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VOLUME I

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THE CIA REFERENCE SYSTEM

Volume I

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*Reference*

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PREFACE

It is axiomatic that an intelligence agency, in order to function, must have a reference system. Intelligence or information must be collected, dissemination <sup>(ED)</sup> or stored for retrieval from specialized files.

It is, therefore, not surprising that collection, dissemination and reference were among the first functions activated within the Central Intelligence Group in early 1946. From that early beginning, there developed within the Central Intelligence Agency an unsurpassed reference system which, for more than 25 years, has provided vitally necessary information to the Agency's production and operational offices. The reference system began as the Office of Collection and Dissemination, later was renamed the Office of Central Reference and, in 1967, became the Central Reference Service. This publication, The CIA Reference System, traces the development of the activity from its origin in 1946 to the present.

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*An early*  
The first historical account of the Agency's reference system is contained in "Development of a Reference Center," Chapter V of Organizational History of Central Intelligence Agency, 1950-1953. The chapter was written in 1957 by [redacted]

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25X1A9A [redacted] and, for the most part, concerns itself with the broad functional development of the system rather than the working-level organizational growth.

The CIA Reference System attempts a more exhaustive review of the development of the reference center and its component units, utilizing the valuable historical information in the earlier history. To insure inclusion of all pertinent historical data in Volume I of this work, therefore, the contents of the

25X1A9A [redacted] document have been reviewed in Chapter I to trace the functional development of the system's two historical activities: liaison (collection and dissemination) and reference. Chapter II describes the early maturity of the Office of Collection and Dissemination in 1953. Chapter III returns to 1946


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and, following the same pattern established in Chapter I (liaison and reference), traces the organizational history and development of the system through 1953.

A yet-unpublished volume of this history will cover the later development of the Agency's reference system from 1954 forward.

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I. Early Functional History and Development to 1953

A. The Liaison Function

Throughout their histories, the Office of Collection and dissemination and its forebearers had actually performed two basic functions: liaison and reference. The functions had come into being together as part of the earliest planning for the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), and were considered vital to the proposed development of the new central intelligence concept.

Operating in tandem from the time of their inception, the liaison activities (requirements, collection, and dissemination) in effect sustained the reference function which was embodied in the original Reference Center.


The latter was envisioned as a focal point where the intelligence officer would find "all" of the pertinent information bearing on a given problem.)

The liaison function, on the other hand, represented the beginning of the requirements-collection-dissemination-reference cycle.

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Thus, in January 1946, when CIG was directed to "correlate and evaluate intelligence related to national security" and to assure appropriate dissemination,\* two of the principal actions required to execute this directive were embodied in the liaison function - i.e., collection and dissemination. In other words, someone had to determine what information was needed by the intelligence producers, that it would be collected for them and, finally, that it would reach them.

Against this background, two independent units, the Office of Collection and the Office of Dissemination, were established in July 1946, both directly under the Director of Central Intelligence but operating "within the cognizance" of the Interdepartmental Coordination and Planning Staff (ICAPS). The former acted for the Director in "collecting" foreign intelligence and establishing coordination with the other collection agencies to "determine the means and methods most appropriate" for obtaining such information to support the production of national intelligence by the Office of Research and

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\* Pres. Ltr. of 22 Jan. '46, para 3A; Natl. Security Act, Sec. 102(d)3 and (e); and NSCID-1, paras 7, 10, 11.

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Evaluation (ORE).<sup>\*</sup> Similarly empowered as the DCI's agent, the Office of Dissemination was responsible for disseminating the "evaluated strategic and national policy intelligence" produced by ORE. (Responsibility for disseminating the flow of incoming intelligence documents from the other intelligence agencies was assigned later.)

At first neither Office was involved in "collection" and "dissemination" in the sense in which the terms are traditionally understood in the profession - i.e., actual <sup>by collecting</sup> collection of information in the field and deciding to whom the intelligence should or should not be disseminated. Rather, the "collection" activity had to do with broad planning and coordination within the US intelligence collection apparatus, while "dissemination" was similarly concerned with broad decisions reached on an inter-agency basis regarding permissible distribution of evaluated national intelligence. In short, liaison activities were treated as unique types of interagency

\* Renamed the Office of Reports and Estimates in October 1946.

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coordination, an activity supervised in general by ICAPS.

For whatever reason, the two Offices failed to survive two months. Presumably management almost immediately recognized as artificial the administrative barrier separating the two closely aligned functions. At any rate, on 10 September 1946 they were combined into a single Office of Collection and Dissemination, working directly under the DCI for Reports and Estimates on the one hand and for ICAPS ~~and~~ <sup>(GOD)</sup> ~~for~~ the non-CIG agencies on the other.

The mission was generally the same <sup>as before</sup> although, in retrospect, it appears to have been <sup>made</sup> slightly more realistic. <sup>The new office was subdivided into three functional branches</sup> The Requirements Branch was responsible for determining what each agency wanted to know; the Collection Branch assigned field collection responsibility; and the Dissemination Branch assured proper distribution of ORE-produced intelligence.

Under the circumstances prevailing at that time, however, OCD could, at best, only limp along. Like the other CIG components, it was still seriously

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undermanned and just as seriously lacking in the experience required to effectively perform the proposed centralized service. For instance, the question of central control --even guidance-- of requirements and collection was far from <sup>attainable</sup> intra-agency, let alone inter-agency, accord. ~~solidity~~. Even in dissemination, the staff-hungry Office had to have help disseminating ORE's production. To further complicate matters, the Office had been assigned the additional responsibility of "reading" and distributing all incoming intelligence documents received from the other agencies. ~~SECRET~~

By mid-1947, however, OCD was fairly well into its developmental period and was putting together a callow but reasonably effective liaison operation.

<sup>no</sup> Intense recruitment and training programs were beginning to alleviate its staffing problem <sup>but</sup> and all three branches (Requirements, Collection and Dissemination) were hard-pressed to keep up with the rapidly mounting volume of business.

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
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1947

OCD's



In January (of the same year (1947)), <sup>OCD's</sup> ~~its~~ sister organization, the Reference Center, had been formed and was experiencing the ~~same~~ administrative and operational problems common to all new (and first-of-its-kind) organizations (discussed below).

[Of the two parallel operations,] OCD's six months of seniority <sup>gave</sup> ~~had given~~ it a slight jump on the Reference Center <sup>4th</sup> ~~and~~ although ~~it~~ seemed well on the road toward carrying out its assigned mission, <sup>it</sup> ~~the consolidated office~~ was fast approaching another reorganization - one which, however, would be the last organizational upheaval for almost two decades.\*

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\* In 1967 the functionally arranged Office of Central Reference (OCD's new name from 1955) was drastically reorganized into the area-oriented Central Reference Service (CRS).

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B. The Reference Function

Development of OCD's liaison function, however, was only part of the story. For while the requirements, collection and dissemination machine was being assembled and put into operation, management was simultaneously <sup>forgoing</sup> foregoing a companion piece that was equally important to the new central intelligence concept--a central reference system.

As noted previously, the 1946 Presidential Directive to CIG to "correlate and evaluate intelligence related to national security" and to assure appropriate dissemination, had resulted ultimately in the formation of OCD, the new Agency's liaison arm for requirements, collection and dissemination.

But the Office of Collection and Dissemination, <sup>OCD</sup> as organized in September of 1946, did not represent, even in theory, a complete answer to the problem it was designed to solve. In addition to the information collected through the mechanism of OCD, there already existed large stores of information in the files of other Government agencies. All this somehow had to

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be brought together and made accessible to the estimates officer. Thus, the original CIG planners in early 1946 envisioned the creation of a reference center ~~1-2-67~~, a "total library" where, for the first time, an officer could find in a single place all information bearing on any given problem, and not have to consult any other source. <sup>P</sup> The CIG planners rightfully considered the creation of such a reference center <sup>an</sup> essentially vital part of the <sup>system.</sup> ~~mission~~ ~~1-2-67~~. They also recognized the problem that faced them in determining the nature of the beast to be developed-- i.e., either a system that guaranteed access to the files of participating agencies; or a common library where, in fact, all national security intelligence would be deposited; or a <sup>com</sup> comprise arrangement according to which required intelligence would be released at the holder's discretion. In other words, would it be an interagency effort operated for the benefit of all concerned or a CIG-oriented system developed within the context of "correlation and evaluation of national security intelligence by ORE"?

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At the policy level, early signs indicated a preference for the latter.

Such policy matters notwithstanding, the practical planners\* who were designing the reference center were faced with a task for which there was no precedent or experience upon which they could draw. The problems were formidable and the solutions had to be created, not borrowed. For a library of such hitherto unknown complexity, for example, the <sup>choice</sup> problem of systemizing the mass of information for specialized control was, in itself, almost overwhelming.

The problems of designing the central reference facility remained with the organization's <sup>planners</sup> architects until the close of 1946 when they adopted what they hoped would be a workable solution. They had decided that the required degree of specialization was too unusual for <sup>normal</sup> library terms and would necessitate semi-autonomous satellite libraries: } for graphics, foreign

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\* [redacted] (an ORE senior officer and later Executive, OCD) and [redacted] (O/DCI) Adviser for Organizational Management) were primarily responsible for planning the reference center.

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industrial installations and biographics. In addition, there would be a traditional library for all other material. Probably the most important part of the over-all solution, however, was the decision in favor of unlimited use of business machines wherever applicable in the operations of the new reference center.

On 1 January 1947, the CIA Library, then known as the Intelligence Document Division, was organized. The Central Index (later the Machine Techniques Branch and then the Machine Division) came into being on 17 March, the Foreign Industrial Register in June, and the Graphics Register in July. Actual formation of the Biographic Register was delayed until unique interagency problems could be solved.\* 1-pp 8, 9, 10

In March the planners submitted their blueprints for a reference center to ICAPS. They were approved, with modifications, in June.

The modifications, however, were important because, among other things, they changed a fundamental principle upon which the original proposals

\* The Contact Control Register was also originally placed in the reference center but was transferred to the Office of Operations in August 1948. 1p12/ 2P7/

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<sup>The change</sup>  
had been based and reflected continued policy-  
level preference for a CIG-oriented service  
organization.

<sup>no</sup> According to the March proposals, the basic  
duty of the new organization's chief would be to  
establish "central reference activities for CIG  
and the member agencies."\* The ICAPS version,  
as approved in June, (however,) directed him to  
"Establish the central reference activities for CIG\*  
and maintain appropriate liaison, administrative  
and policy-making activities."

<sup>no</sup> It was obvious that the approving authorities  
wanted an independent reference center whose prime  
(but not exclusive) function was to serve CIG, a  
concept which would subsequently prevail. 1-pp 11, 12

<sup>supplied.</sup>  
\* Italics [ours.]

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Actually the central reference "mission" that was approved by ICAPS in June 1947 was to remain basically unchanged for both the Office of Collection and Dissemination and the Office of Central Reference\* throughout their histories.

Specifically, the statement of mission authorized the Reference Center (RC)

To be the repository for all intelligence and intelligence information to be permanently filed by CIG; to maintain records of all available intelligence sources, intelligence information and intelligence; to provide a reference

\* OCD's new name, adopted August 1955 as being more descriptive of the Office mission.

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library for CIG; and to establish, in coordination with OCD, procedures for utilization of its materials and catalogs by other agencies.

Operations of the Center were closely coordinated with and, in fact, "fed" by those of OCD. As indicated above, the latter functioned independently under the director "and the cognizance of ICAPS" while the Reference Center was attached to the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) "for administrative support." ~~and~~ <sup>The</sup> RC-ORE organizational arrangement lasted barely three months. In September the Center was transferred to the CIA\* Executive for Administration and Management (A&M) for various reasons. First, subordination of a reference unit to a particular production office tended to inordinately channel the reference efforts into that particular form of production. More important, however, was the fact [of life] that ORE had its own problems and considered administrative support to the Reference Center incidental to its own function. There were frequent conflicts between satisfying RC and ORE support requirements and when

\* The Central Intelligence Agency was established in September, 1947, replacing CIG.

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such conflicts occurred, the Center almost invariably received second priority. The Center's plans were ambitious, including <sup>acquisition of</sup> expensive machines and people to operate them, and management was pressuring the <sup>existing</sup> 1947 staff (of 172 people) for speedy development of the basically sound plan of operation. Second priorities, (then,) particularly in budgetary matters, showed that development and justified the Center's transfer to A&M in September.

For eight months after the Center's transfer, it continued to operate in close <sup>collaboration</sup> parallel with OCD, receiving the intelligence collected by the latter office and performing the final function of the collection - dissemination - reference cycle.

By early 1948, <sup>the</sup> however, flaws in the over-all system had become evident.

