



Directorate of  
Intelligence

~~Secret~~



**MASTER FILE COPY**  
**DO NOT GIVE OUT**  
**OR MARK ON**

**Indications of  
Political Instability  
in Key Countries**



25X1

July 1983

~~Secret~~

GI IPI 83-002  
July 1983

Copy **690**

**Page Denied**



**Directorate of  
Intelligence**

**Secret**



# **Indications of Political Instability in Key Countries**



25X1

**July 1983**

This quarterly was produced by and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and suggestions are welcome and may be addressed to [redacted] Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, on [redacted]

25X1

25X1

**Secret**  
*GI IPI 83-002*  
*July 1983*

**Secret**

25X1

**Indications of  
Political Instability  
in Key Countries**

25X1

**Preface**

This is the second issue of a quarterly publication designed to provide timely warning of significant instability in countries of key importance to US interests. The quarterly, which in this issue includes data from 1 April to 30 June 1983, examines events and processes that could lead to major regime or policy changes. It is not intended to supply short-term warning of revolution or collapse, but rather is designed to address the potential for instability during the next two years in a periodic, systematic, and thematic way through the consistent application of a set of indicators. These indicators are listed at the end of this issue. We believe that most of the 90 indicators are applicable to most of the countries we examine; other indicators are more country specific. All indicators are examined for every country for each issue. Those countries for which indicators have changed significantly or which are otherwise of special interest are treated in a detailed way in the text.

The quarterly includes four parts:

- A brief overview of each country.
- A more detailed assessment of countries in which there have been developments of concern.
- A chart summarizing the status of key indicators for each country and tables tracing political and economic changes during the past several years.
- A reference list of the indicators (revised and reprinted periodically).

This issue assesses—as will each subsequent issue—a total of 26 countries that we have identified as particularly salient to US interests. These countries are included because they are strategic choke points, major oil producers, key US friends or allies, or geographically close to the United States.

25X1

**Secret**

25X1

**Contents**

	<i>Page</i>
<b>Preface</b>	iii
<b>Part 1. Major Developments at a Glance</b>	1
<b>Part 2. Countries in Which There Have Been Developments of Interest</b>	5
<b>Mexico</b>	5
<b>El Salvador</b>	7
<b>Guatemala</b>	9
<b>Peru</b>	11
<b>Morocco</b>	13
<b>Iran</b>	15
<b>South Africa</b>	17
<b>Philippines</b>	19
<b>Part 3. Graphic Indicators</b>	21
<b>Part 4. Indicators of Political Instability</b>	49

**Secret**

Secret

25X1

**Part 1. Major Developments at a Glance****General**

Severe economic difficulties—aggravated in some instances by drought or flooding—are decreasing the ability of many governments to secure additional foreign loans and investment. The imposition of austerity measures to satisfy IMF lending conditions is increasing domestic tension in many key countries. Impending national elections in a number of countries are creating an upsurge of political activity that could lead to civil violence. [redacted]

25X1

**Mexico<sup>1</sup>**

President de la Madrid is adroitly pursuing a firm program aimed at regaining control over the enormous foreign debt, along with steps to retain political support as economic discontent increases. [redacted]

25X1

**El Salvador<sup>1</sup>**

The guerrillas show signs of coordinating their operations more closely and have become more aggressive in the east. Foot-dragging by politicians might delay the national election scheduled for late this year. [redacted]

25X1

**Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

President Rios Montt has survived—for the moment at least—a series of attacks by opponents in the military, the Catholic Church, and the private sector who resent his evangelism, his delay in setting an election timetable, and alleged corruption among his key advisers; he remains particularly vulnerable to new demands by the military. [redacted]

25X1

**Honduras**

The declaration in April of a popular revolutionary war by the National Directorate of Unity, a new Cuban-backed organization of four extremist groups, and a greater US military presence increase the prospect of terrorist attacks. Popular and legislative hostility to the presence of Salvadoran military men at the new US-supported regional training center probably will continue. [redacted]

25X1

**Panama**

The announcement by National Guard Commander Paredes that he plans to retire in August to pursue the presidency and Chief of Staff Noriega's likely accession as the new Guard Commander could occasion temporary discord within the Guard hierarchy as senior officers vie for position and power. [redacted]

25X1

<sup>1</sup> See part 2 for detailed discussion. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

<b>Colombia</b>	The deepening economic recession and increased attacks by insurgents—who have rejected the government's offer of amnesty—do not seriously threaten the regime. <input type="text"/>	25X1
<b>Venezuela</b>	An orderly transfer of power is likely if, as we expect, the center-left opposition Democratic Action Party wins the December election; the party is adeptly exploiting the Herrera administration's failure to turn the deteriorating economy around. <input type="text"/>	25X1
<b>Peru <sup>1</sup></b>	Heightened insurgent activity, natural disasters, and major economic problems are placing considerable pressure on the Belaunde government, but we believe the President will survive at least over the short term. <input type="text"/>	25X1
<b>Brazil</b>	Progress continues in the transition to civilian rule scheduled for 1985 despite moderate social and labor unrest and continuing economic difficulties, including a lessening ability to pay foreign debts. <input type="text"/>	25X1
<b>Spain</b>	Prime Minister Gonzalez appears determined to pursue his moderate domestic and foreign policies, but rising unemployment—now running at 18 percent—could create pressure within the Socialist Party by the end of the year for a turn to the left. <input type="text"/>	25X1
<b>Greece</b>	The government's inability to halt the economic downturn and a controversial new labor law—calling for "socialization" of the public sector and restricting strike activity—have frightened investors and evoked protests by opposition labor groups. <input type="text"/>	25X1
<b>Turkey</b>	The resumption of political activity probably will result in new public disharmony and divisiveness, but President Evren is likely to hold contending politicians to the new rules of the game after as well as before the November parliamentary election. <input type="text"/>	25X1
<b>Morocco <sup>1</sup></b>	The government faces serious foreign financial problems and an increasing probability of domestic economic discontent that could lead to an upsurge of civil unrest. <input type="text"/>	25X1
	<sup>1</sup> See part 2 for detailed discussion. <input type="text"/>	25X1

