11 June 1982

NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Charles E. Waterman, NIO/NESA

SUBJECT: Talking Points on Lebanon Situation

## New Factors

- -- The ceasefire appears to be holding, although there are unconfirmed press reports of isolated Syrian-Israeli clashes.
- -- The ceasefire does not include the Palestinians, and the Israelis continue to bomb Palestinian positions in Beirut as well as in other pockets in the south where the Israelis have established control. PLO leader Arafat says his troops will observe the ceasefire, but some PLO leaders are resisting.
- -- Units of Syria's Third Armored Division -- part of the elite strategic reserve -- were headed toward the Lebanese border prior to the ceasefire, but there is no evidence that they crossed into Lebanon.
- -- Two additional IL-76 Soviet transport flights arrived in Damascus today, bringing the total thus far to four such flights. It still is not clear whether they carried equipment or personnel.

## Basic Trends


- 1. What is evolving in Lebanon now are three large separate geographic/ethnic areas, each influenced by separate authority:
  - -- An Israeli-Maronite dominated area extending roughly from Jubail in the north (the limit of Maronite territory) to the Israeli border in the south, and to the crestline of the mountains overlooking the Biqa' valley. The strengthened Lebanese "central" government will hold undisputed sway here.
  - -- An area of continued Syrian dominance in the central and northern Biga' valley, and some of north Lebanon proper.

the Israelis do not mind seeing this area essentially separated from the central Lebanese government and under continued Syrian control. There is historical precedent for this situation.

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- -- A predominantly Sunni Muslim dominated area in Northwest Lebanon, specifically centered on the city of Tripoli. The Israelis, and some Lebanese Muslims, would like this area joined to the new central government. Continued Palestinian and Syrian presence here remains a problem.
- 2. The Israelis essentially consider the current ceasefire as between themselves and the Syrians, not the Palestinians. Continued fighting reflects both this fact, and that Israel intends no significant armed Palestinian faction will remain in the new Lebanon. They do not care if armed Palestinians exist under Syrian control on Syrian or Syrian dominated territory (i.e. the Biqa).
  - Immediate implications for US policy are as follows:
    - -- A mechanism for Israeli withdrawal initially to the 40 kilometer line, and assumption of authority by strengthened central Lebanese authority, should be evolved. Arab world equities require this.
    - -- We should be prepared to tolerate a continued Syrian presence in the central and northern Biga', even if ties of this area with central Lebanese authority are loosened. The Maronites also find this prospect tolerable.
    - -- We encourage by all possible means assertion of control, by the strengthened (or internationally reinforced) central government, of the weakened Palestinian elements remaining in Beirut.

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