<sup>no if</sup> In 1946, CIG planners had decided that the liaison functions of requirements, collection and dissemination were sufficiently important to require a separate office where <sup>such</sup> the functions could be concentrated upon exclusively. Although plausible in theory, the scheme did not work out in practice

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because the arrangement isolated OCD's liaison function from both the people who generated requirements (production), and the reference people who knew what was already available. Thus, liaison tended to operate in a vacuum and its staff became increasingly divorced from the realities of both production and reference. Further, their contacts with other offices had become formalized and ritualistic, creating too much paperwork, delay, and inefficiency. ~~sp4&5/~~

The two-year-old fledgling needed corrective <sup>survival</sup> medicine and the Director obliged. In May 1948 General Orders merged the functions of the Reference Center and OCD into a new Office of Collection and Dissemination\* and confirmed Dr. James M. Andrews as the Assistant Director.

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\* Along with the Reference Center, A&M's Central Records Division, Services Branch, was also merged into the new OCD. Of the services involved, however, the messenger and courier service and management of the Agency's administrative records and archives were transferred back to A&M's successor (Deputy Director for Administration) in December 1950, while OCD retained Top Secret Control and "custody" of registered documents." ~~sp4&5/~~

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*not* Dr. Andrews, an enthusiastic advocate of the use of business machines (Electrical Accounting Machines or EAM) for the indexing and retrieval of information, had been brought in from Harvard University in January 1948 to head up the Reference Center. ~~1948/~~

In the new Office of Collection and Dissemination, the liaison function of <sup>the old</sup> OCD (old) was [now] reconstituted as the Liaison Division. The remainder of the Office -- with the exception of administrative support staffs -- was entirely comprised of [the] Reference Center elements which remained unchanged: The CIA Library, [and] the Machine Division; [the Liaison Division], and the Biographic, Industrial and Graphics Registers.\* ~~1948/~~

*not* The arrangement was new but the mission remained unchanged: providing liaison and reference service first and foremost to Agency customers and, secondly, to other departments.

\* Immediately following the consolidation, the Machine Techniques Branch was renamed the Machine Division and the Liaison Branch became the Liaison Division.

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C. Liaison and Reference Merged

The consolidation of liaison and reference was especially important in the development of the collection-dissemination-reference function in CIA. In effect, it recognized the distinction between the theoretical and practical realities of the three activities. [That is,] major decisions regarding allowable dissemination, allocation of field collection responsibilities, and the extent of reference service responsibility, rightly belonged to the higher levels of policy-making and <sup>were</sup> not to be confused with the practical, day-to-day routines. Rather, the latter should be solely concerned with making paper move from one point to another, assuring that analysts' collection requirements were properly coordinated and that they received the information they needed. Two years' experience had also shown that collection and dissemination (i.e., distribution) were routine activities which should not operate as a separate organizational entity but were inseparably bound up with reference. To wit, the "collection" man was

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supposed to know what the analyst needed and where it could be obtained. <sup>file</sup> The "reference" <sup>man</sup> [people], on the other hand, knew what was already available and need not <sup>In recognizing the interdependence,</sup> therefore be collected. [Thus,] OCD's July 1948 "Statement of Functions" was far more realistic than preceding charters and the organizational set-up <sup>was</sup> more workable. Further, the mission statement clearly indicated that OCD would become <sup>essentially</sup> more <sup>workable</sup> a facility for CIA alone than a truly centralized file where the intelligence officer could find all the necessary information without having to check other sources.

*The narrowness of this mission was influenced by several factors.*

First, as the system had developed up to 1948, there had been no call for Central Intelligence to establish a collection or reference system for the entire intelligence community.\* <sup>Second,</sup> [Further,] any attempt to "coordinate"--that is, to determine the contents of other agencies' files in order to obtain pertinent

\* Later there would be a few exceptions, such as the delegation of responsibility to CIA for biographic intelligence under NSCID-8 of 28 May 1948.

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information--<sup>have</sup> would <sup>of</sup> involve the Director's "right  
of inspection" (apparently never invoked by any DCI)  
as well as the issuance and enforcement of interagency  
compliance directives. To these and other policy  
reasons was added a clinching, practical argument:  
surveys conducted in 1946 and 1947 had clearly  
indicated that such an interagency "library" would  
be too extensive and complex to permit effective  
central management. 1-PP 17, 18, 20

Thus, the dilemma that had plagued early CIG  
planners had now been resolved. Finally cast aside  
was any idea of an OCD "super" file. Instead, the  
decision had been made to continue the system's  
development within the context of "correlation and  
evaluation of national security intelligence"--  
that is, as produced by ORE.

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Although arranged somewhat differently, the functions of the OCD units remained basically unchanged. The Library would continue to serve as a general repository for the machine-indexed collection of intelligence documents; the Biographic, Graphics, and Industrial Registers would maintain files and provide service within their respective fields of responsibility; and the Machine Division would provide machine support and develop new EAM techniques as required. The Liaison Division would continue its liaison functions of requirements, collection and dissemination.

In short, the mission statement removed any confusion about prerogatives and functional responsibilities. The keyword was "service."

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Any doubts about the Office's mission were quickly dispelled in November 1948 in a "Memorandum for All Hands, OCD" from the new Assistant Director. In what was a total statement of policy, "Jamie" Andrews flatly identified service to Agency requesters as the Office's "major function" and

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specified that such requests would never be denied unless "compliance would work harm to the Agency by interfering with other [vital] services..." Burying the old ritualistic approach for all time was his [typically brusque] warning that "No hint of this approach will be tolerated today." Channels and procedures, as far as Dr. Andrews was concerned, were worthless if they failed to yield "practical results." In short, Andrews held that OCD [primarily] existed to provide service to CIA customers and would not concern itself with questions of policy, prestige, or prerogatives.

The OCD that emerged from the May 1948 reorganization was a viable, service-dedicated organization. By the end of the year, it had fully absorbed the May changes and was already proving itself to be <sup>an effective office,</sup> ~~an effectively~~ [workable organization.] The organizational structure, in fact, was to remain basically unchanged throughout the Hillenkoetter and Smith administrations\* despite the impact of major

\* Admiral Hillenkoetter served as DCI from May 1947 to October 1950 and General Smith from October 1950 to February 1953.

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investigations by the Eberstadt [Committee] and [the] Dulles Committee<sup>s</sup>. Ironically, both committees surveyed OCD during and immediately after the reorganization and both came to similar conclusions.

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The Eberstadt Committee\* in its December 1948 report acknowledged that OCD appeared to be an efficient operation under its "new head" although it had sometimes acted as a "bottleneck" in the past. The Committee suggested, however, that the title "OCD" was a misnomer, that it should become purely a reference service, and that its liaison functions should be "split off."

The Dulles group's survey report of January 1949\*\* similarly recommended that OCD's collection and dissemination functions be transferred to a new "Coordination Division" (an expanded ICAPS) and that the "library, index and register functions" be placed in a "centralized Research and Reports Division (ORE)." The survey team

- \* The Hoover Commission's Task Force on National Security Organization headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt.
- \*\* The committee of consultants chaired by Allan Dulles had been established in February 1948 to survey CIA and the US intelligence community. The committee began its survey of OCD about mid-1948.

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was thus urging return to an organizational set-up which had already proved unworkable. However, the Dulles Committee had begun its investigation immediately after the OCD reorganization and therefore had neither the opportunity to observe how the functions (collection, dissemination and reference) had operated separately, nor what the consolidated Office was capable of achieving after its "shake down" period. Under such circumstances, the Committee's conclusions were understandable--i.e., viewing collection and dissemination as functions of coordination (ICAPS) to be managed apart from reference which they considered adjunctive to research (ORE).

The report, ~~thoroughly reviewed in an early history of OCD, and~~ in essence, constituted a plan to dismember OCD and parcel out its functions to other Agency components.

The reply to the Dulles Committee report by the AD/CD (Andrews) to the Director was immediate and characteristically devastating. In his memorandum of rebuttal, Dr. Andrews zeroed in on the obvious

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fact that the proposed functional separation had already been tried and found wanting. He cited the reasons why the arrangement had failed and emphasized, contrary to the Committee's view, the close inter-relationship of liaison and reference. It was only after lengthy and often painful experience, Andrews held, that the Agency had indisputably learned that the two functions were indeed so closely related that they were performed best by a single, independent administrative unit. In his words, it was

too early to say that the present is the best of all possible organizational patterns for these functions, but it is not too early to say that it represents an improvement over the older and more obvious pattern which is now proposed anew. ~~1 P30/~~

The Director agreed and in his February 1949 comments to the National Security Council (NSC), rejected the Dulles Committee's recommendations. The NSC, <sup>on the other hand</sup> in turn, endorsed the Committee's plan. It was, however, a limited endorsement since it contained the reservation that "there may be other

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methods of organization which will accomplish the same objectives." ~~10337~~

In July (of) 1950 (three months prior to his departure), Hillenkoetter received still another reorganization plan for OCD, this one having been prepared by his Management Staff after a year's study. The plan, <sup>which</sup> affected only two of OCD's six divisions (the Liaison and Machine Divisions), would transfer some of their functions to other Agency components and reconstitute the remaining functions, along with the Library and the three Registers, as the Office of Reference and Dissemination. The so-called ORD Plan proposed that LD's collection requirements function be re-established under the "joint control" of the requirements staffs of ORE and OSI; <sup>e</sup> and that LD's <sup>functions</sup> (work) of obtaining information from the files of other Government agencies <sup>and maintaining</sup> (as well as maintenance of) its Control Register of CIA contacts with other Government agencies be transferred, respectively, to the Office of Operations (OO) and the Inspection and Security Staff.

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With regard to the Machine Division's responsibility for providing EAM support to all Agency units, the Staff proposed that, since machine work for OO's  had recently been decentralized to OO, [that now] the indexing of Agency employees (especially for the finance and personnel offices) *similarly* be transferred to the Special Support Staff. The *remaining* OCD functions that would be assigned, along with the Library and the three Registers, to the proposed ORD <sup>Component</sup> [consisted of] MD's primary work with indexed intelligence documents, and such administrative services as the courier and messenger activity, the records management program, and <sup>the</sup> custodianship of archives. Although Admiral Hillenkoetter asked *of* the Assistant Directors who would be involved *for* their *for* comments, he expressed <sup>his own</sup> concern that the proposed "dismemberment of OCD" would be more costly than the existing arrangement. ~~1955-37-40~~ <sup>FF</sup> Still other OCD organizational problems, (which had been) under study from mid-1950 onward, included centralized procurement of foreign language publications, the creation of consumer-oriented branch libraries, and the handling

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
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of "special intelligence" documentation. 1. pp 40 & 41/

*no 11*  
Resolution of these and other problems regarding  
OCD depended, to a considerable degree, on the  
impending reorganization of the production offices  
which, of course, was being held for consideration by  
the <sup>incoming</sup> (new) Director of Central Intelligence.

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General Walter B. Smith succeeded Admiral Hillenkoetter  
on 7 October 1950. He very quickly announced formation  
of a new Office of Research and Reports (ORR) on  
13 November\* and, a few days later, an Office of Intel-  
ligence coordination (O<sup>I</sup>/C).\*\*

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\* In this production office reorganization, ORE was  
replaced by ORR (first under Theodore Babbitt and  
shortly afterward, [redacted] and the Office  
of National Estimates (ONE) under [redacted]  
Less than two months later, on 15 January 1951, the  
Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) was established  
under Kingman Douglass. The Office of Scientific  
Intelligence (organized in December 1948) remained  
under Marshall H. Chadwell. "Chron" Vol. I p. 39/

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\*\* ICAPS, established in July 1946, had been renamed  
COAPS (Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff)  
in July of 1950. The new OIC thus replaced COAPS.  
"Chron" Vol. I p. 37/

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~~OCD - 11~~

Since General Smith, immediately after taking office, had announced his intention of implementing the Dulles Plan, it now appeared certain that ORR and OIC would absorb the functions of the Office of Collection and Dissemination. (OCD's reference and machine support functions even appeared in a proposed ORR organizational chart.) ~~1 pps 43 & 44/~~

After a month of deliberation, however, <sup>General Smith decided</sup> just as Admiral Hillenkoetter had decided to leave OCD essentially intact (despite or partly because of NSC's limited endorsement of the Dulles Plan), so too did General Smith.

*no PP*  
On 1 December 1950, it was announced that OCD would remain <sup>as it was, both</sup> essentially intact organizationally and functionally. On the same date, the new CIA organizational chart <sup>again</sup> showed OCD, but this time grouped with the production offices under the new Deputy Director for Central Intelligence, William H. Jackson. The only functional changes were minor and involved the transfer of administrative support activities to the DD/A (see footnote on page ~~15~~, above).