Secret

Secret

<b>Egypt</b>	A continued decrease in oil revenues is forcing the government to face further tough economic decisions. President Mubarak, angered by zealous opposition muckraking, may crack down on his critics. [redacted]	25X1
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	The regime remains stable, despite continuing criticism of King Fahd's poor leadership and exaggerated rumors of infighting among the senior princes. [redacted]	25X1
<b>Iraq</b>	Guerrilla activities and terror-bombings by native Kurds, Shia Muslims, and a small group of Communists torment but do not endanger the regime, which continues to retain the support of most Iraqis in the war with Iran. [redacted]	25X1
<b>Iran<sup>1</sup></b>	The clerical regime has made much progress in restoring stability and successfully asserting its authority throughout most of the country although it remains plagued by factionalism that could erupt after Ayatollah Khomeini dies. [redacted]	25X1
<b>Pakistan</b>	In a promised 14 August statement President Zia may announce political reforms and schedule national elections for 1984 or 1985. The opposition is preparing to challenge his proposals but is fragmented, disorganized, and losing support. Communal tensions in Karachi remain close to the surface. [redacted]	25X1
<b>Nigeria</b>	The economy remains weak, and worsening consumer shortages could provoke urban unrest despite increased oil production and other positive developments. The election campaign, which will culminate in early August, is heating up but so far has prompted only a moderate amount of violence. [redacted]	25X1
<b>Somalia</b>	Increased tribal fighting does not threaten Siad's continued rule, nor are Ethiopia and Libya providing increased support to Somali dissidents. [redacted]	25X1
<b>Kenya</b>	The political opposition shows no signs of coalescing soon enough to seriously challenge the Moi government in the September national election. [redacted]	25X1
	<sup>1</sup> See part 2 for detailed discussion. [redacted]	25X1

Secret



Secret

**Zaire**

Fiscal austerity, insisted upon by the IMF, has led to further hardships; although widespread discontent persists, opposition to the Mobutu regime remains unorganized and is unlikely to pose a serious threat in the near term. [redacted]

25X1

**South Africa**<sup>1</sup>

The government faces the prospect of increased turmoil and violence resulting from an upsurge in terrorism, heightening racial tensions, the loss of some conservative Afrikaner political support, and economic problems stemming from a severe drought. [redacted]

25X1

**Philippines**<sup>1</sup>

President Marcos's suppression of moderate opponents is enhancing short-term stability but may unify and strengthen the opposition over the long haul. The armed forces currently are being reorganized to better counter the Communist insurgency, which may benefit from the adverse economic effects of a severe drought. [redacted]

25X1

**Indonesia**

So far, the 30 March rupiah devaluation, subsequent austerity measures, and the military's intensified anticrime campaign, in which hundreds of criminals have been summarily killed in recent months, have not led to organized public opposition. [redacted]

25X1

**South Korea**

A hunger strike by prominent dissident Kim Young Sam and antiregime student demonstrations have gained publicity, but determined government surveillance prevents dissidents from coordinating their activities or marshaling broader support. The government is concerned that North Korea might resort to terrorism to disrupt the Interparliamentary Union conference in Seoul in October. [redacted]

25X1

<sup>1</sup> See part 2 for detailed discussion. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Part 2. Countries in Which There Have Been Developments of Interest**

**Mexico**

- Inflation has risen to about 100 percent a year and Mexican private-sector economists estimate 2 million jobs have been lost during the past year.
- The IMF's determination that Mexico met its first-quarter performance targets has cleared the way for an additional \$1.43 billion in IMF and commercial bank loans.
- Labor continues to support the government despite the regime's adherence to strict wage guidelines.
- Political violence over local issues and personalities is increasing but poses no threat to the central government; opposition parties seeking to exploit discontent appear to be making minor gains.
- Criticism of the United States, primarily of the administration's Central America policy, is slowly increasing.

**Comment**

Controlling Mexico's massive foreign debt continues to be an Augean task for President de la Madrid. Implementation of the IMF austerity program and an 83-percent devaluation of the peso against the dollar since February 1982 have led to a sharp curtailment of imports. There is now a substantial surplus in Mexico's trade account, and the current account is moving toward balance. However, governmental fiscal and monetary restraints are producing serious domestic dislocations. We calculate that economic activity fell at an annual rate of about 6 percent during the first half of 1983. At the same time, according to unofficial estimates, unemployment is running at 20 to 30 percent, and inflation is in the triple digit range.

Price controls and shortages of imported raw materials, intermediate goods, and spare parts are eliminating the profits of many industrial firms and leading to bankruptcies and plant closings. A recent poll of



634590 (A02921) 7-83

private businessmen shows that 76 percent of the respondents expect losses this year, 62 percent plan additional layoffs, and 15 percent are teetering on bankruptcy. Business leaders see no chance of reversing the steep economic slide this year unless they are able to increase the imports needed for expanding industrial production. On the labor side, the 15.6-percent hike in minimum wages implemented in mid-June represents a small concession as compared with the effects of inflation. Real wages for those who retain jobs are down substantially since earlier this year.

So far, the government has been able to maintain the support of labor leaders, and the rank and file have acquiesced in their loss in real earnings. There has been no noticeable unrest in urban tenements, slums, or squatter settlements. The few rallies that have been held to protest austerity have been poorly attended. Nevertheless, we believe the strains on the government's traditionally strong relations with labor and on the social fabric of the country are increasing.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

It is difficult to determine the point at which traditional safety valves might prove inadequate or if a particular incident could now ignite the anger of the unemployed and underemployed enough to evoke serious disturbances. We believe that the very poor who are out of work and lack unemployment insurance have sought to obtain new sources of income in lower productivity areas and personal services—as tourists besieged by hawkers numbering in the hundreds are learning. Legions of others probably are sharing jobs, depending on one job or part-time work in place of their previous two or more positions, or receiving support from extended families. Illegal immigration to the United States, another avenue of relief, has risen considerably during the past year and continues to accelerate. [redacted]

In the event that these safety valves are insufficient and serious violence does erupt, we believe the central government is prepared to use whatever force is necessary to quell disturbances. Local force has been adequate for dealing with growing regional violence focused on local personalities and issues. Nonpolitical robberies, kidnappings, and assaults also are continuing at a high rate and are perhaps still rising according to press reports. [redacted]

Opposition parties on the left and the right are seeking to exploit the growing discontent. The center-right National Action Party appears to be conducting an effective campaign aimed at winning some key municipal elections scheduled for later this year. The Unified Socialist Party, however, is suffering serious internal disputes that threaten to split the 18-month-old coalition. [redacted]

Leftist groups organized a series of small demonstrations against US policy in Central America during the quarter, and press criticism of US activities in the region rose. Criticism by public officials has been only moderate, however, and has been aimed at foreign intervention by all parties. [redacted]

#### Key Indicators To Watch

- Deterioration in the compact between the ruling party and labor.
- The dilution of austerity measures in order to preserve the compact.
- A significant increase in the size or nature of anti-austerity rallies.



