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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

State Dept. review completed

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PAGE 81 JERUSA 81782 82 OF 88 9821212 ACTION NODS-88

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SECRET SECTION 82 OF 82-JERUSALEM 81762 NODIS

WITH SYRIA. TIME WAS VERY PRECIOUS AND THEY ARGUED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD THEREFORE PLAY AN IMMEDIATE ROLE. CERTAINLY THERE WOULD BE NO CEASEFIRE UNTIL THOSE PLO GUNS HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN/SILENCED EITHER MILITARILY OR POLITICALLY.

PASIN REMARKED THAT AFTER THE IDF MILITARY OPERATION ENDS AN ADEQUATE POLITICAL SOLUTION MIGHT TAKE FROM THREE TO FIVE MEEKS AND WARNED US THAT THE IDF WOULD SIMPLY NOT NITHDRAW MITHOUT SUCH A SOLUTION. IN HIS VIEW THE ISRAELI OPERATION HAD NOW GIVEN THE U.S. BETTER CARDS FOR A LONG-TERM NEGOTIATION OF THE LEBANESE/PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. IN ANY EVENT, WE WOULD HAVE TO BRING THE SYRIANS AROUND BEFORE THE IDF WOULD WITHDRAW OR EVEN BEFORE A CEASEFIRE WENT INTO EFFECT. IN THIS CONNECTION, ALL THREE WERE CRITICAL OF THE FACT THAT THE U.S. BY ITS VOTING AND BY ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS HAD JOINED THE UN CALL FOR UNCONDITIONAL ISRAECI WITHDRAWAL, A DEMAND WHICH THEY FOUND UNACCEPTABLE.

8. I THEN REVIEWED IN OUTLINE MAJOR CURRENT U.S. CONCERNS ON THE QUESTION OF THE USE OF U.S. FURNISHED EQUIPMENT SECRET

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE. 82

JERUSA 91782 82 0F 82 8881217

IN LEBANON, AND I WARNED
THEM MAS NOT MERELY A QUESTION, AS THEY PUT IT, OF DEAL—
ING WITH LEGALISMS. WHEN I TOUCHED ON A POSSIBLE MOVE
TO APPLY SANCTIONS ABAINST ISRAEL UNDER A SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION INVOKING CHAPTER 7, THEY IMMEDIATELY
RESPONDED THAT THE EUROPEAN POSITION WOULD DEPEND HEAVILY
ON THE U.S. STANCE. EBAN NOTED THAT GENERALLY THE PRENCH
STAND AGAINST CHAPTER 7 SANCTIONS AND PERES SAID THAT
NOTHITHSTANDING HIS ATTACHMENT TO LEBANON MITTERRAND
HOULD BE PRAGMATIC. SAM LEWIS SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN
ADVISED THAT THE ISRAELI POSITION HAS THAT ISRAEL
SELED THAT THIS HAS NOT THE MOST PELICITOUS PHRASE TO
EMPLOY.

PERES THEN STATED THAT HAVING CAUCUSED LAST NIGHT, THE ALIGNMENT WOULD STATE ITS POSITION IN TODAY'S KNESSET DEBATE AS FOLLOWS:

THERE SHOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE.

THERE SHOULD BE EXPRESSED THE "WISH" OR "DESIRE"
THAT A PROHIBITION OF TERROR ABROAD BE INCLUDED IN THE
DEFINITION OF THIS CEASEFIRE (THEY REALIZE OF COURSE
HOW DIFFICULT THIS WOULD BE TO ACHIEVE).

SUITABLE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE SO AS TO REPLACE
THE 10F THROUGHOUT THE NEW 48-KILOMETER BUFFER IONE.
WITH INTERNATIONAL FORCES. (HERE PERES CLARIFIED THAT
THEY WERE NOT THINKING OF U.S. FORCES AND THEREFORE HAD
NOT USED THE EXPRESSION "HULTI-NATIONAL FORCE.")

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

SECRET

PASE 93

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JERUSA 01782 02 OF 02 882121Z

ASKED WHAT THEY THOUGHT THE PHALANGE WOULD DO, PERES AND RABIN REPLIED DISDAINFULLY THAT THE PHALANGE WANTS ISRAEL TO DO EVERYTHING. IN THIS CONNECTION, THEY YEN-TURED THE POSSIBILITY THAT IF HE COULD NOT EMPLACE AN INTERNATIONAL PORCE TO REPLACE THE IDF, A FALLBACK POSI-TION HIGHT BE TO EXPAND HADDAD'S FORCE SO AS TO DO THE JOB. I THREN COLD WATER ON HADDAD TAKING OVER SOUTH LEBANON. PERES REMARKED THAT THE COMBINATIONS ARE END-LESS (E.G. HADDAD PLUS THE PHALANGISTS). IN THIS CON-NECTION, THE QUESTION WAS ASKED RHETORICALLY WHAT THE. SHITA OF SOUTH LEBANON HOULD NOW DO; BUT THERE WERE NO CONCLUSIVE ANSWERS. BEFORE HE HOUND UP, PERES ET AL CAME BACK TO THE VITAL NECESSITY OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM ON THE EASTERN FRONT WITH THE SYRIANS. PROSED FOR SOLUTIONS, THEY STATED THEIR OBVIOUS PREFERENCES! SYRIAN FORCES TO WITHORAH. THE PLO TO TAKE OUT ITS ARTILLERY, ROCKETS, AND OTHER UNITS, WHILE THE SYRIAN FORCES HOULD REMAIN. AS A MINIMUM FALLBACK ABOUT WHICH THEY WERE HIGHLY DUBIOUS, THE SYRIAMS, WHO ARE BELIEVED TO CONTROL AND COORDINATE THE PLO, AT LEAST IN THAT AREA, MUST ENSURE

THAT THE PLO DO NOT FIRE. GROVE

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