ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File SAFE
Copy in DDA

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Concerns Regarding SAFE

FROM:		EXTENSION	NO.
D/ODP/DDA 2-D-00 HQS.			ODP 0-386
			DATE 31 March 1980

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDA, 7D-24, Hq.				Don:
2.		STATINTL		As this memorandum was coming off the typewriter, [____] called to tell me that he had just met with [____] and had shown him our joint memorandum to the Director. [____] said that he can support everything that we said in that memorandum.
3.		STATINTL		
4.		STATINTL		
5.				With reference to para. 5 of my attached memo, when George spoke of updating functional requirements he really meant that there was a need to investigate anew the requirements which CIA and DIA analysts might have which would exploit a link connecting the SAFE systems in the two organizations. I must confess that I could wish that, if that was his intention, he had found a clearer expression for it.
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				Bruce T. Johnson
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1-79

ODP 0-386
31 March 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: Bruce T. Johnson
                 Director of Data Processing

SUBJECT: Concerns Regarding SAFE

REFERENCES: A. Memo to DCI fm D/IRO dtd 26 Mar 80,
                     subject: Project SAFE (IHC/MM 80-2408

                                                        STATINTL

                 B. Memo to DCI fm D/ODP and D/OCR dtd
                     26 Mar 80, subject: Concerns Regarding
                     SAFE (ODP 0-369)

                                                        STATINTL

1. Attached is a copy of [   ] memo to the DCI (Reference A) commenting on the issues raised by the Science and Technology Advisory Panel (STAP) on Project SAFE. (Another copy is coming to you directly from [   ])

2. I regret to say that I find far less support for CSPO than I expected to find in George's memo. He has indeed, particularly on page 4, said some of the things I thought he would say, but he precedes these points with others which, I fear, will augment any existing concerns about the way SAFE is being managed.

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3. In paragraph 3 [   ] manages to convey the idea that CSPO has been dilatory about changing the SAFE specifications to include the CIA/DIA link. In fact the amendment has already been given to the contractor (as noted in the response to STAP's question 5) and the change has reached them in ample time to be taken into account as the design of SAFE takes shape. In any event, the link cannot be activated until both organizations have systems, which is to say it will be operative no earlier than 1984 when DIA/SAFE comes on-line.

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4. In paragraph 5. George makes some assertions about the need for interconnected services which he supports by quoting the IHC-sponsored Analysts Support Study. I have asked Clare Rice to have someone look carefully at the claims

made in this paragraph. I do not believe that the Study presents as clear a picture of analysts' needs as George asserts. He speaks of analysts regularly accessing SOLIS, for example, but the Study merely says that 36% of all the analysts interviewed (including CIA analysts in the total number) use SOLIS regularly, defining regularly as "at least once a month." When we meet with the Director, OCR will be prepared with more information on these claims based on the Analysts Support Study.

5. Perhaps the most troubling statement George makes is in paragraph 6, where he says that there has been "no extensive formal review or update of CIA's functional require- ments." As you learned during our joint session with Bruce Clarke, the review and updating process has been going on continuously since the decision was made to proceed with the SAFE Project. George is well aware of this fact and I hope to learn from him before our meeting with the Director just what he meant by this statement.

6. The other point which will almost certainly catch the Director's eye is the suggestion in paragraph 7 that he task someone to define the security issues inherent in system interconnection. Here I am sure George intended to be help- ful but he manages again to convey a sense of management failure to address these questions. In fact, we are intensely aware of the security issues and expected to address them as a part of our developing plans for integrating SAFE into the rest of the ODP services. It is not too soon to begin thinking about these problems but neither, in my view, should we be accused of being lax. In stating the problem as he does, unfortunately, George manages to convey the idea that we have indeed been lax.

7. As you can tell, I am not very happy with the "supportive" document from the Director, IRO. Almost cer- tainly his comments will complicate our meeting with the Director next Thursday. However, no one promised that it STATINTL would be easy to develop the SAFE system.

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8. You should know that Messrs. Rice, ☐ Clarke and I are meeting on Tuesday afternoon, 1 April, with Chairman ☐ of the STAP. We hope at that meeting to gain some clarification of the STAP's stated concerns about the Project. I will keep you advised.

ILLEGIB

/s/ Bruce T. Johnson

Bruce T. Johnson

cc: C/SPS/ODP

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Resource Management Staff

STATINTL

IHC/MM 80-2408
26 March 1980

STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

FROM: Director, Information Resources Office

SUBJECT: Project SAFE

REFERENCE: A. Your memo of 21 March, Subject: Concern Regarding SAFE (Tab A)

B. Memo from [   ] Chairman, STAP to DCI dtd 18 Mar 1980, Subject: Questions Regarding SAFE (Tab B)

1. I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the issues raised by the STAP Panel in connection with the SAFE Project. As background to our comments, I should point out that last year, after discussions between the D/DCI/RM, the DDCI, and DDA, it was determined that the focus of our interest in SAFE was to be "the areas of resource allocation and the relationship of SAFE to other programs on a Community-wide basis."* Although we have continued to review the development of Project SAFE, our primary attention has been in accordance with the above quoted limitations. Consequently, we are not prepared to comment, except in general terms, on many of the concerns raised in the referenced STAP memorandum.