Gullberg

Veteran Mexican labor leader Fidel Velazquez reaches wage agreements with business while holding back labor discontent. [redacted]

Excelsior ©

- Unrest in Mexico City's slums.
- Divisions within the PRI over economic policy.
- Heavyhanded measures by the government to prevent potential electoral gains by opposition parties.
- Regional violence directed at de la Madrid's policies or necessitating federal intervention.
- Attacks by public officials on the United States as the source of Mexico's economic ills. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1  
25X1

Secret

Secret


## El Salvador

- General Vides's appointment as Defense Minister has ended the power struggle within the armed forces but led to increased rightist influence in the military. [redacted]
- The guerrillas have become more aggressive in the east, attacking isolated towns and military garrisons and destroying transportation and power facilities. [redacted]
- Government sweeps generally continue to be ineffective, but the armed forces recently began a pacification program that could prove successful. [redacted]
- The government has released two-thirds of its political prisoners under the new amnesty law, which so far has attracted only a few guerrillas and their dependents. [redacted]
- The presidential election slated for late this year is imperiled by legislative foot-dragging and the apparent belief of many political leaders that it should be postponed until spring. [redacted]

### Comment

We expect Vides will grow even more frustrated by armed forces deficiencies in the months to come. He recognizes the need for a more aggressive war strategy and wants to alleviate command and control problems but is hamstrung by a lack of competent officers. We believe that the few changes he has made will not significantly improve military performance and that he probably will order further changes soon. Frustration is pushing Vides toward extreme rightist officers, some of whom he apparently regards as more competent and aggressive than others in the military. The rightists are encouraged by Vides's political conservatism and signs that he will prove less adept than his predecessor in keeping the military out of partisan politics. Vides, for example, recently appointed a crony of extreme rightist Robert D'Aubuisson to head the Treasury Police. [redacted]

We believe the guerrillas, encouraged by their successes in the east, will intensify their attacks in the next few months—particularly against the commercial infrastructure—in order to keep the armed forces



634589 (545210) 7-83

in a posture of static defense. The insurgents also are increasing psychological warfare operations, such as releasing captured government troops, to undermine military morale. The utility of this tactic was demonstrated recently by the wholesale surrenders of a few isolated government units. We are even more disturbed, though, by the growing operational cooperation of the five guerrilla factions. The Popular Liberation Forces, the largest faction, recently proposed further increased coordination of guerrilla operations. [redacted]

Still, the situation overall remains stalemated and is not likely to soon change dramatically. Government sweep operations seldom result in major contact, but they do force the insurgents to temporarily disperse. Some progress is being made in increasing night operations, the use of long-range reconnaissance, and the more effective deployment of blocking forces.

[redacted] a pacification program recently inaugurated in two departments will become a model for the rest of the country. Although the program is clearly a step in the right direction, we believe that it may falter for lack of competent military and civilian personnel to secure areas after they have been cleared of guerrillas. [redacted]

The release of political prisoners reflects the government's effort to improve its human rights image, spur guerrilla defections, and persuade moderate elements within the insurgents' political alliance to participate

Secret

Secret



Ten-year-old leftist guerrilla talks with children in a provincial town. (U)

Wide World ©

in the election. Exiles are unlikely to return and most guerrillas are unlikely to defect, however, because they fear reprisals from the left and right. Nevertheless, the government hopes that publicity and fair treatment of participants will result in some defections. The amnesty probably will be extended beyond its mid-July deadline.

We believe there is only an even chance the election will be held in November or December. The new constitution is not likely to be ratified before midsummer and logistic preparations are far behind schedule. There also are signs of disarray in the major political parties, only one of which has selected a presidential candidate. The continued inability of most of the parties to put the national interest first is underscored by their inflexible demands for an electoral register (which theoretically would reduce electoral fraud). We feel it would be extremely difficult to compile the register in time for an election this year and that, in any case, a register would result in a substantially smaller voter turnout than in the March 1982 election.

#### Key Indicators To Watch

- Increased rightwing sentiment in the armed forces that delays implementation of the land reform program, prevents progress on human rights issues, and benefits ultrarightist parties in the coming election.
- Vides's inability to revise the Army's static defense orientation and prod the military into more aggressive tactics.
- Increased coordination between the various guerrilla factions, leading to an intensification of attacks nationwide and compelling the military to disperse its forces to protect scattered targets.
- Provision of inadequate forces or civic action resources to implement and expand the nascent pacification program.
- Further delays in preparing for the national election scheduled for the end of the year.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

## Guatemala

- Public criticism of President Rios Montt by unassigned Army General Echeverria prompted a chain of events that culminated in a presentation of demands by junior officers. [redacted]
- In response to these demands, the President removed several allegedly corrupt key advisers and announced that constituent assembly elections will be held in July 1984. [redacted]
- At the same time, the President invoked a State of Alarm, enabling him to mute civilian critics by restricting their access to the media [redacted]
- A Supreme Electoral Tribunal has been established to oversee newly allowed political activities; some 20 groups are taking advantage of relaxed regulations to organize political parties. [redacted]
- The insurgents have not taken advantage of the military's renewed preoccupation with politics and their attacks remain sporadic. [redacted]

### Comment

A rising tide of public criticism of the President—focusing on his Protestant evangelism, his failure to set an early date for elections, and alleged corruption by his key advisers—precipitated a series of major events in June, including a presentation of demands by the junior officer corps. Rios Montt weathered the crisis by making several important concessions and imposing new restrictions. He retained the backing of the junior officers by announcing a constituent assembly election timetable and ousting several key advisers. The officer corps generally continues to support the President because it believes many of his opponents are serving only their own vested interests and that there is no one who can adequately replace Rios Montt. At the same time, the President has temporarily quieted his opponents in the Catholic Church, the political parties, and the business sector by imposing press censorship and restrictions on political announcements. [redacted]

The President has gained time, but his removal of key advisers, continuing divisiveness within the military, and strong opposition by rightwing political parties



634586 7-83

may render him susceptible to new efforts aimed at his ouster in the months ahead. If Rios Montt is deposed, we believe the prospect of the political system being opened to allow greater popular participation would be seriously jeopardized. [redacted]

