in training exercises in Cuban military elements. [redacted]

25X1

7

SECRET

25X1

There may be as many as 6,000-8,000 Soviet civilian advisers in Cuba. They provide management guidance, economic training, technical assistance to various Cuban ministries and many industrial projects including Cuba's nuclear power plant. Over 400 technicians are helping the expansion of the Cuban nickel industry in eastern Cuba. Soviets also provide ideological and organizational assistance to various Party and government entities [redacted]

25X1

Nicaragua: There are some 100 to 125 Soviet personnel in-country, of whom about 45 to 50 are military advisers reportedly assigned to the Nicaraguan Armed Forces General Staff and the Sandinista Air Force. Most Soviet military aid to Nicaragua is sent through Cuba, Algeria, and other third countries. Deliveries so far include T-55 tanks, BM-21 rocket launchers, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons. In addition, Moscow has directly delivered to Nicaragua two MI-8 helicopters and six AN-2 light transport aircraft. [redacted]

25X1

Soviet Presence and/or Influence

Peru: Peru remains by far the largest purchaser of Soviet arms in South America, and the approximately 350 Soviets in Peru comprise the largest Soviet presence in Latin America outside of Cuba. Since 1972 Lima has purchased over \$1 billion worth of Soviet equipment, including SU-22 jet fighters, ZSU-23/4 anti-aircraft and gun systems, MI-6, MI-8, and MI-25 helicopters, some 260 T-55 tanks, as well as trucks and artillery. In addition, the Soviets and the East Europeans have extended some \$500 million in economic aid since 1976. Lima's reliance on Moscow for arms influences its foreign policy on matters directly related to the USSR and Cuba, but the military and economic aid have not given the Soviets concomitant influence in Peruvian domestic politics. [redacted]

25X1

Threatened by Insurgency backed by Soviets or Proxy

El Salvador: Moscow has confined its direct involvement to encouraging the formation of the Unified Revolutionary Directorate, the insurgent's umbrella organization headed by a 15-member ruling body made up of three representatives from each of the five guerrilla factions. Indirectly, however, the Soviets are closely collaborating with Havana on the flow of Eastern and Western arms to Nicaragua. The Sandinistas have therefore been able to free-up many of their Western-manufactured arms--captured during the victory over Somoza--for use in El Salvador by the insurgents. (S NF NC OC)

Guatemala: Soviet contacts have focused largely on the orthodox Communist Party. The USSR has been instrumental in persuading that group to join the insurgency and is providing funds and paramilitary training to its members. As in El Salvador, the Soviets have promoted unity between the four active insurgent groups. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Colombia: Since 1980, the Colombian government has confronted sharply increased activity by Cuban-supported revolutionary groups. At least 400 M-19 guerrillas--about half the current active strength of the organization--have received some training in Cuba. In addition, the Castro regime has helped the guerrillas to purchase and transport arms into Colombia. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is the paramilitary arm of the pro-Soviet Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), and is one of the most effective and long-lived of the guerrilla organizations now active in Colombia. The FARC is responsive to the PCC but is not subservient; some of its top leaders have received training in Moscow. In addition, the FARC receives some aid and training from Cuba. Cuban efforts to get the various guerrilla groups to unite thus far have foundered on mutual rivalries and suspicions. 25X1

EAST ASIA

Soviet Supported Agressor/Proxy

Vietnam: The Soviets provide massive amounts of military and economic aid to Hanoi. Deliveries of the military equipment (more than \$1 billion worth in 1979 and about half that amount in each of the following two years) have enabled Hanoi to quadruple the size of its forces opposite China and have helped arm the more than 150,000 Vietnamese occupation force in Kampuchea. The Soviets provided some \$800 million in economic aid to Vietnam last year, and Soviet civilian advisers--some 5,000 of them--work in almost every civilian and military institution in Vietnam. The two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 3 November 1978.

Soviet Presence and/or Influence

Laos: The Soviets also deliver large amounts of economic and military aid to Laos, much of it funneled through Vietnam. There are about 1,000 Soviet advisers in Laos, and hundreds of Laotian students receive training in Soviet bloc countries in administrative, technical, or military skills.

Kampuchea: The Soviets have provided economic, military and logistical support to the Vietnamese-backed regime in Kampuchea. Anxious to have greater control over their aid program, the Soviets plan to increase the level of project aid--and probably advisers--going to Kampuchea. There are probably about 300-400 Soviet civilian advisers now in Kampuchea.

North Korea: The Soviet Union, like China, has a mutual defense pact with North Korea, signed in 1961. Moscow has not supplied any major weapons systems to P'yongyang since 1974, although North Korea continues to receive spare parts for the equipment supplied in earlier years. There are perhaps 100 or so Soviet economist specialists and technicians in North Korea. Although we are not aware of any Soviet military advisers, a small number may be present to oversee the supply of spare parts. North Korea

SECRET

undoubtedly would like to receive more Soviet military equipment, especially modern fighter aircraft and missile systems. But President Kim Il-song's insistence on preserving his freedom of action evidently has served to dampen Moscow's enthusiasm for responding to P'yongyang's needs.

EUROPE

Soviet Domination

GDR: Member of CEMA and Warsaw Pact. Soviet troop presence.

Poland: Member of CEMA and Warsaw Pact. Small Soviet troop presence.

Czechoslovakia: Member of CEMA and Warsaw Pact. Soviet troop presence.

Hungary: Member of CEMA and Warsaw Pact. Soviet troop presence.

Bulgaria: Member of CEMA and Warsaw Pact. No Soviet troop presence.

Romania: Member of CEMA and Warsaw Pact. No Soviet troop presence.
Independent foreign policy.

Soviet Presence or Influence

Yugoslavia: Not a member of CEMA or Warsaw Pact and no Soviet troops.
Soviet trading partner. Communist government. Nonaligned foreign policy.

Finland: 1948 treaty commits Finland to oppose--with Soviet assistance
if necessary--any attempt to invade Finland or the USSR via Finland.

25X1

One-fifth of Finnish exports go to USSR.