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OCD - 12

Beginning with General Smith's administration, OCD embarked on a long period of organizational and functional stability that was also characterized by growth, especially during the first two years (1951 and 1952). In that relatively short time span, the office's staff, ~~as noted previously~~, almost doubled in size, from about 400 people in 1950 to nearly 700 by February 1953, and the files more than doubled to a total of over a million regularly classified documents -- a total which included neither the large holdings of Top Secret and specially classified material nor the Library's already extensive unclassified collections. ~~1 p 47~~

With the operation stabilized and the "central reference" concept generating a rapidly increasing workload, management <sup>renewed</sup> <sup>concern for</sup> turned its attention to OCD's organizational problems which had been under study since the summer of 1950. The problems, none of which had been mentioned in either the Dulles recommendations or in the "ORD Plan," revolved about OCD's jurisdiction over certain types of

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GCD - 13

materials, expansion of its documentary holdings, and further demands for specialized services.

As a result of management's studies, <sup>a few small changes were made</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>which largely resolved the problems</sup> problems were largely resolved but the resultant changes did not effect either OCD's basic charter or organizational structure. Relatively inconspicuous as the changes were, they nonetheless significantly bolstered OCD's jurisdiction as


the Agency's central reference facility. ~~1 p V52/~~

For example, the responsibility for distributing all IAC cables within CIA was transferred from ORE (not yet reorganized into ORR) to OCD and re-established as a Cable Branch in the Liaison Division in February [of] 1951. ~~1-V52 & 2-VII-1/~~

Similarly, OCD's Agency-wide responsibility for the procurement of foreign language publications was affirmed in December 1950 and early the following year the function was centralized within the Library. (Procurement had previously been split among the Library, OO's Foreign Document Division and the DD/A's Procurement Office. In addition, most operating offices had ordered such publications independently.) ~~1-VII, 52/~~

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25X1X8



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- 31 -

OCD - 14

25X1X8

Another issue concerned further development of facilities for exploiting "special intelligence" (SI) -- in this instance, choosing between local (decentralized) control of SI indexing and reference services by the originating office, or merging the services into OCD's centralized system and thus continue movement toward the ideal of "all-source" coverage. To assure that storage techniques used for special intelligence would be compatible with those used for collateral intelligence, responsibility for the SI indexing and reference functions (but not for requirements and dissemination) was transferred to OCD in June 1951. The activities, which previously had been handled by the CIA Advisory Council (for communications intelligence), were now re-established in OCD's new Special Register on a compartmented basis -- that is, physically located within OCI's\* "closed" area. 1-V41, 52, 74/

\* OCI, as noted previously, had just been organized in January (of the same year.)

1951

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~~OCD-15~~

{Also} in the same year, OCD responded to increasing demands from Agency components outside the production area by establishing three branch libraries: one located in K Building to serve DDP components; another in Central Building for the Medical Office; and the third in Alcott Hall to serve the Office of Training. The satellite branches were designed to make the main library's specialized holdings more immediately accessible to offices located away from the main collection.

~~1-11-53/77~~

In addition, there were <sup>yet</sup> two unresolved "problems" involving the Industrial Register and the Biographic Register which <sup>did effect</sup> OCD's basic charter. <sup>Plans were</sup> Under consideration, for instance, <sup>no</sup> were plans to obtain an NSC charter that would formally recognize the Industrial Register (IR) as a service of common concern and strengthen its jurisdiction in order to eliminate duplication of files and effort in other US agencies.

<sup>under taken</sup> Similarly, other efforts had been <sup>no</sup> under way to extend the NSC-approved charter of the Biographic Register (BR) to include responsibility for coverage

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~~OCD - 16~~

of foreign, nonscientific personalities. The Register was the only OCD component that was armed with an NSC directive. The directive, NSCID-8, promulgated 25 May 1948, was a "common concern" charter that made CIA responsible for biographic coverage of foreign scientific and technical <sup>personalities</sup> types. In practice, however, the pressure of requester demands from both CIA and non-CIA offices had virtually forced BR to extend its coverage to include all types of foreign personalities. It was for this broader biographic responsibility that the planners sought authority in a revised NSCID-8.

25X1X8



25X1X8



After General Smith became DCI (in October 1950), plans for NSC formalization of the Industrial Register's function were apparently shelved as a matter of official inter-agency discussion. The biographic problem, however, was referred to the Office of Intelligence Coordination early in 1951 for study.


After more than six months of investigation, OIC in September reported an agreement among the IAC agencies to enlarge the scope of CIA's biographic responsibilities, but only to <sup>to the extent of including</sup> include foreign personalities of "economic concern." The principle of a completely

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34 -  
-OCD - 17

25X1X8

 centralized biographic reference facility was rejected as "not at present practicable" and the committee limited itself to expressing the hope, somewhat piously, that there would be

completely free access, subject only to legitimate security considerations... among the departmental biographic facilities, so that all the resources of the intelligence community will be exploited to meet the requirements of any department.

1-V42&80-82/

*Source?*

By the close of 1952, then, OCD had absorbed the effects of several reorganizations and had been progressively developed into <sup>a</sup> worthwhile central <sub>^</sub> reference facility for CIA and (secondarily) for the rest of the intelligence community.

Much had been accomplished by the Office's architects and leadership. Singularly fortunate was the fact that the leadership had not only been highly capable but continuous from the beginning, particularly with regard to Dr. Andrews. As noted above, he had been brought in to head up the Reference Center in January 1948 and four months later (in May) was selected to lead the merged

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OCD - 18

operation as Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination. In both jobs, Andrews put into highly successful and pioneering practice his enthusiasm for the use of business machines (EAM) for the indexing and retrieval of information. He was to continue his forceful leadership as AD/CD until his resignation in August 1957. Dr. Andrews' principal assistants had also held key positions from the earliest years of OCD's development. His

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Deputy was [redacted] who, prior to his appointment as DAD in April 1951, had been assistant chief of the Liaison Division from October 1949.

His first Executive <sup>Officer</sup> was [redacted]

25X1

originally a senior officer in ORE, <sup>and [redacted]</sup> [redacted]

25X1

and [redacted] were the chief designers of the

original Reference Center.) When [redacted] was

25X1

reassigned in August 1952, he was succeeded by

[redacted] <sup>who had been</sup> the CIA Librarian since June 1947.

Andrews' principle of centralized service was the driving force behind OCD's operations and would continue as the dominant theme of its successor

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76  
OCD - 19

organizations. There would always be administrative conflict with the proponents of decentralization but the trend toward the goal of complete centralization would continue during the years to come.

*of an...  
of an...  
of an...*

Thus, as OCD moved into a period of consolidation, its role as a central reference facility (at the end of 1952) was broadly recognized and the authors of the 1950-1953 OCD history noted that

The development of OCD's reference facilities as an inter-Agency support organization, available alike to the departmental intelligence agencies and to the CIA offices, was also advanced, between 1950 and 1953, but progress was made less by organizational change and formal directive than by continuing CIA/OCD policy to proffer its services to the IAC member agencies, and to extend its assistance to them in all possible cases, limited only by priority demands for service from within the Agency. Under this policy, reaffirmed in January 1951 and March 1953, there was no reference division in OCD that did not have an extensive clientele among the other agencies, and only in rare cases was it necessary to deny their requests because of priority demands within the Agency.

1-v79, 78/ 11

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III  
IV.

Early Organizational History and Development to 1953

[ Such was the Office of Collection and Dissemination in 1953, <sup>the</sup> ~~its~~ <sup>of the</sup> operational cycle still comprised ~~of~~ the two original functions: liaison (requirements, collection and dissemination) and reference; together with the machine data processing which had rapidly become the third major function. ]

The genesis and general development of the Office of Collection and Dissemination -- <sup>liaison, reference, and machine data processing</sup> three functions <sup>had been</sup> the work of policy makers <sup>processing</sup> and senior planners. It was OCD's line divisions, however, <sup>borne</sup> which had borne the brunt of making the plans work by successfully crafting the practical machine. Theirs <sup>was</sup> had been a hectic, often painful and frustrating experience -- creating a new world of information handling while they grew almost bewilderingly in size, responsibility, and sophistication. As with any new activity, they <sup>began</sup> had begun with a directive and a handful of people and had traveled the pathfinder's route of invention, challenge and change before finally achieving operational maturity.

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- 49 -

This odyssey--the organizational evolution of  
OCD's divisions and registers--has never been formally  
chronicled. The only extant official history of the  
Office of Collection and Dissemination\* is more an  
office-level, functional survey of OCD which only  
treats of the working level units referentially.

[Historically essential, then, is the need to complement  
that Office survey <sup>must be complemented with brief</sup> with individual histories of OCD's  
component elements--their origins and subsequent  
development. The individual chronicles, however,  
must remain relatively brief. First, the scope of  
this paper precludes essaying the exhaustive individual  
studies which the units' importance and operational  
complexity justify. In addition, there is <sup>an occasional</sup> [a sometime]  
scarcity of historical documentation on some of the  
divisions [during various time periods]. For the most  
part, the high-level direction and enabling issuances  
are [generally] available but [it is] the routine admin-  
istrative paperwork, the in-house working level issuances

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\*The 1954 [ ] paper summarized in Chapter II.

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-50-

through which an organization's development can be plotted, [that] are frequently unobtainable. The scarcity of this type of documentation is especially apparent for the earliest [developmental] years of the several offices for collection and dissemination; -- that is, from their inception in early 1946 to mid-1948 when they were merged with the Reference Center.

[ Hopefully, the historical evidence must exist somewhere but further, deeper research is necessary to determine whether the documentation still survives, buried in some highly unlikely crypt, or whether it was indeed disposed of during one of the records reduction programs which regularly sweep the Agency. At any rate, the histories of OCD's organizational elements will be brief--primarily because of the time factor rather than lack of documentation--and, for reasons of clarity and continuity, will follow the same pattern of functional development which prevails in the preceding chapter--that is, liaison and reference. ]

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- 51 -

A. The Liaison Elements

Liaison (requirements, collection, and dissemination) was the primal element in the development of OCD. As previously noted, almost immediately after the close of World War II, the Presidential Memorandum of 22 January 1946 established, inter alia, the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) under a Director of Central Intelligence. It directed the DCI to correlate and evaluate intelligence "relating to national security" and to assure appropriate dissemination. 11/ The principal actions thus required to execute the basic directive were collection (both in the field and from other agencies' files), evaluation, and dissemination. Accordingly, in order to carry out these activities, General Vandenberg on 19 July 1946 signed into existence the first four offices of the new Central Intelligence Group to provide centralized "services of common concern." 12/ The four offices, shown on what is apparently the first CIG organizational

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- 52 -

(dated 12 July 1946), )

Chart\* were the Office of Special Operations, the Office of Collection, the Office of Research and Evaluation, and the Office of Dissemination.

(Figure *V*). *\*3* *not needed*

The fundamental importance of collection and dissemination to the new central intelligence operation, or to any intelligence operation for that matter, is self-evident. Before intelligence can be evaluated, it has to be collected; and the finished product produced therefrom has to be distributed if it is to serve its purpose. It is therefore not surprising that collection and dissemination accounted for two of the first four offices established by CIG and that each

*not needed* \*

One previous chart, issued as Appendix "B" to the NIA Directive of 8 February 1946, reflects CIG's planning status at that time--the initial five-month period under the first DCI, Admiral Sidney W. Souers. With the exception of the Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB), the chart shows only an Administrative Section and two operating staffs: the Central Planning Staff (to design CIG); and the Central Reports Staff, the ad interim producer of the President's daily intelligence summary. The planned operating divisions are simply forecast by the line "Central Intelligence Services (To be determined)." (Figure 2) Attachment "A" lists the Group's initial personnel authorization, totaling 165 slots, 43 each from State and Navy and 79 from the War Department. 13/

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
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPENDIX "B"

INITIAL ORGANIZATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP



NIA DIR 2  
8 February 1946

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Figure 2*  
*HS/HC-621*



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- 53 -

was an independent office under an Assistant Director who answered directly to the DCI.

The Office of Collection (OC) was responsible for collecting intelligence "required for the production of strategic and national policy intelligence" and for coordinating the collection of necessary foreign intelligence with other government agencies. The Office of Dissemination (OD), on the other hand, was to assure proper distribution of the "strategic and national policy intelligence" produced by ORE. Thus, at the very outset of Agency history, the ancestral elements (OC and OD) of what one day would become the Office of Central Reference, had been established--at least on papers.<sup>f</sup>

As with all new organizations, CIG's initial period of existence was primarily devoted to planning and organizational development. The only significant line activity was carried out by the Central Reports Staff which had been hurriedly assembled to produce daily intelligence reports for the President and other top officials. By June 1946, when the first

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- 54 -

DCI, Admiral Sidney W. Souers, submitted his Progress Report to the NIA, 14/ he reported that CIG activities since its activation on 8 February had been

...characterized principally by the administrative details of organization, the consideration of urgent problems, and the basic planning for a sound future intelligence program.