Although General Echeverria has no personal following in the Army and is not himself a threat, his demand that the government announce elections and his charge that Rios Montt's evangelical sectarianism is factionalizing Guatemalan society have energized the opposition within the military. The apparent disunity in the military, in turn, has lent strong encouragement to Rios Montt's civilian opponents, who also seek an early election date and attack the President's evangelism and the corruption of his advisers. We believe the rightwing parties will push for even earlier elections and will continue to agitate for Rios Montt's ouster. [redacted]

Some 20 groups are organizing new political parties or refurbishing old ones in accordance with new governmental guidelines. To oversee this political

Secret

**Secret**

activity, which is being permitted to continue under the State of Alarm, Rios Montt has created an autonomous Supreme Electoral Tribunal. We believe that rightwing elements may perceive a conspiracy between new political parties and the radical left and once again act to violently repress their civilian opponents. [redacted]

25X1

Although the insurgents have not been able to exploit the military's renewed preoccupation with politics, they have recently increased the frequency of their attacks in several areas, including Guatemala City. We believe they will continue to emphasize ambushes, economic sabotage, and urban terrorism in an effort to regain momentum. Their lack of unity and loss of internal support networks probably will preclude any large-scale operations in the near term, however.

25X1

**Key Indicators To Watch**

- A continuing confrontational approach by Rios Montt toward the political parties, the Catholic Church, and the private sector.
- The growing perception within the officer corps that the President will not hold elections or has lost the confidence of politically important civilian sectors.
- Demands that elections be held earlier than the timetable set by Rios Montt.
- Increased contacts and cooperation between new political parties and the radical left.
- A resumption of rightwing death squad activity.
- Renewed large-scale insurgent attacks or operations in new areas. [redacted]

25X1

**Secret**

Secret

## Peru

- According to recent public opinion polls, dissatisfaction with economic policies and growing concern over the insurgent threat have led to a sharp drop in the regime's popularity.
- Sendero Luminoso (SL) insurgent activity has compelled President Belaunde to impose a temporary nationwide state of emergency.
- The government's counterinsurgency strategy has borne mixed results and provoked widespread criticism by the opposition, the military, and the press.
- Economic activity decreased at a nearly 10-percent annual rate and inflation rose to a 150-percent per annum rate during the quarter.
- Flooding in the north and a severe drought in the south have caused over \$500 million in damage to crops and infrastructure.

### Comment

We do not believe that the insurgent threat or economic pressures will result in a coup or other major political upheaval during the next six months. Also, in our view, the SL's limited popular appeal and lack of foreign support severely limit its prospects. The SL's late May offensive, however, did demonstrate the insurgents' resilience, underlined the inefficiency of the civil police who are leading the counterinsurgency effort, and belied the government's claims that it is making steady progress. Despite the heavy casualties the SL has taken in recent months in Ayacucho—the primary area of insurgent operations—we believe its political-military apparatus is largely intact. We share the Peruvian military's assessment that eliminating the SL could take two to three years and prove costly.

Public support for decisive action against the SL is widespread and we believe Belaunde will soon order the military to take total control of counterinsurgency operations. The security forces' effectiveness, though, will continue to suffer from deficiencies in equipment, training, intelligence capabilities, and tactics. We are concerned that if the security forces employ more



634587 (A02931) 7-83

brutal methods arbitrarily, they will alienate local communities and possibly elites, and thereby further delay progress against the SL.

Peru's economy is suffering a severe setback owing to natural disasters, depressed commodity prices, and IMF-mandated austerity programs. Unemployment and food prices are rising; imports declined by \$1 billion in 1982.

Belaunde's popularity has slipped from a solid majority to about 20 percent, according to recent public opinion polls. In spite of persistent press rumors we see no indication of a military coup, however. Although top military leaders continue to defend their institutional interests, we do not believe they wish to shoulder the heavy burden of government at this time. Moreover, Belaunde is catering to the special needs and interests of the services to ensure their support.

Secret



**Secret**

Sendero Luminoso slogan:  
 "Against Hunger—Long Live  
 the Guerrilla War."



Liaison ©

The left of center American Popular Revolutionary Alliance—the major opposition party—is becoming more popular as the government's prestige declines. It also is gaining acceptance by the normally suspicious military and seems to be a responsible critic of the regime. Leftist parties and the labor movement, on the other hand, are badly fragmented and remain passive. They might criticize the government more aggressively if the economy deteriorates further.

#### Key Indicators To Watch

- Increased SL activity, especially assassinations of key officials, more numerous terrorist attacks in cities and towns, and extension of guerrilla violence into areas hitherto unaffected.
- Press reports sympathetic to the insurgency.
- Human rights violations by the security forces.
- Increased conflict among and within the security services over counterinsurgency strategy and tactics.
- Further economic deterioration leading to still greater unemployment and rising prices.
- Coup plotting by senior military officers in key command positions.
- Greater unity and criticism of the regime by leftist parties and labor groups.

**Secret**

12

Secret


## Morocco

- A heavy foreign debt—equivalent to two-thirds of the gross domestic product—has significantly reduced the nation's creditworthiness; foreign exchange reserves are able to cover less than a week of imports.
- Deteriorating social services and declining living standards are causing discontent primarily in urban areas.
- Rabat remains unwilling to implement austerity measures recommended by the IMF because of fears they would increase unemployment and prompt social unrest.
- The King is becoming isolated owing to his reluctance to entertain criticism and advice on the economy.
- A strike by national railroad workers in May for better pay and conditions has been temporarily suspended.

### Comment

We believe that the moderate, pro-Western government of King Hassan II is secure over the short term. Islamic fundamentalists and socialists, though, remain at odds with the regime, and deteriorating economic conditions are causing increased unemployment. We are particularly concerned about the growing number of university graduates who lack avenues into the governmental patronage system. Although it is difficult to determine the impact of the worsening economy on the average Moroccan, criticism of the regime's economic policies is growing among organized labor, students, and the unemployed, and new urban unrest could result if living conditions deteriorate further. We believe that renewed economic growth and an improvement in social services and living standards are unlikely in the next several years. The danger is that in the interim the economically disgruntled will join with the politically and religiously disaffected and threaten the regime.

We believe that depressed phosphate earnings and the need once again to increase food imports will further aggravate the government's financial difficulties and



634584 (A02844) 7-83

compel Rabat to seek new external assistance. The government's ability to obtain additional loans from abroad is declining, however. Saudi aid probably will remain at its current reduced level because of Riyadh's decreased oil revenues. Rabat also may be unable to reach agreement with the IMF for new borrowing in 1983. These pressures could necessitate a sharp cut in imports, which apart from food have remained virtually constant since 1978. Ultimately, we anticipate that Rabat will turn to the United States for new assistance. If the King fails to obtain US help or if US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) deliveries are delayed as a result of the government's not meeting FMS repayment obligations, which it is having difficulty doing, the current close ties between the United States and Morocco could become the focus of opposition rhetoric and of anger within the military.