2. Of the four principal concerns listed in your memo of March 21st, only one falls within the scope of IRO's responsibility as set forth in paragraph 1 above, namely:

"What actions are underway to ensure that the Intelligence Community has access to CIA SAFE and that CIA SAFE has access to DIA SAFE as well as such systems as COINS and SOLIS?"

*Memo from DDCI to D/DCI/RM dated 16 March 1979, Subject: Project SAFE

3. It is appropriate that your concerns along these lines be addressed because:

o At the DCI's semiannual review in May 1979, it was stated that a direct physical link between the DIA and CIA systems would be provided.

o Our review of the current version of the System Requirements Specifications indicates that such a communications connection between CIA and DIA SAFE systems is not included in the specifications.

o I have discussed this deficiency to the attention of the SAFE Project Manager and he states that such a requirement will be added by amendment; that, although this has not yet been accomplished, such an amendment will be prepared in the near future.

4. We believe that it is crucial to the ultimate development of the types of intercommunication which are set out in your subject memorandum that this requirement be now formalized in the SAFE documentation since, if properly specified, it will provide the technical capability to enable:

o CIA analysts to access DIA files.

o CIA analysts to access other Community files through the DIA SAFE interface with the COINS network which is included in the current requirements documents.

o DIA analysts to access CIA SAFE files.

o Analyst to analyst communications between DIA and CIA analysts.

o The capability to permit other Intelligence Community components to access CIA SAFE facilities by going through the DIA interfaces with the COINS or AUTODIN networks.

5. It should be noted that the provision of the physical links and the technical capabilities to accomplish the above listed functions will not, in and of itself, result in the implementation of any of these functions. None of the SAFE documentation, either emanating from DIA or CIA, calls for these functions to be provided. Indeed, the original CIA SAFE documentation specifically provides that the CIA SAFE system will be a closed system accessible only by CIA personnel. The position has been taken by some that CIA has no validated requirement for access to any non-CIA system, including DIA SAFE. The results of

the IHC-sponsored Analyst Support Study indicate that this is probably not the case. Nearly half of the CIA analysts interviewed said they regularly access outside data bases such as SOLIS, the COINS files, CIRC II, and the NPIC data system. Furthermore, analyst-to-analyst communication across agency lines was ranked the second most important source of information by CIA analysts and the most important source by DIA analysts. As automated systems develop and improve and analysts become increasingly confident in their use of and reliance upon direct access to automated systems, requirements for and the value of access to external systems should increase still further.

6. The management of the Consolidated SAFE Project Office is working under a handicap in this area. There has been, to our knowledge, no extensive formal review or update of CIA's functional requirements on the user side since the decision was made to combine the two programs. Without any formal statement of requirements from the CIA analytical community (primarily NFAC) which the system is designed to support, it is difficult for those charged with designing and implementing the system to anticipate what those needs may be. Therefore, we suggest that either you or some other appropriate authority should give to the SAFE Project Office some appropriate guidance which addresses these areas of concern.

7. We would call to your attention the fact that providing any access to the CIA system from DIA and more especially from elements of the Intelligence Community outside of DIA raises serious security issues. The resolution of these issues will probably require action on your part to modify the present interpretation of existing security policies, or in some cases amendments thereto. If you should decide that the combined SAFE systems should provide the types of intercommunication and outside access which are outlined in your areas of concern, then someone (possibly the Computer Security Subcommittee of the DCI Security Committee) should probably be tasked with the responsibility of defining the security issues, suggesting possible solutions, and performing appropriate risk analyses so that they may be submitted to you for resolution. If this is undertaken, IRO should probably be involved in some way since decisions on these issues will undoubtedly have major long-term effects on the feasibility of improving the interagency exchange of information and could also have a substantial impact on the resources which will be needed to satisfy Community ADP requirements.

8. General comments on other concerns expressed by you based upon our limited perspective are:

o   We are informed that [   ] of OCR is coordinating
    the CIA user interface with the CSPO; that he is
    completely aware of the status of the project and
    consults regularly with the CSPO.

o   In the development of a project such as SAFE, it is
    extremely important that a well defined single point
    of contact between the users and developers be
    established and maintained. Otherwise, the system
    developers will be faced with conflicting statements
    of requirements.

o   If, in fact, the established lines of communications
    with the users are not adequate, perhaps the reason
    is attributable to a lack of an effective framework
    within NFAC to provide a continuing review of SAFE
    as it develops. If this is the case, we are not aware
    of it.

o   We see no evidence that "major portions of the
    proposed operational capabilities are unspecified."
    It is, however, probably true that NFAC should direct
    more attention to the general issue of what its
    requirements for open source material are and how
    these should be met, either through SAFE or other
    means.

o   The decision to place SAFE on a design-to-cost basis
    necessarily implied some scaling down of the original
    requirements for the initial version. In consonance
    with this, NFAC did review and set priorities on the
    original SAFE requirements.

o   It is our assessment that the CSPO is proceeding with
    development so that NFAC's highest priorities will be
    met first and the design will accommodate the later
    addition of those functions which now enjoy a lesser
    priority.

o   If some of the capabilities which this approach will
    require to be deferred are considered to be important
    enough to warrant it, NFAC should develop a justifi-
    cation for their inclusion in the initial version of
    SAFE and the issue should be addressed during program
    review.