Noting that 71 of the then authorized strength of 165 people had been brought in from State and the Service Departments, the Admiral reviewed the progress which had been made toward achieving the major goals established for CIG. Collection and dissemination were among the problems for which, he said, "immediate solutions are well advanced.\* He concluded that since the planning phase had been completed, "the operation of centralized intelligence services should be undertaken by CIG at the earliest practicable date."

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\* Included in the category was the "Central Register of Intelligence Information," later to be known as the Reference Center, whose parallel development would merge with that of collection and dissemination in 1948.

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- 55 -

Thus the initial five-month planning phase under Admiral Souers had come to an end and on 10 June 1946 Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg became the second DCI, generally coincidental with the outset of the actual organization building period. Having started with the most rudimentary set-up (Figure 1), the organizational structure was now in a constant state of flux, changing almost weekly as the new central intelligence machine geared up to carry out its assignment. It was a period of feverish activity and organized chaos for the new agency's first members. New services were being established to meet new post-War needs of the Intelligence Community. At the same time, many of the functions of the Strategic Services Unit, then undergoing liquidation, were being absorbed. Personnel recruitment accelerated quickly after the initial drafts had been supplied by State, War and Navy. Personnel rosters, lists of assignments and reassignments appeared almost daily. By July, at least the basic structure had begun to take shape and <sup>was</sup> set forth in the 20 July organizational chart mentioned above. Two days later, a second set of charts

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- 56 -

was issued "showing the tentative organization and functions of the components of the Central Intelligence Group down to and including the branch level." 15/  
The more detailed nature of the 22 July charts (Figure 3) dramatically illustrates the bewildering proliferation of the new agency.\* <sup>On Plate No. 4 (Figure 3)</sup> There were still only four operating offices (OC, OD, ORE and OSO), each of which <sup>(Plates 6, 7 and 8)</sup> was now broken down to the branch level with the exception of OSO, for which there was simply a sterile statement of mission. The scope of responsibilities assigned to the early Offices for Collection and Dissemination is rather surprising and, as it developed, were quite short-lived, particularly with regard to the former.

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\* This is particularly true of the Director's Executive Staff which, at this early point, has become a veritable hodgepodge of nascent functional elements. Plate No. 4 shows no less than 15 units and sub-units, temporarily grouped under the Executive Director for developmental purposes, but nearly all of which will subsequently become operating offices or major divisions--for example, security, communications, special intelligence (the Advisory Council), finance and personnel.

(Figure 3)

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- 57 -

The Office of Collection, as charted on Plate No. 6 (Figure 3), had six branches. Two of them, the Information Control Branch (OC's Message Center for receiving and distributing raw intelligence) and the Personnel and Administration Branch, were supervised by the Executive. In addition there were four operating branches, one each for Security, Requirements, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence, and something called "Special Intelligence." Thus, in addition to the basic requirements and collection activities, the original Office of Collection was assigned broad security powers\* including, but not restricted to Top Secret Control and custodianship of registered documents; responsibility for monitoring foreign broadcasts; and ~~some~~ <sup>the aforementioned</sup> rather vague activity in the field of "special intelligence."

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\* For example, the Branch's primary responsibility was to prescribe "such information controls, counterintelligence measures, and over-all security measures as may be required to secure the operations of the CIG."

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- 5 -

The Office of Dissemination (Plate No. 8, Figure 3) was composed of three branches: Distribution (mail and reproduction services), Intelligence Control and Surveys and Reports. The Intelligence Control Branch applied to dissemination the "over-all security measures prescribed by the Security Branch of the Collection Office"--for example, authentication of document classification and security control of dissemination procedures. The main job of the Surveys and Reports Branch was to assist ORE, primarily in the dissemination of evaluated strategic and national policy intelligence produced by the latter office. The Branch was also assigned, inter alia, responsibility for the maintenance of an "intelligence operations room" and a briefing and presentations capability.

Personnel records for both Offices are incomplete for the period. The Acting Assistant Director for Collection was [redacted] [redacted] was assigned to the Security Branch, presumably as Chief. [redacted] was the Acting Assistant Director for Dissemination.

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25X1A9A

25X1A9A

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- 89 -

25X1A9A

Other key personnel assignments to OD included Army

[redacted]

and

25X1A9A

25X1A9A

[redacted] 16/ [redacted] initial CIG assignment in February 1946 had been that of Acting Assistant Chief of the Central Planning Staff.)

Both operations were housed in what was then known as the "New" War Department Building at 21st Street and Virginia Avenue, N.W., the site of today's State Department headquarters building.

Such were the functions and organizational structures of the original Offices of Collection and Dissemination as officially described in July of 1946. It is difficult to determine the extent to which the Offices actually got under way in executing all the functions initially assigned to them. Possibly, some were never more than "paper assignments." The charts themselves, as well as the Administrative Order to which they were attached, were labeled "tentative." The Administrative Order further declared that

Because of limited personnel presently available, the Office of Collection and the Office of Dissemination...activities will necessarily be restricted largely to planning for future operations.

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- 60 -

One month later, another Administrative Order setting forth the "Interim Policy and Procedure for Dissemination" still specified that ORE would continue to disseminate its own intelligence products until the Office of Dissemination had obtained sufficient personnel to function adequately. 17/

Whether or not the Offices actually did achieve an operational mode by early September [at least,] personnel orders attest to the assignment of people and rooms and daily security check duties), they remained in a constant state of change. Within a relatively short period, they not only lost numerous of their originally-assigned functions but their separate identities as well. The first change concerned OC's relationship to the Office of Special Operations. Included in the mission of the Office of Collection was the following:

In conjunction with the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff [ICAPS] and the Office of Special Operations, conducts constant research into the field of collection of information, and recommends new means, methods and techniques for improving the over-all intelligence coverage by United States governmental collecting agencies. (Plate No. 6, Figure 3)

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But the original clandestine services people would have none of this. They considered their collection operation sacrosanct. As a result, a change order appeared on 6 August 1946 which deleted the words "and the Office of Special Operations" from the OC statement of mission. 18/

Then, on 10 September, presumably for obvious administrative reasons, the separate Offices of Collection and Dissemination and all their functions were merged into a single Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD). 19/ Excepted from the merger were the functions of the former Office of Dissemination "pertaining to maintaining an operations room, and briefings and presentations in connection therewith," which were transferred to ORE.

FOIAB3B1

FOIAB3B1

Next, the new Office lost the [redacted] [redacted] the Office of Operations when the latter was activated on 17 October 1946 20/ and, on 1 July of the following year, the OCD Security Branch, originally in OC, was abolished and its functions transferred to the Executive for Inspections

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-62-

and Security (I&E). 21/\* Left unexplained by available [historical] documentation is the nature and fate of the original OC's Special Intelligence Branch, [whose mission was to determine

...the utilization of such special means and methods of collecting information as may be placed at the disposal of the Director of Central Intelligence. (Plate No. 6, Figure 3)


Both the Branch's title and mission statement thus suggest communications intelligence but that special field was handled at that time by the Advisory Council under the Executive Director. (Plate No. 4, Figure 3) However, General Vandenberg, in discussing CIG's progress at the Fourth NIA Meeting on 17 July 1946, observed that CIG was receiving "daily requests" to take over functions performed by other departments, including one suggestion that "CIG centralize the handling of codes and ciphers to improve their ]

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\* Presumably, Top Secret Control and custodianship of registered documents were among the functions transferred but both would be assigned back to OCD in May 1948.

-62.1-

[security." Another source recalls a February 1947 briefing which mentioned a planned "censorship function" for OCD. It is also possible that the Branch's function was intended to support the activities of the Office of Special Operations in some manner. None of these suggested proposals ever materialized, of course--at least, not within OCD--and whatever its <sup>intended</sup> purpose, the Special Intelligence Branch appeared only on that first CIG organizational chart of 22 July 1946. No subsequent charts contained such a unit.



NOT IMPLEMENTED PENDING OPERATIONAL NEED

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(c. Oct. '46)

Figure 4  
H 2/10-631

CIG Organization - 1 July 1947




Figure 5  
A/S/H/C - 631

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By late summer of 1946 the mission<sup>^</sup>--now charged<sup>^</sup> to a consolidated Office of Collection and Dissemination<sup>^</sup>--had been pared back to its primary liaison<sup>^</sup> functions of requirements, collection and dissemination. (Actually, its security functions would remain until their transfer to the I&E Staff some six months later.) The new Office was structured into three branches-- one each for Requirements, Collection and Dissemination (Figure 4)\*--and its assigned basic mission was

To determine the collection and dissemination requirements for strategic and national policy intelligence information and intelligence; and to formulate and supervise the implementation of operating plans, policies and procedures in connection therewith...

22/

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\* On this undated organizational chart, the time of which has been established as October 1946, the projection of an Office of Security was premature. The particular security conception envisioned here was never realized. Instead, an Inspections and Security Staff under the Executive Director was organized on 1 July 1947. (See also Figure 5.) The Office of Security, as such, actually did not appear until February 1955.

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*Handwritten notes:*  
The main...  
with...  
from...

25X1A9A

[Redacted]

OD Chief, was

named the first Assistant Director for Collection

and Dissemination. Chosen for the Deputy job was

25X1A9A

[Redacted]

, also from OD.

[Redacted]

25X1A9A

25X1A9A

[Redacted]

the only hold-over from OC, was named to

head up the new Office's Collection Branch and

25X1A9A

[Redacted]

the Requirements Branch. The

third branch (Dissemination) was set up under

25X1A9A

[Redacted]

who had originally been assigned from

State to CIG and slotted as the Acting Administrative

25X1A9A

Officer.

[Redacted]

Chief of the Office

of Collection, was reassigned to the Office of the

Director and shortly thereafter returned to the War

Department.) 23/

The Office had emerged from its incubation stage and was struggling to solve the problems inherent in all newly achieved operational capabilities. Not surprisingly, the most immediate collection and dissemination problems involved OSO and OO. Especially irritating to OSO, for example, was the fledgling OCD's habit of simultaneously levying collection requirements upon overt and covert sources. OSO rightfully held that overt possibilities (nonclandestine

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- 65 -

overseas sources as well as headquarters' files) should be exhausted before their limited covert resources were approached. Among other matters worrying both OSO and OO was the ever-present danger of having one of their sources compromised by OCD Collection Directives levied on other agencies concerning reports which had originated with OO/C or OSO.

Far more basic, however, were the two major problems of coordinating field collection and, secondly, defining OCD's collection and dissemination role. With regard to the first problem, the field representatives of the several U.S. Departments had always reacted solely to home office collection requirements irrespective of category. To conform to the new centralized intelligence concept, the NIA sought to coordinate field activities--namely, to maximize the collection capability by avoiding unproductive duplication and improper channeling--by allocating Agency collection responsibilities within certain broad categories. Thus, the Department of State was assigned responsibility for political, cultural and sociological

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- 66 -

subjects, and the War and Navy Departments for, respectively, military and naval matters. Each agency was free to collect economic and scientific information according to their respective needs. 24/ Confusion resulted among the field collectors. Generally, the provisions of the NIA directive were in conflict with, or at best not in consonance with, outstanding departmental collection directives. Washington itself first had to be coordinated through the issuance of revised departmental collection directives reflecting the NIA pattern. Further, field collectors were reluctant to conform because of basic loyalties. They had to be assured that copies of anything they collected outside of their delegated sphere of interest and then turned over to the primary agent, would indeed also be made available to their home office. Or, more broadly, that the collateral or secondary intelligence needs of no Washington department would suffer from the elimination of duplicate reporting. Continued pressure from Washington eventually achieved working effectiveness in coordinated collection but it was

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to take a long time. In fact, it would never be completely achieved.

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e The other major problem was defining OCD's role in collection and dissemination--particularly with regard to the latter. From the outset, OCD's collection function was generally understood to be one of broad planning and coordination with respect to the government's intelligence collection system--i.e., a liaison activity--rather than direct involvement in field collection. OCD's function, in other words, was that of a middle-man allocating responsibility for field collection of required intelligence. There were, however, officially recognized exceptions to even this rather mundane role. The Office of Special Operations dealt directly with the FBI and other counterparts and would, in fact, accept from OCD only requirements of demonstrated importance which could not be collected through overt channels. Similarly, OO frequently by-passed the OCD mechanism and worked directly with its own sources, as would the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) with the AEC a

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short time later. Moreover, even within the "middle-man" sphere, OCD's authority was further dichotomized in that it handled only "specific" collection requirements. Responsibility for "general" or "standing" types of requirements belonged to the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS).\*

? Contrary to the relatively clear cut status of OCD in the sphere of collection, however, its dissemination role was surrounded by confusion from the beginning. To avoid another Pearl Harbor, the NSC had placed a positive obligation upon the DCI to keep the policy and operational echelons of the Government informed with timely and accurate warnings through the fullest exchange of information. This was basically a positive charge devoid of exceptions. Thus, the CIG Administrative Order which, in August 1946, set forth an interim policy for the dissemination of CIG-produced intelligence,

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\* ICAPS had replaced the Central Planning Staff (CPS) in July 1946.