The King's reluctance to entertain criticism and advice on the economy, together with his preoccupation with foreign policy, is increasing his isolation as well as the risk that remedial economic measures will not be implemented. Although the government is

Secret

Secret

considering new austerity measures to deal with its growing economic problems, Hassan is reluctant to follow IMF recommendations, particularly a reduction of food subsidies. A cut in food subsidies in June 1981 sparked bloody riots in Casablanca in which 100 people died. We expect that the security forces, which strongly support the King, would be able to restore order in the event of new turmoil, but only after significant violence. [redacted]

25X1

Communal elections in June passed with little violence but occasioned an uproar of allegations of regime interference. Parliamentary elections now scheduled for 1984 may prove more heated and could produce more serious confrontations between security forces and voters. [redacted]

25X1

We do not anticipate that the government will be compelled by its current economic problems to alter its Western Sahara strategy in the near term. If Rabat were to sharply reduce defense spending for the campaign, however, we believe military morale would be badly shaken. The military also would be disturbed by a political settlement of the dispute that, in their view, conceded too much to the insurgents. [redacted]

25X1

#### Key Indicators To Watch

- Further signs of economic deterioration, especially a sharp reduction in food subsidies.
- Spontaneous civil disorder in response to economic conditions, labor strikes, and student demonstrations.
- IMF and Saudi responsiveness to Rabat's requests for greater economic support.
- Anti-US rhetoric by opposition elements angered by perceived shortfalls in US economic or military assistance.
- Renewed heavy fighting in Western Sahara, including heavier casualties and a lack of battlefield victories. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

Secret

## Iran


- The regime has made much progress in restoring political stability and reasserting national authority in most of the country.
- Clerical factionalism and uncertainty about who will succeed Ayatollah Khomeini continue to complicate the resolution of key political issues.
- The government is not having much success in gaining control over independent Islamic revolutionary organizations like the Revolutionary Guard and the semiofficial neighborhood enforcement Komitehs.
- Mounting casualties in the war with Iraq are increasing the population's war weariness.
- General economic conditions have improved during the past year.

### Comment

Khomeini has made considerable gains in reimposing political stability and reasserting central government authority throughout most of the country. Internal dissidents have been decimated, the Communist Tudeh Party has been repressed, and the minorities, including the Kurds, have been rendered a nuisance rather than a threat. None of the exiled dissident leaders maintains a significant following in Iran. Only the military and the Revolutionary Guard could possibly seize power, but they are internally divided, politically weak, and likely to act only if clerical factionalism threatens regime stability after Khomeini dies.

The clerics, now burdened with the responsibility for governing, are split by strong philosophic, personality, and institutional differences that make compromise difficult. These divisions and the frequent independent actions of clerics in and out of the government hinder efforts to formulate and implement national policies on a wide range of domestic and external issues.

Although several clerics would like to succeed Khomeini, none approach his stature. A consensus on a single candidate is not likely to emerge in our view.



634583 (A02843) 7-83

Most Iranians believe Khomeini favors Ayatollah Montazeri, but this has not been confirmed. If Khomeini maintains his silence, we believe the clerics will move quickly to name a leadership council of three to five of their own after he dies. Such a "coalition" would mask an intense struggle for power. Although the clerics seem to realize they must work together to avoid losing control, we believe that, in the absence of Khomeini's overarching authority, their disputes could eventually become uncontrollable and lead to anarchy and possibly civil war. If Khomeini were to die this year, though, we would not expect a quick unraveling of clerical control.

Lack of battlefield successes and heavy casualties in the war with Iraq are making for increased grumbling and reluctance to volunteer for military duty, even among previously supportive lower class urban workers and rural peasants. We believe that further failures and casualties could persuade the leadership to adopt a strategy of attrition to reduce the scale of the war. Khomeini apparently continues to oppose a negotiated settlement.

Secret

**Secret**

We expect no remission in the clerics' loud expressions of continuing hostility toward the United States, an emotion that they deeply feel and that supports the regime's domestic standing.

25X1

**Key Indicators To Watch**

- Khomeini's death, although the odds are that he will remain alive through the next year.
- Increased divisions among the clerics over the war with Iraq, the succession to Khomeini, and economic policy.
- A lack of victories and heightened casualties in the war with Iraq.
- A new major decline in oil prices or a successful Iraqi attack on major Iranian oil exporting facilities that threatened the current limited economic recovery.

25X1

**Secret**

Secret

### South Africa

- The African National Congress (ANC) car bomb attack against Air Force headquarters in Pretoria killed 19 people and wounded 200; about half were civilians. [redacted]
- The Conservative Party, established last year by disgruntled members of the ruling National Party's right wing, made a strong showing in rural areas in four byelections in May. [redacted]
- The unsolved murder in April of a community leader protesting proposals to hike rents in a black township near Durban has sparked continuing local demonstrations, riots, and related violence. [redacted]
- Intensified efforts to remove blacks residing illegally in urban areas, especially in the Western Cape, are resulting in violent confrontations between security personnel and shanty dwellers. [redacted]
- South Africa and its neighbors are suffering the second year of the worst drought of the century. [redacted]

#### Comment

Although no credible challenge to the white-ruled regime seems likely in the 1980s, a number of developments are heightening racial tensions and increasing the prospect of greater turmoil and violence. The Pretoria bombing may signal a new strategy in which the ANC no longer seeks to avoid harming civilians. We believe Prime Minister Botha, in addition to authorizing further military strikes against ANC targets in neighboring countries, is likely to enact new internal security measures aimed at ANC members and their sympathizers, especially activists in the fledgling black labor movement. But while Botha seeks to assuage white concerns, we believe he also will continue to press his proposal for constitutional reform, which is designed to grant limited rights to Indians and coloreds. Many Afrikaners fear the proposal could eventually lead to black rule; further headline-grabbing ANC violence in the near future would undermine the chance of its approval in the referendum for whites-only to be held some time in the next year. [redacted]



634585 (A02845) 7-83

The byelections, in which Botha's racial proposal was the main issue, reveal a divided electorate. The results show that the rightwing Conservative Party has gained popularity among Afrikaner farmers in rural areas and that the ruling National Party has gained support in urban areas. We believe the National Party now has nothing to fear from the liberal Progressive Federal Party. In the election campaign the National Party tailored its speeches to fit each audience. We believe Botha will adopt the same strategy before the coming referendum to persuade conservatives that his proposals do not threaten apartheid and to persuade liberals and nonwhites that the changes are meaningful. [redacted]

The government is continuing its crackdown on blacks residing illegally in urban areas, apparently to allay right-wing fears. Security personnel have used tear gas to disperse shanty dwellers, employed bulldozers to raze the areas, and erected barbed wire barriers to keep squatters out. The police also are arresting pass law violators at an unusually high rate. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret



Casualties from ANC bomb attack in Pretoria,  
21 May 1983.