    9.   In conclusion, I would take this opportunity to inform
you of two initiatives we are taking in conjunction with the IHC
which may have an impact on the future development of SAFE.

o The development of a user language for SAFE will
  result in a common user language for DIA & CIA.
  We are exploring the possibility that this could
  become the initial step for developing user language
  standards for use throughout the Community. This will
  require the cooperation of the SAFE Project Office
  if it is to succeed.

o We expect the IHC to recommend the development
  of a distributed system of bibliographic informa-
  tion storage and retrieval systems. If this is
  to be done, the facilities of both the DIA & CIA
  SAFE systems in this area will have to function
  as part of an overall Community system. If this
  is to be accomplished, the interconnection of
  the two systems could taken on added importance.

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NFAC ZZ 59-50

ODP 0-369
26 March 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Administration
                            Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

FROM: Bruce T. Johnson
                            Director of Data Processing, DDA

                            Clarus W. Rice
                            Director of Central Reference, NFAC

SUBJECT: Concerns Regarding SAFE

REFERENCE: Your memo dtd 21 March 1980, same subject   STATINTL
                            (ExReg 80-754/1)

    1.   This memorandum responds to your query of 21 March
1980, transmitting some questions about SAFE posed by your
Science and Technology Advisory Panel (STAP).   STATINTL

    2.   Attached are answers to the specific questions
raised by the STAP, presented in a narrative form reflect-
ing the complexity of some of the issues they addressed.
These answers represent the coordinated views of OCR and
ODP, reviewed and endorsed by the DDA and the Director, NFAC.

    3.   At our meeting with you, now scheduled for 3 April,
we propose that Mr. [   ] Director of the Con-   STATINTL
solidated SAFE Project Office (CSPO), present a brief
summary which addresses the four concerns you list in your
memorandum, after which we will be prepared to elaborate on
any of those or other STAP questions about SAFE. We will
also have available [   ] Chief of OCR's Systems
Analysis Staff, to discuss NFAC's extensive efforts to iden-
tify user requirements.

    4.   We understand that Messrs [   ]
will be at the meeting, and welcome the opportunity to
discuss their questions with them. We would like to suggest,
however, that it may be profitable for us to spend some
additional time with them subsequent to our joint meeting

SUBJECT: Concerns Regarding SAFE

with you, to supplement the one short briefing previously
provided for them by SAFE's managers.

/s/ Bruce T. Johnson   STATINTL

STATINTL   STATINTL   Bruce T. Johnson

Clarus W. Rice

CONCUR:

Deputy Director for Administration   Date

26 MAR 1980

Director, National Foreign Assessment Center   Date

Attachments: a/s

cc: D/CSPO

O/D/ODP/BJohnson:ee/3-26-80

Distribution:
    Orig - DCI w/att. (w/o distribution)
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        1 - D/CSPO w/att.
        1 - D/OCR w/att
        2 - ODP Registry w/o att.
        2 - O/D/ODP w/att.

21 March 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Deputy Director for Administration
Director of Data Processing

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Concerns Regarding SAFE

1. One of the subjects addressed at the recent Science and
Technology Advisory Panel (STAP) meeting was the SAFE system and
its implementation. Several concerns were expressed at the meeting
regarding SAFE, including the fact that there are no plans at present
to connect CIA and DIA SAFE systems so that they are mutually accessible.
I share several of the concerns expressed by the Science and Technology
Advisory Panel, and accordingly would like to meet with you to address
several of the issues that were raised by the Panel. I attach for your
information and response a list of questions and concerns prepared by
the STAP relating to SAFE. While I would appreciate your being prepared
to address all of these questions at our meeting, I personally am
especially concerned about the following:

-- What actions are under way to ensure that the Intelligence
Community has access to CIA SAFE and that CIA SAFE has access to
DIA SAFE as well as such systems as COINS and SOLIS?

-- How will SAFE deal with open source material?

-- As described in some detail on page 3 of the STAP paper,
what actions are being taken to identify the real needs of the
SAFE user community and will they be satisfied by the system?

-- How can CIA make a reasonable evaluation of the current
status of SAFE with major portions of the proposed operational
capabilities either unspecified or not communicated to the
Agency?

2. I will schedule a meeting to discuss these issues toward the end of next week. In the meantime, I would appreciate your responding to all of the questions in the attached paper and providing such responses to me by the middle of next week for my use in preparation for the meeting.

STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment a/s

STATINTL

cc: DDCI
    DDS&T

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