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22 December 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency

FROM:

Chief, Polish Task Force

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SUBJECT: Whither Poland?

1. The Polish military regime has the situation mostly under control and, with the exception of having created new Polish martyrs, should be satisfied with its performance during the imposition of martial law. Solidarity remains a force to be reckoned with, but it has not during this critical period been able to demonstrate with strikes and demonstrations that it, and not the regime, controls the loyalty of the vast majority of Poles.

2. The Church has chosen to play its traditional role as conciliator. This has in effect placed it on the side of the regime in the past 10 days. Archbishop Glemp no doubt considered that to side clearly with Solidarity militants would have risked the worse evils of a Polish civil war and a Soviet military intervention. The Church is attempting to mediate between the regime and Solidarity, even though it has no great expectations of success.

3. The key unknown is what sort of public mood will develop in Poland after the holidays when the shipyard workers of the Baltic are scheduled to report back to work. The public's initial reaction to martial law was shock and despair. If that mood of hopelessness holds, Jaruzelski's problem will become how to regain enough of a measure of public confidence to obtain cooperation in restoring order to the Polish economy. He may still hope, with the Church's assistance, to coopt a number of former Solidarity leaders into leading a tame union movement.

4. If when the initial shock wears off, on the other hand, the public mood turns angry, any number of regime actions associated with the austerity program it must impose, could again quickly reignite strikes, demonstrations and violence. Revolutions classically occur when public expectations have been dashed and there is a sense that there is nothing more to lose. We will not have a good sense as to the likelihood of this possible course of events for two weeks or so.

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5. Going on the precedents in Polish post-war history, we would have to put our money on a restoration of public order, with the regime's attempting to muddle through for a number of years without ever really restoring much vitality to the Polish economy or society. We do not believe Jaruzelski stands a chance of becoming another Kadar--in the sense of being able to win forgiveness for what he has done to the Polish public or of possessing the requisite political skills to reform and revitalize Poland. We would expect, therefore, that another Polish crisis lies several years down the road, like those of 1956, 1970, 1976, and 1980-81.

6. The Soviets will be perceived in Poland as co-culprits in the events of the last 10 days, which means the Poles will remain as anti-Russian as ever. There is also a substantial prospect of friction in relations between the Jaruzelski regime and Moscow over the level of aid the Warsaw Pact states now provide to Poland and as the Soviets attempt to prevent Jaruzelski from doing anything unorthodox as he attempts to rebuild Poland. The country may remain, in other words, as troublesome an ally of the Soviets as it ever has been.

7. From the US point of view, the US clearly cannot be seen as supporting a regime that has just attempted to crush a revival of pluralism in Poland. Humanitarian concerns argue, nevertheless, that the US cannot be indifferent to the plight of the Poles in the months and years ahead. It should be possible to differentiate in US policies and programs between those intended to establish some leverage over the actions of the Polish regime and those intended to aid the Polish public and realization of its national aspirations. It would also seem to be in the US interest to keep a finger in the Polish pie in case Jaruzelski, whose interests now are likely to diverge increasingly from those of the USSR, yet turns out to be something of a Polish nationalist.



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TALKING POINTS

Prospects

- Imposition of martial law reflects and will accentuate a shift in internal political balance within the Polish leadership favoring more orthodox and pro-Soviet elements. In conjunction with still greater dependency of the regime on Soviet assistance, this change will further constrain Jaruzelski's foreign as well as domestic policy options.

- Even apart from the change, regime professions of an intention to proceed with economic reform following "normalization" should be treated with extreme skepticism. Steps taken by the regime so far-- arrest of their putative negotiating partners, liquidation of self-management, extension of working hours, etc., belie such a strategy.

- There is no evidence that the military leadership even has a serious plan for coping with Poland's structural economic problems; nor is the military equipped to formulate an effective economic reform program. We can anticipate continued attempts to extract greater effort from the labor force through coercive means plus halfhearted measures combining some steps toward decentralization with retention of the basic Soviet-style economic model.