Wide World ©

We believe that the black population, which already bears the brunt of inflation and unemployment, may become increasingly disturbed by additional drought-related burdens such as crop failures, water shortages, and power brownouts. For the first time in 20 years South Africa will import corn, the dietary staple of the black population and a principal export crop. Lower domestic production and increased imports imply higher inflation, already running at 14 percent, and still greater unemployment. Black unemployment is currently 25 to 30 percent, as opposed to only 1 percent for whites.

25X1

#### Key Indicators To Watch

- Greater unity and nonviolent protests by nonwhite groups opposed to Botha's new racial proposals.
- Further defections from the ruling party to the Conservative Party because of opposition to Botha's reform proposals.
- Terrorist attacks directed specifically against white civilians.
- Increased numbers of blacks entering urban areas to escape the effects of the drought.

25X1

Since the Soweto riots of 1976, however, security personnel have not normally interfered with peaceful protests, apparently fearing that heavyhandedness might spark widespread unrest. Nonetheless, we feel that any confrontation in the current climate, even one that begins peacefully, could trigger escalating violence. In April near Durban, for example, a crowd of 3,000 blacks, angered by the murder of a protest leader, marched to the house of a local black official and political opponent of the slain man and began throwing rocks. In dispersing the crowd, the police killed one person and injured over 200, which prompted scattered violence that continued through May and June.

25X1

Secret

Secret


## Philippines

- President Marcos is continuing to crack down on opponents in the Church, the press, and moderate political parties. [redacted]
- The armed forces are being restructured to increase their combat capability and effectiveness against the Communist insurgents, who have made important gains in the past year. [redacted]
- The United States and the Philippines, in concluding their review of the Military Bases Agreement in June, agreed to a \$900-million assistance package for 1985-89. [redacted]
- Balance-of-payment statistics for the second quarter show a midyear deficit of \$600 million—twice what the government anticipated. [redacted]
- Marcos has accepted the recommendation of the ruling KBL party that emergency austerity measures be implemented. [redacted]
- A severe drought continues to plague vast areas of Mindanao, the Visayas, and parts of Luzon, reducing export earnings. [redacted]

### Comment

Marcos has revised electoral procedures to encourage the opposition to participate in next year's National Assembly elections yet continues to take stern action against moderate political opponents. Besides arresting prominent politicians and journalists, he is pressing libel charges against several reporters and has compelled a leading Manila daily to fire its editor. The President also has warned in recent press interviews that he might reimpose martial law if the opposition's "contacts with subversives" do not cease. [redacted]

Marcos might be justified in his concern about Communist infiltration of moderate political parties. Several opposition politicians recently told US Embassy officials that they have been approached by Communists who have claimed Communist help could guarantee a victory by the opposition in the 1984 elections.



634588 (A02867) 7-83

Nevertheless, we believe Marcos's moves against prominent opposition figures will prove counterproductive. For example, according to US Embassy officials, the case against Aquilino Pimentel, the popular Mayor of Cagayan de Oro who was arrested for subversion in May, is weak and could embarrass Marcos, who may have to allow the affair to fade away. Some 25,000 Pimentel supporters demonstrated after his arrest. [redacted]

The US-Philippines base negotiations were completed without major incident. Leftists were unable to organize major demonstrations during the review process because the negotiations were concluded in quiet,

Secret



Secret

informal sessions. We believe Marcos's opponents will now assert that the agreement supports his heavy-handed management of domestic politics. [redacted]

During the past year Communist military operations have been more sophisticated and larger. Although the situation in the southern island of Mindanao has been stabilized since Manila deployed additional units there, casualties remain high and US Embassy officials who visited the area in June report that the guerrillas recently opened a new front. The armed forces are being reorganized to increase the number of combat personnel in the field, improve command and control, and better coordinate intelligence collection. The military high command also is buying helicopters to improve troop mobility, creating elite units specially trained in counterinsurgency operations, and easing the Philippine Constabulary out of such operations because of its frequent human rights abuses. [redacted]

Manila's failure to implement economic reforms insisted on by the IMF was strongly criticized by the Fund in its midterm review in June. This together with the increased balance-of-payments deficit and deteriorating short-term credit standing jolted the ruling KBL party into instituting emergency austerity measures and may compel the government to reschedule some debts. Several commercial banks already are refusing to roll over short-term credit lines, and we anticipate that others will react similarly to the IMF's criticism. [redacted]

We believe that austerity is essential if the Marcos regime is to improve economic performance, alleviate mounting problems of unemployment and poverty, and restore public confidence. However, we share the international financial community's doubts about the government's commitment to austerity because of its past hostility to economic discipline. Only recently, for example, political pressures delayed an 8-percent peso devaluation and the elimination of fuel subsidies, according to the US Embassy. In April, the KBL caucus attacked Prime Minister Virata—a highly respected economic technocrat who lacks a national

political base—for earlier budget cuts made to satisfy the IMF. Mrs. Marcos and politicians and business interests close to the President oppose these cuts because of their adverse impact on pork-barrel politics. We believe the attacks on Virata may continue; Marcos, however, is the sole authority able to dismiss him, and he has publicly stated that Virata will remain in office for at least the rest of the year. [redacted]

#### Key Indicators To Watch

- Further repression of moderate political party leaders prior to next year's elections and of newspapers—such as the *Visayan Herald*—that support them.
- An absence of additional electoral reforms aimed at inducing greater political participation in next year's elections.
- Insurgent gains notwithstanding the restructuring of the armed forces.
- A further contraction of short-term credit that narrows the government's debt management options and necessitates rescheduling.
- The impact of the drought on exports and thus an unanticipated need for increased foreign exchange.
- Further attacks on Virata, including a possible no-confidence vote in the legislature. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Part 3. Graphic Indicators

Status of Key Indicators

Legend

- developments not of concern, or not applicable
- developments of moderate concern
- developments of serious concern