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in effect directed that all such intelligence would be disseminated by OCD "in close collaboration with ORE and interested offices and staffs." 25/ The intelligence dissemination principle, however, also implied a negative system of controls to safeguard the information. The Administrative Order had also stated that desirable changes would be made to meet organizational requirements. The "interested offices and staffs" began pressuring for the "desirable changes"--i.e., negative controls to safeguard the intelligence to be disseminated. In the process that would take place over the next half-dozen years, OCD's role as a disseminator of "all" intelligence would change to that of disseminator of only that intelligence which could safely be disseminated on a "need to know" basis. The function moved toward decentralization, in contrast to the basic, fundamental principle of centralization. Offices such as OSO and OO naturally wanted to protect their sources and methods and their material was "sanitized" prior to dissemination, or, as in the case of the former's counterespionage reports, withheld altogether.

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Within a short period of time many other types of reports would be exempt from the OCD channels. Nonetheless, most types of Agency-produced reports as well as the largest bulk of incoming material came within the purview of OCD's dissemination system. Dissemination, even with all the exceptions, rapidly became the largest and most meaningful of OCD's functions. As previously noted, it was soon afterward described as "the single most important tool for carrying out the Director's continuing obligation to insure exchange of intelligence..." Dissemination, in fact, was to remain an OCD function long after the other two original activities (requirements and collection) had been transferred to other offices.\* Given the broad and ill-defined terms of its original mandate, and the fact that only some of the functional conflicts were essentially

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\* Domestic collection (from US Government sources) went to OO/C in July 1961; the requirements function to the Collection Guidance Staff (CGS), O/DDI in June 1963; and the remaining pure liaison activities to CGS and the Domestic Contact Service (formerly OO) in January 1967.

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resolved during its first year of operation, OCD came to be recognized simply as an intermediary between the collector and the producer;\* and as a distribution center within CIG and a central clearing house for the routing of intelligence within the government.

By early 1947, then, the operation in the new Office of Collection and Dissemination had settled down as much as any operation could in that early, tumultuous period. If the Office's mission was more plebian than was originally envisaged, its services were nonetheless vital to the Government's new centralized intelligence operation. In January 1947 when General Vandenberg presented his Year-End Report (for 1946) to the NIA, he highlighted, among other things, the increasing workloads of OCD's Collection and Dissemination Branches. He noted that the former was already handling collection requests from seven Government agencies in addition to the internal CIG requests, and that the other agencies had "come more and more to call on [OCD] to assist

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\* There would be minor exceptions in the future when, as in 1950, <sup>and 1955,</sup> OCD was to engage in direct field collection by sending survey and microfilming teams to Western Europe to collect overt industrial and

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in locating and supplying their required intelligence material." 26/ By March the Office's on-board strength stood at 43, against an authorized ceiling of 61 27/ and in June Admiral Hillenkoetter's\* first report to the NIA emphasized CIG's (OCD's) expenditure of "much time" for the coordination of U.S. collection efforts "through clearing house arrangements and central reading panels." 28/ At about this time--mid-1947 or shortly thereafter--<sup>1</sup> OCD's by now noticeably lumbering operation was moved from the War Department location on 21st Street to South Building in the 2430 E Street, N.W. complex and to "M" Building on 26th Street, N.W. near Constitution Avenue. 29/

Throughout the second half of the year, personnel and work statistics continued to climb. By October the on-board strength had risen to 62 and the authorized ceiling to 73. 30/ In the same month,

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\* Hillenkoetter replaced Vandenberg in May 1947 as the third DCI.



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the Office received about 325 Requirements compared to 175 in August; and issued almost 400 Collection Directives against the August total of 250. 31/ As the end of the year approached, it was becoming alarmingly evident that something was wrong with the OCD operation; that the system as originally conceived, was sound in theory only. In practice it was unworkable.

As previously noted, one of the basic objectives of the central intelligence concept was the establishment of an equally centralized reference system where "all" pertinent information would be readily available to the intelligence estimators and producers. By the close of 1947 the resultant Reference Center had generally completed its first year of operation and it had become obvious that its function was vitally interwoven with that of OCD. Yet the two functions were organizationally separated. The liaison officers in OCD who collected the required information were isolated from the production people who needed the information as well as from the reference people who knew what information was already available and therefore need not be collected. In consequence,

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OCD's collection and dissemination activities were operating in a vacuum, artificially isolated from the Agency's practical operations which they were designed to support. In addition, OCD's procedures had become pompously ritualistic and all business was conducted through formal channels and memoranda. The inevitable results were "inefficiency, time-consuming delays, and much invective." 32/ In short, after some two years of actual experience, CIA\* management had concluded that dissemination and collection coordination were routine activities which hardly justified a separate office; that most of OCD was sinking in its own morass of paper; and that the system which had evolved was self-defeating and ineffective. (Apparently, the Dissemination Branch, unconcerned by questions of prestige or prerogatives, was the only part of OCD that was doing an effective, down-to-earth job and it was seriously overworked--or understaffed, depending on one's point of view.)

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\* The name change from CIG became effective in September 1947.

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If the O/DCI had become increasingly disenchanted with the OCD situation, they must have been happier with the Reference Center's management. It appears 25X1A9A that [redacted] who had been primarily responsible for the design and development of the Reference Center and was then its Acting Chief, 33/ was called in by Executive Director [redacted] in late 1947 and quietly informed that he [redacted] had found the man he wanted to head up the Reference Center and that he further intended to merge the Center and OCD. "The man" of course, was Jamie Andrews who arrived less than two months later in January 1948 and immediately took up his assignment as Chief, Reference Center. By this time, although the Center had been in operation less than a year and was OCD's junior by about six months, it was already larger than OCD and, apparently, boasted a more effective operation. The plan that 25X1A9A Andrews, [redacted] and their staff worked on for several months was subsequently approved and in May 1948, as we have seen, General Orders merged the two operations into a new Office of Collection and

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Guidance. 34/  
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Along with the Reference Center, the Central Records Division was also brought in from the A & M Executive and placed under the OCD umbrella, thus returning the Top Secret and registered document control functions. Actually, then, it was the Reference Center which had absorbed OCD but, according to one source, 35/ the latter title was retained because it was more widely recognized throughout the Intelligence Community. Thus, as previously described, the new OCD contained the six original divisions from the Reference Center plus a seventh, the Liaison ~~Branch~~ *Division*, into which had been compressed the old OCD liaison functions of requirements, collection and dissemination.

Such was the organizational development of OCD's liaison function up to the 1948 reorganization. There remains now the need to similarly trace the organizational development of the reference elements, from the beginning to 1948, in order to better understand the evolution of the Office of Collection and Dissemination.

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B. The Reference Elements

If liaison was a primal element in the development of OCD so, too, was reference. In brief, if the basic mission of the new intelligence concept for centralization of the national security alarm system was to collect intelligence and make it available to the estimators, then the very fact of availability presupposed the existence of an information storage capability--that is, a reference center. Thus, in establishing CIG, the January 1946 Presidential Memorandum 36/ also directed the new department to perform "such services of common concern as...can be more efficiently accomplished centrally." One of the services intended--along with the more glamorous covert activities--would logically be a reference service and five months later, in the first DCI's June Progress Report to the NIA, 37/ the center is identified by name for the first time--by the first of <sup>several</sup> numerous names, in fact. Specifically, Admiral Souers included a "Central Register of Intelligence Information" as one of the nine problems

"for which immediate solutions are well advanced" and which could be more efficiently operated centrally by CIG.

The "immediate solution" of the policy planners had been to assign to the Office of Research and Evaluation responsibility for developing the center and in August 1946, ORE's first Administrative Order 38/ in part directed its Executive Staff to "prepare for the earliest practicable activation of the projected...Intelligence Library"\*--characteristic terminology of <sup>a/</sup>the time when the reference center concept envisioned a "total library" containing information for all intelligence purposes.

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\* The "Intelligence Library" appears on one of the previously mentioned CIG organizational charts for July 1946 (Plate No. 7, Figure 3). This ORE chart also shows an "Information Center Branch," a mail room, not a reference-type activity, which would continue its expanded function until the Office of Dissemination had achieved operational capability (see page 60); and a proposed "Biographical Branch" which would immediately become part of the reference center planning. The "Technical and Scientific Branch" would become the Office of Scientific Intelligence in December 1948.

It is not particularly surprising that the Central Planning Staff had elected to place the reference activity in a production office as a secondary function--rather than make it an independent office as they had collection and dissemination. First, it probably did not seem illogical at the time to assign such a support function to the office which it was primarily intended to support--although this fact in itself would later prove detrimental to the center's development. Further, the assignment of the activity to ORE was regarded, at least theoretically, as temporary in nature. Witness the ORE Instruction which stated that

This Reference Branch will be a temporary responsibility pending organizational development and availability of space for later efficient independent operation of a CIG Reference Center. 39/

Placement notwithstanding, the following month there appeared the first official definition of the proposed reference center--almost <sup>indirectly,</sup> incidentally, as it were. On 1 October 1946 a CIG Directive 40/ established policy and procedures for the intelligence exploitation of American businessmen and concerns

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with contacts abroad.\* As part of the new operation, the Directive required the DCI to establish within the "Central Register a contact register of all existing and future business...contacts, from which clearances must be obtained by participating agencies before new contacts are approached." The Directive thus secondarily established the Contact Control Register--which would remain a part of the reference complex for about two years--and also defined both Registers. The Central Register, that is, the reference center, was defined as

A file to be established by and in the Central Intelligence Group in which will be recorded - in a form mutually agreed upon - the location, nature, reliability, etc., of all foreign intelligence information related to the national security in the possession of and acquired by the Government. The general function of Central Register is to provide a central and easily administered means of facilitating access by one agency to information in the physical possession of another

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\* The Commercial Contacts Branch, later the Contact Division, established 17 October 1946 when the Office of Operations (OO) was activated. 41/ FBIS was the other element included in OO's original charter (see page 61).

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agency and the exchange of valuable information by and between authorized agencies.\*

The statement of mission is interesting in retrospect-- not simply because it represents the first definition of the new reference center but more because its wording presaged a problem that would concern the early policy planners. The main thrust of the first mission description, particularly in its final sentence, clearly implies that the Register was envisioned as a common effort operated by and for all agencies. Influencing the CIG planners, however, was the increasing conviction that the reference center should be maintained primarily by and for CIG; that is, operated within the context of ORE's "correlation and evaluation of national security intelligence," with secondary service to other agencies. It was the latter philosophy, as we have already seen, that would shortly prevail.

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\* The definition was proposed by [redacted] then Assistant Director for Collection (see page 58), apparently in response to a request from Commander 25X1A9A [redacted] originally on the Central Planning Staff, for suggested definitions of terms used in a draft of the domestic contacts Directive. 42/ 25X1A9A [redacted] was one of the prime architects of OO's Contact Branch.

At any rate, by January 1947, in the same (1946) Year-End Report to the NIA, 43/ in which he highlighted OCD's increasing inter-agency activities, General Vandenberg was also able to state that

The administrative preliminaries to the creation of an interagency reference center have been underway for some time. Delays have resulted from my desire to initiate the project only when adequate and competent personnel are available, but several related projects which have been given consideration have been so developed that when the time comes they will easily fall into the Reference Center pattern. Among these are the Biographic Data Compilation Plan, the Central Contact Register...and Intelligence on Foreign Industrial Establishments.

The "administrative preliminaries" had begun, of course, during CIG's initial structuring phase in mid-1946 when the Central Planning Staff had established the first four operating offices and had placed the reference element in one of them--that is, as the Reference Branch of ORE. Recruitment of key officers to design the center was begun in the late summer of 1946 and [redacted] was brought back to

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CIG\* from State Department in November--this time permanently. 44/ He was assigned to ORE and given the job of developing the reference center. At the same time, ICAPS,\*\* which had replaced the CPS in July, was working to resolve inter-agency problems, including those involved in reference center planning, such as development of a coordinated biographic intelligence plan; acquisition and centralization of data on foreign industrial establishments (the "FIE plan"); and a programmed study by library

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\* [redacted] had previously been with CIG for about three months. In February 1946, one month after President Truman established NIA and CIG, [redacted] and [redacted] were detailed by State (along with six others from the War and Navy Departments) to man the hastily-formed Central Reports Staff and prepare the President's Daily Summaries. [redacted] subsequent selection for the reference center assignment was undoubtedly influenced by his pre-war EAM work with New York's American Museum of Natural History and his OSS wartime experience.