	Social change/ conflict			Economic factors						Opposition activities				External factors			Regime actions and capabilities							
	Ethnic/religious discontent	Demonstrations and riots	Strikes	General deterioration	Decreased foreign aid/investment	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	Food/energy shortages	Consumer price increase	Key export price index change	Per capita imports decrease	Organizational capabilities	Opposition conspiracy/planning	Terrorism and sabotage	Insurgent armed attacks	Attraction for public	External support for government	External support for opposition	Government hostility/attacks on US	Opposition hostility/attacks on US	Repression/brutality	Security capabilities	Coup plotting/military discontent	Decreased unity/loss of confidence	Decreased respect for ruler
Mexico	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
El Salvador	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Guatemala	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Honduras	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Panama	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Colombia	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Venezuela	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Peru	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Brazil	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Spain	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Greece	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Turkey	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Morocco	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Egypt	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Saudi Arabia	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Iraq	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Iran	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Pakistan	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Nigeria	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Somalia	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Kenya	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Zaire	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
South Africa	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Philippines	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Indonesia	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
South Korea	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Note: Judgments presented in this chart pertain to individual countries and should not be used for cross-national comparisons with reference to individual indicators.


589896 7-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Mexico: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

589876 7-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

**El Salvador: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**


Political

- Legend ● developments not of concern, or not applicable  
 ○ developments of moderate concern  
 ⊙ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	○	○	○	⊙	⊙	○	○	⊙	○		
Economic factors	○	○	○	○	○	○	⊙	⊙	⊙	○		
Opposition activities	●	○	○	⊙	⊙	○	○	⊙	⊙	○		
External factors	○	○	●	○	○	○	○	⊙	⊙	○		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	○	○	⊙	⊙	⊙	○	⊙	⊙	○		

Population (millions)<sup>b</sup> 4.7 4.6 4.5<sup>c</sup>

Economic<sup>d,e</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589879 7-83

25X1

Secret

Secret


**Guatemala: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**

Political

- Legend
- developments not of concern, or not applicable
  - developments of moderate concern
  - ⊗ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	⊗		
Economic factors	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		
Opposition activities	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	○	○		
External factors	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		
Regime actions and capabilities	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	○	○	○	⊗		
Population (millions) <sup>b</sup>	7.3				7.5				7.7 <sup>c</sup>			

Economic<sup>d,e</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

[Redacted box]

25X1

Secret

Secret


**Honduras: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**

Political

- Legend
- developments not of concern, or not applicable
  - developments of moderate concern
  - ◐ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐		
Economic factors	●	●	◐	◐	◐	◐	○	○	○	○		
Opposition activities	●	●	◐	◐	◐	○	○	○	◐	○		
External factors	●	●	◐	◐	◐	◐	○	◐	○	○		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐		
Population (millions) <sup>b</sup>	3.9				4.1				4.2 <sup>c</sup>			

Economic<sup>d,e</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589878 7-83

25X1

Secret

Secret


**Panama: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**

Political

- Legend
- developments not of concern, or not applicable
  - developments of moderate concern
  - ◐ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Population (millions) <sup>b</sup>	2.0				2.0				2.1 <sup>c</sup>			

Economic<sup>d,e</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589890 7-83

25X1

Secret


Secret

**Colombia: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**


Political

Legend ● developments not of concern, or not applicable  
○ developments of moderate concern  
● developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○		
Opposition activities	○	○	●	●	○	○	●	●	●	○		
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Population (millions) <sup>b</sup>	25.2				25.6				26.1 <sup>c</sup>			



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



300045 7-83

25X1

Secret



Secret


**Venezuela: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**

Political

Legend ● developments not of concern, or not applicable  
○ developments of moderate concern  
⊙ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○		
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○		

Population (millions)<sup>b</sup> 17.9 18.4 18.9<sup>c</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589861 7-83

25X1

Secret

Secret


**Peru: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**

Political

- developments not of concern, or not applicable
- developments of moderate concern
- ◐ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	◐	●	○	○	○		
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	◐	◐	◐		
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○		
Population (millions) <sup>b</sup>	18.1				18.6				19.2 <sup>c</sup>			

Economic<sup>d,e</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589871 7-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Brazil: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**




Political

- Legend ● developments not of concern, or not applicable  
 ○ developments of moderate concern  
 ⊙ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○		
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	●		
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		

Population (millions)<sup>b</sup> 124.8 127.7 130.6<sup>c</sup>

Economic<sup>d,e</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589872 7-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Spain: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**

Political


- developments not of concern, or not applicable
- developments of moderate concern
- ⊙ developments of serious concern

Legend

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	○	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	●		
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Opposition activities	○	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	●		
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		

Population (millions)<sup>b</sup> 37.6 37.9 38.2<sup>c</sup>

Economic<sup>d,e</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589884 7-83

25X1

Secret


Secret

**Greece: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**

Political

Legend ● developments not of concern, or not applicable  
○ developments of moderate concern  
⊙ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	○	●	●	●	○	●	●	○		
Economic factors	○	○	○	●	●	●	○	○	○	○		
Opposition activities	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	○	●		
Population (millions) <sup>b</sup>	9.7				9.7				9.8 <sup>c</sup>			



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

589885 7-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Turkey: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**




Political

- developments not of concern, or not applicable
- developments of moderate concern
- ⊗ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	○	○	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●		
Economic factors	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Opposition activities	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
External factors	○	○	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	●		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		

Population (millions)<sup>b</sup>                      46.4                                      48.0                                      49.2<sup>c</sup>

Economic<sup>d,e</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589886 7-83

25X1

Secret

Secret


**Morocco: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**

Political

Legend

- developments not of concern, or not applicable
- developments of moderate concern
- developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	○	●	●	●	○	●	○	●	○		
Economic factors	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		
Opposition activities	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Population (millions) <sup>b</sup>	21.6				22.2				22.9 <sup>c</sup>			



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

589889 7-83

25X1

Secret

Secret




**Egypt: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**

Political

- Legend ● developments not of concern, or not applicable  
 ○ developments of moderate concern  
 ○ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	○	○	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	●		
Economic factors	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		
Opposition activities	○	○	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	●		
External factors	●	○	○	○	●	○	○	●	●	●		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	●		
Population (millions) <sup>b</sup>	43.4				44.7				45.6 <sup>c</sup>			

Economic<sup>d,e</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589887 7-83

25X1

Secret



Secret

**Saudi Arabia: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**


Political

- Legend
- developments not of concern, or not applicable
  - developments of moderate concern
  - ⊙ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙		
Economic factors	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙		
Opposition activities	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙		
External factors	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙		
Regime actions and capabilities	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙		

Population (millions)<sup>b</sup> 9.5 9.8 10.1<sup>c</sup>  
 Saudi population includes approximately 3 million foreign laborers.

Economic<sup>d,e</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589888 7-83

25X1

Secret




Secret

**Iraq: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**

Political

Legend ● developments not of concern, or not applicable  
○ developments of moderate concern  
● developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Economic factors	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		
Opposition activities	●	○	○	●	●	○	○	○	●	○		
External factors	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	● <sup>b</sup>		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Population (millions) <sup>c</sup>	13.6				14.0				14.5 <sup>d</sup>			



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Concern is with recent Turkish troop incursion into Iraq and potential effect on Kurdish minority.  
<sup>c</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>d</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>e</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>f</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

589891 7-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Iran: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**




**Political**

- Legend ● developments not of concern, or not applicable  
 ○ developments of moderate concern  
 ⊗ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	⊗	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		
Economic factors	●	●	⊗	○	○	○	○	●	●	●		
Opposition activities	●	●	⊗	○	○	●	●	●	●	●		
External factors	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	○ <sup>b</sup>	○ <sup>b</sup>		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	⊗	○	○	●	●	●	●	●		

Population<sup>c</sup> 40.0 41.2 42.5<sup>d</sup>

**Economic<sup>e,f</sup>**



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Concern is with effects of war with Iraq.  
<sup>c</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>d</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>e</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>f</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589890 7-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Pakistan: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**

Political


- developments not of concern, or not applicable
- developments of moderate concern
- ◐ developments of serious concern

Legend

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	◐	○		
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	◐	◐	●	●	◐	○		
Opposition activities	◐	◐	●	●	◐	●	●	●	●	●		
External factors	●	●	●	◐	●	◐	●	◐	●	●		
Regime actions and capabilities	◐	●	●	●	◐	●	◐	◐	◐	●		

Population (millions)<sup>b</sup> 90.4 93.1 95.6<sup>c</sup>

Economic<sup>d,e</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.

589892 7-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Nigeria: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**


Political

- Legend ● developments not of concern, or not applicable  
 ○ developments of moderate concern  
 ⊙ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	⊙	○	●		
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	⊙	○		
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●		
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●		

Population (millions)<sup>b</sup> 79.7 82.4 84.8<sup>c</sup>

Economic<sup>d,e</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589873 7-83

25X1

Secret

Secret


**Somalia: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**

Political

- developments not of concern, or not applicable
- developments of moderate concern
- ◐ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	◐		
Opposition activities	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○		
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	●	●	●		
Population (millions) <sup>b</sup>	5.9				6.1				6.3 <sup>c</sup>			

Economic<sup>d,e</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589882 7-83

25X1

Secret

Secret


**Kenya: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**

Political

Legend

- ⊖ developments not of concern, or not applicable
- developments of moderate concern
- ⊕ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	⊕	⊕	○	○	○	○	⊕	⊕	○	○		
Economic factors	⊕	⊕	○	○	○	○	○	⊕	⊕	○		
Opposition activities	⊕	⊕	○	○	○	○	⊕	⊕	○	○		
External factors	⊕	⊕	○	○	○	○	⊕	⊕	○	○		
Regime actions and capabilities	⊕	⊕	○	○	○	○	⊕	○	○	○		
Population (millions) <sup>b</sup>	17.1				17.8				18.4 <sup>c</sup>			



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589874 7-83

25X1

Secret


Secret

**Zaire: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**

Political

Legend ● developments not of concern, or not applicable  
○ developments of moderate concern  
◐ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Economic factors	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		
Opposition activities	○	●	●	○	○	○	●	●	●	●		
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●		
Population (millions) <sup>b</sup>	29.4				30.3				31.2 <sup>c</sup>			



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589875 7-83

25X1

Secret




Secret

**South Africa: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**

Political

Legend ● developments not of concern, or not applicable  
 ⊙ developments of moderate concern  
 ○ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	●	●	●	⊙	⊙	●	●	●	○		
Economic factors	●	●	●	●	⊙	⊙	⊙	●	○	○		
Opposition activities	●	⊙	●	●	●	⊙	●	⊙	●	○		
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	⊙	●	●		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	⊙	●	●	●	○		
Population (millions) <sup>b</sup>	29.4				30.2				30.9 <sup>c</sup>			



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589883 7-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Philippines: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**

Political




- developments not of concern, or not applicable
- developments of moderate concern
- ⊙ developments of serious concern

Legend

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	○	○	○	⊙	⊙	○	○	○	○		
Economic factors	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		
Opposition activities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○		
External factors	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○		

Population (millions)<sup>b</sup> 50.3 51.6 53.0<sup>c</sup>

Economic<sup>d,e</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589893 7-83

25X1

Secret

Secret


**Indonesia: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**

Political

- Legend
- developments not of concern, or not applicable
  - ◐ developments of moderate concern
  - ◑ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983				
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	
Social change/conflict	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	○	○	○	○
Economic factors	◐	◐	◐	◐	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Opposition activities	◐	◐	◐	◐	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
External factors	◐	◐	◐	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Regime actions and capabilities	◐	◐	◐	◐	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Population (millions) <sup>b</sup>	154.3				157.6				161.1 <sup>c</sup>				

Economic<sup>d,e</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589894 7-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

**South Korea: Selected Political and Economic Indicators<sup>a</sup>**




Political

- Legend ● developments not of concern, or not applicable  
 ◐ developments of moderate concern  
 ○ developments of serious concern

	1981				1982				1983			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Social change/conflict	●	◐	●	◐	●	◐	●	◐	●	●		
Economic factors	●	●	◐	◐	◐	●	●	●	●	●		
Opposition activities	●	◐	●	●	◐	◐	◐	●	●	◐		
External factors	●	●	●	●	◐	◐	●	●	◐	◐		
Regime actions and capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	◐	◐	●	●	●		

Population (millions)<sup>b</sup> 40.4 41.1 41.6<sup>c</sup>

Economic<sup>d,e</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Base year is 1975.  
<sup>b</sup> Population figures based on mid-year census.  
<sup>c</sup> Estimated.  
<sup>d</sup> Dashed lines indicate estimated data.  
<sup>e</sup> Scales vary according to differing country conditions.



589895 7-83

25X1

Secret

**Page Denied**

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied

**Secret**

**Secret**