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\*\* Created at the time of the Vandenberg reorganization of July 1946, ICAPS reflected the General's policy of replacing committee action with direct executive action--that is, ICAPS was given operational staff authority under the DCI to work out necessary coordination of intelligence activities between CIG and other government agencies in order to develop and recommend to the DCI, policies and procedures necessary for the most effective accomplishment of CIG's national intelligence mission. As successor to CPS, ICAPS was also responsible, of course, for internal CIG management policy as carried out by the Director's Executive for Personnel and Management.

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and business machine experts (when recruited) to design an "interagency filing system and reporting manual." 45/

A planning staff was gradually being assembled to design the new facility within ORE\* and among the key personnel first recruited were [redacted]

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[redacted]

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25X1A9A [redacted] joined CIG in November 1946; [redacted] and

25X1A9A [redacted] in March 1947. Before the close of 1946,

moreover, the staff had been bolstered by the addition of four cleared IBM specialists who were brought in as consultants. 48/ <sup>Since</sup> ~~^~~ The main emphasis

of the early planners was on mechanization of a "super library," ~~and~~ <sup>would</sup> the group ~~was~~ <sup>be</sup> thus also staffed with experienced librarians such as [redacted]

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\* On 31 October 1946, ORE's title had been changed from "Research and Evaluation" to "Reports and Estimates". 46/ Two weeks previously, the Eighth Meeting of the NIA dealt with CIG's proposed budget, including funds allocated for research--that is, for ORE. The Minutes record Assistant Secretary of State Donald Russell's request that the CIG office name be changed from "Research and Evaluation" since its similarity with State's office of "Research and Intelligence" suggested duplication of effort and thus might endanger budgetary approval. The Minutes then note General Vandenberg's agreement to "change the name of the CIG office." 47/

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Chief Librarian of OO's Foreign Document Division, who would join the staff in June 1947.

As we have seen, the planners' mission was to design a truly centralized reference facility where, for the first time, an intelligence officer could find any type of information necessary to conduct any kind of intelligence operation--in other words, a "total library". A further requirement was that it be as completely mechanized as possible; not only to handle the large volume of incoming intelligence material, but to assure the requesting officer of prompt all-inclusive retrieval.

During the early planning stage the staff, quartered in "Q" Building, wrestled with the fundamentals of organization and procedures. Immediately apparent to them was the fact that there existed no such "total" reference facility--either within or outside the government--which was even remotely similar in extent to the one which they had been directed to design. There were many reference facilities in operation but they were all narrow in scope and parochial in content; serving one master, not an entire community of diverse users. Storage and retrieval mechanization,

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Executive and Coordinating Staffs.

Since the proposed mission of the Reference Branch was to receive, classify, record, prepare for retrieval and file all incoming intelligence material, work had also begun on developing systems and procedures. The incoming volume of the material was so heavy and the media diversification so great that the problem of systemizing the mass of information was <sup>itself,</sup> a formidable task. In essence, the diverse types of media had to be sorted out and a coding system developed. Since the system had to cover a wide range of subjects of interest to the entire community, the group set out to adapt to their purposes portions of extant classification schemes--mainly the War Department's Basic Intelligence Directive (BID), which was not a storage and retrieval coding system, per se, but rather a guide for field collection of intelligence. At the outset, the group sought to design, as directed, an "interagency filing system" and worked with representatives of other

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where it existed at all, was relatively primitive. In short, there was no precedent to follow; no model from which to borrow. Whatever was developed by the staff would have to be created. Their's would be the prototype.

It also quickly became evident to the Reference Branch planners that the information storage and retrieval requirements of the proposed reference center were too complex for a single library--both for effective management and for conventional library indexing systems. It was therefore decided that there would be a central repository for traditional library materials and a series of semi-autonomous "satellite" libraries for specialized materials containing biographic, industrial, photographic and domestic contact data; that all would be machine-controlled to the maximum extent possible; and that all would be under single management. There thus evolved, at first on paper, an initial organizational structure of an Intelligence Documents Division (Library), a Contact Control Register<sup>(CCR)</sup>, Biographical Intelligence Register<sup>(BIR)</sup>, Foreign Industrial Register<sup>(FIR)</sup>, the Graphic Materials Division<sup>(GMD)</sup> and, providing machine support to all, the Central Index. In addition, there would be the

departments but the intransigence\* of the latter, their unwillingness to adapt to a common system, made the effort, <sup>increasingly</sup> fruitless. Although it was to take more than a year, the planners eventually developed the Intelligence Subject Code (ISC)--a classification system for coding the area and subject content of intelligence documents. Simultaneously, the machine specialists were working to mechanize the system, seeking a solution that would combine the advantages of IBM punch cards and rapid electronic reproduction of document descriptions. The Finch Telefax equipment (a facsimile printer) supplied the missing element and the planners began the development

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\* Something less than a willingness to cooperate frequently characterized the attitudes of the other departments during CIG's formative period. In a December 1946 report to the Chief of ICAPS, one of the CIG members frankly stated that many of the difficulties encountered by ICAPS in planning CIG had been caused by other IAB representatives' uncertainty regarding CIG's permanence and [then] ill-defined mission; lack of vision by some subordinates who feared transfer of functions to CIG would jeopardize their own positions; the fear of service departments to surrender important operations to a quasi-civilian organization; and frequent changes in policy of IAB members as announced at ICAPS meetings. 49/



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of what would become the CIA Intellofax System. The system permitted machine retrieval of data from the files through the medium of Faxcards-- that is, an IBM card, code-punched according to the ISC for subject and area, upon which a description or abstract of the document had been printed, and which was delivered to the searcher in the form of a continuous Intellofax Tape. It would take until July of 1949 before the system would become fully operative but the groundwork had been laid by the early planners.\* Similar classification systems and internal operating procedures had to be developed for each of the specialized libraries--or registers. Procedures were designed to redirect the heavy flow of incoming intelligence documents through the processing machinery of the Reference Branch. (All incoming material was then being routed by OCD's Dissemination Branch to ORE's "Information Center" for distribution.)

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\* Both the Intellofax System and the Intelligence Subject Code will be discussed in greater detail in the sections below on the Library and the Machine Division.

As the planning continued, the Reference Branch staff grew slowly--painfully so--and as personnel reported for duty, they were assigned to one of the Branch components. A skeletal organization was gradually developed and the literally few people in the library and each of the Registers began putting the untried plans into operation. Internal procedures and proposed systems had to be tested and improved. Bases of information, upon which to build the centralized reference repositories, had to be developed. To a very considerable extent, the new staff members achieved these objectives by visiting every similar organization, both governmental and private, which they could identify. In each instance, systems and procedures were studied to determine their possible applicability to the partially developed CIG reference system. More important, such visits helped accelerate the establishment of data bases. Many of the parochial files that were reviewed were integrated into the Reference Branch data base, either by indexing the material and storing it on machine cards, or by outright transfer of the hard copy file

to the central collection. Biographic data in both forms, for example, was obtained from the Department of State and the service departments. Library equipment and collections (either in whole or in part) were obtained from numerous government libraries like the Library of Congress and from such unlikely sources as the Civilian Production Administration of the Office of Housing Expediter. Similarly, the industrial and graphics specialists added sizeable increments to their data bases as, for instance, the entire OSS photo collection which the Graphic Materials Division inherited from State. While the EAM and systems experts accompanied the substantive specialists on their visits to other government agencies, their efforts were concentrated on private industry, investigating all possibly applicable electrical, electronic and photographic hardware. In some cases, shelf items were applicable. In other cases, necessary equipment was created or converted from available models.

In short, the activity of the earliest Reference Branch personnel was hectically multi-faceted. Newly arrived upon the scene, they simultaneously struggled to implement and improve procedures; to receive, index

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and file for retrieval the routine flow of material which had begun to come in; relieve ORE and other CIG elements of the files they had amassed; locate and integrate into their system large data collections from other agencies; and respond to the information requests which had begun to arrive.

This earliest developmental period, of course, took well over a year and some of the more comprehensive subsystems, such as Intellofax, weren't implemented for about two years. During the developmental period, the embryonic Reference Branch could, at best, barely limp along, pending full development of the basic systems and, more importantly, the acquisition of adequate staff. In retrospect, it is difficult to determine the developmental status of any one of the units at any given time during the first year; for example, the date they began operations or the extent to which they each "began" operations. As noted in Chapter I above, all six components of the Reference Branch officially became operative between January and June of 1947. Indeed, a memorandum issued by the DCI's Assistant Executive Director on 25 June 1947 informed all Assistant Directors that the Reference Branch was

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prepared to begin operations in all its stated functions. The announcement went so far as to instruct the AD's to "make such adjustments in current operational procedures as may be necessary to conform therewith." 50/ Officially, then, the Reference Branch was operational. The operational capability, however, must have been minimal. What with all the developmental tasks that had to be carried on, there were undoubtedly too few people available during the first half of 1947 to achieve any meaningful operational capability. In fact, as late as 31 March 1947, an ORE personnel roster shows only a total of 28 people assigned to the Reference Branch. 51/ With such severely limited manpower, the major effort must have been on in-house development. Nonetheless, as a result of the superb efforts of the early planners, the central reference facility was becoming fairly well established within the first several months of its existence--certainly in blueprint, if not in operating fact. In January 1947 the operation was moved from "Q" Building to the first floor of Central Building in the 2430 "E" Street complex (the remainder of ORE occupied the second floor), and in February  was named Acting

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Late in the first quarter of 1947, the staff completed their planning and on 28 March 1947, [redacted] submitted to ICAPS the proposed Statement of Mission and Table of Organization for the Reference Branch, as approved by [redacted] then Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates. On 25 June, ICAPS approved the plan with certain changes in the functional statement. The changes were important with regard to the scope of the reference center's responsibility. Previously, *there had been* [we noted] indecision on the part of the early policy planners as to whether the centralized reference facility should be an inter-agency partnership or whether it should be operated by, and primarily for, *allied* CIG, with secondary responsibility to the other intelligence agencies. The modifications by ICAPS clearly indicated that the policy makers had opted for the *arrangement* latter. The Statement of Mission submitted to ICAPS in March had echoed the original concept implied in the first CIG definition of the proposed reference element [in October 1946] which, it will be recalled, envisioned the facility as a common effort operated by and for all the intelligence agencies.

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Specifically, the  proposal stated that the mission of the Branch would be

...to centralize various reference functions related to the intelligence activities of the United States Government, and to provide a Reference Library for CIG... This Branch serves as a Reference Center for CIG and the member agencies.

However, the approved ICAPS version of June officially declared that the mission of the Reference Branch was

To be the repository for all intelligence and intelligence information to be permanently filed by CIG, to maintain records of all available intelligence sources, intelligence information and intelligence; to provide a reference library for CIG; and to establish, in coordination with OCD, procedures for utilization of its materials and catalogs by other agencies.

Moreover, whereas the March submission proposed as the primary duty of the Chief the establishment of reference activities for CIG and the member agencies, the June ICAPS version directed him to "Establish the central reference activities for CIG, and maintain appropriate liaison, administrative and policy making activities." 53/ It was now indelibly clear that the policy makers were no longer undecided about the reference center's scope of responsibility.

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With regard to this very fundamental principal, they had finally decided that the center would not be a community partnership effort but a wholly owned and operated CIG facility, the services of which would also be available to other agencies, circumstances permitting. Throughout its history, the reference element, whatever its organizational title, would serve first as a mechanism for its parent organization and secondarily for the other agencies, with the latter service pendulated by budgetary realities.

The Reference Branch organizational structure approved by ICAPS was identical with that developed by the planners and was by then (in June) actually in rudimentary operation. With the T/O pegged at 172 positions, the Branch's components and their position allocations (indicated parenthetically), were the Office of the Chief (4), the Executive and Coordinating Staffs (7 each), and six operating components: the Contact Control Register (29), the Biographical Intelligence Register (23), the Foreign Industrial Register (9), a Graphic Materials Division (23), Intelligence Documents Division or Library (47)

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and a Central Index (23) to provide Branch-wide machine support. (See Figure 6)

Such was the first Reference Center, the name by which it was generally known although it would be officially designated as the Reference Branch until its transfer from ORE several months later. At the time of the ICAPS approval in June, the infantile operation was functioning weakly as it struggled with untried procedures and woeful understaffing. What no one could then foresee was the fact that the plan would prove operationally successful. Over the years, countless changes in systems, procedures and objectives would be effected; divisions would appear and disappear; and eventually <sup>much</sup> ~~most~~ of the operation would be computerized. Nonetheless, the fundamental central reference system as originally conceived would prove sound in principle--that is, the channeling of "all" intelligence documentation to the reference facility for general and specialized indexing and storage by the central library and the specialized registers; category retrieval of documents on demand; and, as will be discussed below, the presumably unplanned development of area expertise for substantive


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analysis and the production of finished or semi-finished intelligence within fields of specialty. In fact, the prototype reference center of June 1947 would remain essentially unchanged in structure and system for <sup>then</sup> three decades\*--and even, <sup>then</sup> the same basic principles of operation would prevail although structured within a geographic rather than a functional framework.

Not surprisingly, the prototype organization with which the Reference Branch began its long career was not the first arrangement considered by the planners. Two early and subsequently discarded organizational charts show that initially a two-deputy structure had been considered for the Reference Branch with a Deputy for Intelligence Source Materials and a Deputy for Machine Operations. Judging from the

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\* In late 1967 and early 1968, <sup>the</sup> DDI, R. Jack Smith, reorganized the functionally arranged Office of Central Reference (OCD's new title from 1955) into the area-based Central Reference Service (CRS) and imposed a one-third reduction in manpower.



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Figure 7  
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two charts, and in the absence of explanatory functional statements, it is apparent that the "main library" was under the Deputy for Intelligence Source Materials and consisted of four divisions, one each for Books, Periodicals and Newspapers, for Pictorial Records, for Maps\* and for Intelligence Reports and Research Papers. The four "satellite" libraries or Registers (for contact controls, biographics, industrial data and machine operations), appear under the Deputy for Machine Operations. (Figure 7)\*\* A short time later,

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\* Transfer of the map intelligence function from the Department of State to CIG had been under discussion but it would not be until June 1947 that the NIA approved the transfer. <sup>54/</sup> The function was reconstituted within ORE in August, as a separate branch, rather than as part of the Reference Center. <sup>55/</sup>

*Branch.*

\*\* The date of this organizational chart--probably the planners' first attempt--can be safely regarded as 16 December 1946. The hand notation ("as approved by <sup>54/</sup> [redacted] 14 Dec 1947") is probably in error. By the latter date, the Reference Center had progressed beyond the stage of structural experimentation and was acceptably functioning within the single-deputy framework approved by ICAPS. The chart was most likely passed to [redacted] two days prior to an internally scheduled due date.

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REFERENCE CENTER, C.I.C.

Office of Chief  
 Chief of Reference Center  
 Deputy Chief  
 Secretary-Administrative Clerk  
 Secretary

(c. Jan/Feb '47)

Executive Staff  
 Chief  
 Administrative Assistant  
 Property and Equip. Officer  
 Clerk-Stenographer  
 Clerk

Coordinating Staff  
 Chief  
 Assistant Chief  
 Secretary  
 Clerk-Stenographer

Deputy for Intelligence Materials  
 Assistant to the Deputy Secretary  
 Clerk-Stenographer

Deputy for Machine Operations  
 Assistant to the Deputy Secretary  
 Research Analysts  
 Secretary  
 Clerk-Stenographer

GRAPHIC MATERIALS BRANCH  
 Photodupl Records Division  
 Map Division  
 Film Division

INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS BRANCH  
 Classification Division  
 Bibliography Division  
 Selected Reference, Accession and Citation Division

CENTRAL INDEX  
 Domestic Documents Division  
 Foreign Documents Division  
 Document Reference Division


CONTACT CONTROL REGISTER  
 Control Division  
 U.S. Citizens Section  
 Resident Aliens Section  
 U.S. Organizations Section  
 Domestic Source Reference Division

BIOGRAPHICAL INTELLIGENCE REGISTER  
 Dossier Division  
 Foreign Personalities Section  
 Foreign Organizations Section  
 Biographical Reference Division

FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL REGISTER  
 Master Files and Statistical Records Division  
 Industrial Reference Division

Figure 5/40 - 707

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presumably January 1947, the same two-deputy organizational configuration persists with minor changes in the second preliminary chart. (Figure 8)

The point of interest engendered by the two charts and other sources is not solely that another organizational structure had initially been contemplated. Rather, the evidence reflects what was apparently a fundamentally different functional concept on the part of the earliest policy planners; namely, development of a reference system exclusively involved in the indexing and retrieval of documents and books. In other words, a machine-supported general and specialized reference activity devoid of any substantive analysis capability. Corroboratively, it will be recalled that the policy planners had opted for unlimited use of business machines in developing a reference center. As a result, it is apparent that mechanization played a major role in their design concept and any analysis capability was incidental--if it was considered at all. There is only slight evidence in the earliest charts and position registers,

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moreover, which would suggest that the actual designers of the reference facility might have foreseen, or at least sensed the need for an analytical capability. For instance, the three earliest organizational schematics mentioned above contain one such evidential item; that is, the "Finished Products" element for the Foreign Industrial Register in Figure 7 ~~a~~ which, in all likelihood, probably refers to such machine-produced reference aids as listings and tabulations. Similarly, in all of the mission statements for the Reference Branch's components, as proposed by the designers in March and approved by ICAPS in June, ~~Figure 4~~, there is also only one possible suggestion of an analysis function and that is the charge included in the mission for the Biographical Intelligence Register (BIR) to "Provide and/or locate upon request detailed biographical information regarding any important foreigner."--again most probably information in the form of machine-retrieved documents from the files. Finally, the Tables of Organization for the components contain positions

for "Reports Editors" and "Reports Analysts." 26/  
Here too, the intent is rather vague and the quantity insignificant--only 12 positions out of the total of 172--and the type of "analysis" implied was probably analogous to that of a library's "research analyst"--that is, expertise in locating a hard-to-find reference. Whether or not these bits of admittedly questionable evidence suggest foresight on the part of the reference center's planners is, however, largely academic. The fact remains that if the need for analysis had not been apparent to the early policy makers and  planners, it became almost immediately evident to the first reference specialists. They quickly discovered that the input and retrieval aspects of a machine-based operation could not be divorced from analysis; that even their primary decisions to code or not to code, to correct factual errors in dates and name spellings and to select pertinent extracts were actions which constituted basic analysis. However slowly, such decisions became increasingly

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intellectual, involving detection, evaluation and interpretation, and even before the end of the first year it had become evident that the process was not one of perfunctory indexing for storage and retrieval. Rather, analysis had clearly begun to emerge as an integral and inseparable part of the reference analyst's job. In fact, after only nine months of existence for the Reference Branch, <sup>had been in existence ↓</sup> the Assistant Director for Reports and

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Estimates, [redacted], stated that analysts in the Branch's Biographical Intelligence Register (BIR) should maintain a reports-writing capability. At the outset, it had apparently been agreed that the Department of State would bear primary responsibility for the preparation of biographic reports for CIG. The Department's Biographic Information Division, however, lacked sufficient manpower to carry out the responsibility and BIR, to fill the gap, had begun writing biographic reports for CIG requesters (rather than transmitting batches of pertinent, raw documents).

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It was this "emergency" production effort which [redacted] said should be maintained, according to a memorandum for the record dated 6 August 1947 (and presumably

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prepared by [ ] [ ] reportedly held that BIR should have the capability of preparing biographic studies "in addition to its regularly allotted functions" (that is, locating, indexing, recording and retrieving biographic information); and that the Register should recruit people "capable of doing biographical research work." 57/  
That the character of the reference analyst's job was changing was indelibly recorded in November when an officer from Administration and Management (A&M), reporting on her manpower survey of the Reference Branch, approved [ ] initial T/O 25X1A9A  
but recommended that

A substantial saving in personnel could be achieved if Reference Center register activity was confined exclusively to punch card recording. The establishment of files and the extracting and annotating of reports for file purposes which occurs in FIR, BIR and CCR are time-consuming and require the services of many professional employees. 58/

The trend toward analysis in the reference analyst jobs was to continue, however, with the eventual <sup>the</sup> development of effective and highly-regarded officers who were recognized authorities in their support specialties--

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for example, industrial officers, graphics specialists and biographic officers. The apex of distinction in this respect would accrue to the Biographic Register which would become the most prestigious component in OCD, culminating with the DCI's directive of October 1961, 59/ and subsequent DDI action, authorizing BR to produce finished intelligence--the only Register ever so empowered.

*The approval by ICAP's of its mission and function*

At any rate, June 1947 probably marked the first milestone in the early development of the Reference Branch. [During its early months of existence, the Branch had struggled through the confusion of emergence but by June, as noted <sup>about</sup> previously, its mission and function had been approved by ICAPS.] At about the same time, and equally important to its development, the Branch was finally allocated sufficient working area. Space limitations in Central Building had begun to inhibit even the slow growth of that early period [and even <sup>since</sup> the relatively small number of newcomers that the recruitment program was beginning to produce could not be

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integrated into the operation but had to be "held" in A&M. Finally, after <sup>secure, wire mesh</sup> storage facilities had been installed, on 12 June 1947 the Reference Branch moved into the 4th Wing of the first and second floors of "M" Building on 26th Street near Constitution Avenue. At last unified in adequate quarters, the Branch began to show small but meaningful progress. By the end of the month,

[the March] on-duty strength [of 28] had risen to 48 and in late July stood at 59. 60/ Developmental and operational activities were accelerated and with regard to the former, [ ] negotiations moved beyond the initial May contact with [ ] munications and by July involved [ ]

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[ ] By late August the library's Classification Unit had completed the general framework of the "all-inclusive" subject and area classification schedule (later the Intelligence Subject Code or ISC), and interagency subcommittees were attempting to develop additional classification segments for coding military

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\* Actually, the name [ ] would not be coined until about mid-1949 when the system was implemented.

subjects (especially for Navy and Air Force) not covered by the initial plan. In the same month, the Branch's machine specialists began indexing

FOIAB3B1  Daily Reports by subject and area for OO; and were drawn further into the new business of providing administrative support by automating personnel records for A&M's Personnel Division. The "search and find" visits to other installations increased in number and in June alone, over 100 meetings and visits were logged. As a result of the contacts, <sup>additional</sup> ~~numerous~~ large file increments were added to the Reference Branch's specialized information bases. For instance, the Contact Control Register, which had started its data base with the inherited OSS Survey of Foreign Experts file (on U.S. sources of foreign intelligence), now arranged for a steady flow of new data from the domestic contact offices of OO, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division. By August it had developed machine control on over 1100 foreign intelligence sources in the <sup>United States</sup> U.S. Similarly, the Intelligence Documents Division had

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arranged to take over the entire reference collection of the deactivated Office of Housing Expediter; the Foreign Industrial Register began building its data base by acquiring the Industrial Card File (on Russian installations) from the Army's Special Document Section in Fort Holabird; <sup>and</sup> while BIR had obtained and was indexing State's Category File (biographic information arranged by organizational affiliation) and was completing priority work on "Project 1640"--locating and centralizing under machine control information on all foreign scientists available in U.S. agencies.


7.8.10 During the same three-month period (June through August 1947), most, but not all of the reference components, were capable of conducting servicing operations. [As recounted in Chapter I above, the previous historians indicated that all Reference Branch elements were organized by July 1947 except for the Biographical Intelligence Register, which "(although it was prominent in early plans), was delayed on account of special interagency problems that needed prior solution." Further]

[ research, however, shows that BIR was activated during the first half of 1947 and, indeed, before the foreign industrial and graphics elements. Organized as early as April or May, BIR had established a considerable data base by June (over 1200 names) and in July handled 35 requests. 61/ In addition, and quite ~~logically~~ <sup>understandably,</sup> the previous history did not deal with the Contact Control Register since it would be transferred to the Office of Operations in August of 1948. 62/

In general, then, by the end of August 1947 all six elements of the Reference Branch were staffed (however minimally) and in various stages of operation. Their internal procedural patterns had been designed, their data bases established and all, with the exceptions of the Foreign Industrial Register and the Graphics Materials Division, were actually answering requests. As a branch of the Office of Reports and Estimates, the new reference facility was developing slowly--but apparently too slowly--and in September it was transferred out of ORE and re-established as a

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CIA Organization - 15 Oct. 1947



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Figure 9  
AS/AC - 632  
15 Oct 47



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separate office under the Executive for Administration and Management. (Figure 9) From this point on, the Reference Branch officially as well as popularly was designated as the Reference Center.

The reasons motivating the administrative relocation are not at all clear. It will be recalled that assignment of the Reference Branch and its development to ORE had been specified as

a temporary responsibility pending organizational development and availability of space for later efficient independent operation of a CIG Reference Center. 63/

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Perhaps management, that is, [ ] had come to the conclusion that the reference facility had been developed to the point where it could strike out on its own. After all, it was a "common concern" utility for all of CIA and the entire Intelligence Community and not the functionary of any single office. More probable, however, were the reasons noted in Chapter I which had been advanced by previous historians--namely, that as stepchild in

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a production office, the Branch's reference activities tended to be inordinately channeled into that particular form of production; and that the reference activity, regarded as incidental to the parent office's primary function of production, received short shrift in budgetary and manpower allocations. Identical views were expressed *historically reviewed* seven years later by James M. Andrews, the man who would subsequently direct the merged reference-collection-dissemination operation:

It very quickly became evident that the Reference Center could not hope to fulfill its mission of developing advanced techniques and equipment, and of serving all offices and staffs of the Agency, as long as it was located in ORE. Being only one of several divisions in a single office, it failed to receive from ORE the support in terms of budget and manpower which were needed in order that it might have the strength to achieve its objectives...

In considering all the elements which might have played a part in dictating the transfer, it would not be whimsical to assume that [ ] had more than a detached interest in the Reference Center. Having worked so closely with [ ] in

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developing the Center, he would presumably be anxious to guarantee to the Center's operators a maximum opportunity to prove its conceptual soundness. Whatever the reasons, it is indisputable that the reference activity eventually did fare better as a quasi-independent function under A&M than as a subordinate activity in a production office. In fact, in his [retrospective] recollections [recounted above], Andrews also stated that

[...] In this new location, the Reference Center received far more administrative support, and was able to commence building up its manpower both in quality and in quantity. Contracts were let for the development of special machine equipment, and a serious attack was made on the major problems which were awaiting solution. 64/

There <sup>was</sup> [would] not [be], of course, any immediate developmental surge for the Reference Center. It [would] take <sup>time</sup> some time before the administrative benefits resulting from its new status <sup>became</sup> [would] become apparent but progress did continue at a slightly accelerated tempo during the final quarter of 1947. By December, for instance, although the

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Reference Center on-board strength had only risen to a total of 92 people, against an authorized total of 224, further developmental and operational progress had been achieved. With regard to the single most important developmental target (Intellofax), the design of the "all-inclusive" unified coding scheme and hardware for the retrieval and bibliographic printout system had been brought to near completion. The Community-oriented document coding plan had been developed by Library and ADP personnel to the point where it was ready for implementation but continued reluctance on the part of other agencies to adapt to the common system had virtually decided Agency planners to go ahead on their own. Similarly, the design of special machines to handle the coded documents had reached a crucial point by the end of the year. The systems experts had inspected equipment produced by RCA, Eastman Kodak and many other companies; and had investigated systems and machines in use in other agencies. None met the Center's requirements as well as the proposed  approach. An over-all plan and

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*Janet's  
file*

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funds to develop and produce the special equipment were approved on 4 December and the contract was let with  the following month.

Operationally, the Registers were also beginning to function with primitive effectiveness. By the end of the year, their data bases, although still unimpressive in size, had nonetheless grown to useable proportions. Some of these document collections were already under machine control while others were manual files, pending final development of the master coding scheme. The Intelligence Documents Division (Library), for instance, had hand-filed 150,000 documents by source and among the other Registers, IBM punched card techniques controlled almost 25,000 names in BIR, about the same number of foreign industrial installations in FIR, and almost 2,000 domestic sources of foreign intelligence (organizations and individuals) in CCR. From these data bases, the Registers had begun to provide CIA and the other IAC members with the reference service that would

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characterize their operations for decades to come. With a staff of 23, for example, the Intelligence Documents Division in November serviced 299 requesters and in December a significant CIA Instruction 65/ centralized the accountability and procurement of all foreign and domestic books in the new library--ending uncontrolled independent purchasing by Agency components. Similarly, the other Registers had also moved into a primary operating mode. Most active were the Contact Control, Biographic Intelligence and Foreign Industrial Registers, whose December personnel totals stood at 21, 15 and 10, respectively. BIR was now unofficially recognized as the focal point for biographic information on foreign scientists and technologists (S&T) and preliminary NSC action had been initiated to formally delegate the S&T biographic responsibility to CIA--that is, to the Reference Center's Biographic Intelligence Register. Least capable of providing more than token service was the Graphic Materials Division. The last of the Registers to be developed, GMD, working with

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Central Index specialists, had completed its procedural and coding plans and had only recently begun to function with its staff of eight. The Central Index had only five people on board but, 25X1A5A1 with the help of at least the four [ ] had made considerable progress. In addition to completing the hardware design of the main index, <sup>setting up a</sup> storage and retrieval system, and sharing in the development of the "unified" document coding scheme with Library personnel, the small staff had begun machine indexing current material in the [ ] 25X1A [ ] at the rate of 500 cards per day after eliminating the three-month backlog it had inherited in August; was key-punching machine indexes to map and pictorial material for GMD; and automating personnel records for A&M's Personnel Division, as well as coordinating the utilization of machines for the entire Agency.

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25X1A9A From the outset, the Central Index had been directed by [ ] who, as previously noted, had been one of the first people recruited

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25X1A9A by [ ] in March 1947. His Deputy, [ ] 25X1A9A  
25X1A9A [ ] had joined CIA in November of the same year.  
25X1A9A Previously, [ ] had worked briefly for IBM  
before joining State Department and serving a  
consular tour in Poland. His forte was organization  
25X1A9A and administration. [ ] with 15 years of experience  
in his field, was the machine systems expert. The  
two of them, along with people like [ ] and 25X1A9A  
25X1A9A the Library's [ ] were the prime  
designers of the Reference Center. Originally  
with the ONI Library, [ ] had transferred to 25X1A9A  
CIG in December 1946 as Chief Librarian in OO's  
Foreign Document Division. Six months later he  
was reassigned as the Reference Center's Chief  
Librarian (later CIA Librarian) with complete  
authority for the Library's planning, staffing,  
organization and management. Similarly, the Contact  
Control Register had also been under single leader-  
ship since its inception. [ ] had 25X1A9A  
entered CIG in November 1946, along with [ ] 25X1A9A  
and was immediately appointed by the latter to  
organize CCR. [ ] was chief of the 25X1A9A  
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Graphic Materials Division, having served in that position since July 1947, and [redacted] was apparently the key officer in the Foreign Industrial Register. Among all the Registers, BIR alone was still without continuing leadership at the close of the year. From about May, [redacted]

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25X1A9A [redacted] had served throughout 1947, apparently without title, as the focal point for activities in BIR. He would be replaced in January 1948

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25X1A9A by [redacted] from the Department of State, who would serve as Acting Chief for the first quarter of the year and subsequently <sup>return</sup> to the Department.\* For the remainder of 1948, [redacted]

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and, from about September, [redacted] would serve as Acting Chiefs until the appointment of

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25X1A9A \_\_\_\_\_  
\* [redacted] would return to CIA in mid-1961, after the Agency had absorbed State's biographic operation, to serve as Program Coordinator for the expanded Biographic Register.

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[redacted] as chief of the Register in  
January 1949.

Thus, by the end of 1947, its first full year of operation, the Reference Center was fairly well established and its continued development would remain uninterrupted by the reorganizational upheavals which were destined to sweep the Agency during the next several years.

The year 1948 began a new era, not only for the Reference Center but for the entire collection-dissemination-reference function. It was at this point in time, as described in the previous section, that the two major events occurred which would have a major impact on the function's development:

the advent of James M. Andrews and A&M's [redacted] decision to merge OCD and the Reference Center because of the former's procedural ineffectiveness and the close inter-relationship between the two activities. Toward the close of 1947, [redacted]

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25X1A9A had privately apprised [redacted] of the two impending developments. In addition, [redacted] Management

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25X1A9A Branch under [redacted] already had completed

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plans for the RC-OCD merger by the time Andrews arrived in January 1948 to become chief of the Reference Center. Scarcely three months later, on 3 May 1948, the Reference Center and OCD were combined into a single Office of Collection and

25X1A9A Dissemination under Andrews. 66/ [redacted]  
the former AD/CD, returned to the Navy.

Characteristically, Jamie Andrews had obtained carte blanche authority to change the merger plans and the organizational surgery was performed according to the blueprint which he and his staff developed, and not according to the plan prepared

25X1A9A by [redacted] and his management officers--"much  
25X1A9A to [redacted] chagrin," according to one source. 67/

The new Office of Collection and Dissemination that was formed in May 1948 was <sup>the</sup> organizational as well as the functional model that would remain basically unchanged for almost twenty years. Collection and dissemination <sup>have</sup> had now been functionally geared to the vitally intertwined reference activity under single direction. The new Office, of course,

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contained the six original reference divisions, plus the collection and dissemination activities from the original OCD. The functions of the latter had been reduced in scope and re-established as the seventh office component--the Liaison Division (LD), chief of which <sup>was</sup> would be [redacted]. Thus, the reconstructed OCD contained the Machine Division, the Library, the Biographic, Industrial, Graphic and Contact Control Registers, and the new Liaison Division.\* It was also at this time, it will be

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\* To avoid excessive detail, the traditional titles of OCD's subdivisions will be used from this point forward, even though titular changes (would) continued to occur for two years--e.g., for most of 1948 the Central Index would be known as the Machine Methods Branch before final designation as the Machine Division; the Registers' names would be shortened; and organizational indicators would differ until the CIA General Order of September 1949 <sup>68/</sup> directed Agency adoption of the Federal vertical departmental organizational structure (office-to-division-to-branch).

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recalled that the mail and courier activities of A&M's Central Records Division were transferred to OCD, thus <sup>also</sup> returning the Top Secret and registered document control functions. On 21 May, three weeks after the merger, Dr. Andrews appointed an Air Force Colonel, [redacted] as his Deputy Assistant Director and [redacted] was named Executive Assistant Director. 69/

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By the end of May, other events of developmental significance had occurred. First, the Library's Community-oriented document coding scheme, now officially called the Intelligence Subject Code (ISC), was <sup>put</sup> in experimental operation. Early in 1948, the system planners had finally concluded that the document classification scheme had crystallized to a degree that justified its use on a trial basis and that the <sup>Intellofax</sup> Intelligence System-- that is, the ISC and the necessary hardware then under development--gave reasonably sure promise of providing a satisfactory mechanical solution to the reference problems. On 15 March 1948, the first edition of the Intelligence Subject Code Manual

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was published and in April the Library began the ISC indexing of intelligence documents and the preparation of descriptive abstracts for selected documents. Pending the development of the Intellofax hardware, the indexed documents were stored manually. In brief, the Intelligence Subject Code, or ISC, was a six-digit numerical framework developed by OCD with IAC, ORE and (later) OSI cooperation, which permitted the subject and area indexing of intelligence documents for machine retrieval. The first manual, of course, was experimental and constant changes were necessary to adapt the new system to *depression which allowed a new operation*, consumer demands. By October 1948, however, the *of output had* volume *the point* would have been increased to where the coding operation was keeping pace with the flow of incoming documents.

The second significant development in early 1948 was the first official assignment of a Community-wide reference responsibility to the new Office of Collection and Dissemination.

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On 25 May the National Security Council issued NSCID No. 8 which formally delegated to CIA--that is, to OCD's Biographic Register--primary responsibility for the maintenance of data on foreign scientists and technologists. 70/ This assignment would remain the only formally delegated Community reference responsibility for OCD and its successor organizations.

By mid-1948, OCD's growth impetus had accelerated noticeably. Its divisions' operating procedures had been improved to the point where they were all functioning fairly effectively. In addition, the Agency's recruitment program was now beginning to provide a steady flow of new people and by the end of July 1948, OCD had an on-board strength of 268. The office was, in fact, in the early stages of a ten-year growth period and the expansion <sup>was</sup> would not even <sup>be</sup> be effected by the loss of two functions in the latter half of 1948. The first operation to be transferred out of OCD was the Contact Control Register. Effective 26 August, CCR was re-established within the Contact Branch

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of OO's Source Development Division (originally the Control Division). Responsibility for providing machine support for CCR's operations remained with OCD. 71/ [ ] who had directed CCR from the beginning, did not accompany the operation to OO but shortly afterward joined the newly-established Office of Policy Coordination (OPC).\* The transfer of the Contact Control Register to OO's Contact Branch was the culmination of a long effort by the latter to completely control access to the index of U.S. sources.

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Actually, CCR's original placement in the Reference Center had been arbitrary and had probably resulted from two factors: the availability

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\* OPC was established on 1 September 1948 under Frank Wisner to handle covert psychological operations. It thus became the fifth CIA office, joining OCD, ORE, OO and OSD. In December the sixth major component was added when the Office of Scientific Intelligence was formed (Figure 